 Good morning ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for making it over here to CSIS. My name is Kathleen Hicks. I direct the international security program here at CSIS. I am not Heather Connolly who's listed on your program. Heather was trapped in Florida of all places by canceled flights yesterday. So the good news is she ended up in a place with the warmest weather in the US. The bad news is there are no flights going there so she couldn't get out. I have the distinct pleasure today of introducing Hermes Rensselu, the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Estonia. Mr. Rensselu has been the Minister of Defense since May of 2012 and he's been a member of the Estonian Parliament since 2003. Prior to 2003 he was a lecturer at the Estonian Academy of Security Studies and also has held a number of positions advising the Estonian government. We are privileged to have Minister Rensselu here today to discuss Estonia's defense priorities and its military modernization plans ahead of the September 2014 Native Summit. After the Minister's remarks he and I will discuss some of the issues most relevant to Estonia's defense and then we will open up this session to questions from the audience. So please join me now in a round of applause for Minister Hermes Rensselu. Thank you very much for warm welcoming words. Well I'm coming from the Nordic country where we are having exceptional situation over the decades that in this winter we do not have snow. So I'm delighted to be here and first of all I'm very proud that among us are two helicopter pilots from the Estonian Air Forces who have served in Afghanistan with US troops and now serve in Maryland National Guard. So I truly welcome you here. This year we will mark a number of very important anniversaries in the US-European relationship. 100 years since Sarajevo and the outbreak of World War I, 70 years since Normandy, 65 years since the Washington Treaty was signed, quarter of century since the Berlin Wall fell and by the steps 15, 10 and 5 years since NATO's post-Cold War enlargements. So it is a moment for us to look back to what we have achieved so far and to assess the way ahead. NATO along with the European Union was a natural choice for Estonia after regaining independence in 1991. Membership in democratic western organizations was and still is seen as the core pillar of Estonian security and the scale was a great engine for reforms back in the 90s. Last year 76% of Estonians supported NATO membership. 58% of the population believes that Estonian Defence Forces should participate in international military operations when they can. And I'm proud to say that actually all the time it has been that when we in parliament vote international missions it is a consensus vote. Because of our history people still remember that peace and security does not come for free. Europe, world and free is something wonderful and highly valuable but it is also a threat to our vigilance. We shouldn't forget that we still need to maintain our defence capabilities and contribute to the alliance. There have been many discussions about NATO's role and its relevance during past 20 years. But we must keep in mind what has been achieved. With the end of the Cold War the global security environment changed almost overnight and NATO adapted to it. Throughout the entire period of the Cold War NATO forces were not involved in a single military engagement. And since that time NATO has been engaged in missions that cover the full spectrum of crisis management operations. From combat and peacekeeping to training and logistic support to surveillance and humanitarian relief. And today just under 100,000 military personnel are engaged in NATO missions around the world. And NATO alone. NATO alone continues to provide that kind of multinational interoperability, command structure and deployable capabilities. NATO still is the most powerful military alliance in the world. Indeed it hasn't always been easy. Many great soldiers have lost their lives. Including nine Estonians in Afghanistan. But NATO has proven that it is able and willing to adapt reform and prove that it is still relevant. And NATO has been an adaptable organisation. Decisions made during different rounds of enlargement are a proof of that. The risk to take in seven more Eastern European countries decade ago turned out to be a worthy one. The security of the Euro-Atlantic community has considerably improved through enlargement of NATO. However we can't take this achievement for granted. Because security needs constant commitment and improvement. Especially in today's increasingly unpredictable and complex world. So NATO has to remain active and find ways to engage more. It's most committed and strong partners. At the summit in coming months we must confirm that we value their contribution. And that NATO's doors remain open to new members. And this is not a consensus understanding today. I'm sure we should encourage and help aspirant countries more so that they can prepare better for the NATO membership. I will not stop on few other things we wish to see among the conclusions of the NATO summit. First a recommitment to the two percent defence spending principle. In the last few years almost all allies have cut their defence budgets. Some by more than 40 percent. Today five countries out of 28 spend less than 1 percent of their GDP to defence. Only five spend more than 175 percent among which four countries cross the two percent threshold. Only four. And in the 90s it was 12. The NATO Secretary General's annual report of 2012 cautioned that if the negative defence spending trend of member countries continued. NATO's military capability and political credibility could be put at risk. It seems that we are outraged by the costs of war but we are even more outraged by the costs of peace. And we should not consider Europe as one homogeneous area where all the countries think and act at the same time. The UNIA is one of the countries that understands the necessity to continuously contribute two percent of GDP to defence and who actually does so. So actually when I 2012 became minister so it was the first year we achieved two percent. And now we have a decade plan and we will remain fit on that level. The biggest difficulty is to maintain this level when many others especially our neighbours don't respect their commitments. And therefore it is of utmost importance that the NATO summit reaffirmed the two percent principle. We need to keep this as a goal even if stating this goal will not automatically and instantly change the defence budgets in Europe. Because if it's vice versa if we will lose that benchmark it will automatically I'm sure bring additional costs. Second at the summit NATO must confirm its ability and commitment to fulfil all its main tasks. Both Article 5 and non-Article 5 are NATO soil and far from it. The Baltic region is the only one in NATO. The only one in NATO where the military strategic balance does not favour the Allies because of our good friend Russia. Thus NATO as a world as well as the Allies in B or multilateral cooperation must continue to ensure that no outside power is tempted into making a miscalculation neither testing the solidarity of NATO Allies nor the functioning of Article 5. The good work we have done in demonstrating the political unity and decisiveness of the Alliance must continue true. First contingency planning and conducting exercises on a regular basis. Second sending unambitious, clear and consistent messages to third parties. Both contingency planning and exercises should be a normal and routine part of NATO's work not something to be shy about. And third the continued strength of the transatlantic link is also one of the main topics of the summit for us. We wish to see the US committed to Europe and the European Allies committed to a fairer burden sharing. And this is a challenge for Europe and we will remain to arise the question among our European Allies. And there is also a question of burden sharing inside Europe that needs to be addressed. Well many, I am the city and elsewhere, myself included are frustrated with European level of defence spending, capabilities and willingness to take part in international military operations. We should not forget that between 2007 and 2011 an average of 30 to 40,000 non-US NATO troops were deployed to Afghanistan, which means on average between 30 to 40 American soldiers who didn't have to go to Afghanistan. There is no other region in the world besides Europe who contributes in such a way to an American led military operation. At the same time the last US tank departed from Europe in March 2013. I don't know where that tank is now, but we miss that tank. While I understand the financial difficulties you face I still have to underline the importance of American presence and visibility in Europe and in the Baltic Sea region in particular, which reinforces NATO's credibility and deterrence posture. In times of diminished resources for defence, having reliable allies willing to share the burden of collective defence becomes even more important. But this seems to be commonly ignored. According to the survey Transatlantic Trends 2013 only 15% of Americans felt that NATO helps countries share the cost of military action and only 12% of Europeans said the same. This means that there is a lot of room for improvement. As Churchill said gentlemen we have run out of money and now we have to think. In the Baltic States we have practiced what is called today smart defence for more than a decade. It was not because we were smart but because we were small and poor. For example officers of the three countries are trained in the one single institution Baltic Defence College since 1919. We have a joint air surveillance system BaltNet and a common mine countermeasure unit Baltron. And in 2016 we will send an Estonian-led Baltic battalion to the NATO Response Force. Our region is of course wider than just the three Baltic States. As specific initiatives I could mention the Nordic Battlegroup which includes on Estonian initiative all Nordic Baltic countries who can contribute. Finland, Sweden, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. We also coordinate our participation in international military operations. We take part of EU-TM which is a training mission of European Union in Mali in cooperation with Finland, Sweden and Lithuania. And we are currently in this discussion about our contribution to resolute support in Afghanistan in cooperation with Nordic Baltic countries and Germany. Another topic at the summit will be the Alliance's continued preparedness and interoperability. Once the eyes of mission comes to its end. As General Breedlove said when he was in Tallinn in Estonia last fall the Alliance is currently at the pinnacle of our interconnectedness. But from the next year the glue will start to unstick. To avoid this NATO must focus more on exercises. Exercises are the sine qua non of combat readiness. It is also important politically as it demonstrates NATO's continued relevance and contributes to the Alliance's deterrence posture. And therefore the Connected Forces Initiative is one of the core issues for Estonia. We hope to see a robust forward-looking exercise program with annual live exercises put in place. And these exercises should take place all over the Alliance on both sides of the Atlantic. To say a few words about the latest NATO exercises. In November, Steadfast Chess Livex exercise took place in Poland and in the Baltic states and cyber coalition that took place in Estonia. Steadfast Chess was the first large-scale article 5 live exercise since the Cold War. It is also worth mentioning that this time Allies exercise it defending a real country. And this country is my homeland Estonia. So we as Estonians have very sentimental feelings about that exercise. As the scenario foresaw the defence of Estonia by the Alliance, NATO headquarters prepared for that for more than a year. And as a result now we are much better acquainted with our region and its security challenges. And Steadfast Chess strengthened the Alliance's deterrence posture in our region. And it also gave Allied Forces and NATO headquarters the opportunity to exercise in a collective defence scenario. But what we learned is that our long engagement in counter-terrorism type wars in failed states has changed our mindset. It really has driven us away from the collective defence approach. The country who was the biggest contributor to the live phase of Steadfast Chess was France with 1200 participants. The second was Poland who contributed 1000 troops and bronze medal same level was to the US in Estonia. Both contributed with a company size unit. And I don't think this proportion was quite normal. About cyber-coalition it was an honor for us to host in Estonia NATO's annual cyber-defence exercise. It was the first time this exercise took place outside of shape. Cyber-coalition 2013 evolved 400 people in 32 different countries and it was a success. We hope to continue hosting such cyber-exercises in Estonia as training, education and exercises are clearly supporting our nation and also NATO's capability development. We have gained a lot of experience in this field and we are interested in the relevant infrastructure development which should be shared with other Allies. Estonia as a country has understood that cyber is an integral part of today's security environment and of every single future conflict of crisis. Therefore we are working closely with our Allies to improve states' national cyber-defence capabilities and the Alliance's collective cyber-policy. And our view is that cyber should also play a bigger role in future NATO's exercises. So, long military engagements have given us more than just interoperability. They have given us a trustful relationship. You can search trust and you can't search a major relationship. Trust and relationships take many years to build. Person-to-person connections are only available because you have gone to school together or because you have endured hardships together. We highly value the relationship we have built with the US on the field of Afghanistan and in Iraq. Nothing can replace the actual combat experience side by side. And we wish to maintain this link after the end of ISAF mission and to find new openings for cooperation. To sum in all up and in anticipation of your questions, we in Estonia hope to see a balanced NATO capable of fulfilling all of its free core tasks. First, collective defence, second, crisis management and third, cooperative security. A NATO currently has a good framework. The strategic concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2020, which give clear, balanced and fair guidelines. And we don't see a need to make revolutionary reforms, but rather just focus on NATO's core tasks and to improve national contributors. Despite pervasive pessimism about the ultimate success of the NATO mission in Afghanistan and continued debate about European contributions to Allied burden sharing, 55% of Americans and 58% of Europeans see NATO as still essential for their country's security according to the last year's study of transatlantic trends. NATO's main value was to be an alliance of democratic countries that should act together. It means that there is a lot worth preserving and we need to do common efforts to the same. Thank you very much. Thank you very much for that both thorough speech but also very provocative talk and I think there's a lot here for us to dig into. The first I think of the comments you made that I was struck by was the recommitment to the 2% metric, which of course is something we really struggled with in the alliance for some time as you rightly point out the statistics on that. I think the real question though for us has to be how can we be persuasive, most persuasive on this. If we use your thought that without having it we might be in more of a free fall than with having it, what do you think can most persuade those countries that aren't currently making the 2% in the absence of an overwhelming threat? Let's just assume that might be persuasive in their sense of an overwhelming threat. What do you think those of us who are making the mark can do to be persuasive to other countries? Well, I try to avoid to be provocative. Oh no, provocative is a good thing. Okay, not in Nordic countries. But I think what is most important is actually to applaud the success stories. And time to time also in NATO and European Union defence ministerials I hear the saying that okay, but we have like a prisoner's dilemma, whether we try to balance during the turmoil of financial crisis our national budgets or whether we have to make the cuts to defence. Estonia has proven it is possible to do the both. These are not contradictiony aims. We do have a balanced budget, our structural budget is balanced. We do have smallest national debt in EU and we have been succeeded to move against the tide in Europe, which means during the times when my fellow partner countries are doing the cuts to the defence spending, we are doing vice versa. We are recruiting more men and women to the army. We are buying new weaponry, etc. And of course we are not doing it just for fun. But this is our view of security that also small country needs to be a net provider of the security. And I think this should be a cornerstone of the way to show also the European allies the way forward. And the second I think is that the very clear and sound messages what the US has given Secretary Hagel also very clearly put to the message that Europe has to understand that this will not be sustainable. That domestic scene in the US will one day just block it because of the viewpoint of fairness. And we as European allies all together have to understand it and not to turn to the NATO through such a negative scenario. So those are I think the cornerstones now. That brings to mind of course smart defence and how countries can contribute and the Baltics and the Nordic states have had this great example already. What lessons do you think that that Nordic-Baltic cooperation what lessons can that provide to other states in Europe who are looking at a smart defence approach? To be honest I'm actually a little bit worried about the overusing the word smart defence in an euphemistical way of excusing the defence cuts. Okay it doesn't matter how much money we will put in but we work on the just on the list of outputs. That is something which is also commonly heard. And so from the zero you can't do positive thing which is like self-evident. So but the smart defence I think very good example of smart defence from our region is indeed a permanent air policing over the Baltic sky and I'm happy to inform you that from the last Friday the U.S. pilots U.S. planes are now taking their duty to defend steunian, Latvian, Lithuanian skyspace for half a year. And I'm very positive also about the security and defence dimension of the European Union where I think the joint procurements and also programs of developing certain new security weaponry systems have turned to be a successful one. You mentioned the U.S. Air Force participation in the Baltic air policing and you also in your talk spoke about the last tank, U.S. tank leaving Europe. What do you think are the most critical U.S. capabilities for defence of European territory? What can the U.S. focus itself on if it needs to focus in terms of providing capabilities forward into Europe? What makes the most impact with you and with your public? I think our region as I mentioned is like a special area in the Europe because we are indeed the only area of NATO where we have a minority territory capability looking to the third, comparing to the third countries. I think the most important is a complex of different actions which could be labelled as a presence. This is exercises, this is visits, this is indeed very clear and sound political statements when they are needed. And surely the crown jewel would be the permanent presence of the U.S. troops in European soil. I would be most pleased to see permanent U.S. presence in my homeland but I understand the realities today. But both countries are a special case and as much as presence of U.S. could produce so I think as efficient it will be also to encourage European countries to fulfil their responsibility. Because it's in a way like again a prisoner's dilemma if the U.S. domestic scene looks that European countries are out. So European countries look okay they are now moving a pivot towards Pacific and so this is like something we have to avoid that both ships are going like far away from each other. What is your sense of the U.S. rebalance approach and how it's received in Europe and how the U.S. has spoken to Europe about its strategy? Is it worrisome? Is it understandable? How do you think you characterize it? Well I consider it positive that actually U.S. takes the seriously the need to explain what their agenda is. And so Secretary Hegel in NATO ministerials has given a very like sound comments on that. But surely especially Eastern European countries call of U.S. being as a real and shown actor in the area will be a consistent one. So I think surely we understand the financial challenges also in the U.S. Army reform which is forehead but the presence could be also produced in the most let's say cost-efficient ways especially in our region as we see it. And it would be very much appreciated in coming times will be on our agenda of alliance or bilateral cooperation. Let me open it up to the audience. We have a few folks with microphones who come around. And when I call on you if you could tell us your name and your affiliation and we'll start right here in the back. Hi Pastor Britt, Renaissance Institute regular around here. I've been on this earth long enough to watch NATO from the beginning. And in my thinking I've managed to divide it into two organizations completely separate. I call them micro and macro. The first micro NATO would have been the one that existed for that first 40 years you talked about when there was no fighting done etc. No warring or whatever. And the macro one has been when this expansion started to take place when we started to bring people in or tried to from 1500 miles away from the North Atlantic. And it appears from an outsider's standpoint that macro NATO has become more or less an antagonist or an aggressor. Is that some of the reason you think that some people have started to back away? And am I correct? I may not be. I'm proud you have mentioned the NATO since the beginning. Although you look younger than 65 years. So I will just tell my country's viewpoint on international missions. When in Estonia we explain to the public why we are brought, why we send our boys and women to the Afghanistan, Iraq and to the Africa, why we are doing it. So we are saying we are doing it in the sake of the liberty of our country. They are defending the liberty of our country there. And they are doing it so that the most practical way in the modern world is to solve the crisis in the area where the crisis occurs. And if the crisis will rise bigger and bigger it will also put to the handcuffs the NATO and all the allies to act. So this is something I will not take the position to say. It is something like we see NATO as an aggressor. We in all cases know that the humanitarian need and the democratic values, why the NATO acts in different scenarios, those are far justified to my understanding of the principles of liberty, dignity of humans and humanitarian reasons. Okay. See all the way in the back on the other side. Stephen Blank, American Foreign Policy Council. You mentioned that the Baltic is the only region in Europe where NATO suffers from a minority position that the balance is against NATO thanks to Russia. In which ways does the balance work on behalf of Russia and against NATO? Well, I will just mention some figures which show that a certain balance or the security situation in our region, the Baltic region is like turning in coming times has turned in near past not in favor of the NATO allies in the region. During the four last years Russia has doubled its strategic weaponry in our region. If I say that Steadfast Chasse where took part about 6,000 NATO troops was the biggest article, five scenario exercise after the Cold War. So it was the Zapat 2013, also the biggest, I would say, aggressive scenario based towards West exercise after the Cold War where we estimate took part both reserve troops and all together about 100,000 troops. So there are a list of different activities from the Russian side what we see that in a historical sense in the western dimension and the western military region in Russia there is a, this is one of the priority regions of Russia to invest the defense and in addition to that it has been turned also a priority in a future way. Whether it will be a danger or not, this is a solid political question but from the military viewpoint we understand that the balance is turning now not in favor of NATO in our region and this is a real active we face. Thank you. Eric Temerlany at the Friends Committee on National Legislation. When you mention the kinds of things the United States can do to ensure the US's commitment to NATO's security I thought it was interesting that you didn't mention the presence of the United States tactical nuclear weapons in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey. So I'm wondering with the end of the Cold War and with declining defense budgets both here and in NATO member states keeping those things in mind do you think NATO can adapt its nuclear sharing arrangement with the United States to reflect the threat environment of the 21st century and what state steps could the US take to assure NATO security without the presence of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe? Well I would say I'm a realist about the future also about the nuclear weaponry and also about the nuclear power balance also looking to the tactical nuclear weapons. So nuclear deterrence is badly needed I think for the NATO so if I didn't mention it in my speech I will do it now. Surely it is a very valuable role which the US produces to the security of the Alliance and the reality is also that nuclear weaponry is very clearly seen also in the Russian Federation's defense strategy where they say that there have been comments that if the US fights against indeed or wants to diminish the nuclear weaponry so it's the only because of in an order in the weaponry US will have then more power. So the reality is that the Russian Federation looking from the regions viewpoint will have nuclear weaponry in their strategic military thinking using the tactical nuclear weapons if the situation in the fourth world theater will demand it is a very sound way to use it from the military planning viewpoint and this is something we are aware. Thank you. The evolution of Russian military doctrine seeming to be moving more into an even more nuclear dependent approach. Particularly given where you are in the region what are the most worrisome trends in terms of Russian military thinking in general? What worries you the most? I think something, first of all I want to not be like paranoid. I would say that the danger of the military actions or military conflict in our region is not actually very low today. But the reality is that what we see problematic is that in Russian strategic thinking to achieve the political aims taking into help of military means is quite justified that and secondly for their military thinking the main danger is actually a military attack from the west side, from the NATO side to Russian soil. This is surely a second one and thirdly I think the problem is the lack of transparency. I think in their way of thinking, in the way of decision making and in the way of what they would achieve in the global politics. When I mentioned that in our region the military balance is minor or negative towards NATO comparing to Russian Federation troops it could also, it could produce also the situations where the dangerous situation could appear not because of vis-à-vis problems between Russia and Estonia or Russia and Latvia but because it is a area where it would be easiest to just to take a certain rebalance in the global sphere situation, military security cooperation and so it is as always finding a balance. But now we have turned indeed a step forward and that's something positive. I think we have time for two more. Let's come right over here. The sphere of Kremlin, NOVA is indeed a European values and western values orientated group of countries. So Ukrainian situation is very clear. I think we understand unfortunately what the Putin plans, Putin wants to build in the ruins of former Soviet Union the new block of countries where a strategic role surely plays Ukraine and they are using I think all the means to achieve that aim. And I think what is very important that the western leaders and also the public audience should send a very clear message. The first message is indeed to Kremlin that it is unacceptable to influence the independent countries to make the options about the countries and nations future. And the second is also that is solely unacceptable to use violence against its own people. And this is the message which needs to be given to the Iano Kovic government. And I'm not very optimistic about the coming weeks and months outcomes in Maidan because the opposition is also fragmented that you have to be always careful with red lines where you put it. Opposition has put several red lines, demanded several different issues. But I think if the opposition is able to get the different structure and leader, one real leader to unite it so I think it could be a real challenge to Iano Kovic and I would be rather suspicious to say mildly that Iano Kovic would move that country to Europe. No, he will not do it and the different question will be the culturally it is not in case where Europe, the union of values could take one country just on the principles of money or the need of money. So this is not just a marketplace but this is a union of values of Europe. And this is I think the fatal mistake what Iano Kovic actually has made. Thank you. Okay, final question. You've noted cyber is increasingly important and that since you are hitting your 2% threshold I'm just curious if you could elaborate a bit on your own capability priorities. You mean military capability priorities. Military capability, for us it is the most important is a rapid reaction capability for us. What we have learned from the Georgian war, what we have learned from the philosophy of modern warfare is indeed that crisis could occur within the days and so we need to be ready to act and also to give our allies a chance when the collective defence model would, article 5 would start the chance to pass the decisions and make logistical movements. So we in Estonia are, as we are moving against the tide in sense of investing to defence, there's also one element where I think we are in the modern world in a minority group of countries. We in Estonia believe strongly in national conscription system and we have remained it in Estonia although after we joined to the NATO it has, there was also the academic discussion whether it is like practical to continue that but fact is that 90% of Estonia supported not because it is a most cost efficient way we could hold a reserve army of also having a rapid reaction capability but because there's also a strong moral dimension that free men are taking the duty to defend their country. This is something very, like I think very important to Estonians also because, very strongly because of our historical painful reasons and so our plan is during the next decade to establish 21,000 rapid reaction troops army. So if we touch the button so within very short time frame we will have such an army and it was based on the reservists. Thank you. Well, thank you so much for covering such a great amount of ground with us today for your talk and for your interaction and also for the great partnership and alliance that we have with Estonia. Thank you very much and please join me in a round of applause for making it yourself. I was very privileged to be here and I'm very happy you receive you here. Thank you very much indeed. So thank you indeed.