 Good afternoon or good morning, ladies and gentlemen on behalf of the Institute of International and European Affairs You're all very welcome today to our guest lectured by Nadia Abateva on the topic of Russia and the EU postponed Partnership and my name is David Dunlop. I'm delighted on behalf of the Institute to welcome Nadia back to speak to us She is a very distinguished Russian political scientist and commentator She's currently head of the department for european political studies at the Institute of world economy and international relations In other words in memo, which is part of the russian academy of sciences in Moscow Nadia has many other distinctions. She is the director of the discussion forum european dialogues She's vice president of the russian pugwash committee She's a member of russia's council on foreign and defense policy And she is the author of numerous articles and essays including four individual publications on EU russian relations European security and russia's foreign policy and we're really delighted and honored to have her with us today Nadia will speak for about 20 25 minutes. She will discuss the current state of EU russia relations and Will argue that these relations have been shaped in particular by the ongoing conflict between russia and ukraine She would also comment on how the post-soviet space has been Has evolved into a zone of rivalry between russia and the west Generally after she has made her presentation. We will move into a q&a session You'll be able to join this discussion via the q&a function on zoom, which you will see at the bottom of the screen Please feel free to send in your questions and comments as they occur to you And we will try to get to as many of them as possible And a couple of other housekeeping points the entire event is on the record And you may also join the discussion on twitter using the handle at ia So with that, I hand you over to nadia nadia. You have the floor Thank you, david for your generous introduction Let me express my gratitude to the institute of international and european affairs and personally to its director You've done a few for the opportunity To present a russian view not the russian but a russian view on the most Exciting topic at least for me the u russia relations Let me start with two preliminary remarks First relations between russia and the european union After the collapse of the ussf have experienced many ups and downs More than once by finding themselves on the edge of a crisis But they have never been as bad as they are now Russia is portrayed in the west As a revisionist state which violated the pose by paul status quo first in the caucuses crisis in 2008 and then in ukraine Conversely as seen in russia, it is the west european union And above all nato that should be viewed as violators of international order The question for our purposes is not so much Who is right but rather The understanding Why it went wrong as well as implications Of these deep disagreements And my second remark is about The methods of my analysis. I would like to propose A layer by layer analysis of the u russia crisis Leading from the superficial perception of problems to the origins of the current Disagreement And this method of an analysis can be called the matryoshka-doll method So the first matryoshka Why it went wrong? The ukraine conflict and particularly kremlin's incorporation of Crimea are widely perceived In the european union and the west of the coast as a turning point in their relations with russia Unlike the caucuses crisis of 2008 Which from the very beginning was a clash between russia and nato The conflict over ukraine was triggered by the clash of two regional strategies the u eastern partnership and russia-urasia Project the ukraine in both strategies for giving a central place Different reference points can be named in the contradiction over ukraine First and foremost you know college the refusal under the pressure of russia to sign An association agreement with european union However, in my view the terming point happened much earlier in 2012 With the return of Vladimir Putin to the presidency of the russian federation Moscow changed the vector called school by pole evolution from european to uration Vacation and did not want ukraine to go in the opposite direction The economic and financial crisis in the west And particularly in the eu force Vladimir Putin to conclude That russia could no longer listen to the moralizing of the weakened EU Who lost the right to lecture other countries on good governance The point was that the economic modernization of russia Inboarded in the partnership for modernization Also required political modernization that presented a threat in the eyes of kremlin to the stability of russia The EU negative reaction to Putin's return to power in 2012 Was another stimulus for kremlin's pivot to uration Putin decided that russia should modernize its economy and Not relying on european Technological innovation but by adopting a new industrialization plan based on modern national technologies and the uration union Looking back in time, we cannot but recognize that russia's reaction to the european partnership project was excessive Moscow got the impression that kids signing the association agreement with european union would automatically Bring ukraine into european union But in fact kremlin's negative reaction was not only about ukraine's would be membership in european union The russian leadership suspected that eastern partnership was a small screen for nature's expansion into the cis space In fact natus eastward Enlargement strategy Strongly and negatively influenced russia's perception of the e.u enlargement policy As the leaders of both institutions repeatedly emphasized That these two processes Are where implementary In the world is georgia in 2008 Moscow Moscow drew a red line to nato expansion to the sphere of russia influence The same security consideration were at the heart of russia annexation of Crimea Although the example of ukraine was different from the georgian peace In the eyes of russian political elite After Moscow's tough response to Sakashvili The west decided to change its tactics and put the european union with Eastern partnership program on the first flank in order to then open the way to nato I would like to quote the british agitator Commenting on the annexation of Crimea to the russian federation Russia had long opposed natus eastward expansion as threatening its own security And says he's planned to associate itself more closely with the west including with the military alliance and the european union Has forced it to react Aside from this There was a widespread miss That territorial conflicts In natus potential members Would automatically remove this issue from the alliance's agenda Nothing of this sort Is contained in any official native document, but the myth has already played a very destructive role Having encouraged some leaders like presidenza akashvili To resolve Territorial conflicts by force and conversely this myth has discouraged and still still discourages russia To contribute to peaceful resolution of the cis conflicts because the logic is very simple Why should we try to do our best in these countries? Then we'll go to nato So in other words both the Caucasus crisis and the ukrainian conflict Which are widely viewed in the west as the main reason for the deterioration of the u russian relations are not the cause but rather The consequence of deeper problems That stem from different views of russia in the west about the acceptable foundation of post-bipole security in europe And rivalry in the post-soviet space So now i'm approaching the matryoshka number two The end of the bilateral confrontation brought up the question of the institutional foundation Of the post-bipole security In the osc was viewed by the russian leadership as a security organization Conceptually more adapted to new realities than nato The west proceeded from the different understanding That in the post code were europe There was no other organization than nato Which could do that job? After the end of bipolarity nato lost its Initial reason that and found its mission In the process of enlargement I put aside the question whether Approaches can substitute ago But i would say that nato's newly found mission in the europe enlargement became a source of instability in europe Paradoxically nato's military campaign against engaslada in 1999 Conducted without U.N. Security Council authorization Became the first act of the newly enlarged nato and this fact fueled Russia's concerns about the real intention behind the alliance's expansion This event together with the u.s. military operation in iraq in 2003 And recognition of kosovo's independence Changed Moscow's perception about the west russia partnership It is also important to note a psychological aspect of nato's enlargement since nato's strategy was Was Met was accepted Was met by russia With hostility it cultivated a kind of confrontational climate That supported nato in its traditional dimension In all probability If russia had been part of the nato enlargement policy As well as eastern partnership over you Caucasus and ukraine crisis would never have happened The lesson that We could draw from this experience Is that as long as russia shares the continent with european union and nato that possess Huge economic technological and military superiority over russia Without russia will be always interpreted by moscow as against russia and it will remain the source of instability in europe Another apple of the sport Was rivalry in the both of its things After the collapse of the u.s. ssah european union and nato Were focused mostly on the central and eastern europe and on the return of this countless back to europe The post service piece was not included in the u.s. post communist strategy Neither european union nor nato were ready to sort out the mess in the post-soviet republics when russia Could not afford to stand alone watching what was going on In its immediate neighborhood, therefore, russia's western partners Offered a pragmatic model for the West russia relation don't bother us in the sea space And we won't bother you in your backyard Interestingly, although the west was concerned in general about russia's new imperial ambition It did not let This Fact russia Activities in the post-soviet space spoiled Relation with moscow because the rest of moscow foreign And domestic policies used for the west perfectly well As it could sometimes in a very uneven and heavy handed way russia stabilized the sea space having frozen a number of conflicts But when the cis was more or less stabilized and European union and nato finished their job in central and eastern europe They came up to the cis space Matryoshka number three In turn This agreement on the post bipolar security arrangements and rivalry in the cis Have also been a product of more fundamental phenomenon phenomenon, which i Call a living end of that by polarity Usually when big wars ended Usually all big war ended with big peace conferences that established new world order new rules of behavior for international actors The end of the cold war which happened in november 1990 remember ended with the barris summit But the ussr thought still existed in those days the Nature change happened only One year later the end of bipolarity with the collapse of the ussr thought And since it was the ussr thought that collapsed This fact persuaded the west of its rightness and They did not Feel they did not feel any need to change anything in their policy so they A new peace conference a general post bipolar conference did not take place and I would like to quote One prominent british strategic thinker lorence freedom Co-observed in 1999 That russia russian weakness meant that it could not expect the privileges respect and dexter sensitivity To its interest normally accorded a great power It means that russia Was treated By the west as a defeated country Very much like germany in japan after The second world war all the russia And the ussr thought Did not Lose the cold war the ussr thought was created for the cold war. It was its genuine environment and the ussr thought Lost detente when vorbachev started its rapprochement with the west new political thinking The solid construction fell apart Moreover the post bipolar euphoria of Of the west Created In the eu and nature The impression that the old rules of behavior namely the health and key principles that helped us survive The east west confrontation lost their importance And they started to selectively apply these principles according to their ideological and political references Not surprisingly Not not surprising that russia Considered this new world order with suspicion and The munich speech of latin but putin of 2007 was simply a reflection of contradiction that Had been building for some time It is necessary To recognize that after The collapse of the ussr thought russia made its fair share of policy mistakes You remember that the ussr thought was dissolved at the stroke of a pen Without any serious negotiation between the newly independent states about the soviet Legacy about the the problems inherited from the ussr thought And this packed largely predetermined the Poor fate of the cis and troubled relations Between russia and its post-solid neighbors The later became clear when russia plunged into never-ending tensions with its neighbors over issues of territory economics defense and Minorities, but I would like to note that russia's neighbors were not only idon on lucas half-heartedly They accepted The model of relations offered by russia political loyalty for economic bonus So nobody is perfect in this post-solid space although I think that the bulk of responsibility for the missed opportunities rests with russia Now approaching the very core of the matryoshka and the fundamental roots for the failed partnership between russia and europe One cannot ignore The history of russia's tragic internal evolution The contradictory and dramatic history of russia Repeatedly led it away from europe and created a fertile ground for verus miss ideological and political fabrication about its uniqueness about special Russian values its special mission in the world And it is quite understandable that the debate about the russian european vacation Acquired An acute political meaning after the collapse of the soviet union and the entire communist system russia's historical drama A european country in terms of its civilizational identity Lies in the fact That it was cut off from the rest of europe by the mongolio For 250 years retracted serve them The communist rule and inconsistent reforms That predetermined its social economic backwardness They exist many definitions of russia. Some people would say that russia is a russian country Other would say that it is european the secret country It's in new europe But my definition is Russia is late europe and russia is lagging behind Other european countries who by the ever Passed through the same experience But many years If not centuries ago What should be done And let me start with the european With the strategy of the eu Visually russia I think that EU is lacking a real efficient strategy which would be different from the famous borrell's triad Based on pushing russia back Containing russia and engaging with moscow at the same time this strategy Lacks any strategic goal. What is more important containment or selective cooperation? It is impossible to keep The right balance between repulsion and interaction At the same time something should be more important than other than Another element Aside from this borrell's definition of the eu foreign policy cannot but inspire anxieties at the presentation of his book european foreign policy in the time of covid-19 He literally said We must remember that foreign policy is about changing the domestic politics of other countries What is foreign policy for us means domestic politics Policies for others This understanding of the eu foreign policy In my view is brought with new problems If not new confidence first The goal of the foreign policy of any state or coalition of states at all times has been To ensure the most favorable external environment for its functioning Merrily through the strengthening of international stability and security of course human rights Can and should be part of the foreign policy agenda but They cannot substitute other issues related to international and regional security conflicts fight against Proliferation of w do the arms control second borrell's position In my view is a retreat from the new global strategy of 2016 Which was the first realistic concept paper Where the traditional rhetoric of promoting democracy had been replaced by the notion of resilience as the guiding principles of the european relation Neighborhood states And third changing the domestic poll disaster. However beautiful european principles and norms may be They cannot be imposed by force on unprepared societies since They will result in counterproductive Threats it will reinforce the Tendencies and reverberating Democratic achievements that these Societies reached In the last years Nevertheless In my view there is a strong connection between the foreign policy interaction of states and positive internal political changes But in my view it is directly opposite to what borrell spoke about The better the external environment For a state the better its internal development And let me remind you that academician andry suffer a well-known Philosopher and human rights human rights Defender Was returned from his exile in gorky to moscow only when gorbachev and reagan Started a new rapprochement between Between the countries Today, russian do you Do not have a common enemy like in the Like the one they had in the anti hitler coalition Neither international terrorism nor the pandemic brought russia and the west closer nonetheless Both russia european union nature are facing A common and the most terrible threat the threat of a global conflict Which could happen because of the possible escalation of regional conflicts incidents and Even political contradiction in this regard One cannot but recall the eastern policy of willy brunt his host politic It was not aimed at democratic transformation of the us It was aimed at strengthening european security And changes in this security environment through rapprochement And reconciliation between west germany and The countries of the soviet bloc something of this kind We need today We should focus on one and probably the most Important the most urgent problem for european security in my view This problem is absolutely obvious It is peace in ukraine and Russia and european union and probably the united states could agree on On On the international peacekeeping operation in ukraine In the corridor between Minsk one and Minsk two agreement And created the necessary precondition for political Solution of this conflict And if we Succeeded in ukraine We could think about a genuine post bipolar peaceful confidence That Would establish new rules of behavior for all countries Thank you