 Well good morning everybody. Thank you Stephen for the introduction. Thank you Thierry for hosting me. I'm proud to be I think one of the two Australians in the audience flying the flag. We're on the cover of the Economist this week but we're thin on the ground in in Morocco. What I'd like to do in a very short period of time is make an argument about the foreign policy consequences of President Trump and I'll touch on four points. First of all his foreign policy instincts, secondly his actions in office, thirdly the limitations on his actions and fourthly reasons to be concerned. So first of all his instincts and let me start exactly actually where Stephen finished. People often say lazily that Mr. Trump is stupid, his views are incoherent but in fact for three decades he has had extremely coherent views on America's role in the world and I think he came to office with more coherent views on America than other recent presidents including President Obama and President Bush. For decades he has held true to four core beliefs and I've come to think of them as the four horsemen of the apocalypse. The first instinct that he brought to office is that he was sympathetic to isolationism or if isolationism is too strong a word then certainly a desire for retrenchment. We heard this during the campaign when he spoke of walling America off from its southern neighbor, reducing America's international commitments. Since the 1940s American presidents have been seized of the advantages of global leadership. Mr. Trump is oblivious to them. Second he was unimpressed by the alliance network through which America has traditionally projected its influence and this is odd because China and Russia would dearly love to have an alliance network as powerful and cost effective as that of the United States. Thirdly as Stephen intimated he was hostile to free trade agreements or at least those that had been negotiated by others of course he could negotiate them much better than anyone else. And finally even before he came to office we noticed his weird affinity for strong men such as Vladimir Putin. By contrast he was notably lukewarm about democratically elected leaders including in the European and Asian countries to which the United States has been allied. So those are the four instincts that he brought to office. The four horsemen of the apocalypse. Secondly I would argue that in office those instincts have in many respects in many important respects informed America's policies. Now this was an argument I had with lots of analysts at the time of his election. A lot of my colleagues said the American system will wrap its arms around Mr. Trump and he will end up as a much more orthodox foreign policy president than you might imagine. But as a friend of mine said never underestimate the impact of Mr. Trump on Trump foreign policy. Let me go through those four horsemen of the apocalypse and point out where his instincts have informed his actions. First of all the instinct for retrenchment. We saw that in his junking of the Iran deal pulling out of the Paris Accord or even in the last week the INF Treaty. Secondly his skepticism to alliances we see all the time. He refused to endorse the collective security guarantee of the NATO Treaty for many months. He later threatened the United States could go its own way if delinquent allies did not meet spending demands. He ran down bilateral treaties with countries such as South Korea and Australia. On free trade he withdrew from the TPP on his first full day in the White House and he imposed hundreds of billions of dollars of tariffs on China. And finally on strong men and his preferred interlocutors. He has pursued his fixation with Mr. Putin to a degree that is difficult to understand. Refusing to stand up for American democracy accepting Mr. Putin's word over that of his own intelligence community blaming all the problems with US-Russia relations on America on past American behavior rather than Mr. Putin's behavior or indeed his interference in the US the 2016 election. Mr. Trump enjoys hanging out with a posse of authoritarians including Mr. Duterte, Mr. Orban, Mr. Salvini and Kim Jong-un who is running rings around a lovesick president. So that's my second argument that his instincts have largely informed US foreign policy. However third there are important limits on his actions. The president's writ does not run everywhere and two factors in particular have limited the Trump influence on his own foreign policy. The first is much discussed and that is opposition within his own administration. The so-called deep state. The adults in the room who have to some extent prevented the president from doing irreparable damage to America's alliances and foreign relationships. They have authored strategic documents such as the national security strategy and the national defense strategy that reflect orthodox rather than Trumpian policies and somehow got Trump to sign off on them. Thank goodness for the deep state I say. However most of the adults have now left the room and there are persistent rumors that the last two standing John Kelly and Jim Mattis will soon follow the others out the door perhaps in a couple of weeks. So that's the first limitation. The secondly, secondly and this is less discussed, the president lacks the patient's discipline and interest to implement his will. The truth is President Trump is not really interested in solving policy problems. He is interested in being seen to win. His style is to make a bold and unexpected move, declare victory and move on. Few believe that not having an Iran nuclear deal is a better way of preventing the Iranians from acquiring nuclear weapons than having one. Few really believe that North Korea will demuclearize but that is to miss the point about President Trump. He is not interested in having victories, he's interested in being seen to win. So the deep state's resilience and the president's lack of interest have combined to limit the damage that Mr Trump has done. He has put America's interests in jeopardy, he has damaged international society, he has run down America's prestige but he has not yet done irreversible harm. However let me finish on this point. There are two reasons I think we should be a little nervous. First, Mr Trump has not yet faced an externally generated crisis. Most of his problems have been internally generated. Sooner or later he will face an externally generated crisis. We remember that President Obama came to office right in the teeth of the global financial crisis. Can you imagine if we had a similar crisis now and our last line of defence in the Oval Office was Mr Trump? Secondly, he could be goaded into making the kind of catastrophic error he hasn't yet made, such as starting an unnecessary war. So those are the reasons to be nervous. Steven, let me finish on one final point. In 2015 I gave a series of public lectures in Australia and I was concerned then about the fraying of the international order. And so I called the first of these lectures present at the destruction. And this was a play on Dean Atchison's memoir about the establishment of the post-war order present at the creation. And I argued then that the country around which the post-war order was constructed, the United States was stepping back from the world, other countries such as Russia and China were stepping in, the pillars supporting the order were weak, the principles that defined the order were under challenge. I said the order is not necessarily finished, but it is certainly fraying. And I was criticised at the time, including by the Australian Prime Minister for being overly gloomy, as is the way with the Australian Prime Ministers, he has now left the stage. But ladies and gentlemen, three years later, after Brexit, after the election and many other leaders, including Mr Duterte and others, and after the election of Mr Trump, no one is now saying that I was too gloomy. Thank you.