 Okay. If I may begin the final discussion for this afternoon, thank you all for being here now. I think we have had five excellent presentations and I have no doubt we will have three more to add to that list with our three speakers. I'd like to, again, you have the bios in the rear for our speakers. I'd like to, rather than going over the bios, I'd like to do something of a book club kind of presentation to introduce our three speakers because they are all writers, they are all thinkers and they've all been published. Something that is a very important thing in our field to get wider distribution of ideas. I had already mentioned that our first speaker, Bruce Rydell, has done his most recent book, Deadly Embrace, Pakistan America and the Future of the Global Jihad. So I want to call attention to that. I'm sure if you have brought your copy, Bruce would be willing to sign as I'm actually going to ask him to, actually, you've already signed mine. So we also have a piece in the back, a more recent piece that Bruce has done on Russian roulette in South Asia. For those of you who do want to talk about the implications of what's taking place in Pakistan, Afghanistan and as it impacts on India and as India has an important role to play in this, we're going to hear some very important things here from Bruce on that subject. And I should mention that Bruce and I worked together for my four years at state when he was a senior director of the National Security Council. So we were colleagues and co-conspirators in moving this relationship with India forward. Secondly, Ray Vickery, an even more recently published author, The Eagle and the Elephant, The Strategic Aspects of U.S.-India Economic Engagement. I had the opportunity to read some of the earlier chapters. I think this is going to be a very important contribution to our understanding of this economic relationship. And I'm delighted that Ray is here. Ray and I have also conspired in government service when he was the assistant secretary of commerce for trade and in the Clinton administration. So I'm delighted that Ray is here. And I just saw him the other day at his book launch at the Woodrow Wilson Center. Finally, Richard Fontaine from CNAS, Center for New American Security. Richard and I had the great opportunity to work together in a project that he directed at CNAS that issued its report. It was co-chaired by Nicholas Burns and Rich Armitage, a project which Richard directed entitled Natural Allies, a Blueprint for the Future of U.S.-India Relations that came out just prior to President Obama's trip. As I have mentioned to him, never in my experience in working in the kind of task forces, working groups, have as many recommendations as we put forward found their way into a presidential trip as quickly. Now, I don't think we can take full credit. I'm sure the administration was thinking along the same lines. But the fact is that this report did do, I think it encouraged and supported directions and ideas that the two leaders very much pursued in their joint statement in the November 2009 summit. Richard has also recently been published in the CSIS quarterly, the Washington Quarterly. And that article on U.S.-India values-based cooperation is in the back. He also is a veteran of working both in the legislative branch with Senator McCain, also in the executive branch, National Security Council, the State Department. So I think we're very fortunate to have these three individuals who will bring an overall understanding of the U.S.-Indian relationship and special perspectives to bear. So that's what we'll be doing in the next hour and 10 minutes or so. I'd like to ask each of them to do what our previous speakers did, which is to come to the podium for about 10 minutes of remarks, and then we will go to questions. So, Bruce, if you could launch the discussion. Thank you, Rick, for that very, very kind introduction. Despite its title, Deadly Embrace is not a romantic novel, although I ascribe all sales to the fact that it's been misplaced in bookstores. I also want to thank CSIS for inviting me. This is the second day in a row. You provided me with lunch, and I'm eager to know what the menu is going to be for tomorrow. I'm going to talk about the U.S.-Indian strategic partnership, the defense relationship, the counterterrorism relationship, and the overall strategic relationship. You've heard already today the superlatives about the rise of India, the importance of the American-Indian strategic partnership. I don't need to repeat those. Everything you've heard is absolutely true. This is a core relationship for the United States. Nothing is more important than getting the U.S.-Indian strategic relationship right. It has come an enormous way in a very short period of time. Just measuring it since the President's trip in 2009, you see significant progress, but if you step back just a little bit and measure it since 1999, it's transformative. Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama, Rick, and many others in this room deserve credit for that transformation. It is a rare example of bipartisan success in American foreign policy. But my main message today is a simple one. This relationship today faces its most difficult problem ever, and that is a ticking time bomb next door in Pakistan. A ticking time bomb which could explode at any moment. Pakistan is usually not on the formal agenda of the U.S.-India strategic dialogue. In the Do-Deli statement issued after the President's trip in 2009, it's barely mentioned. It appears in reference to the counterterrorism problem. This is, of course, understandable. We all know the reason why. Diplomats and leaders have to be careful what they say in public. Words have meaning. But Pakistan is a ticking time bomb that could explode at any moment. There are a number of ways that Pakistan could explode into our consciousness again tomorrow. Another Mumbai, mass casualty terrorist attack in India. Another 9-11, or a Times Square, like last May, postmarked Pakistan. Another coup d'etat in Pakistan leading another general back into power. Another Abutabad at any moment based on what the CIA has found in that mountain of information, in that villa in Abutabad. Let me briefly survey the progress we've made in the strategic and defense areas. I don't want to be exhaustive, and you've already heard an awful lot about it. But it is remarkable. Let's start with counterterrorism. Director of Central Intelligence and soon-to-be Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta made his first foreign visit to New Delhi in 2009. It was a highly symbolic act. Until then, you could say that American intelligence relationships in South Asia were balanced. ISI here, RAW here. This administration tried to demonstrate a change was coming. And we have seen in the wake of Mumbai an enormous increase in counterterrorism and homeland security cooperation between the United States and India, highlighted by Secretary Napoletana's visit. We have seen a tremendous degree of information sharing on groups like Lashkar-e-Tayba. And we've seen cooperation and interrogation of David Headley, the mastermind, or one of the masterminds of the Mumbai era. So a significant improvement, a major change. We've seen significant improvements in the military-military relationship. In 1999, as Rick will remember well, there were zero military exercises. There was zero military exchange between our two countries. The concept of military arms sales in 1999 was a vision for the future. We've made enormous progress. The 10 C-17s that you've heard about today are a big deal. This is the biggest arms sale between the United States and India since the Kennedy Administration in the immediate wake of the Indo-Chinese War of 1962. Those 10 C-17s will give India a strategic aerial lift capability larger than any NATO nation aside from the United States of America. It will be transformative in terms of India's military capabilities. I am for one not surprised that the fighter deal didn't go through. I can understand why Indian military planners would have many doubts about the reliability of Americans' support for combat aircraft in the future. The legacy of the past isn't going to go away overnight. C-17s don't need munitions. You don't have to worry about munitions being delivered in a crisis. Combat aircraft need munitions. Let's hope though that we're on the right trajectory. Summetry. President Obama is the first American president to visit New Delhi in his first term since Jimmy Carter. That is a major, major development. Arms control and proliferation. If you listened carefully the two previous speakers, they didn't spend the whole time talking about arms control, nuclear proliferation issues, combating comprehensive test ban treaties, all that kind of stuff. Ten years ago that would have been the only thing we talked about all afternoon. President Bush's innovative US-India civil nuclear deal deserves credit for that. Afghanistan. Common agreement on the importance of assisting the Kar-Sai government. Common agreement on a path forward to stabilizing Afghanistan. Differences remain. There's no question about that. Libya illustrated those differences. Syria may illustrate them again. Strategic partnership does not mean an identity of views. It means working together. All of this progress is real. All of it is important. All of it is transformative. All of it is significant, but I would argue to you the real challenge lies ahead, and that challenge is immediately to the West of India, Pakistan. We need more dialogue. We need more engagement. We need more cooperation working together to think about how we help Pakistan help itself. Don't get me wrong. I am not suggesting mediation. I am not suggesting we appoint a special envoy for AFPAC-I. I oppose the idea of AFPAC from the beginning. I am in favor of reintegrating Afghanistan and Pakistan into Mr. Blake's bureau. I think we should create a military command for South Asia, but I don't favor mediation. Nor am I proposing a conspiracy that the United States in India somehow plot against Pakistan. What I am suggesting is the need to conceptualize urgently where we are going with this most important country. Obviously, we already talked to each other about Pakistan. I have spent hours talking to Indian diplomats and government in four administrations, under four presidents, about Pakistan, but we need to take it to a higher level now. Why? Because the alternative is playing Russian roulette. India has already had three 9-11s, not one 9-11. It had a 9-11 in 2001 in New Delhi. It had a 9-11 in 2006 in Mumbai. And it had a repeat performance in 2008. Another one is coming. We know that. Yes, Pakistan is the provocateur. Pakistan provides the base for these terrorists to operate from. But that doesn't change the fact that we need to think about how to leverage the U.S.-Indian relationship to assist developing Pakistan in the right place. A butabad is a wake-up warning if we needed it. Here, in the heart of Pakistan, within a mile of Pakistan's West Point, or Sandhurst, Osama bin Laden, high-value target number one, was living for the last five years at least. There is an urgent question. We all want to know the answer to. What did Pakistan's military and its intelligence services know? What did it not know? Were they clueless and incompetent, or were they complicit and guilty? That question now hangs over the U.S.-Pakistani relationship. But a butabad is only one of the things that could go wrong. Disaster is looming. So how do we help? Well, first of all, we have to recognize Prime Minister Singh's very brave decision to move forward with India-Pakistan engagement. Inviting his counterpart to that cricket match was not only a brilliant political move, it was a brave political move. But sitting at a cricket match is not enough, and resuming dialogue is not enough. We need creative problem-solving. What role can America play in this? I've already said it should not be mediator. It should be cheerleader. But come on, we can do a little bit more than being a cheerleader. We can certainly help in creative problem-solving ideas. And this is a role not just for government, but here is a real role for think tanks like CSIS, like Brookings, and others. The bottom line is this, and I don't need to belabor the point. The United States and India today face a common problem. That problem is a syndicate of terrorist organizations that reside in Pakistan. Al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taybah, the Afghan Taliban, and the Pakistan Taliban. This syndicate of terror has at the top of their target list, the United States of America and India. We have seen in the last month a remarkable series of eulogies by every single one of these groups honoring Hussama bin Laden. Lashkar-e-Taybah was the first out of the box. Hafiz Said, the Friday after Abu Tabaad, spent his Friday prayers talking about the hero, martyr, the Sheikh, the Salam bin Laden. Of course he should have. The Salam bin Laden funded the creation of Lashkar-e-Taybah. The Pakistan Taliban has eulogized the leader with carnage from Karachi to Kashmir, attacking the Pakistani state. It's the contradictions in the relationship between the jihadist Frankenstein and the government of Pakistan are the hardest part to get our heads around. The Afghan Taliban put out a statement eulogizing with Salam bin Laden and associating itself directly with the global Islamic jihad. Today the Salam bin Laden's heir apparent Ayman Sawahiri put out a statement reinterrating his loyalty to Mullah Omar, the emir of the believers as he called him. It is a syndicate of terrorism that is not a monolith, doesn't have a single leader, but operationally works together and works against the United States and India. The government of Pakistan to be fair is at war with part of this syndicate. The attack in Karachi vividly demonstrated that. ISI officers are murdered by this syndicate. At the same time it's still in bed with other parts of it. At this point we can only conclude that it is incapable of being trusted to deal with this problem. Whether it's incompetence or complicity, we cannot rely on the government of Pakistan to deal with it. The United States has now responded with unilateral measures not just on the 2nd of May but almost every day from 30,000 feet in the air. India at some point may decide that it has little choice but to do the same. We need a common approach to thinking about this problem and working on it. Not an identical approach, not an alliance against Pakistan, but a common thought process. We needed coordinated engagement with the government of Pakistan. Both America and India have decided Pakistan is too important not to engage with even if it's frustrating and even if it's irritating. We need to engage but we ought to coordinate our engagement. We need to coordinate our counter-terrorism efforts. It's already been mentioned, Lashkari Taiba, the importance of doing that. Lashkari Taiba is today probably the most dangerous terrorist group in the world. We need to share technology and human intelligence. One practical step that should be done is to share that take from the Abutabad Villa mansion that is relevant to the government of India's interests. And we need to start coordinating contingency planning. The nightmares I described to you are real. They may not happen in the near term. They may happen tonight. We need to start thinking our way through them. As Senator Warner rightly put it, we need a true strategic partnership and there is no issue more important to deal with than the future of Pakistan. Thank you. I think after Bruce's remarks, you can see why I'm so honored to appear on the same panel with him and with Richard Fontaine, both of whom are really giants in this field. And Rick, I want to tell you I really appreciate the plug for the book. It wasn't Oprah Winfrey, but it was close. I'm very grateful to CSIS for putting this together. I think Dr. Vardvani has done a wonderful thing in endowing this chair, and we're all grateful. I was very pleased to hear from Senator Warner and Senator Cornyn that the bipartisan support for the U.S.-India relationship is alive and well. It's been one of the great assets of this country. Would only that this bipartisanship prevailed in other areas facing this country. Rick has been kind enough to mention the book that I've just put out, The Eagle and the Elephant Strategic Aspects of U.S.-India Economic Engagement. The thesis of this book is that it is economic engagement, which is the engine of strategic cooperation. And it is this engagement that has driven the change in the U.S.-India relationship from estranged democracies to strategic partners. There have been a lot of metaphors used for economic engagement. People have talked about it as the ballast of a ship that keeps it on course or the foundation. The thesis that I've put forward is that these do not capture the dynamic nature of what economic engagement means to the relationship. And I was so happy to hear Dr. Vardvani put it first on his list of the three areas in which he wants to see his chair move forward. Now the corollary of the thesis that economic engagement is the engine of strategic cooperation is that this momentum of change can only be sustained by increasing positive economic engagement. And make no doubt about it, economic engagement can be negative as well as positive. We have only to look back at what happened with the double Enron project and the whole fast track which went down in flames to see that negative engagement, engagement gone wrong, can set back the U.S.-India relationship for years to come. In fact, it seems to me that what happens is that economic engagement and the political factors we've talked about operate in something called, that I'd call feedback loops. And that is one influences the other. The question is where you'll have the inflection point and I suggest to you that it is at the economic engagement side of the loop that we can have the most impetus in terms of sustaining and building the relationship. I think the civil nuclear deal was a prime example of this principle. We pulled together a coalition for partnership with India that had the economic, the business side. It had Indian Americans and it also had the policy community. And it is that kind of coalition which we need to re-energize in order to build and sustain this relationship. Make no doubt about it. There are forces both on the Indian side and the U.S. side who do not believe in this relationship. They still have the skepticism. They still say, well, remember when those guys did X to us or they were supposed to do this and it happens on both sides. And unless those of us who believe in this relationship will continually adhere to the process of putting our best effort forward in building it, it will not go forward. It will not achieve its full potential. Now, Rick has assigned to me that portion of the joint statement from last November when President Obama was in New Delhi which deals with inclusive growth, mutual prosperity and economic cooperation. By the way, as a Democrat, I didn't think it was possible for the visit of President Clinton to be topped in terms of the relationship. George W. Bush did that in terms of the civil nuclear. Then I didn't think it was possible for that to be topped. But I believe President Obama did. He hid every theme all the way from the United Nations to the lessening of the controls on exports of high technology. And it was a huge triumph and make no mistake about that. But there are matters which we must face and we must face them overtly rather than leaving it to sort of the back rooms to be able to talk about it. And one of those areas has to do with inclusive growth. Inclusive growth is talked about in India as the way forward to majority prosperity. We do the same thing only we call it defense of the middle class and what will happen there. It's a major political issue on both sides and it affects the ability of the United States and India to cooperate on strategic issues. Now how we handle particularly services trade and protectionism is key to the ability of the United States and India to cooperate on inclusive growth and or as you might say protection of the middle class. And in this regard neither side is blameless in terms of its record in terms of protectionism and the unwillingness to further open up the relationship in view of economic difficulties. I'll give you an example. The G20 met in November of 2008 and said we will refrain from raising new barriers to investment or to trade in goods and services. Imposing new export restrictions or implementing rural trade organization inconsistent measures to stimulate exports. A few days later the India raised its tariffs on iron, steel and soybeans and in January not three months later the U.S. enacted a buy America provision for steel and a limitation on the use of temporary visas. Now that is not the kind of progress that we need in order to be able to sustain the relationship. And when you look at the relationship of economic engagement the record over the past several years has not been a continued upward path. It is true that right now we're at a highest level. In 2009 in terms of trade in goods and services which I think is important to include the services we fell back from 66 billion to 57 billion. Now we're up to 74 but basically the first three months of this year indicate that it's flat for this year. In terms of foreign direct investment the total FDI stock of U.S. is about 18.6 billion with an Indian investment stock in the U.S. at about 6.4 billion. But just compare that with U.S. foreign direct investment in China which in the same year was 49.4 billion dollars. And while U.S. India trade has expanded China replaced the United States as India's leading trading partner in goods in 2008 and on the direct investment front the United States has also lost its premier position. Now how we handle questions of services outsourcing what we do in H1B visas has consequences. The Doha round was designated as the Doha development agenda for a reason and that is because economic development, inclusive growth, majority prosperity, protection of the middle class, however you want to put it was to be at the heart of that. And what's happened? That agenda is in shambles at this point and it is in shambles primarily because the U.S. and India have not been able to come to grips with the key factors including trade and services agriculture and across the board. I'll give you another example. The Pacific Council and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry and Ranjana Khanna is here proposed several years ago an innovation economic trade agreement that would be modeled after the very successful trade agreement in services and in goods which had been done at the WTO. And the concept was that there could be a free trade agreement in the area of the innovation economy. Where has that gone? That has gone nowhere and it has gone nowhere because of the forces that I'm indicating in terms of protectionism and the inability to come to grips with some of these basic problems in terms of economic engagement. And it's not a question of right or wrong, it's a question of whether it's useful in building majority prosperity in both countries. Now in this same area of the joint statement of last November there were several other areas and I'd like just to briefly comment on them. One was the Second Green Revolution or as it was renamed the Evergreen Revolution and this was to be modeled on what Norman Borlaug and others had done in the United States in the 60s and 70s in increasing production. And the reality is that is not going to go forward just by looking to the past. What has to happen is to recognize that there must be systematic change for both parties in order to be able to meet the questions of food security. And unless you can meet the question of food security then the other matters become very much more difficult. In regard to health security there was a global disease detection regional center announced. But in terms of where that goes it really depends on our ability to come to grips with basic intellectual property concepts and an unfinished agenda in that entire area. Just one further point. We've talked about higher education and I have worked on that. I'm also of counsel at Hogan levels and we have a very large higher education practice. And there is a lot you've heard said today about the great opportunity and it's all true. If you're going to go from a GER of about 12% to 24% you're going to have to have slots for 15 million more Indians. And who better to work with India on that than United States institutions of higher education who are leaders in the world. The reality is that this whole area is a complete standstill because the foreign education act which is pending in parliament has difficulties in it which make it really impossible for this kind of cooperation to take place. Now this means that we have to go back to the drawing board and I'm very happy to hear Bob Blake announce of course that in October we will have a summit and we'll be able to go forward. My point is this that economic engagement is the driver of the ability of the U.S. and India to cooperate on strategic issues. Economic engagement requires the constant work of the Congress as well as the executive branch, the business community, the Indian American community and the policy community to move the relation forward. This relationship should be and will be in my view the most important of the 21st century. But it will not reach its full potential unless we tend to it every day. This is not written in stone. This is not on autopilot and it requires all of our attention to realize its full potential. Thank you. Well as the eighth of eight speakers I'll try to be relatively short in my remarks. Let me just say thanks to Rick and to Mr. Rodwani and to CSIS for the honor of letting me speak here and also to Don Kamp who is here in the audience and was one of my very first bosses at the State Department and what was then the South Asia only bureau. So anything I know about South Asia that's right you can give him credit and anything that's wrong is my fault or someone else's we can find someone else to blame. I feel like I should promote a book but I don't have one so you know we do have that those things to promote. What I want to do just briefly is talk for a minute about the way I see the strategic rationale for the relationship which includes almost everything that you've heard up to this point but I don't know that it's quite been laid out in just in a minute or two like I'll do and then also talk about the rationale for values based cooperation between what we always refer to as the world's oldest democracy and the world's biggest democracy. So first the strategic rationale everything that you've heard we have Pakistan and trade and education and climate change and all of and energy and all of these reasons to have a closer U.S. India relationship but if we're looking at really the long view and playing for the long game here then it really bears looking at the region as a whole and through the couple hours that we've been able to spend together here I don't know that anybody has actually mentioned this big country that starts with C that's located to the east of India but for my sense that's a big driver of the U.S. India relationship and the and the desire of both to come together despite decades of mutual mistrust and and disaffected relations. So let me just read one sentence and this comes from the National Intelligence Council's global trends 2020 report that came out a few years back and I give Rick Inderforth full credit for actually about a year ago pointing this out to me. It says the likely emergence of China and India as new major global players will transform the geopolitical landscape with impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous two centuries in the same way that commentators refer to the 1900s as the American century. The early 21st century may be seen as the time when some in the developing world led by China and India come into their own. Now there's some obvious poetry and drama and in that statement but I do think there's some truth to to that analysis and that is what forms a backdrop for the future of the U.S. India relationship because we will always have irritants in the relationship. We're too big unwieldy democracies and we will always have problems. We will always have communications issues and we will always have areas of mistrust but driving us forward and particularly from the American side is an overarching interest in having closer ties with an India that is becoming more powerful with greater ambitions around the world at the same time that China is doing the same thing. We don't want a bad relationship with China but we want China to ascend in a region that is surrounding is surrounded by democracies that can work well together so that we can make it easier for us to have good relations with China and not fear China or try to contain China or anything like this. Now that concept has obviously been the backdrop going back to the Clinton administration pushing forward with closer ties with India and from the Indian side forward and the Obama administration to its great credit has taken some really bold steps to push relationship forward in a very significant way and I think what you see is something that's sometimes rare in the US foreign policy activity which is truly strategic thought the United States kind of putting the money in the bank of a relationship without expecting immediate transactional payoffs so you know the civilian nuclear agreement clearly hasn't paid off yet but it was something that we were willing to do for strategic reasons the same thing with the UN Security Council position export controls and so forth but there's something else that in addition to the strategic rationale is this idea that the United States and India share values and we're democracies and it's somehow and some vague and maybe opaque kind of way that makes us like each other more than it would otherwise and I think that at some point we need to try to turn some of this from rhetoric into action because in fact if the US and India do find meaning in the fact that we share values and that the shared values in addition to the shared interests of the bedrock on what our relate which our relationship is built then that suggests that there can be an agenda by which we can do the kinds of values based activities that the United States has done for a long time and which India has done to some extent in its neighborhood but has been somewhat reluctant because of its tradition of non-interference and so forth to be too forward leaning on so for example India was a founding member of the community of democracies and it was a co-founder and a contributor to the UN democracy fund it's as most of you probably know is given a very large amount of money for development projects in Afghanistan and and has been constructing the Afghan Parliament just announced another half billion dollars in commitments that India has moved from a recipient of foreign aid to a donor of foreign aid around the world these are all areas in which the United States and India can try to align our activities more closely the Middle East may provide a great example of this Secretary Clinton earlier this year actually suggested something along these lines talking about India with its great long history and in successful elections among a very large population could provide certain forms of technical assistance and so forth to a place like Egypt and in fact the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has approached India to ask something similar so there's all kinds of activities which are nascent they're small and yet there's something that we can do with India that we can't do with a country like China that we can't do with other countries around the world and so not only does it suggest to perhaps those are skeptical around the world that these values that the US and India are convinced or universal and that we share are not a Western import or exporter the imposition of some values but rather universal things to the degree to which we can work on that we can give true meaning to this this concept of shared democratic values now be the first to acknowledge that this flies in the face of much of Indian foreign policy tradition as I said for the non-intervention tradition and everything else and when I was talking about some of these issues at one point a former Indian ambassador said never happen democracy is like Hinduism either born into it or you're not and a story but I do think that particularly among some of the younger generation of Indian foreign policy leaders you see a growing appetite to to look at these kinds of things and as India grows in stature power and influence around the world I think it's a natural that it will want to take this as a as an element of its foreign policy so I'll stop almost there just to say that as I think everyone else has said already I think there's real reasons for great optimism over the long haul in this relationship we're going to have all kinds of short term interruptions and so forth but on the one hand we have the strategic rationale that I tried to brief you outline and on the other hand we have the bedrock of shared values and if we have those two things then that says a whole lot about where the relationship can go in the future thank you thank you all for those excellent presentations I think that the various dimensions that have been covered the security dimension with Bruce the economic dimension Ray the values dimension that Richard was talking about are all key elements of this relationship that we have today and and I would hope that we can explore all those further I think we've got about 20 minutes I'd like to actually start if I could with the question to Bruce because his focus on the the threats that we face in the world today in addition to his book on deadly embrace his previous book was a search for al-qaeda little did we know that we might find him in a bodice bod at least a leader but the search continues and the question that I have for him is the United States has demonstrated the kinds of actions that we are prepared to take to defend ourselves at great distance from the threat posed by terrorist non-state actors my question is how does India read the actions of the United States with respect to how it will respond if there is a new suggestion maybe more than suggested that the kinds of terrorist attacks that have taken place on the are not finished that there will be others how do we sort of relate to India in terms of its legitimate responses to actions taken against its security in light of the kinds of actions the United States has demonstrated that it's prepared to take to protect our interests very difficult question very good question but very difficult question I will be clear right from the beginning I think that the United States drone operations over Pakistan are an essential counterterrorism move to defend the United States of America I advised in favor of ratcheting up drone operations dramatically when the president asked me my views in February and March of 2009 I applaud his decision to send the SEAL team into Abu Dhabad that was an incredibly gutsy call if you ask people in the administration especially in the CIA they will tell you it was a 50-50 chance that Osama bin Laden would be there that's a pretty big risk factor for a president to take it's a bold decision to make all that said we have created a precedent let's not get ourselves we have said that when you find terrorists in Pakistan it is okay to take unilateral operations to deal with them now how many countries in the world does that apply to aside from the United States of America I think there's obviously one and that's the Indians the reason I say the United States and India need to start doing contingency planning is I cannot see government of Prime Minister Singh responding to the 4th 9-11 a Pakistan based terrorist attack on an Indian city in the same way it has responded to the last three that means we're gonna go from threats we're gonna go from Demarsha's we're gonna go from breaking time breaking communications ties to action when the United States does it we do it as a country which is on the other side of the globe from Pakistan when India does it does it as its next door neighbor I'm not telling the Indian government what to do what not to do but it's gonna be an order of magnitude different I have very good reason to believe that ever since Christmas 2001 and certainly since November 2008 an enormous amount of effort has been spent in the Indian Ministry of Defense trying to figure out what are we gonna do the next time I'm not asking them to share their contingency planning with us but I think the prudent thing for strategic thinkers on both sides in and outside of government is to start thinking about that ramifications and trying to think through some of that scenario let me ask I think that was a provocative question let me ask a provocative economic question of Ray and then of Richard on the question of our economic relationship just recently Ambassador Tim Romer submitted his resignation and will be returning here and he gave an interesting interview in the Wall Street Journal he resigned the day of the decision on the jet fighter deal although he said it was not related it would be hard not to have some relationship in terms of the timing but leaving that aside he said in his Wall Street Journal article he expressed some frustrations on the question of direct foreign investment he said that the relationship between the two countries had to be a two-way street and then he said he added it was frustrating at times to be it awaiting he said the next finance minister sing move to open up the markets has happened in 1991 it is interesting that we're meeting 2011 the 20th anniversary of those economic reforms that finance minister sing initiated with Prime Minister well like to ask Ray to respond to does he share that frustration of waiting for the next finance minister sing to move to open up the markets has happened in 1991 well I think there's no question that the pace of reform in India has faltered compared with what happened in the early 90s I do think we need big ideas in this field and one of those of course is in regard to foreign direct investment it's ironic to me that India having just experienced a decline in FDI and talking about so many areas in which they want foreign direct investment still have not opened up for example in retailing in my view it's impossible to solve the problem of food security unless you have maximum growth in the retail end of what happens with the food you can't have a value chain which gets its full value without liberalization there and yet there's still restrictions this now I understand the political problems and I also appreciate that Minister Mukherjee and others have said that it's going to happen soon but it is no wonder that Ambassador Romer has expressed some frustration in that in that area when you have a situation in which India is pleading for foreign direct investment and yet keeps caps in these areas which are most attractive financial services is another one and unfortunately these are areas in which the United States has some of its greatest strengths and so it operates on two levels against building the relationship so I think yes that that has to has to happen and just if I might digress a little bit on the previous question that Bruce answered so well about what happens in regard to the next terrorist attack I would hope that India would do much the same in terms of consideration of its own interest that it did in regard to the last three attacks and that is to make a very reasoned and rational judgment about what is in its best interest and not say that because Osama bin Laden has been killed by us that therefore any particular activity has to occur in order to do it it seems to me that the history of India in regard to how it has responded to these terrorist attacks has been exactly in its own interest and I could foresee devastating effects on the economic relationship had it acted in manners other than that so it seems to me that these these areas are connected and it seems to me that Ambassador Romer has done a great job and what he's expressing in terms of of how this works together is very appropriate wise counsel Richard security counsel reform I think that the report that that CNAS issued was almost certainly the the clearest fullest public expression and the task forces that I've seen for India's being a permanent member of the Security Council India right now is a non-permanent member and I want to ask you your thoughts on they've been a non-permanent member since the beginning of the year and I want to call your attention to two issues one was on Libya in which India abstained it was a 10 vote in favor of the Libya resolution and five abstentions the five being Russia China India Brazil and South Africa some concerns about why India did not vote with the United States in that regard secondly there's a resolution under consideration on Syria in the Security Council now to condemn the Syrian government's attacks against civilians not to go further than that to impose sanctions or threaten any further measures simply a resolution of condemnation for Syria according to the New York Times today the Russians have strong reservations as do the Chinese but also mentioned that India has questions about whether or not to join in that resolution so the question is how do you see India's role in the Security Council in terms of these very important developments taking place the Middle East and in North Africa and what they say about Indian foreign policy and the ability of the United States and India to work together in this very high council at the United Nations well in many ways the two-year tenure I think is the big opportunity for the United States and India to demonstrate that they can work together on the Security Council because obviously there lingering doubts about what it would actually mean for India to have a permanent membership the Indian and US voting coincidence in the General Assembly is I don't know 30% or something which is you know suboptimal at least from our point of view and and you know we've been on the other side of issues that have come before the Security Council when India hasn't been on it like Burma and certain sanctions and so forth so this is the big opportunity to show what it would actually be like if we were both on the Security Council together I don't think that the Libya vote is particularly consequential because you know the mandate came through and then its abstention is an abstention it'll be interesting to see if India has a high rate of abstentions in its two years because I do think that there's still some working out on the Indian side of precisely the role it wants to play India has said for a long time that it sees itself as a global power with global interests and global ambitions US has said the same thing about India but on a number of international issues India has not taken a stand one way the other or sort of said that it wants to kind of remain nonaligned that does not seem to be commensurate with being on the Security Council and having to take a stand on many issues the one thing that I would flag I don't know if Iran will come up between now and the end of India's tenure on the Security Council but if it does that's the issue that I think has a potential to truly be kind of a train wreck in terms of the relationship because you know India describes some Indian officials describe themselves as having a strategic relationship with Iran they don't want to put pressure on on Iran for fear of stirring up Shia sentiment at home and and they have obviously energy ties with Iran this is at the very top of an American national security foreign policy agenda so if this does come before the Security Council and we're on one side and India's on the other I think that's going to be a very difficult thing to bridge thank you very much I do think that the question of our cooperation with Security Council will be a demonstration of our values-based relationship and we'll see how that does play out so with those questions I'd like to now open up and I can see a little bit beyond the click light in our face here I see a hand I'm Manohar at the garage this question actually two questions if I may to Mr. Adele but before I do I just want to say you'd be pleased to know I picked your book up in New Delhi India at the airport just last week and it was my inflight reading on the way back one I thoroughly enjoyed by the way the first question is I wonder if you can comment on the potential for the U.S. and India to collaborate on a greater basis in Afghanistan on security ideas such as training the ANSF have been floating around but they haven't been deeply explored for various reasons some of which have to do with with Pakistan and the second question is a broader one about Pakistan I believe its scores on the human development index are the lowest in South Asia and there are underlying you know structural political factors that would mitigate against that changing anytime soon so what if anything in the U.S. India and anybody else do to affect that if that in fact affects outcomes first thanks for buying the book I hope you didn't expect a romance novel for the flight home two very very good questions we need all the help we can get in Afghanistan this is a really tough mission and we should encourage India to do even more than it already is it is done in enormous amount already India's economic assistance its road building its construction activities its educational activities in Afghanistan are very very important and there's no reason why it shouldn't be involved in helping with the ANSF in my opinion I know there's an equity here with Pakistan I know we have to be careful about that equity but I think we don't we should not let that become a veto there is competition between India and Pakistan over the future of Afghanistan that's inevitable but I don't think we should let that become a veto over the situation we need all the help we can get in stabilizing Afghanistan and let's be frank we're not getting much help from Pakistan right now the irony one of the many ironies of this war in Afghanistan is that the United States supply line the NATO supply line for more than three quarters of everything we use in Afghanistan arrives through the port of Karachi the supply line for the Afghan Taliban is entirely from Pakistan 100% aside from whatever they can pick up on the battlefield in Afghanistan itself we're not getting the cooperation we need there let's not give them a veto over what we need Pakistan's human development index Pakistan's problems I don't think there is a made in America or made in India solution of this problem there has got to be a made in Pakistan problem there are Pakistanis very brave Pakistanis who are outspoken in what their country needs to do unfortunately they're being murdered systematically by the syndicate of terrorism which now operates in that country what can we do to help them we've tried I think the Obama administration tried very hard to reset US Pakistan relations two years ago I encourage us to continue on that to engage despite our frustrations despite understandable irritation but let's be realistic when the next economic assistance budget is sent to this Congress anyone who thinks that this Congress will prove one and a half billion dollars in economic assistance for Pakistan is living in a la-la land this Congress next Congress is cutting the budget foreign aid is the easiest thing to cut in the budget assistance to Pakistan will be the easiest cut in the foreign assistance budget I would not want to be Bob Blake coming up here and making the case to the Congress of the United States how that 1.5 billion dollars is buying us influence in Pakistan right now as a good civil servant I'm sure he will do it but it's going to be a awfully difficult case so what can we do trade we should get out of the business of spec emphasizing economic assistance with Pakistan and get into the business of reducing tariff rates for Pakistan every Pakistani leader since Zia Hul Huk has asked us to do it we've had a tin ear on it tariffs on Pakistani products in the United States are considerably higher than they are in India or Bangladesh or other comparable countries it doesn't make a whole lot of sense every economist who's looked at this said trade not aid is the most effective way to help build an entrepreneurial class in Pakistan which can help in the transformation of Pakistan in the direction we want it to go I frequently say to audiences when I talk about Pakistan the single most important thing you could do to help Pakistan this year would be to go and buy a sweater for everyone in your family next Christmas made in Pakistan if you want to burn it that's fine just by the damn sweater that will do more to help in developing the right kind of entrepreneurial class in Pakistan than any other thing it's time for this Congress and this administration have the courage to do it yes Mac I think somebody's coming right behind you thank you Mac Destler University of Maryland one bold ambitious initiative which has been recommended by my friend Ernie pre would be the negotiation of a US India free trade agreement hasn't been talked about too much where I've been I know the ambassador mentioned it as I think if I'm correct she said that India is looking at possibly doing a study of it but the idea hadn't crystallized really yet any thoughts among the panel particularly Raymond victory about whether it makes sense even as a goal or whether it's a bridge much too far under current circumstances well India is about to conclude free trade agreement with the EU as you know and it is in concluded free trade agreements with a half dozen other countries we have a hang-up in this country about trade and we have to get over it not only in regard to Pakistan as Bruce has suggested but in regard to India now trade has to be beneficial to protecting the middle class in the United States for it to be politically salient and so therefore there has to be a lot of give and take but just to say if you hear the words free trade agreement that you're gonna run for the exits which most US politicians do is not an adequate response I am a believer in big ideas I do think as I indicated earlier that what the Pacific Council and Fickey had proposed in terms of starting with a free trade agreement in the area of services for the innovation economy is a is a good place to start it may be a bridge too far to say that you can negotiate across the board given all the the problems there are but we certainly it seems to me ought to take that seriously and we ought to to move forward on it and unless we are willing to do that the economic engagement necessary to be the engine and to drive this forward is is going to it's not that the whole relationship will fall apart it's not that China won't still be there we won't have issues in terrorism it's that the ability to cooperate the community of interest necessary to push the relation forward will not grow and if it doesn't grow what you have is a flattening of the relationship and then when the political matters come along there are more than bumps in the roads there they become a real watershed issues so I think that yeah Ernie Prieg has made a very valuable suggestion he's sitting here and I hope taking all this in that yeah and he's what he suggested is that we start with some sort of assessment of whether or not it's beneficial and what the benefits are at this point we haven't even been willing to do that people are so afraid really on both sides in the in the U.S. of the concept and what will do to their domestic constituencies that we won't even make an assessment of it and that's not an adequate response question here won't take the mic please thank you very much K cannon I'm recently with Northrop Grumman major defense industry after nearly four four decades I have to admit with the Department of Defense I would like to ask a question about the goes to the ability to cooperate and the ability to cooperate in ways that we know what the benefits would be particularly in providing a strategic partner with the kind of high technology surveillance tools that would allow them to work with us in a symbiotic relationship so that the U.S. whose defense budget is declining can provide tools to its critical partner so it can do the kind of surveillance to preclude attacks and to know what's going on both in its on its borders and in its maritime environment however the Department of Defense does have these tools but there are U.S. regulatory perhaps some would say aging regimes like the missile technology control regime that would seem to be there so we stub our toe as as we want to cooperate can you comment or share views on how we can move ahead to actually to actualize activities for critical thinking and cooperation and planning with real tools to our our partner thank you I can't really speak to it in a huge amount of specificity but when it comes to the issue of export controls in general I mean I think the pattern has been you need top-down very senior political direction for them to change and only in the consistent pressure that's coming from the top down are you going to see that kind of change I mean that's the kind of thing that ended up with the delisting of Indian entities at the summit last year and previous changes in U.S. export control regime with respect to India but if you let this just be to stay as a technical issue of what should go and what should stay and what applies and what doesn't and it's going to stay in the in the bureaucracy that generates export controls that has an interest that is not to let things go and so it's that top-down political direction that says we want to cooperate with India in the following ways and that's going to require these sorts of changes and then to continue to maintain that I think that's the only thing you can do I notice that we are at the witching hour four o'clock I see two hands here I'd like to ask both questioners to pose their questions and then we will try to answer them the gentleman here and then my colleague Amir Latif thank you Ranjan Gupta I have a question for Richard Fontaine you raise an interesting scenario with Iran and I was just thinking in my mind whether you know there are different ways of looking at diplomacy so while if India and U.S. were at odds on an issue on Iran that is one scenario what what about the situation where maybe India could be sort of a mitigator where it could use its soft diplomacy to help in situations where maybe U.S. is having difficulties in making inroads because we've heard in many presidential speeches that whatever differences U.S. has with U.S. Iranian government it's still always with the people and so I'm just trying to understand the situation thank you yeah I mean and and I guess well there's certainly an avenue for the United States to learn things about what Iran is doing and the way it makes decisions in a way we couldn't do in the absence of consultations with India simply because of India's relationship with Iran and the Iranian leaders and so there there are those kinds of opportunities to use India in a way that is different than we would normally expect which is just one more country that's trying to put on the pressure but I also understand and I think we all should the political reality of the importance of this issue in the United States so take the place we're sitting now where I worked for a number of years I mean if you're sitting in Congress and your constituents say okay well the United States changes export controls because that was a big request of the Indians and it recognized India's aspirations for the UN Security Council and the president you know you add up all of these and then in the civilian nuclear agreement but on one of the biggest issues of importance to the U.S. Congress which is sanctions on Iran and trying to prevent an Iranian nuclear program India is on the other side of that issue that is a very difficult thing to bridge and so yes what you're saying is true but it doesn't stop there I'm here Latif CSIS Richard this question's for you just wanted to ask you about Indian engagement in Southeast Asia and East Asia you know there's been recently in the establishment of an Asia dialogue with India there was also the recent announcement of a US India Japan trilateral as we kind of move towards the East Asia summit later this year what are your thoughts about getting the Indians more engaged on security and economic architectures in Asia I think that the kind of intra Asian building of relationships is one of the great changes that we've seen over the last few years and the United States has to be careful we want to encourage that on the one hand and be involved on the other hand we don't want to mess it up to the extended accrues to our interests in the absence of our presence so I mean you see India's bolstering its relations with Japan with Australia with the countries of Southeast Asia with Indonesia for example with Vietnam I think that's all to the good because again we we want not to contain China but we want a robust web of relations among the countries that we can potentially be partners with in East Asia so I think that the US should encourage this and should encourage India to play an ever greater role in those sorts of arrangements East Asian summit and everything else but I think we do have to think hard when it comes to something that looks explicitly like the United States India plus and and that doesn't mean we don't do it we have to think hard about the quad and some of these other things and the the kind of residual feeling that's gonna leave in the region about what's actually transpiring because some of this should be indigenous to the region I think okay before a couple of clue concluding comments could we express our appreciation to our panelists or thank you all very much it's been a fascinating day and I hope that you've all gotten something out of it I I'd like to end with just two two things one is at Bruce's institution Brookings the former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran was recently there and he was asked about the current state and future direction of the US-India relationship and he said a number of points but four of which I think that we should take with us the first one was the pillars for the US-Indian relationship are already in place and I think that all you've heard today demonstrate that secondly said this is a partnership but both sides will not always agree we need to keep that in mind thirdly he said the US-India relationship is more likely to zigzag rather than develop linearly good point and finally he said the US and India need to nurture the relationship don't put it on autopilot continue to nurture it I think these are all excellent points and I think that that's a good way to bring this discussion to a close I want to thank our speakers again and those who preceded them I want to thank my colleagues John Hamre and all at CSIS for all that they did I want to thank the offices of Senators Warner and Cornyn for all of their assistance their offices were great to help us here we looked at the staff list was there was one job called hallway wrangler I always thought that would be a great job to be a hallway wrangler for all of the work at all levels I want to thank those who took place also for Deputy Chief Mission Arun saying at the Indian Embassy who was very helpful and his colleagues Dr. Romesh Wadwani and to all of you for being here for this half-day conference I'm delighted that you could take your the time to be here and I think we'll just leave with one thought Bruce and I did a piece in the national interest a few years ago now it was entitled breaking more non with deli and I think that what we talked about here is ways to break more bread more non with deli and I hope that we can all in our respective capacities go out and find ways to do that so thank you all very much and look forward to seeing you again on other events well thank you