 Hi, good morning, everybody, and welcome to this panel, which I think may develop a few sparks as we go along here, if I've got my thinking job on right here. I want to thank Terry for inviting me. This is my first World Policy Conference, so I want to thank him for inviting me to what has been a very interesting experience. We've heard a lot of interesting remarks all the way along the line. And I'd like to thank you all for joining us for this panel on the consequences of Trump. Let's see how far we can get before we get as divided as the American political scene is these days. And it seems from the first few days here at Marrakesh that we've been talking around a subject that we're now going to talk about directly. It's the elephant in the room. And when I say elephant, I mean anyone? Yeah, you've got it, Virginia. It's Donald Trump. And I didn't have to say it. He's always been sort of the orange-haired specter behind each one of these panels. We hear the impact he's having around the world. And so I think this morning it'll be interesting for us to see if we can analyze that impact a little bit. As I reflected on the subject, I thought, well, maybe I should look at this sort of geographically. You know, when you look at it a geographic frame, where has Trump had some kind of impact? Where are there some consequences of his three-year-old presidency? Well, it's just like everywhere. Chinese trade war, decoupling, India, the way that Modi was encouraged to go after Kashmir, in Syria, what we see witnessing happening right now in Syria, and putting American armed forces in jeopardy along the way, with Iran, the JCPOA, Saudi Arabia, more weapons and American soldiers on their way, American mercenaries, maybe I should say, on their way. Israel, the way Netanyahu has been inspired, and Trump's son-in-law has come up with a rather one-sided Middle East peace plan in Europe, the encouragement for Brexit in Europe, the way he discouraged NATO in Europe, the encouragement of populism. So everywhere you look, and you include South America for that, Mexico and Canada, NAFTA, Japan and the threats of tariffs, North Korea, South Korea, you know, you name it. Everywhere you look, there's something, there's been some effect from Trump. As Thierry mentioned in his opening remarks here, you see the shadow of the White House everywhere. So we have panelists from everywhere who I think will be able to let us know about what they see as some of the consequences of Trump. We have Renaud Girard, who is the esteemed senior reporter and war correspondent for LaFiguero in Paris, my colleague, Modo Shigo Ito, who, Modo is on the Japanese Council on Economic and Physical Policy, and he is known well in Japan as the father of Abenomics. We have, next is Jean-Claude Gruffin, who's my colleague on the American Hospital Board in Paris. And he described himself the other day as a French banker in the United States and an American banker in France, who does both, Joseph Joffey from Desite, the publisher and editor of Desite, and who else? We've got Lin Chao, Lin being the Chinese representative here on the panel. He is the vice chairman and secretary general of the Shanghai Development Research Foundation, which is an independent Chinese think tank. And finally, at the end, last but not least, John Sawyer, who is on the Newbridge Advisory Council. He's the executive chairman of the Newbridge Advisory Council and a senior advisor of Chatham House. And more importantly, perhaps, he's the former head of intelligence, British intelligence, MI6. So we have a pretty complete panel. And we decided at lunch yesterday, we had such an interesting lunch. We were so taken with our lunchtime conversation that we decided we would try to keep up our brilliant remarks for you today and kind of approach this panel somewhat differently. So I have asked each of our panelists to summarize in three words the first three years of Trump, what their impressions are, what they would say, how would they react in just three words. So, Renaud, your three words, please. In three words only, after three years of Trump, what consequences do we have on the world? Well, we have a close-up between Russia and China, okay? Yeah, I just like to just emphasize only one thing about what I call the globalization dilemma. I mean, the globalization and democracy and sovereign, national sovereignty, that's three are very much related and maybe very convenient way to look at what's happened now. Okay. Jean-Claude? Jim, I give you two versions. You pick the one you want. The first one is unpredictable, erratic, versatile, that's the individual. And then on the policy side, a very consequential presidency. Very consequential presidency, okay? Yeah. Maybe you can explain that a little later on. Joseph? In French, plus a change, meaning there's a lot more continuity between Trump and his predecessor Obama than meets the eye and that will continue even if we have a democratic administration in 1921. Edward Shaw? Three words I want to use. The first one is ignorant in foreign trade and a global supply chain. Second is stubborn, all you may call persistent. The last one is unpredictable. Unpredictable. Yeah. And John, the view from Britain. Well, it's not so much a view from Britain. It's a view from me, but I think the first striking thing about Trump is his approach to business and his deregulating style. I think we should acknowledge that as a significant shift from his predecessors. The deregulating is the first. The second, and you've described it, his approach to the world is disruptive. And the third, I think you have to say, is he's damaging. According to the global public goods. All in all, I would say kind of a negative assessment of the Trump three years. There are a few maybe positives in there. I could see maybe a few positive signs, but not particularly positive for Mr. Trump. I don't know how many Trump voters we have on the panel, but in any case. So let me just begin the discussion and feel free to jump in and disagree with each other and that sort of thing. I want to begin with Reynolds here to ask him, because his president, Mr. Macron, has made a thing of being the Trump whisper. He's the person who seems to be the only world leader who can get along with Trump. And I guess the question is, how has he managed to do that? But also, what has he gotten back from Mr. Trump in return for his attitude towards the United States? I totally agree with what Jim just said. That is to say that Macron actually only had the intelligence to understand that Trump was very sensitive to the personal relationship, which did not read the notes that were made to him. Very sensitive to direct explanations between leaders. But that, he understood. And this particular aspect of Trump's personality can have harmful consequences. We saw it in a telephone conversation that he had on October 6th, last year with President Erdogan, where the Turkish president managed to get a green light from him to invade the north of Syria. But with Macron, I think it works. I think that at the beginning, obviously, it's a bit patchy, but we can't, of course, make Trump's convictions completely change, which has always been very, very strong. So it didn't work on the climate, it didn't work at the beginning on the JCPOA, on Iran, on the nuclear agreement, on Iran. Macron didn't manage to get Trump back in the back. But on the other hand, I think that now, this personal relationship that began with breakfast at the Eiffel Tower, he had a fairly important role in Macron. And we saw it in Biarritz, for example. In Biarritz, he did an incredible maneuver, that is to say that he managed to isolate completely Trump from his ministers. It was not planned. He took it apart. He, Bolton, was more than 200 meters away. And without an interpreter, he spoke to him for two hours. And it's there, obviously, that he trusted him. I asked him, do you see any inconvenience? Do I invite Zarif, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Iranian, to discuss with him. It's there that, obviously, Trump gave him a green light. A green light that was normal. We can't make a conference where the American president is there. He was asked to invite him, which could be an enemy. And so it worked. And Macron did not manage to make the meeting he tried to make in New York between President Rouhani and President Trump, the Iranian president. But it's not serious. Why didn't it work? Because Rouhani is not the leader of Iran. He is the head of the regime. But it's not the Iranian leader. The Iranian leader is the Ayatollah Ramanei. And Ramanei did not give the authorization to Rouhani to make this meeting with Trump. But we can't criticize Macron on this, even if he failed. Because indisputably, indisputably, the cause of peace in the Persian Gulf has progressed after Biarritz. No one can deny it. Another favorite element of Macron's policy in the eyes of Trump is on Russia. I think Macron tried to bring Russia closer to the international community in the discussion. I think Macron understood that it was a madness to want to throw Russians in the arms of the Chinese. And we'll see if it works. It's in Trump's hands. It's very important. There was the breakfast dinner. How are we going to have the meeting in Paris of the Normandy format, that is to say with the French-Ukrainian-Russian German leader, who should arrive, I think, in November or maybe in December? Are we going to move forward on the Donbass file? It's possible, since we have a new gift with the Ukrainian president Zelensky. It's quite possible. And if we move forward on the Donbass field, that is to say, if we regulate the Donbass, we move forward to a Donbass regulation, which is not an easy solution. Amnesty, cultural autonomy, but not political autonomy of the Donbass. That's what the deal is. If we move forward on that, we may be able to have a discussion between the Europeans, the Americans, and especially the Europeans and the Russians on the Middle East. Because, of course, we have the Syrian deal. We show that we need a cooperation between the Russians and the Russians. So, to conclude, what is the situation in America today? The situation in America is that Biden is dead. His candidature is dead. Everyone understood it because of the Hunter, his son. So Elizabeth Warren is getting on. Not everybody would agree with that. I give my interpretation. Next year, you can tell me that I was wrong. I give my interpretation. Elizabeth Warren is getting on. But as she has extremely left-wing ideas, it seems, especially I think she recently proposed to remove the body of the border guards in a way that is American, it will be quite easy for Trump to make a campaign directed against her with only one slogan, and there is no more, which will be Pongkaotas. Pongkaotas is what she calls it. Pongkaotas wants to transform America into a sidewalk. It can work. And so what I'm saying here is that I think that Trump can be elected to still be elected president. In this case, I find that Macron had reason to anticipate. And because if we still have four years of Trump, well, Macron will be there, because I think he also has a very strong chance to be elected himself. Macron will be there to do what we call, and this will be my only word in English of this session, to do what we call, in English, four years of damage control. So as you see it, no negative consequences for Macron, in the sense that Trump's famous for throwing his friends under the bus. So I mean, you know, there's been no negative consequences. I don't think so. No, I don't think at all. I don't think it's negative at all on Macron. I don't think at all. Even there are people who mock him. Here he tried in New York. He waited in a hotel room, etc. And then, and then, the cause of the pain was not superior. I don't think at all that we can reproach him. He does everything. It would still be very serious that there is a fourth war in the Persian Gulf. We have seen the catastrophic consequences of the American war in Iraq from 2003. So I think Macron does everything to find a deal between Iran and America. The deal, it's like Ukraine, we know very well what the deal is. The deal is the abandonment of what we call, in English, the sunset closers. That is to say that Iran never gives up nuclear weapons. But of course, the Americans leave him his ax in the Arab capitals he conquered, that is to say Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut and Sana'a. With maybe the Iranians ready to let go of Yemen because it's not very interesting for them. So we will call it an ax, we will call it a common market. We will find a name a little softer. But that's the deal. The deal is ready. And Macron thinks that this deal can be reached and he is trying to reach it with Trump. And he has, of course, perfectly reason. And anyway, already outside, Macron has made progress the peace in the Persian Gulf. It's absolutely indeniable. Okay, thanks, Bernal. So, Motel, you wrote, if I'm not mistaken, back in 2017, the most worrying aspect of the Trump administration is its protectionist stance. Is that still the case? Do you still feel that way? And what about his criticism of the car companies in Japan invading the United States and the threat to imposed tariffs on the car companies and that sort of thing? Before just to answer your question, we have to distinguish two things. One thing is the result of the Mr. Trump's action, we are just observing what we are now here. But at the same time, there must be a reason why Mr. Trump was elected as president. So we have to thinking about why he was elected and he is doing this kind of business. And that is very much related to what I talked, the dilemma among three things, one is globalization and national sovereignty and democracy. Now when we have more globalization, probably we were in what we call the hyper-globalization in the last 20 years, and there's a lot of pressure for democracy to change. And that is what often people call the populism. So actually Japan was very much used to very severe trade negotiations with the United States for many years. So we know how we should just respond to this. You've adapted to Trump? You've adopted Trump? No, no, just the United States in general. My point is, so Mr. Trump may be populism stage one. And there must be maybe populism in stage two. As long as globalization is continuing, there's always pressure for democracy to be eroded by populism. So we have already just heard the name of the Edelso Boland. I don't know whether she's going to be the next president or not. But the important thing is whether Mr. Trump is continuing or maybe we have some other very leftist, maybe Democrat or whatever. And then we still have to just prepare for the, we have to work on the populism. And another thing I want to emphasize is when you are facing that kind of protectionism, the negotiation is often not just go ahead rather than defending your previous position. Now when Mr. Trump became president, Japan and other Asian Pacific countries were already almost finishing the negotiation on TPP, Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, then unfortunately Mr. Trump just decided or mentioned the United States getting out of the TPP. So our purpose is very obvious. One is how we can survive the TPP. And second, how can we deal with the United States? That is exactly the reason why Japan had a bilateral negotiation with the United States. And in order to just have a... You would prefer to have a bilateral conversation than a multilateral conversation with the framework of the TPP? We needed necessarily a bilateral conversation necessary to survive. I mean like the TPP for us to just finish even without the United States, we need some kind of implicit agreement of the United States for us to continue the negotiation. And the TPP result is actually giving some kind of discriminatory treatment against the United States because other TPP members enjoy declining telephone beef. But that may be a very good weapon for us to just have a deal with the United States that giving a very similar type of telephone reduction may just have incentive for the United States not to raise the telephone in the car. So it is not just forward-looking, it's more defending. But that is a very important part of the bilateral negotiation when you're facing protectionism. But it has to be a bilateral... I mean you're working bilaterally rather than through any kind of an international organization. So it's a little bit difficult for other countries to have the same kind of bilateral relationship. Yes, yes. Jean-Claude, you said a consequential presidency, so why? What does that mean exactly? Let me start by asking the audience and the panel. How many of you are going to vote at the next presidential election in the United States? That's the problem. Because everybody in this room has an opinion, who should be the next president of the United States? Well, there may be some non-Americans in this room, so Trump wouldn't allow them to vote. They've got to have a proper ID card. What I mean by that, everybody has an opinion who should be president of the United States. The bad news is that only the American citizen vote. It takes 60 million people, plus give and take a few, to elect the president of the United States. And the people who are going to vote at the next presidential election, as they have in the past prior election, are not voting on trade unless it affects their own situation. If they are selling soybeans from Hyowat to China, they have a view on trade. Or if they are from Wisconsin and they're selling milk to Canada, USMCA gives 5% more access. Not yet approved by Congress, as you know. This is the new NAFTA or Alina, as you call it here. USMCA gives an additional 5% of market access for milk product from Wisconsin, which is a milk state, as we all know, to Canada. A state which Mr. Trump barely wants. What I mean by that is that the American people, the American citizen care about international policy, when it affects their own personal selfish interest. Or when they belong to a community, that's very important. And has some influence on the political process. And I'll take two examples, and I won't elaborate on that. The Irish community, we've seen that in the past. And obviously the Israeli community or the Jewish community. And that's where you see that they have a view and strong view. Now, why consequential? I'm not trying to run away from your question. Well, again, I mean, I will give you a few examples, positive and negative. You do it the way you want. I will tell you my own personal view. I'm not trying to pre-empt John, but I mean, I agree with deregulation is, to me, one of very critical ones, and I can come back to that. The other one is the judicial process. We have a country that has a three-power structure, legislative, executive, and judicial. And start with the Supreme Court, federal court, and so on and so forth. I have some statistics we can get back to that. But clearly, the judicial process, the number of judicial appointments that have been made since the beginning of the Trump administration is something that's very critical and very important for the Republican Party. The Republican Party don't like Trump. Trump hijacked the Republican Party. They don't like him as a person, but it delivers what they want. So they accept the tweet and they accept his personal attitude and a lot of things that they hate because they're getting what they think is essential. And again, I mean, deregulation because it's good for business, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprise. Judicial process, now they're also getting more. And I know we're going to talk about Turkey and Kurds and so on. But there is less and less. And I think this is very much a bipartisan effort. We've talked about it the last few days. There is less engagement, not the prior panel, the one before who talks about the Middle East, said there is less engagement in the US. This is not something that the Republicans are more interventionist traditionally than the Democrat. But now Trump is not a Republican. Trump was a registered Democrat most of his life. When he was not registered, Democrat, he was an independent. And you know that the 2016 primary election in New York, his children couldn't vote because this is what you call a close primary. They couldn't vote because they were not registered Republicans six months before the election. So I mean, this is the reality. He hijacked the Republican Party. He does not represent the Republican Party. But the Republican Party gets something out of him and they accept the rest because on balance, they feel that they get what's important. But from your standpoint, you would think that Trump was a game changer when you compared to Obama, that his time in office already has accomplished. Not everything, not everything, but in certain aspects. Yes, definitely in foreign policy, there are Obama at the surge in Afghanistan and so on and so forth. Trump said that he was against Iraq war in 2003. That's not true. But he campaigned and said, I'm against foreign engagement. I'm not for regime change. And look, and you know, he appointed Bolton, but everybody knew that I was a mistake and he was five Bolton at some point. That's exactly what happened. And what he's doing now in northern Syria is something that's very disturbing for many people from the modern and ethical standpoint. But this is consistent with the view that a lot of Americans, Democrats and Republicans, feel that this is not the role of the United States to settle every international conflict on the other side of the world. There's been enormous pushback on that from even the Republicans who, you know. I know that, but there are also people who are, I mean, one of my argument is that one of the consequential aspect of the Trump election on foreign policy has been what I call the defeat of the Neocons. The Neocons have lost. And that was not obvious. And I think it's a positive thing. And I can continue on that. I'm sure you can. Joseph, so you said the plus a chance plus a rest of them. So in a way, you two are kind of on different sides of the equation here. You basically are saying that things are basically the same as under the Obama administration, aren't you? Or maybe you want to flush that out a little. I think it's important to note these continuities. I mean, I'm not going to compare Obama in terms of breach of etiquette and nastiness with Trump. But there is more similarity between them than meets the eye, three points. Trump keeps threatening allies to raise defense spending and the threat is you pay up or we move out. Now, that's exactly the line that Obama had in his interview with the Atlantic. He said, free riders aggravate me. That's Trumpian speak. And he meant the Europeans. We guys, we protect you and you don't do enough for yourself. Second point, recall that it was Obama who drew down troops in Europe to a rock bottom of some 30,000. And so that's part of a general retrenchment. Recall third that it was Obama, not just Trump who tried to withdraw forces, American forces from all over the world, like Afghanistan, then you had to have a surge. But the instinct is retrenchment, if not retraction. And what is the impetus behind it? That's where more continuity comes in. One of the oft-repeated lines on the part of President Obama was, it's time for a little nation building at home. In other words, let's take those resources and invest them at home in infrastructure, what have you. That's exactly the line that Trump has been pursuing. It's time for spending our wealth, not on these wayward and sometimes this loyal allies, but on ourselves. So you're saying that it's not the content, is it? One more thing. Okay. Now if we shift forward, and that's to me the most interesting part of Korea, I think we are now in the middle, not in a three year cycle, but in the 11 year cycle, let's call it retrenchment or retraction. Now, assume a Democrat will win the presidency. You'll get the same thing. You'll get protectionism at home. You'll get retraction from abroad and spending money at home. And remember, that is not a revolutionary thing in American foreign policy. Those of, if you think back some almost 50 years during the Vietnam War and then I'll stop. What was the famous line which McGovern used in his campaign? Come home America. So that I think is the one line that unites Obama, Trump, the Democrat who might come in with the tradition that goes back 50 years to McGovern. In short and in conclusion, we are in a cycle, in a new cycle of American foreign policy which is older than the three years of Trump. And so it's, the content hasn't changed, but the presentation has changed under Trump. The presentation? Yeah. Oh, the style, of course. Style is... I don't want to talk about this, I mean we are familiar with Trump stuff. I'm running out of adjectives to describe it. But he's uncouth, he's brutal, he's nasty, he treats allies worse than adversaries. Sure, we should go on, we don't need to go on, but I'll talk about it later when we get to it. Of course, what he is doing unlike Obama, that's very important. He is destroying the framework of American post-war policy. And he's turning an old non-zero-sum game, meaning all of us can win into zero-sum game. Right. I will use my power, my superior power, to screw you and to my gains are your losses. Yeah. Now, Chow, you had probably the harshest words for Trump. You called him ignorant, stubborn, and unpredictable. I don't think I have to ask what you meant by that. I can probably figure it out. But let me just play it against the current talks going on between China and the United States. Mr. Trump over the weekend said a big deal has just, it's huge, a huge deal has just been reached with China. But you've got some more insight into exactly how big that deal was, right? Yeah. Or is. Yeah, I want to start talking about the so-called minute deal just reached several days ago. As you point out, Mr. Trump's claim is a substantial or big deal. But please remember, just one or two weeks ago, he strongly claimed he wants a comprehensive deal, no partial deal. Everybody know that. But why suddenly change? I guess from his perspective, I guess it's not not difficult to understand. His final goal is to be re-elected in 2020. That's his personal final goal. Support his goal. There are the two considerations. First one, he wants to solidly fire his base in Middle East. That's best way is China by criticizing, strong to China. Second consideration is keep U.S. economy from be weakening, from recession. So you look at all of his action, just swing between these two considerations. Sometime first consideration prevails. Sometime second consideration prevails. This time second consideration prevails. Why? You look at the figure, now U.S. economy started to weakening, particularly in manufacture. Lots of data show that. So that case in the deal, so-called deal, China agreed to purchase annually 40 to 50 billion U.S. agricultural products which give Trump good reason or excuse he can claim. He obtained a victor, particularly to his base. But he did not get any major concessions from China, or at least, so far we're, let's just look. No, I'm not sure about that. I'd like to interject something on one of the things he said. Go ahead, did China make any major concessions as part of this deal? I don't think so. You know, Premier Liu He, I guess, in several months ago, he claimed China has three core concerns during the trade war. First one is if the deal done, all of the terrible increase have to be removed. That's the first one. Second one is increased purchase from U.S. export have to be reasonable, rational. Third one is the text of the agreement have to be well-balanced without holding sovereignty of China or dignity of China. The last one is more controversial. It's more complicated. So in this deal, of course, China didn't give up. He's called, the last one, call council because that's the part of partial deal, not all of the deal. So I guess both sides do maybe a little step forward to have kind of compromising. Of course, I read some social media in China, some corner of China feel they're unhappy with the deal. They ask, what benefit for China? China, even without deal, they agree to purchase more agricultural product from U.S. Only U.S. agree to postpone increase from, a title from 25% to 30%, also during the meeting in White House, rather wider to jump in by saying, December 15, whether increase or not increase haven't not decide, obviously U.S. still try to use the tariff as a weapon to continue push China. Chuck, what were you gonna say? No, I wanted to say three things. When you say that manufacturing is weakening, this is true in certain states. Now remember, manufacturing is a very low component of the GDP in the United States, which is an economy largely based on services. So it's relevant as much as it is in a state that's considered to be a swing state. If it's in Michigan, if it's in North Carolina, or if it's in Wisconsin, Trump will care about. At the same time, you can't say that the economy is weakening because it has been acknowledged, published, very recently, the employment figure have never been so good in 50 years. And this is not what the administration says, this is the official statistic. We had the lowest unemployment that we've had in 50 years, and that's what matters at the end of the day. And in the relationship with China, I agree with you that Trump once said, I want a big deal and it will settle for anything that will help his reelection. So I think we all agree on that, I think we got it loud and clear, he's not hiding it in any way she performed. But the real issue are, as we well know, in the relationship with China, which are real, and Trump is raised these issues, but he's not prepared to deal with them because he knows that he can't deal with them in a relatively short period of time and that's not gonna help his reelection. This is intellectual property, this is the market access to mention too, this is unbalanced transfer of technology, and so I mean, we can name it, so we know what these issues are. That's not gonna change. But what matters is that if he gets a small deal and he can say, as I said before, with the mill producer in Wisconsin, look, I get you 5% more, that may shift some electoral votes and that's all he cares about. I mean, he's not trying to resolve the fundamental problem of the economy and the society in the US, he wants to get reelected. Just let me ask a question, if I may. If we were two broadcasters commenting on a football game, who won this game? I can't even, nobody win, nobody lose for many, for many deal. That's my life. It sounds like China won to me, you know. Yeah, I guess different people have different view. Why China agreed to do that, I guess two point. One is, the way doing that is a gradualism, which is called Chinese philosophy. China understand it's hard to make a comprehensive deal in short term, but gradually to reach some way which will create environment to be promote the further negotiation. One thing I want to point, in the trade war, China is under-defensive. That's very important. Also, you look at all of the facts. You're rather defensive in the sense that they were started by the United States. Yes. Also one thing I shouldn't remind, I feel very sorry, not many for mention that. Yes, many criticism to Mr. Xi Jinping. Yes, yesterday lunch Kevin said that. But Xi Jinping say one word, not very mention by many people, particularly in Western. He say, we have 1,000 reason to be have good relation with US. No single reason have the worst relation with US. That's very important. So general feeling is China want to make some compromise. That's the first point. The second point, China want to buy more time. Why? That high tech company to find some components made the non-US for export. Let them find more other market. As we heard in the high tech panel yesterday. Yeah. They also want to keep falling FDI stay as longer as possible in China. They don't want to decopying. Also from the survey of American Chamber in Shanghai. So far also I talked with my friend with that. Not many American company have already started move out. They keep hold because the cost of moving out is tremendous. But if the trade war stay longer, maybe some of them have to move out. While we've been speaking here, John's Queen has been addressing the parliament in the United Kingdom. Now I haven't been able to watch CNN for the last five minutes. But I can tell you that our analysts, I'm sure going over that speech with a fine tooth comb to see if there's any hint about the future of Brexit. So the question and I don't want to bring up Brexit in the middleist, but Trump plays into Brexit. He encouraged Brexit. He promised, or at least he indicated, that the United States would be willing to make up the trade deficit that might be after trade breaks off with Europe with the United States. The United States would make up. Do you have any confidence, John, that that would happen? Well, I don't want to talk about Brexit either. And I don't think Trump had any influence on the Brexit referendum at all. The original sin was David Cameron's and the fault was the British electorate's. And you can't, you may look for scapegoats, you may want to blame Trump, but he's been sort of firing up some of the rhetoric, but you can't blame Trump for that. But can you, do you have any faith that the United States is going to make up any kind of trade shortfall that Britain experienced? Absolutely not. I mean, what we're seeing with President Trump is a more nationalist leader. And I take seriously his basic slogans about make America great again. It's a false slogan at one level, but it shows what his priorities are. He is not prepared to do what President Kennedy set out 60 years ago, which was that America would bear any burden and pay any price to defend freedom. Those words are absolutely meaningless to President Trump. President Trump wants to create jobs for American workers, make America safe from what he would see as threatening migration, and he can let the rest of the world, they can look after its own problems. I mean, I do think, I mean, I just go back to the central question about what is Trump's legacy? I think it's important, John Claude picked up on this. He has been a president who has really helped American business and he's created confidence in America. I think if Hillary Clinton had been elected, America would be peering down a recession at the moment because of the lack of investment in America, whereas this growth is falling, but will probably bottom it about 2% in the next year or so. So we shouldn't, and all the personal views that Joseph mentioned about Trump, I share entirely. But he has done something about the American economy which has reboosted confidence in American growth, which means that a recession is very least pushed off and delayed and certainly is unlikely to happen next year. But the- Why engage in trade war? I mean, I agree with that point completely. Why engage in trade war if we're here? Well, we came to a draw here, and if I look at the statistics, the basic point about the trade war, which is to reduce your trade deficit, has not happened. Well, it probably has in China because I think the overall- Well, overall, Trump has a very superficial view about trade and we all know that. And when he rewrote NAFTA and called it the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement, the change in the dial was about 2% or 3%. It was basically NAFTA with a new name, and the substance has not changed very much at all. This is Trump's style. Trump is aiming at domestic American politics rather than actually aiming to change the structure of the world. I've got other points I want to make. We don't have to take him seriously, right? Sorry? We don't have to take him seriously. Well, you do have to take him seriously because he can act in a way which is very unthought through. And the sorts of areas that Hanoi was talking about, his attitudes towards Iran, his relationship with autocrats like President Erdogan, leads to consequences, which he simply doesn't understand when he's having these conversations. And those are consequential. I think, actually, I would cite more with Jean-Claude saying he's a very consequential president and I would say it's more than the, it's the same. And the reason he's consequential, my third word was damaging. I think his, the damage isn't about individual policies. It's not about relationship with China. It's not about what happens in the Persian Gulf. His approach on deregulation has meant he's unable to do anything to contribute to the international efforts on climate change. He barely believes climate change exists, let alone that it's a problem that America has a responsibility to address. His approach on foreign relations risks conflict and he is largely responsible for what is happening in Syria at the moment. Although one has to say the original sin in Syria was President Obama's, presiding with a group on the ground which was aligned with a prescribed terrorist organization. That sowed the seeds of the current problems with Turkey. So it's not all Turkey's fault. Thirdly, the disdain for alliances means that other countries around the world, whether it's Britain, France and Germany in Europe in other different positions, whether it's Japan and South Korea or Australia or friends of America around the world will simply not rely on America in the same way that he did before. They will have to balance those relationships and they'll have to be more autonomous for their own defense and security. That may not be a bad thing, but it's a consequence of Trump. And then lastly, is the damage to international institutions. Trump doesn't believe in American institutions. He doesn't really believe in the Congress or the Supreme Court or the freedom of the media as an individual. Obviously his party believes in all those things, but he certainly doesn't believe in international institutions like the World Bank and the IMF or the International Trading System. So I think he's very consequential. I think a one-term Trump presidency will do this much damage. I think a two-term Trump presidency will do five times as much damage. And that's the risk that we face. Okay, now just hang out of the thought because I want to play off this, what you've talked about, about doing damage. Just say, for instance, in a hypothetical world and some other parallel universe that Trump is not re-elected for another term. How much of the damage that John's talking about and how much of that damage is going to be permanent or maybe at least long-term? And how much can be recovered by the next president, whoever that might be, within a very short period of time? What should I have first? I think that, Madame- I think that Joseph is right. I think that there is continuity in American politics. It's quite obvious. And that Trump's particular style is completely forgotten. There is a continuity in American politics. I agree that the big change is the abandonment of neoconservatism in the United States, this doctrine that considers that justice or democracy is more important than peace. That's it. Today, we're back to the materialistic realism in the Kisingerian. Peace is the most important thing. I think that there is a legacy, as they say in English, a legacy of Trump who will remain very important. It's still the first one that said it to Davos. And no one had said it before him. Not a European Commission president had said it. Not an American president had said it. He said it extremely clearly. And it's the first one to have said it. Chinese messengers have stopped stealing technology. It's very important. And he has, by the way, a bipartisan support on this, and we have had, until Trump, we have had American presidents who have been extremely, we say in English, complacent, extremely indulgent in the Chinese war, including Obama. I just want to remind you that when Xi Jinping came to the United States in a press conference, he was questioned about the fact that the Chinese had appeared, the receipts of the Paracels and the Spartans in the Meridional China Sea. And Xi Jinping answered publicly, yes, but he promised that he would never militarize these islands. Today, we have Chinese strategic bombers with large pistols and missiles on six or seven of these islands which are international, terranhulius, which belongs to no one, and China doesn't recognize, which is yet to be attached to the multilateralists, doesn't recognize the authority or the decision of the permanent arbitrage of the AEA on this Meridional China Sea, on the possession of this Meridional China Sea. So this is going to be, in my opinion, the main heritage of Trump. So his foreign policy, and it was extremely simple, and it was said, is that his foreign policy, and there are 55 weeks left before the election, is going to be turned towards what can make me succeed. My argumentation, I am Trump, my argumentation in the face of an American electorate who is not the most sophisticated in the world, you have to recognize him. He is very simple. He said, he will say, thanks to me, before we entered, as in a mill in America, with me, it's over. Even if it's not true, it doesn't matter. The feeling, because when politics doesn't count the truth, it's the feeling people say, yes, it's true, it's true that he protected the borders, he fought a clandestine immigration. Then he will say, my detractors for the electoral campaign have said, it's true, you have articles in the New York Times, Stiglitz and others, who explained to you that if Trump was elected, it would be an absolute disaster for the American economy. He said, no, never. The situation has been better. It has been better for the disadvantaged classes, for the blacks and the Hispanics who have never known better salaries and have never known better jobs. John Carter shaking his head, yes, I think he's... I agree with him, I agree with him. But it's the campaign he's going to do, it has to be realistic. But it's the reality. And the third thing, which means I was a good minister of the interior, I was a good minister of the economy, he has one last thing left, he has to show that he was a good minister of foreign affairs. And that's why he's looking for a deal, something that is media, that can be sold, because obviously, the appearance is all in Trumpism. And then there's Iran, that's why he was tempted by Macron's proposal to New York. There's Korea, but indeed, in the execution, he wasn't very good, and I'm not sure that Koreans really want a deal. They need something. Maybe they want to get it with China, but they also need the day of the election to say, look, I'm also a great diplomat. And I think it will be enough if he manages to meet these three conditions. I think it can be enough to make it realistic. So a future president should preserve some of the things that Trump has done. I wanted to say two things very briefly. And that was first in reaction to what John was saying, but we'll not touch on that. If you look at the polls, I don't necessarily believe the polls. All polls are negative and show Trump losing, again, any Democratic candidate. And his perception from the electorate, again, I mean, if you believe at the polls and so far ahead of the election, 55 weeks, 55 weeks, but there's one element on which is always better, he's doing well for the economy. The Americans, the majority of the Americans said, he's doing well for the economy and the job situation has improved. Now I agree with you, he needs something else. He needs something more. Is he gonna get it? That's a big question. But the reality is that, and again, the question is not so much whether he's gonna get reelected on his own merit. The question to me is more, and we touch on that, and I agree with you. I think Biden is toast, as we said in America, for a vital reason. I don't think it has to do with the story of his surviving son or anything. I think it has to do with the perception that when people, somebody said yesterday, you need to be 80 years old to be President of the United States now. And I think it's a very good comment. It used to be true for China, now it's unfortunately true for the United States. So we are in a situation, the people, it was true in 2006. It's not just in the United States. Unfortunately, in modern democracies, we don't vote for someone. We vote against someone. When I voted in 2016, I make no, it's not secret, I said it publicly. I voted against Trump, and I voted against Hillary Clinton, and I voted for a candidate who had no chance of getting elected, but got four million votes, Gary Johnson. No, my point is that in 2016, seven million Americans voted for somebody else than Clinton or Trump. This time, the question is gonna be, we don't like Trump, we don't like his tweets, and I hear it all the time from my Republican friends, but at the same time, they'll look, who's gonna be the nominee of the Democratic Party? Too early to say. Elizabeth Warren, Bernie Sanders are the hot problem, I wish him well. Elizabeth Warren has a good chance of being the nominee. And the Poco-Hantus, as you said, and the rest is gonna come out. And it's gonna be an easy campaign, and Trump can be extremely nasty, and he will be very nasty, and he will get a lot of support for that. So I'm not saying it's gonna work, but the reality is at the end of the day, people are not gonna vote for somebody, they're gonna vote against someone, and they will say, what's worse, having four more years with damaging consequences? I agree, that's real, and that could be serious. At the same time, do we want Medicare for All, or do we want the Green New Deal? Which is something totally crazy. I mean, I believe in the environment, but the Green New Deal, if you have not read about it, heard about it, please study it. We've gotta bring Moto into this. So, let me just come back to your original question, whether there's going to be a changing international system with or without Trump. Now, first we have to remember, when Mr. Trump started the trade war with China, the main issue was trade deficit, and tariffs, and protection of some industries. But now, the much more important issue you just mentioned, the intellectual property, or forced technology transfer. And so, not only just Mr. Trump, many people in the United States is critical against China, so that may take some more time. And then, big question is, when China entered WTO 2001, the size of the Chinese economy was only one over 10 of the present size. So in the last 10 years, China become very, very big, and big question is, can these two big economy coexist under the present umbrella of the WTO? And this seems to be very difficult. So not only the behavior change of China and the United States, which may be necessary for convergence, but we have to thinking about more realistic international system. Unfortunately, we don't know every very clear picture, but that is exactly a point. I mean, to remember, when you have some kind of globalization, then you need some kind of change of the system in order to sustain the system. I want to try something I didn't, it's a little bit of surprise for you because I hadn't briefed you on any of this, but I think one of the things I'd like to ask you, because you're all very highly placed in your various societies and political systems, what do you think your prime minister or president, what do you think that the people around them, the foreign ministers and whatnot, find the most annoying about Mr. Trump? And maybe at the same time, the thing they find most agreeable about Mr. Dealing with Mr. Trump, John, why don't we start with you, get any ideas? Okay, well, the first thing I'd say is that in terms of the British relationship with America, as Joseph would say, 90% of it is unchanged. The only thing that gets changed are things that touch the White House. And as most of us know, we've worked in government, actually relatively few issues go to the head of government, most of them are sorted out at bureaucratic or institutional, departmental level. Certainly the intelligence cooperation between Britain and America hasn't changed at all, despite Trump's unreliability on intelligence and his degree of disregard or contempt for America's intelligence agencies. So life goes on and heads of government, they dominate the media, you guys got lovely stories out of Trump, but actually life does go on as normal. And the great thing, in many ways, if you want to do regular business with the United States, keep it away from heads of government, keep it away from Trump. But unreliable would be one of the words you would think of, though. Well, he's unpredictable, he has, he takes decisions based on prejudices and preconceived ideas. He doesn't try to educate himself. Now Obama was the opposite extreme, he educated himself so much that he didn't take decisions. Right, exactly. But Trump, you get decisions instantly without caring really what the consequences of them are. It's just gut instinct as to what his base is going to welcome. Now what about Xi? What do you think he finds, the people around him, what do they find most annoying about Mr. Trump? Let me first back to the question you asked with or without Trump. Right, okay. Is anything changing in terms of relation between China and the US? I don't think it will be a substantial change without Trump. As many people say in past two days, there's a fundamental difference between these two countries. So only thing may be changing is the focus may be changing from trade to maybe human rights or the style will be changing. The substantial tension, I guess, will be persistent for long, long time. That's my sense. For Chinese side, I don't think they are very much interesting in internal politics in the United States because that's something nothing to do with us. Of course, doesn't mean they don't look up closely. Of course they don't. Because this trade deal, as you said, is going to support Trump electorally and domestically. Yeah, they look up closely, but nothing to do for China in these kind of things. Right. Can I just add a point on the trade deal? My sense in American politics is that there's a trade-off for Trump and the Republicans as to whether you go for a short-term benefit of selling soybeans to China or whether you can position yourself politically as being tough on China. And I think Trump is much more comfortable being tough on China in the debate over the next year than he is getting some short-term economic kick because he doesn't need that short-term economic kick. What he doesn't want is for a Democratic candidate and whoever it may be, it's far too early, I think, to say who the Democratic candidate's going to be. He doesn't want to be outflanked and looked as though he's soft on China because that would be electorally damaging for him, including in his own base. I mean, except that, as we've been talking about, he is taking a short-term gain on the agricultural deal because that's... He want a boss, not only a what. But he's giving up on fundamental change of China because it's not a Chinese economy because it's not attainable. So he's just going for fiddling with the balance of payments and the trade deficit, which will make him look good. Let me shift a little bit, you know, the discussion. It is quite clear that Trump is the bull in the China shop. And he's a pretty bad bull because the normal bull doesn't know what he's doing because it's very weight and strength that he demolishes. Trump loves to demolish a store. He loves to demolish and deconstruct the global system the United States built 70 years ago and kept maintaining, which served American interests and it served the interests of others too. So here he is rampaging through the China store, demolishing stuff, and what puzzles me is how come there is so little reaction on the part of the rest of the world? Normally, if somebody unhinges the system and exerts brutal power, you would have balance of power behavior. The rest of the world would gang up against the bull to tame him. How come this is not happening? That's a good question and, you know, you see this accommodation being made and we talk about bilateral agreements as opposed to multilateral organizations and that sort of thing, but there hasn't been that much pushback on a multilateral level. Look at the Europeans. Yesterday, certainly we're not, are we re-arming? No. No, the share of GDP devoted to defense is actually going down again. Or the three great powers, France, Britain, and Germany doing something to take up the slack. Well, last year the mighty German U-boat force, consisting of six U-boats, had six out of operation. And so you can go on and on and on. This is what puzzles me. Why aren't, I mean, Europe, 500 million people, a GDP bigger than China's, enormous resources? How come, maybe you guys can tell me, how come we don't, Europe doesn't create a counterweight to this raging bull? There's one answer to that, Joseph. Okay, of course there are probably many. And that is that many of the issues that Trump and Lighthizer have raised with the Chinese are actually shared by Europeans. The unlevel playing field for foreign businesses in China, the end of the state subsidies for Chinese enterprises, the rapacious demands for technology transfer or for buying up technology. So many of the issues which Trump in his clumsy, rather brutal way is addressing. So he's our leader. Well, but he's not a leader we're comfortable with, because we don't agree with his tactics. We don't agree with the damage he's doing to the world trade system. But we do agree with many of the specifics he's raising about China. Just as we know, a lot of us agree with his pressures on Germany and Italy and other European countries to raise their defense spending. So he fastens on to some relevant issues. And then he would naturally have support if only he sought that support, but he alienates that support because of the way he goes about it. It's just not about China. It's about tons of other things. For instance, freedom of navigation in the Gulf. So apparently he doesn't pay that much attention to it. He accepts one provocation after another from Tehran. And do we see the French and the Brits and the Germans mount the flotilla to protect freedom of the seas in the Gulf? Well, that is happening to a certain extent. There are British and French ships there. You know precisely that. You know how many major surface combatants the two countries have? About two dozen each. Well, they used to have 250. But it doesn't take much to deter an Iranian attack on a commercial. If you've got the, you know, we see that happen. Example. Before we get to Jean-Claude, Renault is here. And we don't like to stifle his comments because... No, very, very, very, if the Europeans, to answer Joseph, if the Europeans don't react to what you call Trump's brutality, it's because they also have in space and in time, a little more brutal than in Trump. So in space, I don't know if we can say that Putin is not a little more brutal than Donald Trump. I don't know if we can say that Xi Jinping is more brutal than Donald Trump. And in space and in time, they still have the example of George W. Bush who was more brutal than Donald Trump. So that, in my opinion, is the reason why they don't react. But don't forget, we said it, that, in fact, Trump invites the Europeans to react. Because who said before you, before Joseph, there was someone who said to the Europeans to react. It's Donald Trump. So if you want, here's the answer to your question. Why do the Europeans react so little? Okay, so very quickly because we're going to get down to the next group. On these more fundamental issues with China, I think I mentioned it the other day during Q&A session. The Cyprus process, which is the Council for Foreign Investment in the United States, which is the, all the agencies getting together and approving acquisition by Chinese companies and other parts of the world, but mostly Chinese, has been very, very strictly reinforced, strengthened and so on and so forth. And to the point that now many transactions don't even try to be approved because they know they won't get approved. So this is a way to protect some of the American intellectual properties against China. My point, John Claude, is the same as happened in Britain, the same as happened in France and Germany. The European Union is producing a regulation to do very much what Cyprus is doing. And Japan has produced the most rigorous regulations, more rigorous than the United States, to prevent Chinese ownership of even a small proportion of Japanese technology companies. But John's to answer on this, John, the problem is the fact those initiatives are not coordinated. Unfortunately, are not coordinated. And we would be more efficient if we were coordinated. And I take the blame for the Americans. Well, that is my point about it. The damage that Trump has done to alliances is that you've ended up with a fragmented response to this problem rather than a concerted response to it. Before this conversation gets any more heated, and I didn't pack my bulletproof vest, so I'm not prepared for this, I sense the audience is rested. Stu. I want to speak for, as to how many Americans vote, I've been in four administrations and senior positions. I've been in every presidential election since 1964. A couple of quick points, and perhaps you can react to them. Number one, foreign policy won't be an issue at all in the election. Notwithstanding the fact that he's destroyed our alliances, notwithstanding the fact he's the only president who is backed away from at least four, and now with open skies, perhaps five agreements for each president. Will not be an issue. Second point, we have a Goldilocks economy. As you've said, lowest unemployment, growth will have a growth slow down, not a recession. And yet, his approval rating is 43%. And it's been between 40 and 43% for three years. Mueller, no Mueller. Good economic report, no economic report. His disapproval, 55%. So there is vulnerability there, even with the best economy that we've had. Point number three, nobody's mentioned impeachment. He will not effectively be convicted. But remarkably, just within three weeks, now 57% of the public, including a quarter of Republicans support an impeachment inquiry, and 51%, even this early, his removal from office. That won't happen, but it indicates a vulnerability. Fourth, he got elected because he appealed to a base that wanted disruption. They were anti-globalization, they were anti-elite, and they were anti-immigrant. And that base is a very loyal base, and it will remain loyal. But it is a base of 40% and not more. Last point, having said that, as Jean-Claude said, elections are binary. And with all of these disabilities, with impeachment, which probably will be voted by the House, but not agreed to by the Senate, elections are binary. He's pushed the Democratic Party as he's pushed the Republicans to the right, to the far left. If that's the choice, he has a good chance of winning, even with all of this. I agree with you 100%. I don't have anything to add, I agree with you 100%. Can you identify yourself? Yes, I'm Anders Rosenthal from Mexico. I wanted fundamentally to add to what all of you have said with regard to our perspective as the neighbor to the South. We've gone through, from the time Trump came down to the escalators in Trump Tower to announce his presidency up until the day before yesterday, a constant bashing of Mexico on the immigration issue, on drug trafficking, on the wall, on almost everything. And at the end of the day, we now have a president in Mexico who like Mr. Macron has decided he wants to have a peaceful relationship with Mr. Trump. He is from the left. It's quite unusual for someone from the left to not use the relationship with the United States to his own advantage, but so far he hasn't. And really the question I would ask any of you is how long can that go on? How long can it go on with Mr. Macron, especially if Trump is re-elected? And how long can it go with Andrés Manuel López Obrador for the remaining five years of his presidency? People in Mexico are offended by Trump. They are constantly offended. Yet there has not been any public outcry yet against them. So put this question to your answer. One word only, if I may, on this one. As you know, your president wrote to Nancy Pelosi to ask her to put the USMCA on the agenda of the House of Representatives. And she doesn't do it for obvious reasons. And one of the reasons being the fact that the unions are against it. And I know Richard Trumka because happened to be on the ball of United Way and Richard Trumka was the head of the AFL-CIO is against USMCA. So this is again one of the reasons why the Trans-Pacific Agreement was not approved because unions want some more gold plating. Rinal, how long can this love affair with Macron and Trump go on? Je pense pas du tout que ce soit. I don't think it's a love affair at all. I think it is that Macron is pragmatic. As General De Gaulle said, vous devez prendre les réalités tell qu'elles sont. It's what De Gaulle said in January 64 when he decided to recognize China. And De Gaulle didn't like the Cultural Revolution or the ground leap forward. He didn't like it at all. So I think that Macron, il faut prendre les réalités tell qu'elles sont. Je pense que la France, en ce qui la concerne, a tout à fait compris qu'elle ne pouvait plus compter sur les États-Unis comme allié, qui n'était pas un allié fiable. Elle a tout à fait compris. Elle avait déjà compris. C'est pour ça que Charles De Gaulle avait fait la force de frappe indépendante parce que Charles De Gaulle se souvenait qu'en 1940, le président Paul Reno avait demandé l'aide des États-Unis dans la guerre que nous avions déclaré au nazisme. C'est pas, nous avons quand même déclaré la guerre au régime nazi et que les Américains nous ont répondu à ce moment-là, manage. Et donc nous avons ça. Mais là, évidemment, nous sommes allés dans des expéditions extérieures avec les Américains, notamment en Bosnie, là, on ne va plus avoir confiance entre eux, en eux, on va avoir confiance aux Anglais, aux Britanniques. On va garder le format des accords de Saint-Malo et des accords de Lancaster House. C'est très important. C'est-à-dire que... Et d'ailleurs, en Bosnie, ce sont les Anglais et les Français qui sont intervenus en juin 1995. Et quand ça a marché, les Américains disent OK, on vient avec notre aviation. Mais c'est quand, sur Terre, une brigade franco-britannique a commencé à taper les serbes extrêmement sérieusement autour de Sarajevo que les Américains ont dit OK, on vient avec vous. OK. Et donc voilà ce que... Diffie of the point. Voilà. Je pense que c'est ce qui va se passer. Mais je pense que le président mexicain a tout à fait la bonne politique. Il faut s'entendre. D'autant plus que si vous voulez, l'Amérique est quand même un pays où il y a des check and balances. Et ça, c'est très important. Les relations entre le Mexique et l'Amérique sont très importantes. Elles dépendent aussi du congrès. Elles dépendent des sociétés américaines. Elles dépendent de beaucoup de choses, de la presse, des universités, etc. Et je pense que... Je pense qu'aujourd'hui, vous avez un accord commercial. Et je pense que j'ai aucune raison de penser qu'au cours des cinq prochaines années, les relations entre le Mexique et les États-Unis vont empirer, j'ai aucune raison sérieuse de le penser. Yeah, I want to make two comments. First of all, I much admire what Macron is trying to do. But the reality is that Macron has not had any significant influence on Trump's decisions. Which is a shame, but it's the truth. The only people who have had influence on Trump are people like President Erdogan, Mohamed bin Salman in Saudi Arabia, Xi Jinping, who's had a lot of influence on Trump, and Kim Jong-un. He is influenced by dictators, he's not influenced by Democrats. So that's the first point I want to make. By all means Macron carry on, he's carrying a worthy flag, but let's be realistic, he's not achieved anything. The second thing I would say in response to Stuart's point about American politics, and he has more experience in this than me, but when I look back at Democratic candidates, when Democrats choose an aged, well-known insider, like Hillary Clinton or John Kerry or Al Gore or Walter Mondale, they lose. When they choose a fresh-faced young outsider not scarred by Washington experience, whether it's John F. Kennedy or Jimmy Carter or Bill Clinton or Barack Obama, they win. So I think Democrats, they've got a whole sea of new fresh-faced outsiders. If one of them manages to come through, I think they'll stand a very good chance. If they stick with the old and bold and boring, like Biden or Warren, they'll lose. So we'll count that as a vote for Buttigieg. So... No, I said there's a whole... There's a whole raft of them. It's not for one person. There's a whole raft of attractive Democratic candidates. From a Chinese perspective, it's well-known Chinese are historically patient, also flexible. So we are used to deal with what happened or what's changing, Trump or without with Trump. Honestly, it was one year ago when the trade war started. There was a kind of shock for average Chinese people. They don't know what's going on. But now, one year later, we're used to that because we understand that we feel tired of that. Sometimes increase tariffs, increase delay so many times. So people say, okay, whatever you want, you do it. This is exactly what Americans domestically are doing. There's kind of an accommodation being made for all the outrageous kind of behavior. You should say, well, that's Trump being... Mr. Clinton. Thank you. Two reasons that made some of the points I wanted to make. So I'll refocus on the title of the panel, the consequences of Trump. I mean, I agree with some of the things that have been said. In other words, some of the damage is so big. It had some chain reaction. I mean, when you sow protectionism, you get protectionism. When you sow conflict, you get conflict. Some of the things are structural trends and there is some continuity. And some other things, a few, very few things are considered good, like certainly pushing back China and all the things. But I also think that any other president, except perhaps Mike Pence, will be able to reverse some of this damage. Certainly, the international stage on sort of the international agreement and the multilateral order. And more importantly, and nothing hasn't been said here, is that what's happening now within America is extremely important for all democracies in the world, for liberal democracy. The struggle that's going on right now in the courts with impeachment proceeding is extremely important. And if Trump is defeated, whether in the polls or through impeachment, otherwise or resigns, there will have a tremendous effect for democracy around the world. I'm always uncomfortable when people talk about style. It's not about style. It's about substance. I mean, some of the things he's doing and what you call style is the violation of American values, sometimes American standards or democratic standards generally. So I think this has not been covered or stated enough in this panel. We haven't talked about that, and that is one of the more important aspects of the Trump era, is this whole idea about what he represents for the image of America and the image that America has always promoted around the world. Over the weekend in the New York Times, Michel Goldberg wrote a very interesting piece called, The Beacon Has Gone Out with the Subhead, What's Upon a Time We Spread Ideals of Democracy and Rules of Law? Now We Send Rudy. So let's take about three questions because we're out of time, and then I'll see if any of the panel members want to answer them. Okay, over here. We haven't been over here yet. And here. We haven't been here either. So that's it. Thank you. Lay Shuby, former Minister of Algeria. I would like to say that humor is not forbidden. So I would like to ask two questions. The first, would international relations possibly be summarized as a question of furniture, round table, rectangular table, a chair in addition, so for China, and that would be the big debate. Or is there behind this debate that there is no more important problem of great recomposition of the trends that come. We talked about India, we talked about Iran, we talked about Turkey, we talked about Brazil. The next day, the first and the second world war, Europe is totally re-faceted. There was a new Europe. Isn't there a new world coming? Is the debate on recomposition not already there? The second question, very often a scriptwriter who makes films is concerned about having Oscars for his main actor. But at the same time, he wouldn't like that he focalizes all the attention and that he touches the script of the film. So he would try to leave between the character and the film. Don't we abuse too much of the analysis on the ladies of President Trump? Isn't he not a revelator of recomposition that comes within the United States, within the space of the alliances since we don't have the case of the panel. The panel is a bit evoked. Isn't there a great recomposition that is demanded? The United States, how does it evolve with their allies, the relationship in Afghanistan, in Iraq, the economic issues, globalization? And so, is the master word of these two questions not the debate on recomposition? And can we highlight on the recomposition that comes because the fear is that we multiply the debate on yesterday or the costume of Trump. So, behind him, there is a real demand. There is an electoral and a vision, we saw it, for the dismantling of the instruments. Thank you. Good question. I want to just pass the mic right there. That's perfect. Thank you. Thank you very much to all the panelists for this extremely rich discussion. I would like to say again about the intervention of Renault Girard because it seems to me at the expense of all the contributions that have been brought by everyone and thanks to them, the most prospective. Thierry de Montbriel put us on a 12th edition which is on the Global Governance. My question is, in the case where Mr. Trump was elected, what can we envision as a trend line, a big line on the evolution of the world? If we have understood that Trump, I don't want to bring it to this phenomenon, that the Trump phenomenon is in the end a phenomenon, a success of electoral politics or foreign policy, plays a secondary role. What is important is the Exictant Kentucky. It is not Beijing, China. So we aim an internal public. So how can we envision four other years of Mr. Trump in the case where he was elected? I see an accelerated regionalization of the world where each of the regions would be left to their fate. In common, that is to say, what kind of do the human rights still hold? Do the OMC still hold? What will be the end of the multilateral system that we have known since 1945? And third big question, we see it a little with the incursion, as Volcker would say, of Turkish troops in Syria, and then of crisis management. And then if the Security Council does not work, is that international violence left to itself could not lead to major disruptions? So what can happen in terms of global governance in the case of a re-election of the American president? The question could be so interesting to know if in the case of a new candidate who would have succeeded, who would not be Mr. Trump, what would he also become of the possibility of coming back on an American policy which one? Thank you. We should have a workshop on what kind of what kind of world we want to design. I think that's a... Re-shaped. Re-shaped in the world. There's a question back here. Yes, to keep on Renaud's remark, I may ask our Japanese, German, and British friends, what has been allies entail after these years with the Trump administration? We're supposed to be allied. What does it mean actually for each of your countries on your analysis? And actually, how does NATO stand now? Would Renaud say NATO still exists or not and the others? What is it going to imply with Trump administration? Okay. Let's start there and answer any of the questions you've just heard any of you, but Renaud, why don't we start with you because that was the last question. No. I think it's quite obvious there's a recomposition. What is it? Well, there's a serious lack of multilateral system which obviously had flaws but which had a lot of quality built by the Americans in 1945. And Laurent Cohen, Tanuji, we said a word. And even when it can serve him in his fight against China, he doesn't use it. So there's a hate in incomprehension. It's more than a hate. It's incomprehension of multilateral in Trump. Without a doubt because in the United States in New York, multilateral doesn't exist. So there are other compositions that have already taken place. There's still a sort of strategic alliance that continues between well, that is important between Russia and China. Russia has announced three days that it will help the Chinese to put entire missiles more and more. There's also an Axe that we haven't talked about that is building up. The Axe Washington Delhi with, as you've seen, the reception and the speech by Trump when Modi came to Texas. So we're going to have this is that the question that was asked is that we can have great damage. Is that clear? I don't think that I think that this this the international system of the IMF, etc. is damageable, it's obvious, but I don't think that it's enough to provoke two great wars and I still remind you that the international system that works extremely well even with idealists like John Kennedy John Swaz cited John Kennedy John Kennedy at the same time he was very idealist and he said here I'm fighting for freedom, etc. he still provoked a catastrophe which is the American war in Vietnam which put a chaos in the entire Indochina for a very long time. So in fact it's not because you have a anus system the old one hasn't prevented the Soviet to invade Afghanistan in 1980 and hasn't prevented the Americans to invade Iraq in 2003. So here recomposition yes damage of everything we have built on the international governance yes great conflict war and even I think the stories in China in China Meridional or in fact the Americans have lost the war the Chinese have already won I don't think we will go to war I don't think either that we will go to war between Japan and China if of course Xi Jinping was crazy to want to take Taiwan for internal reasons we would have a great war because the Taiwanese would not let go then of course the Americans would intervene in the war but today I think Xi Jinping is enough wise to not want to take by force Taiwan you can see why Renault is such a frequent guest at Radio France International you fill the air time as we say on CNN so any last thoughts because we really are out of time on the evolution of the world and the democracies Jean-Philippe Claude what worries me more than anything else is the polarization of American politics because a lot of questions have been asked what's necessary to sort of fix problems and to fix problems you have to have a consensus historically there was a consensus on basic foreign policy there was a consensus on fiscal discipline there was a consensus on certain policy of immigration there was a consensus on certain free trade we don't have that anymore so the only way to achieve that is probably to forget about this next election which is not going to solve anything and hoping that there is a majority of people in the United States I believe who are what I would say fiscally conservative and socially liberal and what I mean by that I mean there are there's probably now a majority which is pro-choice and not pro-life and as you know Trump has used extensively the pro-life movement to get elected I mean somebody mentioned Vice President Pence on that sense Pence would be worse than Trump something that you have to keep in mind that's one example so my point is that there is a hope there is a hope that but the fiscal discipline is the most important thing the debt is 23 trillion and the deficit we have a situation which is untenable and Tuttleman's Medicare-Medicaid is 64% in 2040 it's going to be more than 100% of GDP right there is a consequence of Mr. Trump that's going to go on beyond his presidency Joseph we have to get you in here as well yeah, quickly this we've described how Trump is demolishing the global order this should have been the hour of Europe because we in Europe for the last 70 years made a living off the liberal global order trade, openness, capital movements that the United States built and maintained so Europe should in its own interest step up but I've never seen I've been around for a while but I've never seen Europe so much in disarray as it is right now if you look at the three major powers Britain is kind of out of the game Macron for all his posturing on the international stage which he does very elegantly is beset by almost uncontrollable forces at home which are hounding him and threatening to demolish his reform program and then of course there is Germany and Mrs. Merkel who used to be the uncrowned Empress of Europe and she was so celebrated for so many years here the Empress of the Holy Roman Empire the EU and there is no no longer any Mrs. Merkel and there is no successor of any weight inside and we're not even going to talk about Italy and then if we add the division between the neo-populist nationalists in the East and the more or less liberal societies in the West Europe is really bad shape and we haven't we've spent pretty much the whole morning talking about Mr. Trump without talking about what is closer to should have been closer to the subject of the panel so that was it was the subject of the panel I know come on but you know you can't talk about Trump without talking about that 70 year old alliance which kept the two of them together I would just say a couple of concluding remarks first of all the I fully agree the American election will be determined by American voters operating on American domestic interest well for the last 70 years the global system has been run by the elite the elite in America the elite in Europe and the elite in other countries we've managed that global system we now have in the White House someone who's straight out of propping the bar up in the local pub with views that are commensurate with someone who is simply not just not part of the elite but anti-elite so that is why I welcome your optimism that a future leader will be able to get back to normal I'm not sure about that and I'm certainly not sure about it if Trump wins the second term and I also share the concern about this violent oscillation in politics and if America is presented with a choice between Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon as their next leader where will normal people go where will they go in France and I think we should remain optimistic we as the part everybody here is part of the global elite we need to do what we can to preserve the system whilst we have a bar room bully in the White House but we should be very careful to be cautious about thinking that this is just a passing storm and it will all get back to normal again when the man goes he is doing serious damage to the international system there's evidence of that everywhere around the world when you look at the other sort of mini-trumps Cal, last word my final conclusion or final remark is the rise of China created two tremendous challenges first one is challenging to the global order whether the rest of the world particularly the western country allow another big economy with different social system but not directly changing or challenging or deny the lifestyle of other countries that's first challenge second challenging to China itself how you correctly summarise your experience for your successful economic success for how do you follow the title of the world which is democracy marketisation internationalisation that's two question I guess it's very tremendous so I know you're all hungry for our brilliant knowledge but you're also probably hungry so I would say that's concluding of the panel and thank you very much for attending great