 Do you have a city? I have a city, right? So I'll start with you. Welcome to the post-lab session. Am I working? My name is Nancy Molacala. I think some of you met me this morning in an earlier session. I'm with the Asia Foundation. And this is our plenary session on Asian approaches to private sector engagement in development cooperation. And we're running it as a panel discussion. It's quite relevant, I think, the minister's comments this morning about the centrality of the private sector in the future of Australian aid. And it's not unusual to hear people speak of the 21st century as a new era of development cooperation or a world beyond aid. We hear that a lot. Declining ODA and the rise of other sources of development like finance has led to an overall reassessment of the dominant aid paradigm. And this reassessment is really the back story of the current narrative about the value and centrality of the private sector to development. The old model of aid is perceived as expensive, ineffective, and is using popularity and relevance amongst many stakeholders, donors, partners, public constituents. And investment, production, and trade are seen as the drivers of economic growth and consequently development. And this was clearly affirmed by the minister this morning. This isn't a new story for Asian countries where private sector investment has been a pillar of their South-South cooperation strategies for decades. And likewise in the era of the SDGs we're seeing more emphasis placed on the role of the private sector. However, there is pressure on the private sector to deliver more than profits. So it's not just about business as usual. So our panel today will try to unpack some of these issues from an Asian as well as an Australian perspective, a government, and a private sector perspective. So I'll introduce the panel quickly. First is Gua Pei Guant, who is the general manager of Sintow in China and chairman of Sintow Green Finance. So he's a specialist in corporate social responsibility and socially responsible investment, and has worked with over 100 companies, governments, and social organizations in China and abroad. Hianjin Jian is the manager of corporate social responsibility at LG Electronics, a firm I'm sure you're all familiar with, where she works on creating and implementing social contribution projects in partner countries. And she also works on devising LG's global social contribution policy and guidelines. Prabhupada Saxena is the principal secretary of the government of Himachal Pradesh. And prior to this, he was a senior advisor to director at the Asian Development Bank and he's also served in several senior positions in India on major issues involving India's economic diplomacy. And finally, Simon Crack is the director of Private Sector Development in Australian DFAT, and has played a central role in DFAT's aid policy and strategy on engaging the private sector. He's also leading a number of innovative initiatives designed for private sector engagement in development cooperation. So we're going to have some discussion with our panel members first and then we hope to have ample time for questions from the audience. Simon, first for you, maybe you can tell us a little bit more about Australian's policy around private sector engagement. A few years ago, there was little to no engagement with the private sector, Australian or international in the development of Australian aid policy strategy or programming. And today DFAT has a strategy to engage the private sector Is this something... Is this like old wine and new bottles? Is this like a new form of tidade or can you give us some... Just demystify it for us. It's always good when you lead with a question of tidade. Thank you. Sorry, does that work? So I'll maybe start with the overall context for why the engagement with the private sector started back in 2014 with the development of the new aid policy at the time whose objectives remain largely unchanged from before, which was to promote prosperity, poverty and enhanced stability. But around that time there was a little bit more investigation around exactly what I guess are the conditions that would help us to be able to transition out of a relationship based on aid to one based on economic partnership and a lot of that work really flushed out how important the private sector and private sector growth was going to be to that transition. The stats are something like around 90% of jobs, 60% of investment, 80% of government revenue in developing countries is generated out of the private sector. So without their growth we weren't probably going to get too far to sustainably. The other thing that was helpful for us because around that time it was one thing to be developing that narrative nationally, but the whole post-MDG discussion as it moved into the SDGs, 2030 and then also the financing for development commitments they were all pointing to this change narrative which said the traditional partners and I'll just maybe a quick reflection on your words before like the old, the boring I think we certainly don't have to, but let's call it the traditional partners. They just couldn't keep doing the heavy lifting. The job was getting too big, too complicated and there was an emergence of a range of other people that had assets that could bring to the development effort and were quite happy to do so, but we sort of didn't have a very clear narrative for how that would happen. So 2030 was really, really important for the government I think in situating its own move to more private sector engagement. So then the task is to sort of make that logical, I guess, and that's what led to the development of ministerial statement creating shared value and that, a lot of that was predicated on, this is a bit of a different way to do things, so it was as much about us understanding what it meant for us as well as pitching ourselves to almost like a new partner, exactly what would we offer them and what did we want from them. So there was a lot of work and a lot of, I guess, introspection in a way to try and think about how we needed to pitch ourselves when traditionally governments in the development business never had to come up with a pitch for themselves. They were a compulsory part of every transaction. So that was a little bit different. So the position that the government adopted has, I guess, a number of features, which I'll just go through very quickly because I've got a short amount of time. So what it does is it adds the new approach adds the private sector as a partner. It doesn't displace everybody else and I think that's really, really important. So if you look at it like a pie chart, all it does is it says before we had a pie that had the players that we all know, but there was a big chunk missing, which was the private sector and all it does is it adds them no displacement. In fact the more intentional fostering of cross sector collaboration is probably the biggest feature of the private sector policy, although we had to call it a private sector policy because you can't call a policy the cross sector collaboration policy because it doesn't sound so fancy. The concept of shared value was also really important for us. We hunted around a long time to try and find some concepts or some frameworks that could talk to the private sector and talk to us and our traditional partners in the same way and shared value was the framework that emerged. I won't go into it in detail. You probably know what it means. But that was important because it meant we didn't have to keep justifying and explaining what it was, like it was our own policy. Business and other organizations and other platforms were already doing that and already developing that orthodoxy. So it allowed us to slot in and focus on the job at hand which was actually trying to do it rather than defend a narrative or defend a new policy position. The private sector engagement is not only about advancing private sector development which is a key, I guess almost like the obvious entry point growing the inclusiveness and size of the private sector in the countries where you work. But it's just as much about bringing new perspectives and capacity and ideas to our existing work on human development. So private sector engagement covers the whole thing. It's a way of saying there's no longer a taboo about working with the private sector. You can go and do it. It doesn't mean that you have to be out there growing the private sector. If you just want to bang around some ideas and get some different perspective that's equally valid. The big one for us and I think this is the thing a lot of people really struggle with and we still struggle with is to maintain a focus on the development objectives. This is not about going to business and saying what do you want from us. We all have a job to do whether you're an NGO or think tanks or whether you're a government doing development that job still remains exactly the same. This is about saying you've got a new partner to have that discussion with. But if they can't help you advance your objectives in case the Australian government then it might be a very short conversation. The important thing with the private sector I guess like any partner respectfully is to get to that point as quickly as possible and not waffle around. So being really clear about what you want, saying what you want or if they don't have a good response to what you want then you go and have another conversation. I think that's really important to maintain that discipline. The task of development is obviously increasingly complex so we need to bring the full range of assets to the table and I think that the financing for development at a Savabar commitments we're really, really clear about that is that this is about trying to get everything to the table otherwise we're not going to crack this particular nut. There's a number of other things which I might leave for later because I've taken too much time but I might just quickly touch on the tide aid point. The Australian aid program is an untied aid program which is still a little bit unusual in the developed world and becoming more unusual but I think the Australian government's position is very clear on this. If we're going to get the best bang for our buck we have to be able to work with anybody, whoever can get us there and that includes the private sector. So if it's the private sector, if it's an NGO if it's an NGO and the private sector, if it's whatever we, where the words we use is we're partner agnostic and that's really important. So that's at the heart of what the tide aid question is about and I think what's been really helpful for us is that Australian business as we've talked to them are very supportive of that position. They don't want a free kick or anything they're saying yeah okay that's fine but then they follow up with but if we're as good as someone else do we get to play and it's like absolutely. So I think they're quite happy with that level playing field and that certainly made it a lot easier for the government and then maybe just to finish off this particular position our mission, I mean we're doing a lot more work here in Australia reaching out to Australian businesses to make them aware of this policy change and we do want to see Australian businesses and we get a lot of foreign governments and a lot of foreign businesses saying they would like to see more Australian business presence there. It's easy for us to go out and have this conversation but what's just as exciting possibly even more exciting is the outreach that our missions are now doing in country with partner government businesses and we've got a number of initiatives now where we're starting to partner directly with businesses in other countries Vietnamese businesses, Indonesian businesses and that's a really important thing to be able to demonstrate to our partner governments that the Australian government is deadly serious about this idea of growing their economy and building up their economy to the point where we can transition to full economic partnership and that's not going to happen just by using this as a Trojan horse for Australian business to get in there that's that you know everyone can see through that quite transparently so it's really important we're able to demonstrate that and I think that's going to be a really key feature of what happens in the future with this. Thanks, thanks Simon. There's some interesting contrast between what you have just described as the Australian policy which as you say is partner agnostic and you know now really bringing the private sector to the table that's in contrast to the Asian kind of South-South cooperation model which has been around for decades and the private sector has been part of the equation for decades but it's never for India for example you know it's never been about aid it's more been about mutual benefit so the word tying I mean it's implicitly tied you know it is definitely linked to companies in Asia to Indian companies in your case and public-private partnerships are really the backbone of India's cooperation with its partners so what can you tell us like how is the private sector playing a leading role in India through your work you come from the government side and what is the government doing to encourage more private sector investment and cooperation that achieve both economic as well as social outcomes Thank you Anthya I would say that the private sector had a very interesting evolution in India because prior to independence there was no public sector as such except railways which was run by British but we had few very illustrious big companies and to some extent they supported the independence movement but when we became independent in 1947 then the country preferred a model called socialist model where they gave premenence to public sector so much so that it was called that they occupy quote-unquote commanding heights of the economy and some of the infrastructure projects were very fondly referred to as temples of modern temples of democracy so that was the prominence which was given to public sector and the private sector also grew but under government protection and it all changed in 91 when because of a huge economic crisis India decided to go for integration and globalization dismantled the licensed regime and it encouraged the private and the foreign enterprise to come to the country interestingly the causes at that time were not very happy because they have been operating under a regime of protection and they thought that the competition, particularly the competition from the foreign companies will actually render them out of business but what happened after 91 is a very spectacular story. Indian industry, private sector has overtaken the public sector by many notches and they have not only established themselves in India but they are now you can see them all over the world in fact some of the biggest employers in UK at the moment are Indian companies so the Indian industry as we see today is only 25 years old prior to that it was playing a very, very third or fourth fiddle to the public sector. As of now I would say if you look at the industrial production there would be about 80% and the public sector would be about 20%. Now coming to the south-south cooperation I think the first major step was taken in 2004 when government of India came up with a scheme called lines of credit and the scheme is officially called IDEA Indian Development and Economic Assistance Scheme. Under this scheme the Indian companies are encouraged to go and have an overseas environmental cooperation project. Now what happens is that government of India signs a contract with a particular government where they say two things. Number one you choose the project but once we have decided the project and we have identified the project the execution will be done by an Indian company and 75% to 85% depending upon the nature of the project goods and services will be sourced by the government of India. So the government of India said that we will provide it on a concessional basis and the concessional cost will be borne by government of India. So that is how for the first time in 2004 the Indian companies were pushed into doing developmental projects particularly in neighborhood and Africa. So this has now acquired a very sizable proportion of the statistics which I have for this panel. So far about 20 billion US dollars projects have been sanctioned by government in the last one decade. I don't know in PPP terms maybe it will be around 70 billion US dollars. So this was the first time when the private companies entered into these markets and all type of people went small business people went some fly by night operators went some only traders went some only suppliers went and some very reputed companies went and they thought that this can be an entry point it's not a point of no return. So let us do some good work so that even when the project of under sponsored by government of India gets exhausted we stay there and there are not many companies who are probably executing more projects which they have secured there on competition of credit. So these companies have not only confined them to developmental project but with a long time vision. Long term vision is to stay there and to help these people with their innovation with their expertise and with their finance. The corporate social responsibility as we call it actually came officially in India in 2014 with an amendment in the company Z when they say that there is a constraint there is a constraint the constraint is that you have to do it within the country and in the area where the factory is located preferably. So whatever funds these companies have utilized for doing such type of activities in Africa is not because of their obligation under the companies act because the company acts stick them to do only in India but because of of establishing a closer contact with the people. So therefore you will find that many companies have opened hospitals in some of these countries and prominent telecom companies training about 10,000 people in 4 countries of Africa for IT related activities. Similarly a very prominent pharmaceutical company of India in 4 HIV infected African countries have said that they will provide ARB medicines for 1 dollar a day which is a huge substantial reduction from the market price. They have also come up with the HIV mother baby packet of 6 to 25 dollars. So these are some of the activities which very prominent companies of India are doing other than what they are supposed to do as a part of the developmental cooperation for which obviously they are going to be able to get a project of India. In 2015 about 7, 8 months back government of India has now come up with a new scheme. He says under the line of credit program we help you to get a project. Now you go and get a project on your own anywhere but if you are able to secure a project which is in place you can provide you interest subvention. So this is a new scheme which has come up which will further push Indian companies into many of these countries under south-south cooperation. That's interesting that there's clearly a much more proactive role that can be played by the private sector now in seeking out lines of credit. So the government is giving a bit more free space for that. Now let's move on to China. China is the other economic heavyweight in our region. China is also ranked by OECD standards as the sixth largest donor if you look at aid. Chinese overseas investment also keeps increasing. So in 2014 Chinese outbound investment reached $123 billion more than 20 times its level in 2004. Like India, investment is a core pillar of Chinese south-south cooperation. Yet there's no shortage of negative press or negative media about Chinese investments overseas. We see that all the time. So from your view and in terms of your work as well, what is the Chinese government doing to promote sustainable Chinese investment helping to articulate what China is doing in other countries in terms of working with companies to work overseas? Well, thanks. First of all, thanks for inviting me. And this morning I joined some of this action and China has been already frequently mentioned for several times. Which is quite normal. As you said, they want to talk about China. And I think not only Chinese companies overseas investment, but also Chinese government overseas development aim. I think these are new to us. So I think we are still learning and we are still new to this area. So if we are new, we will have a lot of challenge because we need to because these challenges are not the same challenges that we face when we're investing domestic market, domestic China. So I think what the Chinese government is doing, I think basically we are as what I can observe from China, from a more like a global perspective, I think Chinese government are doing three things. One, I think the government realize that we have a lot of challenge on social and environmental perspective when our company is overseas. The Chinese company, they invest completely in different social context and economic context. For example, trade union. In China, we have one trade union. We have trade union, but we have one trade union. Therefore, the company only need to deal with one trade union. But when they invest overseas, different. So we have a lot of challenges in this. So my feeling when I talk to some Chinese company, I think they want to be good guys, but they don't know how. Because that's completely different challenge, completely different issues. So I think the first thing that the government is doing now is to tell company how. And what are the issues and how. Because the government wants to tell companies how. So the first thing we can do is to write documents. Which means guidelines. And it works under Chinese context. Because if government document or guidance, the company will take a series. No matter it is voluntary or mandatory. Most of the company, particularly state-owned enterprise, will follow that. So I can tell you how many guidelines we have. The first guideline that I can realize is around five or eight years ago, it's about Chinese overseas investment on forestry and timber industry. So you can search and you can got this guideline if you want from the internet. I think it's also available in English. And in recent three or four years, we have two other new guidelines. One is important in this country. And we have the government asked mining association to develop the mining industry CSR guidance for overseas investment. And another one is the third one I can remember is contractor. So we normally Chinese company will operate the infrastructure building infrastructure in other countries and it's about contracting business. So we also have a guidance, CSR guidance for the contractors. And right now two other guidance are under development. One is palm oil. And another one is palm oil and I don't remember another one. But palm oil is under process and this is collaboration between Chinese government and the British government. So I think the first thing the government is doing is to develop the guideline to tell company how to do it. The second thing we are doing is to encourage country to follow some existing well established guideline of principle in the world. For example I work on green finance or responsible investment area and if you talk to banks then globally they need to consider equator principle. So the first bank in China John equator principle was in 2008 and the government encouraged the bank to participate in equator principle and last year we have another bank John side doctor equator principle and there are also some other guideline of principle like many also side doctor investment company started to look at UN principle for responsible investment and in 2015 UN have the SDG sustainable development goals and end of last year China developed a white paper for fulfilling this or promoting this sustainable development goal in China and it is clearly mentioned that the government wants to see private sector engagement in this sustainable development goal and I think this is the second thing. The third thing the government is doing is trying to build collaboration and dialogue with international organization and I think the first group of international organization it's more like UN, like UNDP and some electoral partnership with GISA in Germany and with DFID in UK for UNDP UNDP in 2015, two years ago collaborate with the military of foreign, military of commerce in China to develop the Chinese overseas investment and sustainable development. That's also a very big report that it's available in English and by doing so I think we are trying to push the dialogue and facilitate the dialogue between private sector and international organization and of course I think international NGO now I think we want to build a connection or Chinese companies started to explore the possibility of building connection with international NGO but I think the process is still quite slow yet and we will expect to see more on this in the near future. Just have one short follow up question you said that there's a lot of guidelines that the Chinese government is putting out and that you said that the companies all follow them so that's a little bit in contradiction of what we heard this morning in the plenary session with Michael Wolcock that regardless of all the guidelines that are out there when it comes to implementation it doesn't necessarily happen so how is that, how do you make sure that the guidelines are followed? That's a good correction I can give you an example on the mining industry as I said the mining association in China called CCCMC they developed the guideline for responsible investment for Chinese mining industry in other country and the guideline was produced like three years ago and last year they started to do capacity building and that evaluation and assessment are part of this follow up capacity building program so I have to say that we have the guideline but it takes some time for the company to fulfill the guideline to learn the guideline and to implement the guideline like what we discussed this morning I think the unique thing for us in China is that the development speed of China is really fast so we have to do it we will face many challenges in a short period of time and therefore I also want to ask that we need to be patient to see the change development area it's a long term area we will not be able to see change in one year, two years sometimes we need five or ten years to see the change so the same case for Chinese companies thank you next question LG Electronics is a global multinational but with Korean roots and it has a long experience of working in partner countries so can you tell us a little bit about how LG has addressed some of the issues we've been talking about around sustainable investments okay first of all thank you very much for inviting me this meeting for conference and I I'm working for the LG our business in more than five years so it means that we have to follow up all national laws or guidelines which your government and your government give us throughout my experience so far I realize that a few years ago when I joined the development conference run by UN at that time even though they talk about private finance on development but I feel like I'm very minority still struggling and argue about whether they will accept us or not so a few years later as of now still I feel like I'm minority but I feel very safe and being here is quite nice so thank you a lot thanks a lot and our company run our business in more about 60 years in several countries and throughout our experience we realize that now it's like a landscape is changing a lot for example since we have a business in America or Europe and in Australia there are a lot of requests from our clients and the stakeholders such as clients or NGOs or consulting firms who lease their ranking of the sustainability so in terms of sustainability it includes human rights, labour, environment so all kind of sustainable issues are involved that's why we have to be healthy at first so for example last year we got a request from 280 stakeholders not only just individuals but very important stakeholders such as a big buyer or the well-known international newspaper or something for example we see the SDG-8 it's about a decent work so it's more related with what we are working we want to reduce the negative impact in the society such as in the area of environment or human rights so it's very related with SDGs and then it's kind of our reputation management activities since if one of the very international media talk about our company is really bad in working place or the factories it affects a lot and damages a lot on our brand image so that's why we are doing CSR activities a lot and then there are requests from the very local community and then the other aspect which I would like to talk about is Mr. Simon already mentioned creating shared value but I don't want to specifically the words itself but if we want to expand market we have to focus on the differentiated value which we can make to the local people it means that we have to develop something unique for example in Africa and Asia we launched some anti-mosquito air conditioner since we focused on what really suffered in the country to develop something CSV project or something but since we focus on the local people on the road in the country that's why we developed those kind of socially sound products so these kind of efforts might be trend as of now for a global company great thank you and how well is the air conditioner unit doing anti-mosquito you know I'm not sure in Australia you have a big problem related to mosquito but when we launch it we have but no malaria like this right yeah yeah dengi we have to launch here we have anti mosquito dengi mosquito air conditioner in Indonesia it was a bit expensive but mega hits actually because we realized that people want to some specific points for the product as of now we launched it in Nigeria and Bangladesh and Cambodia which suffered from anti mosquito in the area of malaria or causes of malaria or dengi or those kind of serious disease so now just to open up some questions that any of you can jump on we talk a lot about different kinds of partnerships you mentioned about bringing everyone around the table inclusive partnerships with different sectors of society so what about civil society we've had a lot of people from civil society in the room we've had several questions already this morning about the role of civil society how can we increase and support partnerships between civil society and the private sector there's probably a lot of people in this room who have perspectives on that I think it's something that we as the public servants responsible for part of this are incredibly grateful for is just how open minded civil society partners particularly in Australia have been to this approach there's obviously a fairly large perceived threat in the beginning that it is going to replace or push out their role but one of the things that's really was really important for us in the beginning was understanding from the private sector's point of view why do you want to work with us and one of the things they said to us very early was in many cases it wasn't actually to get to the government it was to get to the NGOs but they weren't quite sure how to do that and so they're quite interested to use the government as an intermediary to do that because there was a lot of mistrust within the private sector of a lot of NGOs and particularly those that have a strong advocacy role it might have been on the receiving end of some fairly well targeted pokes to the ribs and stuff so they were a bit wary but there's a lot of people in those businesses that knew that part of the reason they were getting that criticism was because they weren't tapping into that expertise and on the flip side there's a lot in the NGO community who also understood that if they were going to really sort of translate a lot of what they were doing at the grassroots level into scale and sustainability they needed to work more with the private sector but a lot of their constituents were also very nervous about partnering with big business and reputational damage that could cause because exactly the case for LG LG or someone like the Australian government if we get some bad press or something it can hurt your share price or it can hurt us politicians politically for a while but for an NGO I mean it can be in the end of your NGO your reputation is everything so if you lose that and you get caught in a scandal it could be 40 years of goodwill just gone very quickly so they're very correctly protective of that reputation and so a lot of I think what the the Australian government has tried to do with this is to position the government as an intermediary as a way to help convene and bring those groups together so that they get to know each other a little bit more there's a bit of a safe space so that I guess the pioneers from both sides can create that space to talk and get together it's exactly like I guess the case you're talking about with NGOs I mean it's not going to happen quickly but you've got to create a space for that dialogue to happen I think that's possibly a role that maybe the Indian government plays as well you know is to create that space for dialogue there's a lot of contact already that's been going on I think there was some really interesting work done by ACFID right early on in the part when we were developing the policy on our side and what it really highlighted was just how much private sector expertise sits within the NGOs I mean all the boards are just full of them or something like 60 odd percent plus have active private sector representatives on their boards I mean for the government we have none so you know we're writing a policy on it so it was important for us to tap into that there's a lot of links that just exist that if anything I think discussions like this the SDGs any policies that we can put out the governments can put out that says this is fine to have this discussion everyone's very supportive of it you're not going to get in trouble for it there's people that have got your back from a policy point of view or whatever it's allowing people to get in and have those discussions and some of those might turn into something concrete reasonably quickly some of them may take years until people could figure out exactly where a transaction might need to take place did that answer your question? From the Chinese perspective I know that there are many Chinese NGOs now there's more than 500 Chinese NGOs that are working outside China so development type NGOs are they working in cooperation with Chinese companies? Well actually I'm a little bit skeptical about the number 500 maybe 5 to 6 NGOs from China I think this is also new to Chinese NGOs but actually it's also relevant to your question but I also want to add from Simon what Simon just said that it's quite interesting to see the role of the government that facilitate business and NGO partnership we just talked about a lot of private sector participating in development areas this was not new in China 20 years ago or even 30 years ago the government in China did that because they want to mobilize the rich areas of the company company located in east coastal area to invest in the middle and west part of China which was quite poor and from our point of view that was kind of private sector engagement in development that was what we are talking now and that happened 20 years ago in China but at that time the project, the program was designed by the government there's basically no role for the so-called real NGO or grassroots NGO or development NGO in this model the model was quite simple the government say that hey come and I will give you provincial policy and you join some of our development work and I build the role for you and you create job opportunity and that's it, that's the deal and that happened one of the famous program maybe some of you can search from the internet it's called Guangcai Guangcai is a Chinese name a Chinese word and it means glorious so basically at that time people will say hey you private sector you just want to make money but some successful private businessmen said that we also want to see a better contribution to our society and therefore they established a work program like they call Guangcai program or you can call it Gloria business program but but I think and therefore Chinese they can understand if the government say you should contribute to the local society and you can contribute to the local development but the Chinese company they did not know how to work with NGO rather than government so if they see the government it's included in this program and NGO it's also included then they will they will they will assume that the government sort of providing guarantee or at value or will ensure that this is politically correct program politically correct which is extremely important for many Chinese company that's their old thinking in China so they will bring this thinking out of the country when they are in West Oversea and therefore I think from this point of view Chinese company are still quite cautious on working with NGO not because they don't want but because they don't know how and they don't know the value they know how to do with the government and therefore if a government in other country can say I can have a role I can bring in NGO that I think are high quality and capable I think it would be a very good way for us to explore together From the Korean perspective has the Korean government that they played a facilitating role between LG and NGO overseas or in some of the countries that you are working in are you working with local NGOs? Since we are a private company we realize that we are experts on the development issue so when we are providing some projects in Africa and Asia we differently work with international organization or NGOs in the local because we cannot work directly so we have to work with our partners about the NGOs mainly from Korea and then international NGOs too because we have our own Korean culture so that's why it's better to work with the Korean NGO but the thing is that Korean NGOs' history is very short we also recently became a donor country so our NGO previously was even though they have a long history previously there was like a recipient organization but just 15 years ago they became donor agencies so in that case we worked with some international organizations such as World Vision or the International Vaccine Institute like this but what I realized that working with NGOs is quite tough actually because I realized that we use different language between NGOs and then private sectors so there are barriers we have to compromise by engaging like this kind of conference or meetings or the human resource flow myself actually previously I used work in non-profit organizations so I tried to interpret what they say to our company so those kind of efforts actually might be very important to work together and then one more thing what I wanted to say is that we also work with COICA which is like OSAID in Korea Government Development Agency in Africa we have vocational school which we work with the COICA they provide us not only funding but also guidelines how we have to monitor while planning or implement this kind of project since same we have no experience in that country's development issue they already have their own history and then experience so we get advice from them also they try to how can I say interpret the relations between NGO and private sectors so and then the other thing which I would like to emphasize is that in private sector I mean in the company it's very important to get how can I say the approval from our top management so if we work together with the Government Agency the project is already very trusty so that's why we welcome to work with Government Agency I'm going to ask you one last question just going back now if we think about holistic SouthSouth cooperation policy and as we can see in Australia now Simon talked about the table analogy bringing everyone to the table have a different mechanisms for interaction with partner countries so India has the development compact as kind of its philosophy around cooperation with other countries how do you think that kind of embodies or expresses like the future of SouthSouth cooperation including private sector and the allow me to actually introduce the concept of developmental compact to the audience here developmental compact for some may appear to be a jargon but it has very specific components the first is the oldest pillar with which India started in 1964 and that is called the capacity development and the skill transfer in 1964 we came up with a program which was called ITEC Indian technical and economic cooperation under this program the Indians by and large invited people from other countries to get trained in India and go back and this became quite a hit and this program is now almost 50 years old and so far Indians have trained about 50,000 people mainly from Africa and neighborhood and not just Africa and neighborhood I would say 161 countries in 52 institutions so in the last 50 years we have trained about 50,000 and now we are training 10,000 people per year so this is the first and the most prominent part of the developmental process. The second pillar of the developmental compact is trade partnership where we had partnerships with few of the countries particularly neighboring countries offering them most favored treatment and much more than that for example with Nepal people can even come and work in India they besides visa they don't even need a work permit so there were few type of these trade agreements and the third pillar of the transformation basically concessional finance this is a late starter because this India could muster this resources only in 2003 when we announced lines of credit and this also include concessional finance which in few instances even go back to 1948 but if you look at a formal system it started in 2003 and as I was telling you this is the third component of the development cooperation. The fourth is grants now grants everywhere are disappearing in India they are more so in a context of few of the neighboring countries particularly Bhutan where we do a lot of program funding as a part of the development and the last is trade investment relationship where we talk about duty free and quota free regime. So these five pillars are actually what is generally referred to as developmental compact they are interchangeable they overlap each other the modalities are not actually very rigid but this is what India has been operating and I would say operating more than a decade and this is what is happening in India in 2004 when we entered into the concessional financing. Now these are some of the tools available in the toolkit for India and the private sector has made a late entry it is contributing in lines of credit 66% of the contacts in the private sector is making its own contribution and its own presence in the entire developmental compact but if you look at the total picture if you look all five together I think they have yet to come of age and at the moment the latest thinking in the government of India is to marry developmental compact with the SDGs because after all SDGs is in the budget and various goals. So that is the object the latest development at the moment is that in terms of money the developmental finance has taken over the ITEC program but ITEC program still retains its own significance. Good, thanks. I think what we can learn from what we've heard today is that increasingly centralizing the role of the private sector in their development cooperation there's much really that we can learn from the practices and experiences of Asian countries which have had the private sector as really a core pillar of their self-self cooperation and their partnership strategies with other countries for decades. We have about half an hour I'd like to open it up for questions I'm sure there are many from the floor Mike's I think on both sides of the room so if you just raise your hand we'll start over here the woman at the left maybe just introduce yourself first and then ask your short question please. Hello my name is Annie Sanderson I'm from ACR. Thank you all for your presentations it was really interesting I just have a question for Dee Fatt so I'm wondering if you could explain a little bit about how you're going to monitor and evaluate and watch the impact of the increased participation of the private sector if you could just speak a bit about how you're going to measure the the good aspects and the not so good aspects about increased participation of the private sector and whether you'll be measuring in which sectors it's worked very well and different regions how that's worked well I'll take this one over here My question's really for all of the panelists in a way doing some work previously with the private sector one of the things that they mentioned in terms of interaction with the Australian Government on development was looking that they valued was actually looking at the governance arrangements and state law arrangements reducing red tape for functioning in developing countries etc so I wondered about the role that that played but in particular as well how the feedback loops so how do you as governments and private sector from your side how do you feedback information from private sector companies to the government to help improve processes sort of a feedback mechanism from private sector to government I guess Great question one more The woman in the blue down Thanks It's Ali Neilbrot Often when we talk about the involvement of the private sector and development cooperation we focus on large companies but if we looked at the sectors with potential for pro-poor and inclusive economic growth I think we see that in many of them there's a significant role played by SMEs so I'm interested from all of the panelists how you see the role of SMEs Thanks Simon do you want to start off and then we'll take another round Sure Just quickly to the ACR colleague I think one of the things that I think we've tried to do fairly early I mean Ali can talk a bit to this because there's a few different platforms there's things like the donor committee on enterprise development and there's a few other platforms that already provide I guess a standard or an orthodoxy for how to do this now it is quite new and even standards like that are evolving as it changes but the department centralised that as a core I guess tool for how our program areas will start to map this out but while that's a bit of a technical answer probably the most important thing is back to that point about problem first partner development so the problem definition still hasn't changed really at all so country programs in the Australian government case we have things called aid investment plans where we decide what sectors we're going to work in in a country we agree with that with the partner government and that defines what we do now and usually what falls behind that is at least a broad level M&E framework that says what are the KPIs what are the targets we're going to achieve whether it's maternal mortality or whatever it might be and then once you go through those steps then you start looking at the problem analysis and who might be best placed to work on that and then if the private sector falls out as one of those then you go and engage them but what's really important from an M&E perspective is that we know what that is before we even start so when we go to a private sector partner government we already know what the target is then you can start to work through the technical things maybe one of the things you're alluding to as a challenge is unlike almost all of our other partners particularly if we're working in a partnership and when I say partnership I mean something where the private sector might be chipping in money or the investors are chipping in money alongside us so not the usual government has a contract with someone to do something for us when you're in a partnership the other side is not as compelled to give us information there's more of a negotiation so they might not want to hand over certain things that might do with intellectual property or whatever or they might not just not be used to collecting that type of information so there can often be a bit of an effort there and I say for example if we're working with LG we'd be saying this is what we need do you collect any of this information with what you do say for example the air conditioner example do you collect this do you do sex disaggregated data when you do your monitoring of the impact but maybe they do I don't know because they might be collecting that information based on consumer preference who's buying it, who's not they might be collecting the same information that's useful but not collecting it for the same purpose so there is a different discussion that needs that will need to happen but I think as long as you've set like any M&E task as long as you know what it is that you're trying to achieve which is often the hardest thing as long as you know what that is I think the rest of it does fall out not saying there's not challenges along the way I might stop there I think that relates a little bit to the second question about kind of the feedback that you get from companies back to government is there a feedback mechanism on the performance of LOEs in countries that Indian companies are working in that goes back to government? It was not so till very recently but in 2015 actually in my opening remarks also I said that all type of companies went and some of them in fact did damage to the Indian Goodwill rather than improving it so in 10 years of experience it was realized that government has to be a little bit more concerned it should not only leave its role when the company is allowed to move into foreign territory so in 2015 we came up with a very detailed guidelines which has plucked many of these loopholes and would now ensure that only reputable companies with good intentions succeed for instance now it is mandatory that unless and until a DPR is made previously one used to go only by the project outline and there were many gaps there so now the new guidelines say that if you don't have a DPR the government of India will give you money to make a DPR by an independent agent and then only the project can be even considered and approved second thing is that the project management consultancy has now become a mandatory condition this was not there before most important is that the boring country has been allowed and I think it is very unprecedented I don't think it is there in any other lending organization including multi-lettered organization that if the boring country so want they can appoint an international consultant to see whether the Indian company and the Indian government is fulfilling its obligations or not and all the projects will have now brief qualification for tendering and also any project about 50 million dollars will necessarily go through a third party evaluation so now these guidelines have come in 2015 when they came there was little shock for some time the program was almost in this area now the boring countries and the Indian companies both of them have realized that these guidelines are there to stay and they better adhere to it so I am sure that in coming two or three years there would be guidelines actually start showing results there will be a proper mechanism to ensure that the standards and the obligations are not only met but reported and evaluated Kim Jen what about for LG is there any kind of formal or informal feedback mechanism for you to the free government on the work that you do in another country with Koika we are a member of DAG which stands for Development Alliance Korea it's like a membership network of the not only company but also NGOs or the organizations who work in the field of development they open host some kinds of the evaluating the programs so events so at the time we can join in to give some feedback to our government and then get some advice but recently we start the Korean government started something proactive one which called innovative some project something so the company can propose to the government to conduct new project with their core capability I mean previously CSR sounds like a bit philanthropic activity but our government now accept some the technology related project too for the development project so from the company side it changed I mean not only just collect some feedback but also open to receive some proposers related with our business core capability everyone on the SME question what's the I know the Chinese government is trying to encourage more SMEs to get involved in development operation I think I like this question because I myself is an SME we have over 60 people in China it's SMEs for me I think I want to I have two comments one how we can mobilize SME to participate in development process you have to connect it to bigger players either to push them or to facilitate or support SME to improve their for example environmental performance or their contribution to the local society for instance in China we I have a friend running a very successful NGO they try to push the SMEs more factories to improve their environmental standard and there's no use if you just talk to them but if you talk to their buyers like Apple, like Dell Nike then the buyers will ask that if you don't charge I will not buy from your side so this is a push power but of course there is also another facilitation power that some of the big brands will say that I want to improve and I want to change supplier's performance so one company they create a program called one proc three so they will bring in three of their suppliers SMEs to work together to improve for example safety issue and their suppliers also need to engage three of their suppliers so that's called one proc three this is one comment the other comment is that SMEs for SMEs they have their own focus or they should have their own focus area on either development area or on CSR areas development it's a big subject but not all the development issues are big project you can contribute a little bit so the large company they may be able to build school and offer scholarship so there are quite different things and for us we are SMEs and for me our responsibility is actually to keep our talent, to keep our people working with us and therefore we need to provide them training and we need to provide training for all the young people who are interested in working on development area and sustainability area and therefore we develop a so called Sintow Academy to the young people that's our CSR project that's our development project so in Chinese we have a Chinese tradition you don't do evil no matter how small the evil is you need to do good no matter how the good how small the good is so the same thing can apply to SMEs you can just choose what you can do and benefit the society and benefit yourself thank you just a quick reflection on the question about the feedback loops another thing that the role that governments can play particularly in country again it's back to that convening and facilitating function so you hear a lot in many cases where governments will legislate say 2% or 3% CSR levy a lot of the times that's businesses are forced to provide finances or something but rarely is there a platform for businesses to come and talk about all the stretch tasks that they're doing or share some different ideas in and around I'm not saying this doesn't happen in India I guess I'm saying that there's often what's suspicion is the wrong word there's often the distance between what business does and what government does that's no different whether it's here government needs to regulate what business does and business doesn't want to be regulated but in the middle of that is this huge amount of activity going on where businesses are trying to test something or want to be able to demonstrate or talk with the government about what they could do but it really exists donor agencies will get together UN agencies to tell about all the great things we're doing for development there's also very little space for the private sector to maybe raise concerns about some of these things without looking like they're trying to dodge tax or something else so I think this is really important the emergence of this dialogue to be able to get everyone together so governments can hear legitimate concerns it's like I'd be happy to do more training for example but the way you tax me on this that means I can't and I'm happy to change there's a lot of interesting stuff in this space it's not by going straight to a transaction or a project a lot of it that you can unlock huge amounts of talent and resources and finances and whatever just by putting everyone together in the same space around a common issue so I think that's something that certainly our government is looking to our public service to do more and I wouldn't be surprised if it's the same sounds like the DAK that you talked about tries to do that in Korea great we have time for another couple questions I know there was one in the middle section here in the blue shirt just behind you put your hands up again I've got a question for our Chinese colleague I apologize I didn't know your name you referred to trying to build international NGOs in the course of your discussion what kind of NGO would that be and what sort of focus is envisaged and what relationship would it have with the private sector by the way I'm Colin Baolo from the New Zitangara Association that's an international NGO working in Eastern Indonesia take another question go ahead someone's up on my phone Simon thanks for your background on the DFAT policy development you talked about that view of economic partnerships and I'm picking up I guess a little bit of the last answer about SMEs but at a slightly different angle so ratio is audience I work in malaria projects in Papua New Guinea I'm interested in the Pacific region they're much in many cases much smaller scale economies and I'm particularly interested in you just we're talking about an engagement model you talked earlier about PPP combinations and that partner agnostic one of the challenges that we find is trying to understand what is that engagement mechanism because a lot of the a lot of the economic activity is at very varying scales in these countries and PNG is a classic where you've got some really really big works but you've got some very very small groups and a disease like malaria is often in places where there aren't too many people working in business so I'm interested in the means of actually engaging that dialogue about and we've built all of our projects on the PPP principle so we're actually operating on a public-private partnership basis but I'm interested from I guess the policy point of view how do we bring that to the table because it's not as if there is a regime of full economic activity that we can necessarily tap into and there was one question in the corner interesting discussion just as a comment it would have been great to have a representative from an NGO on the panel just a question for DFAT just in relation to state-owned enterprises and in your negotiations or work with recipient countries how do you what's your current view on the role of state-owned enterprises and you know there's a lot of views around that they crowd out the private sector and there's just one of what your current position is on that and how you negotiate with countries on that I'll take the question so I'm going to make you run back up there there's one woman there in the purple dress oh great, right there it's a short question and then you'll have I just wanted to open up a concern about the definition of private sector and the kind of statistics that we hear about you know 70, 80, 90% job of the work force is in the private sector in the Asia region I think it's really important we unpack that a bit within the private sector is a formal and very informal approach to work and the risks and exposure in terms of discrimination and exploitation depending on your gender is terrifyingly different and I think that this is an aid conference discussion I'd really like to hear some reflections though a little more gender and litical in terms of how you do that differently depending on whether that's a family owned kind of business or an LG thank you alright thanks for the question yeah I know Chinese name is difficult to remember and that's one of our advantages of being globalised I don't know clearly about Chinese government's agenda on building relationship with international NGOs but from my point of view we will suggest a company to engage with NGOs and I have been, well I never worked for NGOs but I have been working with NGOs for a long long time so basically they're in NGO that want to partner with companies and they're also advocacy NGOs that never want to work with companies they always want to of course improve their performance and standard and even though there's also some in the middle and I think for these two types of NGOs for the development type of NGO I would suggest Chinese companies to start project with them to start project with them to do some maybe start with smaller projects and I think this would be very important because right now Chinese companies, I know there's some needs of Chinese companies that want to invest in local development but they tend to work with Chinese NGO but as I said only five or six NGOs they might have operation in other countries and not enough experience so I would suggest them to start collaborating with assistant NGOs that are reliable that are capable to work with them for advocacy NGO I would not ask Chinese companies just to say no I would ask Chinese companies to build interaction or communication or dialogue with them because I think that in the current society most of the things are not just black and white and you need to communicate if others criticize you they of course will have their own evidence and precision and you need to understand and that's always my suggestion to Chinese company and in recent few years we work with Global Witness who is a UK based NGO on resource industry and some Chinese company started to talk to them and also on the hydropower US organization called International Rivers they also started to talk to Chinese companies so if there is advocacy NGO in the room I guess must be I would also suggest you to start to build connection and dialogue with Chinese company so on the pacific in the smaller economies it ties a little bit maybe to the last question about the non-global players there's two policies that provide the framework for what certainly what DFAT does anyway and that's there's a private sector development strategy and there's a private sector engagement strategy the engagement strategy is the one that talks about the value proposition what we offer what businesses offer us and it's implied in that that it's big and small but the companion piece is the private sector development part which is actually what the main objective is so if you look at the aid policy there's two pillars which is very explicit about the fact that there are the main focus is supporting the informal sector to transition into formal in a crude way I mean it's more sophisticated than that but because of a lot of the risks that exist and so a lot of those figures are packed out because a lot of the private sector activity is actually in the informal sector a lot of the more business of everyone in this room is dealing with them a lot of the reason and I guess maybe to the NGO question this sort of looks a bit stacked like it's the bigger organisations but the reality is that most of our work is down the bottom and the change in policy if anything is back to almost like pay one's point is how do we connect them up into the mainstream economy so a lot of what gets done at the community development level or market development stuff and then it sort of struggles to make that transition into how do they get access to the existing credit systems how do they get into the supply chains the bigger company that's where we've all really struggled there wasn't a very clear policy framework to do that so yeah so a lot of the focus is on that and I think just I guess another thing to stress well this sort of implies it's got lots of the big end of town partnerships that that I have with multi-nationals they're very limited the bulk of our work remains much more at that community level and it should that's certainly what business tells us as a government they're like we don't need you to be Google Google can be Google we need you to be the best version of yourself which is to be a smart clever responsive public sector agency that can take risks that we can't take that can fill spaces that we can't take and we have to do that on behalf of a lot of those people that don't have the capability to do that so at the design of any project the design of any new partnership whether it's with MasterCard or whether it's with a 10 person NGO in Vanuatu still goes through exactly the same design process so in terms of gender and ebony and everything has to go through exactly the same if it's more money it's more rigorous but nothing there's no concessions given oh this is a private sector thing we're going to do a bit of a shortcut to get there so hopefully the discipline still stays the same and hopefully our job still remains the same in terms of that poverty focus or that inclusive growth focus but now we can bring I guess another tool or hopefully other partners to the table and bring them in quite early so they can start to provide some advice and ideas on the PPP question in the Pacific that is harder and a bit more complicated I think obviously Asia is very different the private sector dominates those economies and they're growing incredibly fast in the Pacific it's not quite the case a lot of Pacific governments maybe aren't quite as bullish about the idea of the private sector taking on a bigger role and this comes a little bit to the SOE question as well again it all comes back to the problem of definition the Australian Government's interests are in having relationships more based on peer to peer economic partnership rather than than aid I mean that's not rocket science we've all been trying to do ourselves out of a job forever again if it's an SOE and it's a poorly functioning SOE and it's taking resources away from the government being able to spend it on health and education then that's dialogue we would always have had with the government the only difference would be now is that because we're interacting more with business, with investors and others there are other perspectives and mechanisms that we could possibly bring to the table to say to the partner government there are alternatives to this there is another way someone may be able to come in and there may be some blended finance arrangement or something that could be done and it's going to be done every time but it certainly brings another angle to the discussion Thanks I think that's all the time we have for questions I'd like to thank everyone for the excellent questions and for the responses I'd just like to end with a bit of a reflection Hynne mentioned earlier that the first time we met actually was in Seoul at a global partnership for effective development cooperation conference and she was speaking on a panel with someone from Microsoft on the role of the private sector in development cooperation and there was a question there was a lot of people in the room there was maybe 300 people in the room and there was a question posed to the audience during that session everyone who is here from the private sector can you please raise your hand there was no one from the private sector at that meeting and yet we were having a discussion about the role of the private sector in development cooperation so it was really, there was something wrong this is a global partnership for effective development cooperation one of the pillars is about multi-stakeholder dialogue and cooperation yet there was no one from the private sector there so I would like to ask the audience today and I don't mean developing contractors no offense to you like LG and others that are working overseas in types of projects so who is here from a private sector company like LG and you're just taking a photo please anyone raise your hand one okay right so point made again and so I think that leaves us all with a compelling question about how do we if we really want to have an inclusive dialogue about these issues how do we get these people into conversations like this you know what can we do to encourage more private sector participation you know maybe not for the whole thing but at least to come to DISE like this engage with us so we better understand the motivation so we can share our experience with them thank you very much we have three distinguished panelists the first one is Dr. Saheem Khan he is a senior research economist at the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics anybody who studies the Pakistan economy knows this is a very very prestigious research institute and think tank based in Islamabad Dr. Khan has 14 years of experience in research public policy analysis academia he has a PhD degree in public policy from the School for Policy Studies University of Bristol UK he also has a Master of Science in Development Policy from the University of Heingerheim Stuttgart, Germany so Dr. Khan will make the presentation for about 15 minutes then his presentation will be followed by an interesting presentation about the country ownership dynamics in the Pacific to be made by Susan O'Neill Susan is our very own scholar doing her PhD degree from the Australian National University at the State Society and Governors in Manalisha Program at the A&U she started her PhD candidacy in 2013 and before that she has a rich amount of experience as a development practitioner working with several NGOs government and development agencies in developing deliver and evaluating social programs across Indigenous, Australian and the Pacific so finally we will have Susan O'Neill will also present for about 15 minutes finally we will have Dr. Dennis Trinidad he is currently an associate professor and coordinator for Japanese studies program in the international studies department of Daila Rosa University in Manila, the Philippines he was formerly a visiting scholar at the Japan Institute of International Affairs and the Institute of Developing Economics both based in Japan his research interests include international development assistance, political economy and the international relations of East Asia so now let's start this suite of discussions starting from Dr. Kahn's presentation entitled the Aid Policy Network in Pakistan, Act Network Analysis Hello everyone the Aid Policy Network in Pakistan and Act Network Analysis this paper is a product of my PhD research work at the University of Bristol first of all what is Aid Policy Network the Aid Policy Network is a complex web of multiple actors involved in the aid delivery system connected through interdependent relations that define foreign aid policy and priorities for the development sector the vast aid literature mainly focuses on the evaluation of foreign aid outcomes or aid effectiveness and has rarely considered the practical working of the aid policy process specifically how aid decisions are managed and transformed into action in that sense apart from examining aid effectiveness it is equally important to understand the complex policy networks that influence the aid policy process this research responds to this gap in the literature with the aim to study the Aid Policy Network in Pakistan the objective of this research is to explore donor government interaction in managing the aid policy process in Pakistan in this context this research attempts to map the complex aid policy network determine resource interdependencies examine actor interaction patterns and explore actors perceptions about managing aid policy process in Pakistan to achieve this this research takes a policy network approach to explore the complex aid policy network in Pakistan adopting Copenhagen and Klein actor network analysis this research will help to understand complexities interdependencies and constraints involved in managing foreign aid in Pakistan coming to the research methods quickly a single method approach semi-structured interviews was selected to collect primary data from Pakistan using a proposed snowball sampling qualitative interviews were conducted with a range of actors from Pakistan the data were then transcribed, coded and analyzed this is the simple size in Pakistan and during the three months of data collection in Pakistan during November 2012 and January 2013 the feed work was successfully concluded with 43 interviews in total this is the aid policy network in Pakistan using the actor analysis this research determines who the important actors are we have identified nine strategic groups of actors in Pakistan mainly if you look at can you follow this this is the first group is the federal government the second group is the provincial government then we have multilateral donors we have two groups of bilateral donors one group of bilateral donors comprised of DSE member countries and the second group of bilateral donors comprised of known DSE countries then comes an external interest group which is there here it mainly comprised of international NGOs and international research and development foundation and then we have a domestic interest group here which mainly comprised of local partners which are NGOs civil society organizations political parties and then we have an independent group they are not as independent as the name suggests but they are independent I was not getting any other name this includes the bureaucracy informer actors and the media and you know think tanks like this and we also have another group which is the international forums this includes the united nations and the OECD and like this in the figure if you see these are the key actors in the second circle there are important actors and outside this circle there are peripheral actors and they are positioned according to the respondents views about actors position of resources or means policy influence and involvement in the development process in recent years has transformed in Pakistan as a result of provincial revolution of 2011 although the transfer of power and resources to the lower level may improve governance bring greater accountability and result in effective service delivery the findings for Pakistan indicate that it further complicates the system this would lead to extensive engagements with numerous actors capacity constraints at the lower tier readjustments of coordination and collaboration practices and higher transaction costs more interestingly at present for different political parties have governments in four provinces of Pakistan each province led by a different political party or alliance thus has different political manifestos and different government priorities coming to the interdependencies in its relationship mutual dependence is a central assumption in the policy network approach actors are mutually dependent for their goals achievement and they cannot achieve their objective without resources that are possessed by others this is the analysis we did sorry if you see there are actors on this side and then there are important resources they carry financial resource or production resource competencies or knowledge whatever and then there is a degree of substitutability within the network it could be low or high and then there is a dependence according to the resource substitutability in the network according to the analysis the analysis suggests that major official donors and the Pakistan governments are the critical actors of the eight policy networks now why because major donors carry large volumes of funds, better quality of technical expertise and global evidence based knowledge resource while the Pakistan government carries important resources such as competencies, legitimacy and domestic knowledge these resources which I just mentioned are known or less substitutable in the network which leads to high degree of interdependence and influence in strategic interactions in Pakistan coming to the interaction patterns of actors the network analysis helps to make judgments about the level of inclusivity and the quality of eight relationships in network settings to explore this I pick the key actors only and examine their interaction patterns in Pakistan this is how the patterns look like in the figure the thickness of bar like they are sorry again they are more thick here than here the thickness of bar indicate frequency of interactions that also reflect the level of inclusivity and information between network actors if you see here we have important actor which is ministry of finance and then we have the world bank and then we have the politicians in power which are mostly the ministers and the chief executive and other coming to the ministry of finance they stay in frequent contact with the world bank IMF, Asian Development Bank and politician in power similarly for the politician in power they stay in regular contact with the ministry of finance and the planning department while the world bank stays in regular contact with the ministry of finance, economic affairs division and IMF and interestingly all have less frequent or rare interaction with local partners and think tanks here so if you see they have a rare interaction with local NGOs, local NGOs local NGOs here finally talking about the constraints in managing the aid policy process in Pakistan the discussion inferred that supply driven foreign aid capacity shortages in the public sector and governance issues were the greatest concern for the majority of respondents within the aid policy network again the analysis of these perceptions according to the network group shows that supply driven aid was the prime concern of actors mostly at the recipient end public sector capacity was the prime concern for the donor community while it was a secondary concern for the government and some former actors and governance issues were the secondary concern of the majority conclusions number one carrying a non or less substitutable resource such as large volume of funds does not guarantee an influential role in the aid policy network for instance despite being the largest official bilateral donor to Pakistan China was not considered as an influential actor as other major bilateral donors this was perhaps due to the limited involvement of Chinese officials and policy forums and public policy debates concerning MDGs and restricted communications with other development partners similarly in strategic bilateral relations Asian and Gulf bilateral donors were considered to be more trustworthy development partners than us aid and other western bilateral donors this perception of the respondents was widely based on the trade and economic sanctions Pakistan faced in the past at the hand of western donors second the large scale provincial devolution has made the aid delivery system in Pakistan even more fragmented and complex operating at multiple levels finally donors tend to be proactive and aid seems to be supply driven in Pakistan partly due to the absence of an inclusive development policy framework and limited capacity of the state this provides opportunities for donors to dominate the policy debate and pursue their own priorities last but not least this research is suggesting two recommendations aid to make the aid delivery system work better and enlightened donor approach based on more demand driven economic and technical assistance is required and indigenous version of the foundation model could make development aid effort more productive under the provincial devolution and localization of SDGs nevertheless the federal and provincial governments especially after the devolution devolution of 2011 the federal and provincial governments need to work on formulating policy frameworks under their respective development agenda and to build public sector capacity in a bid to make aid efforts more productive in Pakistan thank you everyone thank you for coming along today this paper is work in progress and draws from my doctoral research given the time frame I've actually made some jumps because I've had to cut the paper in half so if there's any questions that you have please don't hesitate to ask after the session most of you who've worked in aid and development over the last two decades will be familiar with the principle of country ownership which was put at the heart of the global reforms in aid and development through the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 once considered fundamental to the achievement of effective development the principle seems to have lost prominence as the millennium development goals came and went with claims that country ownership was hard to measure difficult to define and difficult to enact I want to consider today what we can learn from the policy making experience in the Pacific by exploring how the idea of country ownership influenced the roll out of the aid effectiveness reforms in the Pacific today today I will briefly outline my research approach and field work then I'll explore the key themes emerging from two case studies and wrap up by outlining some implications for policy making in aid and development in the Pacific just briefly to explain my research framework my research asks given the apparent discrepancies in power relations between aid donors and small island states which rely heavily on foreign aid and often reflect relationships located in post-colonial histories how do Pacific island states exercise choice and agency in their negotiations with donors over aid resources why do Pacific policy makers accept the ideas the norms and the practices identified in global and regional agreements or not and how do the beliefs and values of Pacific policy makers influence their decisions on aid policy making my research explores these questions through an examination of the role of the Pacific's foremost political regional organisation the Pacific Islands Forum in the roll out of the global aid reform policy under the forum compact on development cooperation a policy agreed by the forum leaders that began meeting in 2009 my research framework draws from the policy translation literature which recognises that the dynamic influence of power is critical to how ideas norms and practices are negotiated and enacted across political settings and between policy makers in complex and unpredictable settings the contested facts and values reflect the politics of policy the role of the broker in the negotiation of ideas and norms and practices through facilitating strategies of bargaining, reflexive learning and innovation is key in signalling adherence the framework that I'm using I won't go into detail but I'm happy to have a conversation in signalling adherence to the best practices of the Paris Declaration and ACRA the compact propose a range of strategies to strengthen development cooperation my focus today is solely on the principle of country ownership what I want to outline here today is my proposition that the meaning of country ownership and the values and beliefs it represented for national actors influence their decision to accept the legitimacy of the compact or not and their capacity to make the policy work for them briefly in terms of field work my research draws from interpretive policy analysis approaches using qualitative methods interviews, text and document analysis and participant observation to explore the meanings, the values and norms that drive policy action in country ownership under the forum compact in three countries Samoa, Kiribati and CG because of time today I'm only going to focus on Samoa and Kiribati I identified five interpretive communities country representatives development partners, independent consultants peer review teams and the regional organisations the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat and in Fiji the Pacific Islands Development Forum field work was largely undertaken in 2015 across Fiji, Samoa and Kiribati with interviews also in Australia analysis table I think we can read that okay just to outline the intent of the table first I use this to outline my summary analysis of the relationship between the principle of country ownership and the enactment of the compact so in the first row I talk about the common or dominant values that emerged as a priority for each national actor when considering the meaning of country ownership the second and third rows arise whether the collective action required to enact the compact the aid effectiveness reforms is seen as legitimate that is whether development actors have integrated the hard stuff with policy tools, procedures and practices such as the national development strategies budgets, the performance frameworks into their routines and then secondly the next row assesses whether there is evidence of capacity and confidence to enact the policy and here I'm looking for the integration of the aid effectiveness norms into local behaviours and relationships so paying particular attention to the translation processes of bargaining, reflexive learning and innovation as the policy translation literature says these are evidence of a power shift lastly I consider how we might understand what's happened in each country exploring what might be the triggers or the explanations relevant for the country's engagement with the policy or not so moving to Samoa when I spoke to and today I've taken most of my data from interviews with government policy makers simply because of time okay when I spoke to policy makers in Samoa the dominant values shaping their approach to country ownership under the compact were expectations around mutuality partnership, leadership and persistence these expectations were underpinned by an assertion of differences in understanding and knowledge of the cultural and political environment so that the policy space was important as a space where dialogue between equals matters Samoa accepted the soft stuff of ideas, knowledge and norms alongside the hard stuff of policy procedures, tools and associated practices that I've explained as integral to Paris and the forum compact but Samoa went further they bargained, they integrated lessons from their experience to create innovations and they made the compact meet their expectations and their needs and particularly to hold donors accountable in doing so as Samoa consciously shifted the conversation from a past framework of vulnerability and aid reliance to a new conversation based on Samoa's assertion as equal partners with donors in the process meeting the criteria I argued the policy translation I argued that the triggers for this acceptance lie in Samoa's proud history of political independence and their recognition that more was to be achieved through social cohesion than disruption alongside this Samoa was determined to avoid the vulnerability to external economic forces and natural disasters which dated from their experience in the 1980s this determination was pursued under a stable social, political and government leadership through the public sector reforms and economic reforms of the 1990s and 2000s consequently Samoa's public sector had already engaged with many of the ideas and norms in the compact by 2009 for Samoa the compact was a useful tool to keep donors accountable rather than a driver of their own national change because those processes were already under way okay so I can move now to Kiribati in comparison the strongest theme around country ownership in Kiribati with the values of economic independence self-reliance and survival either as a rejection of solutions imposed from outside or as an aspiration to return to the traditional lands and seas to live the good life on coconuts and fish I argue that Kiribati never really accepted the legitimacy of the compact nor engaged with the compact's norms despite Kiribati's apparent compliance with the hard stuff of the compact it seemed that these moved largely at the instigation of a few key individuals internally and an array of external advisers rather than carried widespread substantive purpose for most government officials or leaders in fact I struggled to find people who knew what the compact was and the three people that did understand it had all been at the meeting so it was really enlightening there were limited examples of bargaining and reflexive learning and an absence of innovation and little confidence in their capacity to take partnerships in development further although they recognised the need to when I dug diggers this was pretty no so when I dug deeper I was surprised to discover that most government officials did not believe that they exercised control over aid it's the reality one senior government official claimed whoever supplies the funds they dictate how the funds are to be dispersed although some officials spoke of their increasing assertiveness in aid negotiations over the last few years they attributed this change largely to the influence of their education overseas and changes in their own personal ability to negotiate with donors their expectations for the main were largely to be able to influence the alignment of aid with eQRBUS priorities through dialogue and relationship because they usually counterbalance that claim with they lack the capacity to do more others including government officials who had once held senior roles in finance were of the firm belief that managing aid responsibly did not matter because there is always aid he said and because it's not your own money and so you don't care how you use it paradoxically while the attitude to aid was ambivalent there was no ambiguity about who owned the fish either as individual livelihood or other means of putting food on the table or as a resource for the whole country through regional and bilateral deals with the support of PNA people strongly asserted ownership of this resource and the potential of other ocean wealth in fact eQRBUS actually arrived at the Cairns leaders meeting in 2009 with its own initiative the Oceanscapes policy and this was where eQRBUS' priorities lay so I struggled to find a unifying thread which explained the ambivalence and paradox in eQRBUS and then I realised that perhaps this is the story eQRBUS is a collection of 33 islands and atolls across a vast expanse of ocean with independence granted from the British in 1979 more often it seemed that family fish the sea and land particularly the home island bound together by Christianity carries far stronger allegiance for the idea of eQRBUS than the idea of eQRBUS as a cohesive nation state in negotiations with donors or each other over managing the money or to craft the institutions of national government and governance having been cast in the role as one interviewee said of the poor small island state eQRBUS' leadership are trying to turn the identity around redefining eQRBUS as a large ocean state grappling through global and regional advocacy with the challenge of turning the potential wealth of fish and other ocean resources into reality but at the same time faced with the more immediate threat of climate change and the reality of individual and family vulnerability and hardship is it surprising that eQRBUS' leaders are uncertain and worried for their future and I'm sure whether to trust donors or themselves to address such challenges so what I think we can learn from this the future policy is that the aid effectiveness agenda with country ownership at its heart is premised on the idea of collective action problems and the possibilities of incentives rewards and punishment within the framework of norms and institutions but in implementation of the policy its instruments have confused the ought for the years and neglected the significance of values and beliefs that shape contemporary relations around aid and development and in the pacific's instance reflecting postcolonial histories so I argue that the compact emerges as hollow policy even when it has apparently succeeded because it didn't persuade those who were not already on board with it it failed the collective test at the point where it really mattered most in design the problem was framed and the policy solution devised the compact appeared to be grounded in the Paris Declaration but in the simplification of ideas and practices one of the key points made by Ostrom and the colleagues and verified by the policy translation literature was neglected the process of internalisation of unspoken norms alongside the formal rules of the game is necessary for ownership through a shift in power to occur country ownership has explored with representatives from these specific countries carries far deeper dimensions than simply the instrumental functional exchange of more money for demonstrations of technical effectiveness and efficiency in the way the money is prioritised managed and accounted for in the pacific the two countries I have examined today have demonstrated that equality autonomy and independence and survival are the values that shape their contemporary relationships with development partners when the compact presume that all parties implicitly shared the unspoken assumptions and the norms on which policy change hinged it proved to be a hollow instrument as government failed to engage with the underpinning norms the route to addressing this gap is to find ways to collectively sit at the table to understand and address the values and beliefs that shape and the policy that each party brings to the table the question arising is whether the new regional framework put forward by the pacific islands for those who are not from the pacific will encourage this deeper conversation thank you I'm not sure what's wrong with the powerpoint anyway sorry about that I'd like to express my thanks to the organisers for giving me an opportunity to present my paper and aid in middle income trap this research received funding from sumitomo foundation under its grant for japan related research projects middle income trap is a phenomenon where a country's economy stagnates after graduating to middle income status the inability to move from a low cost to a high value economy after graduating to middle income status is caused by four interrelated traps economic, financial institutional and sustainability as of 2016 there are 104 countries classified as middle income compared to 31 countries with low income status there is a graph that I want to show but the graph shows that official development assistance to MICs or middle income countries has remained more or less the same while total ODA has increased quite significantly from 2007 so where does the additional ODA allotments go to low income countries the graph indicates a tradeoff between ODA allotted to low income in middle income countries and at least from 2007 donors have chosen to allocate more ODA to the former this tradeoff is often a logical outcome of what is called need efficiency dilemma that donors face when they decide where to allocate their scarce resources they use volume of aid allotment to low income countries is understandable but donors should balance their aid allotments to low income and middle income countries because one middle income countries face not only traps but also gaps in development this include persistence of poverty and infrastructure deficit according to one study the majority of global poverty at 1.25 or $2 a day is now located in middle income countries financial conditions of MICs vary immensely some have adequate source of funding to address poverty while some do not two middle income countries generally have a more established political and economic institutions better institutions mean better aid implementation and development outcome and that's more value for money 3.8 can be redirected towards addressing local middle income trap particularly economic and institutional traps finally middle income countries are not just recipients of aid they also perform an important role in aid delivery to low income countries through partnership with traditional donors my paper seeks to examine how middle income countries can maximize development outcomes from foreign aid by looking at Japan's and South Korea's experience in particular I reviewed two World Bank funded agricultural projects in Japan and one Japan funded investment in South Korea so why these projects for one increased agricultural productivity is welfare enhancing so as I've said these projects were chosen because increased agricultural productivity is welfare enhancing and poverty alleviating jobs for rural poor and addresses food insecurity South Korea is an excellent model of successful post-war industrialization its experience in the establishment of Pohang Iron and Steel or POSCO clearly exemplifies that comparative advantage in economies of scale and experience can be acquired over time these cases provide valuable lessons to middle income countries in responding to economic trap I argue that the catalytic role to MIC's is optimized when it is oriented to addressing the traps and gaps mentioned and when such programs are effectively owned by recipient government itself and aligned with national productivity growth the paper does not assume direct causality between aid and economic development the principles of ownership and alignment are part of the five principles of aid effectiveness adopted in Paris declaration of 2005 I argue further that effective ownership and alignment require three capacities including effective negotiating skills capacity to internalize foreign knowledge and ability to scale up projects beyond pilot stage in Japan and more importantly in South Korea these capacities were achieved as a result of investment in education and administrative capacity using aid from the United States the table shows that Japan in South Korea benefited mainly from two aid providers the United States and the World Bank unlike the current global aid architecture foreign assistance during the post-war period was less fragmented there was less issue on harmonization and coordination because only few players were involved total U.S. assistance to Japan between 1945 and 1952 was 1.8 billion U.S. dollars which consisted of humanitarian relief budget support and more importantly education and technical assistance American aid also allowed hundreds of Japanese students to go to the United States and facilitated exchange of visits of U.S. consultants and Japanese experts during U.S. occupation Japan became a World Bank member country in 1953 at certain period Japan was the bank's second largest borrower after India Japan borrowed a total of 862.10 million U.S. dollars between 1953 and 1966 for 31 projects these borrowings coincided with the implementation of first and second five year development plans that sought to improve national productivity and industrial rationalization in the table is a summary of the two World Bank projects in Japan the IHE water canal was originally aimed at developing irrigation for farmers in Chita Peninsula and nearby areas what is interesting about this project is that the World Bank recommended an American consulting firm to supervise the construction of a dam the concept of a consultant firm was new at that time in Japan a study noted that Japanese engineers were amazed at the modern way by which the American consulting firm designed the project in the U.S. using only maps and technical data of the project site sent from Japan after the project was completed these engineers who were involved in the construction established the first ever Japanese construction consulting firm in 1962 today, large construction firms have their own affiliated consulting firms and many of them have participated in Japanese ODA funded infrastructure and foreign investment projects around the world the American consulting firm also introduced a new method of dam construction called rock fill prior to the IHE project the post war dam constructions in Japan were concrete art type Japanese engineers returned to their respective prefectures after the completion of the IHE project were instrumental in diffusing the rock fill method of dam construction a number of rock fill dams were built in Japan thereafter such as the Miboro and Guzuru dams meanwhile, the main goal of the land reclamation project was to convert three peat lands into arable paddy fields of rice, planting dairy farming and mix farming these peat lands were located in Shinotsu region and Konsen which are both in Hokkaido and Kamikita in Aomori prefecture these projects were challenging because first world bank missions to Japan in 1953 and 1954 recommended that the peat land in Hokkaido should be developed into dairy farming and with cultivation instead of rice paddy fields second bulldozers that were imported using world bank loans were not appropriate for reclamation work as a result, Japanese engineers had to redesign bulldozers that would not sink in swamps the project was a catalyst to local production of bulldozers that could be used effectively in peat land reclamation these are the project sites that I'm referring to in Japan the Konsen pilot farm which was intended for dairy farming was jointly designed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and the local government of Hokkaido the project involved two processes first reclamation of peat lands and then second inviting farmers to cultivate the reclaimed land each farmer was provided with 18.8 hectares of land 10 cattle to raise 611,000 yen subsidy and financing of up to 2.5 million yen the outcome of the project resulted to increased milk production in Japan so what valuable lessons can we learn or can be drawn from this experience from land reclamation project ownership was shown by lead agencies insistence that the Shinotsu peat land should be converted to rice paddies not to dairy farm the world bank only agreed after intense negotiation the project was obviously aligned with the five year development plan adapted by the Japanese government and in terms of knowledge transfer and internalization the Japanese did not only acquire basic operation of imported machines but also created the English manuals Nihongo engineers also redesigned new bulldozers in order to work in swamps after the completion the project side became a breeding ground for new ideas in rice and dairy farming which were adapted by local government and farmers in other areas in Hokkaido this is called scaling up meanwhile Japanese engineers acquired three things from the Aichi water canal project one is rock field dam construction technology two is new methods in construction and three the concept of construction consulting firm the rock field dam technology as I had said was used in the construction of other dams in Japan knowledge diffusion was made possible by Japanese engineers who worked in the project we go to South Korea the figure shows that there were only two predominant bilateral donors to South Korea during the period 1960 to 1993 they were the United States and Japan South Korea received a total of 4.42 billion US dollars between 1945 and 1975 post-war US assistance can be divided into three successive waves the third wave of assistance coincided with the end of the Korean war and the founding of the international cooperation administration the precursor of the US agency for international development in 1953 or USAID this batch of assistance to Korea had the most profound impact on the nation's economic transformation starting 1961 under President Park Jung-hee in a study 66% of loans between 1948 and 1961 were spent for enhancing administrative capacity development and education like Japan Korea also received significant amount of financial assistance from the World Bank the World Bank funded a total of 128 projects between 1962 and 2001 and is spent for infrastructure investment two-step loans and structural adjustment Osco or Poha iron and steel company is Korea's largest steel manufacturer former President Park Jung-hee made several attempts in building Korea's first integrated steel mill the first was in 1961 which marked the start of Korea's first five-year development plan both the World Bank and the United States rejected Park's request for funding by mid 1960s the government pursued a policy of diversifying sources of credit and started negotiating with Japanese government for reparations payments in 1968 Poha was established as a state-owned enterprise 1969 the Japanese government agreed to assist Poha construct its first integrated steel mill using Japanese technology and reparations payments the project was completed in 1973 and Poha started steel production initially with 1.03 ton in 2000 it became the second largest producer of steel after Nippon steel it was also privatized that year today Poha is one of the largest and competitive producers of steel in the world so why Japan agreed to provide funding the motivations that led to such decision were both political and commercial politically it was regarded as a contribution to regional security commercially it was seen as an opportunity to increase plant exports to Korea at least from the Japanese filmmaker's perspective so what can be gained from Korea's experience in terms of ownership and alignment the development of steel industry was in line with Korea's five-year development plan Koreans demonstrated effective negotiating skills in convincing Japanese negotiators to fund the project apparently the Koreans were able to internalize Japanese steel technology and on that basis use it to generate new and more innovative local technology and the institutes on steel production were also established to scale up the main incentive was to make the steel mill profitable this was done through continuous innovation and research to improve production after the first integrated steel mill was built POSCO underwent four phases of expansion which led to among others establishment of Kwangyang Steel Mill in 1970 the Steel Industry Promotion Act was enacted to assist POSCO and future other Korean steel makers to raise on performance the cases studied here showed that aid implementation should be sequential aid must be invested to education and capacity building at early stage of development and moving later to infrastructure and investment projects the study indicates the capacity for ownership and alignment during economic transition requires strong administrative and educational foundation a key in making aid effective is the ability of recipient countries to scale up in the examples discussed governments have played crucial roles in this process nowadays civil society organizations participate in the aid processes particularly in the aid delivery it is time to rethink how they can contribute to scaling up projects beyond the pilot stage it took years before the international aid community acknowledged the importance of ownership and alignment in aid effectiveness particularly in 2005 this is because donors pay more attention to their experience than to successful aid recipients experience Japan and South Korea have been outliers in the aid discourse yes the amount of aid matters and so is geoeconomic and strategic interests of donors on recipients the volume of aid that went to this country was huge compared to most country aid program today and finally the examples shown have demonstrated the importance of harmonization both Japan and Korea had borrowed from the U.S. and the World Bank and in the case of Korea from Japan aid was less fragmented then with the emerging new donors coordination and harmonization have become imperative for effectiveness thank you there was that was the perception of the majority of my respondents were experts of their field I did expert interviewing I did interview with ministers, politicians CEOs of different international NGOs senior officials of donors and consultants and like this and on the recipient side supply-driven aid was the most concerning part and it's a conventional it's a very normal it was not a very illuminating kind of a finding in Pakistan everybody feels the same supply-driven aid donors are coming in with their own agendas and they are publishing their partnership strategies every three years time and they won't even allocate you a single penny beyond that stated agenda which they have published in that document so yes the perception is there and it was very strong at the recipient end but when you ask the donor that this is how the recipients feel in Pakistan they say you tell us where should we invest because there is no inclusive development framework in Pakistan so they have to have they say like I just quote from a respondent from a bilateral donor I don't name it he said if you don't know what to do it I will tell you how to do it and I will tell you what to do so that was the main limitation which was identified in the in my research coming to the lack of capacity because since this paper is a product of my PhD research so this is only one part of it I have published two papers so far the third paper is on public sector capacity and how this aid policy network and the presence of numerous donors influence these policy processes in Pakistan and how it influences the capacity of the state to take decisions and implement those decisions in Pakistan you are very right if you have met some DMG the district management group these are the top bureaucrats in our civil establishment in Pakistan and you must have met some senior secretaries and additional secretaries my research which is as I say will be coming in next few months the third paper my research suggests that as you go down from that top level there is a serious lack of capacity there is a notable shortage of professionals and technocrats in Pakistan and mainly the decision making as well as the implementation is you know is taking care by these bureaucrats so you are right at one end you see if you look at the public policy cycle so agendas are setting by different actors decisions are taken by different set of actors and implementation is mainly is executed by different set of actors so the main concern is the people who are the street bureaucrats or the implementation implementing agencies or the contractors and subcontractors if there are capacity issues on that part no matter how good how perfect the policy you have it will eventually fail because people at the ground may not be able to implement it properly thank you so then I found your discussion about the Samoa and the Karabas most stark so it almost indicated kind of a past dependency the countries geography cultures history shaped whether they can take advantage of the concept of country ownership and the Samoa clearly is better placed than Karabas you talked that one way to as an entry point to lift the country's performance is by us sitting at the table discuss I was wondering whether that is really the kind of policy solutions that will address this deep-rooted issue I think it's a real challenge Karabas faces some significant challenges and I sort of in referencing that idea of sitting at the table that is what the intent of the forum is I couldn't help but reflect that when Karabas was present at the forum for a start it wasn't represented by their senior people or their most senior leader because of tragedies that had happened back in Karabas so they were represented by government officials but it does go I think the quality of the conversation that happens around the forum meetings on an annual basis which is why I think that the regional framework which has said that it's going to provide that opportunity for deeper conversations I raised the question about whether it will be able to do that but I yeah I'm still grappling because there's ideas here around how representative the government is in terms of its ability to meet the issues of the population of Karabas but it comes to the point I think around scale that you raised and the amount of money Karabas is facing some fairly serious challenges and on one hand the compact and the aid effectiveness agenda is about promoting different kinds of governance institutions and the quality of those institutions but the attention of the leadership has been on climate change because it's such a significant issue and that's been quite deliberate with the intention of giving the Karabas an opportunity to choose whether they stay or whether they go so I think that the situation in Karabas for the Karabas is really, really difficult Thank you Dennis I think if we flash back 60 years ago we saw Japan and Korea having loans from the World Bank today Japan is a large donor for ADB it contributes one third of the Asian Development Fund and we forgot that Japan had that kind of base it was actually receiving for Korea even more staggering it's received 15.7 billion US dollars with 128 projects you mentioned that these two countries are outliers we really hope there will be more outliers like this and you attributed one factor for success is the very rapid learning and because of the capacity built by the USA the education and so on I was wondering whether that would be the case because education and capacity is a stock that would be built in generations even if there was the war probably undermined a lot of the capacity but the pre-war capacity and the education and culture and entrepreneurship must have played a role so I'm not sure whether we can directly attribute this kind of rich learning ability to just the post-war aid, sequential aid I think the pre-war factors can have only an important role in the case of Japan because Japan's industrialization actually started during the Meiji period which is why I did not pick one project that is related to investment because Japan was actually an industrial power already before the Second World War and it was just reconstructing its economy so the better example would be Korea so I would say that the pre-war factors the education and the technical competence were achieved by the Japanese society before the Second World War but in the case of Korea some scholars would say that colonialism Japanese colonialism played a lot in the social transformation of Korea but there were also scholars who argued that there are limits to the effects of Japanese colonialism particularly on the educational sector of Korea so Korea's educational sector actually improved after the Korean War only after the Korean War because lots of money went into that sector based from the interviews I conducted in Korea and from the data documentary research I gathered and aside from the educational sector ODA was also foreign aid was used for administrative capacity in particular training and the military of South Korea had a unique organizational capacity because of the trainings they received from the United States so I should say that the pre-war factors only played a lot played an important role in Japan but not really that much in Korea and because of this experience the discourse on Japanese and Korean aid often referred to the experience that they had in the past so they always go back to experience so why Japanese and Koreans are spending more on infrastructure it's because of the experience that they had in the past but what I've seen from my studies is that we have to start first with social capacity building before we proceed to infrastructure and investment projects which could allow government to be more effective in implementing those projects and to maximize the benefits and more importantly the role of scaling up is really very important the project may be small scale but if the government can scale has the ability to scale up then the outcomes could be extended to the entire society to the entire country thank you now the floor is open please can you please introduce yourself and also indicate who you are addressing the question to I'm Nimad Bijan a fellow of Development Policy Center a research associate with the University of Oxford it was a great panel my first question is from Dr. Han in terms of the influence you mentioned that China has concerning its age has less influence policy influence I would call it what is the major donor my question is does it does type of aid matter China is very much focused on infrastructure while let's say World Bank is working with or policy actors or policy makers first and second in terms of the interactions which you mentioned how did you measure the interactions the chart which you had the second question is from Dennis also I wrote when I was at the University of Princeton I wrote a paper on state building in South Korea in Thailand Afghanistan and Iraq and looking different patterns coming to the question which was asked and also you pointed about the institutional legacy of course in terms of education less was invested on education but two trends we can track first under the Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan and Japan universal education was promoted though it was limited and second in terms of types of the state what happened Korea had a new colonial state but during that period that state was transformed into a modern or barbarian state which was crucial for development of South Korea in the upcoming decades and another factor I would like to hear from you in terms of continuity and discontinuity in South Korea because what happened after the invasion by the United States there was continuity in terms of public administration even some of the Japanese were called to stay on and work as advisors although there was they were not welcomed in South Korea thank you thank you thank you first of all what defines influence according to there are five they have divided resources into five major groups that actually defines the influence or the power of any actor or a group of actor within a network these resources are financial resources production resources knowledge resources competencies and legitimizes so anyone who has these resources in abundance and in better in quality and carrying resource in a better shape may have an advantage over another actor within the network or within a specific game which is going on in that network your question was this time of aid work not necessarily I give you an example whenever we had a problem specifically a geopolitical problem we find U.S. aid in Pakistan with a huge amount of grant aid with a huge amount of financial assistance and technical assistance in Pakistan we had a war soviet war in the late 90s in the Cold War thing and the U.S. aid were pumping in aid and technical assistance and everything was humanitarian aid was coming in as soon as the Cold War ends in 98-99 something like that the same U.S. government the state office put sanctions on Pakistan the economic and trade sanctions on Pakistan under the Pressler amendment which was actually passed in 96 but since the war was not ended for the next 2-3 years they hold that amendment with them and they put sanctions on us as soon as the war was and they rolled back their program again they came back after 9-11 with a lot of money with a lot of funds and technical assistance and with a lot of consultants when drawing around the ministries college rules and everywhere but as soon as you see we are actually experiencing this now the war on terror almost end they have Saman Laden and they have control in Afghanistan and might be there interest are fulfilled they are cutting aid every year it's a very small amount of aid projects which U.S. aid are doing it was specifically because when I talk to the experts in Pakistan specifically on the recipient side people were considering Asian and Gulf bilateral donors more trustworthy than U.S. aid that was the main reason next you ask about how I made the introductions which I showed here there were 2 sources one there is an economic EAD, economic assistance division under the ministry of finance they maintain the record of all the donors coming in for the meetings and meeting with the ministry they are maintaining that record there are also record available in the OECD annual report like how many donor delegations and consultants are going into the country and I also used an intensive it was a bit time taking but I made several requests it was a table a large table with for example if I was going to a certain development partner which is a bilateral donor I was asking them to kindly take how regularly how frequently or how rarely you see other actors in the network so they just had to take that so on the basis of that data verified by the EAD I came up with this diagram which I showed there I hope I answered the question in one of my interviews a professor from Ewa Women's University said that Koreans in general give high regard to education so whether or not the Japanese colonial system provide the universal education to Koreans they will they will still go to the school and official I mean foreign aid from the United States complimented that that attitude among Koreans which is why American aid really helped produce a society that is based on knowledge and a well informed members of the community now I haven't tackled the organizational evolution of political institutions in Korea and I'm not quite sure how to answer the continuity issue but after the second world war what we know is that Korea was governed or administered by the U.S. Army similar to the way Japan was administered by the U.S. military and so as I've said because of the Cold War there were so many caveats in my paper that I explained that I was not able to present so because of the Cold War it was it was very strategic for the United States to provide assistance to Korea and part of that assistance went to the Korean military they were trained to organize they were trained to manage and by 1961 the Korean Army was the core of the Korean society who could govern Korea this is the reason why Park Chung-hee was able to get political legitimacy because Koreans had high regard on the ability of the Korean Army to manage the society given the context the Cold War context the Cold War setting Thank you Any more questions? Any more questions? Hello Kim Tidcom is my name Independent Consultant and Researcher In view of the time it's a very short question for Suzanne I'm wondering how would you select the Pacific Compact as the instrument can I say or vehicle for testing your hypothesis on country ownership? Sorry Yes please The Compact was the key forum leaders agreement and it was I guess an opportunity what I'm today's presentation leads up to my consideration of the role of the broker the forum secretariat in negotiating between the forum and countries so that's really what I was interested in looking at being engaged around country ownership with the countries the Compact was the regional dimension of a new initiative by largely the Australian and New Zealand governments that began with the Port Moresby declaration in 2008 and the partnerships for development but the partnerships for development were bilateral agreements so I wanted to add that regional dimension to my work Thank you Suzanne Thank you Just I mentioned this in my blog for the development policy I was listening to Suzanne and she mentioned about the collective action thing and I just want to add on that in my PhD research what I found is that if you talk to people if you go to experts they are known so I don't think we need to spend a lot of energy on just finding problem like what is the problem problems are known the main actual problem is the lack of collective thought and then proper action on those lines what I find specifically in Pakistan I know about Pakistan I don't know about other developing countries what I found in Pakistan is we don't even have a formal platform where donors and government and local partners and other researchers and experts can come and interact and share their ideas and learn from each other no, they are working and operating in isolation and that is the real problem which I found in Pakistan and I am pursuing this in the government whatever colleagues and friends I have in Pakistan but there is very less appreciation there so I just wanted to add this comment that the main problem I find is the lack of collective thought and collective action which Susan mentioned I think that's one of the things I wanted to tease out when the forum leaders gathered in Cairns they were in a relationship where they were sitting alongside their more powerful development partners so even though Kiribati had the Oceanscapes policy it was going to agree with anything that was initiated by one of its more powerful development partners who would not and I think that's what I found when I went to Kiribati it showed evidence of compliance this is an ongoing agenda that had been pursued since 1976 there is evidence in the forum of discussions between country officials and development partners over how the money is used so this meeting took it up a pitch but it didn't get down to the heart of how it could work and what it was that was really meaningful for the countries I think so one follow-up Thank you Dr. Khan I really liked your pictograph of all the different wherever one sat in light of the earlier plenary session maybe it's just in the front of my mind but I noticed the private sector didn't figure anywhere in there so I wonder if they were to be there where they would fit I'm not necessarily a question for now but I'm also thinking about leadership and country led priorities having country led priorities is predicated upon country leadership and the ability to articulate what those country priorities are in my experience development partners and Dr. Khan you recognize this I think development partners, donors are willing to get on board if local governments or those country governments are able to articulate very clearly what they want and oftentimes donors are sitting there asking each other in country donor working groups what do you think the local the government wants how are you guys fitting in should we coordinate together or are really waiting for governments to be able to tell them how to spend this money and so I see certainly the power dynamics in the Pacific but to build that I don't know if it's capacity or agency to articulate those goals in my experience donors will get in line and I've seen those country governments say we don't want this we do want that and if you're not willing to spend the money the way we want to spend it you can take it elsewhere and donors get right in line generally I don't know about it anyway I'm curious to hear your thoughts I think in the interest of kind probably we can have some more discussions afterwards but I want to summarize I feel that from South Asia Pakistan to the Pacific and unfortunately we did not have time to listen to the stories for PG and then flash back to the year more than 60 years ago to Japan and Korea there is a recurrent saying that country ownership is the result it's not something we want to do it will happen it's almost the policy or the outcome of interventions not necessarily the instrument but now that begs the question what is the instrument and the never done what came out of this country capacity that will determine whether aid is a catalyst or countries will become aid dependent but the capacity itself is also endogenous that is the difficulty we can't have a quick fix for capacity and I think we need to continuously search really how we can break this vicious circle to make it a virtuous circle and look forward to enlightening research in this very important question thank you very much thank you thank you