 Welcome everybody. Delighted to have you here. This is a real privilege to welcome Admiral Zimbalis, the First Sea Lord. I just love that title. I mean, he's done a hell of a lot better than CNO. Doesn't that sound flat, you know, but First Sea Lord? And it's just, it's terrific to have him here. Actually my first opportunity to meet him, and I'm hungry to have the next opportunity, is a remarkable intellect who is leading at a crucial time. We were talking just very briefly. This is a period of some concern. We see, you know, the transatlantic alliance is stumbling just a bit. You know, we're not focused on it very effectively here. We've got a lot of other problems, but this foundational alliance is stumbling a little bit over here, and we know that there's been a long debate inside the UK for the last several years about leaving the EU, you know? I mean, I mentioned to the Admiral what we've found of greatest value in this partnership with the United Kingdom was the way that they could be a stabilizing and leading presence inside Europe. And that was of high value to us. So this is a time when we really need our finest minds to help us think through one of our most complex problems. And how are we going to put vitality and vigor into a relationship that's so important for us in our future? And to be able to hear Admiral Zambales this morning share his thoughts, his insights in this, is going to be a rare privilege for all of us. I know he's working through these matters on behalf of the United Kingdom, not just the Royal Navy but the United Kingdom. And he's working through these issues for all of us because we need the help now when we are so distracted with so many crises. So Admiral, you've come at a crucial time, a time of great importance for us and we look very much forward to you. You're the only guy I know that can bring out, you know, the former secretary to the Navy. I had Secretary John Warner sitting here and Chuck Bowser, he was a comrade. You know, half of the Navy when it worked over here is here today to hear you. So I'm delighted that you are here. Thank you. Would you please with your applause welcome Admiral Zambales. Well John, thank you and good morning everybody. Thank you for the great honor of addressing you. You're an internationally respected think tank, so for me to step through these very new and shiny doors to this remarkable building is a great privilege. I'm delighted to be here. I've received a very warm welcome. Indeed, a genuinely warm welcome here in Washington and I do feel amongst friends and that's always a good place to be. Friends of course, because you might say our two countries have some history together, just a little bit. Okay, it didn't start so well, but looking around I think I can say that none of you seem to hold too much of a grudge. So we don't want to dwell on it except to say that as Firstly Lord there's one matter which from time to time in which I take great pride and that's a British naval action in Chesapeake Bay in 1814. Why? You may ask because it was the inspiration for a poem written by an American who witnessed the British bombardment and I might have had to witness it from a British warship which took part in the action. And that poem 200 years old this year is called The Defense of Fort McHenry. Now better known with the addition of some rousing music as the star-spangled banner. So I think that I might be right in claiming that the British Navy has played an essential part in the development of your wonderful national anthem. Not only am I proud of that, but I've come here to claim our share of the royalties on the recording rights. So you can see the naval tradition of mercilessly pursuing prize money at every opportunity is alive and well. And by the way happy 200th anniversary on the birth of a great national anthem. Okay to be serious American independence represents one moment in our history two centuries ago. Another was last century at the time of another great strategic shift. A shift identified by Winston Churchill not just one of Britain's greatest sons, but of course a son of yours through his American mother. In a strategic shift that he identified the speech which he gave here in the US in 1946. And that speech was entitled Sinus of Peace. But because of one striking phrase he used it became known as the Iron Curtain speech. I have to say the Sinus of Peace speech doesn't sound quite the same. And those words gave an enduring name to the post war division of Europe between East and West. And he also said this and I won't try to imitate a Churchillian voice. But you can almost hear his character in the words. Neither the sure prevention of war nor the continuous rise of world organization will be gained without what I have called the fraternal association of the English speaking peoples. This means a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States of America. And today that special relationship has well and truly stood the test of time. And my Prime Minister said when President Obama visited the UK in 2012 I'm proud of our essential relationship. I feel it in my bones. And when our Prime Minister made a return visit to Washington last year President Obama responded in kind by saying in good and bad times our two people stand as one. And when we look at the contemporary strategic context we see that these are not hollow words. We need only look at the events of the past decade, the Western intervention in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya. And in public debate there may now be some uncertainty expressed as to their strategic value but there is one certainty. Individually and collectively they show the willingness of us, us Brits to stand side by side with you in your journey of global strategic responsibility. Actions do speak louder than words. And talking of global responsibility elsewhere around the globe there are significant strategic shifts taking place. Differences. For instance developments in Russian interests. For instance the rise in the authority, responsibility and interests of China. Responsibilities that are complex and onerous both internally and externally. And Sino-Japanese issues too. And the overt rebalance to the Pacific by the USA. With consequences elsewhere in the post-secretary era. And what that might mean in terms of capacity and capability. And therefore the intent for the US footprint and the delivery of its ambition elsewhere in the world. I think therefore that we begin our conversation this morning with this question. Standing in front of you today and given this uncertain start to the 21st century what then is the meaning of our partnership? What is our responsibility? Our collective necessity? Our appetite? And in my answer I want to start by asking you to focus on a small island off the northwest coast of Europe. And that island carries a voice, a voice that wishes to be heard. And it carries this message. The UK is the small island with a big footprint in the world. Not used by me, but by our Prime Minister. What does he mean by that? Well it's an overt recognition of the responsibilities associated with power. According to recent figures the United Kingdom is the fastest growing economy in the G7 and has the sixth largest economy in the world. And we have the fifth largest military budget. Alongside the United States we are one of only two large members of NATO meeting the defence spending threshold of 2% of GDP. We're a P5 member of the Security Council. We are a nuclear power with a serious missile strike deterrence capability. We are building two serious aircraft carriers. We expect to play a continuing and significant role in military and diplomatic activity around the world. As far as British policy will take us. And we have economic interests which are truly global as part of our own recovery from recession. As part of our need to compete very strongly what our Prime Minister has called the global race. And as part of our desire to lead a nation through a prosperity agenda eroding our fiscal deficit and building a sound basis for the future. My point is not to bang the drum for Britain. It is not to say that Britain is great. They're just to show that we're serious. And all of those things are relevant to our partnership with the US. A partnership without equal. There is an alignment. There's a parallel course. There is significant overlap. And that is one of strategic perspectives. We share strategic objectives. Between our two nations we have often stood side by side in a policy sphere in international forums and in the military arena. And that is not just in the recent past but also in the history of the long past. And I'm sure it will remain so. So we have a journey side by side. What's my role in this? Well, my part is to articulate and lead an approach which is genuinely and sincerely part of a vehicle for strategic military partnership. And that is through the continued delivery, deployment and utility of the various, very highest quality assets we can achieve. And that means delivering capability which is credible. And when I use the word credible it has a slightly different meaning to that which is sometimes used in the US. I don't mean it in terms of accepting some kind of bare minimum which is open to all sorts of questions. Credibility is really in the military context only judged by two people. Us and a potential enemy. No one else. So I mean it in the sense of something that is a clear authority about it which is not cast in doubt. So it's about delivering capability which is credible, leading edge and therefore battle winning. In essence, it's about loading the dice in our favor. Secretary of the US, Navy, Ray Maverick has put it another way when he addressed the CSIS in February. He said, we never send our folks into a fair fight. Well, I really agree with him. Now of course we in the UK don't have the scale of the US but we believe passionately in the credibility that goes with what we've got scaled as it is for our national purse. I am for example not interested in large numbers of ineffective vessels. I'd rather have fewer very effective vessels because they're credible. Like our nuclear attack submarines, both that are tested on the Ortec range of the Bahamas under USIs and devices and which the US can see at first hand are Premier League kit. And if our ships and submarines are very effective, very credible, then that means something else. That means that they complement US military capability. Take for example our new state of the art air defense destroyers. They fit comfortably into the task group construct with the US carrier group. What does that mean? It means we have a strategic asset, the US carrier, flying the stars and stripes, which you consider to be appropriately protected by British ship flying the White Ensign. That's significant and that's already happening. And speaking about carriers, you will know that we are regenerating our carrier strike capability. Earlier this month, fortuitously on the 4th of July, Her Majesty the Queen named her new aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth. Not after herself, but after the two Queen Elizabeths. She has reached back through the choice of the name into our own history for another powerful Queen. And all 65,000 tons of HMS Queen Elizabeth are now afloat for the next 65,000 tons coming along nicely nearby. Not a like for like replacement of the pocket size carriers she saw before, but a return to the scale, professional complexity and more importantly the ambition of the 1960s and 70s. In other words, credible carrier strike. So she is the flagship of a naval equipment program, which is generating a British maritime renaissance. And just yesterday I had the privilege of taking another close look at the F-35B, which will be a great jet. So in January this year, former Defence Secretary Gates visited the UK and he made this observation to the BBC. With the fairly substantial reductions in defence spending in Great Britain, what we're finding is that they won't have full spectrum capabilities and the ability to be a full partner as they have been in the past. Well I have, perhaps unsurprisingly, but on the basis of proof, a rather different view. I have a view of the UK's continuing commitment to maintaining a full spectrum capability. An expression used recently to describe the ambition of the navy by our own Prime Minister. It's not just about having credible military hardware, it's what you do with it that counts. That ability to be relied upon as a full partner, because credibility also comes from forward presence and having the willingness to engage. I like the way your CNO and my friend, Admiral John Greener puts it. When he addressed the CSIS back in May, he said, we have to be where it matters, when it matters, so we can influence events around the world. He's a submariner, I'm an aviator, but he's still absolutely right. But we share a common strategic purpose. It's about being forward deployed. Because that is how we protect our individual and collective international interests. Economic, diplomatic, security, which in our globalised and interconnected world have taken root well beyond our own shores. Seeds of doubt may have been sown in your minds last year with the UK Parliament's vote on Syria. But that isolated episode has not derailed UK national ambition nor its responsibility. We have not retreated to our island fortress and pulled up the drawbridge. Writing in one of our respected national newspapers only this month, the Prime Minister said, it is not just the realm that we need to defend, our national interests go far wider than that. He went on to say, many of our citizens live abroad and as an open, outward-facing nation that makes its living through trade, British interests also require open sea lanes, international stability and reliance to help deliver these essential things. And as the head of the Royal Navy, that gives me a clear, unambiguous and very welcome headmark. When he addressed the European Navy Chiefs in May, our Defence Secretary Philip Hammond, now our Foreign Secretary, said this, we must be ready to deploy, willing to project force around the globe whenever and wherever the need arises. Remarkably similar words to CNO. So the UK remains committed to being for deployed alongside the US. That's not just a military commitment, as you've just heard, it's a political commitment. And that gives us credibility, not just in the eyes of potential adversaries, but also in the eyes of our allies and friends. And that in turn gives us the authority to provide leadership to our fellow European partners, leadership in which the UK will be giving at the NATO Summit. It's hosting in September this year in Cardiff. So what does all this really amount to? It's all about the relationship of strategic partners. And that bilateral journey operating as it does from the highest levels of governmental policy alignment, through parallel perspectives on the international stage, through greater alignment at the military level as part of that joined up journey is labeled the special relationship. Now I mentioned earlier Winston Churchill's Iron Curtain speech and his references to the special relationship and the fraternal association as he put it between English speaking peoples. In that speech he also said this, fraternal association requires not only the growing friendship and mutual understanding between our two vast but kindred systems of society but the continuance of the intimate relations between our military advisers. The continuance of the intimate relations between our military advisers leading to common study of potential dangers, the similarity of weapons and manuals of instruction and to the interchange of offices and cadets. He even suggested in that speech that this military collaboration might well lead if and when the world calms down to important financial savings. That's pretty interesting and viewed from our contemporary perspective I think we can all agree he was a man before his time. And his remarks lead me to a final issue I want to mention in the context of continued downward pressure on defence expenditure. In an era of fiscal restraint, how do we in the US and the UK get the most from what we have in our maritime forces? The answer I would suggest lies in smart partnership between the US and the UK. And in my maritime arena, or as we often refer to it the maritime domain between the US, the US Marine Corps, the US Coast Guard, the Royal Navy which includes the Royal Marines. That is a five-point bond which is already very strong. Let me illustrate what I mean by that. Earlier this year, the Joint Chiefs of each of our nations met together in London for the second time. And we compared notes across the table. What we found was this. That the US Navy and the US Marine Corps and the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines have a genuine two-by-two relationship. And that results in us speaking as one. Comfortably, authoritatively and seamlessly we finish each other's sentences. But both the UK's last Strategic Defence and Security Review and your recent Quadrennial Defence Review have placed a renewed emphasis on the importance of allies and partners. As your review puts it, no country alone can address the globalised challenges we collectively face. So in the maritime domain, we are not complacent. We are tireless in our search to be even better together. So what do I mean by smart partnership in a maritime context? For me, it has several components. It comes from interoperability of the sort I have already mentioned. And let me illustrate the strategic importance and the practical application of this concept. A few years ago, I saw Admiral John Harvey, then Fleet Forces Command, and I said to him, I want to tire us together in the Persian Gulf so that if we have to fight side by side, we Brits don't let you down. And the best way to do that, I said, was to really and deeply understand our mutual capabilities and pursue interoperability so we simply don't get caught out with all of the consequences of military and strategic. He agreed. We took action and today our successors are continuing that complex and interrelated journey together and it's formed the basis of many other opportunities. Because smart partnership is also coming into play in the shape of global force management and information sharing. For example, sharing our engagement plans to align our outreach activities with partner nations. And it comes from complementary investment. This fast-moving area of unmanned technology offers a whole new world of possibilities for a joined-up approach. But I cannot discuss this final component without touching on the deterrent. We are not just co-contributors to NATO's defensive nuclear shield, but actually in our future SSBN program, our successor program, our future nuclear missile carrying submarines are rolling out your missile compartment ahead of you. You are allowing us to implement its technical delivery viewed through my lens. That is an extraordinary sign of confidence, of trust and of intent. Our partnership in delivering our strategic nuclear deterrent is, I think, exactly the right note in which to close. Because it helps to crystallize my wider point about the ambition of the Royal Navy, the whole of UK defence and our government, that we are alive, we are alive to our strategic responsibilities and we feel those strategic responsibilities and we are ready to deliver those strategic responsibilities, not alone, but together with our principal strategic partner. In a credible maritime partnership for the 21st century, in a partnership without equal, the United Kingdom, the United States, united together. Thank you very much. George, thank you for those remarks. I want to, if I might, begin our session here by pulling on a few strands on things that you said. With respect, despite your fine words, here's in this town the gates come in again and again that the defence cuts imposed on the British Armed Forces to meet the government's austerity program have in fact put the Royal Navy in a position where its size is no longer credible. And I would like you to comment on that if you would. Thank you, Frank. I think we need to be really honest about the journey that the Royal Navy has come on over the years. There will be one or two people in this room who are sufficiently knowledgeable about the detail to be able to see the truth in a statement that having a very large number of frigates some years ago didn't necessarily disguise the fact that many of them were not of adequate fighting capability. I certainly served on one and have spoken about this before. They were poor quality ships, led strongly doing their best. We're now in a different place. We have less ships, but the journey of technical commitment and proper design, war fighting capability is completely different. And if you take the small Northwest European nation with its rising economy and sense of responsibility which will replace its four SSBNs with a new successor class leading your common missile compartment in its journey ahead that is building two carriers of 65,000 tons each on which will be a fifth generation fighter and more that has some of the best air defense destroyers in the world that will build a replacement of the Type 23 frigate that has got four tankers on their way from South Korea to join our fleet that has replaced every aircraft in the fleet with a new type, that has replaced the mobility protection for the Royal Marines with new equipment. I don't think Frank that sounds like a small, no hope Northwest European nation in decline. And I would challenge anybody to say that given the inventory that I've just listed that really represents a step back from the past. Thank you. Let me now move to the 65,000 ton carrier. Again, this town fixated as it is on numbers and everybody, particularly the people who aren't naval architects have their own design, say that 65,000 tons isn't that just a bit too large for your purposes? I mean the smaller, the illustrious class were okay and you could have bought more of them. I think I'm playing into your previous comment but I do think it's important for you to address that if you would. I'm not sure I can really explain the math that's now got us these extraordinary vessels although I have to say when I really took a first look at Queen Elizabeth, not much surprises me any more in my life but I was surprised how big it was. She is to be precise. What we've done though I think is bought into a concept of agility at the strategic and operational level which is serious. I mean that much deck space, that much logistic support, that much command and control, that much mobility on a piece of strategic territory which we can move around is a grown up statement of intent and we now have to maximize the opportunity. We're very conscious by the way that the journey has only just begun. There's one or two commentators who quite understand why such a vessel isn't already in the Gulf. She's got a few years to go yet and a lot of work to do but that journey which I didn't really spell out has been facilitated by the further investment of the US Navy and the US Marine Corps who have given the UK their expertise in deck operations in jets at sea in engineering support to grow the capability quickly. So although we're a capable nation the nature of strategic partnership is accelerating the opportunity and that's really significant. It is I think surprising to remember for those who don't know that for carrier based support to air operations over Afghanistan there were British pilots flying those sorties from the American carrier off the Gulf. So it's a very deep relationship that has to pass the political tests of authority and legality to bind us together. So I think it's a platform of opportunity but it's also a very very clear head mark. You did say if I heard you correctly that carrier deployed on a continuous basis which implies that both carriers will be built in operation if I got it right. I didn't say that. Sorry but I think it's true. We are looking at options the government's looking at options for the utility of carriers plural and I think it likes what it sees by way of the authority and opportunity that gets from those vessels and the truth is that it's at the strategic level of leadership and judgment if you push the button that says giving a carrier in location A and it's in the middle of a refit then your authority sort of drains away down the plug hole. So in order to make sure you have availability then at least one from two is likely to be the outcome. And people in this audience would be disappointed given my background if I didn't ask you the following question so I won't disappoint. In a town which frequently sees the anti-nuclear deterrent current rise high when here is occasionally that military leaders on both sides but particularly also in London as well as in Washington really don't feel the deterrence necessary anymore that you're proceeding ahead good policy and all that but you could use that money better on conventional ships doing other missions and I just ask you to comment on that. Well deterrence of the type that we are pursuing which is absolutely the top end of the game is entirely a governmental decision. It has fallen through all Navy to have the privilege and responsibility of delivering it and so we will bend every sinew to make sure it's done as effectively and efficiently as we can but governments own those responsibilities is for us to carry them out flawlessly and that's our purpose. Right, thank you for that. Let's open it up to questions now and yes sir. Yeah, that's right. There'll be a microphone on its way to you. I'm Brian McGrath from the Hudson Center for American Sea Power. So you made a very strong pitch for a balanced fleet. That fleet has an expense. That expense has been your cruising Navy primarily you've sacrificed capacity for capability. What were the other fleet designs that were considered along the way and why were they dismissed? Thank you. I think that's a great question because it really asks what price the design we have today. I don't own that history. My predecessors in post have made some courageous and aggressive decisions and stood by them. I think the best way to tease out an answer is to reduce it through the lens of the price of carriers against further ships which is what most newspapers are interested in. The truth is this. If you can't afford carriers you may not necessarily afford more ships but if you've got the carriers you may have to afford more ships. So I think some of my predecessors were extremely wise. Thank you. Yes, sir. Microphone again over here, please. Hi, Arnaud Nagadec from John Washington University. Speaking of special relationships that started on the wrong foot it seemed that in the fall of 2010 a new French-British agreement came online. I was wondering if you could give us a bill of health of it but if you agree with the paradigm that only a close French-British naval in cooperation can amount to the sort of capacity that you've been describing ultimately and specifically speaking of interoperability could you comment on the decision as I understand it to go back to short take of vertical landing on the new aircraft carrier do you believe that it is consistent with the proposition that you need to be interoperable with the French and with the Americans? Okay, I'll just deal briefly with the type of carriers and I'll come to the strategic question you place. The choice of jets was an economic one. Simple. The cost of the rising cost the uncertain cost of electromagnetic rail launch systems for the UK was going to put an additional price on conventional takeoff and landing techniques which for the UK was going to place the whole program in jeopardy no the detail it actually would only have allowed one carrier to operate because the other one was sufficiently progressed not to be able to be retrofitted in any meaningful way so the answers emerge is the option of two from two rather than what might have been a very expensive potentially unaffordable one conventional but I think your big question is about the Lancaster House agreement the arrangements between the UK and the French you won't be surprised if I apologize to you for not centering my speech on the special relationship between the UK and France as I am in Washington but what I think it is fair to say and you'll have seen it repeated in many other fora is that behind the emphasis I've placed in public here and with confidence here is our European partnership with the French and we're proud of that and we're working towards that so please don't take any offense. Yes sir in the back. Dana Gerard at the R&T Foundation I understand that the Royal Navy has identified Galileo and GPS vulnerability as a concern and that you have a partnership with the GLA and perhaps with the French on the Eloran system could you address that sir? I'm not sure I know enough about it to give you an answer to what is quite clearly an informed questioner so forgive me for that I could talk about today I don't really know some of the strategic sort of implications of your question so I'll dodge the long term certainly today in the world we live in day to day it's utterly focused on the current methodologies which we all use in this room it is an American centred algorithm enhanced locational reference system of unparalleled value not just to somebody cruising the streets of Washington but also to our military people so we are where we are and it works very well for us I think you do have to sometimes separate yourself from the aspirations of alternative systems and realize just how expensive it's going to have to be to change so I think there's a natural lag in the truth of the utility of technology which will shape the journey ahead as far as I'm concerned it's steady as she goes Thank you there's a question here Sir Admiral Sydney Friedberg BreakingDefense.com to talk a bit about fleet design when you go away from large numbers when you do the Jackie Fisher thing and go away from large numbers of older but less capable ships it seems like there's an implicit tradeoff that you'll have less peace time presence fewer ships out there in permissive environments to do what we would call phase 0, phase 1 over here and conversely more focus on with the SSBN, with the air defense destroyer with the carrier on war fighting capability now A, have I understood that tradeoff correctly and B, how does that then fit into complementarity with the United States and with Europe as well because there's a rick deal talking to you about well countries can develop niche capabilities rather than try to replicate the whole spectrum You've completely got it and your question is incredibly helpful because it allows me to explain precisely why we are pursuing the path that we are when you have a limited number of vessels available you do have a variable in the equation which is whether to have some high end and some low end to put in simple terms but the danger with that is that when you are needed to perform a high end and therefore a strategically valuable task alongside a partner you find that your low end capability doesn't get through the gate and although you may achieve some short term footprint satisfaction you lose out on the flexibility and the authority associated with credible platforms It's interesting, it might be interesting for you to know that the classic example that's analysed in public on this one for us is whether we could have a more constabulary fleet that does such things as counter piracy of Somalia and a higher end capability elsewhere but the truth is the assets that may or may not be allocated of Somalia are also available for high end war fighting in the region if required and if of course they're not capable they're not usable then they're not valuable within the pole mill context So I think there's a journey that takes you where you have a degree of restriction to the number of platforms you can have to a simple conclusion that you aim for high end and you accept the risk that your footprint has reduced globally as you describe it That said, something has changed from 20, 30, 40, 50 years ago we no longer go around with a tanker in tow because diesel, electric, high voltage propulsion allows us to go 10,000 miles range without having to be dependent on additional support so we've got greater flexibility in longer legs than we had before we've got greater reliability so we can operate more freely around the globe and actually the platforms themselves have a degree of wider utility which is now built into them which gives us the sort of flexibilities that work everywhere from the political level through to the military level So we are harnessed I'm certainly personally harnessed the idea of credible platforms and I absolutely reject the idea of a ostensibly but not proven number of smaller platforms that might have a wider footprint Gentlemen over here Jeff Moore, Muir Analytics I was wondering if you might be able to expand upon British amphibious capabilities in its relation to strategic lift and if you might also perhaps entertain could the British today or in the near future carry out a Falklands type operation regarding that capability? So first of all on the amphibious capability we are in a process of what you might call recovery from the Afghanistan commitment the Royal Marines were utterly focused on that responsibility and spilt alongside US military and our coalition partners blood and treasure in pursuit of operational through to strategic objectives history will judge that value That journey from the dusty plains of Central Helmand to the back to sea performance with the Royal Navy is a big step for the Marines to take it's not just a big step professionally to go back into the environment of shipped objective maneuver it's also a different world for young men who've only ever known tactical engagement in Afghanistan but the numbers at sea are growing fast our platforms are big enough to take a significant number of young Marines to see and our leaders in the Marines are very clear of the responsibility of reintegration back into the maritime domain If I can just go one step further what was learnt in Afghanistan amongst many things were tactical lessons of really great importance about biometric data about knowledge of the people culture, awareness, history about being sufficiently confident in the utility of iSTAR to reach back sometimes days, weeks or months into data to grow knowledge and make the right decisions that operate effectively at the strategic through to tactical level and that knowledge needs to be flowed back into the maritime domain it needs to be picked up by a Navy that is comfortable and littoral that has amphibious shipping and that's exactly what we're doing As to your question about the Falklands well things have changed a very great deal since those days including the Argentinian capability but we know our responsibilities and we take them really seriously and that's why we have the current postures we have in support of our Afghanistan sorry, our South Atlantic responsibilities George, can I ask you to footnotes I don't know how many people in this audience are really aware of the maritime lift capability that you have in the Royal Navy for the Marines could you just remind people what's there Yes, we've been growing capability over some years based on LSDAs LSDs, LPH and now of course with the utility that's implicit in the first two years or so of their use from the Queen Elizabeth class so the UK connobs for the carriers is to try and broaden the utility base and bring in amphibious manoeuvre as part of the emerging capability I think in part that's a reflection of the fact that the jet's going to take a bit longer to arrive than we expected but in truth it is the sort of practical utility where you would have expected you get an awful lot of lift from H Chinook stuck on a sorry, HCH 47 and stuck on the deck of the Queen Elizabeth so we take this seriously and so does the government there's no suggestion of reduction in our amphibious capability and very recently we've found that we're reinforced in our senior meetings in the Ministry of Defense where we expect to see amphibious play amphibious capability to play a central part of our future for years to come Gentlemen over here and then after that Senator Warner Yes sir Sir, good morning George Nicholson I did the requirements for the CD 22 for US Special Operations Command and I remember during the Falklands one of the huge deficiencies you had was an AEW capability having to put the Sheffield out as a picket ship you quickly responded after that and you created the I think the Sea King helicopter with the Cerberus system onboard right now there was an original requirement for the B-22 for the Navy to get 48 now looking at their new AOA for a cod replacement they're looking at that program of record of 48 CSAR for looking at supporting seals and supporting cod resupply the Japanese it looks like we're going to be getting B-22s General Amos has said that the B-22 is a transformational enabling capability for the Marines are you all taking any kind of look at the CD 22 or the B-22 right now? Well, I don't actually choose my equipment to be pleased to know I have a machine that satisfies the requirement which we place upon them to identify the sort of solutions and then they're chosen by committees that make acquisition decisions but all I can say is going back to your first point which is that we do see the need and we are pursuing an appropriate AEW solution for what we are and that must include a number of options so I wouldn't like to say what those options might turn out to be I now finish that sentence with a full stop and start a new sentence in case there's any confusion between the two because yesterday I had the privilege of flying around in a B-22 for a while and I have to say is a remarkable machine full stop Please give the microphone to former Senator Warner who is an honorary KBE I don't know if you knew that George Thanks I don't quite earn a living flapping my jaws for many years I would like to ask a question about the current structure of our principal adversaries both China and Russia when I was privileged to be in the Department of the Navy that was our preoccupation all the time was watching the growth of the Soviet fleet and today, this morning we've announced further sanctions against Russia now we've all seen the uphill downhill with Russia through the years but this is a very formidable chapter in this long history and your beautiful words about our partnership are everlasting in our hearts here and we are Great Britain and the United States look to as the leaders in times of stress like this so just a commentary from you on what is China's ambition to try and put together the size of the fleet they have in mind and today's Soviet fleet and its role in the stressful strategic environment we exist Thank you sir Well first of all on China China is on a journey a complex journey as I try to describe which is not easily reduced to a single sentence of maritime authority or acquisition or aspirations for acquisition of territory that would be undeservedly simplistic and as I believe we must whether it's issues of Russia or China we need to understand really understand what we're doing, what we're thinking before decisions or actions are taken so I believe that what we're seeing with China is the reflection of its own sense of responsibility some of its externalized, some of its internalized in a very complex economic relationship with the rest of the world very complex trading relationship and indeed a big dollop of history and all of that has to be put into the mix and wise heads must always prevail to make sure that early judgments and misunderstandings are avoided so like so many things from a military leader you won't be surprised to know that I need to be led politically and I expect my leaders and they do apply themselves to complex issues and I think that really also applies to Russia with its own complex history and sense of purpose and value and place in Europe and the world with a face east and west at the same time and a sense of vulnerability about its own borders which we need to understand in order to fully reflect on what Russia is today so whatever actions are being taken at political level economic level by a multinational response to events that have occurred sensible, clear, intelligent thinking is required so we don't end up reverting by accident to some confused and difficult place which we might avoid Yes sir, go ahead I served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy when John was Secretary of the Navy and we had to reduce the Navy coming out of the Vietnam War and follow a lot of the principles that you've been saying here but I was in London in October and I had dinner with one of the old friends who was in the House of Commons at one time now in the House of Lords and it was right after the Syria vote and he was saying on the nuclear submarines the SSBN that a lot of the members didn't think the threat was there at this time so my question is do you think that the votes will be there to go forward with that program and would they do it by reducing the number and what has happened recently with the Russians in the Ukraine do you think that would change some of the thinking in the parliament on the threat Thank you sir Well, there's no doubt that those who until very recently said the world is a stable and sensible place led by, you know, a globalised materialistic need now have to reconsider very slightly the index of risk and as deterrents by definition has to be continuing and credible my favourite word then that means you take a long view on these things as you know sir and you invest accordingly to maintain a continuous capability we now have completed our hundredth patrol over 45 years without interruption and that continuous delivery is an utter reflection of the time base associated with the deterrents immoved, unmovable from the perturbations of weekly, monthly risk that we see so as I said earlier to my good friend Frank our responsibility is to make sure we do that credibly and for others to judge others to judge at the most senior levels of government the merit my clear responsibility is to ensure that nothing weakens the commitment to serious credible deterrents and I'm on record saying that needs four boats and that ain't going to change on my watch Time for one last question Yes sir Michael Ossetic, PBS Online NewsHour you express great confidence in the F-35 are you going to be able to afford the compliment that you need and want? That question is have we got enough? Yeah, okay so here's how it works you build 6.2 billion pounds worth of carriers you then don't put a tiny piece of butter on the bread you've got to do it properly and I'm absolutely certain in the delivery of credible carousel strike capability we will see a growth in commitment to F-35s to meet the maximum value the government would want to derive from the strategic assets they have bought and are paying for so there is a temptation I think to view the window of numbers through a very narrow lens but you know we've got 50 years to go on these ships so we've got a bit of time to get this right George, thank you for widening our lenses and for making certain that everybody who leaves this room understands the word credibility and please join me in thanking the first sea lord for terrific amounts