 Oh my god. I think that it's even Thank you for the chance to share it with us. You want to? I'm fine. I am fine. I'm fine. So you mean So you're timing this more later? Let it time my remarks. Where does the Westman come from? Well, I'll be able to That's right, I know. But nobody is going to talk about it. So at about I'll be able to hold on I'll be able to I'll be able to I'll be able to I'll be able to I'll be able to I'll be able to Are you leaving me at the airport? No, I don't have to rush out. You can You can praise this. Um Yeah So Yeah Yeah Yeah Yes Yeah Well, let us start the second session, if we will, please. My name is Tom McNar, I teach in the security studies program at Georgetown, and I have anticipated this panel in particular with great interest because as sort of your typical American national security analyst, I think of China as a rule breaker more than a rule maker and I think it's a stroke of genius to sort of put this panel here so we can talk about the other side of that coin and to do that we have three really terrific experienced panelists. I'll introduce them in the order in which they're sitting, which is also in the order in which they're speaking with the only admonition that we do try to hold to 10 to 15 minutes, which as I told the panelists, it's just impossible. Nobody speaks for just 10 minutes, but I'd like you to really give it a try. Susan Lawrence is at the Congressional Research Service where she's an Asia specialist. She lived in China for 13 years, most of that as a journalist for the likes of the Far Eastern Economic Review, Wall Street Journal, the U.S. News and World Report. Fluent in Mandarin and I think probably fluent in the way China sees the world and sees itself as well. Robert Daley is the director of the Kissinger Center on the U.S. and China at the Woodrow Wilson Center. Came down there just last year from Maryland where he ran the China Project, but about 11 years in China, including six directing the Nanjing Center, which I regard as a very special place. Again, fluent in Mandarin and has interviewed and translated for or interpreted for several Chinese high level officials, American high level officials. Patrick Klossin like me is not fluent in Mandarin. He's fluent in Pentagonese, which is an equally different tonal language, and it's hard because it changes all the time. Those acronyms just keep getting longer and longer. He is now senior director and director of the Asia program at CNAS, the Center for New American Security. If you look at his longer bio, you'll see he's been in a number of places and has always written very, very cogently about U.S. national security in particular about Asian issues. So with that, let me turn this over to Susan and we'll get started talking about China as a rulemaker. Like to start by thanking Georgetown, Oriana and USIP for the invitation to be here. And I'm speaking my personal capacity and my views don't necessarily represent those of CRS. This panel is on China as rulemaker. The framing language that you will have seen in the brochure about the conference seemed to assign two meanings to that phrase. The first one was China as joiner, as participant in the international system epitomized by decision to join most international and regional organizations. And the second meaning is China as rulemaker in the international system in the sense of playing a leadership role, actively proposing changes to the international order. So I'm going to split my remarks into those two categories. Starting with China as joiner, China has been an enthusiastic joiner in recent decades, making up for time lost as the junior partner in the Sino-Soviet alliance and in the aftermath of the Korean War. China, of course, joined the United Nations and took on the seat on the national, on the Security Council held by the Republic of China Taiwan in 1971. Its membership in international organizations picked up after 1978. It has now joined most UN-affiliated agencies, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and so on. It began efforts to join the general agreement on tariffs and trade in 1986 and finally joined the GATT successor organization, the World Trade Organization, of course, in 2001. Nonetheless, for most of the time, since 1971, China has often been described as under-participating in global governance. A 2009 study by the Center for American Progress described China as in the ring but punching below its weight. Chinese scholars have characterized China's role differently as admirably restrained. Chinese scholars sometimes seek appreciation for the fact that China has generally not sought to use its UN Security Council seat, for example, as a way to counterbalance or block the United States. One imperfect metric of China's activity may be vetoes in the UN Security Council. China cast its first veto in 1972, blocking Bangladesh's UN membership because China considered Bangladesh to be a breakaway province of Pakistan, its ally. But it didn't use its veto again for 25 years until 1997, when it vetoed a resolution to send ceasefire observers to Guatemala because Guatemala's diplomatic relations with Taiwan. And China abstained on the 1991 Gulf War resolution, allowing the Gulf War to happen. They voted for the ultimatum to Iraq leading up to the Second Gulf War. They voted for resolution 1386, authorizing the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. So China basically wants credit for not blocking the United States with that position. But of course, the list of vetoes doesn't reflect situations which China wielded influence with its threat of a veto, or otherwise may have informally influenced the behavior or actions of other members. Moving on to China's rule maker. Many observers remarked on an apparent gradual shift in China's attitude toward the international system in the last few years. A desire to move cautiously beyond the Deng Xiaoping dictum of Taoguang Yanghui, this idea that China should keep its head down, not take the lead, focus on domestic development. And that dictum has been in place since the fall of the Soviet Union. It's still officially there, but there's now a lot of debate about how much China should feel guided by that. We're seeing Chinese officials indicating a desire to pursue gradual changes to the international system. An example, November 2013, last year, State Councilor Yang Jiechi, China's most senior diplomat, stated that China wants to, quote, pursue incremental progress in adjusting and reforming the international system. That appears to mean preserving the authority of the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, but wanting the UN to renew and improve itself and play a bigger role. It means securing a greater role for emerging markets and developing countries in the global system, for example, the G20. China really likes the G20, reforming the international monetary and financial systems to give China a bigger role, ensuring a global development agenda that is firmly focused on economic development and poverty alleviation and not on promoting democracy, democratic governance. China is also engaged in a parallel effort to create new institutions in which China can be a rule maker from the start. One example is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Its mission includes, quote, moving towards the establishment of a new democratic, just and rational, political and economic international order. Principles of the SEO include ideas like respect for the diversity of cultures, which is a byword for not pursuing democracy promotion in places like China. It's also got a major focus on tackling what the SEO countries call terrorism, separatism and extremism. And that, of course, just that formulation reflects China's role as a rule maker in this situation. China, of course, uses that phrase, the terrorism, separatism and extremism, to justify its actions in places like Xinjiang and Tibet. And it calls those three things the three evils. And yet, you know, the SEO, all of the SEO countries have signed on to that focus. And the SEO countries, you know, Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyz Republic, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, observers are Afghanistan, India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan. China is also seeking to be a rule maker in the context of the BRICS, the, oops, sorry, the BRICS grouping, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. It has established the China-Africa Cooperation Forum and now expanded on. We now have also a China-Arab Cooperation Forum. And it looks like this year there will be a new China Community of Latin American and Caribbean States forum. So basically the three major regions. China is now setting up specific entities for China's relationships with those whole continents. China has also, under Xi Jinping, is pursuing two very high-profile initiatives which China is portraying as an example of the way that it is beginning to innovate in foreign policy. And, you know, create rules by being the innovator, by being the country that's putting out these ideas. So one is the Silk Road Economic Belt, proposed when Xi Jinping was in Kazakhstan. The other is the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which is leveraging the China-Azian Maritime Cooperation Fund, which China established. That was proposed when Xi Jinping visited Indonesia, and I think we're going to be hearing a lot more about those two initiatives in the months to come. They're becoming very high-profile in China. Part of the shift in China's approach to the international system is in statements saying that China is willing to step forward and shoulder greater international responsibilities, which is something the United States has long urged China to do. Wang Yi, the Chinese foreign minister, for example, last fall, pledged that China would fully and more actively involve ourselves in international affairs and work closely with other countries to meet intricate global challenges and tackle difficult issues facing mankind. He promised to provide more public goods to the international community. As examples of China's provision of public goods, China points to its active participation in UN peacekeeping missions, points to its anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, its diplomacy related to North Korea. And in August, China will be hosting the ministerial conference of the Istanbul process on Afghanistan. China's also said it's willing to get more involved with Afghanistan. Another area which I think we'll be seeing more Chinese activity, which may lead to more rulemaking, is China's pledge to do more to protect the interests of Chinese overseas. There are now 100 million Chinese traveling abroad every year, 20,000 Chinese companies operating overseas, and China is now much more overtly making this part of China's foreign policy agenda. And finally, part of the shift, China is now casting more vetoes in the UN Security Council. So from 1997 to the present, remember from 1972 to 1997, there were no vetoes. From 1997 to the present, China has used its veto seven times, five times following Russia's lead. The last three vetoes in 2011 and 2012 were on resolutions championed by the United States related to Syria, of course. But China abstained on the UN Security Council vote on the Crimea issue, which Russia vetoed. So I will put that out here. I think all three of us are going to be talking on kind of different aspects of this question, which is which is good. And we will then discuss how they all mesh. Thank you. Well, thank you. I'd like to thank Oriana for putting this together and also to congratulate you on the on the structure of the day, which is very enticing as I went through your schedule. I was very glad to, I hope, have the time to be here to listen to the other panels as well. Very good conference. When I was given this topic, China as a rulemaker, I had some of the same thoughts, you know, China hasn't proposed that many rules as such. And so I went back, as I often do, if I'm looking at something in a comparative context, United States and China, to etymologies, to try to see whether we meant different things in English by rule than the Chinese do by primarily by Guizha, because it's often the case when we speak, for example, of education and Jiuyu that they're fundamentally different concepts. Interestingly, etymologically, notions of rule and Guizha are quite similar. They both come from the idea of making straight and from measurement and delineation initially. Now, the processes of rule making in the United States, broadly internationally and in China are quite different, particularly with reference to notions of who gets to participate. But what I wanted to focus on, and here, thinking back to the first panel and Professor Wang's comments in particular, is the degree to which rules are culturally construed in both the Western and the Chinese tradition. They are not static. Rules evolve to reflect changes in values, technologies and power relationships. And so we tend to, I think, overall in the United States, we tend to describe and to judge the efficacy of rules based on whether or not they form the foundation for human flourishing and for human interaction, including economic interactions, security interactions, et cetera. Does the rule provide a good and fair foundation from below for human activity? Whereas in China, it's more often the case that a rule is seen as imposing order on chaos from above. And we often run into this difficulty when we speak of international rules and the question of whose notion of what rules are for is going to predominate. So that in some of the examples that Susan Lawrence just gave of China as a rule maker, I think there is a question in some of these institutions, these organizations, these policies, whether we are really talking about rules as such or as mechanisms for power projection and influence on the Chinese side. And so it's tough to make these distinctions all the time, but it's worth, I think, making the effort. Earlier you spoke also of the culturalist lens through which China approaches these issues, and I think that's correct in the case of rules. Rules are also designed to create and to perpetuate a culture. And often this function of rulemaking is not explicit, but it can be. And I'm thinking of course, because Georgetown is sponsoring this event with the Institute of Peace. We have the rule of St. Benedict, the rule of St. Augustine, the rule of St. Francis, and of course the rule of St. Ignatius Loyola. And this once common, now less common notion of a rule is a way of life that enforces a discipline, schedules, rituals, declarations of faith in order to cultivate certain virtues, certain practices, actually the whip that is used in some of the harsher orders for self-flagellation, that was actually called the discipline by the people who used it. And so this notion of the rule as perpetuating a set of disciplines and cultures is not altogether unknown to the CCP in its histories. This is another sense of rule that I would like to bring in. So rules, I think, are inseparable from values and from cultural practices, which is one of the reasons that we've had so much difficulty in working with China on this front. This week in the States, of course, we've seen this in the US, we've been debating rules about affirmative action, about land use rights in the Cliven Bundy case. So my last comment on that, but I think that in talking to China, with China about its rules, a rulemaker, we need to bear in mind the inadequacy, the inconsistency, and the changing character of our own rulemaking. So what are China's attitudes toward the making of rules to date? We don't have a whole lot of evidence to go on, although it was somewhat encouraging just this week to have in Qingdao a new agreement reached on a non-binding code of maritime conduct. It's encouraging, we'll see how it goes. We can also look to China's recent international behavior as a clue to its attitudes toward rulemaking. And I think that certainly over the past year or so, the evidence there has been far less encouraging when we look at the East China Sea and the South China Sea, where we have declarations of interests rather than rulemaking activity. And as its power grows, another ongoing indicator of China's attitude toward rules is China's own domestic laws. It is becoming clear, I would argue, that China's first instinct and preference in treating problems and people beyond its borders is to treat them as it treats problems and people within its borders. This isn't unique to China. It's not really very surprising. But that kind of treatment often can threaten established and emerging international norms that much of the rest of the world regards as essential to the functioning of modern nations. And indeed, I would argue, many of these rules are essential to China's own efforts to develop an innovative knowledge economy. And so there's a tension that we see in China, and Professor Zhu Feng referred in the first panel to this paradox, between a desire to be involved, a desire to be integrated, a desire to benefit from international rules, which are sometimes at variance with the domestic rules that are very strongly enforced by China. We see a paradox in that China's domestic standards, for example, treatment of individuals, treatment of labor, the environment, the free flow of information, protection of intellectual property rights, Chinese attitudes toward the rule of law and the role of law are not commensurate with established international norms. And China experiences this as a big problem. It describes it as its problem in controlling discourse, huayuquan. It sees very little room to defend or promulgate its own standards for rules that it sees working for it domestically, internationally, because the discursive field is already occupied. It's hard for China to step out. And that is why I think that what kind of rule maker China will become is going to depend on its ability to resolve this sort of nay-why, internal or domestic international paradox, which is what I understood Zhu Feng to be referring to. In other words, it is Chinese exceptionalism. China's uniqueness, which we discussed in the first panel, which like all exceptionalism doesn't meld easily with principles of international law. And the attempt to work with China as a co-rule maker is further complicated by Chinese views toward its foreign policy, deeply held beliefs among Chinese elites, but also among Chinese people more broadly, which were also referred to in passing in the first panel, the belief that China is fundamentally and characteristically peaceful, that it never has and never will threaten a neighbor. Therefore, incursions in the Scarborough Shoal cannot be threats. This is the argument. It is also strongly believed that China also respects nations and peoples and never interferes in the international, in the internal affairs of other countries, that it does not seek to change the systems of other nations, that Chinese foreign policy is always correct, and that China is never at fault in international conflicts. This makes it this belief, which I think is fairly deeply held in China, which I'm sure many of you have encountered in the past, and if you haven't, I'd be happy to send you some speeches and articles that make this point. But this disposition that China is never at fault is always peaceful. This makes it more than usually difficult for China to accept international judgments, whether they're from the WTO, or for example, with the case that the Philippines is bringing about the Spratlys. How are we going to reconcile these deeply held beliefs about China's correctness with international judgments? Furthermore, China, it is believed as a historical victim, is incapable of being an aggressor. The various suggestion is almost oxymoronic from the Chinese point of view. Xi Jinping at Davos in 2014 said that China will never seek hegemony because, quote, this is not in the DNA of the country given our long historical and cultural background. So these beliefs about Chinese foreign policy are going to make it, I say, difficult. These ideas of Chinese exceptionalism for it to make and co-design rules as such. On the other hand, on those, that's sort of the negative side of the equation. On the more positive side, China is aware that it is changing. When I first went to China as a diplomat in the late 80s, and I would, unfortunately, embarrassingly, preach to China in those days about all the things it should do, my Chinese friends would say, well, this is a process. Of course, this is very tough as an American because it's so transparently an excuse, and it's so undeniably true at the same time. So it makes it sometimes tough to have these conversations. But certainly there's a very healthy discourse among Chinese policymakers and in the universities about the fact that China needs to integrate, as had been mentioned. China is also understandably uncertain about what it wants and where it is headed. I was in a panel yesterday with Jia Qinghua of Beijing University, and he made this point strongly and quite convincingly that one of the reasons for China's silence about its desires and rules is that it doesn't know. China is changing very quickly, and we spoke earlier this morning about the need for empathy, and this is, I think, one of the areas where we have to exercise it some of the time. So this uncertainty is one of the things that is making China a hesitant rule maker. It is conflicted, and so it rails against the supposed injustices of the existing world order, even as it games that order with great success, and increasingly now recognizes that it is a beneficiary and therefore that its interests are to refine, certainly not to overthrow that order. Yunpeng of the China Institutes for Contemporary International Research writes about this in a book I'd recommend called Debating China, a series of dialogues about major issues in U.S.-China relations, and Yunpeng wrote, China itself has not yet made adequate, psychological, and strategic preparations for changes in the international system. Therefore, quoting, but from a separate part of his article, China will continue to play the role of constructive participant and gradual reformer, and I don't think that we will see this changing in the very near term. So this question of what China becomes as a rule maker, it's really inseparable from questions about China's modernization and integration into a rapidly evolving world generally. It's rulemaking I would not expect, it's rulemaking capacity to get out ahead of other aspects of Duiwai Kaifeng and its opening policies. So in closing, how should the U.S. face with so many international problems, the need to work closely with China economically and across the board, but we're dealing with a China that is uncertain, although it's quite comfortable declaring what it doesn't like about the existing rules, but it's uncertain about proposing new rules, how should we best work with China? First, I think that it is incumbent upon the U.S. and other countries to make clear to China that it is welcome as a participant, an active participant in the rulemaking process. We do not expect it to be just a responsible stakeholder, a phrase that to the Chinese means we welcome your rise as long as you play by the existing rules. China does have a legitimate interest in refining those rules for a changing world and I think could have something positive to contribute to them, although it hasn't really begun to do so yet. So looking for ways to work jointly with China and to try to listen to China is going to require, I think, a humility and a patience on our part that doesn't always come naturally even as we have to insist on upholding certain fundamental principles. I think the best way to have these dialogues with China is to try to focus in rulemaking with China in areas where China recognizes that it has equities and where it can come to rulemaking not as a latecomer but more or less as an equal. It's a good idea to start on new frontiers. There aren't so many of those. We have them in space and we have them obviously in cyberspace and the new frontiers for rulemaking come to us now mostly not from geography but from technology. Rules about the human genome, for example, and how that is going to be treated. Technology raises privacy questions internationally that China recognizes as such as it potentially impinging on the rights of individuals. These are very good opportunities to work with China as an equal as rulemakers where some of the paranoia that was described earlier can tend to drop away. So I think there is room on the positive side to work with China as a rulemaker. I think it's essential that we do so. On the negative side China, as has been mentioned, has this idea of Daguajui, of big country relations and big country prerogatives that would sometime seem to preclude rulemaking in the normal circumstances. We don't always agree with China on the rules for rules. We disagree about rules in the first instance and we sometimes disagree about what constitutes a rule. Should a rule, for example, on the use of EEZs, apply equally to all countries? This is something China has difficulty answering. So China, as I say, to date remains largely silent as a rulemaker because of uncertainty, because it has problems with discourse. I think it doesn't know how to express its desires without sometimes frightening people. And also, I believe, because it sees time as being on its side. It sees America as in at least relative decline and China as rising. And therefore, the later China declares a rule or makes a deal, the better the deal China is likely to get. These Chinese attitudes toward rule-based order I think have serious strategic consequences in the immediate term that we have to deal with. But the underlying challenges for China are cultural and cultures change slowly. The CCP's default attitudes toward rules are still based on self-interest, maintaining order, maintaining discipline, and on maintaining virtues that are idiosyncratic to the Chinese system. And as the Benedictines and the Franciscans know, that really doesn't work so well except in the cloister. When you're opening to the outside world, it's a little bit tougher. And that's where we have to work. Thank you. Well, good morning. I'm Patrick Cronin. I'm the senior director at the Center for New American Security. And it's great to be back at the U.S. Institute of Peace. And with Georgetown University Security Studies program, I've worked at both institutions. They're tremendous institutions. And I think today's event shows just how strong their current program is as well. I think Oriana asked me to talk maybe a bit more about the specific security issues we face today. I've tried to cover some of the same ground as the two previous speakers who've done a better job than I've done. But I will just for the sake of letting you know my outline of an article I'm finishing, give you at least the punchlines. Because I see China as a partial rule maker and a partial rule breaker. Going back to Tom's earlier point, yes, they break the rules as well. And they also make them. And sometimes they just are not interested in the rules, breaking them or making them. When you think, I've tried to ask three questions. One is what does it mean to be a rule maker? And I think one of the points I'd make here is that from an American perspective, you'd expect predictability. You'd expect transparency and you'd expect a sense of fairness. And without those three qualities of predictability, like the nine dash line, does it apply to land features? Well, maybe, maybe not. There's no predictability. There's no predictability in this issue. How about transparency? Well, there's no transparency either because you can't really see inside China's decision making. It's so difficult. There's so many actors. I hesitate to ever say China as a rule maker because what is China? And is there a sense of fairness? Well, from a Chinese perspective, yes, but it's historically based. And that's so rich, as we just heard, that it's very difficult to try to put that in our, especially American, but more generally Western context. So that's why I want to move on to a second question about the scope of rules being made because I think it really is important to differentiate the kind of rules we're talking about. And so when we focus on the hard issue, the neurologic issues between, say, U.S. and China on security and between China and some of its neighbors on security, especially the maritime domain, but you can increasingly bring it issues like cyber security, you start to see the pattern of Chinese rule sort of making and breaking. There's no doubt that China is looking at this as a justification for power projection as much as rules. I think as Robert just suggested, that is to say, it's both. They're interested in the rules, but not if it touches upon and infringes upon what they think are core national interests. And that's a loaded term as well, because that could be changing as China reawakens old, maybe old claims, not necessarily new claims, but new interests in old claims is leading to a greater desire for influence over those old, old claims where this new awakened power of China. Again, the nine dashed line also these China C, including the air defense identification zone, can be seen as sort of an extension of China's conscious power projection toward its near seas, not necessarily out of an imperious desire, but what they think is a historical right. And that's why this rights movement in China is becoming a more dominant strand of decision making influence than say ideology. Chinese clearly prefer bilateral agreements with smaller neighbors, then they don't want binding sort of agreements certainly through a multilateral mechanism. Those seem to be true throughout all their negotiations on security. We can certainly talk about this with respect to the Philippines Scarborough Shoal in terms of moving the Philippines out. They used of course the rationale that the Philippines brought in a Navy ship, which was a very, very old American Coast Guard cutter dressed up as the Philippine Navy ship to sort of enforce domestic Philippine law on poaching and that allowed China to justify moving in their civilian law enforcement agency ships and basically control now Scarborough Shoal. They've also moved in terms of Second Thomas Reef in the Spratlys to stake a territorial claim over submerged feature, land feature, which doesn't offer any territorial claim because it is submerged and yet they're taking on the Philippines on this issue and they're also, as Robert mentioned, not participating in the international tribunal on the law of the sea arbitration case at least to this point. They can do so at any point over the coming months or even years. This may play out through 2016, but they don't really want to get into a binding arbitration through that international mechanism. They prefer to deal with this bilaterally between the disputants, between the claimants, and they want to have a binding agreement bilaterally that favors the Chinese sort of point of view. In East China Sea where you have a bigger power at Japan, here the Chinese made it very clear to me at least in many meetings, most recently in Australia last week, that they will not sign up to kind of confidence-building measures and risk-reduction measures that are meaningful with Japan until Japan makes good on acknowledging the dispute, acknowledging some Chinese dispute over administrative control over the Senkaku Daio Islands, islands which now President Obama has just clarified U.S. policy but not a new policy, it's the old policy, but he's articulated as President of the United States to say that Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty does indeed cover territories administered by Japan and we recognize that those islands are administered by Japan because when we reverted Okinawa and the islands back to Japan with a 71 agreement that started in 1972, we said Japan, you now have administrative control. So that's just a statement of fact, it stopped short of saying that's a sovereign claim, it simply states the facts according to post-World War II history from a U.S. perspective. Nonetheless, it's likely to flout Chinese expectations, so Chinese will compete and will raise up the temperature even more on this issue, just as they did with the Air Defense Identification Zone last November where they took a legal mechanism, a legal right to have an ADIZ, but they used it when they were not happy with the United States sort of supporting the normalization of Japan's defense posture, the 2-plus-2 agreement between Defense and Foreign Ministers last October where the United States basically got behind Prime Minister Abe and said, yes, we support this and now those statements have become even stronger and more clear in the statements that just came out of the summit meeting in Tokyo. So you can expect that this writes diplomacy from China, this competition, this unwillingness to engage in serious hotlines between Japan and China will grow. Now, you're saying, but we're just reading these stories about the code for unplanned encounters at sea, cues. Yes, let's talk about cues for just a minute and put that in context. So this is actually less rigorous than the binding regulations that are already on the books that the Chinese and Americans have signed up to, among others, the Kohlregs, which go back and have a standing in international law that are binding and they apply to military and civilian shipping alike in terms of avoiding these kinds of dangerous incidents. Cues is voluntary. Chinese immediately came out and said, by the way, they're not only voluntary, but they don't apply to internal territorial waters. Well, what are internal territorial waters? Is it the 9-dash line? Well, you haven't clarified what you mean by the 9-dash line, so we don't know. So the lack of predictability again is an ongoing problem and dilemma here for China as a rule maker. Now, it does help symbolically, though. So it's a good thing. Everybody up here, I'm sure, wants to encourage China to be more a part of the international system. We're trying to encourage this kind of rule-making participation and we're trying to figure out where's the middle ground? How do you get to the happy medium? But there can't be rules at the expense of others. And so that's why this Western Pacific naval symposium, which is one of the major de facto institutions in the maritime space across the Indo-Pacific region, is an important opportunity for China to show that it is interested in joining the rules and making those rules. It's a good sign symbolically. We're about to host them for the very first time as a participant in the rim of the Pacific naval exercise this summer. So it was very important for China to join cues before the rim pack. But again, as I say, this is not the incidence at sea agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the Cold War. Those were serious professional maritime documents that applied to surface and air domains. Not to the submarines, by the way. Why? U.S. Submariners didn't want any rules in the stealthy subsurface. That's another issue altogether. So there are rules. And when you make the rules, you can kind of make the rules cover the issues that you want to cover. And the fact is that, frankly, subsurface, surface and air, not to mention cyber and space, are all going to be more competitive in the years ahead in these issues. We also touched on earlier the exclusive economic zone and the interpretations differ between China and the United States when it comes to naval activity within the 200 nautical mile limits. China has a minority view on this that's shared by a few other countries that it's pushing, but it's doing so within the scope of international law. It's our Chinese interpretation that you should not be able to conduct spine essentially inside our 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone because Uncloss, the UN Conventional Law of the Sea, says that you have to pay due regard to coastal countries and the Americans and most of the other nations who follow Uncloss, even though we haven't ratified it, blight on us, but nonetheless we follow as an executive law Uncloss principles and customary law. And we think that, no, you're allowed to conduct this kind of peaceful activity. We think peaceful activity, not hostile activity inside the EZs and other countries are allowed to do it within ours as they did during the Cold War. Anyway, so this is a long way of saying that China's a partial rule maker. It's conditional. It is seeking power projection as much as rules. It's seeking greater influence. It's also seeking to keep the outside world, the periphery calm by peripheral diplomacy is more important than some of the global rulemaking that the United States is interested in. I could, if there were time, talk as well about some of the cyber. I will just mention that it's interested that the multilateral aspects of Chinese cyber policy are with like-minded countries. So the recent agreement that China was pursuing was with Tajikistan, Russia, and one other, and I've forgotten. But in any event, more like-minded countries on this issue and they've resisted kind of strong U.S.-China cyber rules of the road. But it is a contentious issue. It will be hospitated for dear questions. Thank you very much. I just want to thank the panelists for allowing me to sit here comfortably and not get up with my little two-minute sign. They did that voluntarily. I'm not an intimidating person. They just, they did that. So thank you very much, which leaves us about 15 minutes for questions. And we, we have the usual rule that Oriana articulated earlier. I identify yourself first. We have my, wait for the mic. Identify yourself and ask your question. Where I can't. Oh, okay. As presuppose as I can see the hand. So put them up. Now, good, good morning. My name is Rosemary Seguero. I'm trying to ask about the China relationship with Africa and the rule of law into Africa since we are talking about the world. How does, how do you look at that and the long time relationship or partnership with Africa and China looking at business and the humanity and security? How do you look at that? And how is, how can Africa or China get into that relationship looking at a long time because many times China is in Africa and they are doing a great job in Africa. But when it comes to manpower, you find they are bringing in their own manpower. How do you make that as a rule of law to the African on the continent with China relationship? Thank you. Anybody want it? So we'll go right. Sure. We can all talk a bit on this. There's actually been, there was an interesting project that ran for a number of years that I found quite intriguing. It was sort of coordinated by the World Bank and working with the OECD and with an entity in China basically trying to give China feedback on its involvement in Africa. So I think there were six African countries involved and there were a series of conferences and the idea was they started by doing this big study I guess of China's development and the lessons that it might have for Africa and then after that they had these sessions where African countries got a chance to give China some of the feedback that you're mentioning here about, for example, countries wanting to not have China bring in all the labor for projects and actually to use local labor or standards of worker safety, other issues at mines and so on. I mean, there's been a series of sort of controversy around some of these issues. So that was a, that I think was a useful exercise. Unfortunately, the Chinese entity that was involved in that wasn't an entity that was sort of in a position to do a lot, I guess, to change China's approach to some of these issues. China is of course very sensitive about the criticism of some of its activities in Africa. The Chinese, I think, sometimes have been accused of sort of neocolonialism which they strongly resist that characterization and China actually sees as a real positive the fact that it goes in without any political preconditions unlike the United States and other OECD countries. It's also a topic that the US and China are discussing. There is an effort to try to get China to sign on to some of the OECD rules on development assistance, for example. And that's been part of the US-China SNED, the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. There's a piece of that which has been looking at development assistance and ways in which China can maybe start merging its practices or not merging, but making its practices accord better with the practices of other countries. So sorry, but, Robert, you have things to say. I would just say that it's, as you suggest, it's changing quite rapidly. China has become a big power. It now has international worldwide interests and as it pursues them, it's encountering some of the difficulties that America, as a fellow large country, has had. And so it's having to revisit, as you see in the Ukraine where it has sacred principles on either side of that dilemma. And so it keeps a distance and it professes these vague principles but it doesn't get involved because suddenly it's discovering why the United States has always had what it calls double standards because it has interest in a big, complex, evolving world with limited information. And so China is acclimatizing itself to this and you feel it in Africa where, yes, initially China was very proud that, for example, in the South Sudan that it didn't come in with political preconditions. On the other hand, the foreign minister Wang Yi, I think just in either February or March when he was there, did call for peaceful resolution. That was a big move. That was a slight adjustment to this policy. I think it was positive. I think we should welcome it. So it's changing. China is discovering the essential big country flexibility slash hypocrisy double standard or whatever they wanted to call it and there's an acclimatization to that process in Southeast Asia as well where it's building high speed rail also using mostly Chinese labor. The countries that are transited don't feel that they're getting the benefits that they should. And so China had this wonderful soft power opportunity because it's extending really vital infrastructure in Africa or Southeast Asia, but then it doesn't get the soft power benefit in many cases because it tends to hold on too tightly. But it is learning. It's changing. Well, 10 years ago when I was working with the Chinese government trying to help them on adapting OECD rules, they clearly were expressing a strong interest but at the same time they revealed their fragmented decision making that is the bureaucratic politics who was in charge of the development policy. The fact that state-owned enterprises might be making a key sort of exploitation of resources in the country would be driving policy and they wouldn't touch that. But they clearly are interested and I think as Robert has just suggested they've made a lot of progress in the last 10 years. US policy has to continue to work with both developed countries, OECD and developing countries to put pressure on China in a good way, give them incentives to be part of that and of decision making at OECD and to make those rules. They're more inclined to go along with these when they see some benefit because they're not touching as a general sense their direct core national interest. Their indirect interest sure about their economy but they see their enlightened self-interest. The problem is when you have weak governance in a state and I'm thinking like South Pacific Islands forget about Africa where it's very tempting for a leader in a South Pacific Island to say just give me that one big infrastructure project that's what I want and it's hard to get the transparency that you would want in an international development project. So helping the international community and OECD can work with developing countries to enforce transparency and raise those standards and I think China will keep moving in that direction. Thank you. How about right here, Denise? Remember to introduce yourself, please. Thank you. Donghui Yu with China Review News Agency of Hong Kong. My question is for Mr. Cronin. You mentioned that as a rule maker he should be transparent. He should be credible. But we often see that as a rule maker the United States policy actually has a lot of ambiguity. For example, in terms of the Senkaku and Giao Yu Islands issue President Obama just affirmed the U.S. principle but in terms of the detail he failed short of clarifying the detail of this issue. How to defends the Giao Yu Island if there's any emergency over there. So my question for you is as a credible rule maker how to keep the balance between the policy clarity and the flexibility. Thank you. Well this is a panel about China as a rule maker so I restrained from spending my 12 minutes talking about the United States and its ability to be a rule maker or a rule breaker. But sure, the United States is ambiguous at times. All policy makers in fact prefer to have some executive ambiguity and leeway in policy making if it's possible. But at the same time I think the United States is making a concerted effort to strengthen and adapt an international system that we largely contributed to building post World War II and that includes an Asia Pacific through the United Nations but also through institutions like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. And sometimes I think that the Chinese approach to ASEAN is to see it as a sandcastle that they can kind of keep divided and it'll be very weak and they can pick it apart. Japan is a tougher nut and when the United States sides with Japan China is a very difficult position about how to press its claims and its influence. The ambiguity you see over the Senkaku islands is the fact that the history is ambiguous. I think President Obama has done as much as possible for any American leader to articulate clearly what the U.S. interest is. He wants a peaceful resolution of the dispute and expects it. But at the same time he acknowledges that it is under administrative control of Japan and that our treaty stipulates that we will support territories administered by Japan. So he's stating all the facts. He's talking about peace. He's looking for cooperation. He's encouraging Japan to reach out to China. We have a very strong U.S.-China strategic dialogue. But unfortunately these disputes are not going to be resolved. They have to be managed. That's why the United States prefers serious risk production measures. But as I mentioned in my talk, China prefers to employ a bit of risk here to press its claims and doesn't really want to enter into a binding agreement with the Japan in particular. With the United States it's a bit different because they see us as co-equals sharing the Pacific. And they'd like to sort of enforce that principle at idea at least symbolically. So it's an important difficult problem. China has legitimate claims but we don't know how to adjudicate those. And it's not for the United States to say this is definitely Japanese sovereignty. But we can say definitely this is the treaty. This was the reversion treaty. This is our policy. And by the way, we want everybody to resolve this peacefully. So let's make sure we figure out ways to do that. Thank you. My name is Zhang Hong from China's Hexi Media. We have been talking about rulemaking but I think the other important aspect of rulemaking is rule enforcement. So the US has been able to be a rule maker is partly thanks to its capability of rule enforcement. So can you talk a little bit about the capability of China of enforce the rules, whatever rules they want to make from this aspect to analyze this issue? And also I would like to hear about your... Because I'm particularly interested in the BRICS because I think among all the platforms that Susan laid out outlined, their BRICS perhaps has the biggest potential as a global platform for China to sort of become a global player or global power compared to all the other more regional ones. So what kind of vision have you seen that China developed through this platform? Thank you. First, I think we need in terms of China's ability to enforce rules. I'm not sure if you mean enforce rules or defend interests. So I think we've got to keep on the definitions of what we mean by rules and international rules in particular. And in terms of enforcement, I'll just give a very brief answer and then kick it over. I think it's interesting in a lot of... In many cases we see that the United States and China while both talk a fairly strong multilateral game both for different reasons are not inclined to give up any sovereignty in order to strengthen international enforcement mechanisms. China has sort of this idea, the United States again for different notions for different reasons. You see this in the Senate in particular is not inclined to yield power which is seen as sovereignty to international organizations for enforcement purposes. And this is something that we have in common. I mean just on enforcement, obviously this is a huge issue internally in China, this question of trying to enforce anything. And that's a problem. I mean it's interesting when we're talking about rulemaking. This conference is about rulemaking in the international environment. But as Robert was saying, you sort of start with the domestic environment and then you move out. And internally, China as we know has tremendous problems with rulemaking and rule enforcement because of issues of overlapping jurisdiction, different levels of authoritativeness of the different regulations and laws that come out, the power of local governments to sort of push back and pick and choose about which rules they want to follow and which ones they don't and so on. But when it gets to the international level of I guess it's your question about enforcing rules that China's made, is China then able to enforce? And I guess what we're saying is that China hasn't made a lot of rules in the world. It's sort of gradually, cautiously easing towards the position where it would be starting to make more rules. But it's not really then China's, if it's something like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. I mean that's an organization where China has been very active in developing the rules of that organization. And then enforcing those rules I think is probably a matter of the like, those countries being like-minded countries and being committed to the same set of goals. So therefore that maybe isn't such an issue of enforcement. Sorry, that's a bit of a waffle. Just a brief different point on, my concern would be the lack of international enforcement. I think there's a dissipation of enforcement that is the United States has less capacity, perhaps less interest. In other countries, including the BRICS, have not yet stepped up because of a lot of reasons to this. But they will protect their interests. So we see in Crimea, we see chemical weapons in Syria, we see sanctions not followed against North Korean proliferation. There are lots of challenges. How do we enforce the rules? Who's enforcing them? And what I worry about is that, if there's no enforcement, there's a great incentive to break the rules. Not from China necessarily, but from others, as we see with Russia, I think, in Ukraine. You know, I see a lot of hands rising, but it's noon and lunch calls. So let me try and draw this excellent panel to a close. You know, in some ways I think, I've been trying to think of ways to extend Oriana's marriage analogy, and I'm just going to drop that. Thank you very much. But I see this as a transition to this afternoon's panel. I mean, Susan actually did identify some areas where China's making rules. And to go to the marriage, this is where the couples go to separate rooms and decorate the room the way they want, right? The SCO, you know, the heck with you. I'm going somewhere else. Robert, I thought, was more how hard this is for China. And in many ways, as it is for the United States, we're both exceptional countries. We have very different but very powerful histories that shape our approach to the world. And then Patrick, I think, more expressing the skepticism that I expressed initially about how difficult this is when the married couple really has to deal with one another. There's just a real problem there. So it's a nice transition into this afternoon's session on China's rule breaker. First of all, I want to thank, we've extolled the beauty of the room, the wisdom of the agenda. I agree with all of that. I'd like to thank the Institute of Peace for electronics that are unobtrusive in work. And even though this is the information agent, you'd think that would go without saying, it often doesn't go that way. If we're going to continue this marriage metaphor through the day, I would like to interject that it was an arranged marriage. There was no courtship. We didn't fall in love. We didn't choose each other. It was circumstantial, and we went to the bride chamber as strangers, and there were surprises. So it's still an unfolding. So I don't know how far we want to push this. This afternoon's moderator, you're entirely excused from picking this issue up ever again. Okay, I am enjoying to tell you that to get to lunch, it's out that door. So you come down and out to the right. And those doors are just opening right now. Thank you to the panelists. That was excellent. That was just... Actually, all the... Yes, okay, well... No, I want to take the... Okay. National power of growing consequence. It's addressing that role, we think with increasing seriousness, and beginning to see the benefits that accrue from more engaged multilateralism. China, for example, has been a key participant in the Iran nuclear negotiations. It's worked to help resolve the brutal conflict in southern Sudan. Like many others in the international community, China is also facing up to hard choices in framing its policy on North Korea as well as on Ukraine. Clearly, though, we still have our issues. Tensions in the south and east China seas worry the United Kingdom and Europe as much as they do our friends here in the United States. Others in the region are concerned about China's greater assertiveness and what they see as a lack of transparency in its military development. We think that the best way of dealing with these issues is to engage frankly and constructively. The United Kingdom doesn't take a position on the underlying issues of sovereignty in those seas, but we do encourage all countries in the region to build mutual trust, work for stability, and settle disputes in accordance with international law. Here, too, our voice compliments that of the United States. Like America, Britain wants to strengthen the rules-based international system. That doesn't mean seeking to impose our ideas on China. It does mean working with China to shape the international order, bilaterally, but also through institutions like the United Nations, the WTO, and the International Monetary Fund. It's my friend and our very distinguished Deputy Secretary of State Bill Burns noted in a speech to the Asia Society a couple of weeks ago, out of today's crisis in Europe was such an important opportunity, a powerful reminder of the enduring value of commonly accepted rules of the road and a regional architecture of cooperation that will benefit the entire Asia Pacific. And he added a little bit later, all countries big and small stand to lose if rules are devalued, dialogue breaks down, misreading and misinterpretations multiply, and fear and tensions spiral. We, too, profoundly hope that out of present tensions important lessons will be learned. Among the most urgent of the international issues we're facing is climate change. The world needs China to act on the environment just as we need other big emitters like the United States and the European Union to take action. People of China know better than anyone the urgency of dealing with pollution in air and water. Environmental degradation is estimated to cost China almost a tenth of its GDP and suppresses life expectancy in the north by more than five years. Here, too, the United Kingdom sees itself as a natural partner for China. We were the first country to set legally binding emissions targets. We are a leader in renewables and low-carbon economic growth. Already the UK and China are sharing expertise on offshore wind power, carbon capture and storage, low-carbon manufacturing. China, the United States and the European Union are respectively, as we all know, the world's first, second and third biggest emitters. All three are increasingly aware that substantial progress on a binding global deal can't be made unless we agree amongst ourselves. And last month, the European Union hosted bilateral summits with heads of government from the United States and China and agreed to strengthen cooperation in this area with them both. We hope to see more of this working together in the run-up to the Paris conference in 2015. The problem is urgent, the need for action is global, and our knowledge and experience are complementary. We also think that we can find common ground with our Chinese friends in cyberspace. Like most countries in the world, the UK is extremely worried about cybersecurity breaches and theft of international property. Good cybersecurity is now vital to prosperity around the world, including in China. We should use that mutual interest as the basis for progress. Last month, we held the first UK-China cyber dialogue, and we hope that these discussions will form the basis for mutually beneficial cooperation in the future. Our cultural links are also key to bringing Chinese and British people closer together. We're proud to have been one of the first three countries to establish a people-to-people dialogue with China. The British Council, the cultural arm of our diplomacy, is one of the leading providers of the English language in China and of English language examinations. Almost 300,000 Chinese tourists visit Britain every year, despite the fact that in Mandarin slang, Big Ben is sometimes called a big, stupid clock. British television exports to China went up 90% in 2012 alone. Thanks in part to China's insatiable appetite for Downton Abbey. In 2012, 30 million Chinese viewers watched the royal wedding live on television. We're not quite clear yet whether Chinese viewers prefer the US or the UK version of House of Cards, but I hope that neither is taken as too literal a rendering of how Western democracies really function. Then there are our academic exchanges, which are increasingly high-tech. The UK is now China's second-largest foreign partner in academic research. Peking and Manchester universities, for example, are developing a partnership in genomic medicine. The University of Nottingham has established a centre in Guangdong that will train 2,000 Chinese financial specialists every year. And of course, like the United States, we are welcoming more Chinese university students to our shores. Last year, they totaled 130,000, about six times, I think, the total student body of Georgetown. But we also want our own young people to learn more about China. We plan to increase the number of Brits studying or gaining work experience in China to 80,000 a year by 2020. As Confucius says, it's delightful to have friends visit from far away. As more Chinese tourists, business people and students visit Britain, we hope that they will be impressed by the value and resilience of an open society. We know from our own historical and current experience that the most successful economies are the most open ones and that an open economy requires an open society. Both Britain and China have made international commitments to uphold human rights. Both are members of the UN Human Rights Council this year. We believe those rights underpin peace and prosperity globally as well as locally. And it's in that spirit that we continue to engage China on the issues that concern us. When we've seen signs of progress, for example, on arbitrary detention, judicial reform, family planning, we say so. But we still have our concerns, particularly around freedom of expression, the treatment of human rights defenders, religious freedom, minority rights. We have not shrunk from voicing these in many ways, including at the highest levels. Like the United States, we have no desire simply to nag or preach from the sidelines. In any event, I doubt whether it would be very effective. But at the same time, we will not and should not ignore issues of legitimate international concern. We want to see a strong, stable, prosperous China. And that's in everyone's interests. And we think the best way to achieve that is for China to strengthen the rule of law, increase rights and freedoms, establish greater transparency. Lao Jie, classical poet and philosopher, once wrote, the more prohibitions rule all beneath heaven, the deeper poverty grows among the people. We know from our history that the inverse is also true. The more freedom people have, the more prosperous they will be. By far the biggest beneficiaries of greater openness in China have been the Chinese people themselves. In one of his first speeches on becoming General Secretary in 2012, Xi Jinping said, our people expect better education, more stable jobs, better income, more reliable social security, medical care of a higher standard, more comfortable living conditions and a more beautiful environment. They hope that their children can grow up better, work better and live better. Remarks which could just as easily have been made by President Obama or my own Prime Minister. People in Britain, America and China have the same aspirations and we have a common interest in helping them reach those goals. Early this month, my Chinese counterpart, Xue Tiankai, stood on this same podium and commented, no country can confront all challenges single-handedly. If we don't cooperate, we will probably be overwhelmed. And he added, cooperation in areas where we agree helps deal with areas where we differ. I don't think Britain or America need fear of China's emergency onto the global stage. We can clearly work together on those issues. We must simply proceed with pragmatism and deliberation. Or to put it another way, as the Chinese experts might say, we need to cross the river by feeling the stones. Thank you very much for your attention and happy to answer any questions. Thank you, Ambassador. That was excellent. We have about 15 minutes, I think, for some discussion up here at the podium. I was struck by your comment that Britain, like the United States, has a full spectrum relationship with China from cyber and nuclear issues to global-to-people exchange, human rights, North Korea trade. And there are a few countries in that club. And it's a very comforting thing for the United States that Britain is one of them. And we have certainly come a long way from the early 1780s when American diplomats sent to Canton were instructed to make sure the Chinese knew that we were not British and that we were much more reliable. And the Chinese court records show that, indeed, we were not British, that we were very earnest, but we were somehow dumber. I want to ask a few things. I was very struck at your linkage of the TTIP, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with TPP, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the idea that an EU-China free trade agreement, free trade agreement could someday become a reality. And it occurred to me that we have potentially a convergence of these major trade agreements. Right now, China, of course, is not in TPP and, of course, is not in TTIP, but TPP is premised on agreements in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum that we would move towards a free trade area of the Asia Pacific that would notionally include China. So it's interesting in China to see how it's evolved from seeing TPP as some kind of encirclement or containment and rather more like the WTO, an opportunity for China to use external developments to leverage and get change and reform within and to benefit as the way you described it from standards across the globe. So I wonder if you could say a bit more about how you see the evolution of all of these things, TPP, TTIP. Is there room for China? And if so, is it going to take so long we need to think a little bit differently about a framework for cooperating with China and harmonising standards in the meantime? Because in our Congress, I can tell you as you no doubt know these trade agreements are like going to the dentist with no novocaine. So it may take some time for a formal Chinese participation, but are there things, is that the right direction to go? And are there things we could all be doing that I think it's the right direction of travel? I think you're quite right, Mike, that over the last year or so thinking in China on all this has evolved. I remember hearing from Chinese friends deep expressions of concern when we first started talking about TTIP and because there was also TPP which was going on and there was a sense of potential exclusion. Was this all about going up against China and so on? And I think that thinking has evolved and certainly we think that even in those countries, China obviously notably one of them, not directly involved in these free trade negotiations there is the potential of enormous economic benefit. The figure that I gave in my remarks just now is an estimate of what the economic advantages can be if we are able to use these global free trade negotiations as a means not just of reducing tariffs and improving bilateral trade between the signatory parties but also setting global standards on different issues and products many of which are of course manufactured in China. That means lower cost for consumers it means more single product lines it means that we might one day, for example agree that a turn light on a motor car sold in America could be orange as it is in Europe or red in Europe as it is in America. I prefer orange myself because I think it's safer but you know there are and why can't we have the same standards in America and Europe which we can't apparently at the moment but maybe one day we will have if TTIB becomes a reality. So I think even for those who are not in the room of these negotiations there are major benefits especially for big manufacturing countries from lower costs more limited product lines and the setting of global standards and mutual recognition also professional qualifications from which we can all benefit and indeed putting together global regulatory frameworks which can make I think trade more attractive and should facilitate more growth at the global level. Our sense is that at a time when global economic recovery is so fragile which it is at the moment even though we're quite proud of the fact that the IMF tell us we're going to be growing at 2.9% this year which is better than most Europeans where are we going to find this growth and jobs and security and more wealth answer through knocking down the barriers to trade it's win-win the economists tell us that we could look to somewhere between 1.5 and 2% additional net GDP growth on both sides of the Atlantic leaving aside the TPP Pacific Rim countries if we had a comprehensive free trade agreement that must be a prize worth having particularly when you think that Europe and the United States for example account for half the world's GDP between them and that's just one of the two negotiations. So we think it's going the right way we hope that this will get going we'd like to see fast track authority granted by the United States Congress before too long it doesn't really matter too much that it's not there now but we hope that later on perhaps after the midterms who knows maybe even before that's perhaps unlikely that we will see that and that will be a clear indication of intent I think from the United States that the U.S. as well is serious about this business. How do we manage global governance now with not just China of course but South Africa, India, Brazil and so forth but China is the biggest and most challenging and fastest growing. How do we manage global governance. We grew up most of us in a post-war world where the G5 and then the G7 managed these large global financial, economic and even political issues. We've democratized that reflecting the distribution of economic power to the G20 you spoke favorably of China Asia having a larger share in the IMF which I appreciate it I'm not sure that's a consistent view across Europe but it's important. But at some point do we lose something by expanding the membership and losing the core values that the U.S., the UK the original members of the G5 and G7 brought to this management of the global economy and it comes up when people debate whether or not for example China should be in the international energy agency in other places. What's the right balance? How do we time that? I think this global architecture, global governance issue is an enormous challenge for all of us clearly those who were not at the top table when we put in place the present architecture after Second World War are beginning to ask themselves some questions about why them and why not us we have got the rise, the emergence of major powers, big economies who are understandably saying well we think that we should be part of these big international organizations as well. I don't think any of us feel that we should oppose that trend we want to hang on to the values which are dear to us and which are represented by we like to think the core membership of the number of those organizations that you value we want to have more free trade we want to ensure the Security Council of the United Nations is able to do its job equally we have to adjust we've had to adjust on a day factor if not a day jury way at the moment the G7 and G8 in response to events in Ukraine recently we have to be flexible we are looking at the revision of IMF quotas, IMF reform which we think is important actually I think it's important for the United States as well it got stuck in Congress recently when it got tied up with a number of other issues including financial support for Ukraine but we think that is the right way to go and we are open provided everybody else is content with it with the concept of a degree of Security Council and United Nations reform how and at what speed and with which countries we need to go cautiously and ensure that as you say we don't lose what is valuable but I'm quite sure my government is quite sure that we do need to adjust the global architecture to take account of these new realities not least the enormously important role which China can play and we like to think we'll want to play as it assumes a greater sense of international responsibility in the years to come on security finally we have a close cooperation closely aligned interests I was in the NSC in the Bush administration when we had a very difficult negotiation with the North Koreans in Pyongyang in 2002 in order to send our cable back to Washington this was when the North Koreans revealed to us that they had this uranium enrichment program we used your mission in Pyongyang and so FCO your embassy here knew the results of our negotiations before our State Department did that level of trust doesn't happen I have to complain though we had been negotiating all day with no food we went to your mission in Pyongyang we did the cable and the only thing the ambassador could offer us was single malt whiskey no one complained about that and Walker's haggis favorite crisps Walker's haggis favorite crisps were not crisps were not exactly the thing we'd been envisioning in our hunger anyway with that level of cheek to jowl cooperation but while our interests align the United States has security commitments we have we have security treaties with Japan with Korea with Australia and so forth so it's a little bit like the chicken who has an interest in what's for breakfast and the pig who has a vital interest in what's for breakfast so President Obama made a very robust statement of support for the U.S. Japan alliance in Tokyo very robust I think our friends in China were a bit surprised how can Britain and Europe more generally contribute to if not resolution management and de-escalation and some confidence building in some of these island disputes you said clearly and I appreciated this very much that the UK shares our interest in diplomatic resolutions and so forth but is there some role you can imagine for Europe or for Britain in regional forum discussions or in the US EU Asian discussions or other ways to help lean in with us to try to calm the situation I think that is what we should be doing and I think that is what we are trying to do we don't have exactly the same treaty obligations in the region although we do have in Southeast Asia the five part agreements of which the United Kingdom is a party that we lend our weight collectively in the European Union and bilaterally through the exchanges that we have been having and the visit of my Prime Minister that I mentioned at the end of last year we have had a bunch of very high level visitors since then senior ministers and our people-to-people dialogue and other exchanges we can use the links that we have got to try to reinforce those same messages that is to say we are not addressing quite the same questions of alliance commitments and so on as the President was but we do share very much his view that where there are issues, where there are disputes they should not be resolved in any way unilaterally there should be dialogue and discussion that there is every advantage in de-escalation and in not immediately reaching for the militarized solution to this so we are talking to all of our friends in the region as well as your friends in the region from that very same perspective I don't think that there is anything to be gained from increasing of tensions whether it is the South China Sea, the East China Sea or of other sorts reactions to different policies, decisions and statements from different governments we know there is a complicated history but we think just as we in Europe have had to put complicated and difficult history behind us it is time for the countries in the region to do so as well so I think the links that we have got those political links, those indispensable to go in a phrase relationships that I was touching on just now we aim to use those in order to convey precisely the same messages that the President has been doing the Vice President has been doing on their recent visits and I think that the closer we are able to engage and to discuss and to show understanding of the different issues on both sides of the story hopefully the greater the possibility of these issues being resolved in a manner which is much less tense and of achieving a degree of de-escalation well thank you Ambassador it's encouraging that we are both pivoting to Asia together ten years ago the transatlantic relationship hit the shoals over China policy because of the EU arms embargo issue Washington did not want the embargo lifted there was strong momentum in the European Union among member states to lift it Britain played a critical role in bridging that gap it's essential for all of us that the US and Europe are speaking with one voice in both senses of our relationship with China the hope for success for a more comprehensive and positive relationship but the importance of maintaining diplomatic answers to international problems and effective rules for governing trade and investment and so forth and you've conveyed that very effectively today in Georgetown and USIP I think CSIS and USIP have the same architect it's spectacular here so on behalf of Georgetown and USIP thank you very much thanks for having me I better run away I guess we can start I'm looking for someone to give me a nod Professor Schuyler, thank you I'm Michael Green from Georgetown School of Farm Service Asian Studies and CSIS and I will be moderating this discussion with three of my good friends and three of the leading experts on security in Asia and China and economics if the panel this morning was on China as a rule maker our afternoon session is China as a Rule Breaker so if you could picture the morning session with little angels over one shoulder for this session picture all of us with little devils over the other shoulder and I know these three guys believe me little devils over the other shoulder we'll start with Dr. Derek Cisors who is at the American Enterprise Institute where he writes on China India Asian Economics I read his work it's excellent he is my favorite myth debunker on the Chinese economy in Washington MA in Economics PhD from Stanford he'll talk about economics and then Tom Menken at the Naval War College we'll talk about maritime and security issues Tom and I were classmates at CIS PhD classmates he knows a lot about maritime issues when we weren't doing our dissertations which was about 40% of the time we were playing the game of Imperial Diplomacy and I was Japan and you were Russia and although in real history Japan defeated Russia in 1905 I'm embarrassed to say that Tom crushed me humiliated me so he knows his naval and maritime strategy I know my history but it didn't help and then James Mulvannon another old friend and a very respected expert on cyberspace on China his PhD is from UCLA and he is now the Vice President I'm going to have to find it my apologies but it's important for Irish music the important thing you need to know about Jim Mulvannon is like me he plays Celtic music I play bagpipes he plays guitar and sings drunken songs I can't find it Jim I'm sorry it's Irish isn't it here we are Vice President of really that's impressive Vice President of Defense Group Inc's Intelligence Division and Director of their Center for Intelligence and Research Jim is an expert on cyber security I think we would agree that I'm an expert in this country on China cyber issues so we'll go down the line beginning with Derek we will want to in the presentations in our discussion and in the Q&A I think distinguish between norms and rules they're different I think in the economic sphere there are clear rules there are also norms I think in the maritime sphere there are few rules some norms and in the cyber sphere the rules aren't clear and the norms are heavily debated we'll want to talk about perhaps law fair China's effort to create domestic laws to challenge or balance against the international law that doesn't suit their interests I also think we'll find a distinction when we talk about rules and norms between revisionism and free writing my sense is historically rising powers and you could say this is the United States in some ways as well but certainly Japan and Germany and now I would argue China rising powers tend to free ride on the global scale and be more revisionist in their own neighborhood and so the regional versus global dimension will be important as well I think so let's go down the line and then we'll have some discussion and questions from the audience am I supposed to go there? I think you can if you're comfortable so this is the Bash China panel and I'll try to be a little bit restrained for me anyway the main point, we have two main points one which is to remember when we're bashing China is a lot of this is just a function of China being big and the negative and I'll just say a little bit more about that and the negative side of this is I'm going to argue that China is not improving on the econ side and this is the real problem I think it's actually gotten worse with a caveat that we don't know what this government's going to do so let's start with the big we're talking about China breaking rules China is big enough in economics that it's understandable if they're at least starting to bend the rules or make new rules and they're not going to be very good at it when they first made new rules we know the US was really bad at making new rules when we started on the econ side so some of the rule breaking might be misinterpreted it is just they're a big economy and the rules are going to have to change to some extent they signed on to the existing international economic order when they were much smaller they're less right to now they're less making rules that others can reasonably follow and more making rules that benefit China which is something that was talked about in the earlier sessions I'm sure we'll talk more about but I do think there's some leeway that has to be given because we're in a transition period and China's not going to be good at rule making and so it's going to look like it's rule breaking now I want to say something about size that I think we tend to forget let's compare China to India it's not at all obvious that China is a better economic rule breaker than India I think I would actually pick India as the bigger economic rule breaker what is obvious is China is much bigger and more important so whatever deviations that from the rules they engage in we're going to notice a lot more they're going to matter a lot more than Indian deviations and I picked another big country I'm going to talk about what little tiny countries do when they break the rules nobody pays any attention so a lot of the ammunition comes from China ammunition just comes from size and the US should be sympathetic to this because the same thing is true with us people will point out I can't believe and I did this myself in a weekly standard blog last night can't believe what the US is doing with Japan on autos it's ridiculous but it's also much more noticeable because the US is doing it some little country does it nobody cares it's not part of the TPP it's not a crippling blow to the world trading system we're going to focus on Chinese rule breaking that passes understandable because they're in transition or it's exaggerated just because they're large and go to destructive trying to keep in mind Mike's opening remarks about norms which he didn't tell me about until 30 seconds ago so I'm winging this it's all his fault if it doesn't make any sense we'll do the balance of payment side the balance of payment side and I'll get to some issues you're familiar these are more norms so we have currency manipulation we have incredibly difficult time defining it and from the straight economic standpoint the Chinese pegged to the dollar which is still in existence despite being scrapped four times it's never been scrapped it's much less manipulative than the US flooding the world with dollars due to our monetary policy so there's not really a rule there there's a norm and we're violating that norm more than the Chinese are that doesn't mean there isn't a problem there is a problem and I put it to my Chinese associates all the time you're now arguably depending on what measure you use the second biggest economy in the world when are you going to get your own currency this is ridiculous stop acting like you're a satellite of the United States economically that's what a pegged currency does I mean Hong Kong has a pegged currency it has 7 million people of course it has a pegged currency so that's not a rule but it is a norm that China is violating and it's one that exaggerates global cycles instead of separately so we get booms that are too big 2005, 2006 we get contractions that are too sharp 2008, 2009 I'm not saying China is primarily responsible I'm saying the pegged to the dollar contributes to that what also contributes to that is another norm violation which China's accumulation of large balance of payment surpluses and foreign currency reserves there's no rule about this but it is a norm and they're contributing to global imbalances that way the closed capital account small countries or countries that suffer financial instability are supposed to restrict the movement of capital not big countries that are not suffering from financial instability which China hasn't been suffering from until recently so is that a rule some of us would like it to be a rule but it isn't a rule it's more a norm and China is again stretching the norm so on the balance of payment side we talk about currency manipulation in this country there are a lot of more important issues it's China's breaking norms more than rules let's talk about the WTO and this is where there's a dispute about whether China's breaking rules or breaking norms there's certainly breaking norms they're also breaking rules China's WTO accession negotiations were fake and important respects and I want to talk fast which I am doing and I don't want to take up time because I want to have more question and answer and discussion I'll give you one example because I was sort of involved in this on the periphery there was this big argument over whether we had 49% telecom joint ventures of 50% or 51% where they could be 49%, where it could be 51% but they all required a Chinese partner and guess what happened after China joined WTO sorry you can't have a Chinese partner that was just disingenuous I mean you could say there's not a rule about that but you were making, you were agreeing apparently in good faith to allow telecom joint ventures and you didn't that's pretty close to breaking not an important rule but a rule nonetheless the disputes that we have now is an example over rare earth elements technically China is following WTO procedure so you can say well they're not really breaking the rules but they have a repeated pattern not just rare earth, autos, other minerals it goes on solar, it goes on and on and on where they extend the process as long as possible then they don't implement the required corrections in a timely fashion so they get years of altering industry conditions and it's sanctioned by the WTO is it breaking WTO rules no is it breaking the rules of an open trading system yes and those are maybe not codified in the WTO but there have been rules that most of the large traders in fact all the large trading countries have followed to now Doha round the ITA negotiations, the services in all cases you can't say there's a rule governing Chinese action where they're required to do something that they're not doing but the rule of trade the rule that we're all trying to negotiate trade progression Chinese aren't trying to negotiate trade progression they got what they wanted which is membership in the WTO and since then the WTO has been used to protect their individual and mercantilistic economic interests so the WTO side goes back and forth between breaking norms and breaking rules but we're certainly getting some sort of violation from China now we're going to get into straight rule violation and the number one easy one to start with is in the intellectual property rights and here this is a clear example of China not getting better but what we used to say about intellectual property until maybe 10 years ago or even more recently is as countries get richer and they start developing their own intellectual property they protect intellectual property better that is not what's happening what China has done is they're using the technology they stole to steal more technology I mean that's literally true in several important cases I'm not going to emphasize cyber because Mulvennan's here and he can do it but that's an example of what's happening at the front I wrote in 2003 this is in print for clients saying that the Chinese had just started a have intensified a strategy of acquiring foreign technology then pushing multinationals out this later was called became famous as Indigenous Innovation respect for IPR at home is getting better but respect for foreign IPR if anything is declining we have a tax on inter-digital other U.S. technology firms basically which are coercive IPR attacks and those are against TRIPS rules and China gets away with them because they gained the WTO which is why I gave you the WTO section beforehand and because they intimidated foreign companies into not complaining so on IPR China is absolutely a rule breaker and it's arguable because there's multiple dimensions to this I would argue that they're getting worse at rule breaking and then the last thing is state and enterprises and I don't think you can call the whole effort the fact of Chinese state capitalism and the subsidies of state and enterprises rule breaking because we don't have any rules on it yet although the TPP is trying to establish one and because Japan, Korea, some other countries did this to some extent with their national champions but it's been taken to a much higher level in China and some of the extensions that China has made are in fact rule breaking so for example regulatory protection there are a set of I call them the state teen which is the state 18 sectors where you're not allowed to beat state firms and if there's a rule in international economics you're supposed to have some sort of sense of open competition and that rule is being broken to protect state and enterprises and more obvious and sweeping fashion than it ever was in Japan and Korea which is not to say that they also didn't do things that were troublesome financial subsidies this is not a rule because the WTO is flawed Chinese financial subsidies don't tend to promote exports what they do is block imports which means they interfere with other people's exports which is kind of the flip side of something we do have a rule on so there isn't really a rule there there should be and it certainly breaks the norms another set of rules and this is a violation of absolute violation of national treatment and it has not been called on because I think because people are cowardly to be blunt Chinese antitrust rules don't apply to standard enterprises whenever they feel like it but they apply directly to foreign firms and they're being used increasingly on foreign firms including tiny little foreign firms who are said to have a monopoly in a tiny little market and are using that monopoly to coerce a much larger state-owned enterprise which has a geographic monopoly in that market which is not subject to the antitrust law say that again because I said it too quickly foreign firms which are literally one percent the size of the Chinese firms their market is defined in such narrow terms that a foreign firm appears to have a monopoly in China they are subject to the antitrust law for pricing unfairly gouging a giant Chinese firm which has a huge geographic monopoly in China which is not subject to the antitrust law so we're violating what is a rule in WTO on national treatment it's happening repeatedly and it's not being challenged so I'll just bring this back there are lots of things we can point at as Mike has pointed out some of them are violations of norms which can be important maybe less dramatic but some of them are violations of rules some of the rule violations are because China is large but sometimes China gets away with rule violations because it's large and I think that problem is actually getting worse so that's my bashing China participation in the bashing China panel thank you okay onto the onto the security realm I'd say in the security realm there are very broadly two views of Chinese behavior one is that the Chinese leadership is uneducated and poorly socialized and the theory there is through engagement dialogue will bring the Chinese leadership to understand the correct way of doing things the other view is that China has its own objectives and its own strategy and it is in other words an independent actor that may see things differently perhaps very differently than we do now I state those two positions first to associate myself with the latter but also to point out that I think that the former view is pervasive either explicitly or more frequently implicitly in interactions with China and the security sphere but I view the second as much more persuasive and in trying to think through you know how China constructs its rules in its role I want to just offer three different lenses and tease out the implications in the maritime domain and these three lenses for understanding Chinese behavior has to do first with a hierarchical view of international relations second with a continental geostrategic outlook and third a historical narrative of victimization so let's talk about the first the hierarchical view of international relations and here I want to contrast that view with the dominant view in the west the dominant view in the west is that states are de jura equal even if they are de facto unequal UN General Assembly being the epitome of that Burkina Faso has the same vote as the United States the Chinese view has a heavy over tone of a hierarchical view so China traditionally maintained hierarchical relations between it and states vassals tributaries on its periphery and I think this view is manifest not only in historic Chinese statecraft but also in more recent statements from Chinese Foreign Minister among others but I think it also colors the way China deals with disputes including maritime disputes we tend to favor multilateral dispute resolution China favors bilateral I think bilateral because it allows China to try to get the maximum leverage over the small countries with whom it has disputes I think an interesting test case for that will be to take a look at the agreement just signed this week in Qingdao as part of the western Pacific naval symposium where there's the rudiments of a code of conduct for incidents at sea too soon to tell of course it's a good test case but even now I think there's developments coming from the Chinese side seem to indicate that it will be more applicable to some than to others and that China may not feel bound by the code of conduct that it signed that's number one number two is China acts according to what I would call a continentalist geostrategic outlook and again I draw the contrast to the outlook that I think most Americans just take as given the United States is a maritime power and for the United States like Great Britain before it seapower is a necessity I think we view interaction in the maritime domain as positive sum as win-win we view the ocean in the words of Alfred Thayer-Mahan as a great highway, as a commons as a avenue of international commerce and it's a sense that the use of the sea brings benefit to all brings trade, brings commerce brings prosperity China by contrast has historically been a continental power and continental powers view the seas differently whereas we are insulated to some degree from threats by the sea continental powers like China must coexist with neighbors that pose the threat of invasion and I think China sees Chinese leaders see the sea as an avenue from which threats may emerge and thinks about the sea really from the land from the land outwards you see this in a number of different patterns of behavior first a neurologic response to maritime activities on China's periphery and attempts by China over time to change the accepted patterns of maritime activity and air activity on China's periphery you also see it in the development of so-called anti-access or counter-intervention capabilities to hold other powers away from China's borders and you also see it in a territorial view of maritime disputes really anchored on territory and I think that's actually a pervasive view and oftentimes we speak in Mahanian terms about the commons when the Chinese view things very differently the third is is what I call a historical narrative of victimization the narrative of the century of humiliation and I use the quotes and I use the term narrative because that narrative coexists but sometimes uncomfortably with some of the historical facts but nonetheless I think it is a governing narrative in China today it leads to the belief that whatever the international norms and the international rules they were created by someone else and that they may not always apply it also that view leads to historical claims of various salience and I'd say expanding historical claims I think it also has fed into an anti-Japan narrative that is expressing itself in some dangerous ways in the maritime domain so I guess my bottom line is China follows rules but they are different rules based on some different views of international relations different views of strategic geography and also a different historical narrative and I think where we fail to understand those we risk real problems thank you you want to wave your little red book before you do that's right, over to you Comrade but you can't be a China specialist without a little red book right so well let me begin, I want to thank Oriana and Stephanie for inviting me to come here today it was surprisingly difficult to get my remarks for today approved but we'll soldier on as an homage to Kurt Campbell I have three quick points the first is that China has a long history in the modern era of being a rule breaker you know obviously a party born of revolution which was clearly not a dinner party when it came to lopping off heads and that from the beginning the new PRC when it was inaugurated in 1949 explicitly rejected the international order by definition it was something that was going to be overthrown in a global revolution the existing order and all the existing order's rules were simply impediments and hegemony and imperialism that needed to be overthrown why do I bring all this up well because the same party is in power that used to believe that and if you read Xi Jinping and you see the Neo Maoist push and the Mao Pins on government officials, lapels and everything else it's tough not to sort of draw a direct line through all of that and they clearly didn't write the rules even it's going so far as the UN Security Council arrangement with the Republic of China and how that had to be redone but you see this all through the non-aligned movement in the 50s you see this through the peaceful principle the five principles of peaceful coexistence and the Bandung Conference and all of that good stuff and they fomented revolution abroad they tried to break other people's rules I mean 500,000 people died in 1965 and 1966 in Indonesia when the PKI which had been supported by Mao's regime was slaughtered by Su Harto and his leadership and the PRC system and this is a preview of something I want to say at the end also during this time even broke its own rules I mean the great proletarian culture revolution is a perfect example of a party turning on itself violating its own internal norms and trying to destroy itself and I couldn't help but think this morning as we were listening to the lunch speech that one of the gravest violations of rules during this period was in fact the attacks on the British Embassy during the culture revolution which violated China's commitments under the Vienna Convention and a number of other international laws and so that I want that to be a preview of my point number three which talks about how China in a different way is now continuing to say one thing and do another to violate its own rules but whereas the PRC as a matter of state ideology used to celebrate rule breaking it now desperately wants to be seen as a status quo member of the international order while still selectively following the rules and breaking the rules and breaking the norms now I will say as a caveat as a citizen of a great power that one of the perks of being a great power is selectively adhering to rules and breaking norms so I'm not trying to be all judgy about this but as China has been a rising power they have crossed a transition point where they increasingly are less shy about asserting their imperatives as a great power now I was asked to come here and talk about cyberspace and the cyber security issue and if you look at this at the strategic level what's very interesting about it because Tom mentioned and I'm glad Kristen Lord isn't here because even though my name is on a CNASS report about the global commons and I contributed to a chapter on cyberspace as a global commons I'm here to tell you that cyberspace is not a global commons in fact the Chinese and some of the countries that are signed on to China's international code of conduct in cyber I think actually have a much more accurate and realistic understanding of what sovereignty means in cyberspace than Hillary Clinton's State Department did and a number of other people in this case in cyber China like in some other issues China is more Westphalian than everybody else they're sort of you know they're trying to go as far to the right on Westphalianism as they possibly can in terms of adherence to sovereignty in particular they understand implicitly that the architecture of what we call cyberspace and I'm not talking about the virtual avatar lives where you sit in chat rooms talking to other people who also like on the weekends to paint themselves blue and run around in the woods with bow and arrow doing avatar cosplay that's not what I'm talking about that's your own business but the bottom line is every switch, every router every computer that makes up the architecture of the internet is within the sovereign boundaries of a nation state and therefore governed by its laws or that traffic travels on submarine cables or satellite connections that are owned by companies that are incorporated in countries and therefore governed by their laws this is not the sea, this is not the air this is not the space there is no sovereignty less part of cyberspace and the Chinese understand this and this is one of the main reasons structurally they're pushing to move international internet governance to the international telecommunications union under the UN because they understand this is not an issue this is a common now the cyber espionage I can very easily talk about this issue because there are no rules and there are no norms with regard to either espionage or cyber espionage so it's not exactly fair to say that China is breaking rules or norms we're just terribly upset about how good they are at stealing our crap but that's not the same thing as criticizing someone for breaking a rule but I will didactically make the following distinction which I believe has been blurred in the last six to nine months as we've discussed he who must not be named and that is the distinction between traditional espionage and commercial espionage and the United States before all of this recent kerfuffle as we say in the south, the recent unpleasantness before all of this happened we were very aggressively pounding on the Chinese side about this distinction between using cyber for traditional espionage against government and military targets which is perfectly acceptable although regrettable because everybody does it and using it against commercial targets which the United States government does not do and I realize that recent information would suggest disclosures involving Huawei or Petrobras would seem to suggest that that's not true I'm here to tell you it is absolutely not true and the United States is probably the only government in the world that does not do it not out of any sort of moral imprimatur but for the very practical reason that they wouldn't know how to share even if they did most of the countries we're dealing with have a single state-owned oil company a single state-owned chemical company a single state-owned telecoms company if their intelligence service steals something it's very easy to figure out who to give it to but let's just say notionally that somebody in the US government stole the newest networking technology of this company who would you give it to? Would you give it to Cisco? Would you give it to Juniper? What about the dozen or so networking startups in Silicon Valley? Here's the ironic thing about the US system any one of those companies finds out that they didn't get the technology they actually have legal standing to go to the Department of Justice for an anti-trust case is that crazy or what? So in the absence of an ability to share we don't do it at all but it is a little I understand why the other countries find it incredible to believe that but when there are allegations about stealing information from Huawei or Petrobras you must remember that it is to support strategic economic intelligence to senior policy makers not ExxonMobil and Cisco and that is a fundamental distinction and I will continue to argue about that until I am in the soil now if you drill down on this issue we are also very concerned about a whole set of behaviors that are related to this cyber espionage that fall frankly below legal thresholds and this involves a very large volume of extra legal technology transfers that I and my co-authors documented in our book last year on Chinese industrial espionage the Chinese system has hundreds of organizations that we identified thousands of personnel that form a gigantic cadre devoted to large scale planetary scale open source exploitation of foreign science and technology and research material as well as one way transfers of technology out of individuals through a huge network of pioneering parks and tech transfer parks and a gigantic infrastructure that is designed to prime the pump for the indigenous innovation that Derek mentioned earlier now none of that behavior or the vast majority of that behavior technically falls below any of our EAR thresholds or any of our legal thresholds and therefore can't be described as illegal behavior it can be reclassified as a trips violation it can be reclassified as a lot of things but it is deeply troubling it is deeply injurious to American economic competitiveness and it is behavior that is seen as unacceptable and we are reforming the export control system I think on one level precisely because it is not that the Chinese were breaking rules but that they were exploiting gaps in our system that allowed them to steal U.S. companies blind and universities one way that I do believe and that getting to the norms issue is the global IT standards regime is a perfect case the Chinese regime explicitly and in black and white letters uses the international standards regime as a trade weapon they did not want to pay the royalties to Erwin Jacobs at Qualcomm and other people for CDMA and so had a state funded effort to put together all of the parallel technologies for all of the major international telecom standards there is a Chinese HDTV standard there is a Chinese Wi-Fi standard there is a Chinese 4th generation telecom standard almost all of these standards through legitimate international bodies like the international standards organization to the UN the IEEE almost all of those standards have been rejected as technically inferior but they nonetheless are appearing in products like the dual WAPI Wi-Fi chip that is in my iPhone 5 because all of the equipment is being assembled in China and China is using the full weight of its regulatory apparatus and its product certification apparatus to enforce western companies that are building products in China to incorporate those inferior rejected technology standards in their products that is the only reason there is a dual WAPI Wi-Fi chip in my phone is because Apple wanted a single unified global production chain for its phone it didn't want to build a China phone and then arrest a world phone and it couldn't because China wouldn't let them build it at Foxconn but the real dilemma there is when you talk to the Apple developer connection they don't know anything about it they say it's black boxed they say 3 out of 4 of the crypto algorithms involved are state secrets and weren't shared with them by the state encryption management bureau in China that is not in my view a legitimate trade behavior that is the manipulation of the international standards regime as a trade weapon and we're going to continue to see that particularly given the recent revelations and the push to further divest all Chinese networks of non-domestic the third point though I'd like to make though is that China and this is the part that troubles me the most breaks its own rules or its own state and principles in particular I've noticed a phenomena that over the last 30 years of course we've all read the magazines there's been this huge rise in Chinese political and economic and military and social and diplomatic power but the thing that's bothered me the most and I think that we've seen periodically is that there has been a dangerous and disturbing lag in two key areas strategic communications and crisis management and we've seen this again and again and again in our crises with China one of the difficulties we have on the strategic communications side is that the Chinese regime even as it evolved from a rising power to a great power has been trapped like a bug in amber inside its own rhetorical system dating from the pre modernization era in other words things like the five principles of peaceful coexistence non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries what? give me a break again one of the perks of being a great power is interfering in the internal affairs of other countries and when China started its go out strategy ten years ago all it's been doing is interfering in the internal affairs of other countries $100 of a country's copper building them a new soccer stadium building them a new presidential palace building them a new foreign ministry siphoning off large amounts of money for their kleptocratic children so they can race Ferraris and Monaco all of that is a piece of a part of an international go out strategy that fundamentally involves the effect and we see this in Africa and other places destruction of the domestic textile industry through Chinese imports they've insisted on using Chinese workers in these facilities rather than the locals and things along those lines stationing troops abroad well it's a little difficult to maintain a constant rotation in the anti-piracy task force off the Horn of Africa and then also claim morally righteously that you're not stationing troops abroad and it's really difficult to provide logistics and sustainment to those forces if you continue to insist that you don't have foreign bases and so you have to do all of these ideological gymnastic backflips about places not bases and we're going to pre-po equipment at Costco bonded terminals but that's not really a base even though it's military and we're going to use our leverage to make sure that the host country allows us to have a port visit so that we can replenish food stocks so on the one hand you have this set of clearly outdated principles that don't really conform to what China is doing in reality but they are trapped by them for international reputation reasons but for years China was advocating in the CD in Geneva in favor of the Paros Treaty on Space Weaponization it's a little difficult to square that with their January 2007 anti-satellite test but of course after a week of ideological incoherence about that they came out and said we tested an anti-satellite weapon in order to convince the United States to negotiate the banning of anti-satellite weapons I would have loved to have been in the meeting when those talking points were approved because talk about a culture that is capable of holding two contradictory thoughts in their mind at the same time it is that is the essence of Mao Dunn in my mind similarly no first use of nuclear weapons iron clad will never be revised, will never be changed even as we watch on the ground deployment after deployment of DF-31 alpha road mobile ICBM brigades a new generation of at-CSSBNs and a whole force that to me from the outside looks like an accidental breakout into a limited warfighting force well how the hell do you square that with Yao Yun-Ju's comments about how they're going to have no first use forever for some people in Washington that Derek spends a lot of time with this plays into a strategic deception narrative which says that the way you explain the difference between what China says and what China does is that it's a gigantic strategic deception and that there's somebody you know with a white Persian cat in their lap and they're floating volcano island headquarters that is sort of directing all of this right my argument is somewhat different which is that it's the divergence between China's stated principles and its actual action that is the cause of serious Bob Jervian sort of misperception will cause crisis instability and will cause escalation control problems with the additional absence of confidence building measures and other things and so it you know it is in our interest for China to frankly to embrace Confucius because you know Confucius is concept of the rectification of names the Zhengming because Confucius said there will not be harming the empire until the name of the thing matches the nature of the thing that to me is the essence of China's problem right now you have a Chinese Communist Party managing a state capitalist economy you have a nuclear force that doesn't look like a no first use force and on and on and on and so my one piece of advice to Beijing would be Zhengming Zhengming otherwise there will be continued misperceptions of China's intentions and China's capabilities going into the future excellent thank you Oriana remind me how much time do we have two thirty okay let me ask one sort of speed round and maybe two and then I'll take some questions none of you are liberal idealist or liberal institutionalist so I'll dispense with the idea that somehow we're going to come up with norms that through you know socializing and bureaucracies for peace okay that was the morning wimpy panel so I'm going to the United States Institute for Peace apologies to our audience so let me get right to the tremendous perimeter security for some reason let me get right to the interest based approach to this national interest based approach to this so are we able to shape Chinese behavior in each of these areas you've discussed and if we are each of you give me a number from one to one hundred zero to one hundred percent what percentage of our ability to shape China's behavior in these economic norms and rules will be based on deterrence and what percentage will be based on self-interest for example China may want to join TPP because it wants to use it for internal reform or in the maritime sphere China may want to use some code of conduct because it has sea lane interests out of the Gulf or in cyber or outer space so let me start with Eric we'll go down the line and you know give me a number what percentage of our ability to change China's behavior in these areas is going to be thrown out the window socialization in norms and bureaucracies for peace what percentage will be fear and what percentage will be greed how much of it will require us to be deterring and how much of it will be China's own I mean I'll actually make the question or are we really just even uglier and say you forgot compelence you know I would say there's a five to ten percent area in economics where China imports a lot of commodities including soybeans at the sufferance of the United States so if you really really wanted to get ugly there's very high costs that could be inflicted upon China in that situation it would also cost the rest of the world a lot and that gets to the real question here it's quite high that we could our ability to influence China potentially it's quite high like 75-80 percent but all of those entail some sort of sacrifice including the one where it's in self-interest the way you get China to see it's in self-interest to reform state-owned enterprises is have a TPP chapter on state-owned enterprises they can meet in a reasonable time which means we have to give up something if you set the bar so high that the Japanese have trouble meeting it including IP over the weekend then the Chinese are going to look at this and say okay you know I kind of like to join but I mean come on you guys are not being reasonable here so we can appeal that we have a lot of influence over China both on the self-interest side and the deterrent side and the compelling side all of them are going to require sacrifices by the United States including the self-interest part and the sacrifices are going to get uglier in terms of what I would be short of compelence beyond self-interest is what we're trying to do and I think in TPP which is create an environment where we're hurting the Chinese in a certain direction by setting up these agreements that say look you can join you can join if you don't join things are going to get worse for you that's not easy we're having trouble with it right now we're going to have to make economic sacrifices or concessions to our TPP partners to our TTIP partners and so on so I think our influence over China is potentially very high it all comes it all comes including the self-interest part with a cost and I think the question is not whether we can influence China it's whether we're willing to pay the price to influence China and that's a perfectly legitimate national interest question good so TPP is key how they go by the way Tokyo more work to do so if I was I think the US in the maritime domain has United States and its allies I mean have a great ability to influence Chinese behavior whether we always exercise that ability as effectively as we could is another matter but if I was trying to think about the split between deterrence I think Derek's right deterrence slash compelence on the one hand and self-interest on the other I mean the split I would have is maybe about 70-30 something like that deterrence slash compelence what about the self-interest part see that's where it's tricky right because this gets into perceptions of self-interest versus versus you know the reality look the reality is that I would say no country has benefited more from US command of the commons and the globalization that it's brought on and the free flow of goods and services no country has benefited more from that than China and yet I think well I mean in terms of in terms of you know rise in incomes overall I think China because the gains have been from such a lower starting point and yet I think that is a dissatisfying position to be in for China today as you know probably with Germany in the early 20th century to have one's economic destiny you know in the hands of others even though others are invested in fundamentally invested in the system so you don't see so you haven't given any percentage to the possibility even if it's small that Beijing may be interested down the road in a code of conduct and so forth because of the 80% plus imports of hydrocarbons by C and so forth that's my 30% I thought you said compelence deterrence slash compelence at 70 self-interest at 30 I never used quant methods in my PhD that's about 30% I agree with that my late faculty advisor at UCLA asked me why I wasn't using game theory in my political science PhD and I looked at him I said Rick you'll see game theory in my PhD when it shows up in your work so you know it's good for the goose it's good for the gander cyber deterrence is extremely problematic I see my old ran colleague Tom McNower up there and it reminds me of when I joined ran in 95 and I was waiting to get my clearance I was sitting on a trailer out in the parking lot and they handed me a big stack of Kahn, Wolstetter, Shelling and Ellsberg we were still reading Ellsberg those days and you sat out there and read the canon while you were waiting for the system to do its business I have subsequently gone back through the canon and tried to apply it to cyber deterrence and difficulties that you have attributing the origin of an attack really fundamentally undermine almost all the core pillars of the deterrence canon you combine that with our inability for intended effects I mean out in the garage I've got my wheel of death in my briefcase you know so many pounds of overpressure at optimum burst height does the following to a wood building I still have it with me there is no such wheel for cyber and there never will be because of the law of unintended effects so cyber deterrence is really difficult I realize it's a goal we've put out some pretty milk toast declaratory statements for four or five years basically as you'd expect the United States when faced with a strategic cyber attack will in a manner of time of its own choosing respond with the full measure of U.S. national power the problem is cyber is not an area where we have escalation dominance because we're so wired we're actually a big juicy target in fact last year we were trolling around in some Chinese cyber chat rooms and we found a screenshot that a young Chinese hacker put up of his hack of the graphical user interface for the industrial control system that controls Washington gas here in the national capital region you know that's what I mean by asymmetry and so it's you can't just say you have a credible deterrent because you say you have a credible deterrent you have to have some Berlin airlifts and some Cuban missile crises along the way so while that may be a good asymptotic goal for us there's a good molander word right Tom you know an asymptotic goal for us it's not anything we're going to achieve many times soon so I ascribe much higher percentage to China's own self-interest which we're having difficulty getting them to because they still maintain an asymmetric perception of this domain in other words that the U.S. and other powers are asymmetrically vulnerable in cyber while they are not and they are somewhat coming around you know I mean the fact that all Chinese credit card transactions are processed on servers in the United States you know little things like that China has set up its great firewall in a way that's fantastic for internal security frankly terrible for waging cyber war they've created bottlenecks on their own ability to actually be able to have follow-on attacks so getting back to Derek's point though about you know China will start protecting IPR when it has IPR to protect you know I think the point I don't agree with yeah but but there's an analog in cyber where people say China will begin to care about global cyber security when it has its own internal cyber security problems it'll start caring about hackers when Chinese hackers from one company start hacking other Chinese companies but I would actually not bet against the Chinese possibility of maintaining those two thoughts in their mind at the same time which is that they have a domestic problem but that what goes on in the international space is not a reflection of their domestic problem and so you know I'm actually a bigger advocate of efforts by some to reduce the metaphysical certainty that the Chinese have and the veracity of the information that their actual trading from our networks such that their own system has to reform and that they realize that that the game is up at some level and that they have to turn down the volume on the actual trations because they realize that they're simply not getting the same quality information as they were before and that we could find some sort of an equilibrium but again as I said before in espionage in all cases there are no rules there are no norms I've struggled for years to try and figure out what a Moscow rules in cyberspace might look like and it just makes my brain hurt Excellent we'll not take questions from the audience I have to warn you that if you tell this panel that they're being hypocritical they won't care in fact US diplomats in Asia up until about December 1941 were authorized to say the United States stands by the principle of non-interference and internal affairs in spite of the intervention of the Boxer Rebellion the annexation of the Philippines the intervention in Siberia yada yada yada so there's a little bit of China in all of us right please identify yourself and we have microphones and we have 15 minutes so I'm happy to ask a question about what people make up their mind I think you've scared them all in the back there Steve Wenders, local researcher this to the first speaker this is probably a minor point but with the authors of the new Chinese economic reform seem to be very concerned about this issue of hot money and its deleterious effect perhaps they're trying to find ways to prevent this from happening how does that fit in with the open capital flows what's your take on that it's a very important point it's just a little hard to tie directly to the discussion today the Chinese have created following on with Jim's point about breaking their own rules they created their own hot money problem all the capital flow in and out of China is due to their own rigidity their own controls it's nobody's fault but theirs there was this talk a few years ago that the US was causing inflation in China Chinese money supply is two thirds larger and the lack of wealth is one third the size so this is China's problem entirely and essentially they are now using their own domestic weakness and we've seen this in economics all the time we do it, Japan does it for a long time they're using their own self inflicted domestic economic weakness to say we can't follow your rules yet it'll come later they're using the domestic side to say I know we're supposed to do that but we're not going to that only works up to a point where the Chinese banking system which is responsible for all these distortions was getting stronger until 2008 and then they ruined it with the response to the financial crisis so they're not getting farther away from being able to comply so the way I would tie it back to this is are we at the level of real rules here no they're pretty strong norms and they kind of verge on don't mess with other countries during a crisis which China's done a pretty good job of actually following that rule but they're not getting closer to compliance with the actions at home so along the lines of what Jim said they're saying one thing we want to follow these rules we're moving in that direction but at home they're doing things that are taking them farther away I don't know if that helps thank you I can say much more outrageous things if you guys don't start asking questions we'll take another question thank you my name is Zhang Hong, I'm from China's session media I wonder if the panel can put this question into a broader context China breaks a rule actually there are also a bunch of free riders who also break the rule against the U.S.-led or daughter so can you put that into context and see how this game how does this game play when there's a bunch of rule breakers perhaps led by China and the U.S. on the other side thank you I'll say for instance that if I was a global hacker organization with intelligence service with a sighing capability and I wanted to hack into the United States I would route all of my attacks through Chinese servers I mean when it comes to maritime claims, the maritime domain I think the big difference the big contrast is in acceptance of dispute mechanisms so there are plenty of dispute mechanisms for maritime claims China stands out as one country that's that's opposed multilateral dispute resolution and sought to do it bilateral so it's less the nature of the dispute than how it's dealt with on the U.S. side that's an excellent question one of the functions of China being big is when China breaks a rule everyone notices and they think did they get away with breaking that rule was it beneficial to them so for a little while we had people talking about state capitalism is going to take over the world now we have Chinese state firms being the most indebted of any large economy so hopefully that is checked but the point is when China did it when China had this model it got a lot more attention and more people following more people bringing this up in international discussions then one of the countries might have done it who were smaller so I think you're absolutely right that one of the reasons we emphasize China breaking rules so much beyond their behavior being bad is that it's China breaking the rule we can all see it and others are going to copy and I will say that all the other countries in the world that are looking at this move of international internet governance away from ICANN which by the way was never a cat's paw of the commerce department that was the most ludicrous argument ever anyone who ever met Esther Dyson or Rod Beckstrom and asked them how they felt about the U.S. government they were clearly not a cat's paw of the commerce department as China and its allies want to move that to the ITU there are a lot of countries that are going to free ride on China and Russia's leadership on that in order to be able to change elements of the international order in that area to their liking and there will no doubt be explicit or implicit payoffs to the countries who buy into that new sovereignty construct for cyber. I wouldn't say though because you asked about in effect a loose coalition of revisionist states opposed to the United States and China for all the reasons everyone's been saying it's big and it's highly dependent on the international economy China is not in the same category as Iran or North Korea or in some ways even India or Russia so when people talk about China learning the wrong lessons from the Crimea yes there are some very impressive lessons on how to combine special forces and economic and informational tools but Russia doesn't care Putin doesn't care as much about US relations or the international economy as Xi Jinping has to and that's even more the case when you're talking about Iran so there will be areas I think Jim pointed to one of the most important telecommunications slash cyber or human rights and democracy or general questions of interference and international affairs there will be alignments of convenience but a coalition of revisionists I think is actually very contrary to China's interests in spite of my earlier statements about interdependence and so forth I thought I saw another hand yes right here Hi I'm Bruce McDonald with the US Institute of Peace and I'm an adjunct at Johns Hopkins Seiss I'm a part of a couple of track 1.5 dialogue groups and one of them is on strategic nuclear dynamics I wanted to respond to a comment of Jim's good Irish name that's very good one on your comment on no first use I don't think the existence of mobile ICBMs per say is necessarily means that they are being hypocritical about no first use but I do think that the fact that there was no mention of no first use in their most recent defense white paper is interesting and also that if they start putting missiles to see and yet they say oh we always keep our nuclear warheads demated from our missiles how does that work that I think it's in spades says how does that how do they square that but I wanted to one thing that in the dialogue that drives me nuts and this is not quite rule breaking per se but in line with your theme that of course the United States never tries to have it both ways but here I where I think China does is China will very often make the point about well we're just a smaller power we are and yes transparency in theory is nice but really the weaker powers and we are much weaker than the United States we tend to benefit more from opacity than from transparency and at the same time they want to say that well we're big power in other spheres so I guess my question to you or anyone in the panel there is do you see any signs that as China begins to more feel its oats as a major power and should be taking more responsibility as well as rights do you see any signs of that tendency to want to have it both ways changing or are we sort of stuck with that for the duration after all they've gotten a lot of mileage out of it if I were them I might want to stick with it as well but I'd be interested in your perspectives on that well I mean I don't think it's an accident that the track 1.5 on cyber that I'm involved in your nuclear one previous nuclear 1.5's I've been involved in space 1.5's you have to say to yourself why do they prefer this track why do they want to have a track that's not track 1 it's not GovGov it's not track 2 pure academic but they want to have this one that's sort of a mix of government officials and non-government officials and government officials can make non-statements and issue non-papers and do all these sorts of things and the argument is because of their asymmetry they want to be able to communicate in message but they don't want to be held to any deliverable that comes out of these meetings so they feel like given their self-perception of that asymmetry those are the ideal places for them to be now they've all in various stages the cyber one has basically morphed into a 1.1 at this point and it became the cyber working group under the strategic economic dialogue which still is having meetings about scheduling meetings about having more meetings about scheduling the meetings about the size of the table and the protocol arrangements about the next meeting and the timing of the meeting but it nonetheless provided a channel but I think that that is a manifestation their use of those channels is a manifestation of their unwillingness to get beyond the plane at both ways that you're talking about Bruce now on the nuclear side I realize the nuclear force is small I'm just challenging people to think more creatively and more out of the box than they have historically as we see a sort of technologically determinist sort of modernization of this force and I'm not talking about intentional breakout I'm talking about the leadership waking up one morning and looking at a very robust road mobile force and possibly an at-sea SSBN force and simply asking the question hey did we just wake up this morning with a limited war fighting force or a force to frappe and then the snowflakes start coming down into the Chinese policy system tell me what I can do with this thing I've never abandoned no first use and that's my point so we read this Chinese book the second artillery campaign operations book and there's two pages where they talk about the seven criteria under which China will fire first and some of them apropos of the global the conventional precision global strike discussion some of the reasons some of the criteria where China will go first in nukes it says if we are attacked by conventional forces that attack our nuclear forces with a with an effect that approximates what a nuclear attack would be well that's hypersonic glide that's railgun that's a whole bunch of stuff that right here and now that would cause them to do that but how do we negotiate with them how do we deal with them bilaterally at the strategic level if there is this such a huge chasm between their stated doctrinal position and the facts on the ground of the forces that they have I would chime in I agree I think the concern is that I don't see the political statement of no first use going away but that exists uneasily with a number of developments in force posture but also these doctrinal statements that seem to point at least to some major qualifications in what that means your last point was them having it both ways I think in part in the nuclear realm and related realms they can have it both ways because we let them have it both ways so on the one hand the United States and Russia not always currently on the best of terms we have clarified our nuclear posture they want to play a big role and yet they are unwilling to clarify their posture let alone participate in strategic nuclear arms negotiations the United States and Russia eliminated a whole class of weapons and it's a class of weapons that China has deployed and continues to develop and deploy in great numbers and yet I don't hear discussions about globalizing the INF treaty which I think would be warranted and I don't hear our diplomats engaging the Chinese in discussions along those lines so we sometimes abet that type of having it both ways I think across all three of your areas the better play increasingly is going to be multilateralizing as you pointed out code of conduct in South China Sea you can get norms on cyber and space a multilateral approach is going to be more effective and then TTIP, TPP and broadening the rulemaking and norm making I want to ask one really quick question before Oriana can get up here and pull this off of me the nuclear is a perfect example and you can give many more there's no first use policy that's stated usually by the farm ministry and then there's a war fighting doctrine usually that comes out of the Academy of Military Sciences which contradicts it so you hear two takes on that one is stove piping it's a problem, it's a good thing that Xi Jinping is creating a national security counselor at NSP it's a good thing that he's centralizing economic reform and counter corruption the centralization of authority is presidential style of decision making and strategy it's good because it'll empower the farm ministry and the nationalists and it'll get rid of these problematic gaps which is no, no, no this is all quite strategic and deliberate you centralize it under an NSC or you centralize economic reform and you end up with much more effective use of these state instruments to break rules and norms so we only have ten seconds but I'm going to violate Oriana's norm for just two minutes and I'd be very interested in each of your takes on how much of this is an accident of stove piping that could be fixed by centralization with a strong legal action to bring or how much of it could actually get worse I mean an econ this is straightforward there's a reform camp that's led by the people's bank and then there's a centralization led by the NDRC and if Xi Jinping comes in and says I will adjudicate among these and you will follow my orders and he can be effective as Deng Xiaoping was when he initiated reform in a much more difficult situation than reinitiated it after Tiananmen then okay well they become more effective and then the following question is they become more effective doing what well they have this sweeping reform announcement that they say they want but it's all very vague it isn't going to work as it is so if you believe Xi Jinping is really committed to market reform it's great that he would centralize power and make that decision and if you think he's not then we have exactly as you pointed out a more concentrated you know a suppression of the reform camp and we have a China that will cheat more effectively internationally so that you know there's no information to answer about him yet that's the risk I think our perception is that China's leaders think about defense and national security externally much more than they actually do even in the discussions about the national security council it's primarily domestically focused and so whether it's centralization or not I don't see that changing I think look the big military decisions get changed in the direction of the leadership and other ones don't so I don't see that being as big a driver so we have the central military commission that's all that mattered anyway in cyber the lack of centralization is a huge problem and it's a huge problem because their system is very different than ours they have this bottom up entrepreneurial grassroots cyber espionage system you know go let a thousand you know let a hundred schools contend in sharp contrast to ours and tight sphinctered, heavily controlled and we need to drive their system up that way because it's this grassroots decentralized system that has contributed to the volume and even the redundancy you know same different intrusion sets going up to the same targets you know all kinds of interesting things I want to drive them to a centralized process but for a perverse reason and that is because I know that the extent to which they centralized that decision making and next to every three PLA technical reconnaissance bureau operator someone from the inspector general's office and a lawyer and an auditor that their system will grind to the same halt that ours has and that by definition because of all that paperwork that the volume of the intrusions will go down and so by pointing out to them you know what's going on in an ad hoc level at the lower levels I think it plays naturally into their desire to centralize the system and I think that that will actually allow us to establish some sort of a Moscow rules in cyber which we couldn't do as long as there were two dozen sets operating relatively independently and encouraged to just go out and be fruitful Excellent Jim Tom and Derek thank you it was great thanks for indulging me extra two minutes and thanks for your participation that's good that last question worked out really well he said no I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 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