 Hello and welcome to this latest Loewe Institute online event. Thanks for joining us. My name is Ben Bland and I'm the director of the Southeast Asia program here at the Loewe Institute in Sydney. I want to start by acknowledging the traditional custodians of the land on which I'm speaking, the Gadigal people of the Uyghur nation and paying my respects to their elders past and present. I'm joined today by four esteemed panelists who will be discussing what the world can do about the deepening crisis in Myanmar. First up, Kin Omar is a veteran human rights activist from Myanmar who fled the country after the 1988 democracy uprising. She runs an organization called Progressive Voice. Next, Scott Marciel is a former US diplomat who was ambassador to Myanmar until last year and he previously serves as ambassador to Indonesia and to ASEAN. Scott is now a visiting scholar and practitioner fellow at Stanford University. Next, we have Rizal Sukma, an Indonesian foreign policy expert who's also a former ambassador in his case to the United Kingdom and he was also formerly in a foreign policy advisor to Indonesian president, Joko Widodo. He's currently now a senior researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, which Rizal used to run before joining the diplomatic service. And last but not least, of course, we have Janelle Safin, who's a labor MP in the New South Wales Parliament. She spent decades working on development and legal issues related to Myanmar. She founded the Australian Myanmar Parliament Group and she's also worked as a special advisor to Jose Ramasorta, the former president of Timor-Leste. So since season power in a coup on February the 1st, Myanmar's military has embarked on a violent campaign of repression. The Tatmadaw, as it's known, has killed hundreds of peaceful protesters and detained thousands of people, including Australian economist, Janelle, who's a friend of the Lowe Institute, and I'm sure many other people on this call. The outside world has responded in a range of ways. The US, UK and European Union have implemented targeted sanctions against the Tatmadaw. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, held a special summit last month, calling for a halt to the violence and the appointment of a special envoy. Meanwhile, Myanmar's biggest neighbors, China and India, seem to be taking a wait-and-see approach and the UN Security Council, of course, remains divided as ever. So how can the world best influence the Tatmadaw, which has previously proven so impervious to external pressure? Before I go to our guests, some quick housekeeping. If you have any questions, please ask them by the Q&A function on Zoom, include your name and the name of your organization or affiliation, and we hope to get to as many questions as possible. First, Kinomar, I want to start by asking you about the current state of play on the ground in Myanmar. We know that the Tatmadaw has stepped up its campaign of violent repression against the democracy movement. And I want to ask you, has that succeeded in taking the wind out of the sails of the civil disobedience movement and the protests that we'd seen in the first few weeks and first couple of months after the coup? No, Ben, they have not been successful yet. I would say that their attempted coup since February 1st is in fact, it's failing. So also that's why it's really important for the international community to not to normalize this coup and not to recognize or cooperate with this hunter because the people's movement is very strong and vibrant. I was from the 1988 pro-democracy movement compared to our time. The current movement is extremely resilient and strong and so determined also that civil disobedience movement has now effectively prevented this military from controlling the administration of the government, banks, hospitals, and other sectors. So that's why I'm saying that this coup is in effect, it is failing. But also, of course, as you said, there's how much of that a day and night experience that people are facing is just unbearable. But in spite of that, I would say in spite of the now, the time has come for the schools to reopen. And you see all of these people coming up again, the teachers and students together on the streets and they are now demonstrating again and saying that what they're saying is, military's slavery education is not wanted. So they are not going back to school. So that's where the resilience, how strong the resilience and the vibrant movement is, yeah. And I know that this protest movement unlike previous ones, perhaps is more leaderless. It's more diffuse and dispersed and there are many different groups and people involved in the labor strikes you mentioned in the protest on the street, even potentially armed resistance. But is there consensus, do you think, from Myanmar people about what they would like to see from the world to help advance their cause of democracy in Myanmar? Well, first and foremost, people have been calling out for the international community to help immediately is to stop the violence, to prevent further atrocities by this military hunter. But that's not coming, that is not coming. Not from the ASEAN, not from the United Nations, not from Security Council. Of course, there are like a plausible actions being taken from the United Nations, I mean, sorry, the US, UK and EU. But we're not seeing some of the very, very important countries including Australia and the Australian government is not taking the concrete actions yet. So for the people of Myanmar, they know that in spite of them, telling the whole world what they want and sacrificing their lives, especially the young people. But there is nobody coming to help them to stop these violence. So yes, now you see that the movement is quite vibrant and varied in terms of their tactics. Many of the non-violent civil disobedience movement, non-violent tactics are also employed. Very, very homegrown, really creative and really creative actions are taken place. But at the same time that you have seen, Shua you've seen in the news as well, there are many people who are fleeing into the ethnic revolutionary control areas where they are taking the arms trainings. And so the movement, in fact, the tactic has been quite diversified now. And I can only tell you that for the people of Myanmar, what they want is, they want the international community to stop this violence because that's the only way for them to move forward and to achieve democracy. But if nobody is able to help them and stop this violence, they have no other options left but to defend themselves. And I think this is something that to me, coming from the first-loss generation of the 1988, I'm so worried of another-loss generation that is a great potential of a great loss again, which I hope that the world sees it and help the Myanmar people stop this military violence and help them achieve democracy back. We're gonna get on to the question of what Australia and the US should be doing, but I wanna turn to ASEAN first. And I wanna ask you, Pat Rizal, about the special leader summit that was held in Jakarta a few weeks ago. So this summit, which was held really after a lot of pressure from President Joko Widodo, there was officially a consensus reached by ASEAN and it was a call to end the violence in Myanmar to promote constructive dialogue and also to send a special envoy from ASEAN to Myanmar to meet what they agreed was all concerned parties. But no sooner had senior general Minung Lai who led the coup return to Myanmar, then the military junta distanced itself from this consensus saying it was gonna focus instead on restoring its version of law and order. So what's the next move for ASEAN, Rizal? And what can the member states of ASEAN, apart from Myanmar, do to enforce this consensus and to hold the junta to it? Well, thank you, Ben. Of course, I think ASEAN should just move ahead with the plan and then also with the appointment of the envoy, that's critical. Because once we have the envoy, then the envoy would immediately focus on the issue, then try to find ways to implement the three main outcomes actually, which is stop the violence, and then of course the delivery of humanitarian assistance and to initiate inclusive dialogue if needed and asked by the Burmese people themselves. And this is, I think, where we are at the moment. And I shared some frustrations with Kim in a different form because I'm quite frustrated with the fact that it's almost two weeks and that this envoy has not been appointed yet. So we really need to put pressure on ASEAN, on the chair of ASEAN to actually start doing it. Because whatever the general said in Yangon is actually to be expected. Of course, he would say that he wanted to do it himself. But I think ASEAN already has the foundation, if you like, to move forward. We don't know yet how far, how long it will take, but that is starting point. So we need to press ahead by appointing the envoy and then by talking to all the groups in Myanmar in order for this envoy to make a visit. And Scott, you were a former ambassador to ASEAN. You worked with the organization when you were the US ambassador in Yangon as well and in many other capacities. I mean, we all know that ASEAN has its limits as a consensus organization. Most of its members are not democracies. I mean, do you think ASEAN should be doing more? And what levers of power do you think its member states could potentially be pulling to try and ensure that this consensus is actually implemented? Thanks, Sherbin. Well, I agree with Pat Rizal about the need to move ahead. I give ASEAN credit, particularly Indonesia, President Joko Widodo, as you said, for pushing for this summit and coming up with a consensus. It didn't satisfy everybody. It didn't do enough, but given that it's a consensus organization, it was at least a good start. I think ASEAN is one of the few entities that has a chance to pry open the door a little bit in Myanmar to try to make some progress. I guess my one recommendation or suggestion, knowing, having dealt with the generals quite a bit, without much success, I might add, I think it's fairly unrealistic to expect them to change their current behavior without feeling a lot more pressure. And I know it's not really the ASEAN way to overtly pressure, but my own sense is that from ASEAN's perspective, there needs to be some consequences for the generals if they continue to ignore what ASEAN is doing. Again, as Pat Rizal said, the first step seems to me to be to appoint the envoy, try to get the envoy into the country, see if the envoy can meet not only the military, but representatives of the national unity government and others like to get a clear picture. But again, without some painful consequences for the generals if they refuse or if they fail to cooperate, I just think it's really unlikely that they will. And last, I don't think, this is sometimes put on while the world's waiting for ASEAN to solve this problem. I don't think that's fair to ASEAN. ASEAN I think can be the leading edge, but just as what happened when ASEAN helped open the door for the world to help Myanmar after Cyclone Nargis in 2008, I think the United States, Australia, other countries need to continue to work with ASEAN and in support of ASEAN, rather than say, ASEAN, why haven't you fixed this yet? And so just to come to put that question, if you like, back to you, Rizal, I mean, are there levers that ASEAN can use to potentially punish the junta if it doesn't comply? I mean, obviously some people have talked about even suspending its membership. Is that possible or likely? And are there any other kind of sticks that ASEAN can use as well as its many carrots? Well, you know, there is, well, if you look at, you know, the charter, you know, there is no provisions in the charter, you know, on how to suspend, even how to expel. And there is also no provision on how to quit ASEAN. So it's not like you, you can just quit, like you can do it. But in ASEAN, once you join, you get stuck, you know? And then, so you cannot, you know, leave. And then others, you know, cannot also kick you out. But, you know, having said that individual member state can, of course, you know, take a certain steps or measures if they like. For one, you know, I think, you know, if one member disagree with, say, participation of a representative of the Tan Madal in ASEAN meeting, then the meeting will not take place because it consents us, right? So you can just object, say, Indonesia would say, I will object to any participation by the SAC representative unless they stop the killing. Then the happen will not actually, you know, happen. So that's the leverage that individual member state has over ASEAN and Suhoor. But of course, nobody wants to come to that point yet, you know? So, you know, we try like, you know, Ambassador Scott Marcia said that, you know, we do have the starting point. It's not much, but, you know, we have to focus on that and try to explore how we can actually capitalize on that consensus and then move ahead. And then let's see how the Tan Madal or SAC, you know, would react to that. Because, you know, at the end, they also understand that there are consequences, also diplomatic consequences on the part of ASEAN that ASEAN can impose on them. On the second point that I would like to make, and I think it's probably, it's not so much like international community work to support ASEAN, ASEAN is not taking the lead. But I think, you know, everyone must work, you know, according to their leverage and also position. So that all works will contribute. So it's easy to support, you know, witnesses in one particular organization or one particular country's approach. But at the end, we have to synergize those effort because it has to be multi-approach, multi-levels, and also, you know, multi-strategy in order to really get the breakthrough in Myanmar. I think that's a really good point, Pat Rizal, because I think it's true that many countries around the world have a similar objective here. Even you might argue, China, to see some sort of restoration of stability, the release of on-sensitize and other political prisoners. And there are just very different ways that countries work. So of course, ASEAN or China will never embrace the sort of sanctions that we've seen the US and the UK and the EU take. But in terms of kind of a pragmatic approach to bring people together, I want to ask you, Janelle, about Australia's role. You know, Australia does have this reputation for pragmatic, ambitious, middle-power diplomacy, tackling regional conflicts from Cambodia to Timor-Leste. But I think it's fair to say the government response so far from Canberra has been pretty timid. So what do you think Australia should be doing to try and bring together these kind of disparate views from different countries? Well, first of all, they have to make a decision that they want to act, that they want to take stronger action and that they want to be involved in, you know, the processes either the bilateral, multilateral and obviously as a dial on partner of ASEAN, you know, working there within the Quad, had the successful meeting recently, you know, it's getting legs again. So within the Quad, so with the US and Japan and India, there's a range of areas we can work in. But we have to, you know, Australia has to say, I'm ready to step up and play that role. And there's pressure from the community. And I get people worldwide, you know, state actors and civil society asking me why they haven't yet. They've been, it's a bit like watch and see. And initially, they were concerned because of Dr. Shontanel being detained and stepped a bit gingerly around that. And I agreed with that, I've been involved. But as time goes on, it really is time to step up. But what they can do is consider the financial sanctions and the ones that hurt the hip pocket of General Minong line and the people around him. So really consider that seriously. That requires resourcing to work out who's who, how you do it, understanding banking, the legal basis of it, et cetera. Recognise the national unity government. You know, I'm not naive about how state actors work and do that, but we have to push for that because that's really important. And I say recognition, but even just talking with them, you know, talking with the foreign minister, talking with the minister for women, children and youth affairs because there's a whole range of violence being perpetrated against women has been for a long time. And also look at diplomatic ways. Like we've got the regional beyond that, but we've got the regional economic comprehensive partnership with listeners and our panel would be familiar. And that was signed in November last year and it's yet to be ratified later this year. Myanmar's one of the partners. And do we want General Minong line in that? Our trade with Myanmar Australia's trade is really infinitesimal. So it's small and we working within the UN put pressure on for a Security Council resolution. We know the one we'd like will go down with Russia and China, but we still need to pressure and work that for as well in many ways. And the credentials committee, that issue will come up in September. We need to be on board. I mean, and by not recognizing the NUG and the CRPH in some way, in some form and having dialogue with them, it's a tacit recognition of General Minong line in the State Administration Council. And that's not a good place to be. If ASEAN can step up like it has, and yes, there's all sorts of, you know, they could could be better, you know, could be faster, it could be stronger, all of that. They've stepped up. We can step up too. What have we got to lose? There's nothing for us to lose. Reputationally, it's better that we do step up because that's the one thing people expect us to do. I actually have a list of about 35 actions, but I won't, I'll spare everyone right now. But that needs someone to say, we're going to do this. We're going to focus on it, do a big round table and then resource it and reach out to everybody. But if you send us your list or tell us where it's being posted online, we'll happily, happily share it around. But I just wanted on this question of what outside powers can do. We'll come on to the National Institute of Government in a second, but I have to come back to you here. Scott, obviously with, you know, Australia is a middle power, but the US is a great power. The Biden administration has said that it will put, you know, democracy in a much more important place in its foreign policy. And obviously, the US government has brought in targeted sanctions very quickly on the Tap Midor. But what more do you think the US government could be doing to actually support the democracy movement in Myanmar beyond a bit of pressure on the generals? Where's the room for more movement for the US government here? Right. I would say this for the US, but also for probably a lot of other countries. It's really important first to do no harm. And by that, I echo Janelle's point, doing nothing to confer legitimacy on the Supreme Administrative Council, the HONTA. That's critical. And to make it clear that we and others are on the side of the people, whether it's formal recognition of the NUG or just dialogue and the like. That's very important. I think trying to cut off as much as possible sources of revenue to the HONTA. And that's always tricky. We got a lot of criticism in the past, fairly or not for having broad sanctions against Myanmar because it was seen that it hurt a lot of ordinary people. It's very tricky now because many people, this whole civil disobedience movement is trying to make the place ungovernable, including by causing an economic shutdown. It's one thing for the Myanmar people to make that decision because they're the ones who are bearing the brunt of it. It's harder as a foreign country to say, let's go ahead and help them destroy their economy. So, but I think the targeted sanctions continue to look at what makes sense. I think it's important to be practical because sometimes people will throw out an idea. Like in our case, I always will hear the US should ban the import of jade because the military makes a lot of money on jade. Great, except we don't import jade. Pretty much all the jade goes to China. So we could put a ban on, but it doesn't have any practical effect. So I think just looking through these things. Third, I think as much as possible, and this is for governments, but also private organizations, taking advantage of the various entities that are out there to get humanitarian assistance in, not through the HONTA, but through other ways, through civil society groups and others, including through other countries, to help sustain the population while they're going through this really difficult period. The economy's already collapsing. The healthcare system with COVID is overwhelmed. There's a need for a huge amount of health assistance, some of which can be done in border areas. So there's a lot of help to, a lot of work to be done by governments and others to support the people, literally support the people, help them get through this. On this question of the National Unity Government, I wanna come to you next, Ken Omar. So the National Unity Government was set up by MPs, ousted MPs from the Previously Ruling National League for Democracy and Representatives of other ethnic organizations and parties. The National Unity Government has called for international recognition and it's even looking to establish an armed people's defense force to fight the Tatmador. But Ken Omar, my question for you is, from the outside, should we see the National Unity Government as an organization that's able to actually run the country or is this more like a kind of shadow government that kind of reflects people's will but can't actually, obviously for now, control the government because the junta obviously has its hands on many of the levers of power? Ben, I wouldn't call it as shadow government, I would call legitimate interim government. It's only because the illegitimate unlawful hunter is trying to take over the country. When you ask whether they have the control over the country, the NUG, I would say yes. The very reason I'm saying that is because it's very strong civil disobedience movement comprised of civil servants, including the ministries in Nipidaw, the ministry of staff in Nipidaw, as well as the police and soldiers and public and private sector workers, like including the health workers and education workers, they are all together with the NUG and they're not taking the order from the military hunter, but instead they're taking the order from the since the time of the CRPH, such as like forming the local administration committees, taking control of their own administration. If you actually listen and hear, you will actually see many of the places are controlled by the people themselves. They are already like running this administration by themselves. And in that sense, the NUG is not a parallel, I mean, sorry, not a parallel, not a shadow, but it is an interim government. Of course it is very challenging because they've been under the severe attack. They've been under the severe attack by this military individually, as well as the government, of course since the February 1st. So it is very normal for them to be able to be operating in a very unusual, abnormal, unusual circumstances and environment and the nature of the work that they have to do. But that's a very reason, that's a very reason. We're calling on the international community, like Janelle already said, we will like the international community, international governments to see that the NUG is the people representative, legitimate government. In fact, right now the permanent representative, the ambassador to the United Nations in New York, Mr. John Motto, he is actually, he is the ambassador appointed by the NUG. So what we have is it is a legitimate government. So I think we really need the international community to understand that, but at the same time, I would like to also say that our country ever since we gained independence from British in 1948, we never had a chance to really walk on the nation building process. We never had it because ever since 1962, that was the first military coup, 1988, another military coup, but the military coup by the state, by the same military, you know? So now this is another one, right? So what we're having this military coup after, one after another, by the same military institution, which is blocking all the people of Myanmar, all the people of Myanmar from like a different ethnicity, you know, like a very diverse ethnicity with a very rich tradition of their own independence. But now coming together, wanting to have this federal democracy, but this military continued to remain as a stunning block. I think like, you know, for everybody, all the international governments who've been engaging with this country, who want to see the good in this country, which is also going to be good for, you know, all of the international community, that it is a very clear, they have to see very clearly that the military is the one who is a major stunning block, while the people are trying so hard to walk towards this federal democracy for them to be able to move forward. I think if the international community don't support the people's call, I don't know what else they're going to support. So in that people's call, the call is one of the call is to support this legitimate people representative, national unity government. Of course it is not perfect yet, you know, by the coming together in the end of their current circumstances, and how can they actually operate when the whole, the capital has been seized under the cease of this illegitimate military hunter? But what I'm trying to say here is, this is the government who need to be able to, who need to, who need the support in order for Myanmar people to move forward. I think that is so important, you know, for us to really see that. Okay. And I just want, yeah. Can I just, I just want to sort of push this back to Pak Rizal though, because I want to get a sense of how realistic this is. You know, you're a foreign policy realist. I mean, do you think there's any chance that the Indonesia or the governments of Southeast Asia would ever recognize the national unity government? And if not, is there some sort of gray zone in between where they can find a way to open channels of communication at least without formally recognizing the national unity government? Well, I think, you know, it's hard to go into that, you know, recognition game, but, you know, what I can tell you is actually, you know, it's very clear that the SAC or the Tarmada is not legitimate, you know, a ruling party, you know, government in Myanmar, because ASEAN in 2005 already issued, you know, a joint communique or an understanding that ASEAN should never condone any unconstitutional, you know, takeover or change of government than that 2005, even though after that, you know, ASEAN didn't do anything when the junta in Thailand, you know, also did a coup, and then another coup, you know, in Thailand as well. But this time, you know, I think, you know, there is this clear understanding within ASEAN that, you know, we should never allow any coup, you know, because there is no good coup or bad coup, like what, how they describe it in Thailand, coup is all bad, you know, said we should not accept the coup as the mechanism to change, you know, government. So this, you know, Myanmar crisis is actually demonstrated that because, you know, everyone in ASEAN really want to put a stop to that, you know, want to tell the SAC that, you know, you're not really legitimate. And also, you know, this is, I think, Ambassador Scormersio would understand better that, you know, symbolically speaking, nobody referred to the general as the head of government when he was in Jakarta. All of them actually referred to him as the commander of the armed forces or the commander of the TAN model. That I think is quite, you know, critical. If, you know, you expect that all ASEAN who officially formally recognize NUD, I don't see that's wrong happening because, you know, it's very difficult to get even the date for the summit, remember? Let alone, you know, on this particular sensitive, you know, issue, you know, among the ASEAN members there. And Janelle, I want to come to you with a question actually from Nicholas Copple, who's a former Australian ambassador as well in Yangon. I mean, he's asked, how does recognition of the National Unity Government end the coup? How does it actually help stop the violence and move things forward? Isn't it just symbolic, even if it were to happen? Symbolism is important and it's practiced all the time as Nicholas would know as a diplomat. So symbolism and posture is important. And it's giving a message to the general Minong line that you're not legitimate, you're not acceptable and it's not devoid of mounting pressure to stop the violence. So it's not an either or, but I understand where Nicholas questions coming from. So that's what I would say there. And I do understand about how difficult it will be for some to give recognition, but you've got to call for the ideal and then work with what we have. And I've said shorter recognition, absolute dialogue, talking, inclusion, et cetera. And one thing Scott said, it was about how it can be difficult with the financial sanctions. We know a lot more about the economy and where the general's money is now than we ever did before. So there's groups working on that at the moment and looking at the legal basis of seizing some to go into escrow and things like that. So it is difficult, but we know more. And because with the economy, the only people trashing the economy is General Minong Line and people. One other thing, and I think it was, Pak Rizal, you mentioned about the constitutionality and things like that. There's an Asian constitutional courts and equivalent institutions grouping with 19 members. I think General Minong Line's just been invited to Kazakhstan to talk about their constitutional issues, but some of the ASEAN and other players are in that. And so these are all the mechanisms we need to look at. There are many and work on things like that. ODA, IDA, we really have to redirect a lot of that to civilian activities. And I know that the UN are discussing that at the moment. I just saw Samantha Powers just been endorsed as head of USAID. So I'm sure Scott will be talking to Sam. And so we need to reach out and make sure that it happens. And just one other point. So I went off track a bit, but I did answer Nicholas's question. It's a really important posture by people to be engaged with the NUG. Last point, CRPH, that is the parliamentary body. I'm very engaged with them and they're engaged with the IPU into parliamentary union, 179 parliaments. And so I'm engaged in the parliamentary activities with the ASEAN, parliamentarians, IPAN, et cetera. We're trying to work at that level as well. Ben, can I say something? Yeah, I mean, thanks, Canada. Yeah, I just want to say that like, you know, I mean, like recognizing NUG is not only like by recognizing them per se, you know, like if that is by diplomatically in some way, it's not. I mean, in real politics, let's put it that way. If it's not possible, but there are other practical actions to recognize the NUG or the people's will is such as like, for example, sanctioned the first number one and number two, sanctioned May Online and so on. Why not, right? I mean, you know, in 2018, Australia sanctioned five military officers who are in response to the Rohingya genocide. But then why not sanction the May Online since then? Who is there, you know, like in charge of the command of the Rohingya genocide? So my point here is, of course, if there is a will, there is always, you know, if there is a will, there are always, you know, way, which I think for the Australian government, I would think as a first step, even to take the sanction, these two military generals will be a big step, the people of Myanmar and the NUG will greatly appreciate it because it falls under the cause of the people's desire, no? Thanks, Kenoma, and thanks, Janelle. I think you make a good point about parliamentarians there as well, because if there are difficulties around acknowledging a government, we can certainly acknowledge that these are legitimate parliamentarians and there might be more interesting ways for Southeast Asian parliamentarians as well and others to do more. Scott, I think you were trying to come in as well. Go ahead. Yeah, I just wanted to add to a couple points that Janelle and Kenoma said in response to Ambassador Nicholas Koppel's question. I think at this point, you know, the international community has a limited role here. I mean, most, the outcome in Myanmar is gonna be decided mostly by people in Myanmar as it should be. But I think part of the calculation for the international community is to try to change the calculations of the military leaders. And part of that involves trying to get them to come to the conclusion that they can't really win. I think they expected that this would, who would be accepted both domestically and internationally much more than it has been. It's really important that they continue to believe that it's not accepted and that there's not really any way out. To me, the end state, the end goal realistically, and again, I defer to the Myanmar people, I'm an outsider, is for the home to reach the point that this isn't working, we need to try to find a way out. And part of that is, no matter what you do, the people of the country aren't gonna accept this coup and the world's not gonna accept you. And I think that's why the, whether it's recognition or just dialogue with the NUG and avoiding anything that confers legitimacy on the military is part of that overall strategy. Before we turn to more questions from the audience, I wanna turn to the elephant in the room, which is China. Beijing obviously has big interests and big leverage in Myanmar with its long land border, extensive trade and investment relationships, good political connections in the past with Ong San Suu Kyi and perhaps more troubled relationship with the Tatma door. But China has called for the release of Ong San Suu Kyi, a return to stability, but it seems reluctant like a lot of Myanmar's near neighbors to exert too much pressure. I mean, Scott, I wanted to hear if Myanmar is one of those issues where the US and China might be able to collaborate where they can as Secretary of State Tony Blinken put it recently, means you think there's more that the US could be doing with China quietly to try and get on the same page, even if their approaches is different. Isn't the desired angle the same in Myanmar for now? Yeah, and to be honest, I'm not privy to whatever conversations are happening between Washington and Beijing on this. I just don't really know. And I certainly can't speak for the Chinese government, but my sense would be that this coup and certainly all the turmoil and violence and the aftermath, I don't see how it's in China's interest. Again, my sense is that China wants stability and for a whole host of reasons. And so my guess is they're not thrilled with this, but they're being cautious. So there may be some shared interest between the United States and China in certainly ending the violence and the instability and going back to, not going back, I should say going forward because I think going back isn't an option. Going forward to a situation where the people of the country are sufficiently satisfied with governance that they're willing to move forward or whatever that entails. So yeah, there may be an opportunity, again, of working US and China with others, including ASEAN, to see if there's enough common ground there. Yeah, I know that there's been talk of an ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting with potentially Secretary of State Blinken and Wang Yi from China involved as well. But Resolve, do you think that's likely? Can ASEAN be the force that actually brings the US and China together in a meaningful way or on the Myanmar question? At two points. One is of course, ASEAN expect that both the US and China can do and then work on their own in order to create change in Myanmar. So I don't think that ASEAN in a position to say criticize the sanctions imposed by the US on the generals. And I don't think that ASEAN will ever also criticize China for not imposing or for not taking the same policies with the US. That's the first point. The second point is that ASEAN just hope that whatever plan that we are going to have on the ground in Myanmar, then the US and China can also help to contribute to that plan in the future. Here, we are thinking about, for example, on the humanitarian assistance. It requires a huge operation once it's agreed upon by parties in Myanmar. So that's where I think ASEAN would expect the support from the US, the support from China, and so far, only Australia already patched support one day after the summit. And then I think ASEAN really appreciate that because they need all those support in order to move ahead. I'm going to turn to questions from the audience who have been inundated, which is great. So thanks so much. I'll try to get through as many as I can, but apologies if we don't get through them all. But if the panelists can respond quickly, then hopefully we can get through more questions. So the first one is from Tony Betz. And he asks about the level of gender inequality in Myanmar society. So given this gender inequality, how will the crisis impact women and how can we address this imbalance? So Kenoma, I might come to you first on that one. Thank you. Yeah, the gender inequality has been, of course, like a Burma politics, Myanmar politics always been male dominated traditionally. But I have to say that especially over the last 10 years, women really strive hard to take the important roles, decision-making's being a part of their peace process and all of that, like leading in the civil society sector. But right now with this coup, of course, you can imagine of what is really happening right now, especially the young, this movement, women are at the forefront, especially the young women. Now many of them are in detention, facing the sexual assault, sexual violence and rape, and including the LGBTIQ, they are all facing extreme violence like this. But again, we have to see that this Myanmar military, they have used all along, they've used the rape and sexual violence against the ethnic women in their campaigns throughout. So there is this impunity is so entrenched and embedded when it comes to sexual violence against women in the society. So right now what we really need is we need all the help we can to get the support from international community for these women by like supporting the women actors in the movement, including those in the national unity government that there are many ministers taking the post, women are taking the ministry of post. And they need the support. And like also these women human rights defenders, activists, journalists, their names need to be called out and their release must be called, like demanded. And their families must be supported. And also like demanding for them to have access to the legal assistance. So there are many of these practical needs are meeting at the moment. There are many women in the ethnic areas, there's so much of the, what do you call it? Humanitarian needs are also there. The women organizations are very strong in Myanmar, very resilient also, their capacity is enormous. And they know what to do and how to do it, what they need is the practical support, including the financial support for the cross border aid in order to get the assistance to the needy people, including the women and children in the country. Thanks Ken Emma. The next question is from Emma Connors from the Australian Financial Review who's asking about the Yadana gas project, which is a huge gas project involving Chevron from the US, France's Total and Myanmar Oil and Gas Group. And she's asking, should multinational parties in the Yadana gas field and pipeline shut down production? I might ask you Scott, because you were talking about cutting off sources of finance. So do you think this is what should happen? Chevron and other multinational oil and gas companies should be shutting down their projects to cut off the flow of money? Or do you think that would have potentially negative knock on effects? I think that this is, I assume this is being looked at by a lot of governments, perhaps including my own, I'm not sure. I think it depends on sort of going through the various scenarios and how would it play out? If there is, I mean, a lot of that gas, for example, goes to Thailand. What are the implications of cutting off, I guess? I think the ideas I've heard have been not so much pulling out or cutting off but possibly paying the royalties or whatever it's called into an escrow fund as opposed to paying it to the government. If it can be done in a way that squeezes the government, then I think it's certainly something that should be looked at, but I just don't know enough about the details of how the operation and the financial flows work to say absolutely. And Janelle, more generally, do you think that the private sector has a responsibility here to put more pressure on the military? And what should they be doing? And there's a lot of Australia and a lot of US and one of Southeast Asian companies who went into Myanmar in the last few years with promise of high growth. How do you think they should be responding to try and get the best outcome? They should use leverage. They've got the commercial, the economic leverage to put pressure on the regime because we all talk about pressure to stop the killing, do all the things. So use it. In the, when the coup happened and Dr. Tonelle was detained, I spoke to the head of Woodside, our company, you know, the Australians and asked him to do everything he could possibly do. I mean, I did that quietly, not so quietly now, but you know, so there's things like that we can do. There is a group, as I referred to before, of serious economist bankers working on how that money, as you say, Scott, can be directed into an escrow account, the money that would be paid to General Minong Line and all the two companies of the military. And in the court of a public opinion, that it'd certainly be popular and looking at the legal basis of it because the companies have contractual. You know, I can say, look, Chevron, get out. I said that in 1990, I think, or whatever it was, it's not gonna, they're not gonna get out. Don't matter what we say. So let's, the ones that are there, let's work with them and get the best we can for the people and the people's representatives. Thanks. Next question is. Can I say something very quickly? Can I say, yeah, I just want to say that our civil society organizations, more than 400 have been sending letters through Total and Chevron. And the call is very simple. Stop making the payment to this military hunter. Instead, you know, like a result, like a, what do you call it? Put those money in the secure account for the people of Obama until the democracy is done. So it's a very clear call and I hope they will actually complain to them. Yeah. Thanks. Can I? Next question is from Ralph Costa for Part Result. Given that ASEAN consensus makes any meaningful response unlikely, is it time for Indonesia to step up unilaterally with Jaco'i threatening to recognize the NUG as the legitimate government if the junta doesn't take action to stop the killing immediately? Well, you know, it's not the habit of by Jaco'i to issue threats, you know? And I think even though, you know, Indonesia will always prefer to work within ASEAN, but of course as a suffering state, you know, we also have our own options available on the table. So, you know, I can't say that, you know, if ASEAN fails, then, you know, Indonesia is not going to do anything. So I'm sure that, you know, there will be also other alternative options available. But again, Indonesia has no leverage in Myanmar, to be frank. So whatever options available or we are considering to take if ASEAN can no longer work on this issue. And then of course it must be done, you know, in coordination with other actors and players as well. Thanks for the next question is from Zareer Banji. He says, the atrocities committed by the Tap Maduro are well known to everyone. However, has anyone suggested a workable exit plan for them to consider, especially one that's acceptable to all parties? So is there an off-ramp that can be offered to the Tap Maduro that they might take? If this, you know, this coup does seem to have failed in some senses, is there any way forward that could offer an exit ramp to minimal lying that the military would take and that the civil society in Myanmar would be happy with? What do you think, Kenema? I think the first and foremost important step is to ensure that this attempted coup is completely failed. In order for that to happen, is all of these different punitive actions or pressure that needs to be happened first. Only then, I will say only then, it will be for the Myanmar people together with the National Unity Government to really engage with the international community for that exit strategy for the Tap Maduro. I think for us to say right now, while the people are under the complete terror campaign by this military hunter, it would not be fair to our people. It would not be not the right time to actually talk about it until this military comes to be stopped. I think that's, I mean, the current violence come to be stopped and only then, I think that step should be discussed or you all should be hear out from the people of Myanmar because only then, Myanmar people will also be able to think of what would be the exit strategy for this military? Of course, you know, like pragmatically, everybody knows that this military cannot be kicked into the Indian Ocean. By that, you know, like what is the way out and the solution, but that solution can only be thought through carefully and only when the violence is stopped. But also, we know all of us, you know, throughout the history in Myanmar, Burma, we know that anti-unless we address the military impunity, anti-unless we hold these perpetrators for generations to account, anti-unless we include the transitional justice that is accepted by the Myanmar people. Whatever the solution will not be sustainable, even though let's say that it is imposed by the Myanmar people, by the outside actors, it will not be a sustainable solution that we will see the vicious cycle come back again and again, yeah. What about Janelle? I know you talked to a lot of different parties in Myanmar and you've dealt with a lot of people in the military in the past. Do you see any kind of way they can be convinced to take an off-ramp? They're worried about the International Court of Justice case. They're worried about the ICC and they're worried about their money and also their status. So there's four things that they worry about at the moment. The 2008 constitution, which they say is alive, but which is dead in the eyes of the civilian actors and the government, it's got some protection in there for them. And, you know, but I agree with Kinomah, it's a bit soon to be heading down that track, but they're the things I know they're scared of and people often say they're impervious. My sort of somewhat 30 years experience of watching them tells me they're not impervious and, you know, they do want to be part of the international community in some way. They certainly do the regional community. You know, they want to be that. And I'll just tell a little story that, you know, I hadn't told till recently, but when I was meeting with some of President Uthayn Sain's ministers, his key six, they asked me how to get him a Nobel Peace Prize. And I kept a straight face. And I said, someone had, I said, well, and they talked about South Africa, of course. And I said, well, some, you actually have to do something. They were, that was a negotiated settlement. This is a decreed process in Myanmar, but the point I'm coming to, I could tell more stories like that. And, but they do want recognition in some way. So, you know, they're the factors in terms of the politics of it. No, not now. And a question from Amanda Hodge from the Australian. She asking Pat Rizal. Some say that the ASEAN meeting has allowed countries like Australia to sit back and simply say they're following ASEAN's lead, using it as a cover not to act. Do you think countries like Australia should do more? And I guess you could even argue the same for the US and India and Japan and others. Are they hiding behind ASEAN? Well, I think, you know, we already discussed, you know, that point, you know, so I do believe that, you know, Australia can also, of course, you know, do more unilaterally. But, you know, I think, you know, there are a lot of opportunities for Australia to work, you know, with ASEAN, you know, if, you know, the plans, you know, goes through in the next few weeks. So I don't, I don't, you know, really see that, you know, some countries like hiding behind ASEAN or not hiding behind ASEAN. If I may, and I would like to go back to that point, you know, the way out. So I think the time model should take this, you know, temporary way out offered by ASEAN at the moment. So which is, you know, they have to stop the violence. Then, you know, we can actually start preparing for the humanitarian assistance. Then of course, it's really up to the people of Myanmar themselves to decide what sort of political, you know, solution that they want to have, you know, in the third elements of the consensus, the so-called inclusive dialogue. Dialogue is only, you know, one format, if you like, you know, in order to find the political solution. There are a lot of models that, you know, we can take lessons from, either the South Korean model, if you remember, in 1998, I think, in 1988, when they get rid of this military dictatorship as well, and that they kill all the generals, and there is also an Indonesian model, you know, all Thai model, if you like. So, you know, these models, you know, I think can serve as the reference, but not the, you know, the recipe for Myanmar. The Myanmar themselves, you know, need to find what sort of arrangement. But I think the bottom line is that the military should withdraw from politics. That's universal in any democracy. It's true in Indonesia. It's true also, you know, in South Korea, and true also in many Latin American countries. And then I think we made a mistake, you know, by Scott, you know, in 2010 to 2015, you know, we thought democratization process in Myanmar already, you know, done deal, but actually it was not. So we didn't, you know, help them with the military reform, like, you know, what a lot of, you know, Indonesian friends did in Indonesia from 98 to 2005. Then can I say something very quickly? Yeah, sure. Just to follow on Park Resolve is also like Myanmar people are basically saying, like, you know, we're done with this military. What that means is that they want to see the military completely out of the politics and business as well. But also one thing, a very important point, when I said that the first step, the first benchmark in order to take to the next level, to think about what is the way out, will be to end the violence. That includes the release of, you know, more than 4,000 getting to almost, getting to almost 5,000 people that they have already detained. And that those, you know, like a detainees must be released in that, you know, concept of the ending the violence. Yeah, thanks. Thanks. So we just have two minutes left. So I've got a good last question from Teresa Boer, a barrister, which I'll give to Scott first and then Janelle for the last word, but one minute each. What are your predictions for where Myanmar goes next? An easy question in 60 seconds. You know, there's, it's really impossible to predict. I would say the most likely scenario over the next several months, which is as far as I could go, is sadly probably more of the same. I don't see either side. I don't see the top of now giving in. I certainly don't see the people accepting this coup. I hope there is a way that the ASEAN initiative can make a little bit of headway and begin a process, but most likely scenario sadly is more of the same, which means a lot more suffering sadly. And Janelle, where do you think things are going? And maybe to lift things up, what can the rest of us practically do to help, I guess? Look, it will be more of the same for a while because General Minong Line says stability has to return before he'll consider the five points consensus of ASEAN. He made that announcement. But what we can do, I agree with Scott, back in the, back in that consensus with ASEAN, but still act unilaterally. So we do both things, operate there and support the people of Myanmar don't support the military because it's hard to predict where it will go, but I will predict ultimately General Minong Line will fail and the people or peoples of Myanmar will prevail. Well, let's hope you're right, Janelle. So thanks so much for your insights. Thanks, Scott, Pat Rizal and Kinomar as well. And thank you, everyone, for listening to this Lowy Institute event and see you all next time soon. Bye-bye for now.