 So starting with Gabrielle and into the question about transparency in commercial arbitration, I wanted to ask you, and sort of leaning on Arise's statement about the tail wagging the dog, it is a small minority of cases that potentially have a public interest involved in a arguably similar fashion than in more public international law disputes. But the majority of cases is in commercial arbitration one where potentially the parties have a very strong interest in confidentiality. That's one of the reasons why arbitration has been chosen by the parties. This is what you can still read in every single arbitration book around the world that this is one of the advantages of arbitration. So maybe you want to address this question of the confidentiality of the business transactions and business secrets behind that. Just very briefly. Thank you. I think that the point of how the ICC for instance deals with the issue, I think it's a good starting point. There are other rules, and I'm referring, for instance, to the Chamber of Commerce in Milan, where if the parties don't object to the publication of the award before the award is actually rendered, that award is going to be published. There is, of course, the parties are not going to be mentioned in the publication and so on, but the award itself and the content of that award is published. Now at the ICC we are working in a different way. It's true we are protecting the confidentiality of the business interests of the parties. And the publication of the award happens, A, if there is not a confidentiality closed in the terms of reference, or if the parties do not agree to any confidentiality during the proceedings, B, it doesn't happen soon after the rendering of the award. It happens usually six years after the award has been rendered. And we usually try to protect specific interests, such as military defense or other IT disputes, et cetera. Some of these disputes are never going to be published. Or the awards in these disputes are never going to be published. And also there is a body, an internal body, and that is going to review these awards and they are going to accept the publication of these awards. Of course, no confidential information is going to be published. So the name of the parties, the name of the arbitrators, nothing is actually published. And don't you think that undermines the fundamental idea of transparency that you have so passionately argued for? I think it might and it might not. Since I started at the ICC I've seen an increasing number, for instance, of awards on disputes involving Arab sprints, countries, for instance. And the issues involved in that proceedings are incredibly sensitive. And at the same time, they are incredibly linked to a public interest of two states. So that might be, and that was something that at the ICC that there were people discussing about that, for instance, publishing a few years, do those kind of awards that might compose or together, that might create a body of law that might help both the practitioners and the arbitrators to deal with these specific issues that the arbitrator tribunals encountered during the proceedings involved in Arab Spring States. And moving along to Arip, and I'm not going to ask you to close your eyes, but I'm going to ask you a question about party autonomy, which you have so prominently put forward. Isn't party autonomy also the choice of the parties? And so if we give the option to the parties in commercial arbitration to have confidential proceedings, but maybe also less confidential, more transparent proceedings, then that is actually something that would very much be in line with party autonomy. And for instance, the example of the ICC putting out the names of the arbitrators on their website, the parties cannot out, and the arbitrators cannot out. I can tell you none of my cases is on them. So isn't this something that actually allows for party autonomy? Yes. So I convinced you. Hey. I mean, I mean, so I mean, I think the answer lies, Maxie, in addressing the four or five components of transparency. The first, I think with respect to institutional transparency, they're the rule makers, as I was saying. So the more information that there is out there with respect to how the rules are interpreted, how the rules that they're applied, whether it's a domestic rulemaking body or an international organization of institutions or the ICC or any of the others, I mean, I think that there has to be a significant amount of transparency there because it lends itself to predictability of the process. And I think that predictability of the process ultimately then helps with parties being able to have certainty as to the length and time and costs of arbitrations. I think with respect to the question of publishing the arbitrator's names, look, the big fat of the ICC and Maxie is a great friend, but I really don't see the point, honestly. I mean, so you've published the names of all the arbitrators in order to allow for statistics to then be developed or for parties perhaps to do some analysis in order to see whether an arbitrator has too many appointments. But that arbitrator, for whom you're trying to do the analysis, may have five ICC arbitrations or ICC arbitrations, but I have no idea how many other arbitrations. So ultimately, when it comes to arbitrator transparency, for me, it really is that amount of force and whether ultimately arbitrators or parties are going to point arbitrators based on what it is that they address with the individual who's going to be arbitrating. If you'll be my arbitrator, the one thing I expect you to tell me when I ask about your availability is how many arbitrations are you involved in and can you handle this arbitration? I mean, if you cannot be honest with me about that fundamental question, then we've got a big problem at hand, no? So I think that breaking these things down into what needs to be transparent is very, I think that that's the critical question on the answer to each of those elements of transparency leads to, I think, a different response. Most people, when they talk about transparency, they talk about information access, basic information, such as where the dispute may be in the process, but also about access to the proceedings. And in the context of commercial arbitration, that's highly appropriate. There is no public interest in anybody coming and walking into your and my arbitration and having a right to plead. I think it's interesting because we're moving here almost into a ground where we have some, at least understanding a common ground between the two of you. So I'd be interesting to see later on how that translates into your goals. But let's move to international commercial arbitration and now with Samantha. And the question I wanted to ask you is if you don't see that if we push the transparency, and I think we all agree that we need some form of transparency in the investor-state arbitration we already have with the transparency rules, a certain ground for transparency, but if we push that further, is there not a risk that we undermine really what the system is about? And that is having a cost-efficient system. So if we have too many amicus curiae and too many, the tribunal needs to organize a hearing with open court, is that not going to undermine the efficiency of the process? And is there not a risk, this is sort of the second part of the question, is there not a risk that we go back in time and sort of reminding us that at some point investor-state arbitration was created to depoliticize these disputes. So to get them out of the public discussion and to actually allow arbitrators to resolve the disputes rather than to have populist arguments and potentially even some military or other strong actions. Yeah, absolutely. And I think there's clearly sort of competing interests and concerns at work here. And as with everything in life it's about striking the right balance. But I mean, I think when we talk about just to sort of work backwards in your question, when we talk about sort of depoliticizing the disputes and that's why ISDS was set up. I mean, I think the concern there was really we're in a system of diplomatic protection and an investor would go to the state and set it to its own state. So not to the host state of the investment and sort of say, hey, look, like these guys have stolen my property, we please step in and help me out here. And they'd be like, oh, sorry, but we were actually in some negotiations and this other really sensitive thing here. So your little investment isn't actually of a huge amount of concern to us. And then the investor would be left with that in your remedy except for going to the national courts which in just many situations wasn't an option that was open to them. And so when we talk about sort of repoliticizing disputes, that's not what we're talking about. And what we are talking about is the fact that the disputes that we have now, and this is really about the system in the victim of its own success. We've moved so far beyond you stole my hotel, give me some money into you have adopted an environmental policy that is to the benefit of your domestic population. And maybe it also affects sort of native peoples living on land. And that's the sort of current politicization. And I don't see how a legitimate answer to that is, hey, sorry, but we decided to do a deep politicize one of this 50 years ago. So your interests have no place here. And often there's really not a sort of domestic forum for those interests to be raised because the disputes are just not going forward in the domestic courts. And even if they were, you might end up with two competing decisions there. And I think I sort of, you know, I come back to like the first and the last points of what I said, even if we just start, even if we all sat here today thinking to ourselves, you know, this is all totally overblown. Really, ISDS when it comes down to it, it's almost like about official breach of contract. The state can sort of do whatever it wants. It just has to pay for the consequences. So why are we letting all these people in? Even if we all sat here and agreed on this, nobody outside of this room would think that that is a legitimate way forward. And ultimately, I think that is why transparency is just so vital and so particularly vital at this point in time. So my last question for Richard is, I think if I understood you correctly, you said that we already have a sort of basic level of transparency and going beyond that would be unacceptable. What I wanted to ask you is, and sort of maybe building on what you said, you know, you trust the arbitrators. These are the guys and girls that you've chosen on your tribunal. Don't you trust the arbitrators as well to get that balance right, to potentially limit where necessary transparency? And you have all the possible limits, actually quite significant limits in the uncitral transparency rules. For instance, where arbitral tribunals can, you know, step out of the regular transparent sort of regime of the uncitral transparency rules if they deem it necessary in the particular circumstances of the case. I think that's right. I think that you have to trust the arbitrators to apply the new rules that we've got. I think that, as I said, what we have at the moment is enough. I don't think it should go any further because otherwise it stops being arbitration and it starts being some sort of supranational investment call. That's arbitration. Yeah, exactly. The point is though that I wanted to make is that you're quite right. You have to trust your tribunal to be able to apply that properly. But I think that a lot of the other measures which have been applied go further than is necessary to achieve some of the goals. And I think there's a danger that the baby might, or at least part of the baby might have been thrown out with the backwater. So this is your opportunity and to ask some questions to the tribunal before I will again ask you to vote. Yes, please, could you just say your name? Yeah, my name is Andrew Jareko. And my question is to Mr. Eid Ali. Well, first of all, thank you for this interesting discussion. And I'm sure many of us would like to continue this discussion with you and Gabriella Riscala. But anyway, my question is about application of arbitral awards. First of all, I need to mention that I voted against more transparent approach and I'm against publication of arbitral awards because imagine that it undermines the most important benefit of commercial arbitration, which is the challenge we're seeing for the parties. However, on the other side, there's strong argument that proposed by policy development sector, policy makers, including academics, that it seems that in this state for first, large amount of commercial matters remains to be shadowed by them. And it's not available for proper analysis. Isn't this the situation leading to a huge disadvantage to the idea of keeping the law in place with development of commerce? Because in this digital environment, global environment, many new matters issues arise daily and if they are still in the shadow within commercial arbitration, how would legislation be improved then? So my question is how would you wrap this argument? I mean, it's a very, very astute and extremely good point. And I think you articulate this really well. Okay, at the end of the day, I think that when you look at most commercial arbitration agreements, the points that are of the most interest and that are used by advocates and ultimately by academics and for purposes of legislative reform are those that address procedural problems. So I mean, I do think that the publication of awards can only assist with those procedural points insofar as or up to the extent to which the ICC or other organizations start to use those awards to be more transparent regarding the application of the rules or regarding procedure. But for the most part, the legal principles that you were just talking about, oh, just before I say that, and it's those procedural points that then inform the discussion with respect to legislative reform or the law of arbitration at the seat of arbitration. So that I think is something that can be addressed, not with the publication of awards, but with the analysis of the awards and ultimately then being informed, informing what it is that institutions are transparent about. But if you look at commercial arbitration awards as a substance, frankly, there's very little that you're going to be able to get out of the award that's going to be instructive. Even if you were assuming that there was a world of precedent in the context of, say, the set of stare decisons, that you would be able to do something with it because most of the commercial arbitration awards are fact drippers. And without those facts, the articulation of the legal principle is going to be in a vacuum and really somewhat useless. Now, the other point is that what benefit did you gain out of the decision on force majeure on the Nigerian law if you were operating a case on the Australian law? Very good. So there is a, there's a procedural transparency that I can appreciate because that creates a more developed piping for the substance of the system to run through. But I think ultimately the substance is so diverse that there's very little to be gained from substantive transparency. That's okay. I just want to add a quick comment. It's true that most of the awards are dealing with, they are fact-driven. But I give you another example which contradicts what you just said. It's, for a while there were cases involving parties under embargo. And that happens a lot in the ICC and it's happening more and more. Now, I've been able to review some of these awards were actually very interesting and they deal with, for instance, admissibility issues which are, then we can say we don't know whether it's the procedural or merits or so on, but how the embargo affects the admissibility of a claim or not before an arbitral tribunal, that's very interesting. And it's not, it might be interesting for other tribunals as well. What I've seen, for instance, is that some of these arbitral tribunals are the same in different cases, involving the same parties, they are just parallel proceedings. And they were referring their words to the other case on which they took similar decisions. So that I think it's a typical example of how public international law issues should be interpreted constantly or in a consistent way by the arbitral tribunals because can you imagine you have, for instance, an Iranian party before two different arbitral tribunals, they bring similar cases, similar claims, that they are subject, that party is subject to a sanction, a UN sanction, we are not talking about a state sanction, we are talking about an international sanction. The arbitral tribunals take different decisions in the two different arbitral proceedings. This is incredibly inconsistent and if we think about international arbitration as an international system of justice, as for instance the French courts have defined in a few in the last decades, we cannot accept it. It's not even talking about public interest, it's talking about justice. And if justice is made differently, like in each case, well there might be an issue of legitimacy of the regime in itself. A couple of very, just two small points. One is that you may want to take a look at the decisions issued by the WIPO operation and mediation center. I mean it's not absolutely international operation, the WIPO decisions relating to the uniform, the main name of the street resolution policy has led to a body of law relating to cybersporting that has emanated out of what is effectively an international commercial off-road street resolution system. So I think it's worth looking at. And the other thing, Maxine, you were going to address this, was no one has yet really spoken about the costs of transparency. I mean there's the principle of transparency that I think a lot of people would agree with in the context of domestic state arbitration, but one of the comments that was being made, I comment by who, as to how it makes, what it is that arbitrators have to do. I think you were saying, well, what's the balancing act for arbitrators? So the biggest problem that I face, what I as an arbitrator and an investor state cases, is how to implement the principle of transparency, no matter how much my soul may be bursting and my intellect wanting to allow for transparency, the biggest problem is who bears the costs of the four NGOs that want to participate. It's unfair for the parties to have to do that. When you decide to bring a claim against me, you do a cost-benefit analysis as the investor. I, depending on the case, do a cost-benefit analysis as the respondent state, right? But when those NGOs participate, they do super free. And there's a huge free rider problem that needs to be addressed within the context of investor-state arbitration. Samantha, maybe you want to address that? It goes to your board. Yeah, you want to. Look, and you have some very particular experience, very recent thing, right? Yeah, and I totally, totally take the point. And I think that in commercial arbitration, I'd absolutely agree that sort of efficiency and cost-effectiveness are two very important principles and they're two major reasons why the parties choose that way of resolving disputes. But when it comes to investor-state arbitration, I mean, you can imagine one of these disputes going through a national court, you know, sort of the Keystone Pike mine going through the US courts. I think that would just be a sort of massive, sprawling litigation. And I understand that sort of arbitration is meant to bypass that a little bit, but when it is an arbitration that concerns these issues that a lot of people have a very real interest in, I think you have to sort of give cost-effectiveness and efficiency less range. Oh, that's great. But no, but I mean, who should bear the cost? I mean, maybe there is a way to amend the rules that if you're going to intervene. It's governments, I mean, I can't imagine a single investor that says, oh, I want everything to be transparent about whatever's going on. And when investors do, public relations firms are very helpful in that respect and we've all done it as part of our advocacy. But I think to the extent that states sign on to the unsetral regime on transparency, then perhaps there's a cost associated with that because they can't impose the cost on us as an investor. Well, then perhaps there is an additional transparency fee that is charged by the institution to subsidize the additional costs of that system of transparency that has been implemented. This is not fair on the private party. I mean, you can to a certain extent deal with it at the end in the cost award and say the investor had a totally bogus claim and it was necessary to have an amicus curia keep addressing that and potentially that is something and that can be addressed in the cost award. But of course it's more difficult the other way. So I wanted to give you an opportunity to ask some more questions. I think we have one here and one here. I just want to do this discussion and sort of divergent between commercial and international investment arbitration. So I'm underlie the point that maybe investment arbitration has moved beyond a system of pure arbitration. And so that maybe we shouldn't keep trying to draw a checklist against the standards that we draw of what we understand as pure arbitration. Can I just in the interest of time maybe collect two questions? I think you had one as well. Yes. My question is totally different. I'm Spanish for the student. My question is, I think, mostly to the commercial arbitration speakers. In your opinion, how close is it from total transparency, which is on the way somehow to the fact or precedent system? Not the euro, but I ask it because nowadays, the experience and the arbitral awards and materials, which we have, are quite fragmentary. And I think I'm not enough to show tendencies and trends in each and every sphere. But if more decisions award will become transparent, it may, in my opinion, I think, result in the situation where arbitrators and parties, in most of the case, will be researching everything and find out that in similar cases, in 70% of cases, it was decided in this way. So do you think it may result in precedent system E? And if yes, what are the pros and cons? That's best answered by guys you see. We review, we scrutinize the awards every week. And honestly, I don't see many reference as of today to previous arbitral tribunals awards. I think that the difficult task of an arbitral tribunal to refer to another award is that the law applicable might not be the same. And so the interpretation of a specific contract will close under another law applicable might not be helpful for your specific case. But I think the only significant examples on which I see this reference to other arbitral awards is when we talk about concepts that are a little bit higher than a simple interpretation of the clause. I see, as I mentioned, references in the embargo cases, in the definition of concepts such as the Transnational Public Policy, and all these kind of references. As of now, I don't see a Wendy. I don't know whether you can confirm or not, but I don't see very often references. Yes, that was the question. And if you take the experience, the materials which we have are fragmentary, and you are right. It's difficult to refer to another case, but imagine when cases become transparent, we will have millions of cases available. And perhaps classify it so that we can navigate the massive data then to the president coming to force it. It also depends on how confidentiality will be applied and how the application will be applied by the institutions. I don't think that the ICC might, as of tomorrow, publish all the awards because parties may decide that they don't want to. And we have internal policies that don't allow us to publish soon after the award has been rendered. I think Wendy wants to add. So it might take time, actually. The experience we had would suggest it won't happen. A lot of, are you absolutely right, what we see precedent or earlier cases cited and it would fall in ICC decisions is all procedural issues. And already, although cases aren't published with names, there is the bulletin regularly publishes anonymized case notes on decisions that deal with these types of procedural issues, interpretation of the rules. Potentially that could go into the sanctions issue, which is an important arguably procedural issue. And even with that smaller body of precedent, we're not seeing a whole lot of cases cited. So I think the point Arif keeps coming back to, you know, almost 200 countries, there's an awful lot of governing laws, an awful lot of combinations of mandatory law, place of performance, government law of the contract, law of the seat, all of these things make every single case pretty much different. The place where it might help is in the public-private partnerships and the privatization process, where for example Romania has multiple public-private partnerships all governed by Romanian law and certain public law issues interpreted there. It might be nice to see more consistency in those sorts of decisions, I don't think what I described so was that. But I think for the bigger part, we're not going to see precedent. Certainly not the way we see an investor-state arbitration. We really only had five causes of action, right? And they're all governed effectively, usually by the same law. Thanks. I was just going to say from the point of view of somebody who's a bit of a traitor to the arbitral cause, and I practice in the commercial course as well, I wouldn't get too excited by the value of precedent. I completely agree with Wendy and Arif, it's, you know, the first thing you do is immediately find some fact to distinguish it from the other facts, and it really isn't much to get excited about, particularly the reasons we're talking in an international context. Turning to the other question, I personally wouldn't want to see investor-state arbitration move completely away from the world of arbitration. I still think that there is so much value in taking it away from, taking it out of a court system. And I think if we move too far, we end up with all the problems, or at least a loss of the problems you have with national courts trying to deal with these issues. Who appoints the judges? How many judges do we have? What's the seat? And I think if I could argue slightly against myself, we've got a good system at the moment, but you didn't hear that, everybody can vote for me, okay? Yeah, and I think, look, arbitration is a consensual system of resolving disputes where you get to pick the people who decide it. And as long as that is ISDS, it is arbitration, and the beauty of arbitration has always been that outside of those sort of basic fundamental requirements, you can kind of agree your way to any sort of procedure or rule on any other topic. So I think it's, again, and it goes back to some balancing. So if we decide that in commercial arbitration, once you've got in your consensual dispute resolution process, certain priorities are more important than others. And then in ISDS, certain other priorities are more important than others, that's absolutely fine. But what you just have to maintain, and that's what we're just gonna throw the baby out of bathwater, is just the consensual nature of it. So I think there are still many more questions that we can ask. What I would suggest is that we do so over a glass of whatever is gonna be served in a moment, but we have a couple of other things to do. First of all, I think we should give our speakers a wonderful round of applause for commercial arbitration because we've now heard in detail the arguments. So let me start again by commercial arbitration. Can you please show your hands if you are for the motion that we need an increased transparency? That looks like less than 50% to me. Just checking, can you show your hands if you think that we need, we do not need, against motion, do not need more and increased transparency in commercial arbitration. I think that is the majority. So we've won the case on no further transparency. Arbitration hasn't changed anything, the majority, for more transparency in investor-state arbitration. So I'm gonna ask, who is against the motion that we need an increased transparency in investment arbitration? I think that is probably a hand or so more than we have before, but just tiny bit. So I take it that the rest of you, large majority are still in favour of increased transparency. Yes, excellent. So one last thing, I know that Arif wanted to tell you something about a writing competition, but again, please put your hands together for a wonderful panel. Folks, well, you have to put your hands together. I'm inaugural Decad International Essay competition for which about some 37 people registered interest and then subsequently some smaller number submitted excellent essays and those who did will all receive comments back and we would like to continue interacting with you to help you advance the papers that you've written and hopefully help you also find places that you can get them published. But on this particular Cambridge arbitration day, the winner of the essay competition is Lucia Vizikovic. The question of what process is due parties in international arbitration and hopefully we'll see that published in some points. Thank you. Well done. Congratulations. Thank you once again to our panelists for a wonderful discussion. This brings to an end very engaging discussion on the future of international arbitration. Both commercial and investment. I think we can conclude today that while our windows change blowing, they're not necessarily strong enough to call for a radical change in the entire system. On that note, on behalf of the Graduate Law Society and the faculty of Law School University of Cambridge, I'd like to thank our modulators and speakers for sharing that inside throughout the day. I would particularly like to thank our panelists, Wendy and Arif in particular as the only Indian PhD researcher in this faculty. I think it's important to engage in a discourse on gender and ethnicity diversity. And we've managed that to a good extent with the organization of this event because we have nine women and three men supporting this event. Thank you. Thank you for your success. A special thank you to all our sponsors, Hobbits, Metzzi, Hills, Sherman and Sterling, for Tara Piatta, Bill Mahill, Jack Hurt, Clifford Charles. I think I missed out a few of the panelists to pick. Thank you. Can't, I can't. Other than water, I'm glad you called. And thank you very much to all our sponsors for the continued association in this project and we hope to continue this in the future. Finally, thank you to the organizers for the wonderful event and we hope to see you again in the coming year. I'd like to invite you all to the green section for a very good chance. Thank you. Thank you.