 Ladies and gentlemen, please take your seats. At this time, I would like to introduce our next keynote speaker, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Cyber Effects Operations, Lieutenant General Veriland Dash Jamison. General Jamison is responsible to the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Policy Formulation, Planning, Evaluation, Oversight, and Leadership of Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Cyber Effects Operations Capabilities. As the Air Force's Senior Intelligence Officer, she is directly responsible to the Director of National Intelligence and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. She leads six directorates and supports 73,000 person intelligence and cyber operations enterprise with a portfolio valued at $72 billion across the Air Force. Please join me in welcoming General Jamison. All right, how is everybody doing? I am glad to hear it. I'm going to deviate a little bit first off because I really wanted to come here. I wanted to come here so much that I've been up since 4.30. I got on my Peloton bike at 4.58. At 5.09, the phone rang. And I went, that's really unusual. And about 5.13, as I am having a personal best on my Peloton, my husband says, your flight has been delayed three hours. You are not going to make it. And I said, OK, my exec called back and said, OK, we're working some alternate flights. OK, do I get off the bike? I'm having a personal best. Or do I believe, no, I need to get to the airport. So let's take a vote. What do you think I do? If you think I stay on the bike, clap your hands. If you think I got off and started my shower, clap your hands. You all know me pretty well. Damn it, I stayed on that bike. And I was like, really? Isn't there a flight every hour that goes to Atlanta? So then we get the call back. I hit the shower, 5.31. This is seven unrelated miracles that we will get to. And my husband taps on the door and he's like, hey, good idea. You are booked on American Airlines at 6.46. Plenty of time. We're in McLean. I'm going to go on Reagan. It takes what, 20 minutes? First day of school. Yeah, yeah. Whoops, I don't have two-legged children. All right, so we then get some conflicting information. And my CAG chief who's going with me, I'm sure is pulling her hair out because she's taking, yes, you guessed it, the American Airlines 6.31 flight. I believe I'm on the 6.46 flight. Yeah, you're seeing the nightmare. So Mead Urn, she's like, ma'am? I'm like, I think we've got great time. And she's looking at me like, and I go, OK. We zip through security. OK, we would be me. And I look and I'm like, what happened? She has steel toes in her pumps. So I wait. I'm a good wingman. And I said, I got to have a Diet Coke because I always have a Diet Coke. And she's like, ma'am, the flight is about to take. I go, it's 6.46. She's like, no, it's 6.31. We run from Reagan. Yes. Yeah, the door was already closed and they pulled the gate back. They are leaving early because of weather in Atlanta. No fear. You can run down the entire Reagan Airport to the Delta flight that leaves at 7 o'clock. So we are in 39, the gate for security 39. We run the entire way. Gate one, we are not going to accept those vouchers. Some choice words were said. Buy me. Go upstairs, choice more words on the phone to the exec who says, we are going to get you on a flight at 8.10. 7.34 goes by. I finally get tickets. Of course, Jerry, no tickets. So I'm like, see, I'm not making this mistake again. And I get on the plane. And then I see, thank God, Jerry comes on the plane because she actually has the rental car and everything. And she's like, ma'am, it's good. We are going to make a connection in Atlanta and we're going to fly to Montgomery. Awesome, awesome. So we at this point have gone through three aircraft. We have run the distance twice at Reagan Airfield. We fly into Atlanta and it is pouring, hence the wet dog look. And yeah, the flight I know you're all shocked is delayed over an hour to Montgomery. We cannot make this time slot. So we get in the car, drenched poodle here, and we drive two hours and 13 minutes. At one point I did say, Jerry, maybe 93 is not the number we should make in this work zone. So luckily for security clearances, they always say we don't mean traffic, moving traffic violations. So I went through all that because I really wanted you, you cyber warfare officers enlisted in civilians to know how much your DCS for ISR and cyber effects operations really wanted to be here today. So trains, planes, automobiles, and a Peloton personal best to be here. So I want to give a special shout out to my side partner and wingman always, Mr. Bill Marion, for inviting me to this conference. It's quite an honor. And I also want to give a shout out to Lieutenant General Tony Cotton, Commander at AU for allowing us to host this fantastic event here in Montgomery, Alabama. And so if you thought, how long can she take to introduce this briefing? Well, now you know about seven minutes, which I have really got to tell you, I'm excited. I'm excited for a couple of reasons. When we started crafting what I was gonna talk to you all today, I'm a transparent person. This is not exactly all in my wheelhouse. And I said, you know, I want to make sure that we actually get some really good information and some meat of what we are trying to do so that the field understands, A, we're working for the field, first and foremost. Second, it is all about our amazing airmen. While if you look at some speeches and some things that I've done in the past, I can talk about technology, artificial intelligence and machine learning. Always know at the heart of everything is the airmen. So I wanted to make sure that I had some very good detailed information for all of you so that you knew exactly where are we going and what are we gonna do? So I usually walk around and just sort of ramble, but because this is not as much in my wheelhouse as other discussions, I am gonna reference my notes. So I apologize that I'm not gonna be looking at every one of you. So I do wanna just start off and remind some of you because I know that you all have long memories and look at some notes of what's gone by in the AF ITC conferences of old. In two years ago, in 2017, when I presented to this very audience, I really talked about a couple of concepts and really it was about how we obtained speed and lethality against our adversary through the use of multi-intelligence and multi-domain integration. And I would tell you, here we are two years later and I believe those concepts remain applicable and underpin our relentless pursuit of power projection and defense of our power projection capabilities for and from cyberspace. And we are only able to accomplish that by using the power of our amazing airmen. And I don't have to look down on that part because that part I know first and foremost how true that really is. But I do contemplate because today I know we are in competition. I know we are also preparing to fight and win in any future scenarios that tomorrow might bring us. But I also know that our proven capabilities in intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and cyber effects operations and warfighting calm are really critical aspects of deterrence. And I bring up those three areas because we seem to concentrate on fighting and winning for a future conflict. And we really have to take pause and recognize what are we doing in today's competition and how are we filling up our kit bag with deterrence courses of actions and different ways to de-escalate some situations. So I'm gonna talk a little bit about how really our ISR, our warfighting calm and our cyber effects operations enterprises today are three very important enterprises, but they're different. What we are trying to accomplish in our effort is to make one community. And we're gonna take some specific steps to really expand that competitive edge and ensure the security of our great nation. And I'd like to really speak to you personally by saying you, my cyber warfare operators, otherwise known as just plain old war fighters, really you are the legions in our formation of today's ongoing fight for the competitive advantage. You are really who propel decision advantage. And we do that by fleshing out information warfare. So I really got to thinking, let's actually define what do we mean when we talk about information warfare. And it's a combination of ISR, warfighting comms, cyber effects operations, information operations and electronic warfare. And we held a summit across all of those enterprises and we have defined information warfare as the employment of military capabilities in and through the information domain to deliberately affect adversary human and system behavior and to preserve friendly freedom of action during cooperation, competition or conflict. And I wanna get that out right up front so we all know what I'm talking about. I did not come up with that definition. The summit of you all AOs out in the field came up with that definition and we have all agreed to it. To frame the dialogue, I'm gonna really focus on how the Air Force creates conditions to combat our adversaries foreign from cyberspace. This is a strategic vision that I'm gonna outline that's laced with action. It's also a framework that optimized talent management and it's about developing tools and training to drop the reins from our airmen as you all move out and project power because that's really what it's all about. And where do we get this from? When I did some research and I looked at the 2018 national defense strategy, we all know it said we're gonna shift away from our VEO and our countering terrorist organization fight that we've been in for really the last 18 years and we're gonna refocus on competition, competition specifically with China and Russia. And then when I read the 2018 DOD cyber security strategy, it acknowledged and I quote, we are engaged in a long-term strategic competition with Russia and China and we must take action in cyberspace to preserve US military advantages and to defend US interests. So we all go, okay, that's almost two years old because it was really written in 17, published in 18 and it's part of our fiber and blood now but it keeps coming up to the forefront. Russia and China are our peer competitors with robust threat capabilities and desires to hold the US critical infrastructure and key resources at risk. Make no mistake about it. Recently, I believe it was in the last 10 days, Secretary of Defense, Secretary Esper highlighted the need to shift and I quote, to high intensity conflicts against competitors such as Russia and China. Confirming that China has engaged in the greatest theft of intellectual property in human history. That is what our Secretary of Defense has said. He describes it as a big, big problem. I think that is somewhat of an understatement in fact. It really does demonstrate that China's efforts to steal defense and non-defense technologies otherwise said our intellectual property illustrates China's desire for information dominance. This approach confirms that the United States needs to increase ISR, cyber effects operations, war fighting comms in a teaming manner to compete today in if need be win in future scenarios. Currently, the Air Force, we all know, is not postured to meet the full intent of the national defense strategy to compete, deter and win effectively in current and future global security environments. The Air Force has taken initial steps to merge ISR, cyber effects operations and war fighting comms to project power and defend power projection capabilities and secure global resilient communications. That's a lot to unpack, but that's what we're doing. This is supported by a near real time, multi-domain, multi-spectrum mesh network called the Collaborative Sensing Grid. The Air Force, ISR, CEO and war fighter comm enterprises are postured to ignite information warfare and address the competition that we face today to create a multifaceted deterrence apparatus and to continue to prepare to win for future battles. To meet the national security defense's intent, the Air Force is establishing a cyber warfare flight plan. Our strategic vision is pursuing three lines of effort that will foster relentless pursuit of our North stars. Now this is gonna sound very familiar in theme, but I really wanna tease out the information so that we've got some meat to discuss in Q and A. First and foremost, we look at our foundational capabilities. It is imperative we modernize and scale our training enterprise. We deliver data at the speed of decision making and we realize talent management. This has to be done in order for us to maximize mission effectiveness. Our second North star, readiness and lethality. I'm a simple person. I have to know what does that really mean. I believe it is our responsibility to arm all of you, our airmen, with capabilities commensurate with your skill sets. We need to advance platforms and tools that generate focused cyber effects through air space and cyberspace providing defense of our key weapons systems. All simultaneously accomplished while ensuring resilient resilience in our global communications, command and control and collaborative sensing grid network. So what do we really mean? Let's get down to a really good example and the one that I chose to highlight at great peril with the team is to talk about mission defense teams, otherwise known as the MDTs. And really what I wanna tell you is we are looking at no kidding or in the final throws of standardizing crew concept, standardizing and getting them slots in training and standardizing their tools, i.e. their platforms to conduct this enormous mission to protect our vital weapons systems. The third area is disruptive technologies and its opportunities. By partnering with industry, we can transform our capability to develop an increasingly agile capability to achieve speed to need capabilities. And I kinda went, what are we really trying to do and has this been done before? And the example that I harken back to is the space domain and space command that stands up in about 48 hours from now. And when I did some research and I looked at it, space command partnered with commercial entities to expand the realm of possibilities, space launch, space control and even space travel have sped up those combined integrated opportunities that no kidding just five years ago seemed unthinkable. I believe we should be free to do the exact same thing. Through education and training, leadership opportunities and deliberate talent management, cyber professionals will gain operational expertise, breadth of experiences and depth of knowledge to conduct cyberspace operations across the spectrum of conflict. The published Cyber Space Warfare Talent Management Framework bends expertise of cyber warfare officers otherwise known as, as you all know, 17Xs into two specific categories. Offensive and Defensive Cyber Effects Operators, also known as 17Xs. And also 17Deltas, identified as Network or combatcom slash expeditionary comms operators. Additionally, a Z prefix will be effects to, will be affixed to an individual who shapes cyberspace by advanced software capability and development regardless of the category. This framework and flexibility empowers our airmen to define their own success. More importantly, let's get this done in a smart, methodical manner. You all should know by 30 September, every 17X will have input, their skill set, their training and their expertise and propose how it best aligns to either the Sierra or the Delta construct. There will be a yearly opportunity to address crossflow. More importantly, this framework highlights identifiable skill sets, expertise and training to provide greater flexibility to explore airmen talent. We are also working talent management frameworks for our enlisted workforce and our fantastic civilian workforce. Those are not quite to the same level and able to hit the finish line, but they will be coming out in the next year. As we refine talent management programs and processes as an enterprise and as capabilities become available, we will expand our ability to place the right airmen in the right place with the right skill sets at the right time. It is something we have not been able to do except for a small minority of force in the cyber mission force. We need to do that for all of our cyber airmen. I do wanna give you two examples of how I hope that you share in these vignettes an illustration of exactly what I'm talking about. My first example is tech sergeant Mike. I'm gonna call him that. Mike is his real first name. Mike's expertise is as a certified instructor and he was identified as a no kidding very talented instructor immediately on a deployment. Instead of keeping him in the job that he was tasked to perform, his leadership forward deployed him to a combat zone with a coalition partner. Now you might think, where's the good deal in that? Stay with me here for a second. While he was forward deployed with our coalition partner, he actually established a tailored training plan for them. He overcame security and resource constraints and he then enhanced the host nation's understanding of how to monitor their infrastructure for potential adversary activity. The Air Force invested in him to develop that expertise. Tech Sergeant Mike capitalized on that experience and just as important, his leadership unleashed him to make extensive changes to support our coalition partner. Another example, just last month I was out at Air Mobility Command and I met one of our stellar cyber protection team members and I'm gonna talk about Tech Sergeant Sarah. She created a threat characterization of an adversary intrusion set outlining specific tactics, techniques and procedures of various intrusion sets to properly defend against them. She worked with the technology, automating the process where possible, rather than using the technology to do her job. These efforts facilitated specific tactical tasks that drove service level defense cyber operations. I go, that is pretty incredible. In each case, one airman made a huge difference, one with coalition partners, one in how we defend our own cyber operations. Tailored training to garner expertise will contribute to the seamless fielding of a few multi-domain capabilities and TTPs yielding advances in this ongoing competition we are at. More importantly, we plan to reduce training burden on the units by overhauling the cyber Air Force Specialty Code awarding courses. In other words, to streamline the current 18 month training requirement for the gaining unit. Our goal is for our airmen to graduate from tech training as initially qualified or IQT in their work roles. This will allow our frontline units to focus squarely on mission qualifications, in other words, MQT, to ensure that their airmen are mission ready. This will reduce training burdens on frontline units. And more importantly, I believe it will allow our airmen the flexibility needed to pursue cyber certification and skill sets commensurate to hone their specific expertise. We must seize the initiative, we must take charge and we must lead the future of cyberspace operations today. As you all know, I've talked at length, we are in an ongoing competition. We can and will define readiness and lethality in a way that every cyber warfare airmen can identify and see the value that they bring to bear. Specifically, we are talking about full spectrum use with targeted precision of Air Force weapons systems. This is power projection in and through cyberspace. It will sustain an agile global command and control capability and ensure we have the ability to effectively communicate. As cyber effects operations and war fighting comes capabilities mature. As talent management and initial chaining requirements advance, we are working hand in hand with multi-domain ISR, information operations and electronic warfare to integrate strategy, policy and guidance in order for the air component commander to employ information warfare to deliver power today and allow us to prepare and fight and win tomorrow. Airmen need exquisite tools and tailored training to be on the loop rather than in the loop. We must achieve decision advantage. What am I talking about? I'm talking about positive identification attribution of a target, a network or a threat that's all done by airmen. We will utilize technology to our advantage coupled with the tailored training and incorporate the right tools for airmen to get inside our adversary's decision loop. ISR, cyber effects operations and war fighting comms airmen are transitioning to work in a virtual, collaborative, multi-domain, cloud based, machine intelligence powered enterprise supported by artificial intelligence and machine capabilities. That's a mouthful, but in essence, what am I really saying? We must be able to gain not only enhanced situational awareness, but to actually get inside the adversary's decision cycle. And it's gonna take all of that technology and it's gonna take all of that training and it's gonna take a comprehensive understanding of how to use tools and advanced TTPs to get there. We are engaged in a battle today for cyberspace and our ability to project power in cyberspace is routinely contested. We must shift our weight to the forefront to be ready to offensively deliver and blunt maneuvers from our peer adversaries now and at any time. Our first steps were to merge the A2 and the A6 into the A26 and develop guidance. The cyber warfare flight plan outlines foundational capabilities, readiness and lethality and disruptive technologies and opportunities. The cyber warfare talent management framework describes an environment that trains and equips the right skills for an initially qualified airman to innovate, to have expertise, to complete with advantage today, compete with advantage today while simultaneously preparing to win in any scenario tomorrow might bring. We will and are demonstrating to our competitors and adversaries alike that they cannot nor will they beat us. In closing, I wanna thank you for the opportunity to speak. More importantly, I wanna thank you for your commitment to move forward, to take on these tough challenges, to move swiftly yet very thoughtfully so that our cyberspace warfare will be utilized, thought of, integrated and planned to the same level as air and space. And with that, I'd like to address any questions you all might have or comments, questions or if somebody wants to throw down what their Peloton best, go ahead. I've had mine for two weeks. I'm still a novice. What do you got? Good afternoon, General Jamison. First question, where do you foresee information operations fitting in to the information warfare domain that you described? Okay, can somebody help me out? Is this a live person or what? I don't see anybody. It's over. Okay, so could you do me a favor? Let me know when it's the booth because I'm sitting here not listening. I'm looking. So could we... Sprite light up there. Okay, could we repeat the question please? Remember, I've been up since 4.30. Where do you foresee information operations fitting into the information warfare domain that you described? It is one of the elements and it's a great question. It's a great question because information operations in today's Air Force and the guidance for it actually resides in the A3. And the situation we have there is in the Air Force, we have really concentrated on operation security or OPSEC. We have in the past invested in some military deception, but we have left MISO and really advanced Mildeck to the Army. We're gonna have to make a decision on what aspects of information operations does the Air Force wanna concentrate on? What do they wanna partner with the Army and the Navy on? And then how are we gonna integrate that into our war fighting constructs, our planning efforts as we integrate in our force presentation to a joint force? It's probably not an answer that you like in the booth, but I see that's really where we're at. Caffeine is a good thing. Next question. China has more advanced IT infrastructure and capabilities. They aggregate massive amounts of information to gain decision advantage. If our senior leaders have all expressed they want policies to change, but it can't seem to get them to change, how are we going to catch up with our near peer competitors? So I'm gonna tell you what I heard. China has a more advanced infrastructure and cyber capability and they are a near peer. And I discount both. First off, China is not a near peer, they are a peer. China does not have an advantage in their infrastructure or their capability for two fundamental reasons. This is my belief. Number one, while they have dictated standard while they have put out a mining effort of data from their nation and population with their big data cities proliferated throughout their country, they don't have a lot of diversity in what they're gathering, nor do they still have the applications of choice. What do I mean by that? The use of our Western devised apps that connect with the globe on their black market are ones that they seek to do. I do agree with you. They have mapped out their population and they do gather the big data and they are working through algorithms to advance that capability. But I fundamentally believe that innovation starts in the soul of a free person who has been brought up always to believe you can do it, you are free to choose. You can develop anything you wanna develop. Their culture does not exist in that manner. They are preordained to the point where the data that they collect, if you do not meet certain standards you are tamped down and you cannot continue to have access to certain automated apps. I think they're gonna have a big struggle. I liken it to where they were probably before the booth was born with their one child policy. And when they came up with it, it was a great idea to control their population. And then they had a 25 million disparity between male and female and marriage is a tough thing when there's not a female to marry. And so they're looking at different ways to get around that. Why do I bring that example up? Because this is a long, this is a long-term competition. It's not gonna be over with 5G, 6G or the internet of things from space. This is going to happen for a very long time until some changes occur. And the competition is about adhering to the norms of the world versus changing the norms of the world. I don't know if I've answered your question, but that's how I'm gonna address it. Next question, ma'am. Intel gain loss risk determination and overclassification have been primary impediments to producing effects by, with, and through cyberspace. How will the merger of ISR and cyber improve upon these challenges? Are you just trying to bait me with that one? For the love of God. Okay, again, what did I hear? Intel gain loss has stunted our ability for cyber operations. I don't agree with that. In any domain when we operate, we have to make assessments of the risk versus the gain. While the authorities have in the past been held extremely high, we were not given some insight into who or what the criteria was to make some of those decisions. As we've seen the some authorities come down, we've seen a shift and a little more transparency into how those decisions are made. And we've also seen how at times, the operation takes priority and at other times, protection of some sources takes priority. That's just how it is in every single domain. I think we're gonna see a better partnership. I think we're gonna see a better understanding of how the two aspects that you outlined and I would also integrate in warfighting comms because if you can't communicate it, it doesn't do you a lot of good. You gotta command and control it when we do that through communication as well. We're just gonna have to work out some frameworks so that we know what the ROE is, what the objective is, and what the end state is, just like we do for every other warfighting aspect. Do I ever get a real person to stand up and ask a question? Come on, I mean, five different aircraft and not one of you is gonna stand up and ask me a question. This is a foul. Forget that. Somebody raise your hand and stand up, please. Yes! Give that man a clap. There we go. Some applause, please. Come on up so that you can use the mic and then, you know, hinterlands can hear you. And it gives me a chance to have a little more soda. Some of us are old enough to remember. How are we doing now contrasting contrast to what we tried to accomplish back then and why did we drop the ball? Well, luckily for all of us, I was a major in the 90s so I have no idea why we dropped the ball. And I think it's sort of the, you know, there's a point to which I would say maybe that's irrelevant, because we have advanced and teamed with technology in a way that in the 90s we could not. You might imagine I had a few hours to read some things this morning and I was reading a white paper by the dib on a zero, I'll probably get this wrong, Bill, throw me a lifeline here. Zero trust, there's an ZBT, zero base trust. And why I bring it up is because I thought it did a great job of explaining how no longer do we look at security in the way we do our home where you lock the front door. Security now has to be looked at like an apartment building where you lock the door to the apartment building but you lock every door in every apartment. And where I'm going with this for information warfare is we are learning and teaming with the technology in 2020. In the 90s we used technology. We didn't really change our processes and we didn't team with it. We just used it to do things we thought faster and we thought we would eliminate paper and how will that go for us? But I think why information operations today? It's about spectrum operations. We understand cyber, electronic warfare, information operations, and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance can come together to give unbelievable, quick speeds of situational awareness and decision capability. We did not have that in the 90s because we did not have the same space architecture. We did not have the same, I gotta say it, IT architecture that we actually have today. I am much more optimistic that we will actually be able to flesh out, put meat on the bones and operate and plan and put them into our planning efforts in a more cohesive, coherent manner than just on off, go, stop, start. And I think that's probably why it got junked. Now we're seeing already in chaos what our non-kinetic cells are integrating. It's not just ISR or cyber or space, it's a fusing of all that capability to include electromagnetic spectrum capabilities. All right, I got four minutes and 20 seconds. Ma'am, how are you? I sent in the email, I'll read it to you real quick. Do you see the Russia-China alliance countering US global dominance as a real threat or are there competing agendas too much for them to overcome, for them to adequately work together? That's a great question. So what I heard was, are Russia and China partnered to overthrow our dominance of the world? Yeah, okay. I don't think we actually have dominance of the world. I don't think that's the makeup of our country, maybe I'm Pollyanna here, but I believe that we actually have coalition partners and allies for a reason so that we are not just, we actually are partnering and we adhere to the rule of law and our world order as it was constructed of which Russia was a part of in 1945. China probably is a little upset they were thought of, but not really a part of making and that seems to be the issue, that they feel as though the Middle Kingdom has been left out of having the ability to actually change world order and therein lies the rest of the thought that I'll propose to you. I got one that is a economically rich, resilient, energized, growing, literate workforce and you have another that is dying younger. Its economic standing is based primarily on one commodity and their culture is sort of one that's in your face. I don't think that this union is one that for the long term can stay balanced and equitable and when you get out of balance, you start to see fractures and you start to see seams. I never underestimate Russia, never underestimate Putin. I'm not saying that she is not a strategist, but they are adhering to a communist party, communist structure, communist with characters is now how they're describing it. You gotta love Putin. He's like, hey, this is free and democratic, it's me. He's not trying to say one thing or another, so you have one and a party. They can come together in some aspects because some of the technology and know-how here is desired here but this strength of an economy and a workforce can overtake this. Putin knows that they're gonna figure out when they're gonna dance and when they're not gonna dance. They only do it when they think it's advantageous against us. I don't see a joining for a long-term reunion. Anybody else have any other thought? 32 seconds, sir. I don't know what happens, I've been gone, so did I get the hook or what? Comments that by next year or so, do you expect the civilians to be involved with more training and such? Are you expecting them to fulfill a role very similar to the 17 exes or is it going to be something else entirely? Well, that's the beauty of a framework with our civilians, Mr. Marion and I. We'll have to get together with our civilians to outline their framework for the future. I didn't outline, General Kennedy didn't outline our future for our officers. We had eight months of working groups where they got together and outlined pieces, parts. We will do the same thing for our civilian workforce. We have been doing that for our enlisted workforce. So I look forward to what you and your peers come up with. As I know, Mr. Marion does as well. With that, I do want to say I'm getting the flash. Thank you all so much for making it really worth five aircraft. I really, really wanted to be a part of this forum. I think it is one of the pivotal forums for the year for all of us and I just thank you for the great questions and your attention. At this moment, I would ask Mr. Marion to stage to present General Jameson a small token of our appreciation. It prevails over plane trains and all of those. Thank you so much for coming out today. It really was the perfect, I know you missed the first part, but went from the infrastructure to AI and then the cyber operations. That is really the relationships that are growing out with great speed and accuracy from the chief and the secretary because that AI, tech, cyber warfare is our business, it's all of our business and it's great that you were able to join us today and share that piece as well. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you, General Jameson. Our next key event will be the Software Factory Collider Panel chaired by Ms. Nelson Burger, Chief Transportation Officer and Director of Cyberspace Innovation. Please be back in your seats by 1355. At this time, we will take a short break followed by Adam Furtado from Kessel Run.