 Our guest today and you this afternoon is Dr. LaSima Zerbo, who is the very distinguished head of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization. He's been in that role since 2013, but previously led the technical verification team within the organization all the way back to 2004. So in that time he's had to deal with multiple crises of people breaking out of the non-proliferation regime, particularly the North Koreans. But in the process has established an absolutely fantastic reputation for technical excellence and real credibility. This is an absolutely indispensable multilateral organization. And LaSima is here at ANU to give the 2018 John G Memorial Lecture. John G being a very extraordinarily distinguished Australian diplomat who was one of the founding fathers of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Office for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons until his untimely death in 2007. And we're looking forward very much to your speech, your address, your lecture this evening on the subject of the problems of multilateralism and multilateral organizations in this contemporary age, which are legion. But let's begin briefly by telling us a little bit about the state of play with respect to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the prospects for its ratification and the role that you are nonetheless able to play in your organization pending that ratification and formally coming into force. Thank you Gareth and thank you for inviting me to be at ANU today. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, let me say that consists of an international monitoring system, international data center, basically a verification system that former Secretary of State John Kerry called one of the greatest accomplishment of the modern world. But the greatest accomplishment of the modern world with a treaty that is not yet in force and that's the dilemma we have. So we have a solid technical framework, organizational framework that is supposed to be or that is supposed to back a treaty that is not yet in force, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, with eight countries that are basically holding Austria, the international community. Those countries are US, China, India, Pakistan and the DPRK and Israel, Egypt and Iran. So among those eight, five have already signed the treaty and then three haven't touched it. So those three are the DPRK, India and Pakistan. So the state of play is, you know, we are stuck and trying to do our best to get those eight countries to join and we're hoping that opportunities like the DPRK could help the international community move the treaty a little bit forward. We'll come back to the problems of multilateralism generally and specifically in the context of arms control but perhaps you can say just a little bit more about what makes it possible for your organization to detect nuclear explosions in small countries far away when there's obviously not the capacity to be there on the ground. Is it seismic? Is it atmospheric releases? Very small scale explosions of the kind we had in the early North Korean testing program. You still seem able to pin them down. We can be pretty confident nobody's getting away with anything these days can't we? This day I think we can and we are. I think there is hardly any explosion I mean in the process to develop nuclear weapon that will go undetected by our international monitoring system and the national technical. How many countries are involved in participating in that monitoring system at the moment? We have around 90 countries that are part of the I mean that will host the international monitoring system facility, Australia being the third largest with 21 facilities and we're here to celebrate the completion of the segment, the Australian segment of the international monitoring system. What form do those Australian facilities take? They're essentially seismic monitoring? No, we have all the four technologies. You have seismic, infrasound, hydroacoustic and radionuclide. Radionuclide basically sniffing the hair but with seismic that's what we do on a regular basis. I mean consistently looking for any shaking of the ground and then with hydroacoustic checking I mean you guys are, I see Australia, I often say Australia is an island but I mean that's what we see on the map but I mean it's a continent but I mean you are within the largest part of the ocean on this planet and strategically placed with strategically placed station as well and hydroacoustic for underwater movement and an infrasound for anything that deal with you know air pressure and the radionuclide is a smoking gun of the three other technologies and anything that moves not only in that part of the world but you know all the planet will be detected by our system. It's a fabulous technical achievement. It's a fantastic diplomatic achievement to get that degree of buy-in from so many in the international community. It's also a pretty fantastic achievement to be able to do all this when the treaty is still not in the force, the parent treaty. How have you been able to get away with that? I think basically the preparatory commission that I'm heading, I mean it's still the preparatory commission. Precisely. His mission is to prepare the technical means and the political means for the entry into force of the treaty technically by getting ready with all the facilities supposedly 337 facilities over the four technologies to be ready for an entry into force that was supposed to be due three years after its opening for signature meaning by 1999 we should have had the treaty into force. Well CGPTO is a fantastic example of a multilateral organization working exactly as it was intended to be even if more informally than formally but of course the theme of your talk to us this evening is that multilateralism more generally is under stress and manifestly it is under stress with the armed control regime with the INF Treaty obviously in a very fragile condition at the moment the Americans threatening to walk away from that bilateral arms control nuclear arms control between the United States and Russia pretty much dead in the water across a broad front with a real anxiety about the new start treaty coming up for renewal quite soon and no enthusiasm whatsoever from the nuclear weapons states or the nuclear arms states more generally outside the nonproliferation treaty to show any degree of interest in in nuclear arms control that alone moving towards serious disarmament. Does that make you very dispirited or is it a function of some structural problems in the international community as we have now evolved or is it just a transient issue associated with particular very difficult personalities and none more difficult of course than President Trump in the United States at the moment is it an endemic systemic problem we've got or one that can make us a little bit more optimistic that it might be just transient. I think it's beyond the personalities of the leaders of today it's more of a systemic problem with a changing world changing world with emerging powers emerging powers around the world you take India you take Pakistan and then there are other countries that are coming alone and as countries are emerging people feel that domestic security is not there anymore and then they don't trust each other. I think it's basically a deficit of trust between countries regionally and internationally and if you add to that you know personal egos it just doesn't help so but in arms control and non-proliferation this is where when you talk about stress the stress is more tangible I think we're seeing now potentially another arms race DPRK is one example but if we don't deal with DPRK in a way where the international community solves the issue to stop any other attempt to move into developing nuclear weapon I think we'll go into a serious arm race that will see things emerging again not only in this part of the world but potentially Latin America even in Asia here and that's one of the biggest risks that we see today. Of course the other big alarm bell that's ringing is over Iran's intentions with America walking away from the manifestly very successful uh nuclear agreement that was agreed upon some time ago. JCPOA as it's called. How worried are you that Iran is going to break ranks on this in the context of that abdication of responsibility by the United States and how worried are you that that in turn will generate um preparation pressures elsewhere in the Middle East? My hope is that Iran stays because Iran has strong support internationally with Europe and then the rest of the international community. The sad part from me as head of the CTBT was that we missed an opportunity with Iran to not bring the comprehensive test plan treaty as part of the joint comprehensive plan of action had we done this I would be the happiest person today because one would see this as an opportunity to get other annexed two countries to join the CTBT but there is an opportunity still with the support that Europe is giving to Iran the support that the rest of the international community is giving to Iran there's room to get Iran to use that trust to me to do a further step in arms control and non-proliferation that further step could be considering the CTBT to win the trust of those who are still hesitating about Iran's intentions and that's what I'm hoping. Whenever I talk to Iranians I make very clear my impression that they're occupying the moral high ground at the moment and they'd be very foolish indeed to walk away from that internationally when they've got so much support in that context. The other thought that has occurred to me and I'd be fascinated to see what you think is whether China could in fact be persuaded to play a leadership role when it comes to nuclear disarmament we're focusing on nuclear weapons because that's your specialty. Given that China after all has been you know a very reluctant starter in many ways in the nuclear arms race they have a quite small arsenal much much much smaller than the United States and Russia as we all know and they are of all the nuclear arms states the only ones that are really seriously committed to no first years at least at the moment. So my hope is that the Chinese despite all their nationalist tradition and the chest beating that's going on might be persuaded to play a leadership role on this particular critical global public goods issue in the way that they've chosen to play a leadership role on climate change with the abdication by the Americans of leadership there and on free trade issues as well. Is that a totally quixotic hope that the Chinese might be persuaded to to really pull the pieces together on this in a way that the Russians and Americans are manifestly not keen to do at the moment? I think China's commitment to the no first years makes them to be perceived as the most responsible the most responsible nuclear weapon state I mean that's a perception that the international community at least the developing world is seeing with China so that's probably gives room for them to continue that leadership at least from the perception to giving or pushing for progress in arms control non-proliferation and disarmament because we stuck now if we take the the process towards NPT the NPT review conference 2020 what do we have on the table nothing because we are nothing on the table we may see in China an opportunity to play a leadership you said they did in climate change already to basically open that little door that we're looking for which would be considering the CTBT ratification and that's what I say the DPRK might be that opportunity North Korea a China being a main player in the North Korean issue they might find a way to get North Korea to join them North Korea showing goodwill and China showing an opportunity to open that gate that we're looking for for progress in disarmament and non-proliferation so in that sense yes I think China can and should be persuaded to do so so will they do it really I mean that's a question I mean the situation is such that the tension the current tension seems to push China into getting closer to Russia than previously what was seen Russia in the US and then fearing China's you know as an emerging power but now China seems to be allowing itself to some of the position that Russia is adopting but sometimes rightly so if you say Russia with regard to the CTBT we talk about transmission of data and some countries say we believe in the international monitoring system the international data center but the treaty is not something that we'd want to consider and all of a sudden we see voices coming and then saying but how can you not believe in the treaty and wanting data from its international monitoring system that's the next challenge for the comprehensive test and treaty well you like me you're an incorrigible optimist about the capacity to move the game forward on all these fronts Lassimov but where's the just one final question really before we wrap up where's the leadership going to come from if not from the China in these particular contexts we've been talking about do you see this is really possible for that that group of middle powers that in the past of like Australia and previous government incarnations at least have been very energetic supporters of the multilateral order the rules-based order that we associate with that are you confident that that kind of energy can be regenerated and that it may bear fruit over time or is it all just a pretty gloomy kind of scenario out there at the moment no absolutely I'm confident that countries like Australia could get attraction into getting enough energy to pull the rest of the world in the direction that basically the nuclear weapon countries would follow but it's how to do that I mean if I take the prohibition treaty the ban treaty the ban treaty seems to you know gather enough traction right now but is it practically feasible I mean that's the question that one is asking should a country like Japan I mean that Japan is seen as one country who should go forward with regard to getting this word rid of nuclear weapon but Japan is facing a situation not only with its civil society but with the multilateral or bilateral agreement that they have with the United States and many other countries well I think you'd have to be a supreme optimist to think that there's going to be buy-in to the nuclear ban treaty which was recently negotiated as we know by 122 very well-intentioned members of the international community not including Australia I'm sorry to say but the reason we can't be optimistic is that it's not really an operational treaty with enforcement and verification provisions of any of any credibility it's really just a normative treaty it's setting up there in lights and objective and demonstrating that there is that support in the international community my own instinct is that we are going to move forward on a disarmament agenda it is going to have to be step by step around these issues like no first use buy-in and reduced deployments and reduced launch alert and the CTBT and the CTBT which is full circle back to where we were and but you know some of the nuclear states talk the talk about step by step but don't show very much enthusiasm for walking the walk so that's the task ahead of us last summer it's a gigantic enterprise with the the world in the sorry condition as it is but we're absolutely delighted to have you back in Australia absolutely delighted to have you at ANU and wish you every possible success in the the fabulous work that you are continuing to do with Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization so thank you Lasse Mazzurbo for joining us here at ANU