 Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon and thank you very much for joining us today. My name is Alessio Parthalano, I'm a professor of war and strategy in East Asia, the Department of War Studies at Kings College, London, and a member of the Center for Grand Strategy at Kings. And today we are delighted to host the first event of a set of three that are trying to engage with the relevance of the integrated review that was published last year by the British government, in particular sort of trying to take stock of things that have happened during this year and review together with some leading experts in the country, whether you're under the borders of the country, and sort of try to make sense the extent to which the documents that appeared last year still remains a vilely sort of guidance, a lighthouse for the UK to navigate the continuously sort of changing evolving dynamics in international affairs. Today as a starter we're going to be talking about some of the basic first-order principles, the sort of key, some of the key, if you want, grand strategic ideas that have created an overarching framework for British grand strategy in the modern times, and try to see how the integrated reviews sort of navigated within those. In particular here I'm talking about that sort of long-standing British engagement in trying to find a balance between a continental and maritime informed strategies. The other two events before I come to today's main conversation, the other two events just for those of you who are joining us today will take place on the 31st of May and then on the 13th of June. The second and the third events, as I said, will start sort of dig more in depth into specific events that might have affected how we think about the integrated review, and particularly the first, the second event of the 31st of May will explore the impact of Ukraine on the integrated review, and then on the 13th of June we'll think about how the potential changing dynamics in continental Europe through German announced increase of spending in defence might actually affect British grand strategy, and in many respects the second and the third events really will build upon the conversation that we're going to have today, and for those of you who are interested in signing up you will find the details about the events in the chat here on this Zoom call, or indeed on our events announcement page at Kings and the Center for Ground Strategy. But enough about the future, let's come back to today's main event. So first of all, let me introduce the key speakers. I am absolutely delighted to have this conversation with Dr Basile Goermond at the Lancaster University. Dr Goermond completed his PhD as a graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, and then went on to work in Oxford as a visiting research fellow at the changing character of war program, and today stands as one of the UK leading experts of maritime and security issues. In particular, his work is trying to sort of expand our understanding of maritime affairs and what maritime strategy entails, and I'm particularly grateful for him to joining us today taking time off from his business schedule to share some of his thoughts. And of course, if we want to talk about British grand strategy with a continental flavour, no one would be more apt to take on that mantle than our other main speaker, Professor Rob Johnson, at Oxford changing character of war, and also one of the country's leading experts on a number of subjects. Historical to begin with, his work on Lawrence really defines this idea of linking strategy operation to grand strategy and the understanding, if you want, of a certain tradition of strategy in British history and British statecraft, but also more recently his work sought to link the transformation of NATO to British interest. And perhaps good time also to point out that soon he's going to picking up another very important role as the first director of the newly established Centre for Net Assessment at the UKMOD, so taking his wealth of experience at the heart of the practice of statecraft. So thank you very much, Robin and Basin for today. At order of battle, each speaker will take 10 to 15 minutes with some introductory remarks. I will complete the conversation with some final remarks on the back of our two main speakers, and then we will sort of open up the conversation to your questions. Now, as it is now standard practice on Zoom-based events, you can either ask your questions or submit your comments on the chat, or indeed in the Q&A space, unless of course you have any sort of challenge in using these two tools, please just raise your hands and then we'll enable you to speak and ask you a question. So all the instructions are clear. I just want to mention for anyone on the call that the event is currently recorded, will be recorded, so please keep that in mind as you pay your engagement with us. Now, without any further ado, Basile, the floor is yours. Thanks a lot, Alessio, and thanks for the opportunity. It's really a great pleasure for me to be here and to participate in this panel. I think it's a very exciting topic, a very important one for the country, and especially now in the context of the Ukraine war. Let me just share my screen. Alessio, could you please confirm you can see my screen, please? Okay, brilliant. So what I'm going to do, I'd like to talk about the integrated review in relation with the idea of Britain as a sea state. But to begin with, I think it's important to understand that the IR is more strategic than the two previous iterations of the defence review in 2010 and 2015. So I think it offers an overarching direction, obviously a very vague direction, but an overarching direction for Britain's security, defence, economic, and foreign policies. And as you know, it's all about adopting this global outlook. But it's also very important to acknowledge the fact that the IR is also very much about adopting a maritime outlook. And to be clear, I think that it's the first time since 1968 after the decision to move back west of Syria. It's the first time that we have such kind of strategic document, which is not sea blind, which accounts for so much for the importance of the sea for the UK. So the IR is vague as a grand strategy, but I think that the direction is clearly maritime. And we see that with the unphases on the fact that the prosperity and security of Britain depends on the sea, it depends strongly on the sea. There are a lot of references to the carrier strike group and naval forces, especially in the accompanying command paper. But my point is that it goes beyond that. The IR, I think, recognises that Britain is a sea state and indirectly suggests that a sea state needs a maritime grand strategy. So the first point I'd like to make is around that, what is a sea state in theory and practice? Because if you think of the traditional conception of sea power, the Mahanian conception of sea power, basically it's this mutually beneficial relationship between thriving maritime commerce and the powerful navy to protect it. So it's all about strategic sea power. And we can argue naval power and command of the sea. So what is lacking there? It's the ideational dimension of sea power. And Andrew Lambert wrote this masterpiece published in 2018, the book titled Sea States. And it makes this point about the importance of thinking in terms of the sour of sea power, the spirit of sea power. So that's what I would call the ideational dimension of sea power. So sea states, they develop a maritime outlook because it is in their interest for various reasons. But it's also linked to the development of a maritime identity based on the adoption of maritime values. But maritime values are not so much natural because of the relationship between human beings and the sea as a milieu. So maritime values, they have to be nurtured and they have to be promoted by by rulers. And that's how we can understand why maritime values have often been linked to broader maritime related or maritime friendly values, such as freedom, trade, liberalism, more inclusive political systems. And I would say eventually fluidity, fluidity when it comes to alliances and the conduct of foreign policy, innovation and flexibility. So throughout history, some sea states have managed to combine this maritime outlook and maritime identity with naval power and they have become sea power great powers. You can think of Athens, Venice and the Netherlands and perhaps the last of them England. But we can claim that today there's no more sea power great powers because the US has the most powerful navy ever. But we can argue the US is a continental power, not the maritime one. But we can also argue that the West as a collective of nations interested in the stability of the global maritime order is the hair to sea power states. So I think that in this context when we reflect on the integrated review, I think that the integrated review suggests that Britain can play its part in support of the global maritime order, but that in turn, this will benefit the UK as a sea state, which leads me to the second point I wanted to make today to question whether the integrated review is to maritime. Sir Hugh Strong said it's aspirational because well, in a sense, it's likely that the objectives are not going to be all fulfilled because of the limited means at disposal. And I think that later on, Alessio, you are going to talk about the need to prioritize theaters of operations. Also, our two main competitors, Russia and China, they are continental powers. The Ukraine war is a continental war between two continental states. And clearly, the West has not been in a position to use its overwhelmingly dominant naval power due to the specificities of the Black Sea from a geopolitical perspective, but mainly because of the need to avoid escalation with a nuclear power. But that said, my point is that the competitors, the continental competitors, they are very able to see power, especially if we understand sea power beyond naval power. We understand sea power in its collective meaning. And we also include civilian stakeholders in the equation. So based on that, I would say that the integrated review is not to marry time on the contrary. It says what it has to say to make the most of the comparative advantage of the UK. In the context of the current situation, and this idea that sea power is something we have to understand as a collective and with an input by civilian stakeholders. So there are like-minded maritime nations or nations interested in the stability of the global maritime order. And we can say that, in a sense, the West is a sea power collective. The US Navy being the mussels, the UK perhaps being the sour. But obviously there are the sea states, small sea states such as Singapore or Denmark. And there are big continental states such as France or Australia, but states that are part of the West and share this interest in maintaining the stability of the global maritime order to oppose revisionism and illiberalism at sea. But it's not just nations we are talking about. Also civilian stakeholders, private actors. Think of the Ukraine war when states are prevented from using their naval forces to help Ukraine for the reason I mentioned before. The private actors step forward. The major, all the major shipping companies, but the Chinese have stopped operation to and from Russia. And this is having an impact there and it's recognized in Russia as having impact. Or when we close our ports to Russian flagged, owned or operated vessels, this again demonstrate the importance of the civilian dimension of sea power. So my point is that like-minded maritime orientated nations and relevant maritime stakeholders, they all share both the benefits and the cost of maintaining a stable liberal maritime world order and opposing revisionism. So in my conclusion for today is that in the post-Ukraine era we have to understand the integrated review as being not just about global Britain, but being about maritime Britain. But maritime understood not as naval, it's not the UK trying to become the next great naval power, but it's about being fluid, innovating, flexible, making the most of what this maritime outlook can bring to the UK in terms of its contribution to the global maritime order to the interest of the West as a collective and as a way to oppose revisionism and illiberalism at sea. And I think I will stop now. Basil, thank you so much for the clarity and the power of the delivery. I mean I hate you loud and clear that there is a dimension about global Britain that is also about maritime Britain and in a way I think the very powerful point that you made at the end, this has to be understood as something that was well beyond the traditional understanding of sea power as something that relates to the size of your guns as you used to be in the 20th century. It's much more than that. And that system I think that you mentioned the one whereby you've got the civilian dimension, the one that speaks to the sea as a means of transportation, as a means through which goods are delivered, through which prosperity is accelerated, created and sustained. That's a key element in which the sort of Britain can engage with. And I particularly sort of enjoy your point about how this is also, it's not just about a state approach towards a strategy. It's also about the creation and the sense of identity. And identity certainly existed in the past and it was associated to a large extent with empire. And perhaps being the greater review implicitly tried to reinvigorate by linking Britain as a superpower in different dimension with the science technology. And now the next step is to link the different dimensions that are beyond the material power to what it means in the maritime sense to enhance that idea of a sea state culture, as it were, or a sea state perception of self. Excellent. Thank you. I'm sure that we'll have lots of questions there. This was super Rob. Tell us, what do you think of all of this? I'll say thank you very much indeed for your warm introduction and to be able to participate in the Centre for your grand strategy, which is a super organisation. More importantly, it's super not because of what its name is, but because actually people in it. So I'm delighted to take part. I'm wearing my combined operations tie today in honour of commandos, both army and marine, but also maritime characters on whom they depend. And I should just point out that I'm not speaking on behalf of the UK government. I'm not actually in that job yet. I'm still an Oxford academic at the moment. So my remarks are going to be on that basis. Just an opening vignette, really. An Australian diplomat, because of the diplomat's rule, I can't name him because I'm going to refer to his comment, said recently that the UK needs to act on the global stage, because currently and recently the United Kingdoms tended to underplay its global role, perhaps for lack of confidence. And we hear a lot about global Britain as a sort of brand or as a statement of the integrated review. But it's worth pondering for a moment that global Britain is not some historicist throwback to an imperial era. It is actually about issues which are global and which are going to affect the United Kingdom. And the United Kingdom, I think, through the integrated review, is trying to step up to those responsibilities, which is a permanent five members of the Security Council, you know, it really should be dealing with. But as you know, all of you, it is much more serious than just, you know, a document. Because if you take, for example, Lin Zhibao of China, a spokesman of the People's Daily, he wrote on the 24th of April 2022 in an editorial that a new global order is being marked out by Russia's operations in Ukraine, but marked out because Russia is making closer alignment to China. And he argues that only China and Russia have the capacity and the will to replace the United States and the United Kingdom as the globally dominant powers. So we are in a very interesting situation, because while our attention is very much focused on whether the integrated review lived up to the aspirations in its aspirations in light of the war in Ukraine, we need to go back one step and go, well, what is the bigger picture? And I think the bigger picture was to integrate foreign policy and defence policy. And I think we can say straight away that it has been effective in Ukraine crisis. There were diplomatic efforts that coincided with the deployment of a Royal Navy and Allied naval demonstration in North Atlantic and Russia to notice. The land training teams in the United Kingdom were withdrawn to avoid a direct conflict with Russia. But the UK switched very quickly to weapons supply, diplomatic cohesion with NATO and economic measures. So three domains already, even in the land environment, were being invoked. And that was what the integrated review wanted to do, to bring together these levers of national power. And I think actually we can say broadly, it did so. It also recognised that we're in the era of global contestation, that the raw space international system that was set up of 1945 is under pressure, that economic leverage, it argued, would be used across the globe. And all of those things have indeed come to pass much more quickly, I think, than perhaps even the writer's integrated review thought. The integrated review also makes a very important point about focusing on the future, not on the past. I think that's very important, particularly threats and opportunities. And in terms of threats, we know Russia was the immediate threat, the pacing threat as described by the last CDS, that China was a more systemic threat. There was also this question of nuclear proliferation, which need to be addressed, and crucially, of course, climate change consequence. In terms of opportunities, we've heard already, you know, battles are given a great exposition of what global Britain might have meant, and what it might mean. And I think we were rather distracted by the deployment of the Karis Strike Group and HMS Queen Elizabeth Act II, you know, the Far East. Actually, the integrated review makes the point that trade is the emphasis of the Indo-Pacific tilt. Trade is the leading component. The maritime bit was just the optics that I think we were looking at. And the other one, of course, is the tech revolution. The integrated review recognised the enormous impact that the technological revolution, artificial intelligence, supply chains, someone is going to make on our lives. And that is certainly true. The integrated review also, though, makes the point that Britain wants to engage China constructively over trade and over climate. And I think, you know, that remains to be seen whether that component is going to be possible. What we are seeing, though, is the United Kingdom leading in a post-EU membership role, leading in Europe in defence and security, which is to be applauded. Now, there were a number of implications, though, that I think we should examine. You know, did the integrated review get its implications right? Did it foresee things correctly? Well, Britain was supposed to be a global player. Is it? Yes, I think it is. I think that broadly, the assumption was the integrated review would make Britain more of a global player. And I think that's true. And that the maritime arm would be the leading arm of that emphasis with air and space very quickly falling behind, supported by and supporting a diplomatic effort. And we've had COP26. We've had G7 leadership. We've had the Orca Steel, the joint declaration with Germany. You know, this has been a pretty proactive 12 months for the United Kingdom on the global stage. There was, however, an assumption that there were no major war for a long period of time, possibly 10 years. Now, that echoes, of course, the sort of assumptions that were made in the 1920s with all the consequences we're familiar with. But what it did say was that this would be a period of instabilities and that what Britain would need was an expeditionary capability. And Britain is building that expeditionary capability. I don't think it's ready yet as where it should be, but the architecture is in place and the planning is in place. So, you know, that's a good start. And, you know, because there wasn't supposed to be a major war in Europe or in the North Atlantic region, there was this idea that it would give Britain the opportunity to modernise its armed forces without actually needed to deploy them as it had done in Iraq or Afghanistan or Sierra Leone and so on. Now, that hasn't, that opportunity has not risen. Britain is having to deploy things and build things as it's flying them, as they say. So, that is slightly problematic in terms of an assumption. But NATO remains a pillar of regional security, said the integrated review, and that's also true. In fact, if anything, NATO is far stronger now than it was some years ago. Now, there were some other implications which are a little uncomfortable. One is that the United Kingdom will remain cohesive. The Union will be whole in entire. Well, that's true at the moment, but I don't think politically we can take anything we're granted these days. There was going to be global burden sharing. We are seeing a closer relationship with Japan, with Australia. Some doubts remain over the other pillar though, of course, France, and whether that relationship has been rebuilt or will be rebuilt during a Macron presidency. Lots of connections with outside Europe were going to be capitalised on in the review, with, for example, an ASEAN dialogue CPTPP, I must get the abbreviations correct, looks as if it might potentially happen one day. And as I say, distribution of vaccines, leading on climate mitigation issues, being a scientific superpower, all those things Britain is trying to address as it's set out. There is, however, a geostrategic shift, and a geoeconomic shift, more importantly, underway. And I think Afghanistan and the ending of Afghanistan demonstrated a hard landing for the United Kingdom in that regard. Systemic competition was the foreseen. That is proving much more difficult to handle than I think, although it's going well right now over Russia, but much more difficult, I think, in the future over China. On defence though, specifically, unless you want me to sort of address this issue about the relationship to the land and the sea, and how that would go. I mean, in defence, there is this mantra of detect, disrupt, deter and defend, and that broadly that's what all the services are supposed to be doing together. I think the maritime domain, the Royal Navy is demonstrating that it's got reach, growing capacity. We can talk about the details of that if we like. I think there's a lot more work to do, frankly, for the RAF in terms of its unmanned capability and capacity, but that's underway. There's quite a lot of work to do in terms of future force commandos and the close cooperation and training with the Royal Navy. I think that still needs to be worked through. But the big problem, as one general told me this morning, who I won't name, he said that the army's a mess. We are in trouble. In terms of fires and protection, the army is underpowered in terms of lethality. In mobility, it's got all sorts of problems to sort out and the MOD has been quite open about admitting the problems that the Ajax program has presented, the box is not on stream yet, the Challenger 3 won't happen and we're going to Challenger 2 upgrades and so on. In land air defence, there's much more work to do, I think, to bring about a proper integrated air defence system. It's pretty good in EW. I have to say, AI staff work is underway. Fantastic work going on in terms of artificial intelligence and staff for headquarters. And, you know, some aspirations do multi-role work, so there's a lot to talk about what Rangers will do in support of special forces. I do think, though, there's a big question mark over the future of what they call SFAD, these special purpose sort of brigades of troops that go out defence engagement. I think lots of questions to ask about what they're really going to be doing. I don't know if the army quite know yet what that's going to look like. Now all of this, of course, requires from the land forces closer cooperation with the Royal Navy and to some extent with airlift, although airlift is improving with Globe Master and everything else. The army lacks its drone capability. I think there are limitations, possibly maybe, to adopt drones as they'd like to, but I think I certainly think there's a lot more that needs to be done there in terms of cooperation, joint training, that those things go together. We can have a conversation, I do hope, in the Q&A about, you know, Ukraine, what it means for the integrated review in more detail. I know you've got another session on that. So let me just broadly conclude with this sort of in my sort of, hopefully my key takeaway points. The integrated review is the best we've had for a long time. The command paper that goes with it is a very, very good implementation of that, but there are still gaps. I don't agree entirely with some academic colleagues that the aspirations are too great for the capability. I think there is, we've already demonstrated that even simple anti-tank weapon systems can have a very vegetative disproportionate effect in the battle space, but we do have some gaps. Surface-to-surface missile capabilities, air defence against anti-armour weapons, logistics, do we have enough in the land, and indeed the sea environment, are our striped drones powerful enough? What about our strategic air capability? What about UK civil defence, an almost non-existent facility at the moment, one which we need to learn quickly from our Scandinavian brothers and sisters, how to how to operate? But the important factors of the willingness to act jointly, the fighting spirits of the UK armed forces, the service culture, which emphasises the law of armed conflict and good ethical standards, the leadership, particularly at junior levels, are robustness, are very, very strong indeed. And I think as long as we give those who serve the lethality, the ability to resupply and the proper intelligence finance reconnaissance capabilities, they are an unbeatable world-class armed force. So my conclusion is the balance is right, but the scale and the types are not yet there. And I think they're under construction and a lot more work needs to be done to make them really fit for the 21st century. Thanks, Lesley. Wonderful. Thank you so much, Robert, for adding so much into the conversation. I think a lot of what you were saying, particularly even when you referred to the underpowered nature of what's been thought about for the army, I think it goes back to a point that you made earlier in your talk about the building of the expeditionary dimension, as in rethinking how the integrated review should somehow bring back to life in a context whereby today we use jointness as a polite way to rely to each other and we don't use land sea or air power because otherwise people will be isolated and that inclusive sort of spirit, it will be absolutely wrong. The truth of the matter is that this is about bringing the expeditionary nature of the land component to maximum sort of capacity to serve the broad ideas in the integrated review. And what I hear very strong coming across from you, this isn't about pitching the land against the sea, it's about playing to the strengths of British asymmetry, access to the ocean and deliver effect to the ground. So this is about courting the different pieces and in a way I think the biggest sort of intellectual negative heritage, if you want, is really overcoming this idea that if you talk about naval capacity or naval capabilities it's not something that is designed to be pitched against the army or the air force. This is about taking advantage of the virtues of each particular environment which at the strategic operational and tactical levels provide different type of advantages opportunities and disadvantages. So the sea becomes again that sort of old idea that the army becomes the bullet delivered by the navy in that sense. I think we need somehow to find the 21st century version of that for all of the points that you made to really sort of come to the fore and be seen in a true sense of jointness not as that polite way to avoid uncomfortable conversation but rather as the best way to maximise all of that. Now it has come to me to provide some final sort of force and there is not much to add in the fact that both our first contributors have covered so much ground. What I'll try to do is to perhaps sort of highlight three points that I think are bubbling underneath the surface of the intergood review as a process and as an outcome, as a way perhaps to bring together the two views that have been presented so far. The first point in this regard is how the intergood review was published in the context of what was a very particular political debate in the UK which translated into what I think it's a false dichotomy and the dichotomy that for as false as it is as direct relevance to our conversation today in which the land and the baritones seem to be almost pitched ones against the other and that is because the the integrated review perhaps real novelty in terms of geographical extent of global reach to Britain as much as a reinvigoration of Britain's broader international and international sort of profile really has to do with the Indo-Pacific tilt and how as a result of that the Indo-Pacific tilt has been seen by Medi through the lenses of the Brexit debate and as a result of that sort of like created this false dichotomy between the Indo-Pacific on one hand and the Euro-Atlantic on the other. This is an absolute false dichotomy the integrated review goes to pains to try to avoid that from happening the truth of the matter is that the politics of the day meant that this dichotomy has been created particularly in punditry media coverage the references in particular to the Indo-Pacific as a post-Brexit lunacy on the one hand because it either speaks to a long gone imperial vanity and you just need to pick up your average FT reference to the Indo-Pacific to constantly find this idea of the Indo-Pacific as part of the global Britain strategy as a way to bring banks a long gone imperial euphoria that's certainly one element of the Brexit lenses that have affected this false dichotomy and the other one really the idea that Britain is no longer in the capacity to have any sort of influence of holding international affairs particularly in a place as far as the Indo-Pacific which in the common collective imagery today in the UK is still presented quite regularly as the far East and whether that is for tradition or not in a way kind of like a place to strengthen this and within the second sort of reference certainly the idea that the Indo-Pacific is pitched as an alternative to Europe as an alternative to the Euro-Atlantic again the integrated review goes to great pains to actually be very clear that the Euro-Atlantic remains the core commitment of the UK in defence and security and even though the EU is barely mentioned within there but NATO as Rob was saying is absolutely central to the conversation so the Indo-Pacific really comes on top of that but nevertheless I think a part of the question year on that somehow we are starting to move away from but still very much at least at the personal level in most of my own engagement when it comes to the integrated review is very frequent the reference to is this idea of the the false dichotomy Euro-Atlantic versus Indo-Pacific as the sort of one of the core references of the debate over the integrated review and as I say I don't think that is the case and CSG 21 provided perhaps the best manifestation of that CSG the current strike group deployment in 2021 was first and foremost centered on the Euro-Atlantic half of it was in the Euro-Atlantic it was relevant to NATO it conducted exercises within NATO HMS the friend that could that's again a challenge of excessive maritime claims in the black in the in the black sea and something that in retrospect seems very relevant to the sort of events that that occur later in relation to Ukraine so before going to the Indo-Pacific and really the Indo-Pacific deployment had a secondary if you want complementary and integrative function to that so CSG 21 if it is to be taken as a reference to that conversation to that attempt to clarify the relation between different theaters would indeed the good review it really should be about that and perhaps we should finally take that as a point of temperature to refresh and move forward the conversation which for the first six to eight months would really stuck in this this sort of false dichotomy Euro-Atlantic versus Indo-Pacific with the Indo-Pacific being portrayed as either an act of vanity or possibly the imperial sort of long gone glory or indeed an ambitious and vain attempt to reinvigorate China and Britain's global profile now the second point which I think is very important so that's it in so far as as the broader sort of bigger picture how does the marathon fits into the bigger context and in the integrated review the second point is about how within the integrative review the maritime needs to be reconceptualized this is not just about the sea as a launching path as a platform to bring Britain's a symmetry in international politics to the front it relates very much to a point that baseball was making at the beginning of his remarks about how the maritime today the idea of a sea stain or a sea power state whichever way you want to conceptualize and start or stems from a different the broader understanding of the role of maritime affairs and the maritime order to international politics and here I think there's two elements to this story that is important to highlight and one is this idea of how the maritime is not just that it is more than just sort of physical and material power it's not about the size of the navy it is about also how we conceptualize the role of the sea and the ocean as a habitat as a natural habitat in relation to the challenges that we're facing in contemporary world stemming from climate change to sustaining biodiversity and in this respect the integrated review and certainly is trying to present that kind of like broader complex picture and indeed to an extent it's almost underselling what the what Britain is throwing here I think about the UN Convention on Biodiversity that led to the 30 by 30 initiative which is allowing 30% of the world ocean to become a maritime projected areas by 2030 this is a UN sponsored initiative that is led by the UK it's getting a tremendous amount of of of of attraction and really has a lot to do with that broader understanding of the link what it means to be a sea power in the 21st century and as I say in some respect that this very important initiative barely ever makes the news you don't really hear about it too much and and and I'm pretty sure that within that context it's very much about a missed opportunity to sell more and really has a lot to do with that broader integrated idea that Robert mentioned that Basel mentioned that is that is propelled inside the integrated review and that somehow has not been sort of capitalized to fully and certainly in the maritime context is seen Britain leading in some of its core aspects the second element of this broader understanding of of the meaning of the maritime and is about how the matter order speaks to the stability of the rule-based international system and here I'm using my vocabulary quite carefully in the sense that the rule-based international system is composed of by different type of orders if you want different spaces in which governance is manifest itself in slightly different formats and in this respect the maritime order is particularly central to one aspect that informs the integrated review all through and that is prosperity today international prosperity cannot be understood without the international maritime order and indeed the maritime order underwrites it whether it is shipping which controls the physical connectivity that propels prosperity or indeed it is digital through the underwater sea cables the stability of the matter order matters to international to the rule-based international system we cannot get away from it indeed we need to work with it and one of the things that I have found that the integrated review is almost ahead of its time and in many respects ahead of the broader understanding even within different departments of government in the UK is this idea that this is not meant to dismiss the importance of new domains like cyber like space on the contrary in all sort of by placing the maritime order at the center of the system the integrated review is making a statement about the type of governance that one wishes to see one that rewards a prosperity and a prosperity that builds open societies and open economies and that way that's the way we should approach also our understanding of governance in cyber as well as governance in space so what the UK does in the maritime context and to sustain the stability of the maritime order absolutely matters in a broader sense which is why the UK has a very clear position in places where the maritime order is contested the UK is the only country outside the US to have conducted a clear challenge within 12 nautical miles in the South China Sea around the inappropriate use and application of maritime straight baselines over the Paris Alliance a fact that is long sort of is very often only too often forgotten and barely ever mentioned when it comes to the the the point number one that I was making the debate over the sort of British vanity of influence in the world as a matter of fact Britain has made it that statement and to the present day remains perhaps the only country outside the US to have made that kind of strong statement about the importance of order and it raises of course a number of other issues and questions about how far the UK should and can sort of continuously provide support for the stability of the maritime order and what kind of statements one needs to carry on forward and here perhaps it links naturally with the point that both Basel and Rob were making about how do we define integrated this isn't about you know if point one and point two that I made in this second aspect this idea of a broader understanding of what it means to be mapped on today if we all agree on that then the question is not just about the navy it's all about the various different levers of national power coming together to reinforce that statement and here's my third point capabilities the integrated review and I agree with with Rob and perhaps I'm perhaps I have to leave to my reputation of being a study notey and and in the way I look at these things but perhaps I would say that that the command paper for all its virtues is perhaps the one element that in light of the events of last year needs a little bit of a conversation in terms of whether we are looking at the capabilities that are needed moving forward and looking ahead I think there is a clear sense that that that the direction of travel is broadly right but again given the nature of the challenges in light of Ukraine and in like what will happen in Russia China potential convergence in light of this again there is a question there in terms of the implementation and it's not a fault of the command paper it's just that some of the elements that have emerged have perhaps increased the the the the need for a conversation about the extent to which the capabilities element of this and here in terms of capabilities I want to focus on two aspects one the integrated review makes a lot out of partnerships it really places the uk not so much as making a standalone statements but very much making statements as part of groupings bilateral mini lateral multilateral you name it and I think both the the diplomatic and an economic sort of actions taken in in in light of Ukraine speak to that whether it is jeth whether it is that lateral would pull an understanding whether it is within NATO whether it is in in in in coordination with other european partners and allies that is clearly there and I think in the in the pacific that is also certainly true the question however is that one needs to have a capacity to keep up with diplomatic engagement across different fronts and certainly in the in the pacific there has been a lot of initial movement over orcas again there is still a lot of enthusiasm and commitment but is there enough capacity to continue to have a persistent form of engagement that rewards the broader integrated agenda and so number one if partners are at the center and certainly that seems to be the right way to approach and I couldn't agree more with points that Rob was making in this respect the question is do we have enough capacity and here capabilities therefore is also humans you know human capabilities as the people that make things happen on a daily basis and this leads to the second point in this regard and broader regional expertise the UK still has a desperate need to increase its capacity for people with a degree of of expertise that allow that integrated element to emerge because of a clear sort of in-depth knowledge of different parts of the world and again if I think about being the pacific rewards goes to the fact that the UK is a relatively small cohort of regional expertise that is producing incredible amount of success but again will it be sufficient to create a persistent sustained form of engagement that I think is a big question a number of of of of initial initiatives from orcas to the digital initiative with with with Singapore you know further afield there are questions there whether the hng is equipped with it with with a relevant and an adequate amount of expertise and talent in terms of capacity and sheer numbers as it were um so in that sense and here I go towards the conclusion of my remarks um the key sort of if you want um essay question uh to address is how to achieve that persistent nature of an integrated UK that builds upon and takes advantage of that sort of maritime as interest asymmetry that advantage of being maritime century to speak to all these different questions um and really at the end of the day um do we need what kind of how do we manifest that form of integration does hng need um some sort of forward operating structures that allow to create the link between um embassies and different elements of different departments of government operating on the ground whether it is the arming briar or the navy with two new rpvs there and do we need to have like do we need a an integrated hng hub that covers the in the pacific it sits at the intersection between those operating on the ground and and the policy that action that needs to be taken in in in in in the UK and in London and in that sense do we need other sort of manifestation or do we simply need more people or do we think to we do we need to reconsider elements of documents such as the command paper that have more resources in order to be pursued i think that's the kind of questions that we need to to sort of engage with in light of the last few months because at heart it's not the integrated review the integrated review was absolutely a sharp bang bomb in terms of framework in terms of revamping and re-understanding um what maritime means to Britain as a way to prepare and unleash and unlock its potential but at the same time perhaps therefore it's more about empowering the different levers of national power to achieve this objective in a persistent and integrated fashion that should be at the heart of our conversation on this note i stop here thank you very much for your time um okay now i'm wearing my uh uh sort of uh moderator hats again sorry there's lots of me today um we have an enormous amount of questions already um and perhaps i'll start with the first um couple um which i think are are are are very much for basal and and raw at the same time so the first one really is about a point that basal made at the beginning on uh if the UK is maritime a global strategy rests on being flexible does this run the risk of the UK being a jack-of-all-trades and a master of none um Bob there's a there's a there's a couple of questions also that i think that's that you would be best place to address or engage with um would the UK add other countries to its nuclear umbrella besides uh besides it has with France according to mutual stated vital interests and what are your thoughts about countries that do not have nuclear weapons but not part of a nuclear umbrella interests the Russia China and Iran so i'll start with this too and basically and i'll start with you and then and go to Rob and thanks unless you want that's that's a very interesting question uh i i understand the point i would say that uh in the maritime domain uh flexibility is a is really everything it's an asset because the sea is not a zero some space if you wish and um and that's a point and that i keep making because when we talk about sea power especially um the naval element of sea power we we we still tend to think too much in terms of balance of naval power and thus in terms of a zero some game but uh at sea especially when it comes to the UK which is part uh and even leading the some sort of a solidaristic society of maritime nations the sea is not a zero some space so um so flexibility such as for example the orcas um partnership um plays actually in in favor not not just of the UK but of making the most of of what we can do collectively and that's why my point was about also including civilian uh stakeholders uh into into the picture now is it um is does it mean that this maritime outlook prevents the UK from having more of a clear direction i would say no because of the points aliceo just made the fact that it's not just about the making the most of the in an asymmetrical way of the advantage of the UK but it's about contributing to the stability of the global maritime order in a collective and inclusive way which is to our uh benefits eventually and the benefits of all okay rob thanks so much last year um there's lots of reflections i'd like to offer on on some of your remarks too and also um uh those of us but i'll let me ask the question more directly so first question is about um is the UK at risk uh by being so flexible trying to be so flexible that it's a jack of all trades and a master of none um i don't think so i mean one of the wonderful things uh about um the Royal Navy is that it's often when it comes to some sort of humanitarian or climate related disaster um or some you know natural disaster it's often the first on the scene it's the only uh service with um the immediate capacity um and i don't just mean in terms of personnel but i mean in terms of what's available to support um it's therefore the most flexible really by necessity rather than by choice um so that's one thing to say but in terms of you know what the armed forces in the UK are good i mean you mentioned the word expeditionary as i did and i think one of the um fabulous things about having an expeditionary capability as opposed to a territorial defense capability for example um is that you do have the ability to flex to whatever sorts of crises are emerging if it's a big refugee flow that needs support in the littoral if it's um some sort of question of you know piracy off the coast of east Africa you know the um the UK armed forces have got a lot of experience and they're going to turn their hand too and actually the professional military education in the UK i think is particularly well placed as long as it keeps on doing what it's doing at the moment to actually support that that degree of flexibility and encourage that you know um be ready for all sorts of problems we haven't even defined yet on the non-nuclear powers uh you know what is the value has the UK feel about it how would extend its umbrella let me just say that you know the important non-nuclear powers are as important to the united kingdom in terms of alliances and partnerships as nuclear powers there's no doubt about that and it's partly because you know nuclear weapons are not used you know and and let's hope they never are but i mean we have to be ready for that that eventuality most of the crises and conflicts the united kingdom is going to encounter means that it's going to be working alongside non-nuclear powers um that's just a fact so most of the NATO countries it works with in europe are non-nuclear um and and that means that it doesn't uh privilege you know a particular nuclear power over another it is true that russia and china both have nuclear weapons but here we are you know russia is now you know it day 17 whatever it is of um it's war uh against ukraine let's be absolutely clear what it is um it is running low on long-range fires it has been tempted to use firma barrack weapon systems it's experimented we think with hypersonics um and yet it's not crossing nuclear threshold because russian uh the russian general staff know precisely what the consequences of that will be and i think there are plans i know in the united kingdom i'm not part of them i've not seen them but i know they exist about what would happen if russia used a tactical nuclear weapon there is a plan um and uh you know at the moment we know that the rational minds have prevailed um rott thank you so much if i could stay with you there's um there's a couple of questions that are relatively sort of short and um um i want to get your your thoughts on it um based on all that we've discussed do you believe the uk has completely moved away from a continental strategy or do you think this has been outsourced to alliances such as nato this is this is great um and actually feeling if i'm writing a book at the moment and the the continental commitment you know comes up again and again and i had to reread andrew lamburt's book again because i've read it the first time and i want to be absolutely certain i haven't misunderstood uh what the arguments were about that you know i i have enormous respect for you know the the memory of some michael howard you know i knew him and i have enormous respect for those who were educated by some michael but uh unfortunately i found myself over years disagreeing with him that um he came from a cult you know world war two in a cold war generation where the continental commitment was the thing without that you know his argument was that france would have fallen and you know in the cold war you know west germany wouldn't have survived and so on um i'm afraid we're in a different world and that world we're in now does not require a large-scale british land force to be committed to um eastern poland uh the polish armed forces are perfectly capable of a territorial defense what the european continental powers really want us to help with are the high-end enablers of cyber electronic warfare um headquarters liaison um all the all those elements and logistics remember you know the british way of war um britain was the paymaster of its european continental allies uh and didn't always pay a very large uh content role i know everyone's going to cite mulbra at me uh and the wars the spanish succession fine go right ahead but the point is that that wasn't uh typical and wasn't normal uh if you take a 400 year period i think the conversation we need to have with nato from the united kingdom is a sort of grown-up conversation about that britain provides a very expensive continues at sea nuclear deterrent as an umbrella for europe it provides enablers air assault forces high-end commandos and most important of all a maritime surface and subsurface capability and space defense and space awareness that is a big contribution so if people say oh well it should also be in land forces my view of that is poland say and romania are brilliant they're perfectly capable of providing that they don't need a british core uh in there what they want is the capabilities of britain provides and i think that's the sort of conversation i think we should be having robert hunker more i think there's there's two factors here that that that in their expense if i understood your initial reaction to to to the integrated review publication and one is the idea that the integrated review sort of like broke with tradition in two ways one this is the first piece of document that does not start with a given strategic environment as in or inherited to 20 years of war in afghanistan and iraq so that's a given and everything else is a reaction to it's right so that's the first sort of breaking with the past and the second is this idea that there is no other version to british defense without the british army on the rime kind of approach what now whether it is in france whether it is in germany you know and you stretch it you're stretching that back to to sort of war one but i think the two created moments of breaking with the past one the last 20 years of of raising the operational context that one inherited to the strategic on one hand and the other one is this idea that there is no british defense and security without a british military army land presence in continental europe and i think that's where there is a lot of as you say there's a lot of intellectual sort of also engagement to do because a lot of of of those who've been defining the conversation of the country had some of these assumptions built into the way they were taught to their approach to defense and security so today we are really sort of like rediscovery finding our feet again in slightly different contexts and i think that the point you just made is absolutely crucial that is the kind of like central feature of the conversation this is not about alienating particular elements of the british military establishment this is about re-establishing the tone of the conversation at a different sort of space now i have a couple questions unless you can just make a question regarding this kind of of continental versus maritime opposition when we think about the uk and now europe or european partners i think that beyond the the the discussion about what we can bring to to continental partners in terms of whether it's land forces or naval forces i think something which fits with this argument about a naval maritime outlook and fluidity as i i call it it's what the prime minister was the first to go to ukraine support to finland and and sweden that's the type of thing that i think our european partners they benefit from this kind of more freed outlook that the integrated review has put forward that that's absolutely for horn in fact if i could stay with you and ask you something else but do you think and the you mentioned even in your remarks um in fact i'll ask this to the both of you because you both sort of mentioned this idea that that the integrated here means not just the military that is linking foreign policy and defense but also other aspects and that basically you specifically talked about civilian dimension how do you so there's a there's a quite a couple of questions here how to bring all government departments and non-government actors into this and i think there is there is absolute credit to that type of question because in my own experience i think if there's one limitation that's really how do you achieve integration in a way that it's a sustainable natural sort of a manifestation of the country as a whole basal that's a very tricky question uh unless you because i think the because your question is not whether we have to do it or it's how to do it and uh well if you if you just look at the everything maritime we we've got this this document maritime 2050 and this document is is really brilliant in that it it not only brings together all the different dimensions of britain's foreign economic and security policy related to the sea together but it also makes the point repeatedly that we need to adopt a whole of the government approach to to to what's maritime and this document's been released in 2018 so so much before the integrated review so so i think we we've got again we've got the direction and as rob can can help me there but i think each time we we discuss with uh relevant stakeholders public policy stakeholders they agree that this whole of the government approach is particularly adapted to everything which is maritime but what can we do to to improve the process it's it's beyond my field of expertise and basal thank you for this rob can i also ask you to add something because of some of the questions within this context is if we go from the big picture you know how do we link the different bits and bobs together and then we drill down a little bit more inside ministry of defense and in particular the arm services you talked about this and how feasible and what kind of appetite you think exists within the different services to achieve a level of jointness that rewards that expeditionary dimension which in a way speaks to a place that is there is a natural home for the navy but perhaps might create some sense of discomfort to the army in particular how do you think you know how far off we are from from that certain digital state as it were well so that's a great question and it's a great question that you started with look i can't speak directly for each of the service chiefs not and i wouldn't dare even to try but i can offer a sort of an observation as a sort of an outsider in a sense looking in as i think we all do that i think the arm forces those that i've spoken to to use that american expression which is rather ugly but get it i mean they know that britain has a tradition of expeditionary capability and i think all three services know that that is important some of the greatest successes and achievements have been through an expeditionary mentality and understand the jointness and so on i think there's a lot of work to do in terms of training clouds of its reminded us that in war all things are difficult even the simplest i'm have to say that's also true the civil service and bureaucracy and i think you you know um what we critics i find of the integrated review um tend to look at things from what i might call an operational point of view right that you know what about this capability or we can't do this they tend to be either tactical operational um and i think what's really important about the integrated review and this comes back to bezels point and the points that you were raising earlier alessio is that britain is rediscovering how to be a strategic actor not just an operational one and and i think what we need i mean i i reread recently i looked at some translations of the chinese looking at their 2016 military reforms asking themselves questions the 2016 training reforms in 2021 they did a look at those and they said how far have we got what have we done and one of the things that they were really pleased themselves about is that they unified their command and control from this party to the strategic to the operational now i think we have to ask ourselves a really searching question in the uk have we done that do we have a streamlined unified command and control spine that goes down from the strategic through you know from the policy to strategic down to the operation like pghq actually executing that i'm not sure we do i'm not sure we have done that yet have we trained enough you know are we loading a british brigade on board of ships down in plimoth shipping them up to scotland for an exercise conducting the exercise in a sort of multi-domain environment and then shipping them home again and then having a really good party the end game what do we learn from it all with the likes of dcdc and you know mod doing a kind of proper clipboard exercise of what we've actually learned from it are we doing that yet i don't think so um and i that's what i would really emphasize we should get our we should get on to but we have to have the command and control architecture right first before we get to to next bit and and and what a wonderful note upon which to draw this um i'm proceeding to a conclusion today because i think the the natural sort of um an ending point and to to what you just said rob and don't disappear rob don't disappear stay with me stay with me don't switch your camera off rob you i cannot see you anymore is it there oh gosh i'm back i was just opening a door sorry for saying that i thought i lost you um no i mean the the the point you make that is absolutely essential but there's also something very important to say about this that alongside getting the spine of that command and control function right we also need sort of to continue to foster um because of all the things that we say a sort of a tendency or a comfort with the mission command orientation at the lower tactical level we need to empower people and us as a user in any unit to be able to on a on a on that persistent engagement that happened on the daily basis be comfortable in their chain of command empowering them to provide solutions and opportunities and so the point you were making about you know drawing these big exercises start thinking big and then sort of come back and reflect upon it so that we know how to empower people or in light of the comfort of that that a more invigorating command structure that is both vertical and then it has to be also horizontally at the other parts of gold this is really very much where we start finding a solution so at the end of the day this is about reconciling the land of the sea because it's common used to say things that happen at sea only matter because of what it says on land that the people that are living on it so hopefully we managed to do this today i'm certainly very grateful to our speakers for the wonderful tremendous contribution we are just two minutes late which by my standards is absolutely impressive so thank you very much everyone for joining us today thank you basal thank you rock thank you everybody listening in and hopefully we'll see you again very soon with the next iteration of our series thank you and goodbye thank you so very much thank you