 Okay, we're back, we're live on a given Wednesday in the morning, and we are joined by Carlos Juarez, Cuebla, which is what, 50 miles east of Mexico City. He's there in the University of the Americas, and we are delighted to have him with us again to talk about international relations and foreign policy. Let's talk about American foreign policy for a while. We've had dramatic change in it, not to say that it's been great over the years post-war, but it's not great now, and it seems to be, as you pointed out in our discussion a moment ago, that we've gone from multilateral relationships to bilateral relationships. The first question I would put to you as a student of global relations, is that working? Is Trump's notion of bilateral relations working, or is it so far not working? I think the short answer quickly is to say that Trump's foreign policy and the US relations with the world are at a really low point, dysfunctional, no clear strategy or policy. But if we step back, on one hand, we can speak of really an international system that was crafted after World War II with US leadership that basically has come under a lot of, it's not something that Trump, out of the big reflects of the US is operating in a different world, the right places like India, even the EU. But what we have in the new president, Donald, traditional foreign policy in the US, even though we alternated from Democrats to Republicans, there was usually a bipartisan consensus on core foreign policy issues, including, for example, the importance of alliances, the importance of multilateral forums to carry out a lot of issues. Trump has rejected those norms, those traditions, and very much what we might call a more transactional focus. He wants to emphasize the bilateral, and he will point to some successes on one hand, but at the end of the day, the deals that he's been making have yet to come to pass, and a lot of it is a lot of blustering. We've seen, we've talked about this before, how his strategy is to sort of almost like a bull in a china shop, go in and sort of menace and bully and then make a high drama, existential threat, and then finally come back to somehow make a deal that he would say solves the problem, or is the best deal ever, the reality is far from that. Wherever we might look, whether the Iran crisis, the North Korea saga, the recent relations with Mexico, it's a very impulsive, and even this notion of Twitter diplomacy, where even his own advisors don't know what they can explain or defend themselves by the Twitter feed, what he's thinking is. It's a bit of chaos. It's uncertainty, and that's frustration. It's a community like to have some sense of where things are going. In diplomacy too, you want to know are the things the president said so that people begin to question his credibility, and I think we could say that today the US foreign policy is at a low point. A lot of frustration, a lot of concern. How do you prepare for that? How do you manage it? Where are we? We have very interesting, about 10 days, the upcoming meeting of the G20, the group of 20, these are the top industrialized and next year of emerging powers, a meeting in Osaka, Japan for their annual meeting. Normally these multilateral forums get our way of voicing solidarity, consensus, trying to get some shared interest. We have yet to see how this will play out because of the trade war with China, President Trump, I guess he's signaled that he'll be having a sidebar meeting with the president of China. These multilateral forums often present opportunities for the people. As I recall, Carlos, he threatened Xi Jinping. It's just winning by intimidation. That's foreign policy for you, winning by intimidation. We know it doesn't work, not in the 21st century because they can see right through him. I'm not sure whether they see him as a clown or a bully or rotating clown and bully, but they don't see him as an equal partner in the negotiation because of the way he plays. You can't do winning by intimidation in the 21st century. Nobody will buy it. Anyway, I think my recollection is that he told Xi Jinping that if Xi Jinping doesn't show up at the G20, he was going to increase the tariffs. He was going to punish him for not showing up. There's a great setup of a meeting that will really start you off on the right foot. Yeah, it's a tariff diplomacy now, or a Twitter diplomacy. But on one hand, maybe speaking of where I am here in Mexico, obviously, Mexico was really brought to its knees in this most recent negotiation. So on one hand, Trump and maybe his allies and supporters will argue that only through the threat of these tariff warfares has he gotten action. On one hand, I guess I want to say that that's true. Mexico had very little choice, was in a weak position, and was faced with a very, very real and continues to be faced with this drastic economic threat, try to cooperate. But what I'm getting at here is that while it might have some short term immediate impacts, unfortunately, in the longer term, there's a crisis of credibility of the president. There's a distrust. The worst now here in Mexico, even anticipating that Trump is possibly likely to be reelected. Among many people, there's a strongly held view here that somehow he's going to pull it off again. So what does that mean? Mexico is kind of stuck having to deal with this bully, this transactional leader that is very difficult to plan. But again, Mexico is in a weak position and has few options to maneuver. Yes, but I feel I agree with you that Mexico may be in a weak position and governments are frail sometimes. People are frail who are in government positions and they are subject to that intimidation. But the people in the street, the media, the rank and file, the management, the entrepreneurs of Mexico, I'm sure, as you said, they carry away less trust, less trust in Trump, less trust in the United States. And our relationship, therefore, is affected by what is happening. You might win short term like a demagogue, but you can't fool all the people all the time. And our relationship with Mexico has been damaged, is being damaged, and it's not dissimilar from our relations with so many other countries. So if you have no policy and you go by the rule of intimidation, you wind up isolated in every way, including global relations. That's what's happening. So I agree with you that he's able to intimidate Mexico, but in the long term, we're shooting ourselves in the foot. So let's talk about that. The president of Mexico is not going to the G20. Why? Yeah, and there's a raging debate about that. On one hand, his take is that he's got too much work at home, domestic, his whole platform. He was elected about a year ago that came to office in December. So it's about six, seven months now. But beyond that, he's also won, you know, Mexico in the last 30 years has had presidents that tend to be, you know, ideally trained, confident with English, usually, you know, technocrats and, you know, finance and business. This new leader, a populist left wing leader doesn't speak English. He's not a global traveler, sold the presidential plane and fleet of the helicopters. So if he goes abroad, he's got to get on a commercial airline. But more than that, he, even yesterday, he held a press conference where he had a video conference interview with Mark Zuckerberg. You don't have to leave the country. You can do this. And that, and yet, you know, the reality is that, you know, in the world diplomacy, you need person-to-person real contact. You have a certain group dynamic, a certain, and so in fact, these G20 summit, they're an important forum for many countries like Mexico that are the South of Korea, the Indonesia, the world. They come together in this forum and they have a seat at the table with obviously the top seven, 10, you know, economies. And you would think for the Mexican leader, he might find opportunity to build support from other members of the G20, the Europeans, other South Americans, the turkeys of the world, somehow, you know, rally some, I don't know, some support for their weekend position with the U.S., but he's not planning to go. It's just regrettable. It's regrettable because if he establishes relations with other countries, if he can establish alliance, he can, you know, get some strength as against Trump, so that Trump won't be able to intimidate him this way. It's diplomacy 101, but unfortunately, he's not a student of diplomacy. He has a view that is very much, you know, and maybe it works on some level confronting Trump to ignore him, to not engage him, to obviously, you know, not go to you, visit him and not invite him to come here. But at some point, you know, we live in this globally interdependent world and Mexico doesn't need help. It needs to reach out moreover. So given its heavy dependence on the U.S., it doesn't need to seek, you know, growing partnerships in Europe and Asia, other parts of Latin America. But I think much to my dismay, I think the president here has taken the easy route out. It's not planning to go. And that's unfortunate. I think it's a loss. It is because, you know, the reality is Trump is the president. I have to remind myself of that every day. That's the reality. And furthermore, the reality is that Trump might win again. He might win again. I hope not, but there you have it. And finally, even if whether he wins again or doesn't win again, you still have this large base that believes in him and people like him. And we might have another president coming along that's just like Trump. So the president of Mexico really, it's in the interest, his interest in the interests of Mexico to recognize those realities and try to deal with it and try to level the playing field so we can have, you know, a diplomatic relationship with this country that will be stronger somehow. And that's too bad that he's not doing that. That's opportunity. Yeah. Well, okay, let's unpack some more. So, okay, Xi Jinping, he got intimidated. He's coming to the G20. He's got problems in Hong Kong. He's probably a little sensitive about the loss of his effectively absolute power over recent months and years. So, you know, he wants to, but at the same time, you see what he's doing. He's visiting with Putin and he's visiting with Kim Jong-un in North Korea. He's building his alliances so he's ever stronger. He's pulling the rug out from under Trump in a way by building his alliances in advance of the G20. But I suspect, you must have some thoughts on this, I suspect that there is no agenda whatsoever on this meeting between this big, you know, drumroll meeting between Trump and Xi Jinping in Osaka. Trump hasn't taken it out. He has no idea what he's going to say or do. He doesn't have a position. He doesn't have a position. He'll just try to intimidate him and use tariffs and other things without the likelihood of any meaningful result, which, you know, you didn't mention in so many words, but all this time you mentioned that I guess Mexico has allowed Trump to intimidate it. But all of these efforts in North Korea, Russia, China, the Middle East, what did I miss? Venezuela. Trump has failed. You know, his foreign policy has failed. A lot of talk, no action, no result. So, here we are. We're going to G20. I doubt that Trump has any real agenda, and there won't be a result. Do you agree? Well, yeah, it's pretty clear, and he's made that clear in his other visit abroad, where he doesn't really prepare. He doesn't read the briefings. He just goes and tries to wing it. And I suppose with the ongoing trade wars, I mean, that's his game right now to kind of push the threat of tariffs. And with China, of course, these are the two largest economies. I mean, ultimately, they've got to meet. They've got to talk face-to-face. And, you know, again, we talked about the missed opportunity for even this Mexican leader. As much as it may be awkward, frankly, he would probably benefit from meeting Trump, shake his hand and tell him, hey, chill out, or, you know, let's work on some common agendas, you know. And yes, that's not happening. So, again, like you put it, maybe, you know, there's foreign policy with no policy. I would contrast, you know, the U.S. and its lack of any real clear plan and strategy with the case of China. I mean, they are playing a very slow, long-term game. As you know, they have this ambitious, you know, one-bill, one-road initiative. So they have a lot of strategic interest with many players throughout Asia, throughout Africa, the Middle East. And so I'm quite sure Xi Jinping and the Chinese leadership, very savvy at their diplomacy, they use these multilateral forms to do that, to do a lot of the handshaking and then, and otherwise, you know, deepening the more strategic thinking that they have. We seem to be lacking it on our side. Yeah, I see two possibilities on Xi Jinping. In one possibility, he's building all these other relationships. And as you say, one belt, one road is an enormous economic and influence project around the world all the way to Spain. So, you know, he's got other fish that he's frying, and he's trying to, you know, do without the United States, do without Trump. Of course, that's very hard for China, because China is, in many ways, dependent. So I give you two possibilities. See, what do you think? Maybe there's a third possibility with Xi Jinping. Number one is it'd be the same kind of result that Trump had with Kim Jong-un in Singapore a few months ago, where they, you know, they said, they talked. It's all very love letter kind. But nothing happens. And Xi Jinping doesn't agree to anything. And it's a whole, the whole thing gets kicked down the road. And he feels strong enough to do that. And Trump has really no options, because he's running out of gas on his terrace. People in this country are beginning to wonder, I mean, many people, more than a few months ago. The other possibility is that Xi Jinping gives him something nominal, something, yeah, okay, all right, we'll give you something, but it will be illusory. And it won't be, it won't be, it won't have any meat. And so it plays into Trump's sense of theater, just like Trump is doing this largely for theater. Xi Jinping, you know, can do something largely for theater. Am I missing an option there? Yeah. Well, I think it's gonna fall within that realm, but I'm more inclined to think the latter. I think the Chinese, like so many others, are learning to figure out, Trump. And what does that mean? Well, you've got to praise him, you've got to give him something, you know, something that he can then turn around and claim, you know, this wouldn't have happened without me. I think the best deal. And yet, you know, gosh, even with that knowledge, it's so hard to predict and then to really anticipate that outcome. But I guess what I'm getting at here is I think the Chinese, who themselves have fears about, you know, downturn in their economy, it wouldn't go well with the rising, you know, middle class. And so my point is, I think, yeah, like you suggest, they're likely to see what they can offer some carrot, something to put on the table. Beyond that, though, here, we're talking about a multilateral forum. This is not a summit meeting between China and the US, but it's an opportunity for those leaders to suddenly be on stage. And as we know from, again, the OECD meetings, the NATO meetings, the other G7 meetings, these are not places that Trump likes to be. He prefers a rally where he can put together, you know, the image and all the, you know, the look. It means, you know, he's not about him and he's not the center of it. And that's an uncomfortable position for him to be in. Yeah, Carlos, that's a really interesting point. Because Trump doesn't like multilateral arrangements. But Xi Jinping and the others, the G20 is multilateral. That's what it's about, trying to reach multilateral agreement. So, you know, one thing that Xi Jinping can do is, while he's talking unilaterally, bilaterally with Trump, he's talking multilaterally with all the other people there. At the end of the day, he reaches some kind of illusory theater kind of result with Trump. But he has a real result with, you know, the other countries he's trying to lead. Southeast Asia and Central Asia and all that, all the way to Spain. And so, you know, what might happen at the end of the day is, you know, the possibility that Xi Jinping gives him something, gives Trump something, but makes a real deal with many others in the multilateral discussions. Don't you love that? Yeah, no, no. And then again, he's the kind of person that he commands a lot of attention. And, you know, to some extent, I suppose respect because of the powerful economy that he goes over. And what I want to say is, by contrast, even though Trump represents the most powerful military, the biggest economy, there is a lot of unease about him when he comes in, you know, a lot of uncertainty, and then maybe a recognition that he just doesn't play by the traditional norm. And the way he does play can be quite mean-spirited and unpredictable. So, you know, he walks into a room and it's not like excitement or, you know, maybe an aura, more, you know, trying to see, you know, what could possibly happen. Oh, my God, what's going to happen now? So, let's unpack some of these others. Just thinking geographically, what about North Korea? North Korea going to be there, G20? Is there any possibility that there'll be a day-new moment between Trump and Kim Jong-un? No, no. They would not be there for one. And it would not be a top item for the, you know, because you only have the interest of a handful of players there, Japan, Russia, China, the U.S., and South Korea. So, the players are there, but it's not going to be, I think, an agenda item at the forefront. The G20, really, you know, for many years we've had about 30 years, the G7, it used to be the 80s, these are the top industrialized countries of the world. G20, it began probably around 20 years ago. And the first part, the first 5, 10 years, it was not seen as particularly relevant. It was just a bigger club, a few extra players. But really, in the last decade, when you have the growing power and emergence of powers like India, Indonesia, Turkey, etc., now this G20 is often seen as an important voice for these emerging powers, for the sort of mid-level developing countries. And yet, here we are in a crisis of multilateralism, given Trump, given even the saga that continues in Europe, the crisis in the European Union. So, this multilateralism, I guess I'm suggesting it's kind of facing a real critical political crisis. Are these forums still relevant? They're not what they used to be. And nevertheless, they are continued. They continue to happen every, every, literally every few weeks, every few months, you have one of these forums. The G20, the OECD, the APEC, many of them are overlapping players. Yes. And so there are common issues and agenda items. But, you know, here, I would just go back to this, we're at a moment of critical juncture right now where there's a crisis between the key players, Japan and China, I'm sorry, US and China. Japan is also trying to kind of re-carve out, and they are the host country here in Osaka. But the leader there, you know, Hindo Abe has interestingly come out now to try to almost be a mediator with the crisis in Iran, a role traditionally not played by Japan. And so they're trying to walk this delicate balance. And then Shinzo Abe, who's had probably among the world leaders, you know, one of the closer relationships with Trump, he's also been burned a little bit. And, you know, it remains to be seen, are they going to have any sidebar, you know, and time together? We also know Trump, when he goes to these meetings, he wants to get in, you know, be the last one there and be the first one out. So, you know, will he use what little time he may have there to, who will they meet with? I guess that's the point of, what about Putin? Are they going to shake hands? Are they going to have a picture together? Are they going to go off and have a meeting with no translators again or what? It'll be interesting to see a lot of uncertainty, though, these are strange times. Chaos, as far as the world stage is concerned, and it's not any good reason for confidence by anybody. But you mentioned Abe and his efforts to be a mediator in the Iran thing. Let's turn to that in terms of global diplomatic relations. You know, it seems to me that pulling out of the nuclear deal a year ago was without any effort to try to negotiate acceptable changes to that deal. He just pulled out, bingo, in a punitive way. And now for the last year, he's really been unable to get any traction on meetings and I can understand that. It's not only the Iranians, but anyone who would be offended by what he did in the beginning, not going to be so quick to meet with him. They don't intimidate easily. And they haven't been intimidated. They meet him at the pass on everything, including, you know, building nuclear bombs. So where are we in terms of Iran? It sounds like, you know, you put a thousand troops in and then another thousand, and you bring carriers, you know, in the other borders and all that. And are we going to have a little war here? This sounds very dangerous to me. Yeah, I sure hope not. And it's interesting to think 1979 is now 40 years ago since we've had a pretty obviously continued tense relationship with Iran. You know, unfortunately, you know, Trump is not one who reads the details, knows the history, understands, you know, the policy options and scenarios. So for him, you know, I don't, I'm not sure he could find Iran on a map or tell you anything about previous, you know, very close relations the country had before the revolution in 79 with the US. You know, we see in the media different attention to how, well, neither side really wanted conflict, but when we study war and violence, you know, many, many wars usually were never expected to reach that point. I mean, it's a misperception of one thing or the other about the other side's intentions about their capabilities. And often, you know, it's sparked by some mistakes. So it is a very volatile dangerous hotspot. And I think, you know, after the saga of Iraq, now 15, 16 years back, and what played out there, there's no appetite here in the US for a massive large scale intervention for what? What's the goal? And Iran is a very different context. It's a major regional power. And just like we, we visit, you know, the end of World War Two, where we try to understand Russia and their interests, you cannot appreciate the Middle East without realizing that like or not, Iran is a major, major regional power and it has obviously tentacles everywhere and it will continue. It's also a pretty well educated society, a large population. And, you know, they've been suffering for decades now from this stranglehold. And, you know, I think it's unfortunately, you know, for someone like Trump, it might be naive to think that he alone is going to bring about the change overall we saw from the European partners that a real dismay with the US decision to pull out, because, you know, the progress was being made to ensure that Iran did not have the capability to move forward with a weapons program. And that is now, you know, more up in the air in the US in bellicosity. It's not only their bellicosity and their weapons program, but, you know, they operate through agents. They foment unrest in so many places. They're scoundrels in global sense. And he can't stop them from that. You know, they could do hacking on our power plants. Who knows what? You know, there seems to be a kind of truce on that. But it could happen any time. And if you bring a power plant down in a given location, given region, people die. It's real serious. And that brings me to Russia. You know, where are we in terms of our relations with Russia? It's all clouded and stirred up by the Mueller investigation and the fact that, yes, they did, in fact, mess around in our elections last time and are probably doing the same thing this time. And we'll definitely do it in November 2020. Where can our diplomatic relations be? I don't think he's helped. Do you think he's done anything to help? Has he done anything to hurt? What's your thought about that? Yeah, in some ways, you know, given all these other scenarios, we just talked about whether North Korea or Iran, even Mexico, Russia has kind of been pushed back into the, you know, the third port here. But overall, because of, again, the transactional nature of the relationship and maybe Trump's romance or affinity for Russia, it's more about that relationship. And at this point, we haven't seen much interaction between them. And again, it'll be interesting to see, will there be anything happening at this upcoming G20 meeting? But you also can't help but get a sense that the Russians are probably a little disappointed or tired or maybe frustrated by the U.S. and its current regime, because on one hand, if it is the case that they helped to elect him, I'm not sure that he's delivered to them any good. Has he given Russia more prestige in the world? Has he given Putin anything concretely? And then if you have to go from that, this upcoming election, what is in the interest of Russia? On one hand, you know, one can say they have an interest in destabilizing the U.S. creating conflicts. They had possibly got Trump elected and that was seen as maybe an alternative to a harder line policy that would have come from a victory by Clinton. But what about the future? I mean, there's no clear choice or option right now. But I guess I just can't help but think that Putin and the Russians are probably a little dismayed with Trump. What did I read in just this morning's paper that the Russians were tired of their efforts at trying to influence things in Venezuela? And they're softening their position there and they're just getting fatigued like the rest of us. Anyway, Carlos, it's great to talk to you. It opens so many new thoughts and doors. Carlos Juarez in the International Relations Department of the University of the Americas in Puebla, Mexico, we always enjoyed talking with you. Look forward to the next time. Thank you so much. Thank you so much, Jay. Hello, hot. Take care.