 The music will be helpful. A very good afternoon to all of you. A warm welcome to this session on the future of intelligence services. I think some of you were probably present at the last session, which was the future of militaries. And I will say once again, just as I said then, that this is historic first, because while the World Economic Forum has been discussing almost all conceivable topics, we have never ever had a panel on the future of intelligence services. As such. And there's no coincidence that this is happening right now, at the beginning of 2015. We've been through a remarkable and rather dramatic year in many aspects 2014, which in a sense both saw the further rise of asymmetric challenges, most typically illustrated by the rise of the Islamic State, which is not only operating in the Middle East, but also has many links to terrorism going on in other parts of the world, including close to here. And at the same time, something we did not conceive of a year ago, the full-scale conflict in Europe, in Ukraine, which is basically a total collapse of trust between Russia, the European Union and the US. So we're living in a dramatic world. And the intelligence services have a complicated role in trying to help understand what's going on in this complicated world, which is in many ways getting more difficult. For a few years, the discussion about the intelligence service and surveillance was marked by the Snowden revelations and by strong emphasis on containing the work of intelligence services. I think today maybe there is a slightly new tone to the debate, given that after all the public good that is provided by intelligence and surveillance agencies also has prevented, for instance, terrorist attacks. So it's a big question with many dimensions. We are extremely fortunate to have a brilliant panel helping us to understand this. We have General Kjell Granhagen, who is Lieutenant General Granhagen, who is head of the Norwegian Intelligence Service. We have John Sawyers, who until a few months ago ran the MI6, the British Foreign Intelligence Service. And we have Jean-Marie Guignot, who has had the distinguished career in the UN, now head of the International Crisis Group, but who was also involved in the major overhaul of French security, defence and intelligence thinking a few years ago. So that's the cost. And I would actually like to challenge General Granhagen first. Say a little bit about how your work looks, given the complicated developments in the world, and what are your main concerns and challenges when it comes to the service that you are leading and the services that you are cooperating with. Yes, I think in order to discuss the future of intelligence and intelligence agencies, it would be of interest to look back a few years. I've been in the job for five years and I've seen the tasks of intelligence changing a lot during these five years. I'll make four points. First of all, the change of the sort of terrorist threat that we are facing. Five years ago, terrorism was something that foreign intelligence agencies worked as something happening out there in the world that could be projected into our societies. Today, obviously, as we've seen illustrated in recent weeks, that has changed completely. Terrorism is now something that is among us on a daily basis. Homegrown people, some of them going for jihad abroad, then returning, some only influenced by terrorist organizations out there, urging action in their home countries. So obviously that challenges intelligence agencies in order to operate quite differently, cooperating much more between external services and internal services in order to deal with that. The second area that has developed significantly is cyberspace. Five years ago, that was not on top of the agenda. Now it definitely is, with two aspects, really. One is foreign intelligence agencies are crucial in determining the threats that face us in cyberspace because we have the global outlook and foreign intelligence agencies are those who are able to attribute threats that we observe to certain actors out there. The third important change relates to what you pointed out, Espen, the reappearance of interstate conflict very close to Europe. For my agency, we have always followed that potential risk or threat coming out of that, but I think for many intelligence agencies, both in Europe and elsewhere, that reappearance of interstate conflict is something that has forced us to change focus to a large extent. And finally, of course, the fourth point, the Snowden leaks, which put a great focus on intelligence agencies, portrayed in media in the way that intelligence agencies pose a significant threat to individuals around the globe, to privacy and to the right of individuals. Something that in my view has been largely overstated, in my view, very few, if any, intelligence agencies around the globe are really interested individuals, except those who actually pose a major threat to societies. So even if some intelligence agencies collect enormous amounts of information, there is a significant difference in my view between a mass collection of information and what is called mass surveillance. I think it's very important, and I think you indicated that in your opening statement, that seeing the threats that now are clear and present in our part of the world, there is more of an understanding that intelligence agencies have a very important job to do to balance the activities that intelligence agencies will have to do with privacy and individual rights. That is something that our politicians must look into and find that right balance. There will never be anything like 100% security. There will never be 100% privacy. Striking that balance is the challenge of our politicians. Johnson, you are the very recent head of MI6, one of the world's most known, for intelligence services, particularly thanks to a relatively famous film. What have been your thoughts about striking that right balance as the world moves along? What balance are you talking about? Between security and... I'm not sure there's a trade-off between security and privacy. It's not as if the more security you get, the less privacy you have, or the more privacy you have, the less security you have. In a free society like we enjoy in the West, your freedoms are guaranteed by security. And if security goes down, if your society is subject to a series of attacks, whether they're terrorist attacks or cyber attacks, then people's privacy goes down as well. And meanwhile, if the security goes up, their privacy goes up as well. Så jobb av Westen Governments er å finne de optimale løvelser av privacy og seguritet, så både de maximiserer. Hva gjør de som du, eller hva de services, har gjort som en public good? De gjør det. Vi hadde en recent survey done by The Edelman Trust Barometer av trust in various groups of business and government and NGOs and the media. And they're all going in the wrong direction and they're all below 50%. I think NGOs were just above 50% but descending quite rapidly. Actually, the police and the security intelligence services were up around 70%, which Richard Edelman described as numbers to die for. And I think that does reflect the fact that, first of all, we are contributing to a very real public good in the sense not just of national security but combating crime, contributing through our significant agency to child protection and combating pedophilia and so on. And defending national institutions and the companies based in the UK from cyberattacks from overseas. Everybody recognises these are real threats. I think actually one of the big changes of the last five years, over the last ten years probably, is that the intelligence services are now the front line in national defence against the modern threats that our societies face. And that's put us more in the spotlight. It means we've got to accept a degree of greater openness and accountability. And I think that in turn will reinforce the level to public support that we enjoy. Thank you very much. Let's come back to the issue of trust because I think it's a key issue in this. But first to Jean-Marie Genot, building on what Jean-Soris just said, then based on your work on national defence security and intelligence in France, which I think in many cases are typical issues for any large modern country. How do you place the new challenges to the intelligence services in that broader context? Well, I think one of the challenges is that the distinction between the domestic issues and the international issues is eroding. You have nationals who are connected to international network, like the terrorists who did the attacks in Paris. And of course the laws that apply to nationals are not the legal framework that applies to international operations. And so that raises both legal and operational challenges. The legal challenge is what legal framework will be able to protect the liberties, the freedom of the citizens. And the operational challenge is a question of cooperation. So that because the threat is mobile. And so you can't deal with your territory and ignore the territory of the neighbour. And that cooperation requires trust. So you need trust between the intelligence organisation and the population it protects. You need also trust between the various intelligence organisation. Og så er det en nødvendig nødvendig. La meg bytte på en interessant punkt. For alle i denne audience og alle andre på planetet er det kanskje sidenst om en eller to steder. Det betyr at de er fornøyende i 192 eller flere steder. Da rullet protecter nationals er det bedre fra fornøyende, og da siden intelligens servicier deler med fornøyende, det betyr at min nationall er din fornøyende, og din fornøyende er min nationall. Hvilke kvalitiser har denne international kooperasjonen lydt i denne aspen? Det er en nødvendig region. Du må ha så mye til å worry om det i vår service. Og også i vår system i U.K. Og i den europeiske unionen er det at du ikke diskriminerer på grønnsen. Når ikke alle landene har denne arrangementet. USA er bedre. Det har bedre protekter for U.S. nationals og non-nationale. Men for vår intelligenskollektion er det fokuset på de som har rett i vår society og de som kan provide intelligens sent til nationals sikkerhet er det ikke baseret på nationall. Nå, kooperasjonen er virkelig viktig, og Jean-Marie Gaynor har sagt kooperasjonen mellom servicier i en stat, og selvfølgelig de gamle støvpip-systemene som du har en støvpip-system og sygsinntagency og d Finish Security Service som Hong Kong er forrestort i denne støvpipen. Det er det som det har vært frem. De serbinterarat sammen, Jean-Marie har sagt de harrechtige tattene i Paris to minutter. De har koneksjonser i Franksk og i året. Og som vi våre monitorer de aktivister der opptager alle former av intelligens, og i en slik legalt fremverk. Det også trenger intensivt kooperasjon i andre lander, ikke selvfølgelig, fra europei og amerikanske partner. Det er relativt stort. Det er mer komplikat i andre sosies som ikke har de samme valgene eller de samme deger. Men en deger av kooperasjonen er nødvendig. Det er kjære å være regulert. I stort point om... Jeg vet at snoden har skjønt kjære til å få en kjære, en kjære kjære kjære. Det er en små proportions av noen av de samme kjære. Det er alle om de massive kjære vi har. Det er ikke bare kjære og cyberkjære, men også kjære som er stort av kjære eller staten som er eratisk eller illegalt. i andre partier i verden. Vi har selvfølgelig tatt en frå på hverandre, for å si at det er en nød til å kunne følge hvilke næsjoner du er gjennom i farver, og de regnene som kan være kollaborativt, men ikke på standarden. Så det er en svært måte. Ja, absolutt. Vi ser det i det samme måde i Norge. Fokuset er på de som kan poste et sted til vår søsid, hvilke næsjoner som er foreigners, eller noe som er nødige næsjoner. Nå er det en ny dimension over de seneste årene, som jeg mennes, er faktet at næsjonene er gjennom ting som de ikke har gjennom i tid, og som trenger oss til å følge for det aktivitet når det tar stedet ut av bordene. Bordene i oss er det interna seguritetsserviseringen som gjør det. Det andre som kommer ut av det, er det lage nød for en forhållende koordination mellom interna seguritetsserviseringen og hva vi gjør inn i stedet. Du mennes generell, at det er en av cyber. Koldvården var 25 år siden, og det var et webbordet 25 år siden. Det var ingen koneksjoner, men det betyr at det hele det seneste kvartet av året har virkelig gammelt den måten vi kører og kommunikerer i måten som ingen hadde tatt om før. Er det hjelpig for serviseringen her at folk lever videre online? Ja, selvfølgelig. Men jeg tror at det her er en av kvartet som har vært interessant. Det er en bra svårighet og en bra hjelp. Vi bruker å fokusere, jeg tror at alle organisationer bruker å fokusere på neder. Du vil gjøre servædien på en annen individu fordi han eller siden må være et sted. Nå er alle data interessant, fordi hvis du har gode computer, vil du detectere den anomlige som kommer til en potensjøsrisk. Det er problemet med masse kollektjoner av data vs. masse servædien som var menet av det generelle. En intelligensiske organisation i dag bruker en ganske løsning på teknologi på å få veldig stort computer som kan bruke masse data som kan være kollektivt. Mange av de data er data som ikke er et sted. Det er data som kan være kollektivt fra telekommunikasjoner, metadata, hvem som heter hvem, etc. Men det er også data som er veldig avværende. Det intelligensiske organisationer er ikke de eneste som er kollektivt i data. Alle de mage med internet og Google som er de mest famige kan gjøre det. Da er det noe som kan være kollektivt at det masse kollektjoner av data besøker løsning, og at det har vært overrørt i disse løsninger som er veldig komplikte fra en teknologisk sted. Det er ikke det samme som omkring en løsning i en traditionell system. Jeg vil sørge på Mr. X, og du producer en file, og en judge ser på den, og ser på at det er ok. Hvis du skriver til en kommission en algoritm for å si at vi vil gjøre det, det er en stort aktivitet for å kontrollere. Det er det som skjønner publiken. Jeg er nødvendig å forstå det. Jeg er nødvendig, for det kan være løsning, og det kan være forstået. Jeg tror at vi har en sikkerhetsapparatist som en enormt hjelp, men vi må forstå kvaliteten av å forstå at det ekstraordinære multiplier som teknologiske forståelser ikke har vært forstået mellom organiseringen som bruker teknologisk og generell publik. Generell. For å follow-up på Jean-Marie der, during the time of the Snowden leaks, we often got the question, why do you have to do this mass collection of metadata, for eksempel? Why don't you just concentrate on the terrorists? That of course applies very well to those terrorists that you actually know from before. But the problem now is the terrorists you don't know about, and the threats you don't know about. And in order to find those threats in my view, threats in my view, it is very difficult to avoid collecting data more broadly. So how can we do that and maintain the trust of these societies? In my view there are three very important things there. First of all, it is intelligence activity, including foreign intelligence activity, has to be regulated by national law. There has to be a legal framework for what we do that is very well understood and in all parts of society. The second one is we need authorization mechanisms for the various efforts and the various methods that we have to use to do this. This also has to be legitimized in the societies that we live in. And the third element is oversight mechanisms. In Norway we have a very thorough oversight mechanism, which I appreciate very much. I find that very useful to what we're doing. It helps my people doing their job correctly and it gives legitimacy in the Norwegian society, both at the political level but also among the population. So if we are going to do these things that to some extent or is at least perceived intruding into private lives, we need to build that trust with those types of mechanisms. Thank you, Tom. I agree with Jelle on those three points. Obviously our lives will be much easier if all these terrorists and so on use the single system, badguys.com, and then we could just go there and cover that, but sadly they don't. And it would be slightly bizarre if all the advances in technology and the use of bulk data analysis, which are improving the performance of business, improving the healthcare delivery and so on, somehow national security won't allow to use it. And that would be a very odd thing to say, the most fundamental element of a government's responsibility can't use modern advanced technology. So I very much agree that we need to be able to move forward in this area but with the right level of regulation. The second thing I'd say, and you asked Espen, about whether moving onto a virtual life makes life easier, well, up to a point, because the way in which the technology companies have reacted in the wake of the Snowden leaks means that the level of cooperation between technology companies and intelligence agencies has gone down and that's added to the threat in some ways that we face, because the intelligence collection is not as effective as it was before. And the advances in technology mean that you could create complete no-go areas on the internet, which is just impossible for there to be any supervision or monitoring of what's happening on those systems. Now, we learnt long ago, you can't have no-go areas for the police in our communities where they can't go in and they can't enforce the rule of law because then you just give an open door to the people who want to cause damage and want to commit crimes and so on. It's the same on the internet. If you create a completely closed sector of the internet, which is completely impenetrable and impossible to monitor, you're creating, you may feel a bit better that if you use it, no one can access your bank account or no one can see what you're saying to your friends and family, but you're also creating the perfect environment for evil doers of whatever types they may be to go about their trade. This latter point is extremely relevant here, since I'm sure in the audience there are many people from the IT or telecom or service provider industry. How would you ideally like to see the relationship between the service you just led and them be? Well, I don't have a monopoly on wisdom on this. The technology companies have got serious interests that need to be respected. They're contributing hugely to the advances in modern society. I think there needs to be a serious exchange, a serious dialogue between the technology companies and governments. The attack we had in the UK about two years ago, where a soldier was killed by a couple of young thugs inspired by Islam. Well, there are exchanges on Facebook that could have revealed the air intentions, could have attracted surveillance towards those individuals and prevented that atrocity from being committed. I think the technology companies do want to contribute to wider public goods, but they've been seriously put off by some of the populist reactions to the leaks that came out from stone. We need to find a new balance in here. So there needs to be a proper dialogue. It needs to include all the elements that Shell was pointing to on the intelligence side. And on the technology company side, they need to be able to provide commitments on privacy. But that doesn't mean that they should be completely isolated from the agencies that are preserving our society's security. Very interesting. When John Podesta reported to President Obama recently, I think it was about 18 months ago, on the use of bulk data in government, Podesta highlighted the intelligence agencies as having the most advanced and sophisticated systems of protecting privacy in areas of use of bulk data, far, far advanced from those that commercial companies operate. And that's not bad for John Podesta to have said that in a report to President Obama in the wake of the Snowden leaks. So I just put that on the table as the sort of standards that we have. We in the security community care about privacy. I do sometimes have a concern that those in the privacy advocates, they just take security for granted and don't realize that it has to be worked for. I don't totally agree there because I do think that there's a big question on how you ensure security, whether you do it through a very centralized system of oversight, where of course there is no go area, there is no no go area, or whether you, in a world where if you weaken the systems to protect communication, the bad guys will also use them. And whether the future for security is not in having strong encryption that cannot, where there is no backdoor, there is no possibility of breaking that. So yes, it is a no go area, but it fragments the cyberspace and protects every actor. And that will also make life difficult for the bad guys. It's a different model. But I'm a little nervous that the notion that we need system that we can access, they will be accessed also by the bad guys. That's very important when you think of cyber warfare, where you can, through cyber attacks, you can kill a lot of people if you disrupt water distribution system, electrical and all the vital infrastructures, is the best way to protect the systems to have the capacity of the state to go everywhere. And so have the backdoors, or is it by making sure that there is a kind of gradual strengthening of encryption that will make it very difficult for anybody to exploit the weaknesses of the system. I know you have a view on this, but I'll open it up for the audience for a second. The first question is here. We have a microphone coming, and then it's Antoni Pleisig. Mohamed Jaffa from Kuwait. My question is for you, Sir John. How effective has the intelligence community been at propagating the message to the public that they are there for the protection and for the promotion of security? For the longest time, people didn't know about the agencies. There was a Snowden effect suddenly, and what you've written about in the Financial Times, what you're repeating now about encryption, that we're allowing the hoods to walk the streets with a mask, but we're not allowing the police and law enforcement to go into these streets. I think that's a very powerful message, but hasn't been spread enough in the social media. We'll collect a few questions, and Antoni Pleisig. Thank you very much, very interesting. I just think one issue that came out clearly in some of the lessons we need to learn from the post-911 period is perhaps lack of oversight and perhaps abuse by intelligence communities, and have we learned from these lessons? And for one, and the second question is, there is a difference between intelligence for the sake of national security and then intelligence for the sake of criminal prosecutions, which is a vital part of our response, because ultimately these terrorists are committing terrible crimes and they need to be brought to justice, but is there a blurring of lines between intelligence for national security and intelligence for law enforcement, and is that a good or a bad thing? Good one. Last question. Let me put you on the spot, John. I think we can all agree with what you said, that there needs to be a discussion about the supervision and oversight of intelligence agencies. But what specifically would you propose? OK, well, if I can have a first shot. You can. Certainly the first and third questions. I think on the first question, I think the era when a publicly funded institution could just operate completely behind closed doors, that's behind us. And I think those agencies that continued to work in that way were caught out by the Snowden revelations, the Snowden leaks, because they didn't have a body of public understanding about the positives that they were working to. I've certainly tried during my five years as chief of MI6 to open us up a little bit, to do it in public, through public speeches, through appearances, open appearances in front of our parliamentary committee, and also to involve more people from the media and from parliament and business, bring them inside our famous headquarters on the Thames, and to explain a bit more about what we do. And I think you have to, in a modern society, you have to earn the trust. You have to keep on building the trust. You can't just assume that trust. So we do have to adapt to this, very much so. In terms of the specific oversights and controls, in my time as chief, we saw a strengthening of the law, which enhanced the role of the parliamentary committee, so that they get right into operational detail. And it's quite bracing when you're up before Malcolm Rifkin and his committee to respond on how certain operations were managed, and whether they were effective enough. We've had a strengthening of the two judges that provide ongoing oversight, one of intelligence operations and the other interception operations. And they are expanding their role into areas like bulk data as well. And it's like having an ongoing judge-led inquiry into the work of the intelligence agencies. Now, I don't say we've got it perfect. It's not perfect for all time. But the combination of clear ministerial authorisations for what we do, judicial oversight of the legality of what we do, parliamentary oversight of the appropriateness and accountability for what we do, I think these are pretty strong measures in place to ensure that what we're doing is indeed in the public interest. As I said, I think the high levels of trust that we get from the UK, much higher than most of the other sectors of society, actually reflects that. Blurring of lines, is it happening? Is it a good or bad thing? And I would add, is it possible to avoid? Then why should we? Blurring of lines between the national surveillance and foreign intelligence. Is it intelligence and evidence collection, I think you were saying. Was that what you said, okay. So the question was on intelligence and evidence collection. Yeah, well, in terms of gathering evidence in Norway, that is solely the role of the internal services and the police. So we don't have any role in that at all. Our two major tasks here is to give warning in the cases that we can give warning or threats to the society, to the country. But also in general to collect the information that will help our politicians make better decisions. Realizing that information does not only come from open sources. It also comes from information that is not generally accessible. I, in our country, I don't see a blur of lines here. I think it's clearly distinguished by law. There is specific law regulating the police and the police security service activities. And there is a specific law regulating the work of the foreign intelligence agency. And in general, none of the information that we collect abroad can be used in proceedings nationally. On the blurring of lines, I think it would be a very dangerous thing. Because the whole idea of a judiciary process is that the accused has access to all the elements of the accusation. And an intelligence organization cannot divulge all its sources. And so it's really two different logics. And on the oversight, I think we're still badly lagging in democratic countries in terms of having effective oversight for signal intelligence. Because interception is one thing, but big data, management of mass of information, that requires a whole new level of sophistication, technological sophistication to supervise that. The supervisor needs to understand it. And that is not there. Let's take two more quick questions. One is here. The technologies which are being manufactured, the new programs are being introduced by the United States, or by British, or Norway, or the other countries who can really be brought into the world for the security point of the view. I'd like to know the panel, what's the concept on that. Yes, right. We had a question here. Countries in Europe are increasingly diverse. Hva er det som er fokuset på denne diversiteten for å be able to tap into all the resources of human intelligence that you can get, or you need to get? Hvordan går det? The lady back in the back here first. Fascinating panel, thank you so much. One thing that we haven't heard about is the role of human intelligence. How is that changing, particularly as part of the terrorist strategy that's homegrown. And I think the last one will be here. Actually, it's part of my question. Aren't we trying to rely too much on data and cyber intelligence, and putting completely aside human intelligence on the ground? And aren't we at threat on an organization that would intentionally not be on any form of social, whatever cyberspace places, and be completely in the dark until the moment they're going to hit? John, will you still need James Bond, or can you...? The film about the computer won't be as fun. James Bond is a great set of movies, but actually the reality is not individuals out there operating on their own, but very close teamwork. But I rather agree with this sense that there has been a big focus recently, partly because of Snowden, on signals intelligence. But you can't task signals intelligence in the same way you can task a human agent. And so human intelligence provides you with a quality and a feel for what is happening inside another organization, or a hostile, somebody who's hostile towards you, that signals intelligence doesn't provide the same degrees. But it's a combination of the two, and increasingly the two are working together. And any policymaker will want to know what is the policy analysis, what is the signals intelligence saying, and what is the human intelligence saying before they come to a decision. And just to make the point, the diversity point, I'm not sure quite what diversity you're referring to. But any successful organization these days has to be diverse in every regard, has to have a whole range of skills. You have to have professionalization within your organization on technology, on finance, and how you manage your talent. You need to draw from the full spectrum of society. There was a time, certainly when I first joined the intelligence service back at the end of the 1970s, women were a rarity, except as in support roles. Now women play an absolutely central role on the front line. And likewise people of different ethnic minorities and backgrounds. It's diverse teams provide a much stronger outcome than the monochrome teams do. Humans in this context, obviously not only operators out there, but also the people to interpret all the data. I guess the more information you have, the more it's necessary to have the human brain to actually understand what matters. Absolutely, and I would draw the attention to the fact. My agency is a multi-source intelligence agency. We do signals intelligence, we do other types of technical intelligence like network intelligence, imagery intelligence, open source intelligence is extremely important in this. So there is a multitude of different ways that we collect information. And as you point out, on top of this, it is the analytic process that puts all this together. And it's able both to put together a picture of the facts, but also to make predictions on what will happen in the future. Those are the very important roles of an intelligence agency. So there is more than just signals intelligence and human intelligence. But I fully agree with John that human intelligence is still going to be extremely important. And there are things that you cannot replace by technical means that needs to be done by humans in the future. Especially if you want to disrupt as well as inform. Thank you. We're coming towards an end. I'll give you the floor. Or I just want to say that the products that the services produce, of course, can be specific on a defined target. But also a very important analysis of larger trends. Some of that information might be very useful beyond the borders of the state that produce it. Maybe also for the global public good. The World Economic Forum is here to improve the state of the world, as we say. Is there any way, for instance, to go back to your UN background, is there a way to build on the collective intelligence that has been created by advanced intelligence services for more sort of long term global good? I think there is, because we are focused, I think, in this debate largely on tactical intelligence. Where you need to combine the humans and the sygian to know whether there is going to be an attack in Paris or Oslo. Or any other capital, London, any other capital. That's one thing. But then there is the understanding of the world, the prevention. And there is now a continuum between the kind of work that intelligence organizations can do with their computing power. The kind of work that private companies like Google can do with their own computing power. And the need of the general public, which does need to make the use of those data to be able to anticipate. To see that there is a situation deteriorating in that particular place. And that, since prevention is so much better than cure, how you can address that. And there I think we need to see how intelligence organization can work more cooperatively with the United Nations. Not just to provide tactical intelligence to peacekeepers so that they don't get killed by a terrorist attack. But strategic intelligence so that the United Nations, the world and globally can be more in a preventive mode than in a reactive mode. And that's in a way the most fundamental issue. Very last question. Is this an area where we can foresee some kind of public-private cooperation? Well, I wouldn't go as far as a genre, actually. I think if you want to have effective intelligence and security agencies. You have to accept that they're going to have to operate largely in secret. Accountably, but largely in secret. And although I'm very fond of the United Nations and you and I worked together in New York's genre in previous roles. But the United Nations is not a place where you can put in sensitive information and have reliability that it's going to stay secret. So you have to build a degree of a large degree of trust here. And you know, people's lives are at stake. We've talked about human intelligence penetrations. The individuals who do this work are phenomenally brave and committed individuals who are very exposed. And if a piece of information which only they could have access to becomes public. Then they get exposed and they get subject not just to arrest but quite often the potential of torture and death. So we are a huge responsibility of these people who are contributing to the defence of our societies. And we have to accept that one cost of this is that a lot of the information is going to have to remain secret. I think the futurologists have not been very successful in the last 15 years predicting what the next threats are going to be. I think we as intelligence agencies, we can try and contribute to the best understanding of trends and areas of instability and threats and so on. But above all we have to have the capability kept fresh and live and deployable quickly in order to react effectively to when new threats emerge. Thank you. Here at the World Economic Forum we do not predict but we do strategic foresight. It was really good to have this panel. Time was short. It was the first but not the last. Thank you to all three of you for speaking openly about this and thank you for the audience.