 Section 10 of an Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book 3 of Words, by John Locke. This is a LibriVox recording, while LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Chapter 8 of Abstract and Concrete Terms 1. Abstract terms predicated one on another, and why? The ordinary words of language and our common use of them would have given us light into the nature of our ideas if they had been but considered with attention. The mind, as has been shown, has a power to abstract its ideas, and so they become essences, general essences whereby the sorts of things are distinguished. Now each abstract idea being distinct, so that, of any two, the one can never be the other, the mind will, by its intuitive knowledge, perceive their difference, and therefore in propositions no two whole ideas can ever be affirmed one of another. This we see in the common use of language, which permits not any two abstract words or names of abstract ideas to be affirmed one of another. For how near the kin, so ever they may seem to be, and how certain, so ever it is, that man is an animal, or rational, or white, yet everyone at first hearing perceives the falsehood of these propositions. Humanity is animality, or rationality, or whiteness, and this is as evident as any of the most allowed maxims. All our affirmations then are only in concrete, which is the affirming, not one abstract idea to be another, but one abstract idea to be joined to another, which abstract ideas, in substances, may be of any sort. In all the rest are little else but of relations, and in substances the most frequent are of powers, namely a man is white, signifies that the thing that has the essence of a man has also in it the essence of whiteness, which is nothing but a power to produce the idea of whiteness in one whose eyes can discover ordinary objects, or a man is rational, signifies that the same thing that has the essence of a man has also in it the essence of rationality, that is a power of reasoning. 2. They show the difference of our ideas. This distinction of names shows us also the difference of our ideas, for if we observe them we find that our simple ideas have all abstract as well as concrete names, the one whereof is to speak the language of grammarians a substantive, the other an adjective, as whiteness white, sweetness sweet. The like also holds in our ideas of modes and relations as justice just, equality equal, only with this difference that some of the concrete names of relations amongst men chiefly are substantives, as pater neatus, pater, whereof it were easy to render a reason. But as to our ideas of substances we have very few or no abstract names at all. For though the schools have introduced animalitus, humanitus, corporeatus, and some others, yet they hold no proportion with that infinite number of names of substances, to which they never were ridiculous enough to attempt the coining of abstract ones, and those few that the schools forged and put into the mouths of their scholars could never yet get admittance into common use, or obtain the license of public approbation, which seems to me at least to intimate the confession of all mankind, that they have no ideas of the real essences of substances, since they have not names for such ideas, which no doubt they would have had, had not their consciousness to themselves of their ignorance of them kept them from so idle an attempt. And therefore, though they have had ideas enough to distinguish gold from a stone and metal from wood, yet they but timorously ventured on such terms as orietus, and saxietus, metiliatus, and legnetus, or the leg names, which should pretend to signify the real essence of those substances were of they knew they had no ideas. And indeed it was only the doctrine of substantial forms, and the confidence of mistaken pretenders to acknowledge that they had not, which first coined and then introduced animalitus and humanitus and the leg, which yet went very little further than their own schools, and could never get to be current amongst understanding men. Indeed humanitus was a word in familiar use among the Romans, but in a far different sense, and stood not for the abstract essence of any substance, but was the abstracted name of a mode in its concrete humanus, not homo. End of Section 10. Section 11 of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Book 3 of Words by John Locke. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Chapter 9 of The Imperfection of Words. 1. Words are used for recording and communicating our thoughts. From what has been said in the foregoing chapters it is easy to perceive what imperfection there is in language, and how the very nature of words makes it almost unavoidable for many of them to be doubtful and uncertain in their significations. To examine the perfection or imperfection of words, it is necessary first to consider their use and end. For as they are more or less fitted to attain that, so they are more or less perfect. We have in the former part of this discourse often upon occasion mentioned a double use of words. First, one for the recording of our own thoughts. Secondly, the other for the communicating of our thoughts to others. Two, any words will serve for recording. As to the first of these, for the recording our own thoughts for the help of our own memories, whereby as it were we talked to ourselves, any words will serve the turn. For since sounds are voluntary and indifferent signs of any ideas, a man may use what words he pleases to signify his own ideas to himself, and there will be no imperfection in them if he constantly used the same sign for the same idea. For then he cannot fail of having his meaning understood, wherein consists the right use and perfection of language. Three, communication by words either for civil or philosophical purposes. Secondly, as to communication by words, that too has a double use. One, civil, two, philosophical. First, by their civil use, I mean such a communication of thoughts and ideas by words as may serve for the upholding common conversation and commerce about the ordinary affairs and conveniences of civil life in the societies of men, one amongst another. Secondly, by the philosophical use of words, I mean such a use of them as may serve to convey the precise notions of things, and to express in general propositions certain and undoubted truths which the mind may rest upon and be satisfied with in its search after true knowledge. These two uses are very distinct, and a great deal less exactness will serve in the one than in the other, as we shall see in what follows. Four, the imperfection of words is the doubtfulness or ambiguity of their signification, which is caused by the sort of ideas they stand for. The chief end of language in communication being to be understood, words serve not well for that end, neither in civil nor philosophical discourse, when any word does not excite in the hearer the same idea which it stands for in the mind of the speaker. Now, since sounds have no natural connection with our ideas, but have all their signification from the arbitrary imposition of men, the doubtfulness and uncertainty of their signification, which is the imperfection we hear our speaking of, has its cause more in the ideas they stand for than in any incapacity there is in one sound more than in another to signify any idea, for in that regard they are all equally perfect. That, then, which makes doubtfulness and uncertainty in the signification of some more than other words is the difference of ideas they stand for. Five, natural causes of their imperfection, especially in those that stand for mixed modes and for our ideas of substances, words having naturally no signification, the idea which each stands for must be learned and retained by those who would exchange thoughts and hold intelligible discourse with others in any language. But this is the hardest to be done where, first, the ideas they stand for are very complex and made up of a great number of ideas put together. Secondly, where the ideas they stand for have no certain connection in nature, and so no settled standard anywhere in nature existing to recognize that the idea is to rectify and adjust them by. Thirdly, when the signification of the word is referred to a standard, which standard is not easy to be known. Fourthly, where the signification of the word and the real essence of the thing are not exactly the same. These are difficulties that attend the signification of several words that are intelligible. Those which are not intelligible at all, such as names standing for any simple ideas which another has not organs or faculties to attain, as the names of colors to a blind man or sounds to a deaf man, need not here be mentioned. In all these cases we shall find an imperfection in words, which I shall more at large explain in their particular application to our self several sorts of ideas. For if we examine them we shall find that the names of mixed modes are most liable to doubtfulness and imperfection for the two first of these reasons, and the names of substances chiefly for the two latter. Six, the names of mixed modes doubtful. First, the names of mixed modes are mixed many of them liable to great uncertainty and obscurity in their signification. One, because the ideas they stand for are so complex. Because of that great composition these complex ideas are often made up of. To make words serviceable to the end of communication it is necessary, as has been said, that they excite in the hearer exactly the same idea they stand for in the mind of the speaker. Without this men fill one another's heads with noise and sounds, but convey not thereby their thoughts, and lay not before one another their ideas, which is the end of discourse and language. But when a word stands for a very complex idea that is compounded and decompounded, it is not easy for men to form and retain that idea so exactly as to make the name in common use stand for the same precise idea without any the least variation. Hence it comes to pass that man's names of very compound ideas, such as for the most part are moral words, have seldom in two different men the same precise signification, since one man's complex idea seldom agrees with another's, and often differs from his own, from that which he had yesterday or will have tomorrow. 7. Secondly, because they have no standards in nature. Because the names of mixed modes for the most part want standards in nature, whereby men may rectify and adjust their significations, therefore they are very various and doubtful. They are assemblages of ideas put together at the pleasure of the mind, pursuing its own ends of discourse and suited to its own notions, whereby it designs not to copy anything really existing, but to denominate and rank things as they come to agree with those archetypes or forms it has made. He that first brought the word sham or wheedle or banter in use, put together as he thought fit those ideas he made it stand for, and as it is with any new names of modes that are now brought into any language, so it was with the old ones when they were first made use of. Names therefore that stand for collections of ideas which the mind makes at pleasure must needs be of doubtful signification, when such collections are nowhere to be found constantly united in nature, nor any patterns to be shown whereby men may adjust them. What the word murder or sacrilege, et cetera, signifies can never be known from things themselves. There be many of the parts of those complex ideas which are not visible in the action itself. The intention of the mind or the relation of holy things which make a part of murder or sacrilege have no necessary connection with the outward and visible action of him that commits either, and the pulling the trigger of the gun with which the murder is committed and is all the action that perhaps is visible has no natural connection with those other ideas that make up the complex one named murder. They have their union and combination only from the understanding which unites them under one name, but uniting them without any rule or pattern it cannot be but that the signification of the name that stands for such voluntary collections should be often various in the minds of different men who have scarce any standing rule to regulate themselves and their notions by in such arbitrary ideas. Eight, common use or propriety not a sufficient remedy. It is true common use that is the rule of propriety may be supposed here to afford some aid to settle the signification of language, and it cannot be denied but that in some measure it does. Common use regulates the meaning of words pretty well for common conversation, but nobody having an authority to establish the precise signification of words nor determine to what ideas anyone shall annex them. Common use is not sufficient to adjust them to philosophical discourses. There being scarce any name of any very complex idea to say nothing of others which in common use has not a great latitude and which keeping within the bounds of propriety may not be made the sign of far different ideas. Besides the rule and measure of propriety itself being nowhere established it is often matter of dispute whether this or that way of using a word be propriety of speech or know. From all which it is evident that the names of such kind of very complex ideas are naturally liable to this imperfection, to be of doubtful and uncertain signification, and even in men that have a mind to understand one another do not always stand for the same idea in speaker and hearer. Though the names glory and gratitude be the same in every man's mouth through a whole country, yet the complex collective idea which everyone thinks on or intends by that name is apparently very different in men using the same language. Nine, the way of learning these names contributes also to their doubtfulness. The way also wherein the names of mixed modes are ordinarily learned does not a little contribute to the doubtfulness of their signification. For if we will observe how children learn languages we shall find that to make them understand what the names of simple ideas or substances stand for, people ordinarily show them the thing whereof they would have them have the idea, and then repeat to them the name that stands for it, as white, sweet, milk, sugar, cat, dog. But as for mixed modes, especially the most material of them, moral words, the sounds are usually learned first, and then to know what complex ideas they stand for, they are either beholden to the explication of others, or, which happens for the most part, are left to their own observation and industry, which, being little laid out in the search of the true and precise meaning of names, these moral words are in most men's mouths little more than bare sounds. Or when they have any, it is for the most part but a very loose and undetermined and consequently obscure and confused signification. And even those themselves who have with more attention settled their notions do yet hardly avoid the inconvenience to have them stand for complex ideas different from those which other, even intelligent and studious men, make them the signs of. Where shall one find any either controversial debate or familiar discourse concerning honor, faith, grace, religion, church, etc., wherein it is not easy to observe the different notions men have of them, which is nothing but this, that they are not agreed in the signification of those words, nor have in their minds the same complex ideas which they make them stand for, and so all the contests that follow thereupon are only about the meaning of a sound. And hence we see that in the interpretation of laws, whether divine or human, there is no end. Comments beget comments, and explications make new matter for explications, and of limiting, distinguishing, varying the signification of these moral words there is no end. These ideas of men's making are, by men still having the same power, multiplied in infinitum. Many a man who was pretty well satisfied of the meaning of a text of scripture, or clause in the code at first reading, has, by consulting commentators, quite lost the sense of it, and by these elucidations, given rise or increase to his doubts, and drawn obscurity upon the place. I say not this that I think commentaries needless, but to show how uncertain the names of mixed modes naturally are, even in the mouths of those who had both the intention and the faculty of speaking as clearly as language was capable to express their thoughts. 10. Hence unavoidable obscurity in ancient authors. What obscurity this has unavoidably brought upon the writings of men who have lived in remote ages and different countries it will be needless to take notice. Since the numerous volumes of learned men employing their thoughts that way are proofs more than enough to show what attention, study, sagacity, and reasoning are required to find out the true meaning of ancient authors. But there being no writings we have any great concernment to be very solicitous about the meaning of, but those that contain either truths we are required to believe, or laws we are to obey, and draw inconveniences on us when we mistake or transgress, we may be less anxious about the sense of other authors. Who, writing but their own opinions, we are under no greater necessity to know them than they to know ours. Our good or evil, depending not on their decrees, we may safely be ignorant of their notions, and therefore in the reading of them, if they do not use their words with a do clearness and perspicuity, we may lay them aside, and without any injury done them resolve thus with ourselves. See known vise intelligi, debis negligi. 11. Names of substances of doubtful signification, because the ideas they stand for relate to the reality of things. If the signification of the names of mixed modes be uncertain, because there be no real standards existing in nature to which those ideas are referred, and by which they may be adjusted, the names of substances are of a doubtful signification for a contrary reason, namely, because the ideas they stand for are supposed conformable to the reality of things, and are referred to as standards made by nature. In our ideas of substances, we have not the liberty, as in mixed modes, to frame what combinations we think fit to be the characteristical notes to rank and denominate things by. In these we must follow nature, suit our complex ideas to real existences, and regulate the signification of their names by the things themselves, if we will have our names to be signs of them and stand for them. Here it is true we have patterns to follow, but patterns that will make the signification of their names very uncertain, for names must be of a very unsteady and various meaning, if the ideas they stand for be referred to standards without us, that either cannot be known at all or can be known but imperfectly and uncertainly. 12. Names of substances referred, one, to real essences that cannot be known. The names of substances have, as has been shown, a double reference in their ordinary use. First, sometimes they are made to stand for, and so their signification is supposed to agree to, the real constitution of things, from which all their properties flow, and in which they all center. But this real constitution, or, as it is apt to be called, essence, being utterly unknown to us, any sound that is put to stand for it must be very uncertain in its application, and it will be impossible to know what things are, or ought to be called a horse or anantimony, when those words are put for real essences that we have no ideas of at all. And therefore, in this supposition, the names of substances being referred to standards that cannot be known, their significations can never be adjusted and established by those standards. 13. Secondly, to co-existing qualities which are known but imperfectly. Secondly, the simple ideas that are found to co-exist in substances, being that which their names immediately signify, these, as united in the several sorts of things, are the proper standards to which their names are referred, and by which their significations may be best rectified. But neither will these archetypes so well serve to this purpose as to leave these names without very various and uncertain significations. Because these simple ideas that co-exist and are united in the same subject, being very numerous and having all an equal right to go into the complex specific idea which the specific name is to stand for, men, though they propose to themselves the very same subject to consider, yet frame very different ideas about it. And so the name they use for it unavoidably comes to have, in several men, very different significations. The simple qualities which make up the complex ideas, being most of them powers, in relation to changes which they are apt to make in or receive from other bodies, are almost infinite. He that shall but observe what a great variety of alterations any one of the baser metals is apt to receive from the different application only of fire, and how much a greater number of changes any of them will receive in the hands of a chemist, by the application of other bodies, will not think it strange that I count the properties of any sort of bodies not easy to be collected, and completely known by the ways of inquiry which our faculties are capable of. They being, therefore, at least so many that no man can know the precise and definite number, they are differently discovered by different men according to their various skill, attention, and ways of handling, who, therefore, tend to be very different who, therefore, cannot choose but have different ideas of the same substance, and, therefore, make the signification of its common name very various and uncertain. For the complex ideas of substances being made up of such simple ones as are supposed to co-exist in nature, everyone has a right to put into his complex idea those qualities he has found to be united together. For though in the substance of gold one satisfies himself with color and weight, yet another thinks solubility in aqua regia as necessary to be joined with that color in his idea of gold, as anyone does its fusibility. Solubility in aqua regia being a quality as constantly joined with its color and weight as fusibility or any other. Others put into it ductility or fixedness, etc., as they have been taught by tradition or experience. Who of all these has established the right signification of the word gold, or who shall be the judge to determine? Each has his standard in nature which he appeals to, and with reason thinks he has the same right to put into his complex idea signified by the word gold those qualities which upon trial he has found united. As another who has not so well examined has to leave them out, or a third who has made other trials has to put in others. For the union in nature of these qualities being the true ground of their union in one complex idea, who can say one of them has more reason to be put in or left out than another. From hence it will unavoidably follow that the complex ideas of substances in man using the same names for them will be very various, and so the significations of those names very uncertain. Fourteen. Thirdly, to co-existing qualities which are known but imperfectly. Besides there is scarce any particular thing existing which in some of its simple ideas does not communicate with a greater, and in others a less number of particular beings. Who shall determine in this case which are those that are to make up the precise collection that is to be signified by the specific name, or can with any just authority prescribe which obvious or common qualms. Which obvious or common qualities are to be left out, or which more secret or more particular are to be put into the signification of the name of any substance. All which together seldom or never fail to produce that various and doubtful signification in the names of substances which causes such uncertainty, disputes or mistakes when we come to a philosophical use of them. Fifteen. With this imperfection they may serve for civil but not well for philosophical use. It is true as to civil and common conversation the general names of substances regulated in their ordinary signification by some obvious qualities as by the shape and figure in things of known seminal propagation and in other substances for the most part by color joined with some other sensible qualities do well enough to design the things men would be understood to speak of. And so they usually conceive well enough the substances meant by the word gold or apple to distinguish the one from the other. But in philosophical inquiries and debates where general truths are to be established and consequences drawn from positions laid down, there the precise signification of the names of substances will be found not only not to be well established but also very hard to be so. For example, he that shall make malleability or a certain degree of fixedness a part of his complex idea of gold may make propositions concerning gold and draw consequences from them that will truly and clearly follow from gold taken in such a signification. But yet such as another man can never be forced to admit nor be convinced of their truth who makes not malleableness or the same degree of fixedness part of that complex idea that the name gold in his use of it stands for. Sixteen. Instance, liquor. This is a natural and almost unavoidable imperfection in almost all the names of substances in all languages whatsoever which men will easily find when once passing from confused or loose notions they come to more strict and close inquiries. For then they will be convinced how doubtful and obscure those words are in their signification which in ordinary use appeared very clear and determined. I was once in a meeting of very learned and ingenious physicians where by chance there arose a question whether any liquor passed through the filaments of the nerves, the debate having been managed a good while by variety of arguments on both sides. I, who had been used to suspect that the greatest part of disputes were more about the signification of words than a real difference in the conception of things, desired that before they went any further on in this dispute they would first examine and establish amongst them what the word liquor signified. They at first were a little surprised at the proposal and had they been persons less ingenious they might perhaps have taken it for a very frivolous or extravagant one since there was no one there that thought not himself to understand very perfectly what the word liquor stood for which I think too none of the most perplexed names of substances. However they were pleased to comply with my motion and upon examination found that the signification of that word was not so settled or certain as they had all imagined but that each of them made it a sign of a different complex idea. This made them perceive that the main of their dispute was about the signification of that term and that they differed very little in their opinions concerning some fluid and subtle matter passing through the conduits of the nerves though it was not so easy to agree whether it was to be called liquor or no a thing which when considered they thought it not worth the contending about. Seventeen instance gold how much this is the case in the greatest part of disputes that men are engaged so hotly in I shall perhaps have an occasion in another place to take notice. Let us only here consider a little more exactly the four mentioned instance of the word gold and we shall see how hard it is precisely to determine its signification. I think I'll agree to make it stand for a body of a certain yellow shining color which being the idea to which children have annexed that name the shining yellow part of a peacocks tail is properly to them gold. Others finding feasibility joined with that yellow color in certain parcels of matter make of that combination a complex idea to which they give the name gold to denote a sort of substances. And so exclude from being gold all such yellow shining bodies as by fire will be reduced to ashes and admit to be of that species or to be comprehended under that name gold only such substances as having that shining yellow color will by fire be reduced to fusion and not to ashes. Another by the same reason adds the weight which being a quality as straightly joined with that color as its feasibility he thinks has the same reason to be joined in its idea and to be signified by its name and therefore the other made up of body of such a color and feasibility to be imperfect and so on of all the rest wherein no one can show a reason why some of the inseparable qualities that are always united in nature should be put into the nominal essence and others left out or why the word gold signifying that sort of body the ring on his finger is made of should determine that sort rather by its color weight and feasibility than by its color weight and solubility in aqua regia since the dissolving it by that liquor is as inseparable from it as the fusion by fire and they are both of them nothing but the relation which that substance has to two other bodies which have a power to operate differently upon it for by what right is it that feasibility comes to be a part of the essence signified by the word gold and solubility but a property of it or why is it's color part of the essence and it's malleableness but a property that which I mean is this that these being all but properties depending on its real constitution and nothing but powers either active or passive in reference to other bodies no one has authority to determine the signification of the word gold as referred to such a body existing in nature more to one collection of ideas to be found in that body than to another where by the signification of that name must unavoidably be very uncertain since as has been said several people observe several properties in the same substance and I think I may say nobody all and therefore we have but very imperfect descriptions of things and words have very uncertain significations 18 the names of simple ideas the least doubtful from what has been said it is easy to observe what has been before remarked namely that the names of simple ideas are of all others the least liable to mistakes and that for these reasons first because the ideas they stand for being each but one single perception are much easier got and more clearly retained than the more complex ones and therefore are not liable to the uncertainty which usually attends those compounded ones of substances and mixed modes in which the precise number of simple ideas that make them up are not easily agreed so readily kept in mind and secondly because they are never referred to any other essence but barely that perception they immediately signify which reference is that which renders the signification of the names of substances naturally so perplexed and gives occasion to so many disputes men that do not perversely use their words or on purpose set themselves to cavill seldom mistake in any language which they are acquainted with the use and signification of the name of simple ideas white and sweet yellow and bitter carry a very obvious meaning with them which everyone precisely comprehends or easily perceives he is ignorant of and seeks to be informed but what precise collection of simple ideas modesty or frugality stand for in another's use is not so certainly known and however we are apt to think we well enough know what is meant by gold or iron yet the precise complex idea others make them the signs of is not so certain and I believe it is very seldom that in speaker and hearer they stand for exactly the same collection which must needs produce mistakes and disputes when they are made use of in discourses wherein men have to do with universal propositions and would settle in their minds universal truths and consider the consequences that follow from them nineteen and next to them simple modes by the same rule the names of simple modes are next to those of simple ideas least liable to doubt and uncertainty especially those of figure and number of which men have so clear and distinct ideas whoever that had a mind to understand them mistook the ordinary meaning of seven or a triangle and in general the least compounded ideas in every kind have the least dubious names twenty the most doubtful are the names of very compounded mixed modes and substances mixed modes therefore that are made up but of a few and obvious simple ideas have usually names of no very uncertain signification but the names of mixed modes which comprehend a great number of simple ideas are commonly of a very doubtful and undetermined meaning as has been shown the names of substances being annexed to ideas that are neither the real essences nor exact representations of the patterns they are referred to are liable to yet greater imperfection and uncertainty especially when we come to a philosophical use of them twenty one why this imperfection charged upon words the great disorder that happens in our names of substances proceeding for the most part from our want of knowledge and inability to penetrate into their real constitutions it may probably be wondered why I charge this as an imperfection rather upon our words than understandings this exception has so much appearance of justice that I think myself obliged to give a reason why I have followed this method I must confess then that when I first began this discourse of the understanding and a good while after I had not the least thought that any consideration of words was at all necessary to it but when having passed over the original and composition of our ideas I began to examine the extent and certainty of our knowledge I found it had so near a connection with words that unless their force and manner of signification were first well observed there could be very little said clearly and pertinently concerning knowledge which being conversant about truth had constantly to do with propositions and though it terminated in things yet it was for the most part so much by the intervention of words that they seemed scarce separable from our general knowledge at least they interposed themselves so much between our understandings and the truth which it would contemplate and apprehend that like the medium through which visible objects pass the obscurity and disorder do not seldom cast a mist before our eyes and impose upon our understandings if we consider in the fallacies men put upon themselves as well as others and the mistakes in men's disputes and notions how great a part is owing to words and their uncertain or mistaken significations we shall have reason to think this no small obstacle in the way to knowledge which I conclude we are the more carefully to be warned of because it has been so far from being taken notice of as an inconvenience that the arts of improving it have been made the business of men's study and obtain the reputation of learning and subtlety as we shall see in the following chapter but I am apt to imagine that were the imperfections of language as the instrument of knowledge more thoroughly weighed a great many of the controversies that make such a noise in the world would of themselves cease and the way to knowledge and perhaps peace to lie a great deal opener than it does 22 this should teach us moderation in imposing our own sense of old authors sure I am that the signification of words in all languages depending very much on the thoughts notions and ideas of him that uses them must unavoidably be of great uncertainty to man of the same language and country this is so evident in the Greek authors that he that shall peruse their writings will find in almost every one of them a distinct language though the same words but when to this natural difficulty in every country there shall be added different countries and remote ages where in the speakers and writers had very different notions tempers customs ornaments and figures of speech etc every one of which influence the signification of their words then though to us now they are lost and unknown it would become us to be charitable one to another in our interpretations or misunderstandings of those ancient writings which though of great concern meant to be understood are liable to the unavoidable difficulties of speech which if we accept the names of simple ideas and some very obvious things is not capable without a constant defining the terms of conveying the sense and intention of the speaker without any manner of doubt and uncertainty to the hearer and in discourses of religion law and morality as they are matters of the highest concern meant so there will be the greatest difficulty twenty three especially of the old and New Testament scriptures the volumes of interpreters and commentators on the old and New Testament are but to manifest proofs of this though everything said in the text be infallibly true yet the reader may be may cannot choose but be very fallible in the understanding of it nor is it to be wondered that the will of God when clothed in words should be liable to that doubt and uncertainty which unavoidably attends that sort of conveyance when even his son whilst clothed in flesh was subject to all the frailties and inconveniences of human nature sin accepted and we ought to magnify his goodness that he hath spread before all the world such legible characters of his works and providence and given all mankind so sufficient a light of reason that they to whom this written word never came could not whenever they set themselves to search either doubt of the being of a God or of the obedience due to him since then the precepts of natural religion are plain and very intelligible to all mankind and seldom come to be controverted and other revealed truths which are conveyed to us by books and languages are liable to the common and natural obscurities and difficulties incident to words me thinks it would become us to be more careful and diligent in observing the former and less magisterial positive and imperious in imposing our own sense and interpretations of the latter and of section eleven section twelve of an essay concerning human understanding book three of words by John Locke this is a book this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Matthew D. Robinson chapter ten of the abuse of words part one one willful abuse of words besides the imperfection that is naturally in language and the obscurity and confusion that is so hard to be avoided in the use of words there are several willful faults and neglects which man are guilty of in this way of communication whereby they render these signs less clear and distinct in their signification than naturally they need to be two first words are often employed without any or without clear ideas first in this kind the first and most palpable abuses the using of words without clear and distinct ideas or which is worse signs without anything signified of these there are two sorts one some words introduced without clear ideas annexed to them even in their first original one may observe in all languages certain words that if they be examined will be found in their first original and their appropriated use not to stand for any clear and distinct ideas these for the most part the several sects of philosophy and religion have introduced for their authors or promoters either affecting something singular and out of the way of common apprehensions or to support some strange opinions or cover some weakness of their hypothesis seldom failed to coin new words and such as when they come to be examined may justly be called insignificant terms for having either had no determinant collection of ideas annexed to them when they were first invented or at least such as if well examined will be found inconsistent it is no wonder if afterwards in the vulgar use of the same party they remain empty sounds with little or no signification amongst those who think it enough to have them often in their mouths as the distinguishing characters of their church or school without much troubling their heads to examine what are the precise ideas they stand for I shall not need here to heap up instances every man's reading and conversation will sufficiently furnish him or if he wants to be better stored the great mint masters of this kind of terms I mean the school men and metaphysicians under which I think the disputing natural and moral philosophers of these latter ages may be comprehended have wherewithal abundantly to content him three two other words to which ideas were annexed at first used afterwards without distinct meanings others there be who extend this abuse yet further who takes so little care to lay by words which in their primary notation have scarce any clear and distinct ideas which they are annexed to that by an unpardonable negligence they familiarly use words which the propriety of language has affixed to very important ideas without any distinct meaning at all wisdom glory grace etc. are words frequent enough in every man's mouth but if a great many of those who use them should be asked what they mean by them they would be at a stand and not know what to answer a plain proof that though they have learned those sounds and have them ready at their tongues ends yet there are no determined ideas laid up in their minds which are to be expressed to others by them four this occasioned by men learning names before they have the ideas the names belong to men having been accustomed from their cradles to learn words which are easily God and retained before they knew or had framed the complex ideas to which they were annexed or which were to be found in the things they were thought to stand for they usually continue to do so all their lives and without taking the pains necessary to settle in their minds determined ideas they use their words for such unsteady and confused notions as they have contenting themselves with the same words other people use as if their very sound necessarily carried with it constantly the same meaning this though men make a shift within the ordinary occurrences of life where they find it necessary to be understood and therefore make signs till they are so yet this insignificancy in their words which they come to reason concerning either their tenets or interest manifestly fills their discourse with abundance of empty unintelligible noise and jargon especially in moral matters where the words for the most part standing for arbitrary and numerous collections of ideas not regularly and permanently united in nature their bear sounds are often only thought on or at least very obscure and uncertain notions annexed to them men take the words they find in use amongst their neighbors and that they may not seem ignorant what they stand for use them confidently without much troubling their heads about a certain fixed meaning whereby besides the ease of it they obtain this advantage that as in such discourses they seldom are in the right so they are as seldom to be convinced that they are in the wrong it being all one to go about to draw those men out of their mistakes who have no settled notions as to dispossess a vagrant of his habitation who has no settled abode this I guess to be so and everyone may observe in himself and others whether it be so or not five secondly unsteady application of them secondly another great abuse of words is inconstancy in the use of them it is hard to find a discourse written on any subject especially of controversy wherein one shall not observe if he read with attention the same words and those commonly the most material in the discourse and upon which the argument turns used sometimes for one collection of simple ideas and sometimes for another which is a perfect abuse of language words being intended for signs of my ideas to make them known to others not by any natural signification but by a voluntary imposition it is plain cheat and abuse when I make them stand sometimes for one thing and sometimes for another the willful doing where of can be imputed to nothing but great folly or greater dishonesty and a man and his accounts with another may with as much fairness make the characters of numbers stand sometimes for one and sometimes for another collection of units VG this character three stands sometimes for three sometimes for four and sometimes for eight as in his discourse a reasoning make the same words stand for different collections of simple ideas if men should do so in their reckonings I wonder who would have to do with them one who would speak thus in the affairs and business of the world and call eight sometimes seven and sometimes nine as best served his advantage would presently have clapped upon him one of the two names man are commonly disgusted with and yet in arguing and learned contests the same sort of proceedings passes commonly for with and learning but to me it appears a greater dishonesty than the misplacing of counters in the casting up a debt and to the cheat the greater by how much truth is of greater concern men and value than money six thirdly affected obscurity as in the peripatetic and other sects of philosophy thirdly another abuse of languages and affected obscurity by either applying old words to new and unusual unusual significations or introducing new and ambiguous terms without defining either or else putting them so together as make and found their ordinary meaning though the peripatetic philosophy has been most eminent in this way yet other sects have not been wholly clear of it there are scarce any of them that are not combered with some difficulties such as the imperfection of human knowledge which they have been feigned to cover with obscurity of terms and to confound the signification of words which like a mist before people's eyes might hinder their weak parts from being discovered that body and extension in common use stand for two distinct ideas is plain to anyone that will but reflect a little for were their signification precisely the same it would be as proper and as intelligible to say the body of an extension as the extension of a body and yet there are those who find it necessary to confound their signification to this abuse and the mischiefs of confounding the signification of words logic and the liberal sciences as they have been handled in the schools have given reputation and the admired art of disputing have added much to the natural imperfection of languages whilst it has been made use of and fitted to perplex the signification of words more than to discover the knowledge and truth of things and he that will look into that sort of learned writings will find the words there much more obscure uncertain and undetermined in their meaning than they are in ordinary conversation seven logic and dispute have much contributed to this this is unavoidably to be so where men's parts and learning are estimated by their skill in disputing and if reputation and reward shall attend these conquests which depend mostly on the finest and niceties of words it is no wonder if the wit of man so employed should perplex, involve, and subtleize the signification of sounds so as never to want something to say in opposing or defending any question the victory being a judge not to him who had truth on his side but the last word in the dispute eight calling it subtlety this though a very useless skill and that which I think the direct opposite to the ways of knowledge hath yet passed hitherto under the laudable and esteemed names of subtlety and acuteness and has had the applause of the schools and encouragement of one part of the learned men of the world and no wonder since the philosophers of old the disputing and wrangling philosophers I mean such as Lucian Whitley and with reason taxes and the school men since aiming at glory and esteem for their great and universal knowledge easier a great deal to be pretended to than really acquired found this a good expedient to cover their ignorance with a curious and inexplicable web of perplexed words and procure to themselves the admiration of others by unintelligible terms the after to produce wonder because they could not be understood whilst it appears in all history that these profound doctors were no wiser nor more useful than their neighbors and brought but small advantage to human life or the societies wherein they lived unless the coining of new words where they produced no new things to apply them to or the perplexing or obscuring the signification of old ones and so bringing all things into question and dispute where a thing profitable to the life of man or worthy commendation and reward nine this learning very little benefits society for not withstanding these learned disputants these all-knowing doctors it was to the unscholastic statesmen that the governments of the world owed their peace defense and liberties and from the illiterate and contempt mechanic a name of disgrace that they received the improvements of useful arts nevertheless this artificial ignorance and learned gibberish prevailed mightily in these last ages by the interest and artifice of those who found no easier way to that pitch of authority and dominion they have attained than by amusing the men of business and ignorant with hard words or employing the ingenious and idle in intricate disputes about unintelligible terms and holding them perpetually entangled in that endless labyrinth besides there is no such way to gain admittance or give defense to strange and absurd doctrines as to guard them round about with legions of obscure doubtful and undefined words which yet make these retreats more like the dens of robbers or holes of foxes than the fortresses of fair warriors which if it be hard to get them out of it is not for the strength that is in them but the briars and thorns and the obscurity of the thickets they are beset with for untruth being unacceptable to the mind of man there is no other defense left for absurdity but obscurity ten but destroys the instruments of knowledge and communication thus learned ignorance and this art of keeping even inquisitive men from true knowledge have been propagated in the world and hath much perplexed whilst it pretended to inform the understanding for we see that other well-meaning and wise men whose education and parts had not acquired that acuteness could intelligibly express themselves to one another and in its plain use make a benefit of language but though unlearned men well enough understood the words white and black etc and had constant notions of the ideas signified by those words yet there were philosophers found who had learning and subtlety enough to prove that snow was black i.e. to prove that white was black whereby they had the advantage to destroy the instruments and means of discourse conversation instruction and society whilst with great art and subtlety they did no more but perplex and confound the signification of words and thereby render language less useful than the real defects of it had made it that the illiterate had not attained to 11. as useful as to confound the sound that the letters of the alphabet stand for these learned men did equally instruct men's understandings and profit their lives as he who should alter the signification of known characters and by a subtle device of learning far surpassing the capacity of the illiterate dull and vulgar should in his writings show that he could put A for B and D for E etc to the no small admiration and benefit of for his reader it being a senseless to put black which is a word agreed on to stand for one sensible idea to put it I say for another or the contrary idea i.e. to call snow black as to put this mark A which is a character agreed on to stand for one modification of sound made by a certain motion of the organs of speech for B which is agreed on to stand for another modification of sound made by another certain mode of the organs of speech 12. this art has perplexed religion and justice nor have this mischief stopped in logical niceties or curious empty speculations it hath invaded the great concern ments of human life and society obscured and perplexed the material truths of law and divinity brought confusion disorder and uncertainty into the affairs of mankind and if not destroyed yet in a great measure rendered useless these two great rules religion and justice what have the greatest part of the comments and disputes upon the laws of God and man served for but to make the meaning more doubtful and perplexed the sense what have been the effect of those multiplied curious distinctions and acute niceties but obscurity and uncertainty leaving the words more unintelligible and the reader more at a loss how else comes it to pass that princes speaking or writing to their servants in their ordinary commands are easily understood and the people in their laws are not so and as I remarked before doth it not often happen that a man of an ordinary capacity very well understands a text or a law that he reads till he consults an expositor or goes to council who by that time he hath done explaining them makes the word signify either nothing at all or what he pleases 13. and ought not to pass for learning whether any by interests of these professions have occasioned this I will not hear examine but I leave it to be considered whether it would not be well for mankind whose concern it is to know things as they are and to do what they ought and not to spend their lives in talking about them or tossing words to and fro whether it would not be well I say or that at least if this will happen it should not be thought learning or knowledge to do so 14. for for for for for for for for for in general yet more particularly affects those Those men are most subject to most confine their thoughts to any one's system, and give themselves up into a firm belief of the perfection of any received hypothesis, whereby they come to be persuaded that the terms of that sect are so suited to the nature of things that they perfectly correspond with their real existence. Who is there that has been bred up in the peripatetic philosophy, who does not think the ten names, under which are ranked the ten predicaments, to be exactly conformable to the nature of things? Who is there of that school that is not persuaded that substantial forms, vegetative souls, abhorrence of a vacuum, intentional species, etc., are something real? These words men have learned from their very entrance upon knowledge, and have found their masters and systems lay great stress upon them, and therefore they cannot quit the opinion that they are conformable to nature, and are the representations of something that really exists. The Platonists have their soul of the world, and the Epicureans their endeavor towards motion in their atoms when at rest. There is scarce any sect in philosophy has not a distinct set of terms that others understand not, but yet this gibberish which in the weakness of human understanding serves so well to palliate men's ignorance and cover their errors, comes by familiar use amongst those of the same tribe to seem the most important part of language, and of all other the terms the most significant, and should aerial and ethereal vehicles come once by the prevalency of that doctrine to be generally received anywhere, no doubt those terms would make impressions on men's minds, so as to establish them in the persuasion of the reality of such things, as much as parapetetic forms and intentional species have here to foredone. 15. Instance in Matter How much names taken for things are apt to mislead the understanding the attentive reading of philosophical writers would abundantly discover, and that perhaps in words little suspected of any such misuse? I shall instance in one only, and that a very familiar one. How many intricate disputes have there been about matter, as if there were some such thing really in nature, distinct from body, as it is evident the word matter stands for an idea distinct from the idea of body? For if the ideas these two terms stood for were precisely the same, they might indifferently in all places be put for one another. But we see that though it be proper to say there is one matter of all bodies, one cannot say there is one body of all matters. We familiarly say one body is bigger than another, but it sounds harsh and I think is never used, to say one matter is bigger than another. Whence comes this, then, would they look it from hence, that though matter and body be not really distinct, but wherever there is the one there is the other, yet matter and body stand for two different conceptions, whereof the one is incomplete and but a part of the other. For body stands for a solid extended-figured substance, whereof matter is but a partial and more confused conception. It seeming to me to be used for the substance and solidity of body without taking in its extension and figure, and therefore it is that speaking of matter we speak of it always as one, because in truth it expressly contains nothing but the idea of a solid substance, which is everywhere the same, everywhere uniform. This being our idea of matter, we know more conceive or speak of different matters in the world than we do of different solidities, though we both conceive and speak of different bodies because extension and figure are capable of variation. But since solidity cannot exist without extension and figure, the taking matter to be the name of something really existing under that precision has no doubt produced those obscure and unintelligible discourses and disputes, which have filled the heads and books of philosophers concerning materia prima, which imperfection or abuse, how far it may concern a great many other general terms I leave to be considered. This I think I may at least say, that we should have a great many fewer disputes in the world if words were taken for what they are, the signs of our ideas only, and not for things themselves. For when we argue about matter or any of the like term, we truly argue only about the idea we express by that sound, whether that precise idea agree to anything really existing in nature or no, and if men would tell what ideas they make their words stand for, there could not be half that obscurity or wrangling in the search or support of truth that there is. 16. This makes errors lasting. But whatever inconvenience follows from this mistake of words, this I am sure, that by constant and familiar use they charm men into notions far remote from the truth of things. It would be a hard matter to persuade anyone that the words which his father or schoolmaster, the parson of the parish or such a reverend doctor used, signified nothing that really existed in nature, which perhaps is none of the least causes that men are so hardly drawn to quit their mistakes, even in opinions purely philosophical and where they have no other interest but truth. For the words they have a long time been used to, remaining firm in their minds, it is no wonder that the wrong notions annexed to them should not be removed. 17. Fifthly, by setting them in the place of what they cannot signify. 5. Fifthly, another abuse of words is, the setting them in the place of things which they do or can by no means signify. We may observe that in the general names of substances, whereof the nominal essences are only known to us, when we put them into propositions and affirm or deny anything about them, we do most commonly tacitly suppose or intend they should stand for the real essence of a certain sort of substances. For when a man says gold is malleable, he means and would insinuate something more than this, that what I call gold is malleable, though truly it amounts to no more, but would have this understood, would delicate that gold, i.e. what has the real essence of gold, is malleable, which amounts to thus much, that malleableness depends on and is inseparable from the real essence of gold. But a man, not knowing wherein that real essence consists, the connection in his mind of malleableness is not truly with an essence he knows not, but only with the sound gold he puts for it. Thus when we say that animal rationale is, and animal im flume bipes latis unguibus is not a good definition of a man, it is plain we suppose the name man in this case to stand for the real essence of a species, and would signify that a rational animal better described that real essence than a two-legged animal with broad nails and without feathers. Or else why might not Plato as properly make the word word in Greek, or man, stand for his complex idea, made up of the idea of a body distinguished from others by a certain shape and other outward appearances, as Aristotle make the complex idea to which he gave the name word in Greek, or man, of body and the faculty of reasoning joined together, unless the name word in Greek, or man, were supposed to stand for something else than what it signifies, and to be put in the place of some other thing than the idea a man professes he would express by it. CHAPTER 10 OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS PART 2 section 18 Putting them for the real essences of substances. It is true the names of substances would be much more useful, and propositions made in them much more certain were the real essences of substances, the ideas in our minds which those words signified. And it is for want of those real essences that our words convey so little knowledge or certainty in our discourses about them, and therefore the mind, to remove that imperfection as much as it can, makes them, by a secret supposition, to stand for a thing having that real essence, as if thereby it made some nearer approaches to it. 4. Though the word man or gold signify nothing truly but a complex idea of properties united together in one sort of substances, yet there is scarce anybody in the use of these words, but often supposes each of those names to stand for a thing having the real essence on which these properties depend. Which is so far from diminishing the imperfection of our words that by a plain abuse it adds to it, when we would make them stand for something which, not being in our complex idea, the name we use can no ways be the sign of. 9. Hence we think change of our complex ideas of substances not to change their species. This shows us the reason why in mixed modes any of the ideas that make the composition of the complex one being left out or changed it is allowed to be another thing, that is, to be of another species, as is plain in chance medley, manslaughter, murder, parasite, and so forth. The reason whereof is, because the complex idea signified by that name is the real as well as nominal essence, and there is no secret reference of that name to any other essence but that. But in substances it is not so. Although in that called gold one puts into his complex idea when another leaves out and vice versa, yet men do not usually think that therefore the species is changed, because they secretly in their minds refer that name and suppose it annexed to a real immutable essence of a thing existing on which those properties depend. The key that adds to his complex idea of gold that of fixedness and solubility in aquaregia, which he put not in it before, is not thought to have changed the species, but only to have a more perfect idea by adding another simple idea which is always in fact joined with those other of which his former complex idea consisted. But this reference of the name to a thing whereof we have not the idea is so far from helping at all that it only serves the more to involve us in difficulties. For by this tacit reference to the real essence of that species of bodies, the word gold, which by standing for a more or less perfect collection of simple ideas, serve to design that sort of body well enough in civil discourse, comes to have no signification at all, being put for somewhat whereof we have no idea at all, and so can signify nothing at all when the body itself is away. For, however it may be thought all one, yet, if well considered, it will be found a quite different thing to argue about gold in name and about a parcel in the body itself. For example, a piece of leaf gold laid before us, though in discourse we are feigned to substitute the name for the thing. Section 20. The cause of this abuse, a supposition of natures working always regularly in setting boundaries to species. That which I think very much disposes men to substitute their names for the real essences of species, is the supposition before mentioned, that nature works regularly in the production of things, and sets the boundaries to each of those species by giving exactly the same real internal constitution to each individual which we rank under one general name. Whereas anyone who observes their different qualities can hardly doubt that many of the individuals called by the same name are in their internal constitution as different one from another as several of those which are ranked under different specific names. This supposition, however, that the same precise and internal constitution, those always with the same specific name, makes men forward to take those names for the representatives of those real essences, though indeed they signify nothing but the complex ideas they have in their minds when they use them. So that, if I may so say, signifying one thing and being supposed for or put in the place of another, they cannot but, in such a kind of use, cause a great deal of uncertainty in men's discourses, especially in those who have thoroughly imbibed the doctrine of substantial forms whereby they firmly imagine the several species of things to be determined and distinguished. This abuse contains two false suppositions. But, however preposterous and absurd it be to make our names stand for ideas we have not, or, which is all one, essences that we know not, it being in effect to make our words the signs of nothing, yet it is evident to anyone who ever so little reflects on the use men make of their words that there is nothing more familiar. When a man asks whether this or that thing he sees, let it be a drill or a monstrous fetus, be a man or no, it is evident the question is not whether that particular thing agreed to his complex idea expressed by the name man, but whether it has in it the real essence of a species of things which he supposes his name manned to stand for. In which way of using the names of substances there are these false suppositions contained. First, that there are certain precise essences according to which nature makes all particular things and by which they are distinguished into species. That everything has a real constitution whereby it is what it is and on which its sensible qualities depend is passed doubt, but I think it has been proved that this makes not the distinction of species as we rank them nor the boundaries of their names. Secondly, this tacitly also insinuates as if we had ideas of these proposed essences. For to what purpose else is it to inquire whether this or that thing have the real essence of the species man if we did not suppose that there were such a specific essence known. Which yet is utterly false and therefore such application of names as would make them stand for ideas which we have not must needs cause great disorder in discourses and reasonings about them and be a great inconvenience in our communication by words. Sixthly, by proceeding upon this opposition that the words we use have a certain and evident signification which other men cannot but understand. Sixthly, there remains yet another more general though perhaps less observed abuse of words and that is that men having by a long and familiar use next to them certain ideas they are apt to imagine so near and necessary a connection between the names and the signification they use them in that they forwardly suppose one cannot but understand what their meaning is and therefore one ought to acquiesce in the words delivered as if it were passed doubt that in the use of those common received sounds the speaker and the hearer had necessarily the same precise ideas. Wentz presuming that when they have in discourse used any term they have thereby as it were set before others the very thing they talked of and so likewise taking the words of others as naturally standing for just what they themselves have been accustomed to apply them to they never trouble themselves to explain their own or understand clearly others meaning. From Wentz commonly proceeds noise and wrangling without improvement or information whilst men take words to be the constant regular marks of agreed notions which in truth are no more but the voluntary and unsteady signs of their own ideas. And yet men think it strange if in discourse or where it is often absolutely necessary in dispute one sometimes asks the meaning of their terms though the arguings one may every day observe in conversation make it evident that there are few names of complex ideas which any two men use for the same just precise collection. It is hard to name a word which will not be a clear instance of this. Life is a term none more familiar. Anyone almost would take it for an affront to be asked what he meant by it and yet if it comes in question whether a plant that lies ready formed in the seed have life whether the embryo in an egg before incubation or a man in a swoon without sense or motion be alive or no it is easy to perceive that a clear distinct settled idea does not always accompany the use of so known a word as that of life is. Some gross and confused conceptions men need ordinarily have to which they apply the common words of their language and such a loose use of their words serves them well enough in their ordinary discourses or affairs. But this is not sufficient for philosophical inquiries. Knowledge and reasoning require precise determinate ideas and though men will not be so unfortunately dull as not to understand what others say without understanding an explication of their terms nor so troublesomely critical as to correct others in the use of the words they receive from them. Yet where truth and knowledge are concerned in the case I know not what fault it can be to desire the explication of words whose sense seems dubious or why a man should be ashamed to own his ignorance in what sense another man uses his words since he has no other way of certainly knowing it but by being informed. This abuse of taking words upon trust has nowhere spread so far nor with so ill effects as amongst men of letters. The multiplication and obstinacy of disputes which have so laid waste to the intellectual world is owing to nothing more than to this ill use of words. For though it be generally believed that there is great diversity of opinions in the volumes and variety of controversies the world is distracted with. Yet the most I can find that the contending learned men of different parties do in their arguments one with another is that they speak different languages. For I am apt to imagine that when any of them quitting terms think upon things and know what they think they think all the same though perhaps what they would have be different. Section 23. The ends of language. First to convey our ideas. To conclude this consideration of the imperfection and abuse of language. The ends of language in our discourse with others being chiefly these three. First to make known one man's thoughts or ideas to another. Secondly to do so with as much ease and quickness as possible. And thirdly thereby to convey the knowledge of things. Language is either abused or deficient when it fails of any of these three. First words fail in the first of these ends and lay not open one man's ideas to another's view. One when men have names in their mouths without any determinant ideas in their minds where of they are the signs or two when they apply the common received names of any language to ideas to which the common use of that language does not apply them or three when they apply them very unsteadily making them stand now for one and by and by for another idea. Section 24. Secondly to do it with quickness. Secondly men fail of conveying their thoughts with quickness and ease that may be when they have complex ideas without having any distinct names for them. This is sometimes the fault of the language itself which has not in it a sound yet applied to such a signification. And sometimes the fault of the man who has not yet learned the name for that idea he would show another. Section 25. Thirdly to convey the knowledge of things. Thirdly there is no knowledge of things conveyed by men's words when their ideas agree not to the reality of things. Though it be a defect that has its original in our ideas which are not so conformable to the nature of things as attention study and application might make them yet it fails not to extend itself to our words to when we use them as signs of real beings which yet never had any reality or existence. Section 26. How men's words fail in all these first when used without any ideas. First he that hath words of any language without distinct ideas in his mind to which he applies them does so far as he uses them in discourse only make a noise without any sense or signification. And how learned so ever he may seem by the use of hard words or learned terms is not much more advanced thereby in knowledge than he would be in learning who had nothing in his study but the bare titles of books without possessing the contents of them. For all such words however put into discourse according to the right construction of grammatical rules or the harmony of well-turned periods do yet amount to nothing but bare sounds and nothing else. Section 27. Secondly when complex ideas are without names next to them. Secondly he that has complex ideas without particular names for them would be in no better case than a bookseller who had in his warehouse volumes that lay there unbound and without titles which he could therefore make known to others only by showing the loose sheets and communicate them only by tale. This man is hindered in his discourse for want of words to communicate his complex ideas which he is therefore forced to make known by an enumeration of the simple ones that compose them and so is feign often to use twenty words to express what another man signifies in one. Section 28. Thirdly when the same sign is not put for the same idea. Thirdly he that puts not constantly the same sign for the same idea but uses the same words sometimes in one and sometimes in another signification ought to pass in the schools and conversation for as fair a man as he does in the market and exchange who sells several things under the same name. Section 29. Fourthly when words are diverted from their common use. Fourthly he that applies the words of any language to ideas different from those to which the common use of that country applies them. However his own understanding may be filled with truth and light will not by such words be able to convey much of it to others without defining his terms. For however the sounds are such as are familiarly known and easily enter the ears of those who are accustomed to them yet standing for other ideas than those they usually are next to and are want to excite in the mind of the hearers they cannot make known the thoughts of him who thus uses them. Section 30. Fifthly when they are names of fantastical imaginations. Fifthly he that imagined to himself substances such as never have been and filled his head with ideas which have not any correspondence with the real nature of things to which yet he gives settled and defined names may fill his discourse and perhaps another man's head with the fantastical imaginations of his own brain but will be very far from advancing thereby one jocked in real and true knowledge. Section 31. Summary. He that hath names without ideas wants meaning in his words and speaks only empty sounds. He that hath complex ideas without names for them wants liberty and dispatch in his expressions and is necessitated to use paraphrases. He that uses his words loosely and unsteadily will either be not minded or not understood. He that applies his names to ideas different from their common use wants propriety in his language and speaks gibberish. And he that hath the ideas of substances disagreeing with the real existence of things so far wants the materials of true knowledge in his understanding and hath instead thereof chimeras. Section 32. How men's words fail when they stand for substances. In our notions concerning substances we are liable to all the former inconveniences. For example, he that uses the word tarantula without having any imagination or idea of what it stands for pronounces a good word but so long means nothing at all by it. 2. He that in a newly discovered country shall see several sorts of animals and vegetables unknown to him before may have as true ideas of them as of a horse or a stag but can speak of them only by a description till he shall either take the names the natives call them by or give them names himself. 3. He that uses the word body sometimes for pure extension and sometimes for extension and solidity together will talk very fallaciously. 4. He that gives the name horse to that idea which common usage calls mule talks improperly and will not be understood. 5. He that thinks the name centaur stands for some real being imposes on himself and mistakes words of things. Section 33. How when they stand for modes and relations. In modes and relations generally we are liable only to the four first of these inconveniences. To wit. 1. I may have in my memory the names of modes as gratitude or charity and yet not have any precise ideas and next in my thoughts to those names. 2. I may have ideas and not know the names that belong to them. For example I may have the idea of a man's drinking till his color and humor be altered till his tongue trips and his eyes look red and his feet fail him and yet not know that it is to be called drunkenness. 3. I may have the ideas of virtues or vices and names also that apply them amiss. For example when I apply the name frugality to that idea which others call and signify by this sound covetousness. 4. I may use any of those names with inconstancy. 5. But in modes and relations I cannot have ideas disagreeing to the existence of things. For modes being complex ideas made by the mind at pleasure and being but by way of considering or comparing two things together and so also an idea of my own making. These ideas can scarce be found to disagree with anything existing since they are not in the mind as the copies of things regularly made by nature nor as properties inseparably flowing from the internal constitution or essence of any substance. But as it were patterns lodged in my memory with names next to them to denominate actions and relations by as they come to exist. But the mistake is commonly in my giving a wrong name to my conceptions and so using words in a different sense from other people. I am not understood but I'm thought to have wrong ideas of them when I give wrong names to them. Only if I put in my ideas of mixed modes or relations any inconsistent ideas together I fill my head also with chimeras since such ideas if well examined cannot so much as exist in the mind much less any real being ever be denominated from them. Section 34. 7. Language is often abused by figurative speech. Since wit and fancy find easier entertainment in the world than dry truth and real knowledge figurative speeches and illusion in language will hardly be admitted as an imperfection or abuse of it. I confess in discourses where we seek rather pleasure and delight than information and improvement such ornaments as are borrowed from them can scarce pass for faults. But yet if we would speak of things as they are we must allow that all the art of rhetoric besides order and clearness all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas move the passions and thereby mislead the judgment and so indeed are perfect sheets and therefore however laudable or allowable oratory may render them in harangues and popular addresses they are certainly in all discourses that pretend to inform or instruct wholly to be avoided and where truth and knowledge are concerned cannot but be thought a great fault either of the language or person that makes use of them. What and how various they are will be superfluous here to take notice the books of rhetoric which abound in the world will instruct those who want to be informed. Only I cannot but observe how little the preservation and improvement of truth and knowledge is the care and concern of mankind since the arts of fallacy are endowed and preferred. It is evident how much men love to deceive and be deceived since rhetoric that powerful instrument of error and deceit has its established professors is publicly taught and has always been had in great reputation and I doubt not but it will be thought great boldness if not brutality in me to have said thus much against it. Elequence, like the fair sex has two prevailing beauties in it to suffer itself ever to be spoken against. And it is in vain to find fault with those arts of deceiving wherein men find pleasure to be deceived. End of Section 13 Recording by Abestone Berkeley, California 2019