 And thank you for coming to CSAS. I'm John Alterman, I'm the Senior Vice President here, the Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy and the Director of the Middle East Program. And I am delighted to welcome Sidney Schweitzer, the Head of Delegation for the International Committee at the Red Cross in Yemen. He is here for the week to talk about what is happening on the ground in Yemen and the role of people here in Washington in both blunting the negative effects and perhaps even being able to play a constructive role in trying to resolve some of the many humanitarian issues in Yemen. Sidney has been in Yemen for two years, has been with the ICRC for 14 years where he served in leadership roles in Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Burundi, the West Bank, Guinea, Ethiopia, and West and Central Africa. Before that, he was a lawyer, but he has been, he decided law was too easy and now he's working his way up and now he's trying to resolve the issues of Yemen. I thought the way we do this is, Sidney and I would have a conversation for a little bit specifically about Yemen. And then we'd bring up two of my colleagues at CSAS, Steve Morrison, Senior Vice President, the Head of our Global Health Policy Center, and Kimberly Flowers, one of my newest colleagues here working on food security. And we'd take the very narrow discussion of Yemen and start linking it to what we know about broader issues of international support on food security issues and global health issues. And when we sort of embed that in what we know about other issues, embed this specific in Yemen to the broader issues, we would have a discussion among ourselves and then open the discussion up to you. So with your permission, I'd like to start just by giving people a sense of where Yemen fits into the global context of things and why we should care. And then the reality is that Yemen was fragile long before the outbreak of violence. Yemen is a country with a per capita income of that $950. Millions of people in Yemen have long been food insecure. The country imports 90% of its foodstuffs. It has been running out of water. Estimates have been that the Sana'a Basin, where many, many Yemenis live, would run out of water and run out of groundwater in 2017. The aquifers are being depleted using diesel pumps, which have to drill deeper and deeper into the ground to draw up water. And half of Yemen's water, about 40% of Yemen's water use, is used to grow caught narcotic leaf at Yemen East during the afternoon. Then the problems started. That's where we started from before we got to the problems we're seeing today. Muti movement started more than 20 years ago in the far north of the country and it's gathered strength. It really is, I think, more a cultural movement than a religious movement. People have been trying to shoehorn it into saying this is Shia Sunni. It's not really traditionally the way we think of Sunni Shia tensions. It was an effort to preserve tribal customs. Against onslaughts of Saudi influence, but also a sense that President Ali Abdullah Saleh, the previous president of Yemen, was corrupt. There has been warfare for more than a decade. The ICRC has been operating in the north of the country for much of that time, trying to relieve the humanitarian consequences on an increasingly besieged population in the north. Ongoer turmoil since the Arab Spring has polarized politics, but Yemen doesn't have bipolar politics. There aren't just two parties involved in Yemen. You have Houthis in the very north, Islah Party, which has some ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, some ties to Saudi Arabia, toward the middle of the country, various elements of former military battalions, Iraq separatists in the south of the country, AQAP, al-Qa'dan, the Arabian Peninsula, in parts of the south, rising parts of groups that affiliate themselves with the Islamic State, coming up, tribes scattered throughout, we shift alliances, many non-tribal Yemenis feel very vulnerable to all of this. And in a poor country with very limited resources, it's been easy for people to buy, or at least rent loyalty. A growing aspect of the economy in Yemen has been, and remains, paying protection money and being part of the security business. Being part of the security business drives further insecurity because you need people to feel they need to buy security in order to keep the security business going. And you have a number of people whose way of being productive is to be a security, or to be on somebody's security table. And that's increasingly where the Yemeni economy has been evolving. There is an enduring problem of how, even after all this is resolved, when it makes the Yemeni economy work. From a U.S. perspective, the U.S. gets drawn in on several levels. First are the rise of these jihadi groups who have used Yemen to have global reach. And we've seen this with al-Qa'dan, Arabian Peninsula, and while Aulaki bombing plots that come out of Yemen, several of which were narrowly foiled. Second is the distress that Yemen causes Saudi Arabia, a close security ally of the United States. And Saudi Arabia, in many ways, has been agitated about security coming out of Yemen for centuries. But the fact that Saudi Arabia feels threatened by Yemen, feels threatened by instability in Yemen is partly what drives Saudi action. Securing Bab al-Mandeb, the western coast of Yemen, on the other side of the strait from Somalia, is important for global shipping. And then you have the problem of the overflow of refugees into Somalia. You actually have hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees in Yemen. And the huge displacement of people, the potential spread of disease, extremism, and all those things into an already unstable Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia sees the situation in Yemen principally as an element of Iranian power reaching into the Arabian Peninsula. And they're determined to push Iran back from its effort to reach into the Arabian Peninsula. Many people in the Sunni Arab state see the Houthis as just like Hezbollah, except more aggressive, more successful, more quickly than Hezbollah was in Lebanon. The problems in Yemen combine a whole set of humanitarian issues and a whole set of political issues. There's a massive displacement of vulnerable people. The problems are looming and they are likely to worsen before they improve. But there are also all these questions of control and influence. Each side seeks to dominate people in geography, which it does partly through providing and denying relief supplies. In a modern twist, you don't really have a battle between two states. You have battle between a state and a proto-state or a non-state actor. And as we think about how this gets resolved, it's hard to imagine what victory looks like for anybody. And how do you get there? There was a national dialogue process that started after Ali Abdullah Saleh's fall. It lasted for more than a year and included the Houthis, but it didn't produce a durable outcome. President Hadi, who came to power after President Saleh was pushed from power, remains a president in exile. He has limited support and there is no clear restoration of his power or a successor to him in sight. Saudi airstrikes started more than a month ago in order to prevent a Houthi takeover of Hadin. There was a brief humanitarian pause over the weekend, but political gains and fleeting. Saudi Arabia has pledged half a billion dollars to Yemen for relief. They held Saudi Arabia hosted talks last week in Yemen, which the Houthis declined to participate in. Last night of the medical Houthi said he was willing to attend talks in Geneva a week from today to begin to explore a resolution to the conflict. So, Sidriq, we have 90 minutes to solve this, and I'm glad you're here. As you look at the work you're doing in Yemen, what is the size of the vulnerable population you are working with and where are they spread over this very large country of 26 million people that sort of shaped like a big check mark for southern European Peninsula? No, thank you very much. And thank you very much for this opportunity to be able to share a bit of experience in Yemen the last two years and these two last months as well. In terms of vulnerability, it depends. ICSE has a presence from the north to the south because we were trying to address the needs in older country, in a fragile country, even before this decisive storm operation. But now today to respond to your question, all the population is at risk. It's not just a particular region or a particular population. Is all the population in general, why? Because today we have a problem of access to one of the most needy goods, which is the fuel. And this is a real problem today in Yemen because if no fuel is entering the country and if the fuel cannot be distributed adequately to all the population in Yemen, it's been two main issue and concern for the ICSE, the first one is the hospitals. There is no electricity anymore in Yemen for the last four to five weeks now or very few hours, most of the city. It means that the only way to get energy is generator. And today, hospitals are running out of fuel and it means that they're not able to just functioning in Yemen. And here he has a big impact on the patients. We already heard some allegation of people dying for lack of proper treatment, some hospital closing because they cannot address the need of the patient entering. And this is one of the big concern. There is a need for the fuel to enter, but not only for the hospital, as well for the water. You were speaking about, it's one of the countries that have a big problem of access to water. And the only possibility to have access to water today is not river, is not lake, there is no, is the only ground water. And to get access to the ground water, it's pumping station and pumping station needs fuel to work. And today is one of our main concern today in terms of vulnerability. And here we speak about the whole population is access to water because if fuel is not entering and if fuel is not distributed in very few time, it will be a big humanitarian catastrophe. We are raising this issue for weeks now that there is a need to find solution to allow at least these basic services to function. And here we speak about all the actors concerned, the coalition, the different actors on the ground, to allow these basic services to function because again, if there is no water and I already saw in the streets in Sana, people fighting for water. And Sana is not the worst place for this access to water. So you can imagine the situation in the rest of the country. So for me today, all the population is at risk and there is a need and he is not organization like a CSC or the UN agency who are going to be able to address these needs. There are political decision to be able to address as quick as possible because there is no time to discussion. There is a time today to act to address the need for the whole population. So today, all the population of Yemen is at risk for this particular situation. And that's about 26 million people. Yes. Does anybody have access to fuel? There are still some stock of fuel in Yemen. We have access to fuel because we had some stock for our operation and there are still some possibility to have access to fuel. We managed to get fuel for some hospital so far. But now with the timeframe, it's not going to be very possible to have additional access because the stock are reducing very quickly. The weather you might hand pause which was a very good news. At least for five days, it was possible to have the fuel entering the country. Commercial tanker because here we don't speak about humanitarian organization bringing the fuel. We should just ensure that the commercial system is functioning again to allow this fuel to be distributed in all the country. So during these five days, we start to see a fuel entering. We had the good news as well. Even some gasoline station had again some fuel to be distributed to the population like 40 liters per people. This is a good news, but it's only in Sana'a the rest of the population still don't have access to this fuel. And again, when we speak about, I answer very longly to your question, but when we speak about you might hand pause, it's something we have to be very careful. You might hand pause is very good for the civilian, for the population to breath a bit, to have access to basic services, to be able for the hospital to transfer wounded people, for the dead body to be collected in the streets. But here we should not link the you might hand pause with the blockage of these basic goods to enter Yemen. And these goods should be always allowed to enter Yemen despite the fact there is a you might hand pause or not. And this is what we want to address because it's very important that these fuel, these basic goods can enter despite the fact there are still fighting and are going to be respected by all the warring parties to be able again to address these most basic needs, which is access to water and access to the basic treatment in the hospital. As we look at this crisis and there are reports that something just under 2,000 people have died so far. Where are we on the curve of the crisis? If there's the beginning of a deal in Geneva next week or some sort of pause, are we likely to be able to arrest the decline or are we likely, whatever happens, to see things get more complicated quickly? I would love to be optimistic but I have some difficulties to be optimistic for the future. Again, this situation now with this decisivism operation and what we see with the strikes and the fighting on the ground is just an additional layer of the conflict in Yemen. We had already classified all the conflict in Yemen in the past and it's still currently happening. So it's just an additional one which is on Yemen today and it's aggravating the general situation. If we are at the end, at the beginning of the crisis, what we know is that today we are at the edge of a big humanitarian crisis because of the fuel, because the lack of access to water and basic services. So here it's in a situation that we were not before and there is a need to really quickly address it. But in terms of to expect a quick solution when peace will be again to Yemen, I am not Yemeni so it's difficult to, but I just will share my point of view that it's not going to be for tomorrow. There is a lot of new challenges coming to Yemen. Even if we discuss about the more extreme groups like AQP or the new dynamic like Islamic State, this is a reality today in Yemen and it's even stronger. And we fear today that even if the operation or the airstrikes are going to finish and are over, one that will be over, it doesn't mean that the fighting on the ground will stop. There will still be a lot of tension, there will still be a lot of attacks and the population, the Yemeni population will still be affected a lot. And now with this increasing pressure on them with all the destruction, the fact that the usual structure that has been destroyed is going to be even more difficult for them to recuperate and to try to go back to our into bracket normal life. So it's still for the mid to long term, unfortunately. How much, how large is the internal refugee problem? How many people have been displaced from their homes? And is that rapidly increasing? Do you think it's about to increase? I mean, how should we think about that? It's very difficult to give figures. I know that the UN came with some figures about how many casualties, how many displaced people. As we were there during these two months, I will not take the risk to tell you what is exactly the figure. In terms of casualties, I can imagine this even more that what is announced because some of the figures can be perceived as strategic and we don't have all the global pictures. And the same for the IDPs or for these displaced people. We know it's a reality. We know people are displaced sometime just for a short while. Other time they just left places like Adon or Sana because they want to go to the villages when they consider that it will be safer to stay to avoid, for example, the airstrikes. But again, here we don't speak about just about the airstrike. We speak about the very heavy street fighting, brown fighting in different places, many in the South and people moving. So this is a reality. We speak about tens of thousands of people displaced. We have started now to assess the needs. As a CSE, we are ready to address the need for something like 20,000 families. It's not enough, but we will coordinate with all the other agencies and there is a good coordination among ourselves in Yemen today. And we will see what can be done. But again, when we have sometimes some declaration that when all region has become a legitimate military target and the people, the civil population is asked to live, it creates a lot of problem. It creates a lot of problem. Population is living, this is the first reaction, but then they need to find places to be care of. And this is all the challenge. Today in Yemen, we don't see big camps of people being in the middle of nowhere, this place, but it's becoming more and more the reality and there is a need to address this need today. So I cannot tell you how many, but there are everywhere in the country, from the north to the south, the way as well in the east part of the country, in Mareb, because there were a tension and confrontation for quite a while. So people at this place are everywhere today in Yemen. What, you said that fuel is really the key near term priority. What's the medium term priority for Yemen? If you can get the fuel moving. There are other issues, not only the fuel. I can give you two of the main concern for us, where once again, it's more political decisions that can make the difference that really the humanitarian organization on the ground is access to medicines. We were able to import the most urgent medicines to treat, were wounded for example, and we were able with some difficulties to distribute this assistance all over the country. But now there is all this medicine for clinical disease and this is not, I don't know exactly the way possibility to import this medicine during this humanitarian pose, but until this humanitarian pose, it was impossible to get access to this basic medicine for clinical disease and it was one of the big concern as well. The same like the food. The food is a big concern because 90% of the food is importation. The food is still accessible in Yemen. There is no lack of food, but the problem is that there is no income from the population to buy this food and the price of this food double triple is four times more than before. So this is a real concern and for me on the midterm, we should work on to reorganize the normal system of Yemen, the commercial system to ensure that the basic services are offered to the population with the help of the international community, yes, but the basic system should try to work again. It was quite destabilizing all these fighting and there is a big need now to try to settle it together and to try to ensure that it's functioning and it will work for the distribution of assistance. Just to give you an example, when we wanted to distribute medical assistance, we wanted to organize ICSE convoy because we're respected, we're accepted, we have access to all the country. So we're thinking is the best way to have access and to ensure the security of the convoy to go with all the ICSE emblem. And at the end it was not the case all the time. We arrived to the conclusion that sometimes there are mechanisms that some transporters manage better with crossroads to access the places and ICSE officially asking the permission. So it's something we have to take into account that the local system is functioning quite well to distribute the goods and we have to rely on them and none of the organization will be able to replace this so we have to ensure that it's in place again and it's going to function. United States has put billions of dollars into humanitarian relief in Syria. I think there's some appreciation, understanding in Washington of sort of the nature of the problem in Syria. How would you compare the situation you have in Yemen now with the situation in Syria? It's very difficult to compare, I guess. But what I know that Yemen is in needs of urgent support. It's a country that I know that Syria was always on the media and very attractive in terms of the situation and we understand why and the humanitarian catastrophe. But Yemen is now a bit more on the media for this last conflict, but for years now it's really facing a big crisis, humanitarian crisis. And there is really a need to increase the effort to try to help the Yemeni people today because the situation is very bad and the perspective are not that optimistic. It will take time. It will take time to see a peaceful Yemen, I guess, and the situation is going to worsen in terms of humanitarian needs. So without really comparing what is the most urgent, I know that today there is millions of people at risk. There is a need for immediate decision to be taken to address these needs and Yemen should not be forgotten. And we can even see, and it was interesting to see that when it was announced by the coalition that the decision if some operation is over and it's going to go for the restoration, or I don't know what is exactly the name of this new operation, it was interesting to see that the media attention reduced a lot. When on the ground there were absolutely no change. The number of strikes, the number of problems, and even the problem of the civilian population increased. So it was very interesting. So there is a need for us to maintain the crisis of Yemen in the agenda because there is big needs and it's not going to be addressed quickly. It will be on the long term. As we think about the broader agenda, why don't I ask Stephen Kimberley to come up? Stephen Kimberley, as I say, are people who have thought deeply about the broader issues of global health and food security? And I suppose the first question is how much of what we've heard the Greek talk about is just the nature of a complex emergency and is there something unprecedented unique about sort of what this situation looks like that should especially grab our attention? Steve? Thanks, John. Thanks for playing us together. Cedric, thank you so much for being with us. I think this is remarkably timely to do this and thanks to Rebecca Shirazi for pulling this together as well. This is distinct in a couple of ways. One is cash is not the problem, right? Sometimes cash is a problem. In this case, we've got a bizarre situation in which the lead combatant sovereign state, the Saudis, are the ones committed to funding the relief operations. And so that takes the cash problem away but it creates other wrinkles. The problem is not cash, it's more chaos, arm fragmentation, access and coverage issues, which are the access and coverage issues here are exceptionally limited. This is acute and exceptional in terms of the presence, the very limited presence of NGOs, international NGOs and UN operations on the ground. And we're seeing a quick depletion of international personnel. They're exiting because of the threat, the magnifying threat coming from the, from AQIP, coming from ISIS and elsewhere is leading to a dramatic reduction in international personnel. So the footprint was tiny before and it's shrinking and it's very hard to imagine how it's going to come back. The one thing that we see, the politicization of commodities and the contestation around them, that's partly this blockade issue. The blockade issue is tied into the fact that you have belligerence for whom control of these commodities, whether they're medical food, fuel, water, are precious, valuable political commodities and they're fighting bitterly over them and they don't have a consensus. It's exceptional that the Saudis themselves have no dialogue with MSF or ICRC that I'm aware of. And that is all being mediated through secondary or third parties, which is a problem, a really serious problem. I think we're left with very, very bad choices. I mean, as Cedric has said, the medical and public health and general humanitarian situation was bad and vulnerable before this started out. It's gotten very much worse in this last phase. The five day ceasefire offered some relief and proved the concept of the value of ceasefires, but most close observers believe that this situation is gonna get far worse before it gets any better. So we need to, in our own minds, begin thinking about what will far worse look like, freezing up of the medical services, resumed outbreaks, inability to provide care to people with chronic diseases. Outbreaks, I mean, just sort of for people who don't live in the global health world, what kinds of outbreaks are we talking about? We're talking about infectious outbreaks, things like measles, polio, dengue. We're already seeing some upticks in those. The other thing I wanna mention that is so exceptional about this situation is we're operating in the blind. There is very, very limited data on assessments. And that is all related to what Cedric was saying, which is access and presence is so limited. So being able to say with some confidence, this is the level of IDPs. This is the fatality level. This is the injured level. This is the trajectory of fatalities and injuries. This is the trajectory of malnutrition. A third of the population in this country had no access to healthcare before this war began. And now it's moving, it's moving forward. We had a million malnourished, acutely malnourished children in this country under five before this began. So we're operating in the blind in a highly complicated situation, which is going to become much more urgent, very rapidly, where there's not much of a political arrangement for moving on this. The UN Security Council invoking their responsibility to protect using the sort of channels that ICRC or MSF have created. All of those things are gonna have to be worked in some fashion, but it's not clear to me how we get to a solution that alleviates what is going to be escalating suffering. Kimberly, is this, I mean, have you ever seen anything like this? Not quite. I mean, I think what's interesting in the context that I really wanna make sure to emphasize is that last year Yemen was the seventh most insecure food country in the world, and right now it's a number one. And I really think that we need to realize that pretty soon we're gonna start using the F word. And by F word, I mean famine. And so even though there's enough cereals in the country, they think through August, if there's no fuel to transport them, where they are is an issue. So it's something we really have to look at. And then when you take the context of the already fragile agricultural systems that were there, we can see what a conflict like that, like what's happening now affects those. And some of that you've already mentioned, but it's one of the most water scars countries in the world. And the completion of the groundwater is gonna be more detrimental than even things like climate change. And so when you've got a country that 90% of its water use goes to agriculture and 40% of that goes to cut, you have a challenge. So trying to create development programs which are now suspended for the next year, but whenever they do come back to create market access and create high value or cash crops that can compete with something like cut in the market, you have a real challenge. So what have we learned from other things that are maybe less complex, less bad? I mean, Siddharth mentioned the importance of sustaining the internal market mechanisms and making sure you preserve them. And you referenced that very briefly. What other kinds of things should guide us as we think about the policy response from other situations? Sure. Well, when you think of overall kind of agricultural success when it comes to policy, you look at President Obama's Be the Future Initiative, which focuses on 19 countries, but doesn't focus anywhere in the Middle East. So historically the last year or two, USAID's put in about four and a half million to agricultural development, but has put about 70 million in food aid. And so that imbalance is something that we're seeing evident right now. Obviously for safety reasons, we can't go in, but when we do go back in, we've got to really focus on increasing the capacity of farmers, increasing market access, making sure that they understand how to use better water management and conservation. And that's really the only way that we're gonna get better, but current policy doesn't have a huge focus on agricultural development as far as US government leadership in places like Yemen. And that's all not a key. That's after we get to the question. Absolutely, yeah, that's after all of this. I mean, right now you've got various, but 16 million people in need of humanitarian access and anywhere between 10 and 12 of those are specifically food insecure and that number's just gonna increase. So even by the times we come back in, you're starting at a really low base. And right now US government leadership and development around agriculture is quite small in this country compared to other places. Cedric, as you think about the work you've done in the whole list of other countries, I mean, you mentioned the importance, the centrality of fuel to this, you mentioned the importance of preserving internal market mechanisms. What are the other lessons from your professional experience do you think are most important to keep in mind as you think about solutions in Yemen? Okay, first of all, the immediate concern it is more linked to the mandate of ACSE and to try to address the need of conduct of hostilities. And this is something we need to address this concern with the different parties. So it's something on the immediate term we want to do as well because it's important to have the impact on the direct impact on the civil population of the attack of the strikes or the bombardment of some civilian areas. And here we started to engage on this discussion. It's not always easy, but it's something we'll continue. The same of access to latencies, for example. We need to have access to all the disease linked to this new conflict and it's something very important to address the condition of detention but as well to ensure that the family news are given to the relatives. So it's something on the immediate level. Then we are not a development organization so we'll try to address the first need. We will try to help the first recovery after this big additional conflict. But again, we need to address the order consequences and the order conflict and when you discuss about the possibility, the politics or why it should be, yes, in a stabilized Yemen. And again, it's very difficult to imagine that tomorrow we will see a stabilized Yemen. It will take a lot of time and there is a need for solution among Yemenis and this is very important, I guess, for the future, that to find a way that Yemeni, again, can sit together and to find step-by-step solution to solve step-by-step the stability of Yemen. And it will not be done in one big approach and big national dialogue. I think it will take more time to be able really to get results. So for me, in terms of the long term, something that I see is going to be a bit aside, we'll try to address the needs of the urgent needs and the one of the midterm, essentially. And Steve, you talked about the way in which resources in one of these complex humanitarian emergencies are used to bolster political parties of one kind or another, what are some of the best practices to try to use relief as a way to build political reconciliation as opposed to helping or promoting a balkanization or a contestation of the politics through the use of external relief supplies? Well, I think there's not a whole lot of great lessons around using food commodities that have become highly politicized and turn them around and make them some instrument of peace. But in this situation, I think there's some very concrete things that need to be prioritized and we've heard about some of them. I mean, the lifting of the blockade needs to be a first and foremost priority, resuming the commercial flow of food, fuel, water, easing the procedures for approval of humanitarian assistance. Right now, the procedures imposed by the Saudis and others and the lack of cooperation on the Houthi side among others means that the access and coverage remains dismal. So we need some way of pushing hard on that. We need to see an expanded pool of operational NGOs. We need to see the ceasefire extended. We need to fix the problem that the Saudis have no direct dialogue with MSF and with ICRC who are the two most vital component parts along with UNICEF and WFP. We have to work with what we have to expand access coverage and flow. That will, I think, John, get to trying to make these commodities more freely available and less precious and less valuable in armed combatants, seizing them and controlling them because they think they want to deny them to other populations and give them out in order to win the goodwill and legitimacy that comes with controlling those aspects. You have to somehow flood the marketplace, change the attitudes and rules of behavior. What Cedric was saying about the rules of engagement and the basic Geneva protocols and the like, there's a lot of work to be done on all of that but I think putting a spotlight on this through every possible mechanism through the UN Security Council, through others to make people uncomfortable about what is happening because there has not been any serious public calling to account of what are outrageous breaches of international humanitarian law, utterly outrageous that would have invoked condemnation in any other sorts of settings but we've seen some criticism for certain but it's not been as searing and as loud and as necessary in order to change behavior and attitudes, to bring forward the reputational risk and to bring forward to a broader global public what is going on. Right now this crisis is emerging in the midst of a proliferation of multiple horrible crises. We're in a world today that has whatever it is, six or seven crises that are above stage three in the estimation of the UN system. We've never been in a situation like this. Generally the max has been at three, maybe four and we're moving towards seven and this has the prospect for being lost or orphaned in a way in terms of international behavior and I think what ICRC and MSF and WFP are doing is heroic. It's absolutely essential but it needs stronger backing from external powers to do those concrete things that we're talking about. Thank you. So what do you think governments need to do that or do more of than they're doing now? I've heard about the need to get supplies in and the work of groups like ICRC. What kind of support do you need from governments who you're not getting? It's quite a lot I would say because it's all the frustration we had when we discussed with MSF on the ground. I said, okay, we can make the difference, we can address some needs but this is the summit of the iceberg. All the rest has to be on the political decision and is where we can influence going public and ICRC during all these crises were quite public making some statement to ensure that at least the minimum for the population is respected but it's something we have to work and this kind of evidence, this kind of possibility to raise concern, to raise issue that where we don't have really any direct impact and we have to convince authorities to try to convince others to try to change the behavior. So we were working with some government, we were working with some country belonging to the coalition to try to ensure that our concern are taken into consideration. We want, as you said, we want to increase our dialogue with the Saudi-led coalition and the Saudi, for example, to really discuss this issue because I think we all have to win that and this is something very important to take into consideration that our war is not only strikes and combat on the ground is the way you win the hearts and minds of people and bombarding the way, I just take the example of Sana'a it could be a bit different in other places of the country but people are just becoming that fed up to have strikes every day and night I can tell you it's very strong and close to civilian habitation and all that. People start to change their mind and to see one enemy because he's the one that because of these strikes I don't have access to basic services, I don't have medicines, I don't have access to food and this is something to take into consideration. So we try to raise this issue and here, as you've said, the UN different countries have a real impact and they can play a real impact to try to change and to take into consideration the suffering of the Yemenis. People talk about rightness in solving conflicts and they talk about reaching or hurting stalemate where the combatants feel there's no way to accomplish their goals except through some sort of negotiation. Do you see signs that Yemen is beginning to be right for resolution or does it feel to you like everybody is still being in? I think it's an obligation because we don't see where it leads all this situation. Again, we speak about the last layer of conflict, we don't speak about all the other ones still happening in Yemen and it will take even more time to try to solve it but for this one I think the only solution is negotiation. I think we all know that and I think the five days you might end pause, it's already a good sign. There was some violation but I think it's already a good sign that there is a need today to discuss but where I'm feeling this is something more personal but I think it should be a possibility to discuss without strict condition first. I think everybody should sit on the table and to discuss without condition that before discussing this group should stop doing that or the other one should leave one of the city because with this condition it's going to be very difficult to have all the people on the table to discuss and again it should be Yemeni solution, it should be countries facilitating the negotiation but at the end it should be the Yemenis among themselves that should find a solution. This is the only way we can imagine a progressive solution for the current situation. We have a lot of talent here, I think we have a lot of talent in the audience so I would welcome your questions if I would just ask that you identify yourself that you only ask one question until we've had a chance to go around in my pet peeve that given the talent here that you ask a genuine question not make a statement and say what do you think of my statement. So the first hand I see is right back there, yes ma'am. Good morning, Dr. Sharice Nelson from Howard University. My question is has the recent talks with Iran, the United States recent talks with Iran has it affected the situation in Yemen in a positive way or in a negative way or if at all? For ICSE it's complicated to answer this question that is very political, I will lead to my colleague but we know that as you said either the crisis in Yemen is something not only for Yemen, it's something more linked to a regional crisis I guess. So this we have to take into consideration and we have all the issues, the Iran boat for example, this is something of concern just to be sure that at least for ICSE and what concern ICSE is that all what we want to do, we want to be involved in should be purely humanitarian and we don't want that to be used in a way or another for political reasons. So for us we will just remain on the humanitarian response and all this question we understand, we see it but personally we don't really respond to that because what is important is to be sure that the need of the Yemeni has fulfilled and for the politics side we leave to my colleagues or to the politicians. I think the fact that the Iran talks have meant the US is talking more with Iran, more with Iran, more with its Gulf allies, at least presents an opportunity to play a mildly constructive role because we are in dialogue about security. I think that the fact remains that the United States has some differences with its Gulf allies about just how directly involved Iran is. I don't think anybody disputes that Iran is involved. Nobody disputes that they're Iranian weapons and money going to the Houthis. But is it billions of dollars? Is it sophisticated weaponry? Is it all sorts of things? Is this merely an example of Iran's global reach or is this alliance of convenience? I think there are differences, not differences that prevent you from making progress but certainly differences that lead the United States to conclude that nobody has a key to just turn this off. Partly the regional tension over Yemen is a reflection of a regional tension principally but not only between Saudi Arabia and Iran. If the negotiations lead to a decline in that tension, it may play a constructive role in Yemen. My fear, just building on what Sudurik was saying, is that that process is likely to take longer than Yemenis have. That is, there's not going to be an instant decline in Saudi Iranian tension, but there is a need for an instant decline in the amount of tension in Yemen so you can start getting urgent relief supplies to vulnerable populations right here in the front. I'm in Mouda Lali with the Wilson Center. My question, Mr. Sudurik, is about the fuel because you were saying this is really the basic problem. We're watching the conflict every day and the Houthis are not in short of any fuels for their trucks to go and have more fighting and have more areas conquered and also the tribes that we see that they still have their fuel. Where are these people getting their fuel if the population and hospitals are closing? I have another question. No, you're right. There are still fuel available in the country for the time being, but it's not for all the basic services and our concern, and we need to be realistic. At the beginning, we were asked if as a CSC or an organization, we could be able to deliver this fuel ourselves to what we consider the most urgent structures, but it's just impossible. It's impossible to do. So it's why we go back to the situation that we know that part of this fuel and the fuel is used by the combatant, by the steel use for all the purpose, but what is very important for us is at least there is enough fuel to be able to reach as well the places that are really in needs. If not, it will be thousands of people at risk. And what we say, the only way to do that is the commercial system to go back to normal. And again, I'm not naive. I know that part of this fuel is not going to be used just for humanitarian purpose. That's why we have to be realistic, but today what I know, the reality on the ground is that there is less fuel than before. There is no access. You should see the queue for the cars and all that. Fuel, there are still less and less, and if we want to be sure that the most basic services are going to function again, we need more fuel to enter, and we need, because again, it's not just a question of to stop the blockage. It's to ensure that the parties on the ground, and here we can speak about Ooty's, because if you see the checkpoints from, I think, Odeda to Sana, I think, it's 18 checkpoints manned by Ooty's, we have to be sure that they accept as well that these fuel are going to be distributed in priority to these most needy places. We discussed with them, we received some guarantees. Let's see if it's going to work, but our work, instead of distributing this assistance, will be to ensure that all the hospital in all the country is access to fuel as the pumping station. It's the only thing we can do if we want to be realistic. Have you been able to work successfully with every party on the ground? Yeah, Yemen is quite amazing for that, and I was amazed working in different other contexts that in Yemen we managed to have contact with absolutely all the armed group, which is good, and we used to do that, but I will say to even improve our access to all the country, to be able now to spend with expatriate night in Mareb, in Al Jove, which was impossible in the past, and to be accepted as well with our emblem, because two years ago we were not allowed, it was very difficult for us to go in places with our emblem because of the cross and the interpretation of what means the cross. Today, ACSE can use the cross, can go everywhere, can use the cross, the emblem, and the emblem is understood that the cross is not for proselytism, it's just because we are an international organization working to try to alleviate the suffering of people. So we really started to discuss with all the parties, and here we speak about as well a Q&A. We have contact with them, we engage them on different issues, on protection, we even send them with an intervention, and there is a dialogue on that. The fact that we have access to all the places is because as well we discuss with them to ensure our security. So what we try to discuss is the only way to be able to have access is to discuss with all the parties. I always give this example that if I want to go to Mareb, for example, today we need to at least call 40 people, share and different leaders here and there to ensure that I have sufficient guarantees from all these people to be able to go and to spend the night there. If one of them is saying no, we need all to reassess all the process to be able to go safely. So this is the way of Yemen, I guess you know better than me, and this is the way we can work in Yemen and this is the key word, and for the UN, for all the NGO, if you don't have this networking, this knowledge of people of this tribe, sub-tribe clan, sub-clan, it's impossible to walk or to go out from Sana'a, for example, all the places. So yes, we have quite a good access and a good contact with the parties on the ground. Eisen. Eisen Morogi, I'm a United States Army. I want to ask you a question. Historically, Yemen has been the back door for the holy shrines in Mecca and Medina. So the Saudis moved to compromise with a hostile regime in Yemen is historically not acceptable. Having said that and the possibility of political compromise, where do you see United States Army or United States government and maybe Department of Defense because most of the humanitarian capabilities, logistics are within Department of Defense. Do you see a role for United States military or the government in this crisis? In terms of humanitarian response, you mean in terms of helping for the humanitarian response? Correct. I think to send troops on the ground for trying to answer to the needs will be something impossible to do, very complicated because the perception of United States as well in Yemen, I think it will even more complicate all the situation. Now to use, not to use, but to walk or to cooperate with the United States to try to make advocacy to ensure that they can pass some messages when some channel of communication are cut to help them to open something and to try to pass messages, to put pressure on some government or some groups is the way ICSE tried to work with our humanitarian concern to be sure that they can help us in the way that to open some doors, to open some dialogue. But really on the ground, I think it would be impossible if we want to be realistic and it will add, it could add to an additional layer of conflict I guess. So I would say no, it won't be the best solution. Is there a role for any other military carrying on humanitarian action? Yeah, yeah. Intervention. We are not that in favor, as a CSC, this is something that we are always a bit cautious because then there is a mix between military force and humanitarian and then very quickly it can be confused. So for us, we prefer that the military are doing the job and helping to ensure that the conduct of hostilities are respected and all these kind of issues. But the humanitarian are doing the humanitarian work and I think it's in a better way to avoid confusion. Yes, sir. Thank you. I'm Kate Phillips-Parroso with the International Rescue Committee and just picking up on the last question about the US's role, not in providing humanitarian assistance but in preventing the humanitarian catastrophe that's unfolding. There has been quite a lot of debate about what the US's role as a party in this conflict is as it is contributing some military assets to the Saudis and it's been curious, I think, to a lot of onlookers with the US government to hear from contacts in the US government that they don't feel like they're getting those messages through to the Saudis about avoiding civilian targets and also ending this blockade which is really confounding the humanitarian situation on the ground. For any of the panelists, I'd like to hear your thoughts. We've talked about the Iranians vis-a-vis the Houthis but what about the US role vis-a-vis the Saudis that are an active party to this conflict and as a proxy, the US is as well. As a CSE, what we have done, we have discussed with all the different actors directly involved and the one who could be indirectly involved who can have an influence. So we have discussed with the Iranians, we discussed with all the countries that we know can have an influence on the parties on the ground to try to ensure that the respect conduct of hostilities and that there are countries of the big humanitarian crisis is going to come if there is no change. So we are discussing. So we're discussing with the American, we're discussing with the Iranian. We discuss, we raise our concern and again to be sure that they can raise it and to try to put more pressure on. The challenge with the US government was very open. We were able to discuss. The embassy is not anymore in Sana'a but we're discussing with them to raise our concern and again to ensure that they can play a role for what concern ACSE on conduct of hostilities and to ensure that these basic goods can enter Yemen. So we were discussing with them as at several meeting with the ambassador of Iran in Sana'a is still there to discuss the issue and to try to see how we can find solution to ensure that our message, not only a pass directly when we can but can be passed as well indirectly by other actors or indirect actors. So it's part of the ACSE work. The dialogue with all the people involved and directly involved in the crisis. Two comments or issues that I wanted to put out and hear from Cedric. One is we know the UN envoy, there's a new UN envoy who's been very active attempting to get the ceasefire extended extent, attempting to get talks about talks underway in Geneva because there's competing venues of talks where which are only partial, they're trying to get something going that has broad inclusiveness and legitimacy under his sort of leadership. And the question there is, what is it gonna take to support and move forward that option of empowering the envoy and to show some incremental progress. Second question is around the issue around the humanitarian presence on the ground in this very insecure situation. You can imagine an argument that the UN needs to somehow incrementally while protecting their personnel create more monitoring and presence in some of the key sites in the key major urban centers, ports and the like so that at least there's a kind of insertion of a multilateral presence but the security concerns are huge around all of that. I'm not sure there's much stomach in this moment but what would it take to make that idea work? So it's really back to you Cedric around these two options that are out there that look very complicated and difficult that if there could be some movement on either of them it might begin to change the equation. Again, what I said that when this situation will be over in terms of security constraints and challenges it would be even worse than what we were already experimenting months ago. And for us all this new dynamic, this dynamic of Islamic State for example of the people who declare to belong to them is of a concern and at the time already and I don't want to speak in the name of the United Nations but it was difficult for them to have a full access by themselves. The youth, the implementing partner be able to work in some places and to imagine now to go that there will be more presence with forces or people protecting them it will have to the complication again. It's very complicated to be present in Yemen and to be with expatriate. We speak about kidnapping, we speak about targeting for different reasons the possibility of, it's just a reality. I would love to say it's not a reality but we have to be realistic today in Yemen so I think it would be very, very complex for international force to come or international people to be more present and the same again after this crisis knowing that all this you might end necessity one of the fear we could have, not a fear because we need people to rush and to come to Yemen to help but they should all take into consideration the fact that Yemen is not today such a huge safe place. I'm very sorry to say that it's still a bit complicated and they have to take this into consideration not to rush and then to face additional security incidents because this will remain still for a while. So it's very complex, the right balance or addressing the needs but taking into consideration all the security challenges and I'm not sure that to send additional UN people from outside will help to that. I don't think so. And the envoy, trying to get the envoy. The envoy is somebody knowing very well Yemen I think he's the right person today for that. I used to work with them at the time he was already working in Yemen. I think yes, it should be the one that perceive and accept it to be the one forcing a bit the discussion and negotiation much more that country because in Yemen if you accept an assistant from this country on the other one it will be always perceived that because you belong or you are close to them so you're in favor of this one. The same for the Yemenis, again I'm not Yemeni but I could see with our local colleagues with the name, with the region it's coming from it's very difficult for them to tell to the other people no, I'm acting in a neutral way, impartial way. Yeah, but you always be going to a tribe, to a group, to an area so you are going to be in favor of this one or this one. It's going to be the same. So Ismail is really the person that I think could be and should be the one pushing for discussion and to be the one that doesn't have any agenda except the one of trying to find solution for Yemen. And I think it is the right person for that and the right person I think Ismail. Before I go out to the audience I just want to give Kimberly a chance to respond to Keith's question. I think one thing that we should also remember is the link between national security and food insecurity. So meaning that when there's insecurity in a country that's as unstable as Yemen how that affects the US security interest. And so of course the US government has continued to play a role in emergency humanitarian assistance during this crisis but once that mandate has started to be put on when we come back to work on development resistance we have to focus on creating resilient communities. And so that means putting more money into things like agricultural development and trying to create and fix that balance of the food aid versus strengthening the agricultural systems. And in a country where two thirds of the population are working in agriculture and 84% of the food insecure are living in rural areas. That means addressing the things like the water inefficiency and water scarcity and really looking at how to create better commodities and crops that can compete with things again like Kat like I said earlier. But so I think the US policy really needs to focus on the long-term development strategy which doesn't address the short-term issues right away but in the long-term it's gonna address the stability of the country which is gonna prevent further political instabilities in the future. I had a question here and then we'll go to the front here. So when we start right over there. This man. Yeah. Microphone is coming. Imminently. Right behind you. Nope, nope. I was talking to her and I used that. I know I have a soft voice so you won't hear me otherwise. You had mentioned before about the perception of the US currently on the ground in Yemen as being complex and I wondered if you could elaborate a bit more about what perceptions you're hearing and how the US current support to the Saudi campaign even limited how you feel like that's gonna affect US relations with Yemeni people going forward and do you think that should stop or do you think it would actually make the Saudis dig in more because they would be losing face or how do you think that's gonna affect going forward? He is what I hear is not what I think but there are two ways. The first one is for the and we consider the United States part of a conflict in a way with the drone issue and the fact that the use drones again a QAP and this is something that we are following for years now and we have a dialogue with the US government and we are following up making some intervention when we consider necessary. So here they already consider as one of the party of one of the multiple conflict in Yemen. So already you are not perceived completely outside of the situation because you are involved in a way in a kind of conflict in Yemen. So in the population know that and know that when there is a strikes people kill that the American are behind. And then this is the theory of American are behind everything and then you can hear that on the population that there are the one knowing and doing and these kind of things. For the this is if some operation we know that the American are in a way involved. I'm not going more than that. I don't know which the way but if the way it's perceived on the ground that they can even influence at least on the coalition countries on what's going on and the population is saying that and I heard and again is not what particularly I think but when the sea all the plane fell around and they are saying yes it's the Saudi and it's the first thing to see but afterwards the impression that the American are behind but again it's the impression and in Yemen there's always a lot of impression rumors circulating about everything. So there is a perception that the American are in a way involved in the situation of Yemen. This is the impression there is and this is something a reality that if you ask most of the Yemenis I guess they will think that yes the American play a role in Yemen. Which role? I don't know but they are playing a role. So this is very clear. So that's why to send them for humanitarian purpose it will be always perceived that they are in favor of one group not a group or they are going to come for all the purpose. All this rumor going around when we consider that one person or one country in a country like Yemen is not completely nurtured. The way it's perceived again it's not a CSE here. So that's why it's complicated but it play a role. Now I think for us what is good with the United States we have a dialogue with them for quite a long time on conduct of hostilities and if they can have a kind of influence on the coalition or the Saudi led coalition it's good. So we try to discuss we try to see if there is a possibility to influence and it's the way we work we try to influence through our contact some behavior and if they can help on that as other countries we will do it. Question we hear in the front row. Thank you so much. My name is Ahmad from Yemen Embassy. I would like really to thank you for your valuable information. You really, you have transmitted the real situation which is critical in Yemen that Yemeni people live there because that's touchable to me too because I follow all the information all days. My question is do you rely on in Yemeni emergency needs assessment of medical devices for health facilities or do you have your own emergency needs assessment? Thank you. We work closely with the Ministry of Health still reminding as I see there is like two but the one still present in Yemen we coordinate with the authorities there and we are doing our own assessment. So it's both. We always want to coordinate and even not only between the Yemenis and the ACAC doing assessment we coordinate among all the organizations present in the country to be sure that we have a current approach and reading of the situation. As you say it's difficult today to have that task but we can all together manage to get a bit more of that. So yes we have to rely with our Yemenis or colleagues or Yemeni entities who are dealing with but ACAC always go by themselves to make the assessments and the same for when there is IDPs we can receive some data but we always go first with our own team to assess the situation to really understand and to be sure that these assistance will be distributed and perceived as to be distributed to the most needy people and not linked to the belonging of one group or one family or something like this. And that's one of the reasons why we've decided to stay with expatriates in Yemen or with MSF. And we are quite a big team. We are more than 250 in Yemen among them more than 50 expatriates. It was the way to help our Yemeni colleagues to be better passive if you go alone for an assessment very quickly you can be accused of being of this group, of this tribe that's why you don't want to take me into consideration. So first it was very important to have expatriate accompany the team to try to really show that we take everything into consideration and we address the need according to what is needed and not to whom people belong. So it's a bit of both. We take into consideration what we receive from Yemeni, from Yemeni structures, ministries and then we make our own assessment and then we address the needs. Where is your permanent presence in Yemen? Is everybody based in Sana'a or do you have people in the north, people in the south? We have four offices. Today in Sana'a, Sana'a, Taiz and Adan. For the time being we have a big team in Adan because we have a surgical team as well working there with MSF in coordination with MSF and the only way to reach Adan is by boat so we have these two ways of communication. The Sana'a airport which is now open which is a very good news because it was a kind of lifeline indispensable for the country. That's why you're here, right? That's why I'm here. Because the Sana'a airport. Yeah, exactly. It took time but finally I managed to go out. And we work in all these places. In Sana'a today we had to evacuate most of the staff and it was interesting to see that for a while we had the expatriate being in Sana'a but most of the Yemeni staff being in Sana'a had evacuated. So we were only with two or three colleagues working with us and all the rest left the province because they were afraid of the strikes. And I'll be the same in Adan for different reasons. In Adan we were working mainly among expatriates because our Yemeni colleagues were stuck whether we're living in Qatar area or different area in the city and were not able to go to work for snipers issue and all that. It was very complicated. In Adan we had to change four times the place where we used to live. First the resident was in the middle of the front line. It was in a way protected but targeted not by intention but because it was in the middle of the front line. We went to the Ajamuni hospital to work there and to sleep and to stay there because there were no other places. It was targeted. And you know the Ajamuni hospital now is empty because it was taken as for a military target and it was in the middle of a fire exchange. We went then to the office. The office was in the front line. So now we were with MSF in the same residence and finally we found another residence in the place. So it's very complex the way we work in Yemen and everything is complicated. But again, I don't remember what was the first point. Yeah, we were everywhere. Sorry, we were everywhere. And for places like Mareb or Mukalla where we would like to be in the future, we go for the time being, we go with mission. We stay there one week or more and we have the intention depending of the emergency to establish offices like it could be in Mareb, it could be in Mukalla, small offices to be able to have a permanent presence in this area. It will depend on the needs. So are you putting together a new appeal at the moment? What were you in that process? Yeah, what was that going to look like? We call it a preliminary appeal of additional 15 million. So it appears very ridiculous if we compare with the big figures we hold here. But okay, we consider it's what we can spend now for the situation. We have a global budget of something like now 30 million US dollar. It will be something like 45 million dollars. And it's what we consider that today we need to be able to address the most urgent needs. And depending on the situation in the close future we will ask more. But what we want is to ask what we can spend according to the knowledge and the access we have today. And for the time being is what we need. I have a question here and there's a question there and I think we may be running out of time. So first we'll start over there. Thank you. Hi, Dr. Valerie Begley from the International Civil Society Action Network. The gentleman on the end, you mentioned the need to expand the number of operational NGOs as one of the steps towards rebuilding and I wondered if you could expand on that a little bit more. What are some of the conditions that you see necessary in this very unusual political context? Well, I think it's gonna be very tough, first of all. For the reasons that Cedric's outlined in terms of the security threats, particularly the threats from ISIS and from an AQIP in terms of kidnapping ransom taking and targeted violence. So you're only gonna get the most intrepid NGOs agreeing to come in now. By comparison, when you look at the Ebola outbreak where there was a fast breaking, extremely dangerous situation, it did not involve ISIS or AQIP, but it was very dangerous, what did it, and you had a paucity of operational NGOs and a very urgent demand and there was quite a mobilization around trying to break that and it involved protection and medevac and some deliberate actions taken in order to assure people that they had a certain amount of exit, they had exit strategies that were gonna protect them. Perhaps there's some opportunity to do more in that regard, that I think that Cedric's response around the proposal for a slightly expanded UN presence, which was a very sobering response. I mean, I just think there's a certain collective security sense. If the community, if the international community is not seeing an expanding UN presence and it's not seeing a broader net, what we're gonna see happen is around the perimeter of this crisis, more operational centers forming up, working through local intermediaries with very limited oversight and monitoring of that and simply going in where there's access and so it's gonna be a patchwork that emerges of remote operations, the operations that are technologically not very sophisticated. In terms of medical stuff, MSF and ICRC have had to do this in other conflicted settings like Syria, move to remote locations, work through local intermediaries, lower the technology and sophistication and don't insist on the same type of oversight and monitoring to just in hopes that you're gonna reach your target populations. I mean, those are kind of the limited choices, I don't know what your feeling is. No, I fully share your reading of the situation, we know that it will be very necessary to this presence. It's still going to be very complex to establish the possibility to be because, again, it was complicated before and it's going to be still complicated in the future to have the presence of foreign entities working in Yemen and at least the midterm, if it's not the long term, I don't really see a solution that everything would be easier for them to work so we have to find a good compromise. Everything is a question of compromise in Yemen between the added value of the presence and the security constraints and we have to do the right balance all the time. So it's something that should be taken into consideration by these NGOs to see if it's possible or not to come, yes. I think the last question might appear in the front. Hi, Mohammed al-Basheh, I'm Basi. Just to occur what my colleague Ahmad said, I can't thank you enough for what you're doing in Yemen. I think at this point you're doing more than what we Yemenis are doing for ourselves. So you should perhaps think about running for office and my clan and I will definitely support you. I have a campaign manager sitting right here. So three short questions with three short answers. One, from your experience now in Sana'an Yemen throughout the country, what would be the safest place for us to have a humanitarian hub? And two, you're talking to everybody, obviously. Are you getting the sense that they're ready to talk, to sit on the table and talk or we're not there yet? And three, because policymakers have very short attention span, if you have one urgent top priority, what would it be at this point? Thank you. For the hub and thank you for the comments. For the hub, it's all difficult. We cannot have response that we had in some other crazies that we are speaking about, humanitarian corridor, something which is not possible in Yemen. The way the country is organized, the society is done is just not possible. The hub, it's a tricky question because then where you put it, it will be perceived as something political anyway. So we should try to find a way that's, there are two main entry points I would say today, which is Sana'an for the airport. And there is no other way to enter Sana'an by air. There will be auditor. Adam is still very difficult because he's still very tense and there is still a lot of confrontation on the ground. So it will be a bit complicated. So I will propose with all what it could mean in terms of we controlling Sana'an, but I will say Sana'an could be one of the place to start and to be able afterwards to distribute. But it's a complicated question and I will try to avoid to work with hub. For example, we're thinking the possibility to enter assistance from Oman, for example. And this we are not going to go through Sana'an to distribute it. We will start already from there going all to the east, south, west of the country directly from Oman for the distribution. So starting with spokes and not hubs is what he's saying. But this is indispensable to discuss. And when you say we are discussing with all the parties, yes, are they ready to discuss? My answer, according to, to be very modest on that, but I have the impression people are ready to find a solution because everybody knows that this cannot continue. But it should be without any condition first from a point of view, the way I see it when I discuss with the different telequaters. And we should not forget all the actors with a real influence in Yemen and just to provoke a bit more. We should even think once, if you want really to have a global response to start to englob actors that is difficult to imagine. But even when we speak about IQAP, for example, which is really part of the general society today, there is a need in a way, I've not asked them to go to the table. But just, we have to take this into consideration because if we don't take that, it will be not possible to do. But if there is a hope that people are ready to discuss today, I will say yes, to find a quick solution that's saying let's be realistic. But at least to be able to discuss, I think there is a possibility. But again, if you put condition that we discuss only if you do that or you do that on both sides, you can forget it. And one of my concern is that it's difficult to see what will be today. Now, if there is additional airstrikes, what will be the added value for that? Because now the solution of the weapons are not the solution. There is a need really to discuss and to find political solution today. And for the population and for all the Yemen, because if it continue to go that way for months, it will be almost impossible to find solution that to see a Yemen recuperating of these attacks. And the third was? The number one priority. I will say today is ensure that commercial system can function for the fuel, because again, without that we will see in one or two weeks people dying because they don't have access to water. One or two weeks. Yeah. So this is the big image. It started, it is good. But yes, to continue is not because the Yemen pause finished, it's over that it could stop. It should continue this access on both sides, on all sides, for instance. I want to thank you all for coming. I want to thank Sidriq both for coming here and talking to us and also for all that ICRC is doing in Yemen. I want to thank Stephen Kimberley for being great colleagues and joining me and we hope to see you all again. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you.