 Good evening to everyone. I'm not seeing anybody, but I see the number. We have quite a good number of participants for a webinar, and there are close to 100 persons now, and it's increasing quite rapidly, so that's a great, very good sign, and welcome to all. It's my great pleasure to first to chair this session, but to introduce our guest for this Tuesday lecture, and I remind, but I presume everybody knows, but that this is part of the Tuesday lectures of the Soas Middle East Institute. So we have the privilege of having this evening with us, Professor Anoush Ahtishami, who is a professor of international relations at the School of Government and International Affairs of Durham University. And there is the Nasser Al-Muhammad Al-Sabaah share in international relations and director of the program in international relations named after the same funder. He is also the director of the Institute for Middle Eastern Islamic Studies at Durham, which is a very old and well known center of excellence in Middle Eastern studies. His most recent publication, without going into a list, so the most recent publication, jointly with Nif Horesh, is very relevant to the topic of this evening, since it is, the title is How China is Changing the Middle East. And that came, this is a publication of this year, 2020. The topic of this evening about Iran and China, this relation is a very crucial topic, not only in Middle Eastern politics actually, we are far beyond Middle Eastern politics in importance, that's a topic of crucial importance in global politics. And that's also a key element in the global competition that we are witnessing between China and the United States and so many other issues. So I'm sure this will be a very interesting lecture. Professor Ahtishami will speak for maybe something like 45 minutes. And after that we'll have enough time for questions which you can ask in writing through the device. And without further ado, I ask, invite our guest to start. Thank you very much for being with us. Thanks all. Thank you Gilbert for your very kind words and thank you, SARS Middle East Institute for inviting me and I came particular has been putting a lot of effort into mobilizing me, the rest of us, and also for the wonderful advertising that has been doing. At the same time, he should get a job as a PR person for any government that needs its face reputation improved. He's been very effective and marvelous. It's a real pleasure to be with you and I'm delighted that your distinguished China Institute is also on the sidelines of this event, because it's wonderful that so as can bring such a wide range of regional specialisms together. Now from like this will enable us to share ideas and interact much more fully than many other places in the UK so it's a real privilege to be asked to address this distinguished audience. And the topic is very close. Thank you Gilbert to developments at the global level, if not at the regional level. And, and for that reason what I would like to do is start by providing a bit of a back a context for why this is an important relationship. What's needed for China. Where is China in this broader context, where does where does Iran fit into this, and then finished by some forward looking comments, and also some caveats, because I'm sure in your in your audience there are others who will be saying no but many of the interjections that I'll be making the course of this. So, don't worry about the broad brush statements there'll be time for us to to get into the details of them in due course, but initially allow me to just provide this setting context for this. And I would like to do that by focusing on what what I am other international relations experts called systemic shift. It can be branded about as a very general term, but it has actually a number of very important distinguishing features that allows us to look at the way in which the world as a whole the world economy relations among states is changing through this systemic shift analysis. Let me just quickly list its critical features if I may Google systemic shift then is the idea that first a dramatic shift in the weight of the world economy is taking place. Effectively this has been taking place since the 1980s. Secondly, the idea that the shift has accelerated fall in the end of the Cold War, because of the end of the two global power blocks of the Soviet side and the American left side. Thirdly, the idea that the shift has been facilitated by the intensification of globalization. Here the issue is not that globalization is uneven, but rather than the process itself has has enhanced opportunities for countries corporations and regions to engage at a much more intensive level than hitherto for the, the idea that globalization itself has in turn intensified regionalization and the rise of what we call global regions. The most dramatic of these global regions of course is to be found in Asia for reasons that I will I will go on to in a moment or two. So semi shift is the idea that as a consequence of rapid growth in the GDP. Looking at in GDP terms has been taking place beyond the Atlantic zone that it is the first time in the modern era if you like, that we're beginning to see an alternative economic pole emerge at the global level. Next, the idea that as a result of global economic power changing that same thing has become much more diffuse. It is not one particular actor that can now change the global dynamics, it requires an orchestra of actors to do so. And finally, that systemic shift is exemplified in the rise economic power of several large non Western economies simultaneously. This is not about the rise of one power at the expense of another. But it's actually about an all criticism process of a major shift taking place in the weight of the global economy. And this is has been moving in the last 30 years 40 years from the edges of Europe, and now sits on the boundaries of Iran and Turkey. So that is the pivot of the global economy. And that is how we are able to to measure and inquire is the person who has been pioneering this who was at the LSE, this process of change taking place at the global level. This is important. And I would like to demonstrate systemic shift with the aid of three examples if I may. Example one. And here, we have to have the caveat all things being equal. Of course, all things are not equal. And COVID-19 shows how they can be so unequal so very quickly. But let's assume for the moment, in example one that all things being equal is so called emerging seven group of countries. That is to say Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, the Russian Federation and Turkey combined. Could come to come to comprise 50% of the global GDP by 2050. Let's just digest that fact that by 2050, all being equal is one diverse group of countries will be comprising 50% of the global GDP. Similarly, we assume that GDP will be much larger than what it is now at the global level, which means that their relative weight, compared to say 2020 will be much, much greater. You compare that with the projected size of the group of seven economies, their global GDP size is likely to be standing at 20% of the global GDP by 2050. This is a dramatic illustration of how economic weight is shifting away from the so called Atlantic zone, and towards these E seven, but also much more concentrated as example to demonstrates before the pandemic struck China was accounting for 12% of the world's merchandise trade. A single country accounted for 12% of the world's merchandise trade. That is many trillions of exchanges taking place with China as its pivot. To put that in some context, the United States being the largest economy on the planet accounted for 11% of the world's merchandise trade in the same year. Finally, example three 30% of world exports in manufacturing today come from just a handful of Asian countries. These countries are working closely together in strengthening and creating a robust network of supply chains, which is going across Asia across the eastern edge of Asia in a dramatic way. And you could argue that in fact, recent developments I'll come to in a minute are exemplifying this process. China's metronautic rise has facilitated Asia emerging as a world's most dynamic so called global region. And it's global strategy, the Belt and Road Initiative and all which is associated with that with the BRI, as I will go on to talk about is energizing a complex system of Asian sub regions. This is development since the end of the Cold War, until 1989, 1990, the world was very much in a rigid format. There were the non-aligned movement from over 100 countries that didn't really sing from the same song sheet. We had the Soviet size and the American side orchestrating the way in which global international relations function. That is now broken down completely. And when we look at the assumption that Asia is now this largest global region, then we're beginning to see the not just the emergence but convergence of sub regions of Asia. What are the sub regions? Well, we can divide them into about four or five zones. The first nearest to China is the Northeast Asia sub region. The second is Southeast Asia sub region. Next, the South Asia sub region. Next, the Central Asia sub region. And finally the West Asia of the Persian Gulf sub region. These sub regions are focused very much eastwards as they develop. And we could argue in fact that the Pacific's newest regional grouping, the so called regional comprehensive economic partnership, a bit of a mouthful. To get Aki to get a bit of a PR work on the branding of this new initiative of 15 Asian countries plus New Zealand and Australia is an exemplar of the way in which the systemic shift is leading to emergence of intense integrated regional systems. 13 countries today account for $26 trillion in terms of GDP. Together, they make up 30% of the global economy and 30% of the global population. This is the world's largest economic block today. We're overshadowing the European Union and just being bigger in terms of economic size than the NAFTA, which is the US, Canadian, Mexican partnership. But further Gilbert, systemic shift is encouraging to further currents. First, multi polarity of the national system. We talk about this as a given, but it hasn't not been given. It has taken form as a consequence of this process of systemic shift. And secondly, the further consequence of systemic shift is what I call the process of Asianization of Asia. That is the first time for centuries that Asia is beginning to discover itself as an entity. Why is that it has happened primarily for four or five reasons. The first, as I've already alluded to, is the clubs of the Soviet Union and the opening up of the heartland of Asia to both the eastern edges of Asia, the southern part of Asia, and increasingly the western edges of Asia. Iran sits as a pivotal actor in this opening up of the heart of Asia. Secondly, Asianization of Asia is accelerating because of the sub-regionalization of the continent, that these subgroupings are beginning to act as cohorts that are driving a collective desire to integrate further through economic cooperation. The intensification of interation energy zones is particularly important. And it is contracts like China, like India, like Japan, and like Korea, South Korea in particular, which are driving this energy ties that are developing and have been in existence, particularly at an accelerated pace since the 1990s. And finally, where these have gone, where developments have gone, there are now growing financial networks, the sovereign wealth funds of many of these state led economies are beginning to interact with each other and the opportunities for trade and investment have enhanced as a consequence. This is, if you like, the global backdrop to China's greater presence in regions. And with regard to central, south, and West Asia, history, in my view, provides an added, if you like, imagine glove for the deepening of ties between these regions. They imagine gloves are the sick road that China is very keen to continue to promote as an ancient historical relic that is now, if you like, meeting the postmodern era. And the secondly, Asian cultural ties. The latter is more problematic than the former, because of course, so much of Asia has been westernized that actually it is finding it much more difficult to rediscover the cultural roots that existed centuries before. And it is a process, a long-term process of beginning to develop a new understanding of what the East has always called Asian values. But of course, Asian values are not transferable beyond the broad boundaries of these sub regions. And Asian values to the Muslims of West Asia and the Middle East mean one thing. Asian values of South Asia means a different thing. And Asian values of East Asia, of course, also has its own particular resonance and meaning. These are, if you like, some of the complicating undercurrents that are also in evidence. I would also add, Mr. Chairman, that China's Western pivot, if we can call it, started while the rest of the world was pivoting East. In other words, China started the process of discovering the Western parts of Asia of the Cold War, while the rest of the world and parts of Asia, of course, indeed, were focusing on how did they get on the Asian bandwagon. It is ironic, isn't it, that even India has now got a look East strategy, even though it's actually all about India being part of this pivotal Asian country, which is going to be shaping this vast continent going forward. Of course, in this relationship, the energy partnerships are particularly important. That is important in relation to the Middle East and Iran in particular, because we assume, or at least we'll think that we'll continue to assume that there was going to be a deepening of these energy ties between the West Asia and other Asian zones well into the 2050s. The time we tell, but the current projections are that if anything, these relations are going to be deepened going forward. We should note also, of course, that China today is the largest trading partner of 10 Middle Eastern countries. It is still a small player in this region. And it is now the primary direct investor in virtually all the key Muslim countries of the Middle East. We can put them aside for a moment. But of course, when you look at Israel and Turkey, China also is a major player in both of those economies as well. The second pivot, I should say, has found a large multi-dimensional and well greased wheel of engagement in the BRI, which was formalized in 2013. Over 80 countries, some claim about 100 countries, in fact, are involved in the BRI. Billions of dollars over the last nearly decade have been invested in the BRI areas. And China's budget for trillion dollars devoted to the BRI towards any major investment infrastructure the world has seen. China is a major player in this regard. So if I may now, Gilbert, I'll look very quickly and fleetingly at China itself a bit more closely. So it's obvious, therefore, if it wasn't already, that a focus on China is important. And it is what China does and what China says matters and matters more today than ever. Those countries, which are looking up to the BRI, are hoping and expecting to see the economies lifted as a consequence of China's largesse and involvement with these economies. In so many ways, they are now tied to the prosperity of China for their own development in this century. I presume that China's GDP will be 32 trillion dollars by the year 2030. That is nine years away from now. China's pool will be irresistible. Again, to put that in context, the United States GDP is presumed to grow to about 23 trillion dollars by 2030. In Europe, Britain, France and Germany will have a combined GDP of 12 trillion dollars. Indies will be dwarfed by China, because it'll only be eight trillion dollars and Japan's only six trillion dollars. China by 2030 will be a colossus in these terms, given its size and ambitions. The construction of transport routes, ports, pipelines, IT highways, and so many other infrastructure projects across Asia. And we know also spreading to South to East Africa and also Europe offers the promise of a new duration order in which China provides the hub and its BRI partners, the spokes of an integrated, if we may call it a post Western economic order. China will then be the first amongst equals. China's hub will connect 55% of the world's GDP, 70% of the world's population, and 75% of the world's known energy sources. This is truly a new world order. China today has a large and heavy footprint. The weight it is now carrying around is increasingly being felt in regions long assumed to be in the West's orbit. This is nowhere more visible than in the Middle East and North Africa region. In a region itself, no relationship has raised more questions, eyebrows, fears, concerns, anxieties, and the one which has been emerging between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the People's Republic. So, in the time that remains, let me look quickly at why Iran and why concerns about Iran. And look at this, perhaps through a four sided prism. And then in this we can articulate the answer to the question why Iran. The four sides of the prism are geopolitics. What I like to call ideal political geo economic and civilization. Let me quickly run through these for you. The first geopolitical. Iran is a large and influential Middle East Muslim country. The largest sheer power in the world. It sits at the pivot of where US Chinese interests both converge and diverge. It is at the front line, if you like, of the Cold War between China and the United States. For China, Iran is a plausible deterrence against American misbehavior in East Asia. For America, Iran is a nuisance in its efforts to continue to manage world oil resources for the benefit of itself and its allies. Also, Iran provides a balancer to the US in the Persian Gulf. If China wants to balance against the US, Iran is this ideal partner in that regard. But so long as the United States is a security guarantor of this vital region, China has no need to pick a fight with the United States over this. So geopolitics is really significant. The first part of this ideal political convergence is to be found is this sense of victimhood. Both Iran and China carry baggage about the role of Western new colonial powers in in blunting their growth and development. China in the early 20th century, Iran, earlier than that, carry this burden of domination by the West. And they see this as opportunity to finally shake off these shackles. China calls this the China dream. Iran calls this neither East nor West. The other element of ideological, of course, is Iran's claim and strive to become an independent actor. It is not beholden to China's rivals, no matter what color they may be. And thirdly, importantly, Iran stands the United States, not just for geopolitical reasons, but also for ideological reasons. Iran sees United States as an aggressive power, as a great Satan. That can play very nicely in China's narrative if there was to be a deepening of this cold war between Beijing and Washington, Washington. It is about Iran being seen to shake off this, this chains of foreign interference and involvement, and that plays very nicely to China's narrative as well. The third prism that we can look at the relationship is due economic. I would argue that there are only two countries in the global south that offered the promise of El Dorado. These are Algeria and Iran. Very similar countries, a useful industrial base, a creative population, near large markets and endowed with oil and gas but also much more than that natural resources. Algeria is in many ways far too close to Europe for it to be easily acquired, if you like, by China. Iran is not. Iran has been on the sanctions, Iran has been isolated, and it is right for opening up. In that sense, Iran offers a large market. It offers hydrocarbons riches. The second largest gas deposits, for example, in the world. It's in doubt with a wide range of natural resources. It has a large and innovative population. It has a resourceful middle class. Society is creative and also is ideally located for access right across continents. Due economically, Iran is also an ideal candidate for convergence with China. And last but not least is the civilizational dimension. There are in many ways and see each other in many ways as civilizational bodies. The narrative plays very well at both ends of Asia. And this kind of, you know, respect did not start now. This really is rooted in the Silk Road, and it can really be traced back millennia in terms of relationships between the two countries. But in modern times, China and Iran discovered each other in 1960s at the height of the Cold War. When I visited Iran in 1965, it was for two particular reasons. At that time, China had no vision of becoming an energy border from this part of world. The two reasons were that the American paper tiger was weak, but the Soviet imperialist power was too strong. Iran was close to the American paper tiger, but was resisting the Soviet pressure as well. For China, Iran was this unique model of a developing emerging economy able to assist China's development as well as a potential partner with it. The pattern and image, in my view, has continued into the 1980s, 90s and more recently. But what we're seeing with growing Western pressure on Iran, a process of de-Westernization of Iran. I'm mindful of time, so I will now briefly look at what's in it for Iran. We can divide the discussion into push and pull factors for ease of presentation. What are the push factors for Iran? There are many. Most important of which of course is the pressure of sanctions, that Iran has suffered hugely at the hands of sanctions and they're not recent. They've been in place since 1979 in one shape or another. The sanctions have weakened Iran economy, have costed its historic mission, if you like, as well, and Iran has been desperate to find any way out of this huge pressure on it. The other push factor, of course, is that China provides Iran a way of avoiding Western political and military pressures as well as economic pressures. Thirdly, it is a lever to begin to reduce Iran's isolation, to try and lessen its strategic isolation. Fourthly, it helps Iran to reduce some of its strategic vulnerabilities by being seen to have an emerging global power as its patron indeed partner. And fifthly, that Iran too has been consciously pushing for a look at East strategy to balance the problems that is had with the West in general. If these are some of the push factors, what then have been the pull factors? Here again we can now name a few. First, the economic opportunities that China and its Asian neighbors provide Iran. The fact that China provides a vibrant energy market for Iran's oil and gas exports. The fact that China has been willing to invest in Iran. The fact that China has been able to maintain trade at a much lower level through the sanctions period. The fact that China has always presented itself as a friendly country to Iran. The fact that it provides Iran the opportunity to ride the crest of this Eurasian convergence. The fact that China sees Iran as a pivot in its Belt and Road Initiative into West Asia. And finally, the fact that the two have been talking for some time about this so called deal of the century, not Trump's, but rather the $400 billion trade deal, which has been mooted that that is in the works between Iran and China. I would say before everybody jumps up and down that the $400 billion figure is not true, and the deal itself is also only a modest version of the relationship, which has been going on for some time. To conclude, if I may, looking forward and caveat, and I can see you fidgeting Gilbert so I will be very quick. So the post call post COVID world is important as a first element as we look forward. This is going to weaken the West. As it devotes more time to recovery from COVID. It will mean that the East is rebounding faster. So there is this relative as well as an absolute change in pace of economic recovery. This will increase multi polarity going forward in the next decade. Now, multi polarity does not mean us or Western weakness, or, or, or, or end of the West far from it. The US in particular is far too resourceful to be written off as a second rate power, no matter how much damage the Trump administration has done to the country. Secondly, going forward, will continue to see the rise of China, irrespective of COVID that China is on a path on a dependent path of development that the BRI is going to facilitate and indeed the BRI is likely to accelerate going forward, because most countries are going to be more dependent on the BRI than they were before COVID-19 for a degree of economic stability, let alone their prosperity. But this doesn't mean in any shape or form that the BRI successes is guaranteed, or that indeed is progress is preordained. What this all this means, of course, is that the rise in demand for for pressure and gas is not going to slow down anytime soon. Then there is, of course, the Biden victory, we should have an impact on the relationship. On the one hand, China does not want to jeopardize building new bridges with the Biden administration. On the other hand, it will not want to let Iran go, and he want to use Iran as a bargaining chip for reducing pressure in other arenas on it. Similarly for Iran, Iran does want to see what the Biden administration wants to offer before it jumps from the frying pan into the pot of the Chinese partnership. So the Biden victory is in the process, and both parties will be cautious as they go forward into the 2020s as a consequence of his victory. Also, we have to be mindful of Iran's own presidential elections in June 2021. The assumption is that Iran's conservatives will take control of the executive as they've done of the judiciary. It is probably a given, and it's the conservatives who have much more of an ambition to move further from the West, and much closer to China in particular. So why come this? Well, the evidence suggests that China does not want a close ties with Iran, a radical conservative revolution in Iran, at the expense of close links with the UAE, with Saudi Arabia, with Israel, with Turkey, and others. And last but not least, for Iranians the question still remains, is China a friend or a strategic partner? So in thanking you again, allow me to stop and I look forward to questions and comments. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Anoush, for this very stimulating presentation and a lot of foot for thought and a lot of matters for discussion. We have quite a few numbers now already of questions, which I will be reading to you. But I would suggest that we start with questions about the global perspective or the international perspective before focusing on the Middle East as, I mean, following your own presentation where you started with the global considerations and then came in the second part to the region. So we have a few questions of a general character. Let me start by the end, because that's where we are getting more and more questions here. I will need to, I won't be able to read them, then I will have to summarize what they are, but I don't know how it functions with the system, but there should be a closure to the questions because there's no way we can deal with what we have already, which are 10 questions. I think that's more than enough for the time that remains. If we are to give any meaningful discussion or time to these questions. So I would suggest that we deal with those 10 questions and we can, you know, in the course of the discussion, maybe add a few issues. Okay. There is one question about the, well, let me start by this because it's about the very present time, whether the economic crisis that is going on with the, of course, as a result of the pandemic, the pandemic, primarily, is this going to intensify the tensions to the point of military conflict, well, between the two sides, but this is assuming that China and Iran are on one side in a kind of global military conflict. What, how do you react to this question? Is it, we're talking about intensification of US, China. Exactly. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, that's why I'm saying the question assumes that Iran and China are in one camp in some kind of global confrontation. What is interesting about China is that for all its weight and interest in constructive dialogue, it doesn't really welcome close partnerships, military partnerships. It's very much actually a solo actor, ironically, when it comes to it. And, and, and it is always been reluctant to get involved in other people's problems, and this sovereignty max, which is it's, it's foreign policy ideology if you like, means that it would rather defend itself, and it rather not be called upon by others to defend them as well. And there is an Achilles Hilda mission to this, and that is that countries become suspicious suspicious ultimately of what China's motives might be in conflict configurations. But I don't see myself that the assumption that there is going to be a military confrontation between the US and China is a given. I think the interdependence is so ingrained currently, and I don't see COVID totally bursting these asunder in the next years or so that it would lead to isolationism in the US or in China. China is dependent on America's economic recovery in many ways. And America is dependent on China's finance, if nothing else, and what Americans consume is made in China. So the two need to take a deep breath and go back but what is problematic I guess is that as Trump's position hardened over the last four years. China also became much more rigid and there are say more polemical and to an extent aggressive in his responses. It began to punish countries like Australia for stepping out of line. It began to punish countries for questioning what was going on in Hong Kong. It became very agitated if people refer to Taiwan instead of Fumosa or saw Taiwan as anything other than an appendage of Chinese mainland. And, and of course in South China scene particular where China has been building miraculously these new land masses around which it can claim maritime boundaries are encroaching on many of ASEAN's territorial borders and is resisting any response from countries like the Philippines and Vietnam and Indonesia to try and redress all of these boundary problems. So no question that China has hardened its edge in this post COVID environment. But we have to wait and see whether this is a temporary response is a knee-jerk reaction to Trump and COVID, or whether it is an ingrained process. If it's the latter, then I would say that it will actually affect very badly. It's ambitious BRI agenda. There is a question for from my so as colleague, Professor Arshin, who I didn't look at them, whom you know well about Russia in this equation. Where does Russia fit in this? I mean, Iran, China kind of corridor and relations. Thank you Arshin. Nice to have you with us. That's that in many ways an unfair question, because actually I the focus of my talk was so much China centric that I deliberately avoided reference to other actors. But but obviously I cannot I cannot not respond to Arshin properly. So I would say that in many ways, but let's both China and Iran are suspicious of China of Russia. They have been in the past, and they remain so. While both Iran and China have good somewhat close and growing economic relations with Russia. Both recognize that Russia's interests are not identical to theirs. We see it in Syria, for example, in relation to Iran. And we see in central Asia in relation to China. So, there are matters of convenience, there are tactical relationships, if not alliances, but of this triangle, if there is to be an enduring relationship, I see to be between Russia and China, rather than Russia and Iran. And in many ways Iran's interest to diverge from from Russia's. Whereas over the, you know, Eurasia, China and Russia are close. And both, of course, are very mindful of India's slow, but definitive resurgence as well. And the three, I think, are mindful of each other's relative weight and the relationships that need to balance with each other. But China cannot assume mastery of Central Asia without Russia's consent this day and going forward. So that is a complicated relationship. But given that, you know, the energy zones of Kazakhstan and Kazakhstan and the Caspian are increasingly important to China. China does need to come to some terms with Russia. And then of course, last but not least, the Shanko corporation organization provides yet another pivot around which China and Russia have the pole dance. There is another question involving another regional power, which is India. Although, of course, it's less obviously directly linked to the topic, but I can connect this question about where India fits into that and the, and the person who asked the question is assuming that China is trying to split India. But there is another question about how Iran's China's relations and that's very much more direct affect Afghanistan and what's going on in Afghanistan. So, so are you are you authorizing me to overrule India at this stage. I can just comment briefly that the telling point is to that in this new economic, the regional comprehensive economic partnership. Gosh, it's a mouthful. India is absent. Russia is absent. It is asian plus Korea plus China plus Japan plus New Zealand plus Australia. Very interesting due economic dynamics. Secondly, from the very beginning, India has resisted joining the BRI. And in fact, has set about trying to create its own alternative economic orbit with relative success but nothing as spectacular as the BRI. And secondly, India pushed by the United States is for is very interested in creating this pool of Asian democracies, which pivots around countries like South Korea, like Japan, like Singapore, like Malaysia to provide if you like a geocultural identity, from the links with China as an authoritarian state led society and economy. So, apart from the border dispute, and the technology, technology, technology problems, geopolitical problems between them. There are all these other variables to also bear in mind. And with regard to Afghanistan, as the US draws down as that it will. It's not as China has been very active in in a in a stabilizing force in Afghanistan for some time is is putting billions in stabilization finance in economic support and so on. It's important to it, not because not just because there is a we territorial dimension to the China-Afghan relationship, but also that for for CPAC for the China-Pakistan Economic Cooperation Initiative to work. Afghanistan must be stable. Afghanistan is Pakistan's underbelly. And, and so China recognizes full well the dangers of that to its critical partner that is Pakistan, but also the fact that Afghanistan continues to be this fountain head of radical Islamist linked terrorism that they are absolutely petrified of. And as they see the Americans and the West kind of shrugged the shoulders, they become even more animated about this. And the sea in Pakistan, but also in Iran as stabilizing forces in try and put some order to Afghanistan. What is missing from that equation, of course, is that neither Iran nor Pakistan have got the resources to stabilize Afghanistan, nor do they see stability Afghanistan through the same lens. Their views are different on Afghanistan. And as a consequence, they, they, they, you know, the weight falls back on China to try and stabilize the situation. I hope that answers the question. Yeah, thank you. There's a question about the economic relations between the two countries that you addressed China and Iran. One person noted that these announced Chinese investments in China did not materialize. And I presume a person known to both of us, Valmogaddam or colleague Valmogaddam is asking about the, the fact that the BRI has no projects apparently in Iran. So, how do you comment on that? Is it also because is China deterred by US sanctions on Iran and what that would entail in case they break these sanctions. Yeah, thanks Val. And again, a searching question. Well, this, of course, you know, when, when, when we can reflect on this, China supported the UN imposed sanctions on Iran. China supported restricted measures on Iran's nuclear program. Even though the 1990s, it was trying to get into the game with Iran. China pulled out of its nuclear relationship with Iran on the direct pressure from the United States. China reduced is oil imports from Iran in response to American, not so much American dictate, but American request, and increased is imports from Saudi Arabia in direct response to the reduction of its imports from Iran. And China followed international norms, when he came to an isolation strategy against Iran's nuclear program or support for terrorism and so on, even though China didn't see eye to eye on these broader issues. And when he came to West depiction of Iran's behavior or policies. And of course, Iranians remember all this. And, and let's provide another factor here that is, once the joint cooperation agreement jcpa was was implemented in 2016. Interestingly, President Xi Jinping turned up with a plane full of company leaders CEOs and officials. And yet, so much of Iran's energy till the Trump impulse sanctions were focusing on encouragement of European companies and countries to enter Iran. And that was very interesting that even given the opportunity, even given the presence direct presence of heavyweight Chinese political influence, Iranians were more keen to rediscover their, their, their European if not American ties, then they were the ones. And maybe there are very clear reasons for this, and the technology, the finance that follows it access to markets opportunities for development. There is a fear, and it's not just in Iran that China's joggernaut destroys local economy. That is cheap products, destroy kind of global south products, not advanced economies products, and that as a consequence, it diminishes their economic reserves. Iranians have been complaining about this for some time. They complain that the quality of Chinese products are inferior to the West. Increasingly questioned, of course, we are now proud consumers of many Chinese products, but which work perfectly well, but this kind of this notions of doubt exist, and the shape behavior of decision makers and opinion makers and so on. And so this fear, and the suspicion of China has not gone away. So as a consequence, there are still question marks about how much will China give Iran when the chips are down. Hence my final sentence, that is China a fair weather friend, or, or is a strategic partner, remaining an open question. Interesting. Thank you. Thank you, Anush. A member of the audience is asking about the, how, how Iran is reacting to the oppression of Muslims in China. Did Iran, as a government or media or whatever, did anything or react in any way about this? How is this reported in Iran? In many ways, Iran, Iran wears the same color of shame as other Muslim countries, who have chosen to put expediency in front of values and morals, if you like. What is, but what is interesting is actually, back in 1989, when President Rafsanjani visited China, he was one of the first Muslim leaders to get to know China, and in fact he was the pioneer of this opening up of direct links between Iran and China. He, he went to Xinjiang, and there are, there are facilities in that part of China, built by Iranian money, and there are still, as far as I know, Iranian shops, cultural centers, let's not call them hoses, which, which operate in that part of China. Iranian officialdom has followed the same line as all Muslim countries but Turkey. Turkey, to be fair, has been vocal on this question of repression of the ego population. Iran has decided, at official level, not to, as they put it, interfere in other countries' internal affairs, which is a laugh in itself, given what Iran is doing in Iraq, in Lebanon, in Yemen, in Syria, everywhere else. But that is the fig leaf that they are putting up. And, and all these countries, of course, can justify this position on the basis that China, as a partner, as a global power is far too important to be trifled with when it regards this particular issue, a national security issue. This is not complaining about putting in jail, Hong Kong, democracy activists. This is what China regards as first line national security issue, and none of them seem compelled to, to put up an alternative narrative. Yeah. Thank you. Let me ask on the same question, actually, but with regard to an interpretation that one can find of that, which is to say that there is something sectarian about this also in the fact that the Uighur are mostly Sunni. And that if it were a Chinese, sorry, a Shia population, maybe Iran's reaction would have been different. I think that's the third point, Gilbert, but for a country that claims to be the flag bearer of all Muslims, that's what the constitution says after all. And, and, you know, it bears its chest for Myanmar's repression suppression of its Muslims. It sent arms to the Philippines, Muslim fighters. It defends Islam from its own perspective across the world. It sends the Russian gas to Bosnia to protect the Bosnian Muslims against aggressors and so on. And when it comes to mass imprisonment of hundreds of thousands as far as we can tell, of Muslims of China, he chooses not to interfere in other people's internal affairs is doesn't sit as well with this revolutionary mantra. Thank you. We have a question about whether Iran would actually be interceding for China's interest in the countries where it is it has been expanding its influence in the the Middle East. The question is about Iraq. There was a more or less similar question about Syria. And I can add to that Lebanon, for instance, where Hassan Nasrallah, the leading figure of Hezbollah in Lebanon, was advocating relations with China as a replacement of relations with the United States or with Western countries. So what would you say about this? There's no question that China is, as it sees the world, multipolarize is interested in, in, in providing its, its, I think it's too strong a term to call it alternative, but a checklist for the West's interpretation of intervention. It was very badly hurt by what happened in Libya in the course of our spring, because it was caught with his hands in his pockets when his nationals were exposed to instability there. When it had been assured by Western intervention, that all will go smoothly, and that its people will not be vulnerable. And indeed, Russia and China both still carry grudge, and they were told that there will not be military intervention in Libya by the West. And both of them feel that they were cheated by the West, particularly France in that regard. And so as a consequence, in other places where there is turmoil, Syria you mentioned, Iraq, you mentioned, they would like to see a method of stabilization, which goes beyond the narrative of responsibility to protect, or beyond the narrative of bringing democracy to those places, or defeating terrorism. The Chinese would like all of these terms to be unpacked. And for there to be a much better understanding of drivers of instability, understanding why economic poverty causes radicalization. And in many ways, the Chinese would like these things aired. They like, if you like, not to upturn Western norms, but they would like to supplement them with additional humanitarian, non interventionist approaches that still can go some way towards stabilizing these unstable zones in the Middle East in particular. And it sees Iran's influence, not role as much, but its influence as a way of reaching a better understanding and therefore engaging with these unstable zones in the region. And it will not want to put itself on the front line of changing the regional order in a way that would suit Iran, for example. So again, these are very limited areas of cooperation. They can bring international pressure to stabilize Syria, wonderful. If they can bring pressure to end the war in Yemen, fantastic. If they can bring peace to Palestine, Israel, great. And that in many ways is China's ambition, as far as I can tell. Thank you again. There's a very topical question about whether there is any cooperation in terms of the fight again COVID between Iran and China and any agreements with regard to the vaccine and other issues like that. Yeah. Sorry, I'm just noting these. Yeah, sure. In fight against COVID. Well, in many ways Iranians holds China responsible for their recovery. Iran became the epicenter of COVID in the Middle East as we all know, because there were these direct flights. The Mahan airline between China and Iran, and from the Iranian side, it, it carried ordinary people, but also big chunks chunks of Iran's political elite. Revolutionary guard clerics government ministers and and and and and on the secretaries business people linked to the state and so on. And these folks went. They came back and pretended that there was no such a thing as COVID in so many ways, replicating Trump strategy towards COVID close your eyes close your ears close your mouth and it'll go away. The reasons for the strategy when company United States in Iran, of course, it was the eve of the anniversary of the revolution and Eve of Iran's parliamentary elections, neither of which the regime wanted to be reduced. Just as Trump doesn't want his rallies to diminish in size. Iranians did not want the images of many millions marching on the streets. Celebrating the revolution diminish and as a consequence, COVID spread like wildfire, wildfire Iran is now in its third wave and infection rates are highest in Iran than other parts of the Middle East. And finally, the government has now recognized that it needs to impose bigger restrictions. Here, it's not just that the government is at fault. Iranian people are also at fault. Let's not just blame the government for all of this people misbehave. They don't take the virus seriously, but also because the elite initially said, even when it's all members were being infected that this is not a serious virus. This is something that Americans have have produced to kill Muslims with and so on. These things matter. Word really do matter and has left Iran totally exposed. Therefore, Iran is desperate for vaccines. It has talked itself that it developed its own vaccine, which was a Shiran and is genuinely now looking to China to provide the vaccine. China has been exemplary in providing Iran with medical support. And this was important when Trump criminally, my view, deprived Iran of having access to essential medical kit of medicines to help its people. The medical decision to block access to critical medicines has cost Iranians lives. And for that, you can't blame Iran. You can't blame China. While Europeans were begging the Trump administration to provide access or at least allow access so that medical kits could be brought in the stood firm on this being part of the sanctions regime. Naturally, Iran will turn to anybody but United States for help in this regard. And it's good that China's vaccine have advanced. And it's wonderful that China is prepared to share it with the world, but particularly with countries which are more vulnerable than others and Iran fits that category extremely well. A long-winded answer to the question. Thank you. That's actually very interesting and topical, of course, and everyone is interested in these issues and we hear a lot about COVID but much less about what you just explained because it's very much focused on each country's problems for in each country. Right, so we had quite a wide variety of questions. There's one little bit of perspective in regard to the Biden administration. How do you see things changing with the Biden administration. And if I would put it in a more concrete manner with a resumption of the US participation in the nuclear treaty as it is called and the lifting of those sanctions that the Trump administration imposed on Iran. How would that affect the whole picture and including this this relation that is at the center of your of your talk. In many ways actually Biden is a win-win for both Iran and China. Why? But first of all, the lifting of sanctions removes this barrier put in front of Iran to engage with the rest of the world. To try and recover its oil and gas deposits, to invest in them and also to try and raise the standard of living of its 80 million people. If you look at the last 40 years, the relative curve of prosperity has been in decline. That actually, while you could see the size of Iran's GDP, greater than it was 40 years ago. But when you look at where it might have been under a different political environment regime, Iran would have been one of the so called E7s by now. And that is a historic loss opportunity, opportunity cost that Iran has incurred. And it will therefore, against all the pressures of employment pressures, youth unemployment, inability to pay its way, to pay wages of its employees, for its industry to thrive, and so on. In the face of all those pressures, American return to the JCCO POA or JCCO POA 2.0 will be greeted warmly in Tehran, even though Iran's public face towards the United States may not change. They will definitely appreciate the opportunities that lifting of some of America would not lift all its sanctions, but the lifting of some of these intrusive sanctions will give them breathing space. From the Chinese side, that of course means that China then happily go about building the BRI projects that Val was referring to, enter Iran's economy, invest in Iran more easily, export arms to Iran that both parties would like to do as well, and do this without alienating its equally important partners in the Emirates, in Saudi Arabia, and in Israel. Because it would not be circumventing sanctions then, it will be going about its business as usual. So, all parties will gain from this. For Biden administration, this is a nod to Iran, on the one hand, that we can take it away what we give it. I hope this is an opportunity for you. And it's a nod to China as well, that we recognize the interest that you have here, and we are prepared to open up avenues for the development of relations with a country like Iran in pursuit of your BRI, even though women are directly involved. So, I see this as all in the context of the China-Iran relations, a win-win. We haven't talked about the wider Middle East issues. In that context, I think it would be much more of a mixed bag. Thank you, Anoush. Let me add a comment that may be the final comment, because I think we have addressed all the questions, because there are many overlap, a lot of overlap between questions, as happens with this kind of, I mean, that's the difference between when people are in person in a room and they hear each other. We know what are the questions, and when they all write questions at the same time. So there was quite an overlap between a lot of questions, and I think we discussed them all. Let me add the final one, if possible, since we still have some time, which is that it's of course an unequal relation as those kinds of relations. And in that sense, Iran needs China much more than China needs Iran. I mean by that, if we look at this whole thing from the Chinese point of view, China is busy in developing its relations with all countries. I mean, as you mentioned in the region, not least with Israel, by the way. The arch enemy of Iran. I mean, the two most hostile countries on earth today are Israel and Iran. And yet China has relations with both. As actually Russia has to, I mean Russia also has close relations with Israel and has some, you know, cooperation relations with Iran. China is the customer number one of the Saudi Kingdom. I mean, depending on years, but it's a major buyer of Saudi oil. And therefore it depends. I mean, for China, the Saudi Kingdom is a major partner for its diversification also of its energy sources. So if we look at things from the point of view of China, Iran is one asset among many and they are developing all these assets. Whereas if we look at things from point of view of Iran, which is a much more isolated country, subject to sanctions and all that, the choices are much more limited. Oh, absolutely. I couldn't agree more. And it's, it's, it's only the context of power politics that Iran can become a more significant actor than many of its neighbors when it comes to China, China's influence and presence in the region and also geopolitically. The reasons that you said are all absolutely right, but geopolitically Iran is the only one which has a land mass presence around the Asian continent that China does. And these two have a way of seeing each other as this Asian civilization of powers. And there is, for all the unevenness, there is a symmetry in terms of geoculture and history between them, that the Chinese scholars and people of policy that I've talked to see Iran generally differently from many of its neighbors. And they are very conscious of the past in this relationship as well. They see it, if you like, as an authentic country that they can do business with. And while, yeah, Iran is always a junior partner. So long as Iran thinks that China regards it as fits Iran's own image of exceptionalism and are happy with that. But also, it doesn't matter to them if they're the junior partner, so long as if we imagine this kind of flying geese analogy of one big economy pulling a group of other economies with it. But at the same time, being the smallest at the back, so long as the traveling that same right direction of future development and so on. And they have much more to lose than China does. But, but at the same time, if China is betting on the long term. They much rather have a country which is openly defined of the West on its side than one which is continuing to depend on the West for its security. Yeah, thank you. Well actually you opened also the door to another question which hasn't been raised. And that will be the final one. Speaking of the others, these economic metaphors. Actually, how does I mean how what China does represent for Iran, or does it actually represent for an economic model in terms of of the specificity of the economy, the Chinese economy with this heavy role of the state but at the same time. Peripheral, peripheral economy, which has become a dominant economy within the country. So how, how, I mean how do the Iranian leaders, the rulers, look at this and is there any reference to the Chinese model as a Chinese model to follow. Absolutely, but there is, in fact, you know, the so called Beijing consensus, mirroring the old Washington consensus sits around this idea of state lead development is more efficient. This is upending so much economic theory of the past that state, state sector is for some reason but definition inefficient. It's unproductive. And that it's loss making, and so on. And Iran has been having these debates now into its fifth decade, you know, about what is it gave up Islamic economy idea, long ago. Iran has been grappling with what is an economic strategy, let's not even call it a model, and the conservatives very much who see the state as their embodiment in any case, because it's all about Islam, right. See the Beijing consensus as a very efficient way of developing the economy. And this is the shoppings for modernizations of a gone era, one of whose principles was to open up to the world. Now there are Iranian intellectuals who recognize this reality, and they say that the Beijing consensus is not just a reductionist interpretation of the Chinese model, where the state owns everything, but rather that the state is the orchestra leader, and facilitates everything, and is the guardian of your security, and then lets you develop in Iran. It's monopolization of economic levers by the state, which are holding it back, which are creating these massive structural problems, which are feeding corruption at all levels and so on. China got rid of all of this through the process of modernizations, and China is now if Iran is going to learn anything, China is now the world's greatest champion of globalization. They stand up to United States on the Trump to argue that actually the best path for development of the world economy is through globalization. The president of China stands up in the World Economic Forum as says, and says this in very concrete and explicit terms, while Iran continues to shy from globalization. There are some in Iran who see sanctions as a virtue. Thank God we don't have to face the world because we are on the sanctions. Yeah, this blissful isolation suits their interests. So they've got to be really careful what they wish for, because a state-led model is ultimately inefficient, and Beijing consensus comes with very clear conditions for it to take root. Well, thank you very much, Anush, for these fascinating 90 minutes. Very, very interesting. I mean, of course, this is a huge topic and we would love to have you for further occasions to carry on in this exploration of this topic and whatever is related. It was also a fascinating view of what's going on in Iran itself that you provided us with. So thank you very, very much, and all the best, and good evening to everybody. Thank you, but very much for the invitation and to to MEI colleagues for hanging with me and also to all the participants. It's wonderful to have so many people engaging with this discussion. Thank you. Thank you.