 Question 46 of Summa Theologica, Parse Prima, Trinity and Creation. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. This recording is by Jim Ruddy. Summa Theologica, Parse Prima, Trinity and Creation by St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province, Question 46 of the beginning of the duration of creatures. Next must be considered the beginning of the duration of creatures about which there are three points for treatment, whether creatures always existed, whether that they began to exist is an article of faith and how God is said to have created heaven and earth in the beginning. In the first article, whether the universe of creatures always existed, Objection 1. It would seem that the universe of creatures called the world had no beginning but existed from eternity for everything which begins to exist is a possible being before it exists, otherwise it would be impossible for it to exist. If therefore the world began to exist, it was a possible being before it began to exist. But possible being is matter which is in potentiality to existence which results from a form and to non-existence which results from privation of form. If therefore the world began to exist, matter must have existed before the world but matter cannot exist without form. While the matter of the world with its form is the world, therefore the world existed before it began to exist which is impossible. Objection 2. Further, nothing which has power to be always sometimes is and sometimes is not because so far as the power of a thing extends so long it exists. But every incorruptible thing has power to be always for its power does not extend to any determinate time. Therefore no incorruptible thing sometimes is and sometimes is not. But everything which has a beginning at some time is and at some time is not. Therefore no incorruptible thing begins to exist. But there are many incorruptible things in the world as the celestial bodies and all intellectual substances. Therefore the world did not begin to exist. Objection 3. Further what is unbegotten has no beginning but the philosophy proves that matter is unbegotten and also that the heaven is unbegotten. Therefore the universe did not begin to exist. Objection 4. Further a vacuum is where there is not a body but there might be. But if the world began to exist there was first nobody where the body of the world now is and yet it could be there otherwise it would not be there now. Therefore before the world there was a vacuum which is impossible. Objection 5. Further nothing begins anew to be moved except through either the mover or the thing moved being otherwise than it was before. But what is otherwise now than it was before is moved. Therefore before every new movement there was a previous movement therefore movement always was and therefore also the thing moved always was because movement is only in a movable thing. Objection 6. Further every mover is either natural or voluntary but neither begins to move except by some pre-existing movement for nature always moves in the same manner hence unless some change precede either in the nature of the mover or in the movable thing there cannot arise from the natural mover a mover which was not there before. And the will without itself being changed puts off doing what it proposes to do but this can be only by some imagined change at least on the part of time. Thus he who wills to make a house tomorrow and not today awaits something which will be tomorrow but is not today and at least awaits for today to pass and for tomorrow to come and this cannot be without change because time is the measure of movement therefore it remains that before every new movement there was a previous movement and time conclusion follows as before. Objection 7. Further whatever is always in its beginning and always in its end cannot cease and cannot begin because what begins is not in its end and what ceases is not in its beginning but time always is in its beginning and end because there is no time except now which is the end of the past and the beginning of the future therefore time cannot begin or end and consequently neither can movement the measure of what is time. Objection 8. Further God is before the world either in the order of nature only or also by duration if in the order of nature only therefore since God is eternal the world also is eternal but if God is prior by duration since what is prior in posterior in duration constitutes time it follows that time existed before the world which is impossible. Objection 9. Further if there is a sufficient cause there is an effect for a cause to which there is no effect is an imperfect cause requiring something else to make the effect follow but God is the sufficient cause of the world being the final cause by reason of His goodness the exemplar cause by reason of His wisdom and the efficient cause by reason of His power as appears from the above since therefore God is eternal the world is also eternal and Objection 10. Further eternal action postulates an eternal effect but the action of God is His substance which is eternal therefore the world is eternal on the contrary it is said glorify me oh Father with thyself with the glory which I had before the world was and the Lord possessed me in the beginning of His ways before He made anything from the beginning I answer that nothing except God can be eternal and the statement is far from impossible to uphold for it has been shown above that the will of God is the cause of things therefore things are necessary according as it is necessary for God to will them since the necessity of the effect depends on the necessity of the cause now it was shown above absolutely speaking it is not necessary that God should will anything except Himself it is not therefore necessary for God to will that the world should always exist but the world exists for as much as God wills it to exist since the being of the world depends on the will of God as on its cause it is not therefore necessary for the world to be always and hence it cannot be proved by demonstration nor are Aristotle's reasons simply but relatively demonstrative namely in order to contradict the reasons of some of the ancients who asserted that the world began to exist in some quite impossible manner this appears in three ways firstly because both in the physics and in Decello he premises some opinions as those of Anaxagoras Empedocles and Plato and brings forward reasons to review them secondly because wherever he speaks of this subject he quotes the testimony of the ancients which is not the way of a demonstrator but of one persuading of what is probable thirdly because he expressly says that there are dialectical problems about which we have nothing to say from reason as whether the world is eternal replied to objection one before the world existed it was possible for the world to be as indeed according to a passive power which is matter but according to the active power of God and also according as a thing is called absolutely possible not in relation to any power but from the sole habit of the terms which are not repugnant to each other in which sense possible is opposed to impossible as appears from the philosopher replied to objection two whatever has power always to be from the fact of having that power sometimes be and sometimes not be but before it received that power it did not exist hence this reason which is given by Aristotle does not prove simply that incorruptible things never began to exist but that they did not begin by the natural mode whereby things generated and corruptible begin replied to objection three Aristotle proves that matter is unbegotten from the fact that it has not a subject from which to derive its existence and he proves that heaven is ungenerated for as much as it has no contrary from which to be generated hence it appears that no conclusion follows either way except that matter and heaven did not begin by generation as some said especially about heaven but we say that matter and heaven were produced into being by creation as appears above replied to objection four the notion of a vacuum is not only in which is nothing but also implies a space capable of holding a body and in which there is not a body as appears from Aristotle whereas we hold that there was no place or space before the world was replied to objection five the first mover was always in the same state but the first movable thing was not always so whereas hitherto it was not this however was not through change but by creation which is not change as said above hence it is evident that this reason which Aristotle gives is valid against those who admitted the existence of eternal movable things but not eternal movement as appears from the opinions of annex agris and impediplies but we hold that from the moment that movable things began to exist and the moment also existed replied to objection six the first agent is a voluntary agent and although he had the eternal will to produce some effect yet he did not produce an eternal effect nor is it necessary for some change to be presupposed not even on account of imaginary time for we must take into consideration the difference between a particular agent that presupposes something and produces something else and the universal agent who produces the whole the particular agent produces the form and presupposes the matter and hence it is necessary that it introduce the form in due proportion into a suitable matter hence it is correct to say that it introduces the form into such matter and not into another on account of the different kinds of matter but it is not correct to say so of God who produces form and matter together whereas it is correct to say of him that he produces matter fitting to the form and to the end now a particular agent presupposes time just as it presupposes matter hence it is correctly described as acting in time after and not in time before according to an imaginary succession of time after time but the universal agent who produces the thing and time also is not correctly described as acting now and not before according to an imaginary succession of time succeeding time as if time were presupposed to his action but he must be considered as giving time to his effect as much as and when he will and according to what was fitting to demonstrate his power for the world leads more evidently to the knowledge of the divine creating power if it was not always than if it had always been since everything which was not always manifestly has a cause whereas this is not so manifest of what always was replied to Objection 7 as is stated before and after belong to time according as they are in movement hence beginning and end in time must be taken in the same way as in movement now granted the eternity of movement it is necessary that any given moment in movement be a beginning and an end of movement which needs not be if movement be a beginning the same applies to the now of time thus it appears that the idea of the instant now as being always the beginning and end of time presupposes the eternity of time and movement hence Aristotle brings forward this reason against those who asserted the eternity of time but denied the eternity of movement replied to Objection 8 God is prior to the world by priority of duration but the word prior signifies priority not of time but of eternity or we may say that it signifies the eternity of imaginary time and not of time really existing thus when we say that above heaven there is nothing the word above signifies only an imaginary place according as it is possible to imagine other dimensions beyond those of the heavenly body replied to Objection 9 as the effect follows from the cause that acts by nature according to the mode of its form so likewise it follows from the voluntary agent according to the form preconceived by the agent as appears from what we said above therefore although God was from eternity the sufficient cause of the world we should not say that the world was produced by him except as preordained by his will that is that it should have being after not being in order more manifestly to declare its author replied to Objection 10 given the action the effect follows according to the requirement of the form which is the principle of action but in agents acting by will what is conceived and preordained is to be taken as the form which is the principle of action therefore from the eternal action of God an eternal effect did not follow but such an effect as God willed an effect to it which has being after not being second article whether it is an article of faith that the world began Objection 1 it would seem that it is not an article of faith but a demonstrable conclusion that the world began for everything that is made has a beginning of its duration but it can be proved demonstratively that God is the effective cause of the world indeed this is asserted by the more approved philosophers therefore it can be demonstratively proved that the world began Objection 2 further if it is necessary to say that the world was made by God it must therefore have been made from nothing or from something but it was not made from something otherwise the matter of the world would have preceded the world against which there are the arguments of Aristotle who held that the heaven was ungenerated therefore it must be said that the world was made from nothing and thus it has being after not being therefore it must have begun Objection 3 further everything which works by intellect works from some principle as appears in all kinds of craftsmen but God acts by intellect therefore his work has a principle the world therefore which is his effect did not always exist Objection 4 further it appears manifestly that certain arts have been developed and certain countries have begun to be inhabited at some fixed time but this would not be the case if the world had been always therefore it is manifest that the world did not always exist Objection 5 further it is certain that nothing can be equal to God but if the world had always been it would be equal to God in duration therefore it is certain that the world did not always exist Objection 6 further if the world always was the consequence is that infinite days preceded this present day but it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium therefore we should never have arrived at this present day which is manifestly false Objection 7 further if the world was eternal generation also was eternal therefore one man was begotten of another in an infinite series but the father is the efficient cause of the son therefore in efficient causes there could be an infinite series which is disproved Objection 8 further if the world and generation always were there have been an infinite number of men but man's soul is immortal therefore an infinite number of human souls would actually now exist which is impossible therefore it can be known with certainty that the world began and not only that it is known by faith on the contrary the articles of faith cannot be proved demonstratively because faith is of things that appear not but that God is the creator of the world hence that the world began is an article of faith for we say I believe in one God and so forth and again Gregory says that Moses prophesied of the past saying in the beginning God created heaven and earth in which words the newness of the world is stated therefore the newness of the world is known only by revelation and therefore it cannot be proved demonstratively I answer that by faith alone do we hold and by no demonstration cannot be proved that the world did not always exist as was said above of the mystery of the trinity the reason of this is that the newness of the world cannot be demonstrated on the part of the world itself for the principle of demonstration is the essence of a thing now everything according to its species is abstracted from here and now once it is said that universals are everywhere and always hence it cannot be demonstrated that man or heaven or a stone were not always likewise neither can it be demonstrated on the part of the efficient cause which acts by will for the will of God cannot be investigated by reason except as regards those things which God must will of necessity and what he wills about creatures is not among these as was said above but the divine will can be manifested by revelation on which faith rests hence that the world began to exist is an object of faith but not of demonstration or science and it is useful to consider this lest anyone presuming to demonstrate what is of faith should bring forward reasons that are not cogent so as to give occasion to unbelievers to laugh thinking that on such grounds we believe things that are of faith reply to objection one as Augustine says the opinion of philosophers who asserted the eternity of the world was twofold for some said that the substance of the world was not from God which is an intolerable error and therefore it is refuted by proofs that are cogent some however said that the world was eternal although made by God for they hold that the world has a beginning not of time but of creation so that in a certain hardly intelligible way the world was always made and they tried to explain their meaning thus for as if the foot were always in the dust from eternity there would always be a footprint which without doubt was caused by him who trod on it so also the world always was because its maker always existed to understand this we must consider that the efficient cause which acts by motion of necessity precedes its effect in time is only in the end of the action and every agent must be the principle of action but if the action is instantaneous and not successive it is not necessary for the maker to be prior to the thing made in duration as appears in the case of illumination hence they say that it does not follow necessarily if God is the active cause of the world that he should be prior to the world in duration because creation by which the world is not a successive change as was said above reply to objection to those who would say that the world was eternal would say that the world was made by God from nothing not that it was made after nothing according to what we understand by the word creation but that it was not made from anything and so also some of them do not reject the word creation as appears from Abbasenna to objection three this is the argument of an exagerus but it does not lead to a necessary conclusion except as to that intellect which deliberates in order to find out what should be done which is like movement such is the human intellect but not the divine intellect reply to objection four those who hold the eternity of the world hold that some region was changed an infinite number of times from being uninhabitable to being inhabitable and vice versa and likewise they hold that the arts by reason of various corruptions and accidents were subject to an infinite variety of advance and decay hence Aristotle says that it is absurd from such particular changes to hold the opinion of the newness of the whole world reply to objection five even supposing that the world always was it would not be equal to God in eternity as Boethius says because the divine being is all being simultaneously without succession but with the world it is otherwise reply to objection six passage is always understood as being from term to term whatever by gone day we choose from it to the present day there is a finite number of days which can be passed through the objection is founded on the idea that given two extremes there is an infinite number of mean terms reply to objection seven inefficient causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity per se thus there cannot be an infinite number of causes that are per se required for a certain effect for instance that a stone be moved by a stick the stick by the hand and so on to infinity but it is not impossible to proceed to infinity accidentally as regards efficient causes for instance if all the causes thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of only only one cause their multiplication being accidental as an artificer acts by means of many hammers accidentally because one after the other may be broken it is accidental therefore that one particular hammer acts after the action of another and likewise it is accidental to this particular man as generator to be generated by another man for he generates as a man and not as the son of another man for all men generating hold one grade inefficient causes namely the grade of a particular generator hence it is not impossible for a man to be generated by man to infinity but such a thing would be impossible if the generation of this man depended upon this man and on an elementary body and on the son and so on to infinity reply to objection eight those who hold the eternity of the world evade this reason in many ways for some do not think it impossible for there to be an actual infinity of souls as appears from the metaphysics of all gazelle who says that such a thing as an accidental infinity but this was disproved above some say that the soul is corrupted with the body some say that of all souls only one will remain but others as agustin says asserted on this account a circuit of souls namely that souls separated from their bodies return again to their after a course of time a fuller consideration of which matters will be given later but be it noted that this argument considers only a particular case hence one might say that the world was eternal or at least some creature as an angel but not man but we are considering the question in general as to whether any creature can exist from eternity third article whether the creation of things was in the beginning of time objection one it would seem that the creation of things was not in the beginning of time for whatever is not in time is not any part of time but the creation of things was not in time for by the creation the substance of things was brought into being and time does not measure the substance of things and especially of incorporeal things therefore creation was not in the beginning of time objection two further the philosopher proves that everything which is made was being made and so to be made before and after but in the beginning of time since it is indivisible there is no before and after therefore since to be created is a kind of being made it appears that things were not created in the beginning of time objection three further even time itself is created but time cannot be created in the beginning of time since time is divisible and the beginning of time is divisible therefore the creation of things was not in the beginning of time on the contrary it is said in the beginning God created heaven and earth I answer that the words of Genesis in the beginning God created heaven and earth are expounded in a three fold sense in order to exclude three errors for some said that the world always was and that time had no beginning and to exclude this the words in the beginning are expounded namely of time and some said that there are two principles of creation one of good things and the other of evil things against which in the beginning is expounded in the sun for as the efficient principle is appropriated to the father by reason of power so the exemplar principle is appropriated to the son by reason of wisdom in order that as it is said thou hast made all things in wisdom it may be understood that God made all things in the beginning that is in the son according to the word of the apostle in him namely the son were created all things but others said that corporeal things were created by God through the medium of spiritual creation and to exclude this it is expounded thus in the beginning that is before all things God created heaven and earth for four things are stated to be created together namely the imperium heaven corporeal matter by which is meant the earth time and the angelic nature reply to objection one things are said to be created in the beginning of time not as if the beginning of time were a measure of creation but because there with time heaven and earth were created reply to objection two this saying of the philosopher is understood of being made by means of movement or as the term of movement because since in every movement there is before and after before any one point in a given movement that is whilst anything is in the process of being moved and made there is a before and also an after is in the beginning of movement or in its term is not in being moved but creation is neither movement nor the term of movement as was said above hence a thing is created in such a way that it was not being created before reply to objection three nothing is made except as it exists but nothing exists of time except now hence time cannot be made except according to some now not because in the first now is time but because from it time begins the end of question 46 question 47 of summa theologica pars prima triniti and creation this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy summa theologica pars prima triniti and creation by st. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 47 of the distinction of things in general after considering the production of creatures we come to the consideration of the distinction of things this consideration will be three fold first of the distinction of things in general secondly of the distinction of good and evil thirdly of the distinction of the spiritual and corporeal creature under the first head there are three points of inquiry the multitude or distinction of things their inequality and the unity of the world whether the multitude and distinction of things come from God objection one it would seem that the multitude and distinction of things does not come from God for one naturally always makes one but God is supremely one as appears from what precedes therefore he produces but one effect objection two further the representation is assimilated to its exemplar but God exemplar cause of his effect as was said above therefore as God is one his effect is one only and not diverse objection three further the means are proportional to the end but the end of the creature is one namely the divine goodness as was shown above therefore the effect of God is but one on the contrary it is said that God divided light from the darkness and divided waters from waters therefore the distinction and multitude of things is from God I answer that the distinction of things has been ascribed to many causes for some attributed the distinction to matter either by itself or with the agent democratists for instance and all the ancient natural philosophers who admitted no cause but matter attributed it to matter alone and in their opinion the distinction of things comes from chance according to the movement of matter and exagorous however attributed the distinction and multitude of things to matter and to the agent together and he said that the intellect distinguishes things by extracting what is mixed up in matter but this cannot stand for two reasons first because as was shown above even matter itself was created by God hence we must produce whatever distinction comes from matter to a higher cause secondly because matter is for the sake of form and not the form for the matter and the distinction of things comes from their proper forms therefore the distinction of things is not on account of the matter but rather on the contrary created matter is formless in order that it may be accommodated to different forms others have attributed the distinction of things to secondary agents as did Avicenna who said that God by understanding himself produced the first intelligence in which for as much as it was not its own being there is necessarily composition of potentiality in act as will appear later and so the first intelligence in as much as it understood the first cause produced the second intelligence and in so far as it understood itself as in potentiality it produced the heavenly body which causes movement and in as much as it understood itself as having actuality it produced the soul of the heavens but this opinion cannot stand for two reasons first because it was shown above that to create belongs to God alone and this is what can be caused only by creation is produced by God alone namely all those things which are not subject to generation and corruption secondly because according to this opinion the universality of things would not proceed from the intention of the first agent but from the concurrence of many active causes and such an effect we can describe only as being produced by chance the perfection of the universe which consists of the diversity of things with thus be a thing of chance which is impossible hence we must say that the distinction and multitude of things comes from the intention of the first agent who was God for he brought things into being in order that his goodness might be communicated to creatures and be represented by them and because his goodness could not be adequately represented by one creature alone he produced many and diverse creatures that what was wanting to one in the representation of the divine goodness might be supplied by another for goodness which in God is simple and uniform in creatures is manifold and divided and hence the whole universe together participates the divine goodness more perfectly and represents it better than any single creature whatever and because the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of things therefore Moses said that things are made distinct by the word of God which is the concept of his wisdom and this is what we read in Genesis God said be light made and he divided the light from the darkness reply to objection one the natural agent acts by the form which makes it what it is and which is only one in one thing and therefore its effect is one only but the voluntary agent such as God is as was shown above acts by an intellectual form since therefore it is not against God's unity and simplicity to understand many things as was shown above it follows that although he is one he can make many things reply to objection two this reason would apply to the representation which reflects the exemplar perfectly and which is multiplied by reason of matter only hence the uncreated image which is perfect is only one but no creature represents the first exemplar perfectly which is the divine essence and therefore it can be represented by many things still according as ideas are called exemplars the plurality of ideas corresponds in the divine mind to the plurality of things reply to objection three in speculative things the medium of demonstration which demonstrates the conclusion perfectly is one only whereas probable means of proof are many likewise when operation is concerned if the means be equal so to speak to the end one only is sufficient but the creature is not such a means to its end which is God hence the multiplication of creatures is necessary second article whether the inequality of things is from God objection one it would seem that the inequality of things is not from God for it belongs to the best to produce the best but among things that are best one is not greater than another therefore it belongs to God who is the best to make all things equal he is the effect of unity but God is one therefore he has made all things equal and objection three further it is the part of justice to give unequal to unequal things but God is just in all his works since therefore no inequality of things is presupposed to the operation whereby he gives being to things it seems that he has made all things equal on the contrary it is said why does one day excel another and one light another and one year another year one sun another sun by the knowledge of the Lord they were distinguished I answer that when origin wished to refute those who said that the distinction of things arose from the contrary principles of good and evil he said that in the beginning all things were created equal by God for he asserted that God created only the rational creatures and all equal and that inequality arose in them from free will some being turned to God more and some less and others turned more and others less away from God and so those rational creatures which were turned to God by free will were promoted to the order of angels according to the diversity of merits and those who were turned away from God were bound down to bodies according to the diversity of their sin and he said this was the cause of the creation and diversity of bodies but according to this opinion it would follow that the universality of bodily creatures would not be the effect of the goodness of God as communicated to creatures but it would be for the sake of the punishment of sin which is contrary to what is said God saw all the things that he had made that were very good and as Augustine says what can be more foolish and to say that the divine architect provided this one son for the one world not to be an ornament to its beauty nor for the benefit of corporeal things but that it happened through the sin of one soul so that if a hundred souls had sin there would be a hundred sons in the world therefore it must be said that as the wisdom of God is the cause of the distinction of things so the same wisdom is the cause of their inequality this may be explained as follows a twofold distinction is found in things one is a formal distinction as regards things differing specifically the other is a material distinction as regards things differing numerically only and as the matter is on account of the form material distinction exists for the sake of the formal distinction hence we see that in incorruptible things there is only one individual of each species for as much as the species is sufficiently preserved in the one whereas in things generated and corruptible there are many individuals of one species for the preservation of the species once it appears that formal distinction is a material now formal distinction always requires inequality because as the philosopher says the forms of things are like numbers in which species vary by addition or subtraction of unity hence in natural things species seem to be arranged in degrees as the mixed things are more perfect than the elements and plants than minerals and animals than plants and animals and in each of these one species is more perfect than others therefore as the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of things for the sake of the perfection of the universe so it is the cause of inequality for the universe would not be perfect if only one grade of goodness were found in things reply to objection one it is part of the best agent to produce an effect which is best in its entirety but this does not mean that he makes every part of the whole the best absolutely but in proportion to the whole in the case of an animal for instance its goodness would be taken away if every part of it had the dignity of an eye thus therefore God also made the universe to be best as a whole according to the mode of a creature whereas he did not make each single creature best but one better than another and therefore we find it said of each creature God saw the light that it was good and in like manner of each one of the rest but of all together it is said God saw all the things that he had made and they were very good reply to objection two the first effect of unity is equality and then comes multiplicity and therefore from the father to whom according to Augustine is appropriated unity the son proceeds to whom is appropriated equality and then from him the creature proceeds to which belongs inequality but nevertheless even creatures share in a certain equality namely of proportion reply to objection three this is the argument that persuaded origin but it holds only as regards the distribution of rewards the inequality of which is due to unequal merits but in the constitution of things there is no inequality of parts through any preceding inequality either of merits or of the disposition of the matter but inequality comes from the perfection of the whole this appears also in works written by art for the roof of the house differs from the foundation not because it is made of other material but in order that the house may be made perfect of different parts the artificer seeks different material indeed he would make such material if he could third article whether there is only one world objection one it would seem that there is not only one world because as Augustine says it is unfitting to say that God has created things without a reason but for the same reason he created one he could create many since his power is not limited to the creation of one world but rather it is infinite as was shown above therefore God has produced many worlds objection two further nature does what is best and much more does God but it is better for there to be many worlds than one good things are better than a few therefore many worlds have been made by God objection three further everything which has a form in matter can be multiplied in number the species remaining the same because multiplication in number comes from matter but the world has a form in matter thus as when I say man I mean the form and when I say this man I mean the form in matter so when we say world the form is signified and when we say this world the form in the matter is signified therefore there is nothing to prevent the existence of many worlds on the contrary it is said the world was made by him where the world is named as one as if only one existed I answer that the very order of things created by God shows the unity of the world for this world is called one by the unity of order whereby some things are ordered to others but whatever things come from God have relation of order to each other and to God himself as shown above and it must be that all things should belong to one world therefore those only can assert that many worlds exist to do not acknowledge any ordaining wisdom but rather believe in chance as democratist who said that this world besides an infinite number of other worlds was made from a causal course of atoms reply to objection one this reason proves that the world is one because all things must be arranged in one order and to one end therefore from the unity of order in things Aristotle infers the unity of God governing all and Plato from the unity of the exemplar proves the unity of the world as the thing designed reply to objection two no agent intends material plurality as the end for as much as material multitude has no certain limit but of itself tends to infinity and the infinite is opposed to the notion of end now when it is said that many worlds are better than one this has reference to material order but the best in this sense is not the intention of the divine agent for as much as for the same reason it might be said that if he had made two worlds it would be better if he had made three and so on to infinite reply to objection three the world is composed of the whole of its matter for it is not possible for there to be another earth than this one since every earth would naturally be carried to this central one wherever it was the same applies to the other bodies which are part of the world the end of question forty seven question forty eight of summa theologica pars prima trinity and creation this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy summa theologica pars prima trinity and creation by st. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question forty eight the distinction of things in particular we must now consider the distinction of things in particular and firstly the distinction of good and evil and then the distinction of the spiritual and corporeal creatures concerning the first we inquire into evil and its cause concerning evil six points are to be considered whether evil is a nature whether evil is found in things whether good is the subject of evil whether evil totally corrupts good the division of evil into pain and fault and whether pain or fault has more the nature of evil first article whether evil is a nature objection one it would seem that evil is a nature for every genus is a nature but evil is a genus for the philosopher says that good and evil are not in a genus but are genus of other things therefore evil is a nature objection two further every difference which constitutes a species is a nature but evil is a difference constituting a species of morality for a bad habit differs in species from a good habit as liberality from illiberality therefore evil signifies a nature objection three further each extreme of two contraries is a nature but evil and good are not opposed as privation and habit but as contraries as the philosopher shows by the fact that between good and evil there is a medium and from evil there can be a return to good therefore evil signifies a nature objection four further what is not acts not but evil acts where it corrupts good therefore evil is a being and a nature and objection five further nothing belongs to the perfection of the universe except what is a being and a nature but evil belongs to the perfection of the universe of things for Augustine says that the admirable beauty of the universe is made up of all things in which even what is called evil well ordered and in its place is the eminent commendation of what is good therefore on the contrary Dainese says evil is neither a being nor a good I answer that one opposite is known through the other as darkness is known through light hence also what evil is must be known from the nature of good now we have said above that good is everything apetable and thus since every nature desires its own being and its own perfection it must be said also that the being and the perfection of the nature is good hence it cannot be that evil signifies being or any form or nature therefore it must be that by the name of evil is signified the absence of good and this is what is meant by saying that evil is neither a being nor a good for since being as such is good the absence of one implies the absence of the other reply to objection one Aristotle speaks there according to the opinion of Pythagoreans of the kind of nature and therefore they asserted the existence of the genus of good and evil for Aristotle especially in his logical works brings forward examples that in his time were probable in the opinion of some philosophers or it may be said that as the philosopher says the first kind of contrariety is habit and privation as being verified in all contraries since one contrary is always imperfect in relation to another as black in relation to sweet and in this way good and evil are said to be genera not simply but in regard to contraries because as every form has the nature of good so every privation as such has the nature of evil reply to objection two good and evil are not constitutive differences except in morals which receive their species from the end which is the object of the will the source of all morality because good has the nature of an end therefore good and evil are specific differences in moral things good in itself but evil as the absence of the due end yet neither does the absence of the due end by itself constitute a moral species except as it is joined to the undue end just as we do not find the privation of the substantial form in natural things unless it is joined to another form thus therefore the evil which is a constitutive difference in morals is a certain good joined to the privation of another good as the end proposed by the intemperate man is not the privation of the good of reason but the delight of sense without the order of reason hence evil is not a constitutive difference as such but by reason of the good that is annexed reply to objection three this appears from the above for the philosopher speaks of good and evil in morality because in that respect between good and evil there is a medium as good is considered as something rightly ordered and evil as a thing not only out of right order but also as injurious to another hence the philosopher says that a prodigal man is foolish but not evil and from this evil in morality there may be a return to good but not from any sort of evil for from blindness there is no return so blindness is an evil reply to objection four a thing is said to act in a threefold sense in one way formally as when we say that whiteness makes white and in that sense evil considered even as a privation is said to corrupt good for as much as it is itself a corruption or privation of good in another sense a thing is said to act effectively as when a painter makes a wall white thirdly it is said in the sense of the final cause as the end is said to effect by moving the efficient cause but in these two ways evil does not affect anything of itself that is as a privation but by virtue of the good annexed to it for every action comes from some form and everything which is desired as an end is a perfection and therefore as Dionysius says evil does not act nor is it desired except by virtue of some good while of itself it is nothing definite and beside the scope of our will and intention reply to objection five as was said above the parts of the universe are ordered to each other according as one acts on the other and according as one is the end an exemplar of the other but as was said above this can only happen to evil as joined to some good hence evil neither belongs to the perfection of the universe does it come under the order of the same except accidentally that is by reason of some good joined to it second article whether evil is found in things objection one it would seem that evil is not found in things for whatever is found in things is either something or a privation of something that is a not being but Dionysius says that evil is distant from existence and even more distant from non-existence therefore evil is not at all found in things objection two further being and thing are convertible if therefore evil is a being in things it follows that evil is a thing which is contrary to what has been said and objection three further the white unmixed with black is the most white as the philosopher says therefore also the good unmixed with evil is the greater good but God makes always what is best much more than nature does therefore in things made by God there is no evil on the contrary on the above assumptions all prohibitions and penalties would cease for they exist only for evils I answer that as was said above the perfection of the universe requires that there should be inequality in things so that every grade of goodness may be realized now one grade of goodness is that of the good which cannot fail another grade of goodness is that of the good which can fail in goodness and this grade is to be found in existence itself for some things there are which cannot lose their existence as incorruptible things while some there are which can lose it as things corruptible as therefore the perfection of the universe requires that there should be not only beings incorruptible but also corruptible beings so the perfection of the universe requires that there should be some which can fail in goodness and then it follows that sometimes they do fail now it is in this that evil consists namely in the fact that a thing fails in goodness hence it is clear that evil is found in things as corruption also is found for corruption is itself an evil replied to objection one evil is distant both from simple being and from simple not being because it is neither a habit nor a pure application but a privation replied to objection two as the philosopher says being is two fold in one way it is considered as signifying the entity of a thing as divisible by the ten predicaments and in that sense it is convertible with the thing and thus no privation is a being and neither therefore is evil a being in another sense being conveys the truth of a proposition which unites together subject and interviewed by a copula notified by this word is and in this sense being is what answers to the question does it exist and thus we speak of blindness as being in the eye or of any other privation in this way even evil can be called a being through ignorance of this distinction some considering that things may be evil or that evil is said to be in things believed that evil was a positive thing in itself replied to objection three God and nature and any other agent make what is best in the whole but not what is best in every single part except in order to the whole as was said above and the whole itself which is the universe of creatures is all the better and more perfect if some things in it can fail in goodness and do sometimes fail God not preventing this this happens firstly because it belongs to providence not to destroy but to save nature as but it belongs to nature that what may fail should sometimes fail secondly because as Augustine says God is so powerful that he can even make good out of evil hence many good things would be taken away if God permitted no evil to exist for fire would not be generated if air was not corrupted nor would the life of a lion be preserved unless the ass were killed neither would avenging justice nor the patients would be praised if there were no injustice third article whether evil is in good as in its subject objection one it would seem that evil is not in good as its subject for good is something that exists but Dionysius says that evil does not exist nor is it in that which exists therefore evil is not in good as its subject objection two further evil is not a being whereas good is a being but non-being does not require being as its subject therefore neither does evil require good as its subject objection three further one contrary is not the subject of another but good and evil are contraries therefore evil is not in good as in its subject and objection four further the subject of whiteness is called white therefore also the subject of evil is evil if therefore evil is in good as in its subject it follows that good is evil against what is said woe to you who call evil good and good evil on the contrary Augustine says that evil exists only in good I answer that as was said above evil imports the absence of good but not every absence of good is evil for absence of good can be taken in a privative sense absence of good taken negatively is not evil otherwise it would follow that what does not exist is evil and also that everything would be evil through not having the good belonging to something else for instance a man would be evil who had not the swiftness of the row or the strength of a lion but the absence of good taken in a privative sense is an evil as for instance the privation of sight is called blindness the subject of privation and of form is one and the same namely being in potentiality whether it be being in absolute potentiality as primary matter which is the subject of the substantial form and of privation of the opposite form or whether it be being in relative potentiality and absolute actuality as in the case of a transparent body which is the subject both of darkness and light it is however manifest that the form which makes the thing actual is a perfection and a good and thus every actual being is a good and likewise every potential being as such is a good as having a relation to good for as it has being in potentiality so it has goodness in potentiality therefore the subject of evil is good reply to objection one Dionysius means that evil is not in existing things as a part of the natural property of any existing thing reply to objection two not being understood negatively does not require a subject but privation is negation in a subject as the philosopher says and such not being is an evil reply to objection three evil is not in the good opposed to it as in its subject but in some other good for the subject to blindness is not but animal yet it appears as Augustine says that the rule of dialectics here fails where it is laid down that contraries cannot exist together but this is to be taken as referring to good and evil in general but not in reference to any particular good and evil for white and black sweet and bitter and the like contraries are only considered as contraries in a special sense because they exist in some determinant whereas good enters into every genus hence one good can coexist with the privation of another good reply to objection four the prophet invokes woe to those who say that good as such is evil but this does not follow from what is said above as is clear from the explanation given fourth article whether evil corrupts the whole good objection one it would seem that evil corrupts the whole good for one contrary is wholly corrupted by another but good and evil are contraries therefore evil corrupts the whole good objection two further Augustine says that evil hurts in as much as it takes away good but good is all of a peace and uniform therefore it is wholly taken away by evil objection three further evil as long as it last hurts and takes away good but that from which something is always being removed is at some time consumed unless it is infinite which cannot be said of any created good therefore evil wholly consumes good on the contrary Augustine says that evil cannot wholly consume good I answer that evil cannot wholly consume good to prove this we must consider that good is three fold one kind of good is wholly destroyed by evil and this is the good opposed to evil as light is wholly destroyed by darkness and sight by blindness another kind of good is neither wholly destroyed nor diminished by evil and that is the good which is the subject of evil for by darkness the substance of the air is not injured and there is also a kind of good which is diminished by evil but is not wholly taken away and this good is the aptitude of a subject to some actuality a diminution however of this kind of good is not to be considered by way of subtraction as diminution in quantity but rather by way of remission as diminution in qualities and forms the remission likewise of this is to be taken as contrary to its intensity where this kind of aptitude receives its intensity by the dispositions whereby the matter is prepared for actuality which the more they are multiplied in the subject or it is fitted to receive its perfection and form and on the contrary it receives its remission by contrary dispositions which the more they are multiplied in the matter and the more they are intensified the more is the potentiality remitted as regards the actuality therefore if contrary dispositions cannot be multiplied and intensified to infinity but only to a certain limit neither is the aforesaid aptitude diminished or remitted infinitely as appears in the active and passive qualities of the elements for coldness and humidity whereby the aptitude of matter to the form of fire is diminished or remitted cannot be infinitely multiplied but if the contrary dispositions can be infinitely multiplied the aforesaid aptitude is also infinitely diminished or remitted yet nevertheless it is not wholly taken away because its root always remains is the substance of the subject thus if opaque bodies were interposed to infinity between the sun and the air the aptitude of the air to light would be infinitely diminished but still it would never be wholly removed while the air remained which in its very nature is transparent likewise addition and sin can be made to infinitude whereby the aptitude of the soul to grace is more and more lessened and these sins indeed are like obstacles between us and God according to Isaiah our sins have divided between us and God yet the aforesaid aptitude of the soul is not wholly taken away for it belongs to its very nature reply to objection one the good which is opposed to evil is wholly taken away but other goods are not wholly removed as said above reply to objection two the aforesaid aptitude is a medium between subject and act where it touches act it is diminished by evil but where it touches the subject it remains as it was therefore although good is like to itself yet on account of its relation to different things it is not wholly but only partially taken away reply to objection three some imagining that the diminution of this kind of good is like the diminution of quantity said that just as the continuous is infinitely divisible when a division be made in an ever same proportion for instance half of half or third of third so it is in the present case but this explanation does not avail here for when in a division we keep the same proportion we continue to subtract less and less for half of half is less than half of the whole but a second sin does not necessarily diminish the above mentioned aptitude less than a preceding sin but perchance either equally or more therefore it must be said that although this aptitude is a finite thing yet it may be so diminished infinitely not per se but accidentally according as the contrary dispositions are also increased infinitely as explained above fifth article whether evil is adequately divided into pain and fault objection one it would seem that evil is not adequately divided into pain and fault and defect is a kind of evil but in all creatures there is the defect of not being able to preserve their own existence which nevertheless is neither a pain nor a fault therefore evil is inadequately divided into pain and fault objection two further in irrational creatures there is neither fault nor pain but nevertheless they have corruption and defect which are evils therefore not every evil is a pain or a fault and objection three further temptation is an evil but it is not a fault for temptation which involves no consent is not a sin but an occasion for the exercise of virtue as is said in a gloss on Corinthians nor is it a pain because temptation precedes the fault and the pain follows afterwards therefore evil is not sufficiently divided into pain and fault and objection four on the contrary it would seem that this division is superfluous for as Augustine says a thing is evil because it hurts but whatever hurts is penal therefore every evil comes under pain I answer that evil as was said above is the privation of good which chiefly and of itself consists in perfection and act act however is two fold first and second the first act is the form and integrity of the thing the second act is its operation therefore evil also is two fold in one way it occurs by the subtraction of the form or any part required for the integrity of the thing as blindness is an evil as also it is an evil to be wanting in any member of the body in another way evil exists by the withdrawal of the do operation either because it does not exist or because it has not its do mode but because good in itself is the object of the will evil which is the privation of good is found in a special way in rational creatures which have a will therefore the evil which comes from the withdrawal of the form and integrity of the thing has the nature of a pain and especially so on the supposition that all things are subject to divine providence and justice as was shown above for it is of the very nature of a pain to be against the will but the evil which consists in the subtraction of the do operation in voluntary things has the nature of a fault for this is imputed to anyone as a fault to fail as regards perfect action of which he is master by the will therefore every evil in voluntary things is to be looked upon as a pain or a fault reply to objection one because evil is the privation of good and not a mere negation as was said above therefore not every defect of good is an evil but the defect of the good which is naturally do for the want of sight is not an evil in a stone but it is an evil in an animal since it is against the nature of a stone to see so likewise it is against the nature of a creature to be preserved in existence by itself because existence and conservation come from one in the same source not an evil as regards a creature reply to objection to pain and fault do not divide evil absolutely considered but evil that is found in voluntary things reply to objection three temptation as importing provocation to evil is always an evil of fault in the tempter but in the one tempted it is not properly speaking of fault unless through the temptation some changes rot in the one for thus is the action of the agent in the patient and if the tempted is changed to evil by the tempter he falls into fault reply to objection four in answer to the opposite argument it must be said that the very nature of pain includes the idea of injury to the agent in himself whereas the idea of fault includes the idea of injury to the agent in his operation and thus both are contained in evil as including the idea of injury sixth article whether pain has the nature of evil more than fault has objection one it would seem that pain has more of evil than fault for fault is to pain what merit is to reward but reward has more good than merit as its end therefore pain has more evil in it than fault has objection two further that is the greater evil which is opposed to the greater good but pain as was said above is opposed to the good of the agent while fault is opposed to the good of the action therefore since the agent is better than the action it seems that pain is worse than fault and objection three further the privation of the end is a pain consisting in forfeiting the vision of God whereas the evil of fault is privation of the order to the end therefore pain is a greater evil than fault on the contrary a wise workman chooses a less evil in order to prevent a greater as the surgeon cuts off a limb to save the whole body but divine wisdom inflicts pain to prevent fault therefore fault is a greater evil than pain I answer that fault has the nature of evil more than pain has not only more than pain of sense consisting of the privation of corporeal goods which kind of pain appeals to most men but also more than any kind of pain thus taking pain in its most general meaning so as to include privation of grace or glory there is a twofold reason for this the first is that one becomes evil by the evil of fault but not by the evil of pain as Dionysius says to be punished is not an evil but it is an evil to be made worthy of punishment and this because since good absolutely considered consists in act is not in potentiality and the ultimate act is operation or the use of something possessed it follows that the absolute good of man consists in good operation or the good use of something possessed now we use all things by the act of the will hence from a good will which makes a man use well what he has man is called good and from a bad will he is called bad for a man who has a bad will can use ill even the good as when a grammarian of his own will speaks incorrectly therefore because the fault itself consists in the disordered act of the will and the pain consists in the privation of something used by the will fault has more of evil in it than pain has the second reason can be taken from the fact that God is the author of the evil of pain but not of the evil of fault and this is because the evil of pain takes away the creatures good something created as sight destroyed by blindness or something uncreated as by being deprived of the vision of God the creature forfeits its uncreated good but the evil of fault is properly opposed to uncreated good for it is opposed to the fulfillment of the divine will and to divine love whereby the divine good is loved for itself and not only as shared by the creature therefore it is plain that fault has more evil in it than it does reply to objection one although fault results in pain as merit in reward yet fault is not intended on account of the pain as merit is for the reward but rather on the contrary pain is brought about so that the fault may be avoided and thus fault is worse than pain reply to objection two the order of action which is destroyed by fault is the more perfect good of the agent than the good taken away by pain which is the first perfection reply to objection three pain and fault are not to be compared as end and order to the end because one may be deprived of both of these in some way both by fault and by pain by pain according as a man is removed from the end and from the order to the end by fault in as much as this privation belongs to the action which is not ordered to its do end the end of question forty-eight question forty-nine of Summa Theologica Parse Prima Trinity and Creation this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy Summa Theologica Parse Prima Trinity and Creation by St. Thomas Aquinas translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican province question forty-nine the cause of evil we next inquire into the cause of evil concerning this there are three points of inquiry whether good can be the cause of evil whether the supreme good God is the cause of evil and whether there be any supreme evil which is the first cause of evil first article whether good can be the cause of evil objection one it would seem that good cannot be the cause of evil for it is said a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit objection two further one contrary cannot be the cause of another but evil is the contrary to good therefore good cannot be the cause of evil objection three the deficient effect can proceed only from a deficient cause but evil is a deficient effect therefore it's cause if it has one is deficient but everything deficient is an evil therefore the cause of evil can only be evil objection four further Dionysia says that evil has no cause therefore good is not the cause of evil on the contrary Augustine says there is no possible good I answer that it must be said that every evil in some way has a cause for evil is the absence of the good which is natural and due to a thing but that anything fail from its natural and due disposition can come only from some cause drawing it out of its proper disposition for a heavy thing is not moved upwards except by some impelling force nor does an agent fail in its action except from some impediment but only good can be a cause because nothing can be a cause except in as much as it is a being and every being as such is good and if we consider the special kinds of causes we see that the agent the form and the end import some kind of perfection which belongs to the notion of good even matter as a potentiality to good has the nature of good now that good is the cause of evil by way of the material cause was shown above where it was shown that good is the subject of evil but evil has no formal cause rather it is a privation of form likewise neither has it a final cause but rather it is a privation of order to the proper end since not only the end has the nature of good but also the useful which is ordered to the end evil however has a cause by way of an agent not directly but accidentally in proof of this we must know that evil is caused in the action otherwise than in the effect in the action evil is caused by reason of the defect of some principle of action either of the principle or the instrumental agent thus the defect in the movement of an animal may happen by reason of the weakness of the motive power as in the case of children or by reason only of the ineptitude of the instrument as in the lame on the other hand evil is caused in a thing but not in the proper effect of the agent sometimes by the power of the agent sometimes by region of the defect either of the agent or of the matter it is caused by reason of the power or perfection of the agent when there necessarily follows on the form intended by the agent the privation of another form as for instance when on the form of fire there follows the privation of the form of air or of water therefore as the more perfect the fire is in strength so much the more perfectly does it impress its own form so also the more perfectly does it corrupt the contrary hence that evil and corruption before air and water comes from the perfection of the fire but this is accidental because fire does not aim at the privation of the form of water but at the bringing in of its own form though by doing this it also accidentally causes the other but if there is a defect in the proper effect of the fire as for instance that it fails to heat this comes either by defect of the action which implies the defect of some principle as was said above or by the indisposition of the matter which does not receive the action of fire or the agent but this very fact that it is a deficient being is accidental to good to which of itself it belongs to act hence it is true that evil in no way has any but an accidental cause and thus is good the cause of evil reply to objection one as Augustine says the lord calls an evil will the evil tree and a good will a good tree now a good will does not produce a morally bad act since it is from the good will itself that a moral act is judged to be good nevertheless the movement itself of an evil will is caused by the rational creature which is good and thus good is the cause of evil reply to objection two good does not cause that evil which is contrary to itself but some other evil thus the goodness of the fire causes evil to the water and man good as to his nature causes an act morally evil and as explained above this is by accident moreover it does happen sometimes that one contrary causes another by accident for instance the exterior surrounding cold heats the body through the concentration of the inward heat reply to objection three evil has a deficient cause and voluntary things otherwise than a natural things where the natural agent produces the same kind of effect as it is itself unless it is impeded by some exterior thing and this amounts to some effect belonging to it hence evil never follows in the effect unless some other evil pre-exists in the agent or in the matter as was said above but in voluntary things the defect of the action comes from the will actually deficient in as much as it does not actually subject itself to its proper rule this defect however is not a fault but fault follows upon it from the fact that the will acts with this defect of objection four evil has no direct cause but only an accidental cause as was said above second article whether the supreme good god is the cause of evil objection one it would seem that the supreme good god is the cause of evil for it is said I am the lord and there is no other god forming the light and creating darkness making peace and creating evil shall there be evil in a city which the lord hath not done objection two further the effect of the secondary cause is reduced to the first cause but good is the cause of evil as was said above therefore since god is the cause of every good as was shown above it follows that also every evil is from god objection three further as is said by the philosopher the cause of both safety and danger of the ship is the same god is the cause of the safety of all things therefore he is the cause of all perdition and of all evil on the contrary Augustine says that god is not the author of evil because he is not the cause of tending to not being I answer that as appears from what was said the evil which consists in the defective action is always caused by the defect of the agent but in god there is no defect but the highest perfection as was shown above hence the evil which consists in defective action or which is caused by defect of the agent is not reduced to god as to its cause but the evil which consists in the corruption of some things is reduced to god as the cause and this appears as regards both natural things and voluntary things for it was said that some agent in as much as it produces by its power a form to which follows corruption and defect but it is manifest that the form which god chiefly intends in things created is the good of the order of the universe now the order of the universe requires as was said above that there should be some things that can and do sometimes fail and thus god by causing in things the good of the order of the universe consequently and as it were by accident causes the corruptions of things according to kings book 1 the lord killeth and maketh alive but when we read that god hath not made death the sense is that god does not will death for its own sake nevertheless the order of justice belongs to the order of the universe and this requires that penalty should be dealt out to sinners and so god is the author of the evil which is penalty but not of the evil which is fault by reason of what is said above reply to objection 1 these passages refer to the evil of penalty and not to the evil of fault reply to objection 2 the effect of the deficient secondary cause is reduced to the first non deficient cause as regards what it has of being and perfection but not as regards what it has of defect just as whatever there is of motion in the act of limping is caused by the motive power of obliqueness in it does not come from the motive power but from the curvature of the leg and likewise whatever there is of being an action in a bad action is reduced to god as the cause whereas whatever defect is in it is not caused by god but by the deficient secondary cause reply to objection 3 the sinking of a ship is attributed to the sailor as the cause from the fact that he does not fulfill what the safety of the ship requires but god does not fail in doing what is necessary for the safety of all hence there is no parity 3rd article whether there be one supreme evil which is the cause of every evil objection 1 it would seem that there is one supreme evil which is the cause of every evil for contrary effects have contrary causes but contraryity is found in things according to ecclesiasticus good is set against evil and life against death so also is the sinner against a just man therefore there are many contrary principles one of good the other of evil objection 2 further if one contrary is in nature so is the other but the supreme good is in nature and is the cause of every good as was shown above therefore also there is a supreme evil opposed to it as the cause of every evil objection 3 further as we find good and better things so we find evil and worse but good and better are so considered in relation to what is best therefore evil and worse are so considered in relation to some supreme evil objection 4 further everything participated is reduced to what is essential but things which are evil among us are evil not essentially but by participation therefore we must seek for some supreme essential evil which is the cause of every evil objection 5 further whatever is accidental is reduced to that which is per se but good is the accidental cause of evil therefore we must suppose some supreme evil which is the per se cause of evils nor can it be said that evil has no per se cause but only an accidental cause where it would then follow that evil would not exist but only in the few objection 6 further the evil of the effect is reduced to the evil of the cause because the deficient effect comes from the deficient cause as was said above but we cannot proceed to infinity in this matter therefore we must suppose one first evil as the cause of every evil on the contrary the supreme good is the cause of every being as was shown above therefore any principle opposed to it as the cause of evils I answer that it appears from what precedes that there is no one first principle of evil as there is one first principle of good first indeed because the first principle of good is essentially good as was shown above but nothing can be essentially bad for it was shown above that every being as such is good and that evil can exist only in good as in its subject secondly because the first principle of good is the highest and perfect good which pre-contains in itself all goodness as shown above but there cannot be a supreme evil because as was shown above although evil always lessens good yet it never wholly consumes it and thus while good ever remains nothing can be wholly and perfectly bad therefore the philosopher says that if the holy evil could be it would destroy itself because it should be destroyed which it need to be for something to be wholly evil evil itself would be taken away since its subject is good thirdly because the very nature of evil is against the idea of a first principle both because every evil is caused by good as was shown above and because evil can be only an accidental cause and thus it cannot be the first cause for the accidental cause is subsequent to the direct cause those however who upheld two first principles one good and the other evil fell into this error from the same cause once also arose other strange notions of the ancients namely because they failed to consider the universal cause of all being and considered only the particular causes of particular effects for on that account if they found a thing hurtful to something by the power of its own nature they thought the very nature of that thing was evil as for instance if one should say that the nature of fire was evil because it burnt the house of a poor man the judgment however of the goodness of anything does not depend upon its order to any particular thing but rather upon what it is in itself and on its order to the whole universe where in every part has its own perfectly ordered place as was said above likewise because they found two contrary causes of two contrary particular effects they did not know how to reduce these contrary particular causes to the universal common cause and therefore they extended the contrariety of causes even to the first principles but since all contraries agree in something common it is necessary to search for one common cause for them above their own contrary proper causes as above the contrary qualities of the elements exists the power of a heavenly body and above all things that exist no matter how there exists one first principle of being as was shown above reply to objection one contraries agree in one genus and they also agree in the nature of being and therefore although they have contrary particular causes nevertheless we must come at last to one first common cause reply to objection to privation and habit along naturally to the same subject now the subject of privation is a being in potentiality as was said above hence since evil is privation of good as appears from what was said above it is opposed to that good which has some potentiality but not to the supreme good who is pure act reply to objection three increase in intensity is in proportion to the nature of a thing and as the form of perfection so privation removes a perfection hence every form perfection and good is intensified by approach to the perfect term but privation and evil by receding from that term hence the thing is not said to be evil and worse by reason of access to the supreme evil in the same way as it is said to be good and better by reason of access to the supreme good reply to objection four no being is called evil privation but by privation of participation hence it is not necessary to reduce it to any essential evil reply to objection five evil can only have an accidental cause as was shown above hence reduction to any per se cause of evil is impossible and to say that evil is in the greater number is simply false for things which are generated and corrupted in which alone can there be natural evil in the smaller part of the whole universe and again in every species the defective nature is in the smaller number in man alone does evil appear as in the greater number because the good of man as regards the senses is not the good of man as man that is in regard to reason and more men seek good in regard to the senses than good according to reason reply to objection six in the causes of evil we do not proceed to infinity to reduce all evils to some good cause once evil follows accidentally the end of question 49