 Good morning. Thank you all for coming. I'm Michael Greene. I'm Senior Vice President for Asia and the Japan Chair at CSIS and this is our third annual Asia forecasting event. We started this a few years ago to force ourselves to think about what we should be anticipating or worried about or hopeful about in the coming year and then we designed it in a way where the audience could participate and give us some empirical data using the clickers that you see on your seats. We'll test those in just a minute to see if they work and we'll ask you to leave them on your seats when you exit so that we can use them again. They're useless at home. Sort of like when I try to use my remote clicker on my kids it will not do anything. We are live on www.csis.org and you can follow us on Twitter at CSIS hash mark CSIS live. Sounds like a comedy show. We are organizing this event with our own internal funds based on general contributions we get and I've also been asked to let you know in case you didn't that once again this year CSIS was voted the number one profit excuse me the number one top defense and national security think tank in the world by the University of Pennsylvania's General Think Tank Report and the number one non-profit podcast for iTunes for all of you following us on iTunes that's not music that's actually us talking people actually we have we have been on the iTunes top list with Miley Cyrus at one point so I don't know if that's a technical mistake but apparently we've made the charts. We're gonna go through two panels this first panel which will be chaired by Mira Rapp Hooper our fellow for Asian Security and the Director of our Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative will focus on political and security developments and in particular the alignments or potential shifting alignments that are happening in Asia and whether they might continue or solidify over the coming year and then the second panel which will be moderated by Scott Miller will look at economic reform within countries like Japan China India and others that are struggling with some pretty difficult challenges in their political economy. We'll ask you questions on the clickers throughout the way we do this is we'll ask you to make a prediction we'll show it up on the screen and then we'll ask one or two of the experts on the panel to to comment and and see how they'd analyze that but first to test the clickers and also to see how we've done in past predictions we want to ask you three questions that we asked last year so in order to validate our predictions we are not going to review anything that anyone on the panel said last year but we're gonna review what you all said in the audience and see how good you were this is the professor in me you get the grades so if if we're ready for the first question we're gonna ask you to answer it and then we're gonna show you what people said last year so where is will okay we good all right so the first question we'd like to ask you use your clickers this is also a test to see if the clickers work is the United States living up to the expectations of the so-called rebalance to Asia announced by the administration the they are living up to it in real time goes up and down see now you will have an opportunity for those of you who like see you will have an opportunity to click see on on later questions but for this one it's just a and b okay so it's about 67% say no not living up to the expectations of the rebalance 28% say yes can we show will what the audience answered last year oh that's it on the left sorry so you know the administration gets points for improvement to be sure and I wonder if a lot of that has to do with momentum on TPP and what was a pretty successful trip by the president to India and then to Asia in November all right the second question that we asked last year was how concerned are you about the potential for military conflict in the region this year so now you can do a BC or D and will don't show last year till I give you the queue right so we were voted the number one think tank for security and foreign affairs so we tend to attract pessimistic audiences but discounting for that 62 63% are somewhat concerned 7% are extremely concerned those are the people on their blackberries right now and 16% neither and not concerned at all is only 12% so that's interesting okay well how how pessimistic or optimistic are we compared to last year so maybe a slight of course we can't control for the audience which may be different a slight decrease in terms of extreme concern but still considerable concern about security problems in the region and the third question so far you're doing great with the clickers except for that a b question which of the following best describes your expectations for regional economic growth this year so for the year 2015 interesting so limited growth is a cautiously optimistic group 71% alright last year how did how did we look at things will that's interesting so less of an expectation for for significant growth now we're going to do the low-tech version and this will completely undermine the methodology of this approach how many of you were actually here last year alright so okay let me turn to the first panel as I said mirror up Hooper is going to moderate I'll be on the panel and joined by Victor Cha senior advisor and Korea chair here Bonnie Glazer senior advisor for Asia Freeman share and Chris Johnson our senior advisor and Freeman share in China studies over to you Mira the title of our panel this morning is is Asia rebalancing itself here in Washington we are very fond of scrutinizing and debating various aspects of the US pivot or rebalance to Asia and in fact earlier this month we held a terrific event here at CSIS and put out a report from our Asia team called pivot 2.0 which focused on how the new Congress and administration can cooperate together to advance the US pivot to Asia but in Asia itself we're seeing some interesting new dynamics emerge some of these dynamics have a lot of history behind them some of them are truly novel but the purpose of this panel today is to tease out some of these emerging dynamics and talk about what we really expect to see from them in 2015 we've got a great panel here today and I know that you're all warmed up and ready to use your clickers so let's jump right into our first question what is in store for US China relations in 2015 should we expect to see increased tension a continuing mix of competition and cooperation movement towards a new model of great power relations increased cooperation and confidence building measures or none of the above it looks like our audience thinks we will largely see a continuing mix of competition and cooperation bees looking very strong here but let's loop our experts into this discussion Chris what is your projection for US China relations in 2015 and what are the drivers behind whatever you think that trajectory might be sure thank you mirror I think the audience response reflects kind of where we are in the relationship at this moment obviously we had a good summit meeting between the two presidents on the margins of apex in Beijing in the fall but not a clear sense I'd say so far this year of exactly how we're going to translate that into deepening the relationship I think there's a an active discussion going on in Beijing with regard to how to deal with President Obama during the remaining two years of his administration how much to engage how much to focus on other priorities and my sense is that they really haven't come to a conclusion but but certainly there's a heavy emphasis on keeping the relationship stable keeping it correct but it's not clear to me yet that they see value per se in in trying to invest deeply they certainly have a sense that the president is struggling domestically but there's also a sense that 2016 is very uncertain for them and they're not sure how it's going to come out I think there's maybe a general sense in China that whoever it is might adopt a bit tougher policy toward China so my sense is we'll continue to see this sort of mix and of collaboration and competition going forward until we sort out which direction we're going to go and I think it may take till the next presidential election to do so terrific thank you Bonnie can you add add some more color to this picture as well what perhaps do you see for the US-China military relationship in 2015 and how has this changed at all since last year well the US military relationship with China has been making some progress and will continue to do so in 2015 in spite of a Wall Street Journal report yesterday that military exchanges are on hold that is not true there are some very important exchanges that are on the agenda in fact the defense policy consultative talks will be next week we will have a visiting vice chairman of the central military commission there will be more exercises and importantly there are ongoing negotiations on an agreement on air-to-air encounters to avoid accidents and both sides have committed to conclude this agreement by the end of 2015 I think that Xi Jinping remains very invested in this bilateral military relationship and hopes to see that the agreements on avoiding miscalculations will be completed so I'm quite hopeful that they will be and then these agreements in fact will will really be templates for the negotiations between China and Japan on some similar issues and we'll probably be talking about that a little later terrific thanks if if you had to identify one potentially confounding black swan something that could knock this mix of competition and cooperation in one direction or the other what might that be and why well I think that my answer to that would flow from what I was just talking about and that would be an accident I think that really what keeps people up at night who think about the US-China relationship are not the ongoing problems and you know not cybersecurity or China's land reclamation activities in the South China Sea but isn't it I believe it is an accident that would take place at sea or in the air the political ramifications of an accident and the difficulties of the two sides managing respect of public's particularly on the Chinese side potential in for protests and the spillover that that would have in in other areas track Chris black swans I actually think for me it's more the commercial relationship that's the thing that's at the most risk perhaps this year we just had a letter from several of the associations around the Chamber of Commerce to the new cybersecurity and informationization leading group yesterday with regard to these new principle policies that have been being put out by the Chinese government with regard to banking restrictions what kind of IT gear can be used in banks and in other sensitive institutions in China so it's another suggestion that it's getting scratchy obviously there's a high interest in moving the bit forward as came through both with that the visit the president had and prior earlier in the strategic and economic dialogue talks but obviously I would think it seems to me our trade bureaucracy is much more focused on TPP right now for good reason and so my sense is that this is the space to watch I you know I agree with Bonnie wholeheartedly that an accident is very dangerous but I think in terms of the broad discussion on security issues writ large there's largely a sense that those issues are intractable very difficult and so are kind of on pause it's this commercial relationship which traditionally is what keeps us from tipping over into a more adversarial relationship that could be problematic especially with China's economy slowing terrific thanks let's stay in Northeast Asia as we turn to our second audience poll question today what is the most likely outcome for Japan ROK relations in 2015 will we see a an improvement of relations with an Abe Park summit be muddling along and some occasional trilateral cooperation via the United States see deterioration over history and territory issues or D none of the above as many in our audience might know there was some sidelines talk between Abe and Park that over APEC that there may be some bilateral senior working groups coming up and Japan and South Korea has have recently pledged to share military intelligence on the North Korean nuclear program but of course we still continue to see issues over history and the comfort women issue our audience seems to think that we will see be muddling along with some occasional trilateral coordination with the United States let's turn to Mike Mike where do you see Japan ROK relations headed this year and are there any especially important events on the horizon in Japan that may shape these factors one way or the other whenever Victor char or I or answered or asked to answer this kind of question we inevitably anger someone in Seoul or someone in Tokyo saw Victor's not going to get out of this one but in starting I will endeavor to anger everyone to be balanced it makes no structural sense in terms of international relations and the distribution of power that that Korea and Japan are at such odds right now given the fact that they're both U.S. allies they're both democracies and there are enormous uncertainties about North Korea and about how China will use its growing part power there are some economic explanations at a structural level for the tensions in that Japan is relatively less important to Korea Korea trades more with China now than it does with the U.S. and Japan combined but that does not capture how important Japanese technology and components are to the Korean economy and it doesn't capture the enormous level of foreign direct investment between particularly the U.S. and Korea which had locked this triangular relationship so it's largely historical memory domestic politics and identity rather than the structural issues that that many people use to understand these kinds of alignments or the alignments I think the audience probably has it about right I would be I'd give a little more weight to a some improvement with an Abai Park summit and maybe a little less to see deterioration I think both governments recognize how damaging this is to their larger strategic interests in relations with the U.S. and in terms of how Beijing views it and North Korea so I would lean a little more to a but I think some combination of a and B is most likely some I think they're on balance probably will be a summit this year I'm not sure it will be transformational in the relationship. The key sticking point for soul in is the issue of the so-called the comfort women and whether or not Japan will stick to the apologies and statements made by Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono and Prime Minister Moriyama in the mid 90s I think odds are very very strong that Japan will stick to those statements and that's the official position of the government I think that will be true and I think that that discipline is spreading within the ruling LDP people recognize that they have to keep that. I also think there's on the 70th anniversary a good likelihood we'll see more statements like the one Prime Minister Abe made to the Parliament in Canberra which I'd call to people's attention it was a very moving statement of what Japan did in the Dakota Trail and other battles with Australia very well received by not only the Australian government but the Australian public and that's a kind of model I think the Prime Minister's office will work on. I've heard some people in the administration say this is a Nixon goes to China moment you know Abe should do as a conservative what Nixon did to China it's not gonna happen and I think it's I think it's a false hope to expect it. On the Korean side which Victor can speak to I think that there's perhaps an unrealistic expectation that the entire Japanese political system will have message discipline that even if there is a summit there's no guarantee that someone somewhere will say something that's offensive to Koreans. That's also you know not likely to be candid so in 1998 the high point the high watermark of Japan career relations President Kim Dae-jung and Prime Minister Obuchi met. Prime Minister Obuchi apologized and expressed remorse for the past and Kim Dae-jung welcomed Japan playing a larger role. That that was 1998. What people forget is that 24 hours before they met a drunken member of the Japanese cabinet went on national TV and said the Koreans owe us for everything we did we shouldn't be apologizing and just sort of did a ad lib that was incredibly destructive and Kim Dae-jung chose to ignore it and focus on what the Prime Minister said and similarly in the past Prime Ministers have said things about relations with Korea when members of their own government have have gotten out of line as Obuchi did so I think a lot of this will depend on how much the two leaders want to make this work it's not going to be breakthrough it's not going to be a but some but be with some heavy flavoring of a is possible this year the three countries Japan Korea and China are working towards the summit trilaterally that will start to pave the way so I think it can be a little more hopeful than your response but not probably a whole lot Victor what are your thoughts on this relationship potentially confounding factors or events and how will the anniversary of World War two matter in Korea thanks Vera so I think first of all all of you who said see are probably wrong because it couldn't get any worse than it is right now let me make a couple of points to complement what Mike has said the first thing I think we have to remember about this relationship oh by the way I think I'm gonna go out on the limb and I'm gonna say a I don't think it I think it's gonna be a I think there's just with this being the 50th anniversary of normalization there's just too much pressure on both sides to meet and as Mike said it may not be a transformational meeting maybe they'll be shaking hands and staring at each other's shoes as we saw in another summit meeting recently but but I think I think they will have to meet a couple of points the first I would say is that this relationship is we have to remember it's an extremely complex relationship right this is not just about comfort women or Yaskoony shrine I mean there's so many elements and so many variables that contribute to how the relationship proceeds whether it proceeds filled with historical tension or whether it proceeds through periods of normalcy having to do with domestic politics having to do with identity politics having to do with bargaining leverage so it's a very complex relationship and I don't think simply you know a statement on comfort women or or something like is gonna solve it I just don't think that's gonna happen the second thing though is that while we are in a very difficult period in the relationship today I would urge you all to remember that overall it's been a good relationship it hasn't been a perfect relationship but in the 50 years since normalization to me it's actually quite astounding how these countries have been able to work together in spite of some very deep historical issues that pull them apart so we are in a bad period now right but I think we have to remember that overall it's been a fairly cooperative relationship the having said that I think they're sort of there are two sort of major obstacles to an improvement in the relationship aside from you know the politics of meetings and the ceremonial things that we'll see in June at the 50th anniversary or at the 70th anniversary of the end of the war and both of these obstacles are not material right they're ideational obstacles the primary obstacle on the South Korean side quite frankly and and Mike's right I'm gonna piss off both sides the problem on the South Korean side or the Korean side is they're in a mindset now where they feel like Japan is not important they feel like they don't need Japan they need the United States for the immediate term in the long term and they need China for the immediate term in the long term but there is a mindset now in Korea that they don't feel like they need Japan and I think that's terribly mistaken I think it's hugely mistaken for economic reasons for longer term strategic reasons for alliance reasons it's it's a it's a big mistake and the big obstacle on the on the Japan side is also ideational and that is there has been a dramatic I shouldn't say dramatic but there has been a definitive shift in opinion and views on Korea in the past when there were there was friction between Japan and Korea it was usually the Koreans were emotional and angry on the one hand about history about other sorts of issues and on the Japanese side that was responded with largely indifference and in some cases ignorance and I think but at the same time there was there was sort of a sense of some generosity give some slack to the ROK because they are neighbors they are quasi allies these sorts of things and I think one of the biggest shifts today is that that has shifted Japanese opinion has shifted in a direction that is quite negative on Korea and and that I think is going to that's a challenge I think these are the two challenges on the one hand Koreans think they don't need Japan and on the other hand Japan's opinion has shifted a great deal on Korea and you know summit meeting is not going to be transformational so I'm not going to change that even a statement on comfort women is not going to change that and but I think these are sort of the two the two big obstacles right now terrific thanks so much let's stick with Japan but pull China back into the conversation as we turn to our third clicker question will the establishment of hotlines and other confidence building measures between Japan and China later this year reduced the risk of conflict in the east China C A these will reduce the risk of conflict significantly B reduce it somewhat or C no reduction as many members of our audience may know Japan and China met just last week in a high level discussion to establish a hotline share radio frequencies and hold regular meetings on the east China C issues but also just in the last few weeks we've heard news that Japan has boosted its defense budget a bit clearly thinking about maritime contingencies and rumors that China is reinforcing military facilities nearby the Senkaku Islands it looks like our audience is somewhat optimistic and thinks that the answer is B CBMs and the hotline will reduce tensions in the east China C somewhat let's turn to Bonnie laser who's been doing some great work in this area Bonnie how hopeful are you that these new measures will actually ease tensions in the east China C will China and Japan meet their target deadline of implementing these by the summer and what events might derail these agreements if anything well great questions mirror up I'm sort of torn on this questions because it seems to me yes and progress could be made in actually agreeing on hotlines for example of course if an accident takes place then there's the big question about whether the Chinese are going to answer the phone when the Japanese side tries to call and I think that the fact that there is not a lot of confidence in that on the Japanese side is a problem as I think that they're realistic since the US has had similar problems I don't know if they're going to actually get this implemented by the middle of the year but as I said earlier they are using the US China model we have a military maritime consultative agreement that was set up in 1998 to talk about how to avoid incidents at sea and the Japanese have now created something similar they will follow the US in implementing a an agreement of CBMs to avoid accidents between naval vessels and then move on to the air to air component but the broader question here that's interesting of course is is this going to actually reduce tensions in the overall China Japan bilateral relationship and there I would say probably not I think 2015 is going to be a difficult year for relations between China and Japan in part of course because of the 70th anniversary of the end of the war the Chinese are really gearing up to hold lots of commemorative activities this is something that I think is in part for domestic reasons in China there is a steady feeding of the Chinese people with television programs education articles in the media about Japan's role in the war and I certainly expect that to continue I was just at a meeting the last couple of days in Singapore where there were just fireworks between some of the Chinese and Japanese participants and I thought that that was perhaps a barometer of where the relationship is going to be heading this year so risk of conflict being reduced if the CBMs are negotiated and implemented I would say yes reduced to some extent but the overall relationship probably not heading in a positive direction in 2015 Chris any additional thoughts on the role that these confidence building measures might play and how that factors into the bilateral relationship overall not not much to add I would just say that one thing that's particularly interesting about the celebratory activities that that Bonnie just references they're gonna have what really is sort of an out-of-cycle major military parade on this issue previously those have only been done at the decennial of the founding of the PRC for the last several rounds there's certainly a domestic component to that you know Xi Jinping will get two of these I guess during his time in office maybe more but I would say I wonder I have no firm thought on it but I do wonder to what degree some of the fireworks Bonnie saw on some of these other things are disappointment probably particularly on the Japanese side that after they did manage to get over the line on having the two leaders meet and then it kind of slowed down and despite the fact that they now appear to be running to make it look like something's going on and then I guess on the core question my simple view is just yes it will reduce the risk of conflict but there's still a lot of stuff down there in a very small space that hasn't abated at all so the risk of conflict remains and I think that's why we have so many people answering see Mike let's go to you what is the role of these bilateral confidence building measures in the overall bilateral relationship and what events should we be looking out for this year that might affect that one way or the other I think Bonnie described them well it's a it's a tool but that doesn't mean that the Chinese side will pick up the phone I was in the White House when the EP3 incident happened we had a range of confidence building measures and it took President Bush 11 phone calls he finally found Jiang Zemin in Latin America so the phones are good doesn't mean necessarily the other side will pick up I think the November summit between President Xi and Prime Minister Abe was important though because what it did was it showed both leaders recognized the need to manage this and it also on the Chinese side gave a flashing green light for ministers governors to start meeting with their Japanese counterparts all of which have been frozen and that starts to connect sign use between Japan and China and helps to you know reinforce the economic interdependence and the other issues of common cause but that's sad I agree with Chris and Bonnie the 70th anniversary is going to really make this complicated there's no real change in China's strategy towards these maritime areas in terms of gray zone pressure on on maritime states like Japan I'd be slightly optimistic though in one sense there are other things happening and one is the completion of the US Japan Defense Guidelines review which is going to I think reinforce Tokyo's confidence and their ability to handle these things in the position of the US and the Japanese side is not surprised by this stuff anymore so I think there's a kind of a discipline to the strategy now and a confidence that will help the other variable we'd be Korea I mean if Beijing tries to make the 70th anniversary a return to Cairo and Potsdam and Japan is the enemy of the world Korea stance is going to affect how successful Beijing thinks that strategy is so going back to our first question about Japan Korea that's a pretty important variable in this relationship as well let's travel to the Korean Peninsula for our fourth audience polling question how likely is a North Korean nuclear test in 2015 is it a very likely be somewhat likely see somewhat unlikely be very unlikely or E impossible to tell as many may know there were sort of fits and starts preparations for a fourth new North Korean nuclear test in 2014 and just a few weeks ago the North proposed to the United States a temporary moratorium on testing if Washington reciprocated by suspending its joint military exercises with the ROK our audience seems to think and fourth North Korean nuclear test is very likely followed by somewhat likely so odds at least in this room are looking good let's go to Victor a veteran of North Korea nuclear issues for his read on this question unfortunately mirror my eyes are not as good as yours so if you add a and be together what does that come to I can't see it 78% oh that's interesting because I remember as compared to last year actually the number was much higher I think it was like well over 90% and and of course they didn't do a test last year they did other things but they didn't do a nuclear test and they actually haven't done anything like the Chanon sinking or the shelling of Waipido now you know since 2010 so it is kind of interesting that we always worry and are justified to be worried about more North Korean provocations but we haven't seen them we haven't seen the big ones it's not to say that they're not developing their programs or doing other sorts of things but in direct answer to the question about nuclear test in 2015 2014 we said I think over 90 something percent said it was gonna happen it didn't happen and now it's like 70 something percent I'm still gonna go with a any though I'm still going with a eventually you'll be right thanks Victor let's stay on the Korean Peninsula as we turn to our fifth question how will ROK DPRK relations fair in 2015 will there be a summit between Park and Kim will there be increased North-South dialogue and cooperation short of this high-level summit will they maintain the status quo or will the relationship primarily hinge on deterrence because of North Korean nuclear or other activities it looks like our audience thinks that we are most likely to maintain the status quo in relations on the Korean Peninsula with I think that 62% saying that the status quo is the most likely option Victor it's an interesting question I mean I think what I thought what I've been watching in the new year really has been what look like very deliberate and systematic efforts by the South Korean government to start some sort of engagement with the North it's not necessarily government to government but but some of it is focused on humanitarian needs so this offer to restart training for North Korean doctors and medical professionals and then the other aspect of it is on infrastructure the proposal to reconnect at least on the southern side to start reconnecting the road and railway links between the two Koreas begin the project on the southern side and make known to the North Korean side they're interested in doing that there was also it was either at the end of last year early this year a pilot project where Russian Coles brought through North Korea and then to the port in Najin and then shipped to South Korea so I think we're gonna see more of these efforts by the South Korean government to try to engage North Korea in you know in other administrations I would say if we connect the last question the first question in other administrations if there were a nuclear test I think that would be inversely correlated with the likelihood of a summit I mean sorry in the current administration if there were a nuclear test I think that would inversely correlate with a summit in previous administrations that one's not so necessarily the case you could have us you can have a nuclear test and you could have a summit but I think in this case that's that's probably gonna be okay so I would probably lean more in the direction of B I think that will probably see more North-South dialogue and cooperation it may not be the high politics stuff but I think there's certainly an effort by the South Korean side and it's connected to their desire to do more of a what they call sort of humanitarian engagement with the North with the North Korean people trying to probably leverage the very small openings we're starting to see in North Korean society the interest in markets the interest in information technology I think it's really trying to leverage that Victor just to follow up for a moment if you're right and in fact the relationship tends towards B increased cooperation short of a summit what sorts of events or metrics should our audience be looking out for this year so the the sort of the first stop step I mean the first metric would obviously be family reunions if there's an interest in family reunions or the two inter-Korean projects the K-Song industrial complex or the or the Diamond Mountain tourism project which has been suspended for quite some time and then beyond that I would look for some of these economic projects if there's you know if North Korea accepts sort of the the humanitarian aid such as the training of doctors vaccination for children things of that nature and then the next step would obviously some of these bigger economic cooperation project I mean Prakash has this vision of trying to reconnect South Korea with the continent right with the Eurasian continent and you know this is something that crosses spans ideologies Kim Dae-jung used to talk about it and and she does as well so I would look for those sorts of sorts of things I think that it's kind of a balance it's it's it's managing a very careful balance because if there's too much of this sort of cooperation and there's actually no progress at all on the nuclear issue that's going to create some space between the South Koreans and and the other members of the Six-Party talk so I think they have to be very carefully managing any enthusiasm they receive from the north about these proposals terrific let's bring China back into this conversation as we move to our sixth clicker question how will the ROK approach its relationship with China in 2015 will it gravitate towards Beijing and away from the US Japan alliance will it gravitate away from Beijing and towards the US and Japan will it maintain the status quo or do you not know looks like our audience has voted a plurality in favor of see maintaining the status quo but there is also a significant portion who think that the ROK will gravitate more towards Beijing and away from the US Japan alliance Victor let's get your thoughts on that I actually love this is my favorite question in the whole thing so I'm curious who said who said be yeah I actually tend to agree with the be people I think actually contrary to what might be the conventional wisdom in town that well first of all I don't think Korea is gravitating towards China I mean yes they've had six meetings or six summits and yes Xi Jinping and Pakenna seem to get along famously and yes they're trying to deepen strategic dialogue FTA all these sorts of things but I don't see that as gravitating away from the US Japan alliance what I see that as is an effort by the South Koreans to to try to fill a space that they think is opening up between the Chinese and the North Koreans Chris and Bonnie and others can talk to this but it's very clear that the under the Xi Xi Jinping government they've got a lot of problems with this regime in North Korea they are not at all happy with it the fact that there hasn't been a meeting and I think the South Koreans recognize that and that's why they are working so hard at trying to really build equity with the Chinese and you know in the short term I think it's it's it's about economics you know it's about all these other things but in the long term I think it's really trying to shift the way the Chinese weigh their equities on the peninsula I mean objectively speaking you know they're they're in with the North Koreans even though it's very costly both materially and reputation Lee their future by any metric on the Korean Peninsula is with South Korea it's not with North Korea and yet they're stuck with this albatross around their neck and I think a lot of this effort by the Pakeneg government is really aimed at trying to help help change the way the Chinese calculate their interest on the peninsula now having said that every time there's a summit or there's a meeting I'm sure the Koreans walk away from that meeting feel like feeling like we're getting them right we're getting them we're pulling them on our side but I'm sure the Chinese walk away from that same meeting thinking we're pulling them away from the US Japan Alliance you so you know which of these in the end is right I don't know I mean there are lots of reasons why I think having to do with geography history a whole bunch of things why I think staying aligned with the United States in Japan is is entirely in Korean interests even if they have a good economic and strategic relationship with China so for those reasons that's why I'm actually more in the in the lines of B and also I don't think the Korean the Chinese will try to make the 70th anniversary about Japan and I don't think the Koreans are going to take the bait because the Chinese have tried this before in their summits with the South Koreans bilateral summits and the Korean response has been very clear which is basically that you know you have your history issues with Japan we have our history issues with Japan we deal with them bilaterally we don't need your help meaning China we don't need your help and as long as they maintain that line I think this won't work to anybody's advantage to try to leverage these these celebrations for other purposes let's go to Chris Chris you're a veteran watcher of the Chinese leadership what do you think will factor into Xi Jinping's approach to the ROK and how does the DPRK weigh in all this well I think you know what we've seen so far out of the Xi Jinping administration certainly in the early part of 2013 I think there was a lot of discussion about whether or not China had changed its North Korea policy I think if you look at the objective facts as Victor was just discussing they haven't fundamentally changed there's still the lifeline you know etc I think what's changed is the way they describe the relationship for so many years after the Korean War it was a special relationship like lips and teeth and their propaganda you know this sort of thing that's all changed clearly there's no instinct from Xi Jinping I think at this point to have Kim come for a visit or to make a visit himself to North Korea and I have to think that you know not being a Korea expert on deferred a victor but in the same way that a Chinese president has to a new Chinese president has to demonstrate that he can go to the United States because so that he can manage that relationship well I have to assume in the North Korean system there's some similar desire to go and show you can manage the big relationship with a summit visit so denying him that is is significant with South Korea yeah I think Victor's right there is a very seemingly cozy relationship between Xi and Madame Park he's one of the she's one of the few world leaders where he appears a little bashful most it's an odd situation watching them interact with each other and I think there is some strong personal chemistry there between the two of them I also think though that as Victor was pointing out if if China's plan is indeed to somehow try to peel South Korea off of the alliance you would think then that some of their behavior would be somewhat different so for example with the air defense identification zone in the East China Sea they had an opportunity to draw it around the small area of conflict with Korea they were asked to do so I believe by the Koreans and and didn't and likewise when Xi Jinping went for his summit in Seoul you know he was reluctant to to provide the Korean side with a text of the speech that he gave at Seoul National University in advance which in which he bashed Japan and sort of suggested Korea was with them on that so my sense is that the Chinese may have it in their mind that that this strategy is working I think Victor's right both sides walk away every time thinking you know we won what's interesting to me is what came out of our MacArthur study earlier this year which is that when asked the question Korean elites on you know the 10 years what's the economic relationship huge numbers China what's the security relationship huge numbers the US and I think as long as that maintains the balance then we're probably in a pretty good spot Bonnie any additional thoughts on the China side of this well just to quickly link this to a prior question and that is the possibility of North Korea conducting a nuclear test and then how China responds my prediction would be that if the North Koreans do go ahead with the nuclear test or another provocation the Chinese probably will not live up to Seoul's hopes for the amount of pressure that China would put on North Korea so that could lead to some disappointment on the North Korean side so I think that's one thing to watch another issue that I think is worth looking at is the discussions that are underway between Seoul and Beijing on the delimitation of their maritime border and my expectation is that will be difficult it could lead to more tensions in the relationship but it's not impossible and if they did reach an agreement on that then that could be something that the two nations could use to better the relationship and ease some of the frictions that's been going on between fishermen in their common waters great let's go to make well just to wrap this we spent a lot of time on this and you could argue this is the most important together with Japan Korea variable in the overall alignment and distribution of influence and expectations in Asia in the year ahead and I don't think it is inimical to US interests or even Japanese interests for Korea and China of good relations I don't think we're in a world where this is zero sum but I would go with whoever answered E even though there was nothing up there because the right answer exact the right answer may be the ROK gravitates towards the US Japan alliance I'm quite optimistic about that and gravitates towards China and the reality the substantive reality in polls and in other ways is that the US Korea relationship is extremely strong and deep and even the the expectations of Chinese economic relations are based on trade not foreign direct investment capital flows technology and so even on the economic side the US Korea relationship is very very deep and plus values plus security I worry that in Beijing there is this is not understood that in Beijing there's a view that Korea's up for play as it historically has been in Northeast Asia and I also worry that in Tokyo there's a view growing that the US Korea alliance is not so strong in the Korea's in play so the fact that we have a very strong US Korea relationship does not mean that Seoul or or Washington can be complacent about how Korea's role in Asia looks to other parties and I wonder whether the Park government has taken a little too much comfort in the strength of the US Korea alliance and not thought enough about how Korea's role in Asia is perceived by China by Japan in particular and that are a stronger South Korean foreign policy in 2015 would think about that 360-degree view about how Korea is viewed because when Korea is viewed as being in play strategically in Asia it never ends well for anyone great Mike just to follow up on that terrific point when you say it never ends well this idea of Korea being in play what potential unintended or negative consequences could we see whether in 2015 2016 or down the road from this view even if it is incorrect well I mean a nuclear test if we went back to the Japan Korea question that would solve that a little bit aside from a nuclear test the there are two things one would be something these are black swans these are sort of out of the expectation the the Tokto Takeshima island issue is unlike the Senkaku-Dyayu issue between Japan and China is not a militarized or a tense issue that could lead to accidental conflict but I think that issue because of fishing fleets and other things could I wouldn't bet on this but that could be something that suddenly creates challenges in the Japan Korea relationship as it did in 94 I think and not something people think about but fishing fleets are a wild card in all of these relationships great let's go back to Victor I mean the the I think the the thing that is yet and you know to the extent there are these black swans that come down the stream later on in 2015 or further those will really test the relationship and then we'll really sort of see where you know where Korea falls if you will so you know one example clearly is some sort of North Korean provocation and if the as Chris says if the Chinese don't do what everybody wants them to do and they kind of hang on to their to their little brother then you know how are the Koreans going to respond to that the other is going back to a previous question the likelihood of some sort of Sino-Japanese configuration over either fishing boats or the set or or the Senkaku Daita or something like that even though Korea won't be militarily involved in that everybody's going to watch where Korea stands on that right and if they sort of take a you know completely sit-back attitude then all the theories about Korea being in play are going to really start start to come up so I think those sorts of things there have been some small things for example missile defense you know where the Chinese have come out very strongly to the South Koreans and said do not allow the US to have that on the Korean Peninsula if you do that will put you in the adversary camp and and I don't really consider that a test because you know anytime anybody tells a Korean don't do this they're going to do the opposite thing right so so the Korean response is you know you you know they've been quite negative to that sort of Chinese heavy-handedness but I think some of these other things particularly something that happens between China and Japan over fishing boats over the island and where Korea sits not militarily but politically on the issue will be an important test terrific let's pull Russia into our conversation this morning with our next clicker question in 2015 China Russia relations will a a line based on defense cooperation and coordination in regional institutions be strengthened significantly through defense and energy ties see we can somewhat as Japan Russia ties develop or deep not matter much for regional security it looks like our audience is voting pretty strongly in favor of be with 53 percent thinking that China and Russia will strengthen significantly their ties through defense and energy mechanisms but we've also got a significant showing in favor of a defense cooperation and coordination through regional institutions so let's go to Chris on this one Chris what's your take on China Russia relations in 2015 how they changed even just over the last couple of years well I think we're certainly seeing a situation in their bilateral relationship where because of the difficulties with Ukraine and so on the two of them are coming closer and there certainly does seem to be a fairly strong personal tie between Xi Jinping and Putin they seem very comfortable with each other in some ways they see I think in the other themselves in that they are confident leaders people who feel they're very much in charge of their own system as odd as that system may be and that they will defend that system you know that they've created and I think there's heavy alignment between the two of them on this notion that the West is out to destroy the systems that we have created whether it's color revolutions or other other issues so I think what's striking about what's happened just in the last couple of years is the degree to which they have sort of gotten around some of the long-standing tensions in the relationship they're still there and you know most folks who watch the relationship for a long time argue those impose serious constraints on their ability to work together I happen to agree with that viewpoint but my own view is that it also doesn't mean that they can't make a mess together if they want to on the way down and I also do feel that this ideological piece is very new in some ways and and different certainly very different than what brought them together in the in the 50s so and I think we see them also both at very high leadership labels in their interactions saying things they haven't before with regard to the fact that the rebalance to Asia is aimed at them you know I mean we saw this when the Russian Defense Minister visited China so my sense is that it's not just about strengthening through defense and energy ties those are going to be the main methods but I think it's these other things as well how are they going to talk together about the new security concept in Asia you know what kind of discussion will they have about that Central Asia is very interesting you know it's my impression that up until now they've kind of decided just not to talk about it because clearly what China is doing in Central Asia would pose some sort of a challenge to Russia's traditional sphere of influence there and so I think we have to wait and see what was striking to me was when the ruble had its near collapse you know my sense historically of Chinese behavior would have been for them to just back off and say well that looks really bad let's get away from it instead primarily Kachang you know made a statement the next day saying that they would come in they didn't come on with much money but it's unusual Chinese behavior in that regard so I think that tells us something and then just in closing for the first time since the end of the Cold War I think we do have a Russia-US-China triangular relationship again and that means we have to pay attention to it it's not an isosceles triangle and so on but it is a triangle that requires management skillful management by the US and an understanding that something is indeed going on in that relationship that's new Bonnie let's get your thoughts on this trajectory on this issue of the reemergence of a triangular relationship among the three which is where I started in the early 80s watching this strategic triangle I think the Chinese feel rather uncomfortable in some ways yes it could be a source of leverage they are working with the Russians as you say on criticizing the United States its alliances they are they are promoting cooperation and promoting regional security mechanism that might exclude the United States but at the same time I think the Russian invasion of Ukraine is very unsettling to the Chinese particularly a hold the holding of a referendum which always in Chinese minds they think of Taiwan and that could be a real threat for them I think in there in their view so I think that the Chinese really don't want to have tension in their relations with the United States and as the US- Russia relationship continues to be tense that creates challenges for China to really hold together its new type of major power relationship with with the United States so I think that Chinese just a little uneasy about that I think we're gonna see more cooperation on cyber security internet regulations the Chinese and Russians have been working together on that and I think a big question mark is in the energy field if the Europeans are gonna hold on the sanctions and the Russians then have to sell more oil and gas to China that Chinese are gonna be the beneficiaries of that they've taken advantage of it and they will continue you may have heard in the news today that you know Greece is somewhat uncertain whether it is going to uphold the EU sanctions and so you know they'll there'll be some issues going forward but this provides I think some potential benefits for China that the Chinese will reap reap these benefits the last thing that I would say is the economic relationship between China and Russia is growing I think close to now a hundred billion but less to remember that's less than one-fifth of the trade relationship between the United States and China so once again the United States looms very large in China's foreign policies and priorities and although China talks about its and talks up its strategic relationship with Russia I think it pales and important in importance to that of the United States and so what you see is Chinese Russian cooperation on a select set of issues and those are important and we need to watch them but I would argue that it's not the strategic relationship that the two actually use in their moniker for it terrific so just to follow up with both Bonnie and Chris if this was truly a strengthening partnership at its core what signs would we look for as a strengthening partnership as opposed to sort of an opportunistic marriage of convenience we've noted a number of ways in which China and Russia have cooperated in the last year or so a number of ways in which they might in this coming year what what should we be looking for to know whether this is becoming a more strategic deep partnership and what would tell us that this is really more opportunistic well we could look for certainly more cooperation in the military sphere we already see a significant amount joint exercises the cooperation is being reinvigorated in the co-op in military production so we could look for some really significant systems and dramatic expansion of their of their cooperation but what I would really look for would be a real alignment that would be anti US I really don't think we're going to see that I think that's extremely unlikely but if the Chinese were to conclude that the US threat to China in the rebalance to Asia and how it is conducted is so threatening that China has to reorder its priorities put this relationship with Russia at the top treated as a real alliance then I think that that is is really what would tell the rest of us that this is a fundamentally different relationship than it has been in the past Chris any additional thoughts on that I would just I think Bonnie's absolutely right I mean that would be the smack everyone in the face determinant that it indeed shifted I think smaller things to look for might be military technological cooperation below the level of Finnish systems and emphasizing Russian expertise in very fine technology technology elements the other piece would be some greater sign of Russian willingness to respond to what I presume is pretty steady Chinese pressure not to sell gear to Vietnam not to sell gear to other places I don't think the Russians will do it because they need to sell this stuff but that would certainly be another indicator that they're drawing closer well let's keep our eye on China but traveled to Southeast Asia for our next audience question in 2015 China ASEAN relations will be characterized primarily by which of the following a increased coercion by China be increased coercion by ASEAN countries see legal proceedings by either or both sides d intervention by third parties such as the United States and Japan or e reduce tensions and progress on a code of conduct for the South China Sea it looks like our audience is voting overwhelmingly in favor of increased coercion by China perhaps our audience has been coerced but but there is some hope here for reduced tensions and progress on a code of conduct in the South China Sea as well actually reasonable optimism in that regard Bonnie let's get your views on this first what are the prospects for China China ASEAN relations in 2015 what are the prospects for a code of conduct how much does it matter that Malaysia has taken over chairmanship of ASEAN well I think part of this question is asking whether Chinese foreign policy the way that it approaches the South China Sea has actually shifted in the aftermath of the foreign affairs work conference that was held last November and I think that the jury is still out we could see some tactical shifts and less Chinese pressure on other claimants in the South China Sea particularly Vietnam because I think that the Chinese were taken by surprise by the vehement reaction of the Vietnamese when they deployed the oil rig off the coast of the power cells and in Vietnam's EEZ and so I think that the Chinese are going to be a little bit more sensitive to Vietnam and its concerns because of the potential impact on the domestic situation in Vietnam where I think Beijing fears that its behavior has begun to push Vietnam to get much closer to the United States something particularly its security sphere that that China does not want to see so then the question is what kind of coercion could we see we could see economic coercion against the Philippines which we have seen in the past in the form of quarantine of bananas or preventing Chinese tourists from going to the Philippines we've actually seen some pressure to not send tourists to Vietnam as well recently so we could certainly see some more economic coercion and then we could see military coercion it in the form of the second Thomas Sholl situation where we have this rusted out World War II vintage naval ship that was beached on second Thomas Sholl in 1999 and it if it is if it is not reinforced with concrete or something else is good chance that in 2015 that will slide into into the water Chinese law enforcement ships are operating very very closely around that Sholl and would probably move in and take over that that land feature which is by the way us completely submerged so that's something else that could happen in 2015 I'm it's interesting to me that we've got 25% who are hopeful about progress on the code of conduct I myself not very optimistic about the code of conduct I think that the Chinese are continuing to hold out the prospect of a code of conduct but at least until this case which of course is raised in the sea legal proceedings which the Philippines has this case that the arbitral tribunal could come to a decision late this year it may go to early next year hard to say it's assuming that they find jurisdiction but as long as that case is pending I'm fairly doubtful that the Chinese are going to move forward on a code of conduct but they will keep talking about it Chris your thoughts on this question I just was intrigued by the course of arm of Ozzie on that wasn't I wasn't aware of that have to do gotta do some research apparently no I mean my thinking is very similar to Bonnie's I think certainly the messaging coming out of the foreign affairs work conference just like the peripheral diplomacy conference the year prior was that we've got some work to do on the on the periphery which of course implies some acknowledgement that what they have been doing isn't being very successful some effort I think to reset toward a friendlier policy toward what worked in the past with regard to goodly neighborliness with some new spin put on it in Xi Jinping speech with regard to developing a dedicated effort to develop soft power you know these sort of tools I guess the question is to what degree are the Ozzie on countries buying it you know they're my sense is that when China delimited the nine-dash or brought out the nine-dash line in 2009 it caught a lot of the Ozzie on countries by surprise they reevaluated their assessment perhaps of where the Chinese are and what they're thinking and so now when China returns to this more friendly approach I think there's greater skepticism one other thing I think that'll be very interesting which I think does have a bearing on what happens down there this year is to what degree if there are increased cross-strait tensions as the Taiwan president election comes closer and it looks like the opposition party in Taiwan might do better you know last time that cycle happened in the mid-90s the Chinese made a decided decision to to focus exclusively almost on on the cross-strait situation and let everything in the South China Sea go to the back burner it'd be interesting to see now with their perception of their growing influence and strength and frankly suite of capabilities certainly if they might try to manage both of those situations at the same time so not letting up pressure down in the South China Sea even if they did have to put more focus on cross-strait Chris that's a great point and something we should all be keeping our eye on given that the Taiwan presidential elections are in 2016 do you anticipate that may become an issue as soon as this year that Beijing will have to start juggling or do we expect to wait a year or so until that becomes a true management problem again if at all well you know there I think there does come a decided point as we go along the pathway and as they begin to see how the different candidates might be lining up in Taiwan and so on where they begin to feel that with President Ma's approval rating continuing to struggle that they might feel a need to try to get something concrete out of him on the on the issue core issue of sovereignty before he leaves office because they don't know what's going to come next my sense is President Ma has been very clear that that's not on his agenda and so that in and of itself might spark some difficulties I certainly think that we wouldn't have to wait until we were three weeks before the election to see some challenges what they won't do is what they've learned from the past which is not to do public finger pointing and so on or insist that the election go one way or the other but if we do have greater tension there I mean you know my own sense is that the most realistic piece or instance of Xi Jinping's kind of true views on this issue where when he had his first meeting with Lee and John where he said no the issue can't go on from generation to generation he hasn't said that sense but I think it was very telling that he did at the beginning terrific thank you let's stick in maritime security issues and China for one more audience question do you expect that China will deploy it's 981 oil rig in disputed waters declare an ADIZ or take some other destabilizing action in the South China Sea in 2015 a yes or B no once again for those of you who like see this is not an opportunity to press see it's a yes or no question will China take some destabilizing action in the South China Sea this year once again C&E audience favorites somebody somebody is sitting on their clicker our audience is voting strongly in favor of yes China will take some other destabilizing action some destabilizing action rather in the South China Sea in 2015 Bonnie let's get your thoughts on this question not only how likely some destabilizing action is but what particular destabilizing action we might see what factors might lead China for example to declare an ADIZ in the South China Sea if that's likely at all this year well I've already talked about this to some extent mirror but let me just add a few points obviously one of the issues in advance of potentially declaring an ADIZ as whether China has the capabilities to enforce it so that is one of the reasons why I think there is so much attention being paid to the land reclamation activities taking place in the South China Sea where we are seeing now the Chinese had one airstrip in the power cells and now one likely in the Spratlys and it may be more than one since there's rent land reclamation going on at about five or six land features in the Spratlys now the Chinese Defense Ministry continues to state that the security situation is not very worrisome in the South China Sea and therefore at the present time they are not seeking to declare an ADIZ so if the Chinese change their assessment of the security situation or maybe when they have the capabilities they were conveniently change their assessment of the security situation and declare one I have heard very explicitly from particularly senior PLA officials that this is something that is in fact on the agenda the Air Force of course is wanted an ADIZ over East China Sea, South China Sea and Yellow Sea that this is in the plan I believe it's a question of when not a question of if so yes this is something that could occur in 2015 and then finally I don't think that we're going to see this rig deployed in Vietnam's waters in the near future for reasons that I talked about earlier I think the Chinese are quite concerned about the domestic political balance within Vietnam that they don't really want to push over over the edge. Chris let's get your take on this question what sorts of calculations are China's leaders making with respect to things like potentially declaring a South China Sea ADIZ and is that likely to come to fruition this year? I mean I largely agree with Bonnie I think it is on the agenda timing is the issue not whether or not they will or will not do it my personal view is they probably won't do it this year that's all I have on that one. Thank you let's now broaden our aperture a bit as we move on to our tenth question when President Obama was in India just last weekend and made joint statement with Modi one of their many agenda items was the fact that they expected to broaden trilateral cooperation with Japan so we have a question now for our audience about how Japan-India relations will fare in 2015 will they A. improve mainly based on economic cooperation B. improve mainly based on security cooperation C. improve based on strengthened economic and security ties D. sustain positive momentum but not achieve concrete results or E. deteriorate. Our audience seems to think they are likely to improve based on both strengthened economic and security ties but this of course strengthening relationship between Japan and India may be a sign of a broader trend that we'd like to parse here as we get close to wrapping up our panel today and that is the fact that we are seeing some new alignments that may not have been particularly present in the region before but are sort of coming to the fore now this of course includes Japan and India but also includes new relationships like Japan and Australia so let's turn to Mike Green and get his thoughts on this emerging trend and this particular bilateral relationship. I'm guessing everybody who answered D. has actually done business in India but but I would still but I would still say let me recover I would still say that C is right I put about 90% on C for one thing that Japan-India relationship has been underinvested for decades you know. Idiationally India has no history problem with Japan. The Indian judge at the Tokyo war crimes tribunal refused to find Japan guilty so there's no there's if anything ideational or identity bonds. India needs infrastructure investment technology Japan's got it and needs markets and then they both are maritime powers with strong navies dealing with a rising China so there are a lot of reasons why this relationship for both countries is going to catch up so we're not talking about we're really talking about catching up from decades of sort of odd estrangement what my friend Satya Lame calls the result of having you know sushi and samosa the same deal not a not an easy mix but for Abe and Fremonti and Rick Rosso may talk about this in the next panel it's all win-win and the two governments have set up a two plus two arrangement for defense and foreign ministry senior officials ministers they're going to now regularize not only bilateral defense engagement but also trilateral and exercises with the US and I would actually even go a little further on the limb and say in 2015 you'll start seeing Japanese defense items being discussed and perhaps even agreed on for sale to India because of the changes in Japan's arms export rules so I think there's a lot of room for for for growth it there's going to be a capacity problem the Indian foreign ministry is about the size of New Zealand's excellent like New Zealand's of course but but so there will be capacity issues but I think both Prime Minister see this as win-win and it points to another we need to end and get to Q&A but another thing we should put on the table before finishing which is this other side of alignments not alliances don't want to overstate it but alignments as Japan reaches out much more ambitiously not only with India but with Australia and with ASEAN with Canada with Israel you probably saw Prime Minister Abe agreed with Prime Minister Natan Yahu on on defense equipment development Australia and Japan as many of you know are developing a replacement for the Australian Collins class submarine I was in I was talking about government's fairly senior levels recently they're they're very confident this is going to move forward with US help and and with Vietnam and the Philippines Japan is promoting the export of non-lethal equipment like patrol boats and things to help with maritime domain awareness this is not an alliance with a mutual security commitment where you're going to suddenly see you know the Vietnamese Navy show up in the East China Sea to help Japan it's not that kind of article 5 security treaty real alliance but it's it's it's it's it's quite significant and the fact that some of these ASEAN states are willing to be public about it in spite of China's presence is significant and on the 70th anniversary Japan doesn't have a real problem in Southeast Asia or South Asia 96% of ASEAN's in polls last year the 10 ASEAN countries citizens said they like Japan and relations are good so it's it's it's it's not only productive I think for Prime Minister Abe it's fun it's not like dealing with China and Korea that said strategically for Japan the Northeast Asia piece is always going to be more important and these help Japan strategy but that doesn't obviate the need for thinking about relations in the toughest part of the neighborhood for Japan which is Northeast Asia but there's a lot more of this going on you know and I don't think it is the we're not looking at blocks this is not a sort of Russian Chinese access against a maritime democratic access with Korea stuck in the middle I don't think it's that pronounced I think every country is deepening cooperation signing trade deals and hedging at the same time and the hedging behavior is more pronounced but in in large measure that's because most of these countries that we're talking about now India ASEAN and so forth want to see a trans-specific open rules-based democratic order want China integrated in a way where it can't use coercive means to change the rules so I think it will it will only accelerate terrific well audience now is the opportunity for you to chime in if you felt insufficiently enfranchised by your use of the clickers for this last hour we are going to take some questions from our audience please raise your hand if you have a question and if you're called on please do remember to state your name and affiliation and be brief questions looks like we have one right here could we get a microphone hi I'm I'm Dr. Donna Wells I work for the clandestine service of the Central Intelligence Agency I'm also a NASA engineer I went to Georgia Tech and the University of Texas I've submitted this proof to the network can you comment on it it's a math proof pertaining to the trillion dollars we owe China specifically the People's Republic of China so it's some it's an if then statement it's symbolic logic we study symbolic logic at the University of Texas it is in the philosophical department so it's if a debt and this is also basic contract law if a debt cannot be collected and it can also cannot be itemized this is two things it can't be collected and it cannot be itemized it is therefore null and void null is the Russian word for zero can you please comment on it thank you Chris do you have any comments on that not sure I understand the question but I think it's basically are we in deep trouble because the amount of money we owe the Chinese I always come back to the fundamental principle which is that any Chinese action against the US currency is ultimately going to redouble back upon themselves so I guess you just want to have that read into the record and I'm not sure okay do we have any other questions from our audience here today yes gentlemen right here with glasses on thank you thank you I'm one who came professor of hungry University of foreign studies Korea and Johns Hopkins size my question will be addressed to Dr. Cha or any other others who wish to kindly answer first question is about Korea-Japan relations the bilateral relations has been quite cold for the past only the last and 10 years though that bilateral relations has been inelastic to any changes domestically and internationally several or two or three government changes in South Korea and as many number or more number of government changes in Japan and North Korean regime change leadership change in Chinese leadership change and global recession and all those kind of factors did not affect positively bilateral relations between South Korea and Japan then what factors what environment would lead to the improvement of the bilateral relations second question very briefly inter-Korean relations this question will be addressed to Dr. Chang Park Geun-hae government he is the first Korean government which outspokenly claim reunification then how much how much how would North Korea react to this outspoken approach by South Korean government to reunification thank you let's go first to Mike and then Victor on this first question about the persistently cold nature of our okay Japan relations and then we'll ask Victor Chah to comment on Park Geun-hae's outspoken policies I teach a course at Georgetown this afternoon in fact on leaders in Asia and the structural factors or the ideational factors always constrained leaders but real leadership is about stretching those boundaries so to me the Japan-Korea relationship will be turned around when there's a stronger leadership recognition than we have now that it's important for both countries interests and that's what Kim Dae-joon and Obuchi did it's harder now for a lot of reasons and as I said in the earlier question I'm not highly optimistic that this will happen this year I think countries both countries will manage this will probably be a summit not transformational but you know manage it and perhaps do a little better but eventually it's going to take a leadership decision that each side will take some political risk at home because it's for the larger national interest so first on the on Japan Korea I mean I think I don't disagree with the characterization that over the past few years it's been quite bad at the same time though again constant with the theme I was making earlier I mean the real and the question is what have we missed right in this period when things have been bad right you know because the way we measure the value of this relationship is and the way history impedes it is in terms of the acts of cooperation that did not happen right when they might have because of a rational interest and so so the things that we haven't seen we haven't seen a summit right we haven't seen a general information sharing agreement right there's a military parts servicing agreement that couldn't be done there's an FTA that hasn't been completed but I wouldn't say that has anything to do with anything other than the difficulty of the two large economies trying to negotiate an FTA I don't think that has anything to do with the historical emotional issues and then there was this one effort at a collective defense statement right I mean so these are the things that we've missed are they important of course they're important does that fundamentally make it difficult for Japan Korea the United States to transact their business whether it's politics and security in the region I would say no right now there was a short period where you could argue it was dysfunctional where there were no meetings taking place between the two sides but quietly these have come back on both at the bilateral level and the trilateral level Sung Kim the deputy assistant secretary of state was just in Asia and did a trilateral with with his Japanese and Korean counterpart so it's starting to come back on and then even if it's not a leadership change issue whenever there's something that happens that compels cooperation we've seen it both historically and today I mean the fact that they were able to finally conclude an information sharing agreement on North Korea shortly after this this North Korean cyber hacking case right again Sony again to me is a sign that when things happen there there's an effort by responsible people to forge cooperation even if the irresponsible politicians can't do it and and so I think that's so that's why you know I'm trying to you know when we talk about Japan Korea it's like always so dark but if we actually look at the longer perspective it's yes it's complex but it's not as bad as we think it is in terms of unification Park Geun-hye certainly talks a lot about unification her predecessor did as well and I know one take on this is to say it's ideological right because prior to Lee Myeong-bak and Park Geun-hye there wasn't as much open talk about unification for the previous decade because he had progressive governments in Korea Kim Dae-jung, No Mi-hyun, progressive governments and we're talking about unification was really not considered politically correct so one take is that you have two conservative leaders that's why they talk about unification and that may be true but I think what really drives the discussion of unification Korea today is a concern about what's happening in North Korea I think there's a concern that there's little sign of economic reform under this new leadership the this young leader of North Korea doesn't seem to be interested in foreign direct investment law in free trade zones or special economic zones or any of these sorts of things he's interested in ski resorts and amusement parks and Dennis Rodman and you know not serious things and so I think for that reason there's a growing concern that the future is not as stable as we might wish it to be and I think that's why we're hearing more discussion of unification because they're trying to prepare they're trying to prepare the country their people the world that this is something that could fall into their laps not that they're trying to push it but it's something that could fall into their laps let's take one more question right here in the front thanks Lin Kwok Brookings Institution they've been calls within the US for Taiwan including from people like Bonnie Glazer for for Taiwan to take a step to clarify its position on the dash line in the South China Sea could you speak to what the US would be willing to do to support such efforts on the Taiwanese end especially since many Southeast Asian countries are not willing to openly at least support Taiwan because of China's position thank you well I personally have called for Taiwan to clarify its position on what was the original 11 dash line that was of course created under the KMT when it was in power in the mainland but frankly I think this is something that all all of the claimants should do they should make quite clear what their claims are and specifically bring their claims in line with the UN Convention on the law of the sea so identify what land features they claim and then what territorial space whether it's a 12 mile territorial waters or a 200 mile exclusive economic zone and continental shelf that they might claim around land features so I think that it is it contributes to the uncertainty and the instability that prevails in the South China Sea that most of the claimants have really not made their claims clear so this is something I think we've seen a little bit of progress from a few of the claimants and Taiwan is one of them so this is I don't think should be linked directly to the issue of Taiwan's participation in for example talks on the code of conduct I personally would like to see Taiwan be at that table it is a claimant if we want to talk about some of the activities that are taking place on some of the land features Taiwan obviously occupies the largest although I think as of a few weeks ago it's the second largest because China is building fiery cross very very quickly but Taiping Island is probably the largest natural land feature and is Taiwan is engaged in some activities and trying to expand the the runway and the ports there are no troops deployed on on Taiping Island but there's there's there's coast guards so I think that if Taiwan were at the table I think it would play a constructive role but having said that I don't think that the two should be linked I think that Taiwan has an interest in demonstrating that it is a responsible player and therefore should clarify what its claim is bring it into line with the UN Convention the law of the sea and encourage all the other claimants to do that as well thank you for being such an active and engaged audience we are going to take a short break and reconvene here at 1025 for our next panel on leadership and economic reform but before we go I hope you'll thank me in thinking join me in thinking this terrific panel for their thoughtful forecast and great discussion thanks so much