 Pierre, you've listened to three of your fellow panelists and you have a set of views on this, so it would be interesting to get those. Thank you and thanks to Thierry for inviting me in this major conference. Let me reflect a little on the notion of international economic order. The first question is whether we need one. And as an economist, my answer would be yes, because we believe in markets and markets don't function in a vacuum. They need rules, they need previsibility. And an order brings that. And the reason why we were so prosperous after World War II was because there was a set of rules of the game and market players could believe in them and use them. So in a way we do need an order. My second remark is that an order is not going to be stable. It's a reflection of a current set of political issues, concerned challenges that needs to be solved collectively. And it's not likely to resist to changes in the global environment. So in a way there are cycles and this is very well shown in a major work by Mark Danton in the United States about the history of the world government in which he shows that there are cycles. And these cycles start with a loss of legitimacy of the existing order. And then there is an interregnum in which new ideas are discussed, there is disagreement, and that leads to a new order. And then again the new order suffers from losses of legitimacy. And Danton says that we are in the third cycle. The first one was between the 1910s and the 1940s. And the interregnum lasted a long, long time. You may recall the fact that the major international conference in London in 1933 was a major failure. And the new order that emerged was the Bretton Woods Agreement. And then there was a loss of legitimacy at the end of the 1960s, the early 70s with the rupture of the exchange rate agreements within Bretton Woods with the oil shocks. And the interregnum lasted till the end of the 1970s with the emergence of a neoliberal order with Margaret Satchel's Reagan and the deregulation of financial markets. So this neoliberal order again suffered from a loss of legitimacy that maybe we can date basically with the 2008 crisis. But this loss of legitimacy is now what creates the interregnum disorder we live in. And it's very complex because it is multi-form. One is inequality, the fact that financialization failed to deliver prosperity for all. It benefited many, many the rich. The second is the failure to deal with the major environmental challenge, not only climate change but climate change and biodiversity. The third is the vulnerability created by very tight supply chains. And we again live through that during the COVID pandemics. The fourth is the political incompleteness of that order. It is increasingly difficult to explain to major emerging countries that the governance of the world is mainly directed by the older powers. It doesn't work. The fifth is horizontal incompleteness. We have worked a lot on trade. But how about labor rights? How about the environment? How about health? When you look at the structure of the world institutions, WTO was a more powerful institution than ILO. Is that legitimate? Well, increasingly the legitimacy, the loss of legitimacy hinges on the fact that we haven't been able to work as successfully on other aspects of interdependence. So that's where we are now. Politics come back and this is a good news. We need to work on these challenges. The big question is how long will it take to reach a set of negotiated agreements that we reconcile the national interest with international collaboration? And this is what an international order is about. It could be a definition of an order. I think for a number of years we are bound to muddle through, which may not be a catastrophe but it means that markets won't be anchored on a set of rules. We may have less growth indeed. That may also be an opportunity to redefine what is the purpose of economics. Is it growth? Is it shared prosperity? And by the way, how do we define growth? Is it the change of GDP? We all know that it's a very, very poor indicator. So in a way, all this now has to be discussed and I would interpret the disorder as a wonderful opportunity. But as the 1930s demonstrated, I'm not sure that we can manage this opportunity successfully. I compare, so you know, very, very coherent and integrated comprehensive set of issues that all need to be addressed. And I guess the question I'm going to come back to you with is, and actually to the other panelist is, you know, two-thirds of the way through the first round, we've got a very good sense of all the problems. And also of all the things that need to be addressed. But we also have a sense that the current set of international political relationships makes it hard to address any of those problems well. And what I want to come back in the second round is to get your views on how are we going to actually make any progress on addressing these things. And if we don't make progress, in a way, how will we manage without the right set of rules still to have interactions? What's the consequence of all this? So I think it would be useful to see where is the impetus for change going to come and it can't just be to preserve the past because of all the problems you've just outlined with the past. So starting with Madam Tugay, you know, so you started and then Pierre, your last set of comments shows this. Here's all these sets of problems with the way we currently manage our relationships. And we're sort of not clear how we can actually move those forward. So I think if you could think a bit about that set of issues, we'll come back to that. But before we get there, I've still got two more colleagues to get their perspective.