 Why don't we start? Well, there's absolutely no doubt that the UK will do whatever the US wants. If you go back to the days of... We've had lots of prime ministers recently, but if you go back to the days of David Cameron, the idea then was a golden era of relations between the UK and China. Well, that golden era is now long gone. Britain caved into American pressure over Huawei. When I say caved in, I mean, that's a pejorative phrase. And I think in the end, probably the security people in the UK were happy to have their arms twisted. But I mean, basically the UK is always going to follow the US lead. And I think that is also true essentially of all the countries in NATO. I mean, the thing, if you look at the China, the People's Republic and the USA, the fact is that the US has lots of allies, but China has lots of trade partners. I was shocked the other day when Carl Bilt pointed out that there are only 20 countries in the UN who name the US as their number one trading partner. So essentially that means Canada, Mexico, a few Caribbean islands and so on. Whereas if you take the reverse, you take how many countries name China as a lead trading partner, that's at least 120. So if you were to look at this sort of rivalry as a potential conflict, then you're tempted to use the phrase, a might is right. Well, how do you define might? Is it economic pressure, economic links, or is it military pressure, military links? Maybe it's something that we can get involved in later. But I think what lies behind your question, Douglas, is if push comes to shove, which way will countries, what choice will countries make? Well, of course, none of the countries want to have that choice. They want to avoid it. And I think common sense should indicate that the choice never has to be made. But that's what we're saying now with the benefit of common sense. Common sense doesn't always work. You have First World War, Second World War, and so on. I think that if you look around the world at the moment, if you take NATO out and say, OK, all the NATO members will follow an American lead, if you look at Africa, there are now something like 10,000 Chinese firms operating in Africa. You've got the Chinese military base in Djibouti. You've got potential bases also. I think China now is developing something like 50 different ports in Africa. That's not necessarily a bad thing. If you take the whole BRI initiative, which is obviously not just Africa, it's Europe, it's Central Asia, and so on, that really does bring real influence to bear. The downside of that, of course, is that you get a sort of debt imperialism. If you take Sri Lanka, for example, there, the Rajapaksa government went into some dodgy deal and suffered for it. But it means that the main port is now basically taken over by China. If you take Greece, where I was in Athens last week, I mean, Pyreas, one of the best ports in Europe, is now Chinese-owned, effectively, and works very, very efficiently, very effectively. So one shouldn't see this in a Manichean way. I mean, there are reasons why countries should accept largesse from China. But if the largesse also does come with some strings attached. I thought it was interesting that Xi Jinping is maybe even now still in Saudi Arabia. I mean, they may be leaving tonight, I'm not sure when. Perhaps he's waiting for the soccer matches to finish in Qatar. But I mean, Xi Jinping is making good friends with Saudi Arabia and really with the whole Gulf Cooperation Council countries. Remember that Saudi Arabia has been a faithful American ally really since the foundation in 1932. So we're talking 90 years. Now that's all up for grabs. I don't want to rub it on too much, but I would think that Africa really does not want to make this choice. And I don't think it really has to. It can be independent. A much more difficult choice, I think, is in Southeast Asia and South Asia. I mean, Pakistan is, I think, really in hawk to China thanks to the CPC, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. And if you take the countries of Southeast Asia, they all depend on China for their trading links, their economic growth. The challenge will be over Taiwan and what may happen there. I'm actually fairly optimistic. I don't think Xi Jinping is a madman, nor incidentally do I think Vladimir Putin is a madman. But you can't really meditate too much against what can happen when people make decisions which then lead to other consequences. I think we, I'm talking when I say we, I sort of mean West here, I think we were lulled into complacency in the era of Deng Xiaoping. And that carried on with Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. I think with Xi, it's a different ball game and we don't really know how to assess him, how to treat him. And I think that means that the possibility of miscalculation does exist. A final thought, if there were a war, remember that American military really is battle-hardened. So if there were a war between China and the States, regardless of who is on what side, I suspect America would win. But that's sort of a catastrophic concept which I don't think is going to happen. But, you know, one lesson I think that Xi has taken from the UK war is that the American military and NATO in general, but especially the American military, is really very, very good. And I suspect that if you look at the Chinese military, even though it has invested enormous amount into modernizing the military, the Navy is supposedly now bigger than America's Navy. Nonetheless, it hasn't done, it doesn't have much battle experience and what it's had has been pretty poor, for example, in Vietnam. So let me leave it there. Thank you, John. I think there are a number of things I'd like to probe on that. Is China going to be everybody's leading trade partner forever? Is the disposition of forces the way you've described it or has it been changing? Is the debt policy of China undergoing various changes as we heard this morning in other panels?