 The Locust Years 1936 I have, with some friends, put an amendment on the paper. It is the same as the amendment which I submitted two years ago, and I have put it in exactly the same terms, because I thought it would be a good thing to remind the house of what has happened in these two years. Our amendment in November 1934 was the culmination of a long series of efforts by private members, and by the Conservative Party in the country, to warn His Majesty's Government of the dangers to Europe and to this country, which were coming upon us through the vast process of German rearmament, then already in full swing. The speech which I made on that occasion was much censured as being alarmist by leading Conservative newspapers, and I remember that Mr. Lloyd George congratulated the Prime Minister, who was then Lord President, on having so satisfactorily demolished my extravagant fears. What would have been said, I wonder, if I could, two years ago, have forecast to the house the actual course of events? Suppose we had then been told that Germany would spend for two years eight hundred million pounds a year upon war-like preparations, that her industries would be organised for war as the industries of no country have ever been, that by breaking all treaty engagements she would create a gigantic air-force and an army based on universal compulsory service, which by the present time in 1936 amounts to upwards of thirty-nine divisions of highly equipped troops, including mechanised divisions of almost unmeasured strength, and that behind all this there lay millions of armed and trained men, for whom the formations and equipment are rapidly being prepared to form another eighty divisions, in addition to those already perfected. Suppose we had then known that by now two years of compulsory military service would be the rule with a preliminary year of training in labour camps, that the Rhineland would be occupied by powerful forces and fortified with great skill, and that Germany would be building with our approval, signified by treaty, a large submarine fleet. Suppose we had also been able to foresee the degeneration of the foreign situation, our quarrel with Italy, the Italo-German Association, the Belgian Declaration about Neutrality, which, if the worst interpretation of it proves to be true, so greatly affects the security of this country, and the disarray of the smaller powers of Central Europe. Suppose all that had been forecast, why no one would have believed in the truth of such a nightmare tale. Yet just two years have gone by, and we see it all in broad daylight. Where shall we be this time two years? I hesitate now to predict. Let me say, however, that I will not accept the mood of panic or of despair. There is another side, a side which deserves our study, and can be studied without derogating in any way from the urgency which ought to animate our military preparations. The British navy is, and will continue to be, incomparably the strongest in Europe. The French army will certainly be, for a good many months to come, at least equal in numbers and superior in maturity to the German army. The British and French air forces together are a very different proposition from either of those forces considered separately. While no one can prophesy, it seems to me that the Western democracies, provided they are knit closely together, would be tolerably safe for a considerable number of months ahead. No one can say to a month or two, or even a quarter or two, how long this period of comparative equipoise will last, but it seems certain that during the year 1937 the German army will become more numerous than the French army, and very much more efficient than it is now. It seems certain that the German air force will continue to improve upon the long lead which it already has over us, particularly in respect of long distance bombing machines. The year 1937 will certainly be marked by a great increase in the adverse factors which only intense efforts on our part can, to effective extent, countervail. The efforts at rearmament which France and Britain are making will not by themselves be sufficient. It will be necessary for the Western democracies, even at some extension of their risks, to gather round them all the elements of collective security, or of combined defensive strength against aggression, if you prefer, as I do myself, to call it so, which can be assembled on the basis of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Thus I hope we may succeed in again achieving a position of superior force, and then will be the time not to repeat the folly which we committed when we were all powerful and supreme, but to invite Germany to make common cause with us in assuaging the griefs of Europe, and opening a new door to peace and disarmament. I now turn more directly to the issues of this debate. Let us examine our own position. No one can refuse his sympathy to the Minister for the Coordination of Defence. From time to time my right honourable friend lets fall phrases or facts which show that he realises more than anyone else on that bench, it seems to me, the danger in which we stand. One such phrase came from his lips the other night. He spoke of the years that the locust hath eaten. Let us see which are these years that the locust hath eaten, even if we do not pride too closely in search of the locusts who have eaten these precious years. For this purpose we must look into the past. From the year 1932, certainly from the beginning of 1933, when Herr Hitler came into power, it was general public knowledge in this country that serious rearmament had begun in Germany. There was a change in the situation. Three years ago, at the Conservative Conference at Birmingham, that vigorous and faithful servant of this country, Lord Lloyd, moved the following resolution. That this conference desires to record its grave anxiety in regard to the inadequacy of the provisions made for Imperial defence. That was three years ago, and I see from the Times' report of that occasion, that I said, during the last four or five years the world had grown gravely darker. We have steadily disarmed, partly with a sincere desire to give a lead to other countries, and partly through the severe financial pressure of the time, but a change must now be made. We must not continue longer on a course in which we alone are growing weaker, while every other nation is growing stronger. The resolution was passed unanimously, with only a rider informing the Chancellor of the Exchequer that all necessary burdens of taxation would be cheerfully borne. There were no locusts there at any rate. I am very glad to see the Prime Minister, Mr. Baldwin, stored to his vigour, and to learn that he has been recuperated by his rest, and also, as we hear, rejuvenated. It has been my fortune to have ups and downs in my political relations with him, the downs on the whole predominating, perhaps. But at any rate, we have always preserved agreeable personal relations, which, so far as I am concerned, are greatly valued. I am sure he would not wish, in his conduct of public affairs, that there should be any shrinking from putting the real issues of criticism which arise, and would certainly proceed in that sense. My right honourable friend has had all the power for a good many years, and therefore there rests upon him inevitably the main responsibility for everything that has been done or not done, and also the responsibility for what is to be done or not done now. So far as the air is concerned, this responsibility was assumed by him in a very direct personal manner, even before he became Prime Minister. I must recall the words which he used in the debate of the 8th of March 1934, nearly three years ago. In answer to an appeal which I made to him both publicly and privately, he said, Any government of this country, a national government more than any, and this government, will see to it that in air strength and air power, this country shall no longer be in a position inferior to any country within striking distance of our shores. Well, sir, I accepted that solemn promise. But some of my friends, like Sir Edward Grig and Captain Guest, wanted what the Minister for the Coordination of Defence, in another state of being, would have called further and better particulars, and they raised a debate after dinner, when the Prime Minister, then Lord President, came down to the House, and really showed less than his usual abannity, in chiding those members for even venturing to doubt the intention of the Government, to make good in every respect the pledge which he had so solemnly given in the afternoon. I do not think that responsibility was ever more directly assumed in a more personal manner. The Prime Minister was not successful in discharging that task, and he admitted with Manly Kander a year later that he had been led into error upon the important question of the relative strength of the British and German air power. No doubt as a whole, his Majesty's Government were very slow in accepting the unwelcome fact of German rearmament. They still clung to the policy of one-sided disarmament. It was one of those experiments, we are told, which had to be, to use a vulgarism, tried out, just as the experiments of non-military sanctions against Italy had to be tried out. Both experiments have now been tried out, and Ministers are accustomed to plume themselves upon the very clear results of those experiments. They are held to prove conclusively that the policies subjected to the experiments were all wrong, utterly foolish, and should never be used again. And the very same men who were foremost in urging those experiments are now foremost in proclaiming and denouncing the fallacies upon which they were based. They have bought their knowledge, they have bought it dear, they have bought it at our expense, but at any rate let us be duly thankful that they now at last possess it. In July 1935, before the general election, there was a very strong movement in this house in favour of the appointment of a minister to concert the action of the three fighting services. Moreover, at that time the departments of state were all engaged in drawing up the large schemes of rearmament in all branches, which have been laid before us in the White Paper, and upon which we are now engaged. One would have thought that that was the time when this new minister, or coordinator, was most necessary. He was not, however, in fact appointed until nearly nine months later, in March 1936. No explanation has yet been given to us why these nine months were wasted before the taking of what is now an admittedly necessary measure. The prime minister dilated the other night, no doubt very properly, the great advantages which had flowed from the appointment of the minister for the co-ordination of defence. Every argument used to show how useful has been the work which he has done accuses the failure to appoint him nine months earlier, when inestimable benefits would have accrued to us by the saving of this long period. When at last in March, after all the delays, the prime minister eventually made the appointment, the arrangement of duties was so ill-conceived that no man could possibly discharge them with efficiency, or even make a speech about them without embarrassment. I have repeatedly pointed out the obvious mistaken organisation of jumbling together, and practically everyone in the house is agreed upon this, the functions of defence with those of a minister of supply. The proper organisation, let me repeat, is four departments, the navy, the army, the air, and the ministry of supply, with the minister for the co-ordination of defence over the four exercising a general supervision, concerting their actions, and assigning the high priorities of manufacture in relation to some comprehensive strategic conception. The house is familiar with the many requests and arguments which have been made to the government to create a ministry of supply. These arguments have received powerful reinforcement from another angle in the report the Royal Commission on Arms Manufacture. The first work of this new parliament, and the first work of the minister for the co-ordination of defence, if he had known as much about the subject when he was appointed as he does now, would have been to set up a ministry of supply, which should, step by step, have taken over the whole business of the design and manufacture of all the supplies needed by the Air Force and the Army, and everything needed for the navy, except warships, heavy ordnance, torpedoes, and one or two ancillaries. All the best of the industries of Britain should have been surveyed from a general integral standpoint, and all existing resources utilised so far as was necessary to execute the programme. The minister for the co-ordination of defence has argued as usual against a ministry of supply. The arguments which he used were weighty and even ponderous. It would disturb and delay existing programmes. It would do more harm than good. It would upset the life and industry of the country. It would destroy the export trade and demoralise finance at the moment when it was most needed. It would turn this country into one vast munitions camp. Certainly these are massive arguments if they are true. One would have thought that they would carry conviction to any man who accepted them. But then my right honourable friend went on somewhat surprisingly to say, the decision is not final. It would be reviewed again in a few weeks. What will you know in a few weeks about this matter that you do not know now, that you ought not to have known a year ago, and have not been told any time in the last six months? What is going to happen in the next few weeks which will invalidate all these magnificent arguments by which you have been overwhelmed, and suddenly make it worth your while to paralyse the export trade, to destroy the finances, and to turn the country into a great munitions camp? The First Lord of the Admiralty in his speech the other night went even farther. He said, We are always reviewing the position. Everything, he assured us, is entirely fluid. I am sure that is true. Anyone can see what the position is. The government simply cannot make up their minds, or they cannot get the Prime Minister to make up his mind. So they go on in strange paradox, decided only to be undecided, resolved to be irresolute, adamant for drift, solid for fluidity, all powerful to be impotent. So we go on preparing more months and years, precious, perhaps vital to the greatness of Britain, for the locusts to eat. They will say to me, A minister of supply is not necessary, for all is going well. I deny it. The position is satisfactory. It is not true. All is proceeding according to plan. We know what that means. Let me come to the Territorial Army. In March of this year I stigmatized a sentence in the War Office Memorandum about the Territorial Army, in which it was said the equipment of the Territorials could not be undertaken until that of the Regular Army had been completed. What has been done about all that? It is certain the evils are not yet removed. I agree wholeheartedly with all that was said by Lord Winterton the other day about the Army and the Territorial Force. When I think how these young men who join the Territorials come forward almost alone in the population and take on a liability to serve anywhere in any part of the world, not even with a guarantee to serve in their own units, come forward in spite of every conceivable deterrent, come forward one hundred and forty thousand of them, although they are still not up to strength, and then find that the Government does not take their effort seriously enough even to equip and arm them properly. I marvel at their patriotism. It is a marvel. It is also a glory. But a glory we have no right to profit by unless we can secure proper and efficient equipment for them. A friend of mine the other day saw a number of persons engaged in peculiar evolutions, genuflections and gestures in the neighbourhood of London. His curiosity was excited. He wondered whether it was some novel form of gymnastics or a new religion. There are new religions which are very popular in some countries nowadays, or whether they were a party of lunatics out for an airing. On approaching closer he learned that they were a searchlight company of London Territorials who were doing their exercises as well as they could without having the searchlights. Yet we are told there is no need for a Ministry of Supply. In the manoeuvres of the regular army many of the most important new weapons have to be represented by flags and discs. When we remember how small our land forces are altogether only a few hundred thousand men, it seems incredible that the very flexible industry of Britain, if properly handled, could not supply them with their modest requirements. In Italy, whose industry is so much smaller, whose wealth and credit are a small fraction of this country's, a dictator is able to boast that he has bayonets and equipment for eight million men. Half the figure if you like and the moral remains equally cogent. The army lacks almost every weapon which is required for the latest form of modern war. Where are the anti-tank guns? Where are the short distance wireless sets? Where are the field anti-aircraft guns against low-flying armored aeroplanes? We want to know how it is that this country, with its enormous motoring and motor bicycling public, is not able to have strong mechanized divisions both regular and territorial. Surely when so much of the interest and the taste of our youth is moving in those mechanical channels, and when the horse is receding with the days of chivalry into the past, it ought to be possible to create an army of the size we want fully up to strength and mechanized to the highest degree. Look at the tank corps. The tank was a British invention. This idea which has revolutionized the conditions of modern war was a British idea forced on the war-office by outsiders. Let me say they would have just as hard work today to force a new idea on it. I speak from what I know. During the war we had almost a monopoly, let alone the leadership, in tank warfare, and for several years afterwards we held the foremost place. To England all eyes were turned. All that has gone now. Nothing has been done in the years that the Locust has eaten to equip the tank corps with new machines. The medium tank which they possess, which in its day was the best in the world, is now looking obsolete. Not only in numbers, for there we have never tried to compete with other countries, but in quality these British weapons are now surpassed by those of Germany, Russia, Italy, and the United States. All the shell-plants and gun-plants in the army, apart from the very small peacetime services, are in an elementary stage. A very long period must intervene before any effectual flow of munitions can be expected, even for the small forces of which we dispose. Still we are told there is no necessity for a ministry of supply. No emergency which should induce us to impinge on the normal course of trade. If we go on like this, and I do not see what power can prevent us from going on like this, some day there may be a terrible reckoning, and those who take the responsibilities so entirely upon themselves are either of a hardy disposition, or they are incapable of foreseeing the possibilities which may arise. Now I come to the greatest matter of all, the air. We received on Tuesday night from the First Lord of the Admiralty the assurance that there is no foundation whatever for the statement that we are vastly behindhand with our Air Force programme. It is clear from his words that we are behindhand. The only question is what meaning does the First Lord attach to the word lastly? He also used the expression about the progress of air expansion that it was not unsatisfactory. One does not know what his standard is. His standards change from time to time. In that speech of the 11th of September about the League of Nations there was one standard, and in the Hall of Al Pat there was clearly another. In August last some of us went in a deputation to the Prime Minister in order to express the anxieties which we felt about national defence, and to make a number of statements which we preferred not to be forced to make in public. I personally made a statement on the State of the Air Force, to the preparation of which I had devoted several weeks, and which, I am sorry to say, took an hour to read. My right honourable friend the Prime Minister listened with his customary exemplary patience. I think I told him beforehand that he is a good listener, and perhaps he will retort that he learned to be when I was his colleague. At any rate he listened with patience, and that is always something. During the three months that have passed since then I have checked those facts again in the light of current events and later knowledge, and not that foreign ears listened to all that is said here, or if we were in secret session I would repeat my statement here. And even if only one half were true, I am sure the House would consider that a very grave state of emergency existed, and also, I regret to say, a state of things from which a certain suspicion of mismanagement cannot be excluded. I am not going into any of those details. I make it a rule, as far as I possibly can, to say nothing in this House upon matters which I am not sure are already known to the general staffs of foreign countries. But there is one statement of very great importance which the Minister for the Coordination of Defence made in his speech on Tuesday. He said, the process of building up squadrons and forming new training units and skeleton squadrons is familiar to everybody connected with the Air Force. The number of squadrons in present circumstances at home today is eighty, and that figure includes sixteen auxiliary squadrons, but excludes the Fleet Air Arm, and of course does not include the squadrons abroad. End quote. From that figure, and the reservations by which it was prefaced, it is possible for the House, and also for foreign countries, to deduce pretty accurately the progress of our Air Force expansion. I feel, therefore, at liberty to comment on it. Parliament was promised a total of seventy-one new squadrons, making a total of one hundred and twenty-four squadrons in the Home Defence Force by 31 March 1937. This was thought to be the minimum compatible with our safety. At the end of the last financial year, our strength was fifty-three squadrons, including auxiliary squadrons. Therefore, in the thirty-two weeks which have passed since the financial year began, we have added twenty-eight squadrons. That is to say, less than one new squadron each week. In order to make the progress which Parliament was promised, in order to maintain the programme which was put forward as the minimum, we shall have to add forty-three squadrons in the remaining twenty weeks, or over two squadrons a week. The rate at which new squadrons will have to be formed from now till the end of March will have to be nearly three times as fast as hitherto. I do not propose to analyse the composition of the eighty squadrons we now have, but the minister in his speech used a suggestive expression, skeleton squadrons, applying at least to a portion of them. But even if every one of the eighty squadrons had an average strength of twelve aeroplanes each fitted with war equipment, and the reserves upon which my right honourable friend dwelt, we should only have a total of nine hundred and sixty first-line home defence aircraft. What is the comparable German strength? I am not going to give an estimate and say that the Germans have not got more than a certain number, but I will take it upon myself to say that they most certainly at this moment have not got less than a certain number. Most certainly they have not got less than fifteen hundred first-line aeroplanes, comprised in not less than one hundred and thirty or one hundred and forty squadrons, including auxiliary squadrons. It must also be remembered that Germany has not gotten its squadrons any machine, the design and construction of which is more than three years old. It must also be remembered that Germany has specialised in long-distance bombing aeroplanes, and that her preponderance in that respect is far greater than any of these figures would suggest. We were promised most solemnly by the Government that air parity with Germany would be maintained by the home defence forces. At the present time, putting everything at the very best, we are, upon the figures given by the Minister for the Coordination of Defence, only about two-thirds as strong as the German Air Force, assuming that I am not very much understating their present strength. How, then, does the First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Samuel Haw, think it right to say, quote, on the whole, our forecast of the strengths of other air forces proves to be accurate. On the other hand, our own estimates have also proved to be accurate. I am authorised to say that the position is satisfactory. End quote. I simply cannot understand it. Perhaps the Prime Minister will explain the position. I should like to remind the House that I have made no revelation affecting this country and that I have introduced no new fact in our air defence which does not arise from the figures given by the Minister and from the official estimates that have been published. What ought we to do? I know of only one way in which this matter can be carried further. The House ought to demand a parliamentary enquiry. It ought to appoint six, seven, or eight independent members responsible, experienced, discreet members who have some acquaintance with these matters and are representative of all parties, to interview ministers and to find out what are, in fact, the answers to a series of questions, then to make a brief report to the House whether of reassurance or of suggestion for remedying the shortcomings. That, I think, is what any Parliament worthy of the name would do in these circumstances. Parliaments of the past days in which the greatness of our country was a building would never have hesitated. They would have felt they could not discharge their duty to their constituents if they did not satisfy themselves that the safety of the country was being effectively maintained. The French Parliament, through its committees, has a very wide, deep knowledge of the state of national defence, and I am not aware that their secrets leak out in any exceptional way. There is no reason why our secrets should leak out in any exceptional way. It is because so many members of the French Parliament are associated in one way or another with the progress of the national defence that the French Government were induced to supply six years ago upward of sixty million pounds sterling to construct the Maginot line of fortifications, when our Government was assuring them that wars were over and that France must not lag behind Britain in her disarmament. Even now I hope that members of the House of Commons will rise above considerations of party discipline, and will insist upon knowing where we stand in a matter which affects our liberties and our lives. I should have thought that the Government and above all the Prime Minister, whose load is so heavy, would have welcomed such a suggestion. Owing to past neglect in the face of the plainest warnings, we have now entered upon a period of danger greater than has befallen Britain since the U-Boat campaign was crushed. Perhaps indeed it is a more grievous period than that, because at that time at least we were possessed of the means of securing ourselves and of defeating that campaign. Now we have no such assurance. The era of procrastination of half measures of soothing and baffling expedience of delays is coming to its close. In its place we are entering a period of consequences. We have entered a period in which for more than a year or a year and a half, the considerable preparations which are now on foot in Britain will not, as the Minister clearly showed, yield results which can be effective in actual fighting strength, while during this very period Germany may well reach the culminating point of her gigantic military preparations, and be forced by financial and economic stringency to contemplate a sharp decline or perhaps some other exit from her difficulties. It is this lamentable conjunction of events which seems to present the danger of Europe in its most disquieting form. We cannot avoid this period, we are in it now. Surely if we can abridge it by even a few months, if we can shorten this period when the German army will begin to be so much larger than the French army, and before the British Air Force has come to play its complementary part, we may be the architects who build the peace of the world on sure foundations. Two things I confess have staggered me after a long parliamentary experience in these debates. The first has been the dangers that have so swiftly come upon us in a few years and have been transforming our position and the whole outlook of the world. Secondly, I have been staggered by the failure of the House of Commons to react effectively against those dangers. That, I am bound to say, I never expected. I never would have believed that we should have been allowed to go on getting into this plight month by month and year by year, and that even the Government's own confessions of error would have produced no concentration of parliamentary opinion and force capable of lifting our efforts to the level of emergency. I say that unless the House resolves to find out the truth for itself, it will have committed an act of abdication of duty without parallel in its long history. End of Speech. Recording by Ruth Golding. How to Prevent War This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or how to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Speech given by Winston Churchill to the House of Commons 24th March 1938 The Prime Minister in what I think it is not presumptuous for me to describe as a very fine speech set before us the object which is in all our minds, namely how to prevent war. A country like ours possessed of immense territory and wealth, whose defenses have been neglected cannot avoid war by dilating upon its horrors or even by a continuous display of pacific qualities or by ignoring the fate of the victims of aggression elsewhere. War will be avoided in present circumstances only by the accumulation of deterrence against the aggressor. If our defenses are weak, we must seek allies and, of course, if we seek allies, alliances involve commitments. But the increase of commitments may be justified if it is followed by a still greater increase of deterrence against aggression. I was very glad to hear the Prime Minister reaffirm in such direct terms our arrangements for mutual defense with the French Republic. Evidently they amount to a defensive alliance. Why not say so? Why not make it effective by a military convention of the most detailed character? Are we once again to have all the disadvantages of an alliance without its advantages and to have commitments without full security? Great Britain and France have to stand together for mutual protection. Why should not the conditions be worked out precisely and the broad facts made public? Everyone knows, for instance, that our air force is tripled in deterrent effectiveness if it operates from French bases and, as I pointed out in the House three weeks ago, the fact that an attack upon this country would bring the attacker into conflict with the French army is another great security to us here. We are obliged in return to go to the aid of France and hitherto we have always been better than our word. Here, then, is the great security for the two countries. Do not conceal it. Proclaim it. Implement it. Work it out in thorough detail. Treat the defensive problems of the two countries as if they were one. Then you will have a real deterrent against unprovoked aggression and if the deterrent fails to deter you will have a highly organized method of coping with the aggressor. The present rulers of Germany will hesitate long before they attack the British Empire and the French Republic if those are woven together for defense purposes into one very powerful unit. Having gone so far there is no safe halting place short of an open defensive alliance with France not with loose obligations but with defined obligations on both sides and complete inter-staff arrangements. Even an isolationist would I think go so far as to say if we have to mix ourselves up with the continent let us at any rate give the maximum of safety from our commitments. The government acted in this sense and a month later invited M. de Laudier and M. Bonet to London to discuss methods of concerting the defensive arrangements of the two countries. Then we come to the case of Czechoslovakia. There has been a lot of talk about giving a guarantee but I should be sorry if the grave issue now open in Europe were to turn solely on that point cardinal though it be. Far wider decisions are called for far larger interests are at stake. I listened with the utmost attention to all that the Prime Minister said about our relations to Czechoslovakia and it seems to me that he has gone a long way in making a commitment. First I was very glad to hear him reaffirm his adherence and that of the government to the obligations of the Covenant of the League. Under the Covenant of the League we are not obliged to go to war for Czechoslovakia but we are obliged not to be neutral in the sense of being indifferent if Czechoslovakia is the victim of unprovoked aggression. The Prime Minister seemed to me to go farther than those mere obligations of the League and to indicate how very real was the interest which we took in affairs in that part of the world. Lord Halifax speaking in another place used language which is particularly important coming from the head of the foreign office. He said he had asked Field Marshal Goring to repeat to him the assurances which he had given to the Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia and that this had been done by the German government and then Lord Halifax said by those assurances solemnly given and more than once repeated we naturally expect the German government to abide and if indeed they desire to see European peace maintained as I earnestly hope they do in Europe in which it is more vital that undertakings should be scrupulously respected. We not only have therefore the general obligations of the Covenant of the League but we have this particular reference to special assurances given and received and noted. There is a third aspect. We have our agreement which I have described and of which the Prime Minister has reminded us with France and if France is attacked by Germany for going to the rescue of Czechoslovakia no one can say that we shall not be involved not legally not as a matter of bond but by the force of events. The Prime Minister used language which undoubtedly had the effect of making it perfectly plain that the course of war once started could not be limited that no one could tell what would happen that other countries would be drawn in and he mentioned especially France and Great Britain as two countries which might be involved. Taking all these points together I cannot doubt that we have considerable commitments and personally I am very thankful for any words that have been used which sustain that point of view. But this seems to be another case if I may say so of making very considerable commitments without gaining the full proportion of deterrent value. We are not taking the fullest steps in our power to stop the event occurring and yet we are liable to suffer from it if it occurs. We are liable not only to be drawn in but to be drawn in perhaps late in the day and very likely in unfavorable circumstances. It is really for consideration whether having gone so far the Boulder course might not be the safer. All attempts to bridge a 12 foot stream by an 8 foot plank are doomed to failure and the plank is lost. It is a concession no doubt to bring forward a 9 foot plank but again that may be lost. This point in view is to achieve the object and to produce the effect of an adequate deterrent. The question does not turn upon an automatic permanent pledge. What I should be inclined to ask if these matters could be at any time reconsidered is not that a permanent or automatic pledge should be given but that now on this present occasion in these circumstances which surround us at the moment with the rape of Austria before our eyes Great Britain should say, if the Germans march in upon the state of Czechoslovakia without even waiting for an impartial examination perhaps by a commission of the League of Nations or some other body into the position of the Sudeten Deutsch and the remedies offered for their grievances if in those circumstances an act of violent aggression were committed upon that country then we should feel on this occasion and in this emergency bound to act with France in resisting it. Such a declaration although limited to this particular emergency although limited until a tribunal has examined the position and until the negotiations now proceeding have reached their conclusion such an assurance would I believe do a great deal to stabilize the position in Europe and I cannot see that it would very seriously add to our risks. I must say that I myself have not felt during this crisis that there is an immediate danger of a major land war breaking out over Czechoslovakia. I know it is very rash to make such a statement but when there is so much natural but misdirected alarm in the country now on one's point and now on another one must run some risks in stating one's honest opinion. At any rate that is the assumption on which I base my argument this afternoon and I will give my reasons to the house. The first reason is that in the opinion of many good judges Germany is not ready this year for such an ordeal as a major land war. The second reason carries more conviction to me because obviously the first is based upon facts which one cannot measure and secrets which one cannot probe. It is that I cannot see that it would be to the interest of the rulers of Germany to provoke such a war. Are they not getting all they want without it? Are they not achieving a long succession of most important objectives without firing a single shot? Is there any limit to the economic and political pressure which without actually using military force Germany will be able to bring to bear upon this unhappy state? She can be convulsed politically. She can be strangled economically. She is practically surrounded by superior forces and unless something is done to mitigate the pressure of circumstances she will be forced to make continuous surrenders far beyond the bounds of what any impartial tribunal would consider just or right until finally her sovereignty, her independence, her integrity have been destroyed. Why then should the rulers of Germany strike in military blow? Why should they incur the risk of a major war? Moreover I think it is to be considered that there are other even more tempting lines of advance open to Germany's ambitions. A serious disturbance among the Hungarian population in the Romanian province of Transylvania might offer a pretext for the entry of German troops at a Hungarian invitation or without it. Then all the possibilities of the oil and food of Romania would be open. Here again, force may be avoided and virtual annexation may be veiled in the guise of a compulsory alliance. In the meantime, the control of Vienna enables the economic fortunes of all the states of the Danubian Basin to be manipulated, exploited, and controlled so as to favor German designs and for the benefit of German finance, trade, and arms. Why then should Germany go to the one place where she would encounter the veto of France and of Russia, which has also made definite assurances? I do not think the government would have run very much risk if they had added the full force of Great Britain to the French declaration about Czechoslovakia. They would not greatly have increased their commitments and they would have made the insurance double sure. But the story of this year is not ended at Czechoslovakia. It is not ended this month. The might behind the German dictator increases daily. His appetite may grow with eating. The forces of law and freedom have for a long time known nothing but rebuffs, failures, and humiliations. Their influence would be immensely increased by any signs of concerted action and initiative and combination. The fact that Britain and France combined together at such a moment in such a cause would give them the strength and authority that they need in order to convince wavering states that they might find a good company of determined people to whom they might join themselves upon the basis of the Covenant and in accordance with its principles. On the morrow of such a proof of unity as could be given between Great Britain and France we might be able to make such an arrangement or begin to make it for the effective fulfillment of the Covenant. We might have a group of powers as it were, mandatories of the League who would be the guardians of civilization and once this was set up strong and real would liberate us at least over a long period from the torments of uncertainty and anxiety which we now have to endure. Joint action on this occasion would make easier and safer the problem of dealing with the next occasion. If successful it would certainly pave the way to more effective joint action in the enforcement of the non-intervention policy in Spain. Nations that have joined together to meet one particular emergency may well find when they look around that they have assembled forces sufficient to deal with other emergencies not yet before us and thus we may gather an ever-growing company ranged under standards of law and justice submitting themselves to principles that they are ready to enforce and thus by military and moral means combined we may once more regain the Ascendant and the Initiative for the free peoples of the world and throughout the Empire. Do not let anyone suppose that this is a mere question of hardening one's heart and keeping a stiff upper lip and standing by to see Czechoslovakia pull axed or tortured as Austria has been. This particular kind of fortitude will be needed from us. It is not only Czechoslovakia that will suffer. Look at the states of the Danube Basin. First and foremost there is Yugoslavia. That is a most powerful and virile state. Three-quarters of whose martial people are undoubtedly in the fullest sympathy with the democracy of France and Great Britain are led by an ardent hatred of Nazi or fascist rule. They have a rooted desire to maintain themselves in their independence. Is nothing being done to ascertain what Yugoslavia would do assuming that Great Britain and France were prepared to interest themselves in the problems of the Danube Basin? Yugoslavia might well be gained and I am told that on Bulgaria would probably be to draw her into the same orbit. Then there is Romania so directly menaced by the potential German movement to the east. These three countries if left alone and convinced that there is no willpower operating against the dictators will fall one by one into the Nazi grip and system. That would be the position of Greece and Turkey. I ask these questions hoping that they may be carefully considered. Is it not possible that decided action by France and Great Britain would rally the whole of these five states as well as Czechoslovakia all of whom have powerful armies who together aggregate 75 million of people who have several millions of fighting men already trained, who have immense resources, who always to dwell in peace within their habitations, who individually may be broken by defeat and despoiled, but who united constitute an immense resisting power. Can nothing be done to keep them secure and free and to unite them in their own interests in French and British interests and above all in the interests of peace? Are we really going to let the whole of these tremendous possibilities fall away without a concerted effort of any kind? If we do let us not suppose for a moment that we shall ourselves have escaped our perils. On the contrary we shall have multiplied our perils for a very obvious reason. At present Germany might contemplate a short war, but once she has laid hands on these countries and extended her power to the Black Sea, the Nazi regime will be able to feed itself indefinitely however long war may last and thus we may weaken the deterrent force against war of that blockade to which the honorable member who has just spoken referred. We should have removed another of the deterrents that stand between us and war. The Nazification of the whole of the Danube States is a danger of the first capital magnitude to the British Empire. Is all to go for nothing? Is it all to be whistled down the wind? If so we shall repent in blood and tears our improvidence and our lack of foresight and energy. I have set the issue before the House in terms which do not shirk realities. It has been said by almost all speakers that if we do not stand up to the dictators now, we shall only prepare the day when we shall have to stand up to them under far more adverse conditions. Two years ago it was safe. Three years ago it was easy and four years ago a mere dispatch might have rectified the position but where shall we be a year hence? Where shall we be in 1940? In these next few months all these substantial countries will be deciding whether they will rally as they would desire to do to the standards of civilization which still fly over Geneva or whether they will be forced to throw in their lot and adopt the system and the doctrines of the Nazi powers. The Prime Minister spoke about the negotiations with Italy. I forbear to comment upon them because I prefer to await the results when they are presented to us. I know no more effective means of aiding those negotiations than the creation of a denubian block and nothing that would make it more likely than any engagement entered into would bear fruit and be effective in the hour of serious need. I trust that the government will do their utmost. If it is too late the evil is upon us but do not let any chance be thrown away of endeavoring to save this great area from being overrun, exploited, and despoiled. I now come to the second aspect of the deterrence which we are assembling against aggression, namely national defense. I welcome very much the announcement that the Prime Minister has made in this respect and particularly his decision to consult the trade unions. I know that he is averse from hasty decisions. No one can say that this is a hasty decision in the third year of rearmament. I am glad also to hear the reassurance that drastic action will be taken to augment the speed of our air program, of our air raid precautions system, and of our anti-aircraft artillery. It is only a fortnight ago that my right honorable friend told us he was satisfied that we were making the best and the most effective use of our resources. However, it appears that there were other resources not being used which now will be used in a greater effort. I regret very much that these additional resources have not been applied during the last two years when the air program was seen to be trailing so far behind. Not only did we start two years too late, but the second two years have been traversed at only half speed. The Minister for the Coordination of Defense said a fortnight ago in rebuking me, I detected Mr. Churchill's demands a fundamental difference of opinion with the government for he contemplates a great deal more interference with industry than has hitherto taken place. I was sorry to be told I was in fundamental difference with the government, and I am glad to know from the Prime Minister's statement that this particular fundamental difference is likely very soon to be removed. However, I must say I do not feel sure even now after this latest decision that the problem of rearmament is being dealt with on right lines. Is the method of organization to be employed adapted to a nationwide effort? Aught there not to be created, however tartly, a ministry of supply? Aught there not to be created a far more effective ministry of defense? Are there not problems pressing for solution which can be handled only by a minister of defense? Aught there not to be a defense of the realm act giving the necessary powers to divert industry as far as may be necessary from the ordinary channels of commerce so as to fit our rearmament in with the needs of our export trade and yet make sure that rearmament has the supreme priority. I will venture to echo the question which was posed by Mr. Amery last week. Is our system of government adapted to the present fierce swift movement of events? Twenty-two gentlemen of blameless party character sitting round an overcrowded table each having a voice is that a system which can reach decisions from week to week and cope with the problems descending upon us and with the men at the head of the dictator states? It broke down hopelessly in the war. But is this peace in which we are living? Is it not war without cannon firing? Is it not war of a decisive character where victories are gained and territories conquered and where ascendancy and dominance are established over large populations with extraordinary rapidity? If we are to prevent this bloodless war being turned into a bloody war ought not his majesty's government to adopt a system more on a level with the rate of crisis in which we live? Let me give a warning drawn from our recent experiences very likely this immediate crisis will pass will dissipate itself and calm down. After a Bola constrictor has devoured its prey it often has a considerable digestive spell it was so after the revelation of the secret German Air Force there was a pause. It was so after German conscription was proclaimed in breach of the treaty it was so after the Rhineland was forcibly occupied. The House may recall that we were told how glad we ought to be because there would be no question of fortifying it. Now after Austria has been struck down we are all disturbed and alarmed but in a little while there may be another pause. There may not we cannot tell. But if there is a pause then people will be saying see how the alarmists have been confuted? Europe has calmed down it has all blown over and the war scare has passed away. The prime minister will perhaps repeat what he said a few weeks ago that the tension in Europe is greatly relaxed. The Times will write a leading article to say how silly those people look who on the morrow of the Austrian incorporation raised a clamour for exceptional action in foreign policy and home defense and how wise the government were not to let themselves be carried away by this passing incident. All this time the vast degeneration of the forces of parliamentary democracy will be proceeding throughout Europe. Every six weeks another core will be added to the German army. At this time important countries and great rail and river communications will pass under the control of the German general staff. All this time populations will be continually reduced to the rigors of Nazi domination and assimilated to that system. All this time the forces of conquest and intimidation will be consolidated towering up soon in real and not make believe strength and superiority. Then presently will come another stroke upon whom? Our questions with Germany are unsettled and unanswered we cannot tell. What I dread is that the impulse now given to active effort may pass away when the dangers are not diminishing but accumulating and gathering as country after country is involved in the Nazi system and as their vast preparations reach their final perfection. For five years I have talked to the house on these matters not with very great success. I have watched this famous island descending incontinently fecklessly the stairway which leads to a dark gulf. It is a fine broad stairway at the beginning but after a bit the carpet ends. A little farther on their only flagstones and a little farther on still these break beneath your feet. Look back over the last five years. It is true that great mistakes were made in the years immediately after the war but at Locarno we laid the foundation from which a great forward movement could have been made. Look back upon the last five years since that is to say Germany began to rearm in earnest and openly to seek revenge. If we study the history of Rome and Carthage we can understand what happened and why. It is not difficult to form an intelligent view about the three Punic wars but if mortal catastrophe should overtake the British nation and the British Empire historians a thousand years hence will still be baffled by the mystery of our affairs. They will never understand how it was that a victorious nation with everything in hand suffered themselves to be brought low and to cast away all that they had gained by measureless sacrifice and absolute victory. Gone with the wind. Now the victors are the vanquished and those who threw down their arms in the field and sued for an armistice are striding on to world mastery. That is the position. That is the terrible transformation that has taken place bit by bit. I rejoice to hear from the prime minister that a further supreme effort is to be made to place us in a position of security. Now is the time at last to rouse the nation. Perhaps it is the last time it can be roused with a chance of preventing war or with a chance of coming through to victory should our efforts to prevent war we should lay aside every hindrance and endeavor by uniting the whole force and spirit of our people to raise again a great British nation standing up before all the world for such a nation rising in its ancient vigor can even at this hour save civilization. End of speech. This recording is by Aaron Elliott, St. Louis, Missouri. The annexation of Austria. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Ashwin Jain. Speech given by Winston Churchill to the House of Commons 14th March 1938. The minister overshadows the debate and dominates all our minds. I do not know when in my lengthening experience of the House of Commons I have heard. A statement so momentous expressed a language of frigid restraint but giving the feeling of determination behind it. I am sure in all quarters of the House we heard with greatest pleasure is a formation of the rights and interests and duty of Great Britain in Central Europe. He has said that there must be no haste decision and everybody will feel that while our minds are under the immediate influence of this painful and lamentable event is not the best time to take fresh results provided that nothing is lost by delay. I listened with great pleasure to the speech of the Honourable Member for Sprachbook. I have found myself ready to respond to the appeal which he made that we should pool our opinions and have faced differences as far as possible. Above all, I agree with him in a statement that the policy to be declared within a reasonably short time by this country must be clear and precise so that it can be understood for good or ill in countries and all parties. Everyone remembers the controversy which has dragged on for many years about whether we could have stopped the great war in 1914 if Sir Edward Gray had made plain declarations a week beforehand. I myself am of opinion that it did all that it was possible for him to do in the circumstances and I doubt very much whether the event would have been decided even if he had made such a declaration. But still, there is a weight of historic judgment piling up that in all these matters of international strife in danger. It is most necessary that nations should declare plainly where they stand and of all the nations we should so declare itself our country with our insular characteristics still partially remaining to her has an obligation to give a perfectly plain statement of what she will or will not do in certain contingencies when those contingency approach the threshold of reality. Long delay would be harmful. Why should we assume that time is on our side? I know of nothing to convince me that if the evil forces now at work I suffered to feed upon their successes and upon their victims or tasks it would be no easier when finally we are all united. Not only do we need a clear declaration of the government's policy but we require to set to work to rally the whole country behind the declared policy in order that they may not be shifts and changes as well as that they may not be any doubt or hesitation. It will certainly be no easier for us to face the problems that we had a year and hence that it is today. Indeed we might easily delay resistance to a point where continued resistance and true collective security would become impossible. The gravity of the event of the 11th of March cannot be exaggerated. Europe is confronted with a program of aggression nicely calculated and timed unfolding stage by stage choice open not only to us but to other countries who are unfortunately concerned either to submit like Austria or else to take effective measures while time remains to ward off the danger and it cannot be warded off to cope with it. Resistance will be hard yet I am persuaded and the Prime Minister's speech confirms me that it is to this conclusion of resistance to overweening encroachment that his Majesty's Government will come. The House of Commons will certainly sustain them in playing a great part in the effort to preserve the peace of Europe and if it cannot preserve to preserve the freedom of the nations of Europe if we were to delay if we were to go on waiting upon events for a considerable period how much should we throw away of resources which are now available for our security and for the maintenance of peace how many friends would be alienated how many potential allies should we see go one by one down the grizzly gulf how many times would bluff succeed until behind bluff ever a gathering forces had accumulated reality A shall we be two years hence for instance the German army will certainly be much larger the French army and when all the small nations will have fled from Geneva to pay homage to the ever-waxing power of the Nazi system and to make the best terms they can for themselves we cannot leave the Austrian question where it is we await the further statement of the government but it is quite clear that we cannot accept the solution to the problem of central Europe the event which occurred on March 11 the public mind has been concentrated upon the moral and sentimental aspects of the Nazi conquest of Austria a small country brutally struck down its common scattered to the winds the operation of the Nazi party doctrine imposed upon a Catholic population and upon the working classes of Austria and Vienna their hard ill uses of persecution which indeed will ensue which is probably in progress at the moment of those who this time last week were exercising their undoubted political rights discharging their duties faithfully to their own country all this we see very clearly but there are some things which I have not seen brought out in the public press and which do not seem to be present in the public mind and they are practical consideration of the utmost significance Vienna is the center of all the communications of all the countries which form the old Austro-Hungarian Empire and all the countries lying to the southeast of Europe a long stretch of the doubt is now in German hands this mastery of Vienna to Nazi Germany military and economic control of the whole communication of southeastern Europe by road by river and by rail what is the effect of it what is called the balance of power such as it is and upon what is called the a word about this group of powers called the little intent taken singly the three countries of the little intent may be called powers of the rank but they are very vigorous states and united they are a great power they have been and are still united by the closest military agreement together they make the compliment of a great power and of the military machinery of a great power Romania is the goal, Yugoslavia is the goal both have large armies both are mainly supplied with munitions from Czechoslovakia to English years the name of Czechoslovakia sounds outlandish no doubt they are a small democratic state no doubt they have an army only two or three times as large as ours no doubt they have a munitions supply only three times as great as that of Italy but still they are a very people they have their treaty rights they have a line of fortresses and they have a strongly manifested will to live freely Czechoslovakia is at this moment isolated both in economic and in the military sense a trade outlet to Hamburg which is based upon the peace treaty can of course be closed at any moment now her communications barrel and river to the south and after the south to the southeast are liable to be severed at any moment a trade may be subjected to tolls of an absolutely strangling character here is a country which was once the greatest manufacturing area in the old Austro-Hungarian empire it is now cut off or may be cut off at once unless out of these discussions which must arrangements are made securing the communications of Czechoslovakia you may be cut off at once from the sources of a raw material in Yugoslavia and from the natural markets which he has established there the economic life of this small state may be practically destroyed as a result of the act of violence which were perpetrated last Friday night and driven into the heart of what is called the little intent this group of countries which have as much right to live in Europe un molested as any of us at the right to live un molested in our native land it would be too complicated to pursue the economic military and material reactions apart from moral sentiments altogether into other countries it would take too long but the effects of what has happened now upon Romania upon Hungary upon Bulgaria upon Turkey must be the subject of the closest possible study not only by his majesty's comment by all who aspire to take part in the public discussion of these matters by what has happened it is not too much to say that Nazi Germany in its present mood if matters are left as they are it's in a position to dominate the whole of southeast Europe over an age inhabited by perhaps two hundred thousand thousand of people Nazism and all that involves is moving on to absolute control therefore I venture to submit to the hags that this Nazi conquest of Austria cannot remain where it is and that a patient determined to serve during discussion of it ought to take place and to be pushed forward first of all no doubt to the chanceries and by the diplomatic channels but also and ultimately it should be pushed forward in the natural place for such discussions at Geneva under the League of Nations we are not in a position to say it tonight the past is the past we cannot say the past is the past we are surrendering the future therefore we await further statements from his majesty's comment with the greatest possible interest the serious nature of our affairs is realized and apprehended in all parts of the house I have often been called an alarmist in the past yet I affirm tonight that there is still in my belief an honorable part to safety and I hope to piece what ought we to do the prime minister today has made a declaration upon the subject of defense there is to be a new effort of national rearmament and national service we shall have to lay aside our easy habits and methods we shall have to concentrate on securing our safety with something like the intensity that has been practiced in other countries whose excesses we may desire to retain I think the house will be grateful to the prime minister for that declaration and I am certain that he may rely upon all those strong forces in every part throughout the country to second the efforts of the government to place us in a position where we shall not feel ourselves liable be blackmailed out of our duties out of our interests and out of our rights it seems to me quite clear that we cannot possibly confine ourselves only to a renewed effort and rearmament I know that some of the honorable friends on this side of the house will laugh when I offer them this advice I say laugh but listen I affirm that the government should express in the strongest terms our adherence to the coven of the League of Nations and our resolve to procure by international action the reign of law in Europe I agree entirely with what has been said by the leaders of the two opposition parties upon that subject and I was extremely glad to notice that at the beginning and in the very forefront of the speech the prime minister referred to the League of Nations and made that one of the basis of our right to intervene and to be consulted upon affairs in Central Europe their matter has an importance in this country there must be a moral basis for British rearmament and British foreign policy we must have that basis if we are to unite and inspire our people and procure their whole hearted action and if we are to stir the English speaking people throughout the world our affairs have come to such a pass that there is no escape without running wrists on every ground of prudence as well as of duty I urge His Majesty's government to claim a renewed, revivified, unthinking adherence to the coven of the League of Nations what is there ridiculous about collective security the only thing that is ridiculous about it is that we have not got it let us say that we cannot do something to procure a strong element of collective security for ourselves and for others we have been urged to make common calls in self-defense with the French Republic what is that but the beginning of collective security I agree with that not so lightly with the two great liberal democracies of the west be challenged and not so easily if challenged will they be subjugated that is the beginning of collective security but why stop there why be urged and pushed further down the slope in a disorderly expulsing crowd of embarrassed states why not make a stand while there is still a good company of united very powerful countries that share our dangers and aspirations why should we delay until we are confronted with the general landslide of those small countries passing over because they have no other choice to the overwhelming power of the Nazi regime if a number of states were assembled around Great Britain in France in a solemn treaty for mutual defense against aggression if they had their forces marshaled in what you may call a grand alliance if they had their staff arrangements concerted if all this rested as it can honorably rest upon the covenant of the League of Nations in pursuance of all the purposes and idols of the League of Nations if that were sustained as it would be by the moral sense of the world and if it were done in the year 1938 and believe me it may be the last chance there will be for doing it then I say that you might even now arrest this approaching war then perhaps the curse which overhangs Europe would pass away then perhaps the ferocious passions which now grip a great people would turn inwards and not outwards in an internal rather than an external explosion and mankind would be spared the delirial deal towards which we have been sacking and sliding month by month I have ventured to indicate a positive conception a practical and realistic conception and one which I am convinced will unite all the forces of this country without whose help your armies cannot be filled or your munitions made before we cast away this hope this cause and this plan which I do not at all disguise as an element of risk let those who wish to reject it ponder well yet earnestly upon what will happen to us if when all else has been thrown to the bulls we are left to face our fate alone End of speech Recording Mayashvinyas