 with Russian dialogue and understanding, one of the co-organizers of the conference. The topic of this panel is the view from the region, Russia's neighborhood, and the future of international system. Having deciphered Russian motivations, preferences, and expected future trajectories of its policies in the morning, having examined the Western responses along with its capabilities to translate seemingly common diagnosis of the situation into practical steps, it seems as quite an obvious follow-up to look into the region and to listen to the people from the region how they see it. It seems obvious, but it is not obvious at all because I had an opportunity to participate in many meetings of that kind, or trying to analyze the situation around the crisis we have been experiencing for almost a year, and a lot of them, a lot of organizers, typically put a full stop here after analyzing Russia and the West. I mean, as if the post-Soviet area, in general terms, was a kind of a battlefield between the two forces. And I believe there are some dreamers on both sides, I mean, in Russia, in the West, the dreamers of Grand Burgain between US, Russia, possibly the European Union, some even say China, that they should find a solution without actually the actors from the region by the table. So we are not going to follow this path, and that's why we believe that it is quite the crucial thing to ask the people, either the insiders from the region what they feel about it, and the experts dealing with analyzing the situation around Russia, how do they see the situation with respect to those countries and their attitude and their influence and their vision of the international system after what has happened this year. So I have a pleasure to introduce three speakers to insiders from the region, Professor Mikhailo Kirsenko from Kyiv, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Ukraine, Ambassador Theodor Zaparidze, the head of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and in Georgia Parliament, a former foreign ministry, and Dr. Jeffrey Mankov from here from CSIS, Deputy Director of Europe and Eurasia Program. So if I may ask you about 10 minutes long introductions so that we could have time for the discussion with the audience, so let me pass the floor first to Professor Kirsenko. Thank you. It's a big responsibility to speak immediately after Dr. Josinski, and in order not to repeat conclusion of our distinguished colleagues, I would like just to share some points, some opinions with you who can add a couple of new aspects to what has been said already. First of all, we are witnessing a hybrid war, a kind of totalitarian war, in total war in fact, totalitarian, aimed not only at defeating enemy's army or occupying territory, but at destruction of the whole infrastructure of the target area, it's first observation. Next observation, from the very beginning, so-called Commonwealth of Independent States after disintegration of the Soviet Union was regarded by Russia as a tool, as an instrument of reintegration, while from the point of view of Ukraine, it was just an instrument of a civilized divorce. I'll just mention these points, because in such a highly professional audience, it's not necessary to develop it in more detail. We are now destined to regard events in the triangle Poland, Russia, Ukraine, and I'm glad to see that more and more, the West begins to regard Ukraine not as a twin sister to Russia, but I do hope that very soon it will be regarded as a twin sister to Poland, as one of the largest, not the best one, of course, but the largest nations of East Central Europe. I mean, all territory between Russia and Germany, Baltics and the Balkans. All nations of East Central Europe had appeared in self-determination after dissolution of such multinationals empires, reels as Austria, Hungary, Russia, and Ottoman empires. Ukraine has had shared all, but one, a typical phenomenon of the regional development. The only exception was unprecedented genocide, Holodomor, aimed at repressive preventing resistance to the drastic communist transformation of the country. In the peacetime, it had destroyed in the interval period about 10 million lives, or one-third of Ukraine's population. The nation had been so exhausted and silenced that it can explain us a lot of subsequent fatal slowness and inconsistency in its current development. Perhaps Galicia and Valinia, being out of the Soviet Union in the interwar period, had been not touched by man-made femines, though these regions had suffered hardly in cruel Soviet suppression of the guerrilla war. In both regions, in both Galicia and Valinia, 25 years ago, the Democrats had won the first comparatively free elections. After the Orange Maidan, over half of Ukraine followed this example, and dividing lines between Western and pro-Moscow trends coincided with borders of old Polish, Lithuania, and Commonwealths. The revolution of dignity this year has resulted in unanimous support to new presidents oriented to the European Union and North Atlantic Alliance. And finally, the recent parliament election for the first time in almost a century have excluded communists from the Ukrainian parliament, I hope forever. Deeply rooted in history, the mentality of national elites as the Polish nobles and the Ukrainian Cossacks to lesser degree of townspeople and peasants had been based on individual ownership, elected ruler as Primus Interparis, Magdeburg German city law, respect for legal procedure, and first of all and most of all, mutual responsibilities of rulers and subjects in their rights and duties. These typical European civilization values sharply contradicted to the Moscow rural traditions of Serbdom, communal property with land repartitions, collective responsibility, officials appointed from above, and the semi-divine charismatic Tsar, Secretary General or President at the top of social pyramid. These two absolutely opposite Western and Oriental identities just could not peacefully coexist within the same structure. Poland and Ukraine had passed longer on our briefer periods of national statehood prior to development as constituent parts of multinational entities. They were more than once repartitioned and subjugated by alien neighbors. Unlike Poland and Ukraine, Moscow has never been a nation, but in the late Middle Ages had jumped from a tiny principality on the Mongol periphery to a polyethnic conglomerate of Turkic Finogreek Mongol tribes colonized by Slavic settlers. The very name of Russia was acquired later in a desire to prove its imagined continuity from Kiev or still more fantastic from Byzantium. The orthodoxy had to legitimize these crazy claims to regional and then to global hegemony. Without such an ideology and Chauvinist quasi-spiritual mythology, the Russian Federation had lost any sense of existence, his own debtor. The same happened with Austria-Hungary when it proved to be not necessary anymore as a barrier against Turkish pressure on Europe and failed to become a protector of small nations with the Pan-Germanic and Pan-Slavic assimilative threats. The Habsburg monarchy had been painfully replaced with a network of sovereign nations. After the Second World War, Germany and Japan were forced by the victorious allies to the liberal democracy, resulting in their respective economic miracles. Unlike them, Russia, after its complete defeat in the Cold War, was not occupied by Americans and the revanchists have misused it for a dangerous attempt to restore Lansiang regime. About 100 years ago, the Russian White Guard could not conclude an alliance with Yusuf Pilsudski against the Soviets because Russian generals considered Poland just a part of their empire. For similar reason, Moscow now is not able to recognize an independent nation of Ukraine. Its integration in Europe requires some time after genocide. The population in the southeast of Ukraine had been partly replaced with newcomers from elsewhere, whose offspring just needed time to identify themselves with the country with their new homeland. It's a matter of so-called Lans patriotism, adaptation to the old-fashioned of folks patriotism. The phenomenon of Russian speakers defending Ukraine now against Russian invasion proves vanity of the Kremlin attempts at protecting Russian speaking minorities in post-Soviet areas, comparable to the attempt of the Third Reich to protect folks' torture abroad. Every American knows that Washington is located in the east of the nation, but Moscow is used to call a central Russia, their country's extreme west. With Vladivostok as far east, we could find Russia's far west, somewhere close to Newfoundland perhaps. This confusion in the people's mind means claims in Eastern Europe and on the other hand, a subconscious feeling that behind the URLs there is not Russia properly. The intellectuals in Siberia still more often recollect in memory their white and green colors of their short-lived autonomy about 100 years ago. The Asian Russia, quite self-sufficient and exploited by Moscow, is keeping oil just because of neighboring with huge China. If Beijing one day finds some modus vivendi with Siberia, the Kremlin would not be able to hinder it. In the early 20th century, there were movements for Turkey cultural autonomy or a Tartar-Bashkir state in the Russian Federation. The Muslim Congresses tried to coordinate legislation. They had educational, financial, and military, even military branches of social structures. Yet the republic in Kazan had been crushed by the Red Guard, national committees dissolved and banned. An idea of Ural and Volga reappeared after the USSR collapsed and anniversaries of the Kazan-Hanat destruction by Moskovite in the 16th century are attracting still more numerous guests from all non-Russian republics of the Russian Federation till now. Even in purely Russian regions of Novgorod and Tver, we can see some nostalgia and some memory of what was committed by Moskovite to their ancestors several centuries ago. So it seems to me we could not regard, and we should not regard, Russian Federation as the monolith. And if we regard it as a continuation of the Soviet Union, perhaps its destiny also will be the continuation of the Soviet Union. As to Ukraine, we cannot see a crucial antagonism between Donbass and Galicia in East and West Ukraine. So without a foreign intervention, any separatism would be quite impossible. And even the Russian militias used to recruit unemployed paupers of their paid mercenaries and still more often replaced them with regular Russian Federation troops. Troops, now the Crimea specific case should be analyzed keeping in memory very tragic destiny of its natives forced to emigration during two centuries after destruction of the Crimean Hanat and finally deported by the Russians to Asia. Since then, a lot of retired Soviet officers with families had settled at Peninsula and prevented a repatriation of the Crimean Tatars. This small nation forms just a part of their only homeland population. And unlike colonists, I'm sorry, there's no alternative to a real autonomy in Ukraine. The Crimean dependence on water and energy supply may crush an expansion to continental areas inevitable after the Peninsula annexation. And I would like just to recollect in our memory 76 years ago, the West surrendered Sudetenland to the Nazi Germany. As a result, Czechoslovakia has been crushed. Later on, the Nazi Germany put forward a claim of land communication to Danzig and all of us know the result. Now the same situation we could observe in Crimea and now we are observing in Donbas because Russia is demanding land communication to Sebastopol and if it is not stopped, it's very difficult to preserve, to keep European peace. And just a couple of closing remarks. So unprecedented artificial monster of so-called new Russia out of several Ukrainian regions has absolutely no prospect and is destined to defeat. It's only real explanation is the desire to capture Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv and other industrial cities with their military plans to cut off Kiev from Blackshore and as a result to reconquer Ukraine. A small victorious war also looks and seemingly is a useful tool to distract attention from Russian authoritarianism and disastrous dependence on gas pipelines. And finally, just a couple of remarks. It's impossible to deceive people for a long time and let's hope that Russians will be able to see realistically their future. History usually repeats tragedy later and later as a farce. However, the danger should not be underestimated. We should must be watchful to resist it. With in dealing with a handful of constructors threatening existence of Ukraine, undermining stability and blackmailing the world with nuclear missiles, it's necessary to strengthen effective solidarity of the civilized community. Ukraine is now a vanguard at its front line and desperately fighting and expecting a kind of land lease to save more resources of the West. We cannot predict now how the struggle will, how long the struggle will last and how many human lives, precious human lives it will cost. But final result is quite clear. As during the Battle of Britain, now the United States has again a real chance and moral duty to become a mighty arsenal of democracy. Nothing has been done unless everything has been done. Let us hope that our useful and fruitful exchange of opinions here can to some extent promote better understanding and cooperation to general and common benefit. We should not waste precious time. Thank you. Thank you for this overview of historical roots of Ukraine's aspirations. Now, I'd like to give the floor to Ambassador Japaritza. How do you see the situation in Ukraine from the perspective of Georgia, especially from, for instance, in the context of 2008 and hasn't solicited here things. Please, the floor is yours. Thank you very much. It's really interesting, you know, panel, interesting topic. I'd like to, you know, create, you know, panelists with Chairman Yu, those of you who are in the audience to listen to this, I would say, dramatic, you know, sad story about Russia and its, you know, neighborhood. Ah, I'd like to be, I had, you know, I can talk about this issue long, long time, but I'd like to, at the outset, as far as we are going to speak about Russia's, you know, neighborhood, I'd like to, and as far as we are at the CSIS in one of the influential, you know, academic, you know, centers of the United States of America, I'd like to start, ah, say a couple of words about interpretation because the issue and topic of our, you know, panelists, you know, Russia and the neighborhood, and Russia's, you know, perceptions or attitude towards the neighborhood, but I'd like to say that it's not only about neighborhood, but we live in a region or in a neighborhood where there are different, you know, interpretations, not only of neighborhood itself, which, you know, Russia interprets its own in no way, as far as Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, I'm sure, you know, Azerbaijan, Armenia, all other, you know, post-Soviet republics, currently independent states, who interpret, you know, this neighborhood, you know, concept notion in an absolutely different way. Same thing about, you know, security. Same thing about stability, economic cooperation, independence, sovereignty. So whenever we speak about, you know, Russia and, you know, Russia's immediate neighbors, we need to take these differences into account. If we speak about Georgia and Russia, and we, as you understand, we are immediate in the neighbors, though there are several, you know, Muslim enclaves between Russia and in Georgia, enclaves like Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan and so on, but still we'll, we'll, you know, we are immediate neighbors of the Russian Federation. And again, at the very outset, I need to tell you what kind of neighborhood we are talking whenever we had, you know, a war, hot war, you know, with Russia, we do not have diplomatic relations. And we call that we have kind of strange, I would say, but relations without diplomatic relations. We had a war, as I said, we lost it. We lost, you know, 20% of our territories. Georgia is a dismembered, you know, defeated in our country. And we're still in different, you know, forests in different, you know, conferences and on different, you know, panels. We need to talk about Russia and its immediate neighborhood. I, again, we all know that Georgia is committed, despite the fact that from time to time you may hear, you know, different sort of vibrances from this, you know, little beautiful country where I live, because it's a country where people are appointed on Mondays and maybe, you know, set on Tuesdays. But still we are committed, you know, despite this fact, we are, you know, committed to democratic values. We are committed, you know, to our foreign policy trajectory, which is, you know, about integration into NATO whenever it happens and our, you know, integration into the European Union, also whenever it happens. And it's about, you know, democratic principles, values and practice, yes, we are not perfect. We try to be better every day. We make, you know, mistakes here and there, but, you know, it's about Georgia's, you know, vision and Georgia's agenda. And it's absolutely different from what we have, you know, in the Russian Federation. And Dr. Zhezinski, and I fully agree with you, that it's not easy even to talk about, you know, these issues after Dr. Zhezinski, you know, talked so eloquently in a very strategic manner. I'd like to recall, you know, one, whenever we speak about Georgia's, you know, foreign policy agenda, or Georgia's, I would say, strategic agenda, which is, you know, very linked with NATO and EU perspectives, including, you know, different formats like good neighborhood and the other and Eastern partnership and so forth. I remember, you know, one big gathering like this, even bigger in Berlin, when due to some reasons, one of the participants, you know, raised issue about Georgia and during this, you know, comment, she mentioned, you know, Georgia's kind of Eastern partnership and good neighborhood policy and something like that. And there was a couple of Russians in the audience and they, you know, one of them, you know, made very, I would say, quite negative and very, he got, you know, very much irritated of that about, it was just about Georgia's participation in the European Union's good neighborhood policy. And I raised my hand. I posed the question in the presence of, you know, close to more than 100 participants and I said, I can understand the reason of your irritation. I know him quite well. Maybe some of you know this Russian also well. I understand the reason of your irritation, though I do not agree with you, but okay, you are irritated over Georgia's, you know, aspiration to be part of the European Union, including this, you know, I would say, not that complex or very important format of good neighborhood policy, but again, where is your good neighborhood policy? Where is, you know, Russia's good neighborhood policy? And this Russian colleague of ours, you know, he looked around and he said, Russia does not have a good neighborhood policy and Russia would not have this policy in the foreseeable future. So, and again, we are talking about Russia and, you know, it's a neighborhood and that's, you know, the position of the Russian Federation. So I think we need, while talking about neighborhood policy, I think we need to focus and it's good to be here in Washington and I'd like to raise, you know, these issues specifically here and also to be heard, you know, by our European partners and friends and especially those who are from Central Europe and specifically from Poland, that, you know, we, Russia's immediate neighborhood, at least, you know, those of us, you know, Georgians, Ukrainians, Voldova, I would include also Azerbaijan, even Armenia, who are in so-called, you know, gray zone because we want to join European and Euro-Atlantic, you know, structures. We understand we are realists, we are pragmatically oriented people. We understand it's a long, long, you know, term process. We do not want to go back where we used to belong. We do not want to be part of these customs in, you know, whatever formats, you know, Russian 7. By the way, I do not know how they are going to implement customs union when they had this, you know, kind of terrible, dramatic developments, you know, with Ukraine. But on the other hand, it's not only about Russia, we know Russia, we know Russia's policy, you know, for centuries and there's nothing new in that. But the question should be about Europe and the United States of America, and specifically, I think about Europeans, that what about, you know, these countries in this so-called, you know, gray zone? We cannot stay in this kind of, you know, suspended animation for a long, long time. We need, you know, clarity in this regard. Yes, we made publicly public statements about Georgia's, Ukraine's, or whatever, European, Euro-Atlantic aspirations. But we need kind of, you know, practical decisions because we cannot stay in this, you know, kind of, as I say, suspended animation in a long, long time and we need, you know, clarity when, how, and what we need to do, you know, and whenever it happens to join NATO or the European Union. And again, it's not kind of, you know, Georgian obsession that we want to be, you know, members of the European Union or NATO. But I'd like to tell you at least, you know, I don't know about Ukraine, but for Georgia, it's not about only membership, but it's about, you know, Georgia's survival as a state. So we need the clarity in this regard, and we do not need too many, you know, messages from our, you know, Western friends, mainly European, that on the one hand, we understand, you know, Georgia's concerns, but on the other hand, you should take into account, you know, Russia's, you know, kind of, you know, position in this regard. So again, we understand that. So please, deliver to us, you know, clear-cut message. We are, you know, just naive. We are not, you know, just stupid. We understand messages and we understand that also that, you know, this European, Euro-Atlantic process is a long-term model. The third point, and I'd like to conclude with that, we, at least, you know, in Georgia, and I hope in Ukraine, we understand why West, in general, Europeans or Americans, you know, need cooperative Russia. Russia is a cooperative partner. It's not about friendship, it's not about, and you know, each of you, I mean, Americans, Europeans, and in Europe, it's more, you know, diverse. They have different reasons, different interests. And for example, Americans have some security, you know, risks, challenges, and they need, you know, Russia to resolve, you know, these big, big, you know, security issues. Europeans have their own, you know, agenda with them. And we understand that. You need, you know, at least, you know, cooperative Russia, more or less stable. It's not about democracy, but it's about, you know, the partnership. But my message would be, and I'm really, very much delighted to be here, that my dear friends, you would never have this kind of Russia, a cooperative partner, until Russia does not settle its, you know, relationship. It's their, you know, immediate neighbor, neighbors. And until Russia does not recognize that Ukraine should be, you know, independent and sovereign, as well as Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and they need to deal with this reality. We want to talk about, you know, neighborhood and, you know, cooperation. I think, you know, Russians, because they still, we leave, you know, in the 21st century and, you know, what happened, some little green Chilovechiki, I don't know, Chilovechiki, what's in English? Ariel. Little green man. Little green man, you know, just redrafted the territory and, you know, landscape of a sovereign country. And we are making, you know, strong statements. We're making, you know, different kind of, you know, political steps. But again, that's the reality. So, again, we know, we all need to know Russia. We need, we all need to know stable, peaceful, you know, Russia, economically engaged with Europe. But on the other hand, realities that we have, whatever we have in Russia, we have, you know, Putin. And we do not know, he's, you know, whether he's in a president, whether he's in a Tsar, whether he's, you know, national leader, and, you know, that, you know, people. And we deal not only with personalities, but we deal with a country where, you know, population prefers to freedom and independence over security. They love security more than freedom and independence. So that's the reality. And that's how we look, you know, at our perspectives and in near future and even longer, you know, from Georgia. Thank you. Thank you for your observations. Now the floor goes to Jeffrey Mankov. How do you see the region in the context of current situation? Thank you. Of course, I'm in the unenviable position, not only of being on the panel that follows Dr. Brzezinski, but also of being the last thing that stands between you and getting out into a cold DC afternoon and DC traffic. So nevertheless, I've been asked to talk about the perspective from the region, from the neighborhood. As Ernest said, I am from the Russia and Eurasia program here at CSIS. And I think that term Eurasia is one that we should probably bring into the discussion. Because a lot of what is happening in and around Ukraine really turns on this question of Eurasia. What is it and what is it becoming? Of course, there are different definitions of Eurasia. There are different conceptions of what that term describes. And certainly Mr. Putin has one idea, but I don't think that it's the only one. If anything, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Eurasia has become more multipolar. It has seen the development of new trade, economic, investment, political relationships among various states in the post-Soviet region and other countries that geographically are located on the Eurasian continent, from West to East. So now you have pipelines connecting Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. You have a pipeline connecting Turkmenistan to China to the extent that China now buys more gas from Turkmenistan than Russia does. You had, in addition to Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia seeking to sign association agreements and even comprehensive free trade agreements with the European Union. This proliferation of ties beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union is, in part, a natural market-driven development since the monopoly on connections that was imposed by the Soviet Union no longer exists. But there's more to it than that. In part, it's the result of Russia's own inability to develop as an attractive pole of attraction for its post-colonial neighbors. They're dissatisfied with the offer, the bargains that they're being offered from Russia and sought to diversify their ties in part to take advantage of better economic conditions but in part also to hedge their political dependence on Russia. This was a strategy that was pursued not only by Ukraine but by the majority of Russia's post-Soviet neighbors. And in response to developments in Ukraine over the last year plus, all of these neighbors have been put in a much more difficult position. This policy of seeking good relations in multiple directions, pursuing a multi-vectoral foreign policy has become much more difficult. In response, of course, Russia has pursued its own vision of Eurasian integration. And this is a vision of Eurasia that is mostly a closed one that's concentrated on tying the post-Soviet republics more closely together under some form of Russian leadership and making it more difficult for them to proliferate economic, political, and other ties outside the borders of the former Soviet Union. And so for the countries of Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, the attitude towards this notion of Russian-led integration is in a lot of ways the most important question that they face in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis, which broke out, of course, as part of a struggle over whether or not Ukraine itself would participate in this integration process. Now, for the majority of the smaller post-Soviet countries, the position they find themselves in is a very difficult one. Their vulnerability to Russian inducements and Russian pressure remains very substantial, although it varies across the region. For one thing, the ideological and political doctrine that the Kremlin has advanced since, certainly Putin's return to the Kremlin in 2012, if not before, is one that fundamentally questions the legitimacy and the viability of many of these states. We've heard from some of the earlier panelists about the new Russian approach to the international system, one that privileges ethnicity over sovereignty. And for countries, many of which have substantial ethnic Russian minorities, this is obviously a very threatening development. But I would argue that it goes even further than this, because it's not only ethnic Russians we're talking about. Another term that's been used by Putin and many of his advisors, Saitechistviki or compatriots. And this is a term that actually has legal standing in Russia. It's been interpreted to mean different things, but basically it means anybody who identifies with the former Soviet Union, anybody who sees the USSR as his homeland or their descendants. And so in that sense, inhabitants of South Ossetia or Abkhazia or the Donbas could be Saitechistviki, regardless of whether or not they're ethnic Russians. In essence, anybody who lived in the former USSR could be a Saitechistviki, a compatriot, and therefore have the right to accept Russian protection. For countries that have only been independent for two decades and a little change, this assault on the principle of sovereignty is a fundamental threat, and one that they are struggling to figure out how to cope with. Now, for many of them, the most attractive option, at least in the short run, is to hue as closely to Moscow as possible, precisely because of their vulnerability. It's a vulnerability that's exacerbated in some cases by the presence of substantial migrant populations for countries like Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, and millions of migrants working in the Russian Federation. For Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, there are two of the three countries in the world, the percentage of whose GDP is the most dependent on remittances, and so the economic vulnerability is very, very high. At the same time, the bulk of the former Soviet region remains very much within the Russian information space. Russian television, Russian newspapers, Russian websites remain the source of news and information for at least the current generation of elites. And as we know, with what's happening in the Russian information space inside Russia, we can understand how events in Ukraine and elsewhere are being portrayed and what the impact of this is on these societies. There's another piece though, and one that I don't think gets remarked on all that much, because especially among the governments of some of the less liberal democratic states in the former Soviet Union, there's a concomitant fear besides the fear of Moscow, and that's the fear of the Maidan. For many of these leaders, many of these governments, what happened in Kiev last year was profoundly shocking, and it represents a threat to their own hold on power, to the patronage networks that they depend upon, and to their ability to continue doing the things that they wanna do. And so in the short term, in a lot of these countries, there's been an effort to crack down, one that in contrast to the West, Moscow is not particularly alarmed by and is willing to go along with. And one of the fundamental tensions that the United States and the European Union face is reconciling support for the sovereignty and independence of these countries with the support for liberalism and democracy, which for many of them right now seem to be in conflict. Nevertheless, the question now for leaders in countries in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia is going to be over the longer term what to do about this question of integration into Russian-led, multilateral organizations. I was in Kazakhstan this summer and one of the experts I met with used the analogy of a parking lot. If you drive into a parking lot, there's this little apparatus where you cross in that's made up of metal spikes. And as you're driving into the parking lot, the spikes lay down and there's no problem. It's only when you try to get out that the spikes come up and do major damage to your car. And this was the analogy that Mayena Lakhater was using to describe the customs union and the Eurasian Economic Union. You can check out any time you like, but you can never leave. That being the case, the aftermath of events in Ukraine have led elites in many of these countries to see membership in these Russian-led integration organizations as at least as far as their short-term survival goes, something that ought to be pursued simply because they don't have a lot of great alternatives. They look around at what's happening elsewhere in the world and there's a lot of depression that sets in. Particularly in Central Asia, there's the perception that the U.S. and its allies are withdrawing from Afghanistan. They're turning their face away from Central Asia, which has been on the front lines of that conflict for the last decade. If the United States is going away, the best thing to do is make our peace with Russian domination, at least for now. Moreover, the economic crisis, which I think plays a very fundamental role in the Russian calculation, also affects the way that elites in these other countries view their options. As we read now about the possibility of a Grexit popping up again, the potential for continued economic stagnation in Europe, the prospect of the European Union and even the United States spending more resources, getting more involved in this part of the world looks to be rather far off for many of the people on the ground. And as far as the United States goes, of course, there are a lot of other things that we're dealing with right now, not only the economy, but the conflict in the Middle East, ISIS, the Iranian nuclear program, Ebola, midterm elections, all of these things combine to make the U.S. much more introspective than it has been in at least the last, much of the last decade. And that also has an impact on the psychology and the thinking of elites in these countries. So, of course, the answer is not gonna be the same. A country like Georgia is gonna continue, I think, to resist integration as much as possible. Other countries, even those that don't see a lot of active benefits from participating, countries like Armenia, Kazakhstan, others, are going to go along for the time being because they just don't see a lot of great options. That said, it seems likely that once they're on the inside, they're going to work to impose limits on just what it is that blocks, like the Customs Union or the Eurasian Union, Eurasian Economic Union, can do. Russian proposals for building supernational bodies within the context of these institutions, a Eurasian parliament, Eurasian political party alliances, things like that, have found very little support. And I would suspect that most likely we'll continue to find very little support. Nevertheless, this is a region that's going to be in flux for a long time to come. Traveling around and talking to people in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, the message I heard again and again was that people in these countries would like to see greater engagement, greater presence from the West, particularly from the United States. What kind of presence that is can be up for negotiation. Certainly, more investment is something that all would welcome. All would welcome deeper political investment, greater high-level interest in what's happening. And in some cases, even greater security ties. I don't think there's a single answer for how this kind of engagement can be done. I don't think there's a single template that's gonna be applicable to all of these countries, which in many ways are very, very different. And since the collapse of the Soviet Union have only become more different. But nevertheless, even though right now the center of attention is very much on what's happening in Ukraine, this is a much bigger question. It's one that has implications for not only what kind of a relationship we want with Russia, but also what kind of a Eurasia we're going to build. Because like it or not, there is a new Eurasia that's coming into being. And our commitment and our engagement with those other countries is going to say a lot about what kind of a Eurasia and what kind of a Russia we're gonna be dealing with for the decades to come. Thank you for this excellent analysis of Russian leverages and vulnerabilities of the countries around. And the clear statement that the neighborhood is very diverse actually around Russia. So now we are coming, having half an hour for Q and A session. So please raise your hands, Sergey. First, let me use also my own position and ask one question to the panel at the very beginning. Since we all are just talking about how the West should help the region, the Ukraine for now, but the whole region, whole post-Soviet area. But I will try to ask a reverse question. What do the countries of the region have to offer right now? It sounds cynical and maybe a little bit mercantilistic right now under current circumstances. But nevertheless, if you need help from the outside, you have to somehow show your commitment and determination and what kind of commitments, what kind of determination are those countries in the region willing and able to show? And Sergey, please. Sergey, first regarding the intervention of Professor Kersenko. You know, Russian television on many occasions made the case following the reported words of President Putin at the Bucharest NATO Summit that Ukraine is not even a state. You are now sort of making a case that Russia is not even a state. Well, my opinion is that both actually may continue existing in the present borders and we can resolve these hard issues that exist. But I agree that at some point, Russia may actually face kind of challenges of staying as it is as a country, and this is just another reason for not playing with the fire in Ukraine. But at this point in time, it is Ukraine that has to resolve those challenges, especially in the east of the country. So when you were speaking about mentality, about the differences in mentality, number of Ukrainian researchers, even before the crisis, were underlining that in the east of Ukraine, you have a widely spread Soviet mentality as they put it. People who had much more in common with the Russian space than with the Ukrainian space. And currently, even as the rebel movement have been instigated and supported by Russia, you have a lot of Ukrainian citizens involved in that or supporting it, tacitly. And the question, a difficult question for a Ukrainian government right now is how to get those people on their side. There was a proposal integrated in the Minsk Agreement that there should be an amnesty, there should be this law on special regulations for municipal government in those areas. But now it seems to be in the past already, at least Poroshenko and his people say that they will not continue with that, seeing that rebels do not respond. So what's your opinion? What should be the Ukrainian state policies in order to appeal the people in the Donbass and reach out to them, probably over the heads of those who seem to control the rebel movement. And in question to Ambassador Jeperiz, you know, with the importance of, with the importance of the issues of being integrated in the West or in developing relations with Russia, we actually see in the last several months at least significant growth in- You Russians or you? Those who monitor the situation in and around Georgia, we see that in the last several months, probably a year, there was a significant growth in trade between Russia and Georgia. Well, just according to the statistics, I mean. And there are some proposals on the table on how to proceed with that. There is an idea of a railroad through Abkhazia. There is an idea of a new road that would connect Dagestan to Georgia. And some people think that this is just another opportunity for Georgia to develop. And others say that this might be a security concern. So what's your opinion? Do you think that Georgia must go this way of developing trade relations with Russia further or you think it's dangerous and can rather be avoided? James? I would also like to follow Sergey in making life a bit uncomfortable for our panelists, including my friends on the panel. The one enormous vulnerability that I did not hear addressed and that I rarely hear addressed, which has been there for 20 years, is the absence of the institutions and legal culture we call good governance. And on top of that, the unhealthy relationship at all levels between power and money. And it is, I'm not saying anything controversial by stating that it is those things that make it indecently easy for the Russian state to bind in key representatives of key elites into Russian policy and its development model. So I would just welcome your reflections as to why we are still talking about this as the biggest vulnerability 20 years after the Soviet Union collapsed. Thank you. Minister Hrysko? Thank you. I would like to promptly react to what Mr. Utkin just said. I have probably a very short answer to your very long question. Please withdraw Russian troops and Russian guerrillas from the Donbass region and in two weeks everything will be very quiet and peaceful. Thank you. Are there any more questions for now? I'd like to ask Mr. Viseshkevich to describe what's on the agenda of the dialogue for understanding, the Polish-Russian dialogue and understanding group. What your agenda might be? Okay, I'm just moderated. That was supposed to be my function. Nevertheless, if you have a minute or so, I can elaborate a bit on the topic. But first questions should go to the panelists as the heroes of the day. Okay, so now the first round of responses, please be brief. Thank you, Sergey. Maidan and Kiev was the only place in the world where the people were struggling and dying under the European flag with 12 golden stars. The people from every part of Ukraine, from Crimea, from Donbass, and so on. Russian speakers, Ukrainian speakers, Polish speakers, Hungarian people, I know it from my own experience. It's the first idea. Second, so-called Novorossia, or new Russia, had to encompass all territories from Kharkiv to Odessa, half of Ukraine. In fact, it could be partly and temporarily successful, only in those small districts which were occupied by the Russian troops and cut off any alternative channels of information from Kiev in order that the people could compare. I have students from everywhere, and it's very painful to observe how these young boys and girls, very intelligent, very well-educated, consciously go to fight and to die for their country. It's absolutely painful and desperate and must phenomenon in my country. So it is just a matter of time that the people need to look with open eyes at what is going on around them. There is no hatred towards Russia and Ukraine. There is surprise, and to some extent maybe hatred, to those persons who initiated this war. And of course, a lot of fanaticism in these border districts occupied by Russian forces. But I do hope it's just temporarily and short event. So we can be cautiously optimistic. Thank you. Ambassador. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to start with your question. Of course, we are talking about the West and what Georgia wants to receive from the West, the United States of America. And your question was what Georgians or just post-Soviet republics are going to offer to the West. Again, whenever we speak about Georgia, and I'll speak about my own, you know, country nature, of course, and help or assistance from the United States or Europe or, of course, first of all, we appreciate that whatever we know, we are received from the Western communities, specifically from the United States of America. And there is an even saying in Georgia that if Georgia survived for at least 23 years of independence, it's because of this assistance. But again, I fully understand this message from you and the content of your question. Of course, Georgia should help itself in our first world. And what we can offer to you is a stable and democratic country of institutionalized democracy, a rule of law, of real injustice. Good governance, as Jamie just admitted, because not only Ukrainians, but including Georgians who are running this vicious circle of good governance, trying to find out where this good governance is, almost 20, 20 more years since our independence. So that's what Georgia can offer to the West, stability, democracy in this part of the world. And again, Georgia has certainly no functional perspective, says energy security, transit, and other issues and geography, its location. But again, Georgia should become, first of all, and we are on the way. It's not easy, you understand. It never happens in one day or in one year. But I'd like to ricochet back the question you just posed about that. And I talked about what we would appreciate also from the Western community and specifically from Americans is that there was on the previous panel, one of the panelists admitted that there is a huge amount of sympathy, there is a huge amount of good, strong statements. So what we expect from our Western friends is some solid policy towards post-Soviet space. There is no policy. We are still instruments in different kind of gambits and whatever formats between Russia and the US or the West in general. So we would appreciate some clear-cut policy towards Georgia, clear-cut policy towards Ukraine. And then I think we deserve to have a certain. We understand that, for example, Georgia is not the significant top-level priority for Americans, but at the same time, we need a certain amount of policy not to urge you. You can speak about Georgia or Russia. Oh, you're up there. For the first time, Russia is hiding away, which is. So it's very interesting question. Yeah, as I admit it, we had in a war, hot war for five days. And we do not have diplomatic relations with your country. We have kind of relations of which those who participate in these formats in Prague, Ambassador Karasin from Russia, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, and Zorava Bashidze from the Georgian side, Prime Minister is a special representative. They call it a small, small-step approach. They talk about different issues, trade, some exchange of different products, and so forth. And it's not big amount of, big amount of, you know, just trade. I wouldn't say, you know, that way. But things positive things are going on. But again, what matters, you know, for us, and I would appreciate if we get back, you know, this message, you know, from at least one Georgian, one bleeding heart, you know, Georgians sitting over here is, you know, that we're still occupied country by Russia. That's, you know, Georgia's in the position. And there are, you know, red lines in our relations. So, OK, there is nothing bad to open a railway, but, you know, we need to resolve some other, you know, no less important issues before we go. And, OK, let's work on these issues. I understand these are not, you know, easy issues. These are very sensitive, delicate, delicate issues. But again, you know, that's the message answer, you know, from Georgian side. We need to deal first of all with these red line issues and try to resolve that. So, that's my answer. Jeff, would you like to comment? Sure, let me just touch on that for a second and then I'll take a stab at James Scheer's question. All of the countries in the former Soviet Union, apart from Russia, it's natural that they have and need to have some kind of a relationship with Russia. Russia is there, there are legacy connections that continue to exist. In a lot of cases, Russia is the most natural market that these countries have for whatever it is that they produce. And so, there's a balance that has to be struck, and this is true of Georgia as of all of the others, between getting the benefits from maintaining that relationship and avoiding or at least limiting as much as possible the vulnerabilities that come with it. I heard when I was in Georgia recently that after the embargo on Georgian wine had been ended, now about 70% of Georgia's wine exports go to Russia again. And there's a debate among Georgian wine producers and others whether this is a good thing or not. For some, it's great that the market is back and for others, this is a source of vulnerability. I think the challenge is, you know, how can you ensure that countries like Georgia and the others have the best of both worlds? How they can continue trading with and having, you know, political and other kinds of relationships with Russia, but not be so dependent on those relationships to the point that it constrains their sovereignty. And that's one of the real concerns when it comes to institutions like the customs union, the Eurasian, whatever it is union, is what impact will participation in those institutions have on the actual de facto sovereignty of the member countries? On this issue of institutions, I mean, this is a huge, huge question. Not all 12 of the post-Soviet countries came into the world in the same place. Some had much more historical experience than others, but all of them came out of a particular political culture, which included institutions that they inherited from the Soviet Union, and in a lot of cases, elites that they inherited from the Soviet Union, who in some cases are still there. It's been, I think, a mixed bag, but there is a very particular post-Soviet political and institutional culture that exists across a lot of these countries. I think Georgia has been very striking in its ability to make fundamental institutional changes to help break that legacy, but it hasn't been easy. It hasn't been complete, even in Georgia, and in many of the other countries, it hasn't really happened at all. I'm not sure that there's a panacea in terms of how you actually do it, certainly to the extent that leaders in these countries want greater engagement from the West, want greater investment in particular from the West, the absence of functional institutions is one of the greatest obstacles that they face. I think a lot of them have a fundamental misunderstanding about this. It's not enough to simply go to Washington and say, please bring us American investment. You actually have to do things to make an investment climate where privately held companies are gonna wanna risk their money in your country. And until that happens, I think there's gonna be a problem here. The more value that leads in these countries put on economic and political relations with the West, I think the more leverage that gives the West a push for these kind of fundamental institutional changes, but I don't pretend that it's gonna be easy. Thank you. Just not to forget, somebody during previous panel talking about the capacity of the West to react appropriately. And I don't remember which one, but of the participants there, he admitted that in the West, they talked about Ukraine, that Western community, Western decision makers, they need a certain amount of time to react and he metaphorically used that something happens in Ukraine, let's say on Monday and there is no way for the Western community to react, take decisions on Tuesday because they need no time, they need a certain amount of time to consult with each other and so on and so on. And that may be true, speaking about how to react to Russian, whatever Russians are doing in Ukraine, but in this regard, I know instantly as a Georgian, there is one interesting small question from my side, but I think the Western community, including I think it was in a Polish representative, I do not see him here, you have enough time because what Russians did in 2008, had you reacted accordingly? No, I think Russia could have done different way this year when it happened in Ukraine, so you had much time to analyze Russia's capacity in this regard, so that's why whenever it's, I'm not critical about the West, I cannot be critical, but again, sometimes it's time to also, to speak in a very clear cut way and call a spade bloody showers, people say. We have one first here, gentlemen over there, and then two other questions, please. Thanks very much. Building on Zbigniew Bryzinski's idea for finalization of Ukraine and using Ukraine as a bridge between Europe and the West on the one hand and Russia on the other hand, to what extent do you think it would be possible to reconcile the association agreement with Europe and this Eurasian Economic Union, so two questions, A, could it technically be done so that Ukraine could both be a member or ratify and implement the association agreement and participate in some way in the economic union, the Eurasian Economic Union, and B, if you could technically do it, would it make a difference in Russian policy? Yeah, I have a Finlandization-related point as well. I was kind of struck by Dr. Bryzinski's argument concerning Crimea, that with 12,000 Ukrainian troops present, not a shot was fired, and therefore that's a basis for us to write off Crimea, because if Ukraine wouldn't defend that territory, why should anyone else? And then that kind of leads you to the Finlandization of Ukraine argument from there. Well, first I'd like to make the point that one of the reasons those shots were fired was the tremendous pressure that interim Ukrainian government was placed under by the United States, by Germany, by Britain, by the EU, to not fire, so as not to provoke an armed invasion. That didn't get Ukraine very far. So much for that kind of appeasement from us towards Russia. God us don't bust subsequently. So that's not a great strategy as history has proven, recent history. Let's talk about the discomfort of Russia by having NATO creep towards its border. Russia is perfectly comfortable creeping towards the NATO border. Russia is very comfortable having Belarus within its sphere with its tanks in Belarus, very close to the Polish border, and right on the Ukrainian border with an easy drive of cave. That's perfectly okay for Russia, but if Ukraine is in NATO, my God, the world falls apart. Not acceptable. That's not a good strategy for the United States to pursue and it's suicidal for Ukraine. We can talk about the Ukrainianization of the world rather than the Finlandization just to take Finland off the hook. That's the proposal. That will get us nowhere and it certainly will get Ukraine nowhere in the future. It basically creates an environment of economic instability, the fear of moving into that territory because you never know when Russia will choose to expand again freely over those boundaries. So I would challenge that notion and I'd like the panel to speak to it. What about putting Belarus on the table with the Russians and have the Russians pull out of Belarus if you want a buffer against NATO? Get the heck out of Belarus. Lithuania would be more comfortable, Poland would certainly be a lot more comfortable and then we could challenge the premise that the NATO border being too close to Russia is the real issue here. Okay, gentleman Rudia. Thank you, Maria Kowaliewska-Belarus politics blog. To follow up on this question and referring to the wider question of the future of the international system, I would like to ask your opinion about what changes should be introduced in the international system to prevent conflicts like this, to prevent invasions of Russia like this. Russia fought wars before with Georgia. It's fighting now with Ukraine. It will fight further wars with its neighbors or with those who are not in content with its policies, with its self-assumed sphere of privileged interests. So it is very likely that this precedent is not a standalone precedent. This is a trend and it will continue. So what kind of changes should there be apart from Finlandizing all countries that do not want to be with Russia? It's going to be a challenge for the panelists to answer this question in one minute, but maybe... It's about the future of the international system. And the last question from Professor Mendoza. Thank you. I wanted to underline the contradiction in terms in what Jeffrey Monkov presented because it is a Russian contradiction in terms about ethnicity and former Soviet compatriots. We know that it simply doesn't work. You cannot defend the concept of ethnic Russian and then say that anybody who speaks Russian or was included in the Russian Empire or Soviet Union is a Russian. So my question to you is, should we really pay that much attention to this kind of ideological confusion? And not because it's not just a question, for example, of the Crimean Tatars. The question that if, you know, when you go to Ukraine, the majority of inhabitants of Ukraine speak Ukrainian and Russian, and their problem is to be non, not to be ethnic Ukrainians, but to be Ukrainian nationals. So it seems to me that where we are strong in the discussion with the Russian is that the Ukrainians have adopted a rule of law definition of a Ukrainian national and that the only thing that counts. And so this is also why I do not understand this obsolete discussion about filandization or even I would say about the Eurasian Union, that customs union may be, but I really do not see anything happening recently. That would help Moscow get something a little more organized or get more benefit from this so-called Eurasian Union because Eurasian Union is institutional. So there the Russians would play the card of institutional state arrangement. And we know that they're not very good at that. Okay, that was the final round. So now the panelists have, well, maximum two minutes for comments if you want to keep the time. Let me propose the opposite order right now to move through the whole process, Jeff. Yeah, so should we pay attention to this contradiction between ethnic Russians and compatriots? I don't think we need to delve down into the details. It is contradictory. I think what we need to pay attention to is that these justifications are out there and they can be used instrumentally. And this gets to, I think Heather was quoting this earlier. We had Professor Timothy Snyder giving a talk here a couple of weeks ago where he used the term applied post-modernism to talk about the organizing principle of Russian foreign policy, which again is this notion that there's no settled truth, capital T truth. And I think it's the same thing here. Who's a Russian? Who's a compatriot? I get to say, and that's the problem. It's not that whether these two definitions are compatible or not, it's that they're held out there as justifications that can be invoked for doing things that established international law doesn't allow you to do. On the question of what changes to the international system are needed, I'm not gonna even try to answer that in 30 seconds or less, but I would just say that what's missing in a lot of the discussion, it's not as missing in the discussion, but it's missing on the ground is deterrence. We have a conception of deterrence that we have inherited from the Cold War that doesn't work very well in this context because nobody's talking about massive retaliation. But it's how do you deter some of these other things that fall below the threshold that would invoke something like massive retaliation both inside NATO countries that are bounded by Article IV and Article V and in countries outside of NATO? I'll leave the other questions to the other panelists. Thank you, Ambassador. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, in a very brief way. Let me react, first of all, I know this issue of Finlandization because just before people started talking about Ukraine and this model of interaction with Russia a couple of years ago, I was part of Carnegie Format European Security Initiative and we've been talking long about Georgia and Finlandization idea. I think it sounds good, but it's good for Finland because I heard that about my finishing of France, but it's different history, different kind of relations and they had themselves, in a sense, big, big, big doubt that Finlandization as a model would fit, for example, country like Georgia because it's absolutely different environment, different history, different Russia and Russia, Finland relations and Georgia and Russian relations are absolutely different, different category of fish. But speaking about models and having here our Pope or friends from Poland, I would just humbly deliver this message to them that I think central Europeans should play a very special role in our part of the world, which is not in all, which is close to the NATO European Union space, but countries which are, as I said, in my intervention in our countries. That happened to be in gray zone and I think as far as you are here, dear friends from Poland, I think Poland has a special mission, being in NATO, being in the European Union, you have a special role, special function to take care of your own security. It's not only Georgia's or Ukrainian security, but it's about also your security and Poland was very much invisible in the couple of years ago. Now you a bit, you know, disappeared. I don't know the reasons, there are different reasons for that, but I think central Europe, a front line in our states, Baltic states, of course, and if, you know, Finland makes decisions, we welcome Finland also in this loop regarding association agreement and Georgia has this unique opportunity to have a direct interaction with the European Union, but it's not about only Georgia, European Union, as I said, it's long, long term, you know, let's say project, but it's unique opportunity for Georgia, James, it's about to become a normal to implement this real and functioning internally, you know, reforms and regarding this good governance. So I hope that Georgians would use, you know, this opportunity. Three brief considerations. First, 200 years ago, English-speaking Americans and 100 years ago, English-speaking Irish didn't like British Empire too much. Second, percentage of Russian schools in Ukraine is higher, much higher than percentage of ethnic Russian minority. There is no Ukrainian school in Russian Federation. In spite of the fact, there is several million of Ukrainians there. Next, unlike Georgians, unlike Finns, unlike Poles, the Ukrainians were persecuted just for using native language. And now, in the Crimea, and now, I'm sorry, and now in the Crimea and in occupied districts of Donbas, Ukrainian speakers are risking their lives and a lot of them disappear for speaking native language. I don't comment it, it's quite clear. So Ukraine is, and on the other hand, Russian speakers of Ukraine proved to be very good patriots defending Ukraine's independence. So it is very conscious choice. It's not a choice of native language. It's a choice of policy, of existence, of consciousness, of feeling European, not Americans, of course, but feeling European. And this choice is absolutely irreversible. Thank you. Oh, thank you. No, sorry. Out of time, out of time. Let me just ask the audience to thank the panelists for their contributions. And Flo goes ahead and conclude the remarks. Very briefly, thank you all so much. I know it's been a long day, but this day did not disappoint. What a tremendous amount of insights we have been provoked. We have been challenged in our thinking. We've gained great insights. And clearly for me, the conversation must continue and we'll continue that conversation with Tato immediately following this discussion. A huge, huge thanks to the Center for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding. It is their inspiration and their support that makes this possible. So I'll throw the microphone over to Dr. Dembski, but thank you all so much. Thank you very much, Heather. And thank you for cooperation. We are very happy that we could provide this platform of dialogue between Europe and United States about Russia. And I have two groups of people I would like to thank in particular. So Adam Daniel Rothfeld, Wodomiro Hrysko, Mariman Dra, Siergi Utkin, Roman Kuźniar, Teto Czaparidze, Mykoła Kyrsenko, James Schaer, representing Europe. And Angela Stend, Paul Jones, John Herbs, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Joffrey Mankowski, representing a Europe side. And I would like to thank all your team. I would like to thank my team, Ernest Ciszkiewicz and Katarzyna Kowakowska there for putting all these puzzles together. Thank you very much for your attention. And I think we'll continue this kind of format in the future.