 We're going to start. Good afternoon and welcome. My name is Chantal Lyon-Antat. I'm the president of Women in International Security, also known as WISE. I'm also the former associate vice president of the Jennings Randall Fellowship Program here at USIP. And it is in that latter capacity that I actually asked David Yoss to update his 1998 book, NATO Transformed the Alliance's New Roles in International Security. That was a book that he wrote while he was a Jennings Randall Fellow at USIP. And I have been told that that had actually was one of the best-selling books of the USIP Press catalog. And in this regard, I would like to recognize and thank the director of the USIP Press at the time, Valerie Norville, for supporting this project to update the 1998 book and for shepherding this project through the USIP system. But I think true congratulations are due to David and his new book on NATO, NATO's Balancing Acts. And I think this is not just an update, but really an entirely new book. And I am sure that, like the previous one, this will become a best-seller. Because, David, your timing has been exquisite. Indeed, in the last months or so, we have seen a renewed interest in NATO in this town, an interest that we haven't seen for many years. Whether this interest will endure, we will see. And I hope that this panel can actually shed some light on that question. Indeed, I think we want to have the discussion to be forward-looking. And we have a terrific panel of three of the foremost experts on NATO, and we're generally transatlantic relations. Of course, David Jost, who is professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, longtime observer of NATO and author of many, many articles and books on the subject. And, of course, his latest, NATO's Balancing Act. We will then turn to Gail Methox, who is professor and former chair of the Political Science Department at the U.S. Naval Academy, and visiting scholar at AICGS, which stands for the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies. Gail is also former president of WISE. Gail is also somebody who has written extensively about NATO, has had a strong voice in the 90s in the NATO enlargement debates, and is herself soon coming out with a new book, an edited volume on NATO and partner experiences in Afghanistan. Gail is also a very close observer of German politics, and I hope, Gail, that in addition to telling us about some of the lessons of Afghanistan for the Alliance, you will give us some of your views on how Germany looks at NATO and at Russia these days. And then finally, we'll have Michael Brown, who's the dean of the George Washington Elliott School of International Affairs. And I would say one of the lonely voices in the 1990s warning about NATO expansion. He has in a recent article on the Foreign Affairs website argued that it is time for NATO to go back to basics. I also would like to add that Michael has been for many years a real wise guy that is a staunch supporter and contributor to women in international security. Unfortunately, Catherine Kelleher, another formidable NATO expert and former president of WISE, will not be able to join us, and so I will try to moderate the discussion. But I'd like to ask David Jost to start us off. And David, I would like to ask you whether in your opinion the Russian aggression, the Russian invasion of Crimea is a real game changer? Does the Atlantic Alliance has an answer to this type of aggression by Russia? Does it really have the capabilities? And to what extent does this new situation forces the Alliance to reassess its core mission or missions? The title of your book refers to those three missions of NATO as laid down in Chicago in 2010 in the strategic concept, which is the balancing act between collective defense crisis management and cooperative security. So has this changed given the current situation or is it more of the same? And what do you think are the conditions for NATO's continued relevance? So David, I would like to turn it over to you. That's how it works. Thank you very much, Chantal, for that generous introduction. I think it should be underlined that Chantal is the godmother of the book because she supported the idea of a sequel to Godmother of today's event because she had the energy and determination to bring it about. She has raised excellent questions. I hope to offer at least a partial answer to them and the panel as a whole, I believe, will be responsive to these questions. I'd like to begin at the beginning. The book is entitled NATO's Balancing Act for several reasons. Since the end of the Cold War, the Allies have been engaged in striking a balance among their three main missions as they define them, sometimes called core casks. First, there is the original mission of collective defense. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty has remained primary in NATO's declared policy and in a number of its activities. These include exercises, infrastructure investments, and the NATO defense planning process. The second core task is cooperative security. During the Cold War, cooperative security was limited to dialogue and arms control with adversaries to the east. Since the end of the Cold War, the Allies have undertaken a much broader effort to shape the strategic environment. They have cultivated partnerships and conducted operations with non-NATO countries and other international organizations, notably the European Union and the United Nations. The third core task has come to be called crisis management. This means conducting military operations, particularly non-Article 5 operations. There were no NATO operations during the Cold War. NATO operations began during the 1990-91 Gulf War with NATO air surveillance, air defense, and ace mobile force support to Turkey as a hedge against the risk of an Iraqi attack. NATO's subsequent crisis management operations have included Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya. The Allies have been trying to do justice to all three core tasks, even though there are tensions among them. For example, Russia. Russia has been the Alliance's declared partner since the 1990s, notably in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. This, however, has obviously not eliminated concern about Russia as a potential aggressor towards some of the new NATO Allies in Central and Eastern Europe. Partnerships with NATO did not prevent Russia and Georgia from going to war in 2008. Ukraine's partnership with NATO did not protect it from Russia's annexation of Crimea and subsequent destabilization operations. Russia's behavior, in fact, has been a source of mounting concern for NATO since 2007, when Moscow suspended its compliance with the CFE Treaty. It was also in 2007 that Russia raised the prospect of nuclear strikes against missile defense facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic. In 2009, Russia conducted military exercises that simulated an incursion into the Baltic States and a nuclear attack on Poland. In other words, there have been several Russian actions and not only Russia's interventions in Ukrainian affairs this year that have convinced many experts and officials that the Allies should give considerably more attention to collective defense. It is time for the Allies to substantially improve their military capabilities. Reversing the widespread failure to meet agreed defense spending and forced development goals. The Allies have to date had four responses to the Ukraine crisis. Alexander Vershbo, the NATO Deputy Secretary General, listed these four responses in a speech last month. First, Vershbo said, quote, we have reaffirmed our full support for the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Ukraine and the inviolability of its international recognized borders. Allies will maintain a long-term non-recognition policy regarding Russia's annexation of Crimea, end quote. This is what Vershbo said. A critic in Kiev might say that this non-recognition policy may have as much impact as the Allies having refused to date to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. Second, Vershbo said, to quote him, we have agreed to strengthen our support for Ukraine through intensified political and military cooperation. This includes helping Ukraine's armed forces transform into modern and effective institutions that can defend their country against external threats while providing credible deterrence. This includes improving the ability of Ukrainian forces to operate together with Allied forces and greater participation in NATO exercises so that Ukraine can continue to be a contributor to global security, as we have seen in the Balkans and Afghanistan, and most recently in our maritime counter-piracy mission, Ocean Shield, end quote. This is an interesting statement because it makes clear that Ukraine's armed forces, not NATO's forces, would, to quote him, defend their country against external threats while providing credible deterrence, end quote. It suggests that Ukrainian interoperability with NATO forces would be for non-article five crisis management operations, as was the case in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and the Gulf of Aden. Third, Vershbo said, quote, we have also reaffirmed our commitment to collective defense, deterrence, and reassurance for NATO's own members, end quote. Vershbo's statement implicitly excludes collective defense, deterrence, and reassurance for non-allies such as Ukraine. Ukraine is evidently on its own in the event of war with Russia. Fourth, Vershbo said, quote, we have suspended virtually all practical civilian and military cooperation in the NATO-Russia Council framework. Our political dialogue will continue to allow us to exchange views on the current crisis and its resolution, but business as usual is clearly not an option, end quote. The Allies adopted a similar policy of no business as usual in response to Russia's use of force against Georgia in August 2008. That policy of no business as usual lasted formally for 16 months until December 2009, but the foreign ministers of the NATO-Russia Council, in fact, met for the first time after the Russia-Georgia war in June 2009, less than a year after August 2008. The duration of the current no business as usual policy will depend in large part on Russian behavior, but some Allies will be much more eager than others to return to business as usual cooperation with Russia. In the case of the current Ukraine crisis, the Allies have not suspended NATO-Russia Council consultations in contrast with 2008. In 2008, and in the current case, Allies have said that no business as usual does not mean no business at all. Vershbo's formulation, our political dialogue will continue to allow us to exchange views on the current crisis and its resolution may be too narrow. The NATO Allies may wish, for example, to continue consultations and practical activities relating to nuclear security and nuclear non-proliferation, especially with regard to Iran. As during the Cold War, cooperation may continue on areas of common interest. Vershbo and other NATO spokesmen have repeated long-standing policy that the Alliance must have the full range of capabilities to deter and defend against any threat. To quote Vershbo, this means high-end capabilities to deter and defend against large-scale threats to our territory and expeditionary forces for future crisis management missions. Therefore, we need to redouble our efforts to work together to fill key capability gaps, including missile defense, cyber defense, and joint intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance. End of quote. Whether these capability goals will be met depends more, much more, on political will to increase defense spending than on concepts such as NATO's smart defense and the EU's pooling and sharing initiative. As we have seen with regard to economic sanctions, specific allies differ in their priorities and in their political will, and on how to strike a balance in the Ukraine crisis. As in the past, NATO policy will represent a compromise among national positions. One of the main points of this book is that it is remarkable that the Alliance works as well as it does and achieves as much as it does, despite the requirement for consensus among 28 sovereign states, each with its own internal political dynamics and priorities. Thank you very much, David. I think we will come back to a lot of the issues that you have raised. You have mentioned some allies or many of the allies don't have a similar threat assessment. And I think that is certainly true also in Europe and for Germany. And I hope that Gail will shed some light on the German position. But maybe you want to start off, Gail, by looking at what are the lessons from Afghanistan for the Alliance and whether these lessons are really applicable to the new situation if we accept that there is a new situation. Thank you, Shantel. And congratulations to David Yoast. It is a new book. It is a very detailed book. So for those of you that look at these issues, it's an incredibly good book on NATO that reviews a lot of those very important issues over the last few decades since he's written his last book, not his last book, but the last big one on NATO, previous book. Thank you. And I think, you know, his discussion of the challenge, especially the three core tasks, is very good. The work that I've undertaken is to address a part of what Professor Yoast has done in balancing act as he calls his book. While he addresses Afghanistan from a broader perspective of crises for NATO, I would agree that with his assertion that NATO risks an overextension and that NATO's intervention in Afghanistan probably should not be the template for future crises. However, I would not dismiss as quickly the collaboration gained through the cooperation that we've had in Afghanistan. There are a lot of very positive things that have come out of Afghanistan. And I think that we need to really look at them to see what we can take away that is positive and what we take away. That is something we don't want to repeat in future crises. But before I seem to starry-eyed, I think in some Afghanistan really can't be termed a real success for NATO beyond maybe the killing of Osama, which actually was the U.S. rather than a NATO mission. The mission has not significantly improved the average Afghanistan's life. It has not halted all of al-Qaeda's efforts as I think Mali and some other instances show. And although they do seem to be somewhat slowed, the mission has not stopped terrorist activity by any means, of course, even have ignited new groups. So I think the bottom line is more skeptical for me about terming NATO's mission a success. But what it has done is to underline a lot of its deficiencies and its capabilities. But it's also allowed NATO to see what it can do. It's allowed it to test out its capabilities and to particularly strengthen the collaboration and cooperation. And I think where this is probably been most important is with those, not only members, of course, but also the non-members that have participated in Afghanistan. So let me talk about some of the issues that I think are important to and have come through in the study that I've done on the various countries and how the various countries have collaborated, how they have approached their participation in this NATO mission. First of all on UN mandate, I think that it's one of the things that we should come away with is unlike Kosovo, we really do need a UN mandate. I think that most of the countries mention that and it's very prominent in a lot of the discussions about going to Afghanistan. Second thing is motivation and threat. What came across very strongly, and we looked at about 16 countries, is that most of them were not there because of the terrorist threat. Most of them were there because of allegiance to the United States very strongly. They wanted to show the newer members, wanted to show their capabilities. Many of the non-NATO members wanted to show also their support for the United States. And I think that the sort of non-state actors, the threat that came from the terrorists, took then a secondary priority for most of those that were participating. I can't speak for all of them, I didn't do a study of all 42, but I think that it was a pretty good representative study. It still was a priority, but not a number one. The ISAF mission itself was very much a legitimizing factor for a large number of the countries. Marrying security to assistance, the way that was done in Bonn in 2001 and repeated over time was very important for a number of countries, the Netherlands, Germany, particularly for public opinion, even if it seemed at times it was more of a facade. I think for some governments, maybe it's being too harsh, but certainly public opinion saw this helping out, assisting Afghanistan as being a legitimizing factor to be there. The question is about how successful we would be and what we would take away from that and whether or not, and this is a good question for David, is whether or not actually the way in which that assistance was undertaken, whether it's a template for the future, probably not, and I'll talk about that a little bit more. The mission, and I think this is one of the important factors is the way in which it shifted over time. What was it? Was it counter-terrorism? Was it counter-insurgency? Was it nation-building? What exactly were we doing? I think that when you look at different periods, we were doing different things, and different countries were actually seeing the mission differently, and that shifting strategies and all that then went along with that was a real shortfall for the overall Afghanistan mission. You can look, for instance, at the very beginning in the assignments, for instance, for the U.K. to provide oversight to prevent drug cultivation, Italy on judicial reform, Japan on demining, Germany to train the police, the U.S. to train the army. Most of those things fell way short and in many times were discarded. A second part would be the provincial reconstruction teams. There, I think, most are in agreement that, by and large, they fell very short of what their intended objectives were. And this was not always true in all of the PRTs, the perception in all the PRTs. I think the Germans still look pretty favorably on their PRTs. They held tremendous promise. And most of the countries and the public saw this as a really focus or what should be a focus of why we were there. But I don't think that they were able to live up to the expectations that we had for them. A fifth was the ISAF coordination. The ISAF coordination between the various allied forces left a lot to be desired. And I think you could even say this was a real plus in terms of overall the mission in that I think we saw where some of our weaknesses were. I think in Libya at times some of that was addressed. The members' coordination really improved over time. Hopefully we take something away from that. The smaller powers seem to feel that they could show sort of what they were capable of doing. They were able to work with the larger nations. And the non-members could show the way in which they could step forward and actually play a very important role. And I think that's reflected in the 2012 NATO summit and was recognized there. David has, by the way, a very interesting section in his book on the discussion over should there be three different types of partners, what kinds of partners, what happened in the Chicago summit, which if you're interested I think is quite interesting. My sixth point is on Iraq. Iraq was mentioned by most of the different countries as being a real problem in the diversion of energy and the diversion of focus for the United States. The troops went down, the capabilities were reduced, as some of the better forces were pulled out for Iraq. The UK commented that it had the further impact that it conflated Iraq and Afghanistan, so that the public, which was against going into Iraq, then also that the polling changed to then be reflected in Afghanistan. In other words they sort of mixed the two missions and deployments of UK forces and it had a negative impact on Afghanistan. Some of the reasons that were mentioned were, as I mentioned, the focus, the inability to focus or perception that we were not focusing as well on Afghanistan, that it gave the Taliban the chance to regroup, that it stalled some of the efforts in Afghanistan as we then had a lot of our best forces over in Iraq. And of course the budget constraints then also played a role as 2007, 2008, 2009 would begin to have budget issues. Seventh in the list that I have is the role that the Special Operations Forces played. They played a very pivotal role. There were some issues and I found that interesting. That it was mentioned in that they had more money so often some of the Afghan National Army then sought out to bring the Special Operations Force for them to be as a model. Unfortunately then it shifted where the Special Ops then turned over their responsibilities to the National Guard which did not have as much money and did not have the kind of status that the Special Operations did. But Special Ops I think was really felt that it had, it was able to improve training and there were a lot of positive things about Special Ops. Eighth, one of the things that came out which is really interesting and that is the domestic institutional coordination. I think in the US we had some discussion about that. You know once you set up the PRTs and you tried to bring in the USAID but even more Department of Agriculture, some of the experts across the government that they were very slow incoming. The training was not, was done but it was delayed a lot of times delayed reaching the PRTs and that a lot of institutional coordination needed to be adjusted during Afghanistan. Again as I, ninth and Shantel is telling me to wrap up but there was of course the work together and the coordination together of forces. US, UK, Jordanian for instance, the Germans with the Norwegians. I mean there's a whole list of ways in which both sides really profited from that. And finally one thing that I think has come out more recently since the SEGAR, John Sopko's been appointed and we've heard more from General McMasters is the corruption and the deficit and accountability there. And we seem to have, we're addressing, the US, we being the US is addressing that issue increasingly and I think is increasingly aware of the problem but it's in the other countries. The other countries also have problems. They didn't spend as much, they weren't as large forces so it's not as large a problem but it definitely is and I think here something similar to the closer accounting of the use of money, these bags of money initially that were distributed later in a much more sophisticated manner but NATO I think needs to address that issue maybe even have its own accountability function. And finally and just the last point is of course the capabilities. I mean this is, David mentioned that this is a perennial problem, the shortfall especially among some of the allies of actually having capabilities that are necessary to address this kind of crisis. So I guess my bottom line is just that we've learned a lot. Maybe I'll just come in on the Ukraine crisis then later but I think that one of the unfortunate things is that Afghanistan is first of all now entering a very critical period assuming that we get a BSA which people seem to think we will which the candidates look like that's what will happen. First of all have to figure out the post-2014 period and how that's going to be handled and secondly they're jumping right into the frying pan on Ukraine so I think that that is going to be a real problem in terms of addressing lessons learned from this military part, this period that's been more focused on the military in Afghanistan because I don't know how you know you've got X amount of resources at NATO and whether they can be sufficiently put to the task of looking at lessons learned in Afghanistan is I think going to be an issue. Thank you Gil. I think indeed you point to you know small gains that have been made in inter alliance cooperation and cooperation with partners but it seems to me you're also really pointing to the problematic aspects of that core mission that NATO adopted in 2010 which is crisis management or put out as one of the three core missions. So Michael you've been saying we should go back to basics you've always been sort of a critic of this more global NATO and a broader NATO with many missions what's your view on what's happening right now with NATO? Okay thanks Shantel and thanks to Wison USIP for organizing this panel it's a privilege to be on a panel with Gail and David and David I'd like to add my congratulations on the publication of your book I think this will further solidify your position as one of the world's leading experts on the world's most important alliance. The panel today is supposed to look at NATO's future and so I'll focus mainly on that and I noticed in the announcement for this panel it says and I quote some argue that NATO needs to prioritize collective defense its original mission and de-emphasize the crisis management and cooperative security roles that have involved the alliance and conflicts from Afghanistan to Libya end quote some people well that's me I'm that guy that's that's my role on this panel my view is that NATO has been tremendously important and will continue to be tremendously important as far as the eye can see because Europe still has interstate security challenges as we've learned in the last few months if we didn't know that already to maximize its prospects NATO should minimize its mission focus on Europe focus on collective defense focus on strategic reassurance if there's any excess capacity then you can start to think about doing other things but when I look around Europe I don't see a whole lot of excess security capacity to create a credible alliance and to continue as a credible alliance NATO should not make promises it can't keep and it shouldn't take on missions it won't be able to perform well thanks to NATO expansion NATO now has solemn commitments to defend Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania good luck with that in terms of global actions NATO of course has been involved in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya airlift in Somalia I don't think anybody wants to argue that these have been nation building successes but if you'd like to argue that they're stability producing successes I'd be happy to have that debate with you I would argue that these operations have not been credibility enhancing for NATO since the 1990s we've been told that NATO has to go out of area formulation is out of whack and NATO indeed should go back to basics looking at the current situation and looking forward I see four immediate challenges for NATO starting with president Vladimir Putin what are his ultimate goals he has made it very clear that at a minimum he would like to bring all Russian speaking people in contiguous countries under the Russian Federation he would clearly like to expand Russia's influence he would like a weak Ukraine that he can dominate if he doesn't want to chop it up altogether if unchecked he might have more ambitious objectives such as the Baltic states which I just mentioned if NATO is unable to defend Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania it will destroy NATO's credibility it could lead to the breakup of the alliance itself it could lead to the ejection of the United States from Europe and I wouldn't rule that out as being on Vladimir Putin's wish list of things that he would like to accomplish I think it would be a mistake to assume that he has modest objectives I do not associate the word modesty with Vladimir Putin the second challenge is that NATO's members do not agree on the threat some European countries some European members in particular are still on denial they are still captivated by the allure of a European security nirvana that does not exist and of course the views in Europe by geography I think the president of Estonia has it exactly right the fundamental understanding of security in Europe has now collapsed everything that has happened since 1989 has been predicated on the fundamental assumption that you don't change borders by force and that is now out the window I would hope that out of area it also goes out the window but I think the president is correct in general Breedlove, NATO's here has said a paradigm shift it's a paradigm shift for those who weren't paying attention but clearly things have changed and I agree with their assessments that we now need to focus on these fundamental challenges in Europe but there is disagreement in Europe about the nature of the threat a third problem of course is that NATO's members don't agree on the response in part that's because of geography the closer countries are to Russia the more threatened they feel on Russian oil and gas exports and European economic ties with Russia and so there are asymmetric vulnerabilities here asymmetric in terms of territory asymmetric in terms of energy and economic issues that creates a very complex matrix within Europe but the result has been a set of weak sanctions coming out of Washington and European capitals and the fourth challenge that I see is very much here in Washington DC and that's been the Obama administration's handling of things so far my view is that the US wasn't really focused on this as much as it should have been back in November it was preoccupied with other issues like Europe handle the negotiations with Ukraine in November and as someone has pointed out Europe brought a baguette to a knife fight and we saw how that turned out on February 28th President Obama came in front of the microphones and told President Putin that there will be costs if he annexes Crimea Putin was so intimidated by that that within hours he went to the Russian parliament and asked for permission to annex Crimea President Obama has not stopped talking since then in fact I asked my research assistant to look into the number of statements the President has made about this issue there have been 17 separate discussions between late February and the end of April when President Obama threatened Russia with cost consequences or further actions 17 threats over an 8-9 week period about twice a week President Obama has been threatening Vladimir Putin Vice President Joe Biden added 5 threats of his own Secretary of State John Kerry added 15 between the three of them that's about one threat every other day 17 from the President 5 from the Vice President all of them is that if you're talking three times as much as Joe Biden you are talking too much and that is I think a very serious concern I think the administration also has a fundamental misunderstanding of the power dynamics here the US approach as we have read again and again is to give Vladimir Putin an off-ramp from this horrible crisis in confrontation Vladimir Putin does not want to get on the off-ramp he's in the HOV lane confrontation is politically contagious for him his polling numbers are going up as long as the cost benefit calculations remain the same for Vladimir Putin he has a political incentive in sustained confrontation it's working for him it's not working for us Putin isn't looking for an off-ramp everybody else is so recommendations let me suggest four immediate steps that the US and its allies should take first NATO needs to strengthen its defenses against the new unconventional threat posed by Russia's destabilization campaigns so far most of the steps that NATO has taken have been very conventional sending in some planes sending in some troops some exercises conventional symbolic stuff that doesn't really provide a defense against the actual threat which we all know is this threat of destabilization posed by unhappy Russian speakers in green uniforms provocative actions that lead to destabilization cyber attacks, public diplomacy campaigns, and all the rest what NATO needs to do is to think hard and fast about internal and homeland security especially for the three Baltic states we need to think differently about training intelligence and we need to think differently about how cyber campaigns and public diplomacy play out in these kinds of actions conventional responses are fine they certainly don't do any damage but I would argue they're not at all sufficient second the US and its allies need to strengthen economic sanctions and this is not going to be easy to do because of those asymmetric vulnerabilities that are in place one thing that the US could do would be to stop talking about sanctions every other day Teddy Roosevelt figured this out about a century ago speaks softly and carry a big stick the Obama administration, my advice would be stop talking altogether carry stick, you stick as needed but stop talking, that's something you could certainly do the US also needs to repair its relationship with Germany that will be the key to forging a common economic sanctions front against Russia of course that relationship was strained very badly by the NSA revelations last June the US in my view has not taken sufficient steps to repair the damage it's done with its allies and it needs to do that it would certainly be good right now if the US and Germany were tight in standing up against Russia it would be certainly good right now if President Obama and Chancellor Merkel were close on these issues but they're not and they need to get closer and I think it's very much up to the US to repair the damage that's been done there in the longer term to develop a more powerful and effective set of economic sanctions vis-a-vis Russia will have to do something that really changes its cost-benefit calculations in a substantial way that means coming up with a set of actions or threatened actions that will substantially damage the Russian economy and therefore threaten Putin's survival as a leader that will get his attention that will change his cost-benefit calculations everything else is just talk and as I've indicated we've been doing far too much of that third the US and European allies need to take steps to change the balance of power in Europe in their favor over the next two to five years we can't fix the asymmetric vulnerabilities problem in this short run a lot of that's tied to economic ties that will evolve slowly but there are two things we could do we could push a step on the accelerator to try to get the TTIP negotiations concluded that's probably not going to happen prior to November due to US domestic politics but after November I hope President Obama makes it a priority a successful TTIP agreement would have economic, political strategic and symbolic value vis-a-vis Russia and that's something that we could conceivably wrap up by this time next year even more important in the long term is addressing Europe's energy vulnerabilities vis-a-vis Russia that means figuring out ways for the US to export more oil and gas and for Europe to import more oil and gas but without coming via pipelines from the east fourth and last turning to NATO specifically my view is that NATO needs a new strategic concept there's a summit coming up in September in the UK and I hope that NATO's leaders will call for a new strategic concept discussion at that time in my view the 2010 edition of the strategic concept is too broad it tries to embrace both the minimalist and the globalist visions of NATO it's a political document it's unfocused it doesn't make choices and in my view it's strategically incoherent I'm not optimistic that NATO's leaders will move toward a new strategic concept it's always difficult for leaders to admit that they've made a mistake and I think it will also be hard for them to do that because as I indicated before US and European leaders are divided and therefore they are strategically incoherent on these issues my view is that a fundamental strategic assessment is needed in NATO Europe faces serious security challenges interstate security threats have not gone away my recommendation is that NATO should focus on Europe and get back to the basics my prediction is that the NATO summit NATO's leaders will get back to black thank you thank you Michael that was clear where you stand I see a lot of NATO experts here in the room so I want to give you the opportunity to come with questions or comments and then we'll turn it back to the panel including David so who wants to start off and please introduce yourself and you have a microphone in front of you if you click the button it will work thank you I'm Francois Rivasso former NATO desk officer in the French ministry of foreign affairs 20 years ago but presently the deputy head of European delegation here and a frequent flyer to the USIP thank you for organizing that and thank you for inviting David yours that we consider as one of the best experts on these issues giving a look at this book strengthens me in this belief three small questions or comment basically I think I would agree broadly with Michael Brown that we are witnessing a new paradigm the public opinions in Europe and in the US are the same on that they don't want new foreign peacekeeping or whatever you call them operations they are doubtful of the results particularly even in Afghanistan and the rejection of new operations outside the border is very strong at the same time the crisis in Ukraine reminds us that article 5 is the main function of the alliance the first one and today get a new importance where it is interesting is that we should not stop there but we should go much further than that in redefining the new paradigm and I'm interested to hear everybody in the panel discussing how we should react to something which is a new threat you have said Michael that we should develop DHS capabilities because that's what is indeed needed we don't need so many more planes or so many more tanks we need capabilities of maintaining order this has never been in the function of the alliance this has never been in the capabilities of the alliance this is usually left to member states with some efforts of coordination by the European Union we see for example in another area which is also very important for us which is Mediterranean Sea where we have so huge flows of immigrants and so daily tragedies at sea how can we do that should we find about strengthening the complementarities between EU despite its difficulties and NATO on that and if yes how that would be the first question my last point is about sanctions I very much agree that we should not talk too much but at the same time the logic of sanctions is very much logic of deterrence and if you just say we should sanction more then you forget rule number one of deterrence which for French is obvious a weapon deterrence weapon is a no use weapon you should never use if you have to use your weapon it means that deterrence has failed if we sanctioned Putin as much as we could with sanctions it means that nothing else will prevent him to move and let's be frank between us I think we should part of a new paradigm is probably and that's the question I put to you involving a better assessment of financial capabilities of every actor we are not sure that just the threat of financial sanction has not deterred Putin to go far than he had not so far that he had planned to go and we truly believe that an important part of any new strategic concept should include a strong economic dimension thank you my name is Sylvia Pettic I'm the Vice President of WISE in Germany and you mentioned the strained US-German relationships and I'm wondering if you have any suggestions how those can be repaired do you think there's a soft power approach or does one just have to be patient thank you let me go back to the panel maybe David you want to take a first step at the new paradigm the issue that was raised by François Rivet I think François has in fact artfully and insightfully recast one of the points Michael Brown makes in the conclusion of this article the recommendations that it is a new type of threat and that we have not yet defined an effective counter strategy with regard to the question about Germany I think I would defer to Gale on that one if I understood the question correctly I thought I would make just a point in response to each of my fellow panelists first with regard to Michael's presentation he has a great quote from the Estonian President saying the fundamentals understanding of security in Europe has now collapsed everything that has happened since was predicted I think it should be predicated on the fundamental assumption that you don't change borders by force and that's now out of the window and I was quite surprised when I read this because borders were changed by force in 2008 in Georgia and somehow we seem to have forgotten that this issue of our relations with Russia has been deepening for several years and with regard to Gale's valuable study of the lessons from the Afghanistan conflict I think she's absolutely right about the uncertainty of the achievements nonetheless champions at NATO headquarters of this draw attention to the fact that no one else or let me put it this differently no other alliance could have organized such an operation let's say it's a a technical achievement a logistical achievement a coordination achievement and as she suggested Afghanistan it can be argued contributed to alliance cohesion because the allies have gained a great deal of experience in working together including in combat it has enhanced the interoperability and readiness of allied forces a Belgian scholar Alexander Matalaier published an article in survival a couple of years ago with a surprising title of how Afghanistan has strengthened NATO and this is what he means that although the achievements are debatable at best at least the alliance's cohesion has not been severely damaged these operations and others have not been conducted as effectively or with as much political consensus as I believe Gail was pointing out without the partnerships with non-NATO nations and other organizations especially the UN and the EU that this cooperative security aspect these partnerships that seem fuzzy perhaps even flaky actually can have real world payoffs in terms of more effective cooperation Michael do you want to add something on the paradigm a couple of things Francois point about what should NATO's role be in addressing these unconventional challenges one of the many terrific things that David does in his book is talk about how collective defense activities have expanded over the years including things like cyber which of course none of us thought about 20 years ago for obvious reasons and so what I would say is that all of these things now need to be thought about in the context of collective defense NATO has taken it upon itself to make solemn security pledges to Estonia Latvia and Lithuania they are more likely to face these unconventional threats and tanks coming across the borders so that's the responsibility that's the problem and maybe NATO has been in the internal security homeland security business but it better get into it and make that part of the cooperative cooperative effort see David wants to jump in too well I would just say the Estonians in particular could testify as to the importance of cyber capabilities absolutely but remember the difficulty they had and the dotted line basically that goes from NATO to the center that's in Estonia I mean it wasn't that everybody was immediately you know yes let's really bring the discussion of cyber into the alliance I would also I always like to point out to my students that there is actually a mention in the Washington Treaty of Economics you know we've just never really it's never really been a major issue but it's not that it's that it was absent in if we want to call them the founding the founding fathers but I would say your suggestion about closer EU NATO cooperation certainly would be an aspect to address this new paradigm shift and but the EU needs to get its act together before it isn't just a piggyback on NATO and it actually does contribute so there's a lot of work to be done there especially as it's been fairly still over the last few the last few years does Germany have a soft power approach does it work to an extent it does I mean certainly it's just if I take Afghanistan the fact that Germany has offered assuming a BSA that Germany has offered to be the deputy command and that's been overlooked by the way by a lot of people so in some cases if you look for instance at Iraq Germany increased its for it didn't go into Iraq but it increased its forces in Afghanistan it took up the slack in Bosnia as the US moved troops out it sent frigates to the Horn of Africa it had chemical weapons units in Kuwait not in Iraq but it did do other things to try to no boots on the ground certainly but we could have a whole discussion about how Germany has evolved over the last even decade but I do think that there are ways in which Germany can pick it up but as Michael mentioned in terms of Ukraine I think NSA still plays a really big role on and the listening in on Merkel's cell phone but broader than that just the nervousness by the German citizen that's quite different than the American it hit a chord that I think especially the younger generation in this country just assumes okay somebody's listening I'm talking I don't think there's that same approach and so I think it hit the Germans in a much deeper way and if you watch the press conference with Merkel when she was here after after Obama said something and then Merkel spoke in German she made it clear that this has not been resolved and that makes this relationship that we basically really need right now much more difficult I think it's much harder for Obama to pick up the telephone than it has been for some other presidents in the past and call Angela and talk to her not even to mention some of the continued ties that maybe the U.S. would prefer were not there between Germany and and Putin that Germany is unwilling to back away from some of the industry of course that's very necessary in East Germany for the rebuilding of East Germany they have not been willing to back away the Germans from as a matter of fact have even signed some contracts since we've been trying to put on sanctions and this makes the relationship a lot harder to really pressure Putin in the way that you would hope would happen on U.S.-German relations you're asking if we should sort of wait and see what happens and I think the answer is no absolutely not alliance relationships always require a lot of care and attention even under normal circumstances and these are difficult circumstances I think the Obama administration doesn't appreciate the impact that the NSA revelations had internationally among allies and friends around the world and I spend quite a lot of time in Asia as well it's had tremendous repercussions and I think the administration is still looking at it through a narrow sort of national security intelligence gathering lens and of course those things are important as well but America's allies and friends are most important strategic assets I mean John Eikenberry pointed out in foreign affairs the U.S. has 60 close relationships around the world Russia has 8, China has North Korea and that's one of the reasons why the U.S. and its allies together form such a formidable coalition and this has been a huge setback and the administration needs to take concrete steps so that Angela Merkel can then go to the German people and other European leaders can go to their people and say look the steps have been taken to get things pointed in the right direction and that hasn't happened yet I mean it's hard for Merkel to understand the CEO of Siemens going to see Putin it's really hard for the Americans to understand that I mean there's a real where you sit certainly it has an impact Let's go for a second round gentlemen here Yes my name is Oliver Curly Deputy Chief of Mission at the Macedonian Embassy and couple of questions first for professor yours you will understand my interest I'll be very interested to hear your view on the whether the alliance this fall should even discuss enlargement there are two ready made candidates in two countries Bosnia and Georgia that want to become closer to Georgia basically wants a map to be awarded is this the time or should the alliance discuss enlargement at the summit in Wales second question for Dean Brown I would appreciate your view on the eventual effect that the agreement signed today for the delivery of Russian gas, oil to China $400 billion the effect on the sanctions that are supposed to threaten Russia Thanks I think this is on thank you Leandra Bernstein, Ria Novosti my question for the panel concerns some people who have called into question the overall significance of NATO in the post cold war world Russian expert who is often referred to as the woman who ended the cold war recently told reporters that anyone with a third grade education in Russia would have known that an intervention in Ukraine would cause trouble it was the equivalent of putting a stick in a hornet's nest and of course Russia would get angry based on the history there yet the United States the EU NATO allies went in there in a very heavy handed way and the State Department was caught red handed orchestrating a new government in place of a bad but democratically elected government and in its place there are currently Nazis legitimate Nazis serving in the Ukrainian government so my question if you could respond to that how that intervention was conducted and also whether this very handed intervention was a sign of NATO desperation after essentially losing its reason to exist after the cold war okay thank you and the gentleman here John Berry formally of the NATO Defense College I'd like to see if we could dig a little deeper around the sanctions issue and I would start it this way I imagine just me that one of the reasons we talk so much Vice President Secretary of State is that we're trying to condition the Europeans who are so reluctant to participate in sanctions to come along the different audiences to those comments is not working very well and I just wonder if there is a way for a wise president of the United States to do something to help our Europeans take a stronger stand on the sanctions or do we simply have to wait for Putin to make a mistake and do something that we've drawn our red line on and said you better not do that and he's very good at walking right up to it but not going over that line it's a conundrum for me I don't know how to bring our European friends along thank you David do you want to take the first stab we have issues of enlargement yeah I don't know if I should be embarrassed to plug my own book but if you if you look on page 286 you discover that NATO awarded membership action plan status to Macedonia in April 1999 and I quote but the allies have still not offered this country an invitation to join the alliance in April 2008 the allies stated that an invitation to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will be extended as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached the allies have repeated this promise at subsequent summit meetings including the May 2012 Chicago summit I think it's highly likely that absent a solution to the name dispute they will say anything it's unlikely that absent a solution to the name issue they will say anything different I expect them to repeat the same policy well you can read all about it here so I mean the Greek declarations and so forth with regard to the idea that there are Nazis in the Ukrainian government it might be useful to peruse these US State Departments document refuting a number of Russian assertions about the situation in Ukraine and the character of the Ukrainian government Michael do you want to talk about the new Russian-Chinese gasoline there were a couple of terrific questions and that's one of them clearly what's going on here after many years of negotiations is not a coincidence that the deal was reached now and this strikes me as a clever strategic move on President Putin's part to reduce his own energy and economic vulnerabilities and China's appetite for energy is almost limitless and so this is good from their standpoint as well Putin of course will want to be careful because now that he's established the precedent that borders can be changed if I were in Putin's shoes I'd want to make sure that I had solidified border control in Siberia on the question of how to develop stronger sanctions I mean I'm with you completely it's very hard to do if it was easy to do it would have been done already I think talking about it in public as much as the administration has been talking about it is counterproductive I mean after a while it just becomes background noise to adversaries and allies alike and I know the administration would like to develop a stronger set of sanctions it would be great if they were embraced widely by the allies everyone knows multilateral sanctions are more effective than unilateral sanctions I don't think it's mainly a public opinion issue and I guess I would say here too it would be important for the administration to emphasize quiet diplomatic channels with allies to talk these things through and I'm sure some of that's been going on but I think the public messaging just hasn't been getting anywhere in some respects has been counterproductive I think the fundamental problem though of course as I said before is that there are these asymmetries within the alliance some of it is different views of Russia and Gail knows much more about Germany's position than I do but there are these economic and energy asymmetries as well and even though Putin is going off and signing a deal with China the US and its European allies ought to be thinking the same way about how do we strengthen our strategic position how do we strengthen the balance of power here and the answer is to reduce European vulnerabilities and it's not going to be solved in a year or two but if we don't get started it's not going to be solved at all and if we could be moving in that direction I think that would also get Putin's attention and it's something that we ought to do because it's a smart strategic move You have a two finger on this Maybe I feel compelled to try to answer your question three points first of all this is an issue we discuss constantly I spent half of my day yesterday just discussing that in various setting in White House and Department of State second the issue is to be seen in a certain level of complexity and not only through just the prism of the differences of vulnerability because if something is sure is that it is that the Ukrainian crisis has contributed to narrow the gaps which have always existed in Europe about the threat perception by Russia which was summed up by another Baltic president I think it's very simple the farther you go from the Russian border the less fear you are from Russia Energy security since 2011 this is one of the three or four highest priority in the EU we have designed a strategy for energy security which is basically trying to get a diversity of sources of energy you have also to understand that we have also some financial constraints for example if by chance we could convince the US to relax a bit their laws about long terms agreement of providing gas with European countries it would remain that American gas will be always twice as expensive as Russian gas so you have also to take into account the laws of the markets third consideration you have also to remember that there has been an agreement sealed through a number of declarations by the US administration and the European leaders that in our efforts to face the Russian activities we had to act together to make the same level of efforts which was initially meant for Europeans to pay a bit more for their defense but also in terms of sanctions and in terms of sanctions don't forget that the trade between European and Russia is 15 times higher than the trade between US and Russia and as President Barroso recently reminded it in another think tank in another town very recently it could mean that if we want to make the same effort and get the same result we can have any sanction taken by the EU has 15 more impact than any sanction taken by the US so this is something to consider and finally let me just call your attention on a very simple thing we are today we have prepared both in the US and in the EU a broad and ambitious set of sanctions would Russia continue its pressure further than it had done till now on this according to principle of deterrence but we have lowered the threshold for sanctions in making clear that if Russia was completely disrupting the elections of which will take place next Sunday and not recognizing the results that would be something which would probably trigger new sanctions now we have hope that this election will not be disrupted too much if you look at the data provided by independent observers in that more than 90% today can change we are still four days of the first turn and there may have been a second turn but today we have worked and we are hoping crossing fingers that the elections will accept in 12 or 15 urban areas of eastern Ukraine take place normally and even that a number of voters will be able to cast their votes in the province of Donetsk and Luhansk this is the most important thing of all but let's be consistent if just the following day we just say oh 30th sanctions we go for tough sanctions sectoral sanctions which will mean it will be a bit self-contradictory with a view that the elections have behavior so we have to wait to see what happens also that's a fundamental principle we should be ready to react we should have a big stick and I think we have prepared it maybe it could be a bit bigger but we have prepared it on both sides of the Atlantic now we shall see we should not use it before the right moment if deterrence works maybe this moment will not come and in that case it will not be seen as a failure from us but as a success just to tell you that for us it's a quite complicated issue yeah there we go I don't know whether I should ask the panel or perhaps Mr. Vivasso there was an article in the New York Times today saying that a number of very right-wing movements in Europe are lining themselves more with Russia saying that this is a good counterbalance to the US and I wondered if you had read that or comment on it comment on this or I think it's a thank you if you're ready for another question my name is David Steele I'm currently adjunct faculty at Brandeis University in a graduate program on coexistence and conflict I also do consultant work around the world I've actually worked in a number of situations where NATO has been involved in the past I was in Ukraine action I was NATO but with UNDP actually in the Crimea in 07 there was something about the dynamics what was happening at that time I was actually asked whether or not we were I heard a comment at the time I just come from working in Kosovo the comment from one of the Ukrainians were the next Kosovo and I said I'm not a lot to look at anyway I guess somewhere in my background may be important too that I worked in the former Yugoslavia for 13 years I was at CSIS at the time the program on preventive diplomacy and what's not been mentioned here actually is that we supported the change of borders in Europe very very strongly I actually had involvement with NATO with the US ambassador in NATO at the time I was part of a back channel in terms of finalizing actually negotiations over the end of the war in Kosovo through in part at least US ambassador to NATO there was an awful lot that we did that is very different than the way we're looking at this situation now it was Russia and Finland that actually negotiated that agreement back a long time yes, not quite the current situation but I think probably others will look at that history and conclude a lot of different things than we might by ignoring it I guess one of my basic questions is I teach now a lot of students from all over I was going to be involved in Afghanistan at one point, didn't work on it supervising now thesis development on the part of an Afghan student and I like a lot of the concerns that you raised about Afghanistan in terms of what they teach us about NATO and its involvement but also some questions about that too you mentioned a lot of the concerns such as corruption for example what I read what my student tells me is that we actually fed that corruption in many many ways NATO and the West were part and parcel in terms of who we cooperated with what partners were we looked at also the involvement of NATO troops and the rounding up of so many people in Afghanistan that were not part of the Taliban that helped turn the whole thing against the West in general basically not being in tune or in touch with the society that may be very different now in Ukraine but it's part of the history that informs the way in which other people look at us and I guess one of the comments I made in relation to one of the questions is the basic part of my question that is it's never been part of the mandate of NATO to maintain order but that seems to me to be the primary point at this point when it comes to Ukraine how do you somehow maintain order I teach a class on 3D security for example at Brandite so we look at diplomacy, development defense and how you look at all of that working together what I really want to ask you is yes you're NATO you talked about the fact that you are collaborating have to collaborate with partnerships with non-military partners, EU for example how do you see the task in terms broader than just military a lot of questions about whether sanctions will work look at it, you're on thank you very much I think we have to wrap it up and while we do so it is clear that the alliance is still very relevant but I would also ask the panellist there's a new NATO secretary general coming into office do you have a piece of advice for him or something that you would like to convey to the new secretary general of NATO when he starts his new job read my book well I think given looking back at Afghanistan looking at Libya and now looking at Ukraine I think that Michael's suggestion in talking about Ukraine the need for a new strategic concept is probably the right one however if we look back at the strategic concept we got out of Lisbon it was a long time in making it's not something that we can do in Wales I don't think but I think the idea of it is very good and I think it's something that's probably should be started the process should be probably started but I'm not quite sure that we can get it in Wales okay in answer to actually a couple of comments about how borders have changed before in the Balkans in the 90s and as David pointed out with respect to Georgia more recently it's true the borders have been changed and sometimes by the use of force what is different about this case is that Crimea has been annexed it hasn't just become an independent state it has been annexed it's Russia and it does matter when great powers annex territory so I think that's why the President of Estonia sees it as something that is really fundamentally different and I think what we've seen here has been very different as well in terms of advice definitely read David's book if you haven't purchased a copy yet please do so for NATO Secretary General I'd love it if they invite me to be a keynote speaker it would be fun for everybody but more seriously I think the two things I mentioned earlier are things that have to be on the agenda the first cannot wait until September and that is focusing on the new challenges of collective defense it's not just military it's never been just military alliance cohesion is always involved wide range of political and economic and intelligence issues what we see now is that there is a new kind of threat it involves a different kind of operation requires a different kind of response and we need to think about it and I think it falls very much under the collective defense umbrella broadly defined and defense is not just military it's multi-dimensional and that's the way we need to think about it that has I'm sure that's already happening already in Brussels people in NATO are I'm sure starting to think about this issue but they need to turn deliberations into action very quickly and then the second piece of advice would be to think about a strategic concept and I agree with Gale it's not going to happen in the UK at the summit it's going to be a long drawn out process I'm sure but I hope that NATO's leaders at least have the awareness to understand that this kind of discussion is needed I would be pleasantly surprised if they announce the start of a strategic concept process I'd be even more pleasantly surprised if the next strategic concept is strategic that involves making choices not just throwing in everything and calling a document is not a strategic concept and putting the title on the title page isn't enough some choices are needed prioritization is needed that's what strategy is all about and I hope that will be undertaken over the next year or so but the process could conceivably be publicly launched in September thank you very much I'd like to thank the audience for their participation I'd also like to thank the panelists for this discussion I would like to congratulate David Jost it was a terrific book and I would like to reiterate by the book and then read the book thank you very much