 And now, we come to Jean-Claude, the one of us who's actually been there, seen it and done it. And can speak with an authority. I don't know. I don't know whether I will speak with authority. I share, of course, many of the views that have been expressed. I have six points I would like to make first, but very rapidly. First, it is absolutely true that we have a currency which is an edgaman in the present system, but it is not entirely unipolar. And then I am a little bit, I would say, out of the emerging consensus. And of course, we should not forget that the structure of the system changed dramatically. I would say overnight in January 99 when we created the euro, because before, you had one currency, the edgaman, 10 times more important depending on your criteria than the other. And that is a system where you can say, well, you don't need to be a great mathematician to see that it has a structure which is a totally different nature from the present system, where you have an edgaman, a number two, which is five times the number three, and which is only three times less important than the number one. So we change dramatically, in my opinion, the system of the international currency. So everybody knows the figure. They have been set for X, 60, 20, 4%, international debt, 60, 22%, international loans, 60, 20. That is the new structure. Now, that being said, when I look at the global payment currency, I have different figures which are illustrating the fact that the euro indeed exists. 45% for the dollar, 34% for the yen. That is the proportion in global payment currency according to the BIS. So why is there such a difference between the global payment currency and forex international debt, international loans? Despite the fact that the trends are a little bit different from what was coming out of the discussion until now. When you look at the figures, you see that the dollar had 70%. At the very beginning, the day we created the euro, it was 70% in reserve currencies. The euro was as computed as was done by our eminent colleague 19, so the same level as today in adding up all the currencies. Today it is still 20, but the dollar came from 70 to 60, 62. And all other currencies gained market share. So there is a trend which is not negligible, at least according to that criteria of reserve currency, which is not hurting the euro, but is hurting a little bit the dollar as I just underlined. So still, of course, the dollar is an agenda. Esteresis has been mentioned very wisely as regards the reason why when you have had the central position, you keep the central position for a long time, I was amazed myself to see that the copper was traded in sterling until 93, aluminum until 87, tea until 92, coffee until 92, long, long, long after World War II. And if not too misinformed, cocoa only after 2015. So Esteresis is there and of course it's associated with complementarity, but also with the easiness that you have to continue to have the same unique of account, if the currency itself remains liquid, of course. Now there is another reason which is dominating and our colleagues were all very eloquent on that. Of course, what counts is your currency, but also the signature behind the currency, the treasuries, if you take the benchmark, the other signatories. And there of course we are at a fantastic disadvantage in Europe, because it's true that the difference between the volume of the treasuries is very, very important. The daily trading of treasuries in volume in New York is 500 billion dollars and the equivalent in Germany, in France, in Italy would be approximately the 125th of that level. So we are in totally different universe. Only the creation of a new safe bond would create an element of death and liquidity on the euro market, which would permit to accelerate the transition and that is really the point. The point is not that the currency has defect in my opinion. The currency, frankly speaking, I take it as no defect, but the problem of course is that the signatories behind the currency are not the same. Even if you have already euro bonds, the bonds that are issued by the ESM for instance or the EIB are good signatories, but of course it is a very small amount. Now, shall I deplore the fact that we are not at 50-50 vis-à-vis the US dollar? Certainly not, because had it been the case, what would have been the consequence on the exchange market? Which kind of skyrocketing of the euro vis-à-vis the dollar would we have registered? Unless of course it would have been organized with special accounts, the IMF behind and so forth. But if we are in the universe where we are in a free behavior of market participants, of course it would have been a total catastrophe. We would have become totally out of cost competitiveness, if I may, in the global trade. So I am not unhappy with the way it proceeds. It's a big transformation, but a progressive one. Now that being said, is it because of the fact that the euro is not yet an international currency of the size of the dollar, that we have problem with Iran, that we have problem with the sanctions of the US and so forth? I don't trust it is the case. I trust the problem is that the United States for cultural reason and political reason does not hesitate to blackmail all those who are not participating in the sanctions. And when I look at all the European firms, it is not because they could not settle their trade in the dollar that they interrupted totally their trade with Iran. It was because they would lose a lot in their own interest in the United States of America and more largely in the world because the US had a lot of legal capacity to tease them. So again, the main problem we have in my opinion in Europe, if we reason on Europe balancing the US, is of a political nature, both the treasuries and the safe bonds which are not there and the geopolitical capacity to say if you blackmail us, then we will blackmail you. And let's agree that there is no reason that you would impose us in particular your own sanctions. It seems to me that it is there that we have the real problem. Iran, the recent experience of trying to create a special vehicle to bypass the US dollar proved that it was not the problem. We have no problem to bypass the dollar. We have a real problem to bypass the capacity of the US to impose legally its sanctions everywhere. Now we have stopped there if you permit, John, because I would have some... Can I have two more minutes? Please, go ahead. So on the future of the system, as many of the speakers, I trust that of course the renminbi, when it is fully convertible and there is a clear will to participate with full convertibility in the international monetary system, we will have necessarily a large multiple world and that would be again probably sooner than we think but we are far away nevertheless in terms of conditions to be a real international currency. How will we run that? There are several possible assumptions. We will run that as we have run the so-called hegemon but nevertheless with G5 or G7, whatever, from time to time giving some indications to the market that the dollar is going too low or the dollar is going too high and I participated in all the such agreements. They are very important. They are useful. They were not necessary in the most recent period of time because for reasons that are extremely complex, the international system, the core currencies were relatively stable even in the worst crisis ever since World War II. So this is something which academia is looking at but I have no convincing conclusion to understand why we were not trapped in one of these large fluctuations that we had before and that is an open question. But of course we can imagine that the four, the five major currencies would from time to time give some indications of what they see and tell the market as we did in the Louvre agreement in many such agreements. The last one was the Japanese G7, G5 agreement where we gave market important indications and I was very happy myself to participate in this message to the market. We could imagine to have a basket of currencies and the SDR perhaps could be, if there is a private SDR market, I mean it means a lot of will to arrive to that consequence. I don't exclude totally that but it seems to me that the fact that the same definitional price stability is now the definition of the major issuing currencies for the present basket of SDR, Rinminbi being a part, but the four others have more or less the same definitional price stability. It is something which has not been looked at very carefully but is very important in my understanding and of course I eliminate, I have to say, the identity of the bank or, and I don't trust that a digital currency if it is not backed by either a central bank or a pool of central banks could float. You would really need behind those institutions or this institution which would be responsible for the currency to have all the three characteristics which were mentioned by Jeff in our Aristotelian definition of a currency if I'm not misled, the three that you have mentioned. Thank you.