 And I'm not saying we'll sort of give her a public opinion, but we should be madly willing to do it more. And they would say I was really distressed by what we just saw in the previous presentation. And I learned a great deal from it, despite the fact that I had written roomously on the subject and both for those ones. I was not aware of many facts that he's quoted. My analysis, however, is of a more historical character. And what I am looking at is the modern welfare state, and how it came about historically and ideologically. One of the points that I find amazing in my books on the development of the modern material state is we now have necessarily development here. I'm not saying that living in another type of welfare state would necessarily be heaven. But the welfare state that we now live under has a very specific character. It is driven by the idea of equality and by the idea of universalization of universalism. Not all welfare states, as they've existed in the past, had the same ideals or were as comprehensive in their relation to the individuals of subjects and the other. And when it goes back to the late 19th century to the 20th century, it seems that the other models of welfare states, some of them, well, the concern of the disarmament state was a very good example of that. And sometimes I hear the mistaken, in fact, ridiculous idea that Obama's and Jewish and Bismarck, no, he's not, in fact, he's not. We are a thing called a spike element. He's a much more rattle of political figure who has just gotten much more control. For certain, those who are behind him are much more in control over the certain conditions of those who happily forged a bad portion of the name in the state that is being developed, political orders that have been developed. But the 19th century welfare state, but it wasn't the one, was mostly of a defensive nature. It was an attempt to co-opt a working class so they would not support social revolutionaries to make them supportive of the official ruling class, something that had begun under the Louis de Beaumont and France, which is continued by the Germans, which to some extent is represented in the British and Polish monarchy. And I don't think it was ever any pollution entertained by those who were stupidish policy and certainly never gave any other impressions about what they were doing. They basically wished that the working class would be coming radicalized, and therefore tried to offer them social programs that were compatible with a traditional stratified society. And even in the old sense of the term, in the authoritarian state, and I'm not using the word in any way of the sense, I mean, it was a traditional authority and people accepted it, but it was a very limited nature and certainly relevant to what the state would become. The welfare state has now exist, I think, is to some extent a product of the Swedish socialism in the 1920s, which I think is an indispensable stage getting into socialism developed after the Second World War. And already in Sweden in the 1920s, there was a kind of cradle to brave socialism that was developed. And although it travels in those pro-Nazi companies for a while and talks about the DNA or stand up, nor upgrades and so forth, by the time you got to the post-World War period, the Swedish social experiment very deftly is a recognized or leftist task. And already in the 1920s, of course, this feminist policy is a little, back then, part of this feminist policy was to get as many more women to be your children as one could, but at the same time, allow them to work and create nurseries where they would be raised. And it was a great deal of stress on equality and economically distribution within the nation. And this is in some ways compatible with what is fascist welfare states, the Italian fascist welfare state, which in some ways is a primitive foreshadowing of what the welfare state then becomes. It's not that fascism is something for which we are moving. It's a much more limited model of social and economic control when they have seized. But Sweden is an economic dabbler who basically pays off interest, economic interest in this country. Where Obama is doing right now, he did it on a much more modest scale. And people ran around in uniform and sang songs and they were interested in iconography. But the welfare state, aside from certain kind of rhetoric about the workers and the owners of this revolving part of the accountability as seen in the Cappadella Lado, which comes out in the 1999, mid-1920s, does not really go very far in terms of economic redistribution. And in many ways, the counter-fascism I think illustrates Eric Stoltz's notion that the fascism is a counter-revolutionary limitation of the left. I don't think we would dance to that. The Nazi model, of course, is much more vicious and brutal than the moralistic. But economically, aside from sort of being Jews and engaging various terrorist acts, they don't change the economy of the country very decisively. And the communists, of course, do. But there is a relatively short-life experiment, except for Russianists. And in Eastern Europe, there's simply members of the garrison state imposed by Soviet occupation which then proceeds to brutalize the population and carry out various social experiments that would simply increase the poverty. But all of this will end with the removal of Soviet armies. What becomes the winning model among these competing models of welfare state government becomes something like the Swedish social monarchy as modified by Anglo-American democratic institutions. And this is really the victory of the United States. The victory in the Second World War there becomes the archetypal, quote, of typical democracy. And it stands for freedom and democracy against the Soviet empire. And it also stands for capitalism of a very strange kind. I'm always amused when I read French Marxist denouncing French communism in a society of the very large welfare state. And in a society in which the airline and other industries walk in state, but yet this represents the most vicious form of interesting removalism for the Marxist and the social select. The reality, of course, is you do not have examples of, let's say, fair capitalism in these countries. What they represent is Western capitalist democracies. It's kind of halfway house. They are partly socialist. They are partly capitalist. They are partly liberal in the 19th century since they have usually some constitutional documents, certainly in the case of the Americans, going back to late Asian century. And the British have a number of constituencies. Theoretically, going back to, I don't know, Abel for some ancient figures, the reality, of course, is that all of us move in a particular direction, which is toward egalitarian democracy, bureaucratic control, and something moving like socialism, but never quite becoming socialist. And this becomes the importantist welfare state model. And another one of the points that I think needs to be emphasized is that the reason this model wins is because the other models of welfare state lose the Soviet model, the communist model, which is kind of going to start. And the fascist model, which is a kind of counter-revolutionary petition of the right, and the Nazi model, which leads to a little disaster. So by default, the American model wins, which is really the Anglo-American model, since the British have pretty much the same model, but it's a little more advanced and a little socialist. And this is modified by messages in both liberal heritage and by some continued on which being paid to the free market, particularly when you're ending the communist and egalitarian socialism. It becomes necessary, even if you're moving a large democratic welfare state to speak of yourself as the defenders of capitalism, engaged in a worldwide struggle against socialism or socialist communism. If one looks at the East German and the East German governments, you're looking at one as a socialist democratic government and the other as a Soviet socialist government to say that one represents socialism, the other represents capitalism, is an overstatement, this leading overstatement. But this is what one typically could have thought before. Another important factor to understand what the welfare state becomes is to look at what I call a Malaysian model of the interwar period. And it's something that I think which gave a fairer dimension to the belief that some of all people, I think a certain Hans mentioned this in his humorous remarks this morning, that all people are really the same, they're all interchangeable. There are no ethnic, cultural, gender differences. And all people can equally socialize by an inevitable, presumably all powerful state, the one who should vote. And then at some point in the future you all become the same. And part of this is the infat injection of genetics, heredity, and new behavior. Now I, for one, do not believe that this is the result of Nazism, not the effect of it. This may have intensified the tendency, but it goes back into the interwar period. And in the interwar period you have schools that have an apology, sociology, development, mostly in the United States, basically like the Romeo and John Hopkins, which will make an argument against any kind of red-terminated influence in the United States. And it will also push the argument that the state can socialize people in a sexual way as to make them all perform at pretty much the same level. And the only reason they're not performed at the same level is because of discrimination or unfair economic privilege, conditions that the government should be able to move in a relatively short period of time. And you do it democratically. And to be democratic, A, it was everybody who voted for it. Particularly the condition that they were on. Age and age were the people who were all voted for it. So they were democratic. And the other thing is to make people more equal quality is the essence of democracy, right? And everyone is equal. As the Greeks would say, come on old days. So the quality of this is the necessary foundation in a little bit forward. And what works to bring the second notion into the mix, the universally egalitarianism, the notion of violent anti-control, is that the welfare state then will become emboldened to try things that go well beyond simply means of leaving money, but providing everybody with great grief, security. And now this is the socialized agreement. And here, of course, we come to the war against the million system demon, fascism. But now, fascism can mean everything from not treating co-votees who smell the body over and people who seem discriminating against extra group of white people. They're not against your things, that's what they say. We're encouraging that. And I think there's an end to that. But other groups are often treated equally. And at the same time, we are trying to win the dominant group for, I suppose, white, male, old, Western Christian, of any vestiges of past discrimination, attitudes that might lead them to treat people like equally. Because any sign of equality would lead inevitably to second elections. I mean, it's both from one to the other. It's very easy moving forward. Any unwillingness to accept unlimited numbers of political immigrants will then be re-educated by the state. And be given a form of action shows an inclination or a fact which itself can lead you to another public cost. So as long as you keep people aware of these problems, they're very convivial. We've learned, as long as they are implicated in certain attitudes to public education, to the media, that it would be possible to go on socializing that. So I think what happened is, once we could introduce this element of re-socialization and fascism, is that the welfare state becomes much more aggressive and all-encompassing in its mission than it did before. This is sort of the second state. Now, sort of looking back at it, one of the questions that I sort of asked myself in retrospect is it possible for the welfare state to develop differently than necessarily how to go in the multicultural anti-factual direction? And what I say is there are counterfactuals I can come up with. They can say, well, you could have remained something like an Irish Catholic state, an Ireland, a plural of fascism, or a Polish nationalist state, or something like that. But this could only exist, one might say, within very, very small groups, relatively small groups. It would certainly not work in a, what is really a kind of multinational nation state, an American nation state, but a multinational empire. You could not push something like this. But so it raises a diverse population, it's these diverse cultures that is almost impassable to impose these more colloquial groups in the welfare state, really, by religion, nationality, and so forth. And in this respect, America against the model, because the United States is, here is the idea of concern. It's a global democracy. We are global, but to the sense that one can try to absorb everybody, and the other thing is that we're successful, we'll be able to make the rest of the world look like New York City, just like moving our armies, and moving our media from one place to the next. So this, in a sense, becomes the American model. I mean, it's global, it's a global welfare state. It also has a global vision, because it cannot tolerate human inequalities anywhere else. We have to go to Iraq to make sure that if women's rights, and they live in a secular state, that they become like Americans. But the notion that some other democracies never fight each other, of course, overbooks the inconvenient fact that they sometimes fight brutal war as more brutal than other societies. But also that the notion of global democracy is an invitation to continue in the hearings. It's not that I don't know, it's once you are safe, you're safe in the rest of the world, because the other Europeans, they tend to fight fascism in their own countries. Americans insist on fighting the same demons all over the world, or did it to work recently. And sometimes they don't do it brutally. So at the well, the democratic welfare state not only, in my say, is concerned with re-socialization of its own population, or socialization of its population, re-socialization of the old folks like me, the young folks that we socialize with once. But it also is interested in reaching out to other parts of the world, and to bringing them into the community of the mean. And there's also, I think, a kind of myth that deserves to be explored in America, that countries like it represent, the use of the words of Erwin Crisco, one of his many of the tutorials for the Wall Street Journal, America's a democratic, capitalist welfare state. This is almost like describing a country as a Nazi communist, humanitarian government. I mean, it contains all kinds of problematic terms that I'm not familiar with, that we would have to sort of unpack. Democratic states do not remain capital states forever. Because the tendency of democracy is to explore a greater quality, and to the majority of the population voting to distribute income, and we're seeing this unfairly among the managers. The welfare state, at some point, is gonna start to lead me into the capitalism. And I think it's not a majority, but a majority of the German citizens are well-searched. The majority of the American citizens are well-searched. It is, in many ways, the logical outcome, or the culmination of a democratic welfare state. And I think we'll see, if we have seen for a very long time, is a kind of perperous coexistence of qualities or attributes that are not necessarily multi-coaches forever. And I think you have to look at freedom in terms of this life of democracy. It's going to work very well. If you look at the free economy, I suppose single vote would be better. It would, you know, the free economy, and it's a fairly controlled society, and it's not very democratic. But if people are given votes, they will vote in the street, in the economy, particularly when public education, and other institutions that coexist with our democracy, push them in the same direction. The problem is, once you have made this way through the devil's eyes, once you've asked the government to start reducing people's income, and to deal with economic and social inequalities, you will encounter the state of other things as well. And if you look at the United States, the economic freedom is probably more secure than other folks' freedom. I think freedom of expression, freedom of opinion, is probably more safe than economic freedom. There used to be, when I was a little kid, why do you believe that once you have, this is a typical liberal argument, probably Bob Hitchman used to say, you know, we believe in verbal intellectual freedom. It's not a reasonable property. Well, it's sort of a different point where they've got the race for even property, income, all kinds of other things, but this seems to be a less of a problem than verbal control. And I think this is really part of the, that it's not just the one kid, it's all the people in the welfare state, as it becomes more and more interesting socialization. Without necessarily abandoning economic distribution, what is going to suffer, even more in that kind of freedom, will be fought, will be fought. And I think in the United States, those who say this is the case, I think that the United States is on the same path that Europe is moving right here. And I suspect that in 10 years' time, we may, in some ways, become insurmountable. I would like to believe, well, the only thing that is possible is that the government and they move in this way and we lose some kind of backlash, which I pray, this made, in fact, happen. And it made it so catastrophic, in fact, to be overwhelming. And that's what I hope, because the other, more likely, outcome, and if you're obeying them, you'd better not come in too. I think when you come more like Europe, we'll be more in thought control, more political correctness, more thoughtless, hate speech laws, together we'll be doing more in another institution. Now, I really need to leave you with this, these unhappy thoughts. Therefore, I would like to perhaps focus on how to help everyone, in which the people who rise up, the Americans who rise up and react against this, before it is too late. And the point that I make so long is that so much of the socializing process is left in the hands of the state. And the state is assisted by the media, which has become what I call priesthood and material state. It is very, very hard to divorce these friends. And another problem, which I think one faces, political parties become simply accessories to the manager of the state. All ideology becomes, in a sense, a function of getting favors to the manager of the state. So the Republican Party of the United States is making this much redistribution of the Democrats. They do this pretty much the same things. They just go to get a government over the back, together with this government, it's good. They do the same things. The Christian Democrats in general, and the social Democrats, basically, with other socials in the party, the political parties have become useless vehicles of change. And therefore, it has to look for the self-possibility outside of the parliamentary system or the party system. There are a referendum in the United States, which in honor of this is very much on me, people can occasionally vote down bad things. The problem is the same people that turn around and vote for political parties that do all the bad things they didn't do against. And their kids are going to be brainwashed by the public educators, and by the need of their parents and the kids by the media. So whatever happens, or what would happen to bring a better change has to be so catastrophic, so apocalyptic, that I can barely imagine what it would be. But I think this system is very much in place. And perhaps looking retrospectively or finding a retrospective as to how we got here, I suppose it's mostly active, anthologists, looking at from the location. But I suppose that's about it for today. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.