 Hello and welcome to NewsClick. I am Paranjoy Guha Thakurtha and today's topic of discussion is the politicization of India's armed forces. Once upon a time, we in India used to consider it a matter of pride that our military, our defence services, our armed forces were far less politicized. They were far more insulated from the political leadership, even as they acknowledged the leadership of the civilian political leaders. Why has this come to pass? Why has psychofancy become rampant in the armed forces? And then why are so many senior officers increasingly identifying themselves with the Hindu nationalism of the Bharatiya Janata Party that unashamedly, unabashedly seeks to exploit military achievements for political gain? I'm very happy to welcome Rahul Bedi from Chandigarh. Rahul Bedi has been a senior journalist for over 40 years. He's specialized in writing on military matters and the defence services. Thank you so much, Rahul, for giving me your time. And I was reading the article that you recently wrote for The Wire and what you mentioned is that we are having this huge debate today in the mainstream media as well as the social media about how there has been the nexus between the military and the political leadership that has become stronger and that what, to use your words, guarantees reciprocal benefit. Please elaborate on what you mean. Well, it's a complicated situation because I think we first have to go back in history to 1947 and the experience of Pakistan and for some years in Bangladesh. Let me at the onset state that we are nowhere close to where Pakistan is as far as the military ascendancy is concerned. But what has happened over the last 15 or 20 years and particularly over the last five or six years is that the military and the political class have used each other for mutual profit. The military class has used the politician to climb up the promotion pyramid, which is a very narrow pyramid and is a very greasy pyramid and a very slope up the pyramid. And the politician has used the military to tom-tom national security and not only that, but more dangerously to tailor operational responsibilities of the military to suit political ends. So it's in a sense a symbiotic relationship between the two and both profit from it, but I think the loser in this case is the country. Rahul, you know what you mentioned is that very often what is happening today in the military is justified. And I'm here referring to your article and you say that, you know, there've been so many instances of military personnel charged with corruption, illegally offloading subsidized candy and goods, especially liquor, you know, being sold in the black market. But what you've been particularly critical about is senior military officers lobbying, lobbying with politicians. And you've used very, very strong language, but at one level, you've also put forth the argument that this, if this is true for Indian society as a whole, if corruption is rampant, if this kind of psychofency is rampant, then how can you expect the army, the navy, the air force to be, you know, insulated or divorced from what's happening around all over in our society? Well, you know, this is a double edged argument, which is used at times by the military to say that since the military also comes from Indian society, can it be any different? But the other side of the argument is that the military sets different standards for itself. It believes it is a lot superior. The justice system in the military is swift, discipline is greater, and therefore it's more ethical and it comes from a different sort of background and ethos. Now, you can't really have both those arguments at the same time. Either the military is superior and therefore it should behave better. Or it's part of the same venal corrupt nepotistic civilian setup and behaves that way. But it can't be a combination of both. And the military really tries to fall between two stools because it's hypocritical when it wants. And it takes a high moral ground when it wants. So it really, I would accuse the military of very severe double standards. Rahul, you know, you talk about how the military no longer holds that high moral ground that it used to hold once upon a time. All the way through till the late 80s, military officers were held in high esteem by society. They were upright people. They were respected, as you say, eagerly sought after by parents as suitable matches for their daughters. And even the fancy perks, the colonial era perquisites that they get was kind of said, Okay, we tolerate that because after all, you're fighting for our country. And so what, once in a while, you go for horse riding and shikar and mountaineering and golf, etc, etc, etc. But over the years, and you're really seeing this, there's been a deterioration. That the very politician that once upon a time, the military officers and I'm using, I quote you, Generations of soldiers had vilified politicians for duplicity, ineptitude, and for completely misreading military matters has today emerged as his patron and is being manipulated cynically for political ends. That's very strong language you're using. Would you like to explain and elaborate and maybe even give us a few examples? I think examples are a little difficult because that would entail naming people and I don't really intend to do that because it's firstly libelous and secondly, I think there's no counter-defense on the other side. But actually, there's a historical reason for this because military service was one of the few avenues of advancement in colonial India. And a lot of people in those days did join the military and did extremely well and they carried on the traditions after independence. And life was generally a lot more, I would say, a lot more honest, a lot more decent and there was decency in society and the army in fact represented that. And I think the army conducted itself extremely well in all the wars that it fought in 1947, in 1962, in 65, in 71. And it was held in high regard and it was a political army, I mean even in messes, I remember as a young boy, I had friends whose parents were in the army and politics was never really discussed in the mess. It was sort of a free masonry of soldiery as it were. So, but unfortunately, all that changed over the years because there was profit to be hired, there were promotions to be hired, there was money to be made. And the politicians realized that the soldiers were exploitable and therefore it exploited them. And I think this really reached a crescendo during the Kargil war when the National Democratic Alliance headed by Prime Minister Vajpayee was in office. I mean the Kargil war was unabashedly used by the BJP led government to push its own agenda and to return to power soon after the Kargil war was over because a lot of people tend to forget that during the Kargil war the NDA government was a caretaker government. So, and that trend has continued in the last five or six years under Prime Minister Modi. For example, we had the so-called surgical strikes across the Pakistani border in 2016 and then we had... Just before the Uttar Pradesh elections. Just before the elections stood the BJP in extremely good stead. I mean everybody expected the BJP to lose because it had come soon after demonetization but the BJP won. And in fact, all the posters at that time during the elections featured the military. Subsequently, there was the airstrike in Balakot last year and we all know the outcome of the general elections. Mr. Modi won over 300 seats. So, and as a consequence, a lot of people who were around in those days or who were in senior military positions have also profited in terms of getting jobs after retirement. I think it's hardly a secret that General V.K. Singh is a union minister. I mean, so that's how everybody knows about him. We didn't have... I think one thing we must say about General V.K. Singh, I mean here was a general who went and I think disgraced himself by going to court over a alleged wrongly attributed date of birth. And even if he had prevailed, he would have served for another four or five months. But he brought the office of the army chief down by several pegs by following that route. And then subsequently went into politics and is currently a minister. I think the profile and dignity of the army has been significantly solid over the last 15, 20 years. Rahul, I'm going to come back to you on some of the points that you made. But before that, let me step a little back. You yourself talked about how the Indian army and the armed forces did incredibly well, not just in 47, but in 71. But the 62 was the war with China was terrible. Now, once again, the military brain, the political leadership were long decisions. And you have argued in your article, I was reading that it's about time that we released a report that was presented way back in 1963. The Henderson Brooks Inquiry Report. And you know, I mean, everybody is wondering, why is it that after so many years, we haven't released that report? And you point out there just two copies of that report. I mean, what is it so sensitive about that report that it should be still kept under wraps? Actually, I mean, that's a million dollar question. Nobody really has an answer to it. And a lot of what was in the report, in fact, has been has been published in a book called India's China War by a former foreign correspondent called Neville Maxwell of London Times. But again, it's not authenticated because the report has not been released. I think over the last 30 or 40 years, there have been two or three official commissions, which have examined the feasibility of releasing the Henderson Brooks report. But I have all for some strange reason decided against it. And the reasoning that is that is relevant to these committee reports is that it is operationally sensitive. Now, I really don't know what that means because what happened in 1962 is very little, if any relevance in 2020, which is, you know, almost 60, 70 years ago. So it really is mystifying why the Henderson Brooks report is still not being released. And I would be very, very, I'm sure there would be millions of scholars who would be very interested in reading the Henderson Brooks report. And I'm given to understand that one reason why it's not been released is that it vilifies the politicians and blame the politicians more than it does the soldiery. But that again is speculation. All right. It's interesting, you know, in your article, you've gone back to a story which a lot of people have heard about, you know, about General who became Field Marshal Sam Manikshaw, who headed the Indian Army between 1969 and early 1963. And this pertains to the timing of moving into what is today Bangladesh, what was then East Pakistan. And he actually told the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that no, I don't want to do it now, wait for winter. And that's how this entire the Indian Army and the Indian armed forces moved into Bangladesh. And then Bangladesh came into being only in December 1971. So I suppose what you are suggesting is that the military leadership had the guts to tell the political leadership straight on their face what they felt. And you believe that this kind of independence, this kind of autonomy, this kind of spine is lacking among the present generation of leaders of the armed forces. Is that correct? Absolutely, absolutely. And but I mean, I think to be fair, we must also give credit to the political leadership of the time. We're talking about, you know, 1970, early 71. When Mrs. Gandhi asked Manikshaw to move in and Manikshaw basically told her, he said the monsoons are coming up. And he says, I can't ensure that my troops will be able to survive. And also he said, we don't know about the Chinese. And he told Mrs. Gandhi very firmly. And according to people who were at that meeting and there have been several accounts, people were a little taken aback because Mrs. Gandhi again was a very autocratic leader. But she realized the wisdom of what Manikshaw was saying and she agreed. Unfortunately, that quality of officer is missing now. Most of the people who are in top positions of authority at military headquarters and then the higher command are of, to put it very bluntly, poor caliber, and have got there purely through their obsequious behavior and through, you know, sort of reasonably unfair means. And no dissident is tolerated. No differences of opinion are encouraged. And it's basically a yes man army. And once you have a yes man army, then you're going to have a yes man leadership. And when you have a yes man leadership, it's going to be subservient to the political leadership. So therefore, there's going to be very little difference between the military and the politician. So that's the stage where we are at. Rahul, Admiral Arun Prakash has declared and he said that we all know that age, rank and financial status demand much more difference in India than anywhere in the world. And he's been very critical of what the culture of upseekersness, of servility, of plain simple cham-chagiri in the armed forces. And Admiral Arun Prakash has acknowledged that there were very, very fine officers who did not get promoted. Why? Because they did not want to conform. And they put forth their views in a forthright manner, in a blunt manner. And he actually goes on to say that the evil of psychophancy will undermine the roots of India's military unless, and you say he states wishfully, that the senior leadership curbs it ruthlessly. Your views? I think Admiral Prakash, who I know well and respect, is whistling up a gum tree. I don't think, and I think the fantasy that he's perpetuating is not going to happen. And the only certainty is that it's going to get worse because the human resource that is going into politics as well as the military is of a very poor quality. There is very little uprightness left and the only thing that matters is excess and money. So I don't think the dissidents or any kind of good quality officers are going to make it beyond the rank of colonel or maximum brigadier in the army. And the equivalent in, of course, the Navy and the Air Force. So, you know, you have made another point in your article and you said that there was a bargain and there was a creation of the post of the chief of defense staff, the CDS. But you say the military remains utterly clueless about the tasks, the responsibilities of the chief of defense staff. Would you like to elaborate and add to what you have written? You know, the military has been saying that there's a one point formula or magic bullet that they have, which is called the CDS. And if the CDS comes in, everything is going to work very efficiently. And they've been demanding it for the last, in fact, 25, 30 years. A lot of the political leadership has been very wary of creating post of chief of defense staff because they look at Pakistan and of course they look at Bangladesh and they look at other countries in this region. But anyway, the recommendations of the Cargill Review Committee in 2001-2002 were responsible for the creation, for wanting the creation of a CDS who eventually came about. And General Rawat, who was the army chief, became the first, India's first chief of defense staff. But despite having lobbied for it, despite having agitated for it for the last 20 years. The military has spent no time in trying to figure out a priority or an agenda or a program or a timetable for the chief of defense staff. And even the notification that came out early this year in January, appointing General Rawat as the chief of defense staff. Sorry, it came out in December of last year because he took over on the, I think in the first of January. Doesn't really outline what his responsibilities are likely to be. So again, it's just yet another sort of jobs for the boys. And operationally, the CDS is not responsible for the Army Navy or Air Force. But it seems that General Rawat having been army chief is exercising some amount of operational responsibility in the army, overriding the current army chief. So, you know, there is a problem, there is a clash. So it's a bit difficult and it's a bit tenuous as to how this is likely to be worked out. And I think the next few years and particularly the next few months, given the crisis we're facing on the Ladakh border with China, it works itself out. You know, I'm glad you mentioned Ladakh. I mean, that's been occupying everybody's mind. And people are complaining that we don't know, we don't have enough information. The line of action control was always never clearly demarcated. We know there have been 20 casualties on our side, including commanding officer Babu. We don't know what has happened on their side. There are all kinds of claims and counterclaims including the claim that the Chinese have encroached into territory which we thought belonged to us. But I come back to the point with which I started. The politicization of India's armed forces, the politicization of India's military. You write that there's been a Faustian bargain between the soldier and the politician. And increasingly, the top military personnel are identifying themselves with this jingoistic, ultra nationalist, this Hindutva line that seeks to achieve, you know, seeks to exploit whatever military achievements that have taken place for political gain. Now, we've talked about what happened, the surgical strike and then the outcome of the assembly elections. In Uttar Pradesh, we've talked about Balakot, Pulwama, February 2009 and the looks of our elections. But sometimes these things take you by surprise. I mean, see what happened in Ladakh. Prime Minister Narendra Modi said, made a statement and then later when people asked him about it, you know, that statement. I mean, there were all kinds of clarifications issued. So I'm saying post Ladakh, do you think Mr. Narendra Modi's government will continue to be successful in using the armed forces? And I dare say with the complicity of some of the top individuals in the armed forces and to reap more political gains in the near future. Most definitely, most definitely. I think if you for this, again, in this, there's no straight answer, but I think we, if you go back to the Kargil war, after the Kargil war ended, Prime Minister Vajpayee to his credit ordered an inquiry into the Kargil war within three days of the Kargil war coming to an end. We know, know fairly, fairly firmly that the Chinese Chinese intrusion into Indian territory was also due to an intelligence failure. The army was army was deployed there. So the army is in a sense culpable. But I think the army and the politician are working in tandem with each other to sustain a sort of a workable solution, which I think they will present to us. And therefore this partnership between the army and the politician, not the army so much as the military and the politician will proliferate and will continue and will grow. And I think it's a very, very dangerous thing because the army has to stand up to the politician at some point. And I think the politician also has to, has to make the army a lot more accountable than it has. So I think there are a lot of ifs and buts. And like Admiral Prakash says, the higher political leadership will have to take action. But unfortunately I don't think the higher political leadership in this case is either going to take action or is capable of taking action or even which is even more disturbing wants to take any action. Well thank you so much Rahul Bedi for sharing your views candidly and explaining to the viewers of NewsClick how the Indian military, the Indian armed forces, the defense services have been increasingly politicized under the Narendra Modi government. Thank you once again and keep watching NewsClick.