 conference, and turned to three of the most distinguished ambassadors in Washington representing their countries. We were back in the green room and enjoying lunch, and the happy and uplifting tone of these three gentlemen belied the somewhat pessimistic economic and security forecasting we did in the morning. So I'm hoping we'll end on a somewhat upbeat note. To my immediate left is the Honorable Nguyen Quoc Cong, the ambassador from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. He arrived in Washington as ambassador in 2011, and before that served as deputy minister in the foreign ministry and deputy prime minister responsible for foreign affairs. Ashok Kumar Mirpuri is the ambassador from Singapore since 2012. He was ambassador in Indonesia and high commissioner in Malaysia and Australia. And ambassador Kenichiro Sasai is Japan's ambassador to the United States. He served as vice minister in the foreign ministry before coming here. I've known Sasai for a long time. He's had pretty much every difficult job there is in the foreign ministry. North Korea, trade, Asian affairs somehow survived. And has risen to vice, far minister and now ambassador lending a very steady hand on the tiller in our bilateral relationship with Japan. We have an hour. I'm going to ask a few questions of the ambassadors picking up on some of the discussions and clicker survey results from this morning, and then we'll open it up for some questions before we conclude. I wanted to start by asking about President Obama's trip to Asia this spring. He or the White House has not formally announced the itinerary. The expectation is he will visit Japan. There's talk also of Malaysia and the Philippines, possibly Indonesia. But the entire region will be watching the trip. And I wanted to ask each of the ambassadors what they would like to see. What are the expectations for you, for the region as you see it, for the President's visit? We asked the audience what they expected from the trip. And the highest hope and expectation seemed to be that TPP would move forward. But some people said improving relations with China. Some people said consolidating relations with other countries. I think it was Chris Johnson or Victor Shah who said actually it's all of the above. So what would you like to see come out of the President's trip? If we could, we'll start on that side and then work our way down. Ambassador? Well, thank you, Michael. Thank you for giving opportunity for me to address the year and this gathering. About President Obama's visit to the region, I think it is vital opportunity for the United States to express its vision, what role the United States is going to play. And we know all these people, Americans rebalancing and so forth. He need to operationalize, he need to substantiate what he means by that. And for that, we continue to have a great expectation for the United States to show its interest, its commitment, and its role specific. But it's going to do for the regional peace and stability. And that is what most of the countries and regions are welcoming. And saying that we also want to see the United States make clear who are the friends and allies and travel makers and potential problem makers. And you need to make sure that the United States is going to play the vital role. So you have to have your own allies and friends with you very strongly. I think that's very important thing for the United States to do. Now, and also, obviously, there are some challenges. Security challenges like nuclear challenges, maritime challenges, and also human rights and democracy challenges, and all around the region. So there are lots of changes taking place. So what we need to see is that America will continue to work for that one together with friends and allies. Now, on the economic side, I think we need to get the TPP done before the president will come. Thank you. I'll follow up on that in a moment. Thank you, Ashok. Thank you, Mike. I can agree with everything that the Japanese ambassador says. But I think it's important to see the visit not as a discrete event. It has to be seen in the overall context of the U.S. engagement with the Asia Pacific, which is not something that is new despite all the talk of the pivot when the Obama administration came in in 2009. This is something that is ongoing and long term. You were involved with this, Mike, in the previous White House. It's an ongoing process. So I wouldn't put all the elements and saying this is going to be the make or break visit. We have to see it in the context of what else has to be done. The president goes, presumably, in spring. He would go again in November for the East Asia Summit. He missed last year's East Asia Summit. So he will get out there again. And this is an ongoing continuing engagement. What is, I think, useful in terms of addressing it, looking ahead into the year? We have had the pivot for five years. People don't like the term. I don't like the term. But just for a short form, let's call that pivot. And that was pivot 1.0. I think now it's time for pivot 2.0. Sort of relook at what has been achieved in the past five years, where some of the gaps are, where some of the uncertainties are, and then move into pivot 2.0. Now, that has got a large security dimension, but one of the criticisms of that pivot 1.0 was really, it was a lot of it with security focus. So build on that, but then also look at the economic parts of it. The TPP obviously is very important. And then there are things to be done even with countries that are not TPP members. If he's going to Philippines, Philippines is not a TPP member. If he's going to Indonesia, Indonesia is not a TPP member. What do you do with ASEAN countries who are not in the TPP, giving them a bridge into the TPP? Let's not put every Singapore, Vietnam, Japan, all members of the TPP. While that is important, I think other forms of engagement are important. Energy is very, very critical. Climate change, these are issues of great interest for the region. I think these are things that the president can go and say as part of pivot 2.0. But it's again not everything around the president. Cabinet secretaries have to travel out to the region. Members of the administration have to travel out of the region. You cannot just put all the issues on the burden on the president going out in April and solving these issues. It's got to be a huge run-up of events taking place into that process. And so let's think about it in terms of a pivot 2.0. Yes, sir. First, I also agree with what Ambassador Sassin Mipuri from Japan and Singapore just mentioned. I think that the president's visit to the region is very, very important. I noticed that last night when President Obama delivered the State of the Union address, he reiterated that the United States will continue to focus on the Asia Pacific. And I think that's a very important point. And apart from the bilateral agenda of the visits, I think that I agree with my colleagues here that you should look at it at a regional, more geopolitical, strategic point of view. I think at least three or four points. First, it's a continued commitment to rebalancing. And second, it's also a continued commitment to U.S. allies and partners. And third, it's also a continued commitment to regional architectures. I think that the U.S. has a very important role in the architecture institution building process in Asia Pacific region, like EAS, APEC, U.S. ASEAN. Talking about ASEAN, I think that I would love to see U.S. more focused support on the centrality role of ASEAN and the support to the building of the ASEAN community by 2015 about the ASEAN connectivity and so on. And of course, the U.S. has a very important role to play in maintaining peace and security in the region. About economic TPP, I agree with Ambassador Saisei from Japan that we would love to see when the present visit in the region in April, there would be some big announcement to make on the TPP. We Vietnam also want to conclude the work with the United States and other TV partners to conclude the TPP and the sooner the better. Thank you. I hope my friends in the NSE are listening to this because these three gentlemen just wrote the President's speech for him. Not that you're interfering in our internal affairs. This is much appreciated advice from close friends and a lot of overlap, a lot of consistency. Ambassador Saisei, you emphasize depth a bit. I want to show who you're friends, who you're allies, clarify that. I thought you emphasized breadth in some ways, yes, TPP, but also ASEAN and architecture and as did you, Ambassador, in particular the importance of ASEAN. All those elements are somewhere in the U.S. government's articulation of the rebalance of the pivot. Sometimes they're not, sometimes some are stressed, sometimes others are stressed. Do you think that the region, people following this near country, understand what the U.S. strategy is? Do they understand what the rebalance is? Or is this trip and the trip at the end of the year going to be really important in terms of explaining what the U.S. is about? You all made the point that showing up is important. As Woody Allen said, 80 percent of success in life is just showing up, which was the first talking point in every memo with Matt Goodman and I did in the NSC for our bosses. You've got to show up. Except for missing the trip with the debt crisis, the administration has a pretty good attendance record. But the question mark is, does the region understand what the U.S. is trying to achieve and what our priorities really are? We'll go in reverse order, Ambassador Nguyen, if you don't mind trying to answer that one first. Yes, talking about rebalancing, I think that we, the ASEAN and other the regional countries have been talking with the U.S. administration here again and again that we welcome the U.S. rebalancing as long as it contributes to peace, security and development in the region. But we would also want to see a balanced, more comprehensive rebalancing. And I think that the U.S., as I mentioned before from Singapore, just mentioned, I agree with him that like one U.S. for the past four or five years is 1.0 rebalancing and this time is entering the 2.0 rebalancing. I think that with 2.0 rebalancing, we, the countries in the region, want to see the U.S. We think the U.S. can do more about the rebalancing, first about the U.S. economic recovery. Everybody is talking about that. And in terms of economic recovery in the U.S. alone, it's also a contribution to countries in Asia Pacific and to the world as a whole. And I think that as President Obama mentioned yesterday and the other days about the political gridlock, we don't want to see countries in the region, it should be solved for the goods of all. And we also want to see more and more U.S. engagement in economic and trade ties, mentioned about TPP as a one, but not all countries in the region are members of TPP. So I think that the E3 initiative from U.S., I think that the United States and other countries in the region should put more efforts on the E3, for example. And now talking about the also other very important issue that few people talk about is about the non-traditional security issues. I think that's more and more important to the region, like climate change issues, sea level rise for countries like Vietnam and others. So a lot of issues and that the United States, we want to see the U.S. to be more involved. Thank you. Again, I want to take a little bit of the long view of where the U.S. and the role the U.S. has played. I think there's a deep understanding in the region that the U.S. is a resident power and the U.S. has contributed to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific for the past 50 or 60 years. And that is something that is, I think, important to keep emphasizing of where the U.S. is. It is very much in the U.S. interests to be active in the Asia-Pacific. And when you ask, does the region understand what this is about? If we look back 30, 40, 50 years, the emergence of Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia has really been very much under this umbrella that was provided by the United States. And I think that's what the region wants to see in terms of going forward. That the U.S. setting out what the rules of the game are. The U.S. is the most successful country out in the region over there. Playing that role as a resident power, that's what the region wants to see. Unfortunately, with the region, you have to keep reiterating these messages over and over again. It is showing up, and it is saying these things over and over again, because that's how it gets a much broader understanding. We can discuss these things in small meetings, in ASEAN meetings, in EES meetings, but there's got to be a broader articulation of these things. Where the U.S. sees its interests in the Asia-Pacific and what it intends to do in order to protect its interests, that's where I think it needs to be explained again and again. Well, thank you. I think I completely agree with Ashoka's point. I think the United States was there, and for many years, it is there, and it would be there forever. And but often the case, if there is a misunderstanding, I think that is the time when the United States President doesn't appear and come to the meeting or skipping and so forth. And that gives the impression that the United States is not paying sufficient attention to the process in the region. But over the years, I think the United States is increasing its interest in presence. And for example, this East Asia Summit, and we were asking the United States to participate some years in not only the APEC and some of the meetings, and that was a good decision. And nowadays, I think the United States is a major participant to address the security and economic agenda. And that's what we need. So when we talk about the balancing, we know that whether it is a diplomatic, strategic, economic security, I think the United States has to be in every part of that process that we are asking for and that what we are expecting the United to do. Now on the strategic dimensions, I think the important part of that is United States is engaged in the region and when it engages, we continue to see the strengthening the alliance networking. And not only with the allies, but also some of the friendly countries which share the fundamental values like human rights, democracy, and rule of law, that doesn't mean that we have to antagonize those countries which are not really catching up. Look at the example of Obama, say Myanmar. It was a difficult country for some years. There was a criticism a lot about democracy and so forth, but at the same time, we were engaged with them to advise them to advance little by little, taking some agents part of the time. So on those issues, I think we are moving in the right direction with the support of the United States. When you look at the trend of the region for the democracy, there are some countries still lagging behind or even rejecting the idea, but I think the history tells after 10 or 20 years, we are moving in the right direction. I think what the United States can do is to promote the process and continue to say and does act and continue to be vocal about what the United States believe to be right. Thank you. We've beaten up on the US sufficiently. Lee Kuan Yew has the most painful and accurate line, which is Americans think foreign policy is like a DVD movie. You can turn it on again after you've turned it off to go do the dishes. And what I heard was consistency, consistency is critical. Let's talk about China for a moment. Major, major source of economic growth across the region for the United States. But I think our discussion this morning, both on the panel and with the audience accurately portrayed the last year as a rough one in US-China relations compared to the previous years, a rough one for US-Japan. Vietnam has extremely complicated, long, long history with China. And Singapore, of course, is, well, when you talk about pivoting, I mean, Singapore is right there at the fulcrum of the Indo-Pacific region. So all your governments are watching this closely. I'm wondering if we could start, perhaps, with Ken Sasai. And doing what ambassadors should never do, which is predictions. But ask you, the tone in the audience this morning and on the panel was 2014 might not be a better year necessarily for relations with China. Is that right? Is that wrong? Well, I think it could be right and wrong both ways. I think it depends. Yeah, I mean, to be honest, I mean, it's easy to say that we are destined to be calling and fighting and so forth. I don't take that argument. I think people are really afraid that all this relationship could be deteriorating. But that's not good to be frank. That's fulfilling prophecy. I mean, we have to roll back the relationship. I think that's what we want to do. These days, as you are well aware, there are some disputes and bickering and Chinese ambassador. And I have to exchange some in a country, op-ed in Washington Post. I mean, that's not what I wanted to do because he's a good friend of mine. He had to do it, possibly. And I have to do it. But I have great respect and administration to Chinese people. And they have a long history of the development. We have a long history of friendship with them. It's only a limited time of the history. And there is no reason for us to be always bickering and arguing and simply focusing on some history, some of the past. Oh, well, we have to always remember the history in past. But it's not protective to only talk about the history and past things and remembering and agitating the people's emotions in a negative way. That's what I want to avoid. So I really hope that this year we could go into a very constructive dialogue with China. And although it is not easy all the time to come to a nice dialogue, if you see the history of the dialogue, that is always up and down. While I was vice minister, we had a difficulty. And while I was director general, we had a difficulty. But whenever there was a difficulty, there was also effort to regain the momentum, the dialogue. I think that's what we need now. Thank you. Well, as a small country, we have friends with everyone. So that's a good advantage, you know. So we have friends with the US, we have friends with China, we have friends with Japan. I'm pleased to hear the Japanese ambassadors speak positively about Japan-China relations. And let me put an ASEAN perspective, you know, because Singapore, we have relationships with the whole region. And for the region, what suits the region is actually calm relationships among the major powers. US-China relations, Japan-China relations, Japan-Korea relations, that's what suits ASEAN. ASEAN is very focused, security issues have come into the agenda. But the priority of ASEAN is economic development for the whole region, for the 10 countries of the region. That's what we want to achieve, an ASEAN economic community. And that is not something that we can do on our own. It's something we do with our partners. We have excellent economic relationships with the US. The US has been a major investor in most of the Southeast Asian countries, and will continue to be. China is a new emerging economic partner for all of us. They have come up with ideas to link the region together. We are trying to do these things. Japan has ideas, doing ASEAN connectivity. All these requires a certain calm in the region. These are the major powers, and if they can calm down the relationships among themselves, if they can look ahead, I think that's most useful for ASEAN in many ways. And we want to be able then to have a platform where these countries can engage with each other as well. That's the whole reason why ASEAN has been able to be useful, is creating this platform for the major powers to engage with each other. So that's how I see things working out. I'm going to put you on the spot and follow up and ask in the context of your very elegant and visionary view of the need for the big powers to get along. You didn't mention the US and that, or maybe you included the US. What is the US role in ensuring an environment where the big powers get along? Well, the US-China relationship is key in many ways. And how this is shaped through 2014 is going to shape how the other countries engage with the two major powers. The US-China economic relationship is growing and will continue to grow, and that's important. But how the US plays its role dealing with China is one that establishes that there are certain institutional structures, rules that apply for everybody. And that's how the US can play that role that is always played in the region. So it's about rules that apply for everyone, not necessarily if I can draw further out your thinking, not necessarily some new bipolar condominium or management of the region by the US and China, but a relationship that allows the rules that we all depend on to take root. Is that a fair take away? Well, you know, this bipolar idea, sort of multi, it's something that is talked about, but I don't really see it emerging as a reality. It has to be something that involves the whole region, the whole East Asia. Thank you, Professor Han. Yes, talking about our relationship with China, I think that Mike was right when saying that we have thousands of years of history of relationship with China. But I think that all countries in the region wants to have a good relationship with China. Even it's a very big role, very important role in the region. And of course, Vietnam is a neighboring country of China, a very big neighbor of Vietnam, so we want to have a good relationship with China. I think last year, relations between Vietnam and China have somewhat improved, and we see more and more exchanges of visits at the highest level and more frequent contacts. You know that we established the hotlines among the leaders of two countries for years, but never been used. Last year, we started using it twice. Our party chief and President Xi Jinping just had a phone call the other day, and I think that in the coming Lunar New Year, there will be some more exchanges on the phone between the leaders of two countries. And we have now a strategic, comprehensive shared partnership with China. China is number one trained partner of Vietnam, and so on. Exchanges of the people to people and all kinds of exchanges. But having said that, I must say that we still have very, very, very different views on the claims, on the South China Sea, we call it the East Sea issue. And we have expressed our concerns again and again over the Chinese recent activities, acts on the South China Sea like a fishing ban, which you consider it as illegal, and it's invalid because it violates our territory, our integrity, and we call on the Chinese side to revoke it. Maritime security in the Asia Pacific region is a vital national interest for all three of your countries and for the United States. And as you mentioned, Ambassador, you had the recent case of a Chinese declaration of administrative control over fisheries. You had the Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea. I think many analysts expect at some point a similar ADIZ in the South China Sea or the Yellow or West Sea. What, I'm gonna ask all three of you, but begin with Ambassador Nguyen, what's the right toolkit to deal with these maritime problems? Is it the ARF and multilateral? Is it deterrence? Is it dialogue and conference building? How, for three countries that have a vital national interest in maritime security, how should we all be trying to deal with these issues which look like they could complicate 2014 yet again? I think that the many times claims, conflicting claims among countries and region is a very complicated issue. We don't expect the dispute to be solved overnight. So we think the most important thing is no, there's no other ways that all countries need to respect international laws, you know? Establish norms and rules. And that's the number one. Number two, not pending a solution, all countries should refrain from complicating this division to exercise self-restraint. And in that regard, I think that we see some positive development when for the first time, the China and the ASEAN countries have agreed for a some senior official level consultation, formal consultation on the COC last year, as I recorded last September. But we call for an early, substantive negotiation on CCC to be started soon. And number three, I think that we all need to have cool heads to deal with issue, even the increasing nationalism in countries and region. So leaders and people in the region should need to have a cool heads in dealing with those kinds of issues. Very complicated, very sentimental issues as well. I think cool heads is probably the most sensible thing for all of us to sort of deal with these issues. You need to deal with it at a multiple number of levels. Firstly, Singapore is not a claimant state, but we are obviously a maritime trading country and freedom of navigation is a critical thing for us in the region. There are bilateral claims and these have to be resolved bilaterally. And that will happen over time. It takes a long, long time to overcome these and to resolve bilateral claims. There'll be lots of give and take and I don't expect to see it happen very soon. But that is a process that will continue. In the meantime, what we need to do is to build up a framework where cool heads can prevail. And this is where the code of conduct that we're trying to negotiate with China will become very critical. There's already a start of the process. We need to get into serious discussions, ASEAN and China to talk about the code of conduct. And the code of conduct is important because it can set out how do you deal with these issues. I cannot prejudge what's going to go into code of conduct, but it should be important that it lays out that framework for countries that are concerned about this issue to deal with it. And in this, the US plays a very important role because the US has also made statements when Secretary Kerry was in the EAS last year when he deputized for the president. He spoke about how important freedom of navigation is for the region. Now it's important that the US keep pressing the region and China to keep talking about these issues rather than to let them slip away because this is where the US plays its role as a resident power. To step up to the plate and say, these are how we see the things being sorted out. The US has a long experience on this and also US vessels and Chinese vessels have had encounters as well. So you need to work out rules of engagement as well that would prevent any sort of miscalculation on either side. So while we're doing the code of conduct, I think a strong US spotlight on this is very useful as we talk about it. So to make sure that there is a certain momentum that keeps advancing this, it's not something again that's going to happen overnight. When we did the declaration of conduct, it took us 10 years to get there. And so these are sort of decade-long processes. But I think it's important the region and all ASEAN's dialogue partners keep a focus on this to keep moving it forward. Well, I think all this problem on the maritime domain is related to the fact that China is rising and China says it's peaceful rise. And the question is that is that peaceful enough? I think that's the question we need to address. Now, what happened in the region on the maritime domain? There are two things I want to say. And this is not simply the incident and the happening over five or four years, even 10 years. It's more than 20 or 30 years, I think. Since the time when the American forces withdrew from Vietnam and had also withdrew from Subic Bay in the Philippines and so forth, there was a vacuum of power, we all know it. And so that was the time when Chinese the military expanded its activities and influencing the regions. And then this was especially accentuated since 1990. So when China suddenly declared the inclusion of all this foreign territory into their lands, and then they send their vessels and fishing vessels and official vessels gradually expanding its own influence and also assertiveness. So this is a long standing phenomenon. It's not an overnight phenomenon. Number two is that what's happening in South China Sea around Vietnam, in the Philippines and those areas not totally led to what's happening in East China Sea. I think they are more or less the same staff, I would say, the same phenomena. And that's consistent with Chinese, I would say, maritime policy expansions and matching the influence of the United States. We have to look at the realities on what's happening. So for that, I want to be candid that we like to have more, I would say, open and transparent and democratic, I would say, Chinese foreign policy in the region, especially on this maritime domain so that we could have more constructive dialogue. About this code of conduct, I complete that. We view the two speakers, it is good for us to see all this code of conduct to be realized, not simply by the agreement by paper. That has to be implemented. That's the whole question. You said that it took 10 years. So it could take another 10 years or 20 years. What would happen during that time? I think we have to be sober about this point. Thank you. Let me open it up to the audience. If we have a microphone, I'm sorry, Ambassador, please. I just want to add one more point about, I see the tensions of the East China Sea or the East Sea, as we call it, as three categories. First, about the dispute, bilateral dispute between one country to the other, like between Vietnam and China, over the spreadly, over the parasails. It should be solved bilaterally between Vietnam and China. But for the issues that involve not only two countries, but others, it cannot be solved bilaterally. But it should be solved multilaterally. For example, the issue with spreadlies, not only Vietnam, China, but other, partner as well, Philippines and Malaysia and so on. So it should be solved multilaterally. You cannot solve between Vietnam and China, solve the issue with the spreadlies. But China cannot solve it bilaterally with the Philippines over the spreadlies, for example. So we need all the engagement of all countries about all claimants. And the third category of issue is the freedom of navigation, freedom of commerce. It's not concerning the countries in the claimants only, but all countries, including, you know, country like Japan here, including the United States and others. So it's the responsibility of all to get, you know, stake, you know, to have a voice in there. Excellent points, thank you. All right, we have microphones if you could identify yourselves and I'll try to scan the room so that I'm fair in asking questions. Why don't we go right here in the front? I'm looking for my microphone, folks. Okay. Thank you, hi. My name is Matt Shul. I'm a reporter from Inside US Trade. So I'm gonna ask a question about the TPP and follow up on Ambassador Sessai's comments. So specifically, Ambassador, you said you think the TPP needs to be done before Obama's trip in April. But right now, the main obstacle in the negotiation seems to be a disagreement or a negotiation between the US and Japan over market access. The US has said Japan is not offering enough on agriculture market access. So I wanted to ask you, you know, what is Japan's view of what's going on and what do you think needs to happen in order to conclude, you know, that bilateral problem that would allow the TPP to conclude by in the timeline that you mentioned. And secondly, to all of the ambassadors, do your countries need to see this fast track trade promotion authority legislation pass through Congress before your countries would be willing to really put their best offers on the table to conclude the TPP? Thank you. Good question. That was the next question on my list. All right. Well, while we stand on this TPP year, you know, it's a negotiation in every negotiation and there is a phase you come in, negotiate and try to wrap up. And the, always the difficulties comes in the entry point and the ending point. And I think now we are coming to the ending point. That's why we are facing enormous difficulties. It's obvious in whatever the negotiation, do you face the difficulties? If there is any difficulty, doesn't mean much. So I think we are coming to that phase now and looking at the current start of negotiations, I think if you look at the starting point of the position taken by the United States and Japan, it was a big difference. I think we are now narrowing the gap day by day and moving inch by inch passively. And I don't talk much about what we are talking about, but obviously as you know, and the market access is a difficult one and both in terms of some of the agriculture products and also auto bill. And it's not a one-sided game, you know. United States is asking for some special measures to be applied to the auto bill, which is pretty hard for Japanese to swallow all these special measures to protect. And Japanese government is enormously, under pressure because there are obviously some sensitive parts and farmers and we need to maintain some of the minimum way to protect those legitimate interests. But the question is not, you know, the black and white. We are now in the process of the final landing zone, I would say, what would be the proper landing zone, which is, you know, passable under the current limit of political acceptabilities. And there are sensitivities in both parties and we recognize the sensitive part for the United States and American government also recognize the sensitive part to us and this week negotiations are on hold and taking place. And I can't say that how it is difficult and how we are moving, but what I can say is that there is a political will of the both government that we need to set on this issue. Number two, we are trying to null out the gap and there are proposal coming forward but both sides are asking for more of the flexibility to find the best ground to land on. So having said it, there is always, you know, difficult moment before coming to terms and to finalize the negotiation. I think we are now in the phase. So from that point of view, I'm basically optimistic and we have to have more road to go, but if there are sufficient goodwill and the flexibility of the both parties, I think we could overcome the difficulties now. About TPA, definitely we need it. Unless United States will have it, people might be worried that what would happen if there is a negotiating result and lots of proposals and changes in taking place, nobody will be seriously negotiating to find a landing zone. So we welcome the support and passing of this TPA in the Congress as soon as possible. Thank you. I'm in the fortunate position of not being a trade negotiator so I can take a more strategic view of these things rather than get into, because watching these guys negotiate these agreements is very, very complicated. But I think it's important to remember why the U.S. and 11 other countries got into TPP. It is to set up an economic architecture for the Asia Pacific, which is very critical that will help to move the whole region towards a free trade area. There will be chewing and throwing about what do you give here and what do you give over there. My general approach of that, if everyone is a little bit unhappy, I think we have generally a good agreement. Everyone cannot be entirely happy at everything you get, but that's the nature of negotiating a trade agreement like this. But more important, it does anchor the 12 members into this economic architecture of the region. I think that's important to understand. And that's when you come to TPP or TPA, it's really a chicken and egg, which comes first. We've been negotiating the TPP for four years without the TPA on the understanding that there will be a TPA. This is really what I consider U.S. domestic management of the issues. And it will come to that. And what I think everyone looks for is really a bipartisan TPA, the way that the president asked for last night at the State of the Union, something that pushes forward, that brings together a broad understanding of why it's important to have all these trade agreements, the president mentioned both Asia and Europe last night, TPP coming together, and using TPA in order to drive this forward. I think that's where I see the whole framework of things. Rather than one comes before the other, we need one in order to sort of negotiate, we've been negotiating in good faith for four years without the TPA. I think that recently we have made quite big progress on the recent negotiations in Bali, in Salt Lake, and in Singapore. And I think at least we have made some breakthroughs in defining the deadlines for most of the domains under the negotiations now. And given that, I'm also very optimistic that TPP can be conquered this year in 2014. And for that, I think TPA is very important. I think that TPA, if built, if adopted, it would hopefully lead to an early conclusion of TPP. What I hear is that all our negotiating partners have to have high credibility that TPA will be passed. And those that are negotiating for the first time, in this case Japan and Vietnam, particularly need some early movement on TPA. Yes, sir, in the front here. And the middle here, I should say, yeah. Thank you, Michael. Rob Colorena, AIC Investment. I was curious, Russia was not mentioned, and I was curious as to the mindshare that particularly the ASEAN ambassadors may have towards Russia, and I'll leave it at that. I want to see the ASEAN way. Yes. We will go first. So I think that we ASEAN, we welcome Russia's more engagement with the region. That's why I invited Russia to join the AES, the East Asia Summit. Together with the United States in 2010 when Vietnam was chair of the ASEAN. And with Vietnam I think that we enjoyed excellent relationship with Russia as well. So we also support Russia to have a more important role in the Asia Pacific region. Just simply, the more Russia wants to do in the region I think the more they'll be welcome. They are part of the frameworks. We have the East Asia Summit. We have the ARF. The more that they want to do they'll be welcome to do it. Yeah, I think Russia is becoming much, much greater partner to the region. I think that's a great thing. We welcome Russia in the constructive role, both in the issues of strategic implication including how we would cope with North Korean threat in the region. And although some of the leverage over North Korea might be limited to copair to the one China has, but still I think we welcome Russians interested in the region. Number two, I think in terms of the economic engagement in the region including their effort to develop Siberian part. I think that would also have a broader implication to the region, not only supply and gas and oil, but also in terms of geopolitical interest and shift of Russia today within Russia and into the Asia Pacific. So if this century is the Asia century, we can't exclude Russia to be a part of the process. And I think probably from a US perspective, despite the ups and downs in relations with Moscow, it's been a fairly consistent theme for the four administrations since the Cold War ended that Russia can play a constructive role in Asia and help us all deal with the problems we face. Right in front of the camera here. Thank you, Dr. Green. Being with Hong Kong Phoenix TV, my question is to Ambassador Sunsaya. First, could you please shed some light on the Japanese foreign minister's visit to the US next month? What is the purpose? And secondly, as the Japanese ambassador to the US, I'm wondering, do you think Japan and China can solve their problems, the history issues and territorial disputes? Can Japan and China solve those problems without the US backing Japan up, without the US involvement? Thank you. Thank you. I see you will face many times. Where I go, I see you are welcome. That's great. Now, about the foreign minister's visit is that made public? Not yet, right? Okay. But okay. So if he would come, right? I hope he will come. But I think he's, and this is a part of the, you know, the ongoing dialogue between the US government and Japanese government. And the objective is continue to work on on the strategic planning in between the two countries, which would include, I would imagine, that how our bilateral collaboration on the security and also the economy, which would include the TPP agenda, obviously, need to be addressed. And also, what will you do about the region? Some of the topics we had addressed in the session will be naturally covered. And also some of the international, you know, agenda like Iranian issues and Middle East peace and others, and all those will be naturally addressed. But I think I want to say this, you know, this, the, you know, coming and going is very important in a way to show that we are engaged to each other. So it's nice for us to see the American president coming to the region, as Ashok said, you know, foreign ministers and defense minister coming and have a dialogue as a part of the process. And if there is, you know, emphasis on Asia Pacific, you have to show up and speak and get engaged. So that's exactly the purpose of his speech. Now, how could we resolve the questions between Japan and China, whether that is a history agenda or a territorial agenda? Is that possible without the United States involvement and support? That was your question, right? Yeah. I would say that if I'm asked, could we resolve this question today or tomorrow? The answer is no, possibly. It's been there for some time. And it will be there for some years to come, obviously. And, but it doesn't mean that we can't address the issues and in an amicable way. Because there was this, you know, problem in the past and especially the history issues, I would say. And there was a time when both parties recognized the importance of putting this issue in perspective. And not really too much emphasizing in the implications of all these issues. But whenever things are getting, you know, ugly, there is a tendency to unilaterally focus on the issues and to make the impression that this is the issues, you know, controlling the entire relationship. And then we are subject to very heated debate. And that's no good. So the best way for the moment is you just need to calm down and to restrain some of the agitating remarks from both parties. I think that's the starting point. And number two is that this is basically something Japan and China need to sit down and discuss. And what the United States can do is facilitate possibly, not really intervening per se. That would complicate the situation, I would say. But, you know, when it comes to these sovereignty issues, you know, the relationship, the United States and Japan is very solid one. And we never want to see that China would misunderstand our own position on the issues. It's the illusion that Japan will be threatened and given to whatever the pressure of when you come to the sovereignty right. So it doesn't mean that we have to fight a war. I mean, nobody is willing to fight a war, I think. That's not what everybody is hoping for. But you look at some of the remarks coming out from this and that part are very jingoistic. And I don't think that they are the mainstream thinkers, even from China and even on our side. So I think we have to level down some of the year, I would say, the legal and hostile remarks coming out. And that would include some of the spokesmen and so forth. Listening to your comments, I think one forecast we can safely make is that these three gentlemen are going to be very busy this year. But the U.S. couldn't have three better friends than Kenyushiro Sasai, Ashok Merpuri, and Yen Kwok-Kwang. And your countries couldn't have better representatives. Your comments were excellent, strategic, helpful, candid, without being undiplomatic. I want to thank, as we conclude, Fred Hyatt and John Bussey for guiding our experts. I want to welcome Rick Rosso. It's great to have you and you'll be seeing more of him. You can count on that. And thank Nick Sencheni, who shepherded this effort in all of the RA's and interns who are holding microphones today, but in three decades will be secretaries of state. Thank you all. Thank you. Excellent, Master. Thank you.