 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, visit LibriVox.org. This reading by Karl Manchester 2007. Leviathan, or the Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil, books one and two, by Thomas Hobbes. Printed for Andrew Crook at the Green Dragon in St. Paul's Churchyard, 1651. To my most honoured friend, Mr. Francis Godolphin of Godolphin. Honoured Sir, your most worthy brother, Mr. Sidney Godolphin, when he lived, was pleased to think my study is something, and otherwise to oblige me, as you know, with real testimonies of his good opinion, great in themselves, and the greater for the worthiness of his person. For there is not any virtue that disposes of the man either to the service of God, or to the service of his country, to civil society or private friendship, that did not manifestly appear in his conversation, not as acquired by necessity, or effected upon occasion, but inherent, and shining in a generous constitution of his nature. Therefore, in honour and gratitude to him, and with devotion to yourself, I humbly dedicate unto you this my discourse of Commonwealth. I know not how the world will receive it, nor how it may reflect on those that shall seem to favour it. For in a way beset with those that contend on one side for too great liberty, and on the other side for too much authority, it is hard to pass between the points of both unwounded. But yet, me thinks, the endeavour to advance the civil power should not be by the civil power condemned, nor private men, by reprehending it, declare they think that power too great. Besides, I speak not of the men, but in the abstract of the seat of power, like to those simple and impartial creatures in the Roman capital, that with their noise defended those within it, not because they were they, but there, offending none, I think, but those without, or such within, if there be any such, as favour them. That which perhaps may most offend a certain texts of holy scripture, alleged by me to other purpose than ordinarily they used to be by others. But I have done it with due submission, and also, in order to my subject, necessarily. For they are the outworks of the enemy, from whence they impugn the civil power. If not withstanding this, you find my labour generally decried, you may be pleased to excuse yourself, and say that I am a man that love my own opinions, and think all true, I say, that I honour your brother, and honour you, and have presumed, on that, to assume the title, without your knowledge, of being, as I am, sir, your most humble, and most obedient servant, Thomas Hobbes. Paris, April the 15th, Stroke, the 25th, 1651. Introduction Nature, the art whereby God hath made and governs the world, is by the art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an artificial animal. For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principle part within, why may we not say that all automata, engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as to the watch, have an artificial life? For what is the heart but a spring, and the nerves but so many strings, and the joints but so many wheels giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the artificer? Art goes yet further, imitating that rational and most excellent work of nature, man, for by art is created that great Leviathan, called a commonwealth or state, in Latin, civitas, which is but an artificial man, though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended, and in which the sovereignty is an artificial soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body, the magistrates and other officers of judicature and execution, artificial joints, reward and punishment, by which fastened to the seat of sovereignty, every joint and member, is moved to perform his duty, as the nerves that do the same in the body natural, the wealth and riches of all the particular members of the strength, salus populi, the people's safety, is business. Counselors, by whom all things needful for it to know are suggested unto it, are the memory, equity in laws, an artificial reason and will, concord, health, sedition, sickness and civil war, death. Lastly, the packs and covenants by which the parts of this body politic were at first made, set together and united, resemble that fiat, or the letters make man, pronounced by God in the creation. To describe the nature of this artificial man, I will consider, first, the matter thereof, and the artificer, both which is man. Secondly, how and by what covenants it is made, what are the rights and just power or authority of a sovereign, and what it is that preserveeth and dissolveeth it. Thirdly, what is a Christian commonwealth? Lastly, what is the kingdom of darkness? Concerning the first, there is a saying, much usurped of late, that wisdom is acquired not by reading of books, but of men. Consequently, where and to, those persons that for the most part can give no other proof of being wise, take great delight to show what they think they have read in men, by uncharitable censures of one another behind their backs. But there is another saying, not of late understood, by which they might learn truly to read one another if they would take the pains, and that is, no say, teyipsum, read thyself, which was not meant, as it is now used, to countenance either the barbarous state of men in power towards their inferiors, or to encourage men of low degree to assourcey behavior towards their betters. But to teach us that, for the similitude of the thoughts and passions of one man to the thoughts and passions of another, whosoever looketh into himself and considereth what he doth when he does think, a pine, reason, hope, fear, etc., and upon what grounds, he shall thereby read and know what are the thoughts and passions of all other men upon the like occasions. I say the similitude of passions, which are the same in all men, desire, fear, hope, etc. Not the similitude of the objects of the passions, which are the things desired, feared, hoped, etc. For these, the constitution individual, and particular education, do so vary, and they are so easy to be kept from our knowledge, that the characteristics of man's heart, blotted and confounded as they are with dissembling, lying, counter-fitting, and erroneous doctrines, eligible only to him that searcheth hearts. And though by men's actions we do discover their designs sometimes, yet to do it without comparing them with our own, and distinguishing all circumstances by which the case may come to be altered, is to decipher without a key, and be for the most part deceived, by too much trust or by too much diffidence, as he that reads is himself a good or evil man. But let one man read another by his actions never so perfectly, it serves him only with his acquaintance, which are but few. He that is to govern a whole nation must read in himself not this or that particular man, but mankind, which though it be hard to do, harder than to learn any language or science, yet when I shall have set down my own reading, orderly and perspicuously, the pains left another would be only to consider if he also finds not the same in himself. For this kind of doctrine admiteth no other demonstration. End of introduction. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer visit LibriVox.org, this reading by Cal Manchester 2007. Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes. The First Part of Man. Chapter 1 of Sense Concerning the thoughts of man, I will consider them first singly and afterwards in train or dependence upon one another. Singly they are every one a representation or appearance of some quality or other accident of a body without us, which is commonly called an object. Which object worketh on the eyes, ears and other parts of a man's body, and, by diversity of working, produceeth diversity of appearances? The original of them all is that which we call sense, for there is no conception in a man's mind which hath not at first, totally or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense. The rest are derived from that original. To know the natural cause of sense is not very necessary to the business now in hand, and I have elsewhere written on the same at large. Nevertheless, to fill each part of my present method, I will briefly deliver the same in this place. The cause of sense is the external body or object which presseth the organ proper to each sense, either immediately, as in the taste and touch, or immediately, as in seeing, hearing and smelling. Which pressure, by the mediation of nerves and other strings and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the brain and heart, causeeth there a resistance or counter pressure, or endeavour of the heart to deliver itself, which endeavour, because outward, seemeth to be some matter without. And this seeming or fancy is that which men call sense, and consisteth, as to the eye, in a light or colour figured, to the ear in a sound, to the nostril in an odour, to the tongue and palate in a savour, and to the rest of the body in heat, cold, hardness, softness, and such other qualities as we discern by feeling. All which qualities called sensible are in the object that causes them, but so many several motions of the matter, by which it presseth our organs diversely. Neither in us that are pressed are they anything else but diverse motions, for motion produceeth nothing but motion. But their appearance to us is fancy, the same waking that dreaming. And as pressing, rubbing, or striking the eye makes us fancy a light, and pressing the ear produceeth a din, so do the bodies also we see or hear produce the same by their strong, though unobserved, action. For if those colours and sounds were in the bodies or objects that cause them, they could not be severed from them, as by glasses and in echoes by reflection we see they are, where we know the thing we see is in one place, the appearance in another. And though at some certain distance the real and very object seem invested with the fancy it begets in us, yet still the object is one thing, the image or fancy is another. So that sense, in all cases, is nothing else but original fancy caused, as I have said, by the pressure that is by the motion of external things upon our eyes, ears, and other organs there and to ordained. But the philosophy schools, through all the universities of Christendom, grounded upon certain texts of Aristotle, teach another doctrine, and say for the cause of vision that the thing seen sendeth forth on every side of visible species, in English a visible show, apparition or aspect, or a being seen. The receiving whereof into the eye is seeing, and for the cause of hearing that the thing heard sendeth forth an audible species, that is an audible aspect or audible being seen, which entering the ear make a hearing. Nay, for the cause of understanding also, they say that the thing understood sendeth forth an intelligible species, that is an intelligible being seen, which coming into the understanding makes us understand. I say not this as disapproving the use of universities, but because I am to speak here after of their office in a commonwealth, I must let you see on all occasions, by the way, what things would be amended in them, amongst which the frequency of insignificant speech is one. End of Chapter 1 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, visit LibriVox.org. This reading by Karl Manchester 2007. Leviathan, by Thomas Hobbes. Chapter 2 of Imagination That when a thing lies still unless somewhat else stir it, it may lie still forever, is a truth that no man doubts of, but that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion unless somewhat else stays it, though the reason be the same, namely that nothing can change itself, is not so easily assented to. For men measure, not only other men, but all things, by themselves, and because they find themselves subject after motion to pain and latitude, think everything else grows weary of motion and seeks repose of its own accord, little considering whether it be not some other motion wherein that desire of rest they find in themselves consisteth. For hence it is that the schools say, heavy bodies fall downwards out of an appetite to rest, and to conserve their nature in that place which is most proper for them, ascribing appetite and knowledge of what is good for their conservation, which is more than man has, to things inanimate, absurdly. When a body is once in motion, it moveeth unless something else hinder it, eternally, and whatever hindereth it, cannot in an instant, but in time, and by degrees, quite extinguish it. And as we see in the water, though the wind cease, the waves give not over-rolling for a long time after, so also it happeneth in that motion which is made in the eternal parts of man then, when he sees, dreams, etc. For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it the Latin's call imagination, from the image made in seeing, and apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it fancy, which signifies appearance, and is as proper to one sense as to another, imagination therefore, is nothing but decaying sense, and is found in men and many other living creatures, as well sleeping as waking. The decay of sense in men waking is not the decay of the motion made in sense, but an obscuring of it, in such a manner as the light of the sun obscures the light of the stars, which stars do no less exercise their virtue by which they are visible in the day than in the night. But because amongst many strokes which our eyes, ears, and other organs receive from external bodies, the predominant one is sensible, therefore the light of the sun being predominant, we are not affected with the action of the stars, and any object being removed from our eyes, though the impression it made in us, remain, yet other objects more present succeeding, and working on us, the imagination of the past is obscured and made weak, as the voice of a man is, in the noise of the day. From whence it followeth, that the longer the time is, after the sight or sense of any object, the weaker is the imagination, for the continual change of man's body destroys in time the parts which in sense were moved, so that distance of time and of place has one and the same effect in us. For, as at a great distance of place, that which we look at appears dim, and without distinction of the smaller parts, and as voices grow weak and inarticulate, so also, after great distance of time our imagination of the past is weak, and we lose for example, of cities we have seen, many particular streets, and of actions, many particular circumstances. This decaying sense, when we would express the thing itself, I mean fancy itself, we call imagination, as I said before, but when we would express the decay and signify that the sense is fading, old, and past, it is called memory, so that imagination and memory are but one thing, which for diverse considerations have diverse names. Much memory, or memory of many things, is called experience, again, imagination being only of those things which have been formally perceived by sense, either all at once, or by parts at several times, the former, which is the imagining the whole object, as it were presented to the sense, is simple imagination, as when one imagineth a man or horse, which he has seen before. The other is compounded, from when the sight of a man at one time, and of a horse at another, we conceive in our mind a centaur. So, when a man compoundeth the image of his own person, with the image of the actions of another man, as when a man imagines himself a Hercules or an Alexander, which happeneth often to them that are much taken with reading of romances, it is a compound imagination, and properly but a fiction of the mind. There be also other imaginations that rise in men, though waking, from the great impression made in sense, as from gazing upon the sun, the impression leaves an image of the sun before our eyes a long time after, and from being long and vehemently attempt upon geometrical figures, a man shall in the dark, though awake, have the image of lines and angles before his eyes, which kind of fancy has no particular name, as being a thing that does not commonly fall into men's discourse. The imaginations of them that sleep are those we call dreams, and these also, as all other imaginations, have been before either totally or in parcels, in the sense. And because in sense the brain and nerves, which are the necessary organs of sense, are so benumbed in sleep as not easily to be moved by the action of external objects, there can happen in sleep no imagination, and therefore no dream. But what proceeds from the agitation of the inward parts of a man's body, which inward parts for the connection they have with the brain and other organs, when they be distempered to keep the same motion, whereby the imaginations there formerly made appear as if a man were waking, saving that the organs of sense being now benumbed, so as there is no new object which can master and obscure them, with a more vigorous impression, a dream must needs be more clear in this silence of senses than our waking thoughts. And hence it comes to pass that it is a hard matter, and by many thoughts impossible, to distinguish exactly between sense and dreaming. For my part, when I consider that in dreams I do not often nor constantly think of the same persons, places, objects and actions that I do waking, nor remember so long a train of coherent thoughts dreaming as at other times, and because waking I often observe the absurdity of dreams, but never dream of the absurdities of my waking thoughts, I am well satisfied that, being awake, I know I dream not, though when I dream, I think myself awake. And seeing dreams are caused by the distemper of some of the inward parts of the body, diverse distempers must needs cause different dreams. And hence it is that lying cold breed us dreams of fear, and raise us the thought and image of some fearful object, the motion from the brain to the inner parts, and from the inner parts to the brain being reciprocal. And that as anger causes heat in some parts of the body when we are awake, so when we sleep, the overheating of the same parts causes anger, and raise us up in the brain the imagination of an enemy. In the same manner, as natural kindness when we are awake causes desire, and desire makes heat in certain other parts of the body, so also too much heat in those parts while we sleep, raise us in the brain and imagination of some kindness shown. In some our dreams are the reverse of our waking imaginations, the motion when we are awake beginning at one end, and when we dream at another. The most difficult discerning of a man's dream from his waking thoughts is then, when by some accident we observe not that we have slept, which is easy to happen to a man full of fearful thoughts and whose conscience is much troubled, and that sleepeth without the circumstance of going to bed or putting off his clothes as one that nodeth in a chair. For he that taketh pains and industriously lays himself to sleep, in case any uncouth and exorbitant fancy come unto him, cannot easily think it other than a dream. We read of Marcus Brutus, one that had his life given him by Julius Caesar, and was also his favourite, and notwithstanding murdered him. How at Philippi, the night before he gave battle to Augustus Caesar, he saw a fearful apparition, which is commonly related by historians as a vision, but considering the circumstances one may easily judge to have been but a short dream. For sitting in his tent, pensive and troubled with the horror of his rash act, it was not hard for him, slumbering in the cold, to dream of that which most affrighted him. Which fear, as by degrees it made him wake, so also it must need make the apparition by degrees to vanish, and having no assurance that he slept, he could have no cause to think it a dream or anything but a vision. And this is no very rare accident, for even they that be perfectly awake, if they be timorous and superstitious, possessed with fearful tales and alone in the dark, are subject to the like fancies, and believe they see spirits and dead men's ghosts walking in churchards, whereas it is either their fancy only, or else the navery of such persons as to make use of such superstitious fear to pass disguised in the night to places they would not be known to haunt. From this ignorance of how to distinguish dreams and other strong fancies from vision and sense, did arise the greatest part of the religion of the Gentiles in time past, that worshiped satires, fawns, nymphs and the like. And nowadays, the opinion that rude people have of fairies, ghosts and goblins, and of the power of witches. For, as for witches, I think not their witchcraft is any real power, but yet that they are justly punished for the false belief they have that they can do such mischief, joined with their purpose to do it if they can, their trade being nearer to a new religion than to a craft or science. And for fairies and walking ghosts, the opinion of them has, I think, been on purpose either taught, or not confuted, to keep in credit the use of exorcism, of crosses, of holy water and other such inventions of ghostly men. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that God can make unnatural apparitions, but that he does it so often as men need to fear such things more than they fear the stay or change of the course of nature, which he also can stay and change, is no point of Christian faith. But evil men, under the pretext that God can do anything, are so bold as to say anything when it serves their turn, though they think it untrue. It is the part of a wise man to believe them no further than right reason makes that which they say appear credible. If this superstitious fear of spirits were taken away, and with it, prognastics from dreams, false prophecies, and many other things depending thereon, by which crafty, ambitious persons abuse the simple people, men would be much more fitted than they are for civil obedience. And this ought to be the work of the schools, but they rather nourish such doctrine, for, not knowing what imagination or the senses are, what they receive, they teach. Some saying that imaginations rise of themselves and have no cause, others that they rise most commonly from the will, and that good thoughts are blown, inspired, into a man by God, and evil thoughts by the devil, or that good thoughts are poured, infused, into a man by God, and evil ones by the devil. Some say the senses receive the species of things, and deliver them to the common sense, and the common sense delivers them over to the fancy, and the fancy to the memory, and the memory to the judgment, like handing of things from one to another, with many words making nothing understood. The imagination that is raised in man, or any other creature, endured with the faculty of imagining, by words, or other voluntary signs, is that we generally call understanding, and is common to man and beast. For a dog by custom will understand the call or the rating of his master, and so will many other beasts. That understanding which is peculiar to man, is the understanding not only his will, but his conceptions and thoughts, by the sequel and contextual of the names of things into affirmations, negations, and other forms of speech, and of this kind of understanding I shall speak hereafter. End of Chapter 2 Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes Chapter 3 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer visit LibriVox.org, this reading by Carl Manchester, 2007. Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes Chapter 3 Of the Consequence or Train of Imaginations By consequence, or train of thoughts, I understand that succession of one thought to another, which is called, to distinguish it from discourse in words, mental discourse. When a man thinketh on anything whatsoever, his next thought after is not altogether so casual, as it seems to be. Not every thought to every thought succeeds indifferently, but as we have no imagination whereof we have not formally had sense, in whole or in parts, so we have no transition from one imagination to another, whereof we never had the light before in our senses. The reason whereof is this, all fancies are motions within us, relics of those made in the sense, and those motions that immediately succeed one another in the sense, continue also to gather after sense, in so much as the former coming again to take place and be predominant, the latter followeth, by coherence of the matter moved, in such manner as water upon a plain table, is drawn which way any one part of it is guided by the finger. But because in sense, to one and the same thing perceived, sometimes one thing, sometimes another, succeedeth, it comes to pass in time that in the imagining of anything, there is no certainty what we shall imagine next. Only this is certain, it shall be something that succeeded the same before, at one time or another. This train of thoughts, or mental discourse, is of two sorts. The first is unguided, without design, and in constant, wherein there is no passionate thought to govern and direct, those that follow to itself as the end and scope of some desire or other passion, in which case the thoughts are said to wander and seem impertinent to one another, as in a dream. Such are commonly the thoughts of men that are not only without company, but also without care of anything, though even then, their thoughts are as busy as at other times, but without harmony, as the sound which a loot out of tune would yield to any man, or in tune, to one that could not play. And yet in this wild ranging of the mind, a man may oft times perceive the way of it, and the dependence of one thought upon another. For in a discourse of our present civil war, what could seem more impertinent than to ask, as one did, what was the value of a Roman penny? Yet the coherence to me was manifest enough, for the thought of the war introduced the thought of the delivering up the king to his enemies, the thought of that brought in the thought of the delivering up of Christ, and that again the thought of the thirty pence, which was the price of that treason, and thence easily followed that malicious question, and all this in a moment of time, for thought is quick. The second is more constant as being regulated by some desire and design, for the impression made by such things as we desire, or fear, is strong and permanent, or, if it cease for a time, of quick return. So strong it is sometimes as to hinder and break our sleep. From desire arises the thought of some means we have seen produced the like of that which we aim at, and from the thought of that the thought of means to that mean, and so continually, till we come to some beginning within our own power. And because the end, by the greatness of the impression, comes often to mind, in case our thoughts begin to wander, they are quickly again reduced into the way, which, observed by one of the seven wise men, made him give men this precept, which is now worn out. Respise, fene, that is to say, in all your actions, look often upon what you would have as the thing that directs all your thoughts in the way to attain it. The train of regulated thoughts is of two kinds, one, when of an effect imagined, we seek the causes or means that produce it, and this is common to man and beast. The other is when imagining anything whatsoever, we seek all the possible effects that can by it be produced, that is to say, we imagine what we can do with it when we have it, of which I have not at any time seen any sign but in man only, for this is a curiosity hardly incident to the nature of any living creature that has no other passion but sensual, such as a hunger, thirst, lust, and anger. In some, the discourse of the mind when it is governed by design, is nothing but seeking, or the faculty of invention, which the Latins call sujassitas, and seletia, a hunting out of the causes of some effect present or past, or of the effects of some present or past cause. Sometimes a man seeks what he has lost, and from that place and time wherein he misses it, his mind runs back from place to place and time to time, to find where and when he had it, that is to say, to find some certain and limited time and place in which to begin a method of seeking. Again from thence, his thoughts run over the same places and times to find what action or other occasion might make him lose it. This we call remembrance, or calling to mind. The Latins called it reminiscentia, as it were a reckoning of our former actions. Sometimes a man knows a place determinate within the compass whereof he is to seek, and then his thoughts run over the parts thereof in the same manner as one would sweep a room to find a jewel, or as a spaniel ranges the field till he finds a scent, or as a man should run over the alphabet to start a rhyme. Sometimes a man desires to know the event of an action, and then he thinketh of some like action past and the events thereof one after another, supposing like events will follow like actions. As he that foresees what will become of a criminal reckons what he has seen follow the like crime before, having his order of thoughts, the crime, the officer, the prison, the judge, and the gallows. Which kind of thoughts is called foresight, and prudence, or providence, and sometimes wisdom? Though such conjecture, through the difficulty of observing all circumstances, be very fallacious. But this is certain, by how much one man has more experience of things past than another, by so much also he is more prudent, and his expectations, the seldom, are fail him. The present only has a being in nature, things past have a being in the memory only, but things to come have no being at all. The future being but a fiction of the mind, applying the sequels of actions past, to the actions that are present, which with most certainty is done by him that has most experience, but not with certainty enough. And though it be called prudence when the events answereth to our expectations, yet in its own nature it is but presumption. For the foresight of things to come, which is providence, belongs only to him by whose will they are to come. From him only, and supernaturally, precedes prophecy. The best prophet, naturally, is the best guesser, and the best guesser, he that is most versed and studied in the matters he guesses at, for he hath most signs to guess by. A sign is the event antecedent of the consequence, and, contraryly, the consequence of the antecedent, when the like consequences have been observed before. And the oftener they have been observed, the less uncertain is the sign. And therefore, he that has most experience in any kind of business, has most signs whereby to guess at the future time, and consequently, is the most prudent, and so much more prudent, than he that is new to any kind of business, as not to be equaled by any advantage of natural and extemporary wit, though perhaps many young men think the contrary. Nevertheless, it is not prudence that distinguishes man from beast. There be beasts that at a year old, observe more, and pursue that which is for their good more prudently, than a child can do at ten. As prudence is a presumption of the future, contracted from the experience of time past, so there is a presumption of things past, taken from other things, not future, but past also. For he that has seen by what courses and degrees a flourishing state hath first come into civil war, and then to ruin, upon the sight of ruins of any other state, will guess the like war and the like causes have been there also. But this conjecture has the same uncertainty almost with the conjecture of the future, both being grounded only upon experience. There is no other act of a man's mind that I can remember naturally planted in him, so as to need no other thing to the exercise of it, but to be born a man, and live with the use of his five senses. Those are the faculties of which I shall speak by and by, and which seem proper to man only, are required and increased by study and industry, and of most men learned by instruction and discipline, and proceed all from the invention of words and speech. For besides sense and thoughts, and the train of thoughts, the mind of man has no other motion, though by the help of speech and method, the same faculties may be improved to such a height as to distinguish men from all other living creatures. Whatsoever we imagine is finite, therefore there is no idea or conception of anything we call infinite. No man can have in his mind an image of infinite magnitude, nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, or infinite force, or infinite power. When we say anything is infinite, we signify only that we are not able to conceive the ends and bounds of the thing named, having no conception of the thing, but of our own inability. And therefore the name of God is used not to make us conceive him, for he is incomprehensible, and his greatness and power are inconceivable, but that we may honour him. Also, because whatsoever as I said before, we conceive has been perceived first by sense, either all at once or by parts, a man can have no thought representing anything not subject to sense. No man therefore can conceive anything but he must conceive it in some place, and endued with some determinant magnitude, and which may be divided into parts, nor that anything is all in this place and in another place at the same time, nor that two or more things can be in one and the same place at once, for none of these things either have or can be incident to sense, but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit, without any signification at all, from deceived philosophers and deceived or deceiving schoolmen. But who was the first that found the use of letters is not known? He that brought them into Greece, men say, was Cadmus, the son of Aginor, king of Phoenicia, a profitable invention for continuing the memory of time past, and the conjunction of mankind dispersed into so many in distant regions of the earth, and with all difficult, as proceeding from a watchful observation of the diverse motions of the tongue, palate, lips, and other organs of speech, whereby to make as many differences of characters to remember them. But the most noble and profitable invention of all other was that of speech, consisting of names or appellations and their connection, whereby men register their thoughts, recall them when they are past, and declare them one to another for mutual utility and conversation, without which there had been amongst men neither commonwealth nor society, nor contract, nor peace, no more than amongst lions, bears, and wolves. The first author of speech was God himself, that instructed Adam how to name such creatures as he presented to his sight, for scripture goeth no further on the matter. But this was sufficient to direct him to add more names, as the experience and use of the creatures should give him occasion, and to join them in such manner by degree as to make himself understood. And so by succession of time, so much language might be gotten as he had found use for, though not so copious as an orator or philosopher has need of. For I do not find anything in the scripture out of which, directly or by consequence, can be gathered that Adam was taught the names of all figures, numbers, measures, colors, sounds, fancies, relations, much less the names of words and speech, as general, special, affirmative, negative, interrogative, optative, infinitive, all of which are useful, and least of all, of entity, intentionality, quiddity, and other insignificant words of the school. But all this language gotten, and augmented by Adam and his posterity, was again lost at the Tower of Babel, when, by the hand of God, every man was stricken for his rebellion with an oblivion of his former language. And being hereby forced to disperse themselves into several parts of the world, it must need to be that the diversity of tongues that now is, preceded by degrees from them in such a manner as need, mother of all inventions, taught them, and in tract of time grew everywhere more copious. The general use of speech is to transfer our mental discourse into verbal, or the train of our thoughts into a train of words, and that for two commodities, where of one is the registering of the consequences of our thoughts, which being apt to slip out of our memory and put us to a new labor, may again be recalled by such words as they were marked by, so that the first use of names is to serve for marks or notes of remembrance. Another is when many use the same words to signify by their connection in order to one another what they conceive or think of each matter, and also what they desire, fear, or have any other passion for. And for this use they are called signs. Special uses of speech are these. First, to register what by cognition we find to be the cause of anything, present or past, and what we find things present or past may produce or affect, which in some is acquiring of arts. Secondly, to show to others that knowledge which we have attained, which is to counsel and teach one another. Thirdly, to make known to others our wills and purposes that we may have mutual help of one another. Fourthly, to please and delight ourselves and others by playing with our words for pleasure or ornament innocently. To these uses there are also four corresponding abuses. First, when men register their thoughts wrong by the inconstancy of the signification of their words, by which they register for their conceptions that which they never conceived and so deceive themselves. Secondly, when they use words metaphorically, that is, in other senses than that they are ordained for, and thereby deceive others. Thirdly, when by words they declare that to be their will, which is not. Fourthly, when they use them to grieve one another, for seeing nature hath armed living creatures, some with teeth, some with horns, and some with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an abusive speech to grieve him with the tongue, unless it be one whom we are obliged to govern, and then it is not to grieve, but to correct and amend. The manner how speech serveth to the remembrance of the consequence of causes and effects consisteth in the imposing of names and the connection of them. Of names some are proper and singular to one only thing, as Peter, John, this man, this tree, and some are common to many things, as man, horse, tree, every of which, though but one name, is nevertheless the name of diverse particular things. In respect of all which together is called a universal. There being nothing in the world universal but names, for the things named are every one of them individual and singular. One universal name is imposed on many things, for their similitude in some quality, or other accident, and whereas a proper name bringeth to mind one thing only, universals recall any one of those many. And of names universal, some are more and some of less extent, the larger comprehending the less large, and some again of equal extent, comprehending each other reciprocally. As for example, the name body is of larger signification than the word man, and comprehendeth it, and the names man and rational are of equal extent, comprehending mutually one another. But here we must take notice that by name is not always understood, as in grammar, one only word, but sometimes by circumlocution, many words together. For all these words, he that in his actions observe the laws of his country, make but one name, equivalent to this one word, just. By this imposition of names, some of larger and some of stricter signification, we turn the reckoning of consequences of things imagined in the mind into a reckoning of the consequences of appellations. For example, a man that hath no use of speech at all, such as is born and remains perfectly deaf and dumb, if he set before his eyes a triangle, and by it two right angles, such as are the corners of a square figure, he may by meditation compare and find that the three angles of the triangle are equal to those two right angles that stand by it. But if another triangle be shown him, different in shape from the former, he cannot know, without a new labor, whether the three angles of that also be equal to the same. But he that hath the use of words, when he observes that such a quality was consequent, not to the length of the sides, nor to any other particular thing in his triangle, but only to this, that the sides were straight and the angles three. And that was all for which he named it a triangle, will boldly conclude universally that such a quality of angles is in all triangles whatsoever, and register his intention in these general terms. Every triangle hath its three angles equal to two right angles. And thus the consequence found in one particular comes to be registered and remembered as a universal rule, and discharges our mental reckoning of time and place and delivers us from all labor of the mind, saving the first, and makes that which was found true here and now be true in all times and places. But the use of words in registering our thoughts is in nothing so evident as in numbering a natural fool that could never learn by heart the order of the numeral words as one, two, and three. It may observe every stroke of the clock and nod to it, or say one, one, one, but can never know what hour it strikes. And it seems there was a time when those names of numbers were not in use, and men were feigned to apply their fingers of one or both hands to those things they desired to keep account of, and that thence it proceeded that now our numeral words are about ten, in any nation, and in some but five, and then they begin again, and he that can tell ten, if he recite them out of order, will lose himself and not know when he is done, much less will he be able to add, and subtract, and perform all other operations of arithmetic, so that without words there is no possibility of reckoning of numbers, much less of magnitudes, of swiftness, of force, and other things the reckoning whereof are necessary to the being or well-being of mankind. When two names are joined together, into a consequence, or affirmation, as thus, a man is a living creature, or thus, if he be a man, he is a living creature. If the latter name living creature signify all that the former name man signifyeth, then the affirmation or consequence is true, otherwise false. For true and false are attributes of speech, not of things. And where speech is not, there is neither truth nor falsehood, error there may be, as when we expect that which shall not be, or suspect what has not been, but in neither case can a man be charged with untruth. Seeing then that truth consisteth in the right ordering of names and our affirmations, a man that seeketh precise truth had need to remember what every name he uses stands for, and to place it accordingly, or else he will find himself entangled in words, as a bird in lime twigs. The more he struggles, the more be limed. And therefore in geometry, which is the only science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind, men begin at settling the signification of their words, which settling of significations they call definitions, and place them in the beginning of their reckoning. By this it appears how necessary it is for any man that aspires to true knowledge to examine the definitions of former authors, and either to correct them, where they are negligently sat down, or to make them himself, for the errors of definitions multiply themselves, according as the reckoning proceeds, and lead men into absurdities, which at last they see, but cannot avoid, without reckoning anew from the beginning, in which lies the foundation of their errors. For once it happens that they which trust to books, do as they cast up many little sums into greater, without considering whether those little sums were rightly cast up or not, and at last finding the error visible, and not mistrusting their first grounds, know not which way to clear themselves, spend time in foddering over their books, as birds that entering by the chimney, and finding themselves enclosed in chamber, flutter at the false light of glass window, for want of wit to consider which way they came in. So that in the right definition of names lies the first use of speech, which is the acquisition of science, and in wrong, or no definitions, lies the first abuse, from which proceed all false and senseless tenants, which make those men that take their instructions from the authority of books, and not from their own meditation, to be as much below the condition of ignorant men as men endued with science are above it. For between true science and erroneous doctrines, ignorance is in the middle. Natural sense and imagination are not subject to absurdity. Nature itself cannot err, as men abound in copiousness of language, so they become more wise or more mad than ordinary. Nor is it possible without letters, for any men to become either excellently wise, or unless his memory be hurt by disease, or ill constitution of organs, excellently foolish. For words are wise men's counters, they do but reckon by them, but they are the money of fools, that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other doctor whatsoever, if but a man. Subject to names is whatsoever can enter into, or be considered in an account, and be added one to another to make a sum, or subtracted one from another to leave a remainder. The latins called accounts of money, rationes, and accounting, ratiosenatio, and that which we in bills or books of accounts call items, they called nomina, that is, names, and hence it seems to proceed that they expended the word ratio to the faculty of reckoning in all other things. The Greeks have but one word, logos, for both speech and reason, not that they thought there was no speech without reason, but no reasoning without speech, and the act of reasoning they called syllogism, which signified summing up of consequences of one saying to another, and because the same things may enter into account for diverse accidents, their names are, to show that diversity, diversely rested and diversified. This diversity of names may be reduced to four general heads. First, a thing may enter into account for matter, or body, as living, sensible, rational, hot, cold, moved, quiet, with all which names the word matter or body is understood, all such being names of matter. Secondly, it may enter into account, or be considered for some accident or quality which we conceive to be in it, as for being moved, for being so long, for being hot, etc., and then, of the name of the thing itself, by a little change or resting, we make a name for that accident which we consider, and for living, put into the account of life, for moved, motion, for hot, heat, for long, length, and the like, and all such names are the names of the accidents and properties by which one matter and body is distinguished from another. These are called names abstract, because severed, not from matter, but from the account of matter. Thirdly, we bring into account the properties of our own bodies, whereby we make such distinction, as when anything is seen by us, we reckon not the thing itself, but the sight, the color, the idea of it in the fancy, and when anything is heard, we reckon it not, but the hearing or sound only, which is our fancy or conception of it by the year, and such are names of fancies. Fourthly, we bring into account, consider, and give names to names themselves and to speeches, for general, universal, special, equivocal are names of names, and affirmation, interrogation, commandment, narration, syllogism, sermon, oration, and many other such are names of speeches. And this is all the variety of names positive, which are put to mark somewhat which is in nature, or may be feigned by the mind of man, as bodies that are, or may be conceived to be, or of bodies, the properties that are, or may be feigned to be, or words, and speech. There be also other names, called negative, which are notes to signify that the word is not the name of the thing in question, as these words, nothing, no man, infinite, indossable, three want four, and the like, which are nevertheless of use in reckoning, or in correcting of reckoning, and call to mind our past cognitions, though they be not names of anything, because they make us refuse to admit the names not rightly used. All other names are but insignificant sound, and those of two sorts, one, when they are new, and yet they're meaning not explained by definition, where there have been abundance coined by schoolmen and puzzled philosophers. Another, when men make a name of two names, whose significations are contradictory and inconsistent, as this name, an incorporeal body, or which is all one, an incorporeal substance, and a greater number more. For when so ever any affirmation is false, the two names of which it is composed, put together and made one, signify nothing at all. For example, if it be a false affirmation to say a quadrangle is round, the word round quadrangle signifies nothing, but is a mere sound. So likewise, if it be false to say that virtue can be poured, or blown up and down, the words in poured virtue, in blown virtue, are as absurd and insignificant as a round quadrangle, and therefore you shall hardly meet with a senseless and insignificant word that is not made up of some Latin or Greek names. Frenchman seldom hears our Savoir, called by the name of Parole, but by the name of Verba often. Yet Verba and Parole differ no more, but that one is Latin, the other French. When a man, upon the hearing of any speech, have those thoughts which the words of that speech and their connection were ordained and constituted to signify, then he is said to understand it, understanding being nothing else but conception caused by speech. And therefore, if speech be particular to man, as for ought I know it is, then is understanding particular to him also, and therefore of absurd and false affirmations, in case they be universal, there can be no understanding, though they think they understand then, when they do but repeat the word softly, or calm them in mind. What kinds of speech signify the appetites, aversions, and passions of man's mind, and of their use and abuse, I shall speak when I have spoken of the passions? The names of such things as affect us, that is, which please and displease us, because all men be not alike affected with the same thing, nor the same man at all times, are in the common discourses of men of inconsistent signification, for seeing all names are imposed to signify our conceptions, and all our affections are but conceptions. When we conceive the same things differently, we can hardly avoid different naming of them, for though the nature of that which we conceive be the same, yet the diversity of our reception of it, in respect of different constitutions of body and prejudices of opinion, gives everything a tincture of our different passions. And therefore in reasoning, a man must take heed of words, which, besides the signification of what we imagine of their nature, have a signification also of the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker. Such as are the names of virtues and vices, for one man calleth wisdom, what another calleth fear, and one cruelty, what another justice, one prodigality, what another magnanimity, and one gravity, what another stupidity, etc. And therefore such names can never be true grounds of any rateosination. No moreking metaphors or tropes of speech. But these are less dangerous, because they profess their inconstancy, which the others do not. Chapter 5 of Leviathan This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org, recording by Anna Simon, Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes, Chapter 5 of Reason and Science. When man reasoneth, he does nothing else but conceive a sum total from addition of parcels, or conceive a remainder from subtraction of one sum from another. Which, if it be done by words, is conceiving of the consequence of the names of all the parts to the name of the whole, or from the names of the whole in one part to the name of the other part. And though in some things, as in numbers, besides adding and subtracting, man name other operations, as multiplying and dividing, yet they are the same. For multiplication is but adding together of things equal, and division but subtracting of one thing as often as we can. These operations are not incident to numbers only, but to all manner of things that can be added together, and taken one out of another. For as arithmeticians teach to add and subtract in numbers, so the geometricians teach the same in lines, figures, solid and superficial, angles, proportions, times, degrees of swiftness, force, power and the like. The logicians teach the same in consequences of words, adding together two names to make an affirmation, and two affirmations to make a syllogism, and many syllogisms to make a demonstration, and from the sum or conclusion of a syllogism they subtract one proposition to find the other. Writers of politics add together factions to find man's duties, and lawyers, laws and facts to find what is right and wrong in the actions of private man. In sum, in what matter so ever there is place for addition and subtraction, there also is place for reason, and where these have no place, there reason has nothing at all to do. Out of all which we may define, that is to say determine what that is which is meant by this word reason when we reckon it amongst the faculties of the mind. For reason, in this sense, is nothing but reckoning, that is, adding and subtracting, of the consequences of general names agreed upon for the marking and signifying of our thoughts. I say marking them when we reckon by ourselves, and signifying when we demonstrate or approve our reckonings to other men. And as in arithmetic, unpracticed men must, and professes themselves, may often err and cast up false, so also in any other subject of reasoning, the ablest, most attentive and most practised man may deceive themselves, and infer false conclusions. Not but that reason itself is always right reason, as well as arithmetic is a certain and infallible art. But no one man's reason, nor the reason of any one number of man, makes the certainty, no more than an account is therefore well cast up because a great many men have unanimously approved it. And therefore, as when there is a controversy in an account, the parties must by their own accord set up for right reason, the reason of some arbitrator or judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or their controversy must either come to blows, or be undecided, for want of a right reason constituted by nature. So is it also in all debates of what kind so ever. And when men that think themselves wiser than all others, clamour and demand right reason for judge, yet seek no more but that things should be determined by no other man's reason but their own, it is as intolerable in the society of men, as it is in play after Trump is turned, to use for Trump on every occasion, that suit whereof they have most in their hand. For they do nothing else, that will have every of their passions as it comes to bear sway in them, to be taken for right reason, and that, in their own controversies, be reying their want of right reason by the claim they laid to it. The use and end of reason is not the finding of the sum and truth of one, or a few consequences, remote from the first definitions and settled significations of names, but to begin at these and proceed from one consequence to another. For there can be no certainty of the last conclusion without a certainty of all those affirmations and negations on which it was grounded and inferred. As when a master of a family, in taking an account, casteth up the sums of all the bills of expense into one sum, and not regarding how each bill is summed up by those that give them in account, nor what it is he pays for, he advantageous himself no more than if he allowed the account in gross, trusting to every of the accounts of skill and honesty. So also, in reasoning of all other things, he that takes up conclusions on the trust of others, and doth not fetch them from the first items in every reckoning, which are the significations of names settled by definitions, loses his labour, and does not know anything but only believe it. When a man reckons without the use of words, which may be done in particular things, as went upon the sight of any one thing, we conjecture what was likely to have proceeded, or was likely to follow upon it. If that which he thought likely to follow follows not, or that which he thought likely to have proceeded it, hath not proceeded it, this is called error, to which even the most prudent man are subject. But when we reason in words of general signification, and fall upon a general inference which is false, though it be commonly called error, it is indeed an absurdity, or senseless speech, for error is but a deception, in presuming that somewhat is past, or to come, of which, though it were not past, or not to come, yet there was no impossibility discoverable. But when we make a general assertion, unless it be a true one, the possibility of it is inconceivable. And words whereby we conceive nothing but the sound, are those we call absurd, insignificant, and nonsense, and therefore if a man should talk to me of a round quadrangle, or accidents of bread and cheese, or immaterial substances, or of a free subject, a free will, or any free but free from being hindered by opposition, I should not say he were in an error, but that his words were without meaning, that is to say, absurd. I've said before in the second chapter that a man did excel all other animals in this faculty, that when he conceived anything whatsoever, he was apt to inquire the consequences of it, and what effects he could do with it. And now I add this other degree of the same excellence, that he can by words reduce the consequences he finds to general rules, called theorems, or aphorisms, that is, he can reason, or reckon, not only in number, but in all other things, where of one may be added unto, or subtracted from another. But this privilege is allayed by another, and that is, by the privilege of absurdity, to which no living creature is subject, but man only. And of man, those are of all most subject to it, that profess philosophy. For it is most true that Cicero said of them somewhere, that there can be nothing so absurd, but may be found in the books of philosophers. And the reason is manifest, for there is not one of them that begins his ratiosination from the definitions or explications of the names they are to use, which is a method that hath been used only in geometry, whose conclusions have thereby been made indisputable. The first course of absurd conclusions I ascribe to the want of method, in that they begin not their ratiosination from definitions, that is, from settled significations of their words, as if they could cast account without knowing the value of the numeral words one, two, and three. And whereas all bodies enter into account upon diverse considerations, which I have mentioned in the precedent chapter, these considerations being diversely named, diverse absurdities proceed from the confusion and unfit connection of their names into assertions. And therefore, the second course of absurd assertions, I ascribe to the giving of names of bodies to accidents, or of accidents to bodies, as they do that say, faith is infused, or inspired, when nothing can be poured or breathed into anything but body, and that extension is body, that fantasms are spirits, etc. The third I ascribe to the giving of the names of the accidents of bodies without us, to the accidents of our own bodies, as they do that say, the color is in the body, the sound is in the air, etc. The fourth, to the giving of the names of bodies to names, or speeches, as they do that say that there be things universal, that a living creature is genus, or a general thing, etc. The fifth, to the giving of the names of accidents, to names and speeches, as they do that say, the nature of a thing is its definition, a man's command is his will, and alike. The sixth, to the use of metaphors, tropes, and other rhetorical figures, instead of words proper, for though it be lawful to say, for example, in common speech, the way he goeth, or leadeth, hither, or thither, the proverb says this or that, whereas ways cannot go, nor proverbs speak, yet in reckoning, and seeking of truth, such speeches are not to be admitted. The seventh, to names that signify nothing but are taken up and learned by road from the schools, as hypothetical, transubstantiate, consubstantiate, eternal now, and the like canting of schoolmen. To him that can avoid these things, it is not easy to fall into any absurdity, unless it be by the length of an account, wherein he may perhaps forget what went before. For all men by nature reason alike, and well, when they have good principles, for who is so stupid as both to make mistaken geometry, and also to persist in it when another detects his error to him? By this it appears that reason is not, as sense and memory, born with us, nor gotten by experience only as prudences, but attained by industry, first in apt imposing of names, and secondly by getting a good and orderly method in proceeding from the elements, which are names to assertions made by connection of one of them to another, and so to syllogisms, which are the connections of one assertion to another, till we come to a knowledge of all the consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand, and that is it, men call science. And whereas sense and memory are but knowledge of fact, which is a thing past and irrevocable, science is a knowledge of consequences, and dependence of one fact upon another, by which, out of that, we can presently do, we know how to do something else when we will, or the like, another time. Because when we see how anything comes about, upon what causes and by what manner, when the like causes come into our power, we see how to make it produce the like effects. Children, therefore, are not endued with reason at all, till they have attained the use of speech, but are called reasonable creatures for the possibility apparent of having the use of reason in time to come, and the most part of men, though they have the use of reasoning a little way, as in numbering to some degree, yet it serves them to little use in common life, in which they govern themselves, some better, some worse, according to their differences of experience, quickness of memory, and inclinations to several ends, but especially according to good or evil fortune, and the errors of one another. For as for science, or certain rules of their actions, they are so far from it, that they know not what it is. Geometry they have thought conjuring, but for other sciences, they who have not been thought the beginnings, and some progress in them, that they may see how they be acquired and generated, are in this point like children, that having no thought of generation, are made believe by the women, that their brothers and sisters are not born, but found in the garden. But yet, they that have no science, are in better and nobler condition with their natural prudence, than men that, by misreasoning, or by trusting them that reason wrong, fall upon false and absurd general rules. For ignorance of causes and of rules, does not set men so far out of their way as relying on false rules, and taking for causes of what they aspire to, those that are not so, but rather causes of the contrary. To conclude, the light of humane minds is prospectuous words, but by exact definitions first snuffed and purged from ambiguity. Reason is the pace, increase of science the way, and the benefit of mankind the end. And, on the contrary, metaphors and senseless and ambiguous words are like ignis fatui, and reasoning upon them is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities, and their end, contention and sedition, or contempt. As much experience is prudence, so is much science sapience. For though we usually have one name of wisdom for them both, yet the lethins did always distinguish between prudencia and sapiensia, ascribing the former to experience the letter to science. But to make their difference appear more clearly, let us suppose one man endued with an excellent natural use and dexterity in handling his arms, and another to have added to that dexterity an acquired science of where he can offend or be offended by his adversary, in every possible posture or guard. The ability of the former would be to the ability of the letter as prudence to sapiens, both useful but the letter infallible. But they that, trusting only to the authority of books, follow the blind, blindly, are like him, that, trusting to the false rules of a master offense, ventures presumptuously upon an adversary that either kills or disgraces him. The signs of science are some certain and infallible, some uncertain. Certain, when he that pretended the signs of anything can teach the same, that is to say, demonstrate a truth thereof prospectuously to another. Uncertain, when only some particular events answer to his pretense, and upon many occasions prove so as he says they must. Signs of prudence are all uncertain, because to observe by experience and to remember all circumstances that may alter the success is impossible. But in any business whereof a man has not infallible science to proceed by, to forsake his own natural judgment and be guided by general sentences read in others and subjected to many exceptions is a sign of folly, and generally scorned by the name of pedantry. And even of those men themselves that in councils of the commonwealth love to show their reading of politics and history, very few do it in their domestic affairs where their particular interest is concerned, having prudence enough for their private affairs, but in public they study more the reputation of their own wit than the success of another's business. CHAPTER VI. OF THE ENTERIOR BEGINNINGS OF VOLUNTERY MOTIONS, COMMONLY CALLED THE PASSIONS AND THE SPEECHES BY WHICH THEY ARE EXPRESSED. There be in animals two sorts of motions peculiar to them, one called vital, begun in generation, and continued without eruption through their whole life, such as are the course of the blood, the pulse, the breathing, the concoction, nutrition, excretion, etc. To which motions there needs no help of imagination, the other is animal motion, otherwise called voluntary motion, as to go, to speak, to move any of our limbs in such manner as is first fancy in our minds. That sense is motion in the organs and interior parts of man's body, caused by the action of the things we see, here, etc., and that fancy is but the relics of the same motion, remaining after sense has already been said in the first and second chapters. And because going, speaking, and the like voluntary motions depend always upon a precedent thought of whither, which way, and what, it is evident that the imagination is the first internal beginning of all voluntary motion. And though unstudied men do not conceive any motion at all to be there, where the thing moved is invisible, or the space it is moved in, for the shortness of it invisible, yet that doth not hinder but that such motions are. For, let a space be never so little, that which is moved over a greater space, whereof that little one is apart, must first be moved over that. These small beginnings of motion within the body of man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly called endeavor. This endeavor, when it is toward something which causes it, is called appetite, or desire, the latter being the general name, and the other often times restrained to signify the desire of food, namely hunger and thirst. And when the endeavor is from toward something, it is generally called aversion. These words, appetite and aversion, we have from the Latins, and they both of them signify the motions, one of approaching, the other of retiring. So also do the Greek words for the same, which are orma and aform. For nature itself does often press upon men these truths which afterwards, when they look for somewhat beyond nature, they stumble at. For the schools find in mere appetite to go, or move, no actual motion at all, but because some motion they must acknowledge, they call it metaphorical motion, which is but an absurd speech, for though words may be called metaphorical, bodies and motions cannot. That which men desire they are said to love, and to hate those things for which they have aversion. So that desire and love are the same thing, save that by desire, we signify the absence of the object, by love most commonly called the presence of the same. So also by aversion we signify the absence, and by hate the presence of the object. Of appetites and aversions some are born with men, as appetite of food, appetite of excretion, and exoneration, which may also and more properly be called aversions from somewhat they feel in their bodies, and some other appetites not many. The rest which are appetites of particular things proceed from experience and trial of their effects upon themselves or other men. For of things we know not at all, or believe not to be, we can have no further desire than to taste and try. But aversion we have for things, not only which we know have hurt us, but also that we do not know whether they will hurt us or not. Those things which we neither desire nor hate, we are said to condemn, contempt being nothing else but an immobility or a contumacy of the heart in resisting the action of certain things, and proceeding from that the heart is already moved otherwise by other more potent objects, or for want of experience of them. And because the constitution of a man's body is in continual motion, it is impossible that all the same things should always cause in him the same appetites and aversions. Much less can all men consent in the desire of almost anyone in the same object. But whatsoever is the object of man's appetite or desire, that is it for which he for his part calleth good, and the object of his hate and aversion evil, and of his contempt vile and inconsiderable. For those words of good, evil, and contemptible are ever used with relation to the person that useeth them. There being nothing simply and absolutely so, nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves, but from the person of the man, where there is no common wealth, or in a common wealth from the person that representeth it, or from an arbiter or judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up and make his sentence the rule thereof. The Latin tongue has two words whose significations approach to those of good and evil, but are not precisely the same, and those are polkrum and terpe. Whereof the former signifies that which by some apparent signs promiseeth good, and the latter that which promiseeth evil. But in our tongue we have not so general names to express them by. But for polkrum we say in some things fair, in others beautiful, or handsome, or gallant, or honorable, or comely, or amiable, and for terpe, foul, deformed, ugly, base, nauseous, and the like, as the subject shall require, all other words in their proper places signify nothing else but the mean, or countenance, that promiseeth good and evil. So that of good there be three kinds, good in the promise, that is polkrum, good in effect as the end desired, which is called jakundum, delightful, and good as the means, which is called utile, profitable, and as many of evil, for evil in promise, is that they call terpe. Evil in effect, and end, is molestum, unpleasant, troublesome, and evil in the means, in utile, unprofitable, hurtful. As in sense that which is really within us is, I have said before, only motion, caused by the action of external objects but in appearance, to the sight, light, and color, to the ear, sound, to the nostril, odor, et cetera. So, when the action of the same object is continued from the eyes, ears, and other organs to the heart, the real effect there is nothing but motion, or endeavor, which consistseth in appetite or version to or from the object moving. But the appearance or sense of that motion is that we either call delight or trouble of mind. This motion, which is called appetite, and for the appearance of it delight and pleasure, seemeth to be a corroboration of vital motion, and a help thereon too, and therefore such things as cause delight were not improperly called jakunda, javando, from helping or fortifying, and the contrary molesta, offensive, from hindering and troubling the motion vital. Pleasure, therefore, or delight, is the appearance or sense of good, and molestation or displeasure the appearance or sense of evil. And consequently all appetite, desire, and love is accompanied with some delight more or less, and all hatred and aversion with more or less displeasure and offense. Of pleasures or delights some arise from the sense of an object present, and those may be called pleasures of sense, the word sensual, as it is used by those only that condemn them, having no place till there be laws. Of this kind are all onerations and exonerations of the body, as also all that is pleasant, in the sight, hearing, smell, taste, or touch. Others arise from the expectation that proceeds from foresight of the end, or consequence of things, whether those things in the sense please or displease, and these are pleasures of the mind of him that draweth in those consequences, and are generally called joy. In the like manner, displeasures are some in the sense, and called pain, others in the expectation of consequences, and are called grief. These simple passions, called appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief, have their names for diverse considerations diversified. At first, when they one succeed another, they are diversely called from the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what they desire. Secondly, from the object loved or hated. Thirdly, from the consideration of many of them together. Fourth, from the alteration or succession itself. For appetite with an opinion of attaining is called hope. The same without such opinion despair. Aversion with opinion of hurt from the object fear. The same with hope of avoiding that hurt by resistance, courage. Sudden courage, anger. Constant hope, confidence of ourselves. Constant despair, diffidence of ourselves. Anger for great hurt done to another when we conceive the same to be done by injury, indignation. Desire of good to another, benevolence, goodwill, charity. If to man generally, good nature. Desire of riches, covetousness. A name used always in signification of blame, because men contending for them are displeased with one another's attaining them, though the desire in itself to be blamed or allowed according to the means by which those riches are sought. Desire of offense or precedence, ambition. A name used also in the worst sense, for the reason before mentioned. Desire of things that conduce but a little to our ends and fear of things that are but of little hindrance, pusillanimity. Contempt of little helps and hindrances, magnanimity. Magnanimity in danger of death or wounds, valor, fortitude. Magnanimity in the use of riches, liberality. Pusillanimity in the same, wretchedness, miserableness or parsimony as it is liked or disliked. Love of persons for society, kindness. Love of persons for pleasing the sense only, natural lust. Love of the same acquired from humiliation, that is, imagination of pleasure past, luxury. Love of one singularly, with desire to be singularly beloved, the passion of love. The same, with fear that the love is not mutual, jealousy. Desire by doing hurt to another to make him condemn some fact of his own revengefulness. Desire to know why and how, curiosity, such as in no living creature but man, so that man is distinguished not only by his reason but also by this singular passion from other animals, in whom the appetite of food and other pleasures of sense, by predominance, take away the care of knowing causes, which is a lust of the mind, that by a perseverance of delight in the continual and indefatagable generation of knowledge exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnal pleasure. Fear of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publicly allowed, religion, not allowed, superstition. And when the power imagined is truly such as we imagine, true religion. For without the apprehension of why, or what, panic terror, so called from the fables that make pay in the author of them, whereas in truth there is always in him so that feareth. First, some apprehension of the cause, though the rest run away by example, every one supposing his fellow to know why. And therefore this passion happens to none but in a throng or multitude of people. Joy from apprehension of novelty, admiration, proper to man, because it excites the appetite of knowing the cause. Joy arising from imagination of a man's own power and ability is that exultation of the mind which is called glorying, which, if grounded upon the experience of his own former actions, is the same with confidence. But if grounded on the flattery of others, or only supposed by himself, for delight in the consequences of it, is called vain glory, which name is properly given, because a well-grounded confidence begeteth attempt, whereas the supposing power does not, and is therefore rightly called vain. Grief from opinion of want of power is called dejection of mind. The vain glory which consistseth in the feigning or supposing of abilities in ourselves, which we know are not, is most incident to young men, and nourished by the histories or fictions of gallant persons, and is corrected often times by age and employment. Sudden glory is the passion which maketh those grimaces call laughter, and is caused either by some sudden act of their own that pleases them, or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves. And it is incident most to them that are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves who are forced to keep themselves in their own favor by observing the imperfections of other men. And therefore much laughter at the defects of others is a sign of pusillanimity. For of great minds one of the proper works is to help and free others from scorn, and compare themselves only with the most able. On the contrary, sudden dejection is the passion that causeth weeping, and is caused by such accidents as suddenly take away some vehement hope, or some prop of their power, and they are most subject to it that rely principally on help's external, such as our women and children. Therefore some weep for the loss of friends, others for their unkindness, others for the sudden stop made to their thoughts of revenge by reconciliation. But in all cases both laughter and weeping are sudden motions, custom taking them both away. For no man laughs at old jests, or weeps for an old calamity. Grief for the discovery of some defective ability is shame, or the passion that discovereth itself in blushing, and consisteth in the apprehension of something dishonorable, and in young men is a sign of the love of good reputation, and commendable. In old men it is a sign of the same, but because it comes too late, not commendable. The contempt of good reputation is called impudence. Grief for the calamity of another is pity, and ariseth from the imagination that the calamity may befall himself, and therefore is called also compassion, and in the phrase of this present time a fellow feeling, and therefore for calamity arriving from great wickedness, the best men have the least pity, and for the same calamity those have least pity that think themselves least obnoxious to the same. Contempt, or a little sense of the calamity of others, is that which men call cruelty, proceeding from security of their own fortune, for that any man should take pleasure in other men's great harms without other end of his own, I do not conceive it possible. Grief for the success of a competitor in wealth, honor, or other good, if it be joined with endeavor to enforce our own abilities equal or exceed him, is called emulation, but joined with endeavor to supplant or hinder a competitor, envy. When in the mind of man appetites and aversions, hopes and fears concerning one and the same thing arise alternately, and diverse good and evil consequences of the doing or omitting the thing propounded come successfully into our thoughts, so that sometimes we have an appetite to it, sometimes an aversion from it, sometimes hope to be able to do it, sometimes despair or fear to attempt it, the whole sum of desires, aversions, hopes, and fears continue till the thing be either done or thought impossible, is that we call deliberation. Therefore, of things past there is no deliberation, because manifestly impossible to be changed, nor of things known to be impossible, or thought so, because men know or think such deliberation in vain. But if things impossible, which we think possible, we may deliberate, not knowing it is in vain. And it is called deliberation, because it is a putting an end to the liberty we had of doing or omitting according to our own appetite or aversion. This alternate succession of appetites, aversions, hopes, and fears is no less in other living creatures than in man, and therefore beasts also deliberate. Every deliberation is then said to end when that whereof they deliberate is either done or thought impossible, because till then we retain the liberty of doing or omitting according to our appetite or aversion. In deliberation, the last appetite or aversion immediately adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that we call the will, the act not the faculty of willing. And beasts that have deliberation must necessarily also have will. The definition of the will, given common name by the schools, that it is a rational appetite, is not good. For if it were, then could there be no voluntary act against reason. For a voluntary act is that which precedeth from the will and no other. But if instead of a rational appetite, we shall say an appetite resulting from a precedent deliberation, then the definition is the same that I have given here. Will, therefore, is the last appetite in deliberating. And though we say in common discourse, a man had a will wants to do a thing that never lathes he forbear to do, yet that is properly but an inclination which makes no action voluntary, because the action depends not of it, but of the last inclination or appetite. For if the intervenion appetites make any action voluntary, then by the same reason all intervenient aversions should make the same action involuntary. And so one in the same action should be both voluntary and involuntary. By this it is manifest that, not only actions that have their beginning from covetousness, ambition, lust, or other appetites as to the thing propounded, but also those that have their beginning from aversion or fear of those consequences that follow the emission are voluntary actions. The forms of speech by which the passions are expressed are partly the same and partly different from those by which we express our thoughts. And first, generally all passions may be expressed indicatively, as I love, I fear, I joy, I deliberate, I will, I command. But some of them have particular expressions by themselves which nevertheless are not informations unless it be when they serve to make other inferences besides that of the passion they proceed from. Deliberation is expressed subjunctively, which is a speech proper to signify suppositions with their consequences, as if this be done then this will follow and differs not from the language of reasoning save that reasoning is in general words, but deliberation for the most part is of particulars. The language of desire and aversion is imperative, as do this, for bear that, which when the party is obliged to do or for bear is a command, otherwise prayer or else counsel. The language of vanglory of indignation, pity and revengefulness, operative, but of the desire to know there is a peculiar expression called interrogative as what is it, when shall it, how is it done, and why so. Other language of the passions I find none, for cursing, swearing, reviling, and the like do not signify a speech, but as the actions of a tongue accustomed. These forms of speech, I say, are expressions or voluntary significations of our passions, but certain signs they be not, because they may be used arbitrarily, whether they that use them have such passions or not. The best signs of passions present are either in the countenance, motions of the body, actions and ends, or aims, which we otherwise know the man to have. And because in deliberation the appetites and aversions are raised by foresight of the good and evil consequences, and sequels of the action whereof we deliberate, the good or evil effect thereof depended on the foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which very seldom any man is able to see to the end. But for so far as a man seeth, if the good in those consequences be greater than the evil, the whole chain is that which writers call apparent or seeming good. And contrarially, when the evil exceeded the good, the whole is apparent or seeming evil, so that he who hath by experience or reason, the greatest insurer's prospect of consequences, deliberates best himself, and is able when he will to give the best counsel unto others. Continual success in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say, continual prospering, is that men call felicity. I mean the felicity of this life. For there is no such thing as perpetual tranquility of mind while we live here, because life itself is but motion, and can never be without desire, nor without fear, no more than without sense. What kind of felicity God hath ordained to them that devoutly honor him, a man shall no sooner know than enjoy, being joys that now are as incomprehensible as the word of schoolmen, be a typical vision is unintelligible. The form of speech whereby men signify their opinion of the goodness of anything is praise. That whereby they signify the power and greatness of anything is magnifying. And that whereby they signify the opinion they have of a man's felicity is by the Greeks called Makarismos, for which we have no name in our tongue. And thus much is sufficient for the present purpose to have been said of the passions. End of Chapter 6 And in the chain of discourse wheresoever it be interrupted there is an end for that time. If the discourse be merely mental it consists of thoughts that the thing will be and will not be, or that it has been and has not been alternately. So wheresoever you break off the chain of a man's discourse you leave him in the presumption of it will be, or it will not be, or it has been, or has not been. All which is opinion, and that which is alternate appetite, in deliberating concerning good and evil, the same is alternate opinion in the inquiry of the truth of past and future. And as the last appetite in deliberation is called the will, so the last opinion in search of the truth of past and future is called the judgment, or resolute and final sentence of him that discourses. And as the whole chain of appetites alternate in the question of good or bad is called deliberation, so the whole chain of opinions alternate in the question of true or false is called doubt. No discourse whatsoever can end in absolute knowledge of fact, past or to come, for as for the knowledge of fact it is originally sense and ever after memory. And for the knowledge of consequence which I have said before is called science, it is not absolute but conditional. No man can know by discourse that this or that is, has been or will be, which is to know absolutely, but only that if this be, that is, if this has been, that has been, if this shall be, that shall be, which is to know conditionally, and that not the consequence of one thing to another, but of one name of a thing to another name of the same thing. And therefore when the discourse is put into speech and begins with the definitions of words and proceeds by connection of the same intergeneral affirmations, and these again into syllogisms, the end or last sum is called the conclusion, and the thought of the mind by it signified is that conditional knowledge or knowledge of the consequence of words which is commonly called science. But if the first ground of such discourse be not definitions, or if the definitions be not rightly joined together into syllogisms, then the end or conclusion is again opinion, namely of the truth of somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and senseless words, without possibility of being understood. When two or more men know of one and the same fact, they are said to be conscious of it one to another, which is as much as to know it together. And because such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one another, or of a third, it was and ever will be reputed a very evil act for any man to speak against his conscience, or to corrupt or force another so to do, in so much that the plea of conscience has been always harkened unto, very diligently, in all times. Afterwards men made use of the same word metaphorically for the knowledge of their own secret facts and secret thoughts, and therefore it is rhetorically said that the conscience is a thousand witnesses. And last of all men vehemently in love with their own new opinions, though never so absurd and obstinately bent to maintain them, gave those their opinions also, that reverenced name of conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawful to change or speak against them, and so pretend to know they are true, when they know at most, but that they think so. When a man's discourse beginners not at definitions, it begins either at some contemplation of his own, and then it is still called opinion, or it begins at some saying of another, of whose ability to know the truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth not, and then the discourse is not so much concerning the thing as the person, and the resolution is called belief and faith. Faith in the man, belief both of the man and of the truth of what he says, so that in belief are two opinions, one of the saying of the man, the other of his virtue. To have faith in or trust to, to believe a man, signify the same thing, namely an opinion of the veracity of the man, but to believe what is said signifies only an opinion of the truth of the saying. But we ought to observe that this phrase I believe in, as also the Latin, credo in, and the Greek, pyseno es, are never used, but in the writings of divines. Instead of them, in other writings are put, I believe him, I trust him, I have faith in him, I rely on him. And in Latin, credo ili, fido ili, and in Greek, pyseno anto, and that this singularity of the ecclesiastic use of the word has raised many disputes about the right object of the Christian faith. But by believing in, as it is in the creed, is meant not trust in the person, but confession and acknowledgement of the doctrine. For not any Christians, but all manner of men, do so believe in God as to hold all for truth they hear him say, whether they understand it or not, which is all the faith and trust can possibly be had in any person whatsoever. But they do not believe the doctrine of the creed. From whence we may infer that when we believe any saying whatsoever it be, to be true? From arguments taken, not from the thing itself, or from the principles of natural reason, but from the authority and good opinion we have of him that hath said it. Then is the speaker or person we believe in or trust in, and whose word we take, the object of our faith. And the honor done in believing is done to him only. And consequently, when we believe that the scriptures are the word of God, having no immediate revelation from God himself, our belief, faith and trust is in the church, whose word we take and acquiesce therein. And they that believe that which a prophet relates unto them in the name of God, take the word of the prophet, do honor to him, and in him trust and believe, touching the truth of what he relate is, whether he be a true or a false prophet. And so it is also with all other history, for if I should not believe all that is written by historians of the glorious acts of Alexander or Caesar, I do not think the ghost of Alexander or Caesar had any just cause to be offended, or anybody else but the historian. If Livy says the Gods made once a chaospeak, and we believe it not, we distrust not God therein, but Livy, so that it is evident that whatsoever we believe, upon no other reason than what is drawn from authority of men only and their writings, whether they be sent from God or not, is faith in men only. End of chapter 7, recorded by Gesine in January 2007. These virtues are of two sorts, natural and acquired. By natural I mean not that which a man hath from his birth, for that is nothing else but sense, wherein men differ so little one from another and from brute beasts, as it is not to be reckoned amongst virtues. But I mean that wit which is gotten by use only and experience, without method, culture, or instruction. This natural wit consists of principally in two things, celerity of imagining, that is, swift succession of one thought to another, and steady direction to some approved end. On the contrary, a slow imagination maketh that defect or fall to the mind, which is commonly called dullness, stupidity, and sometimes by other names that signify slowness of motion or difficulty to be moved. And this difference of quickness is caused by the difference of men's passions, that love and dislike, some one thing, some another, and therefore some men's thoughts run one way, some another, and are held to, observe differently the things that pass through their imagination. And whereas in this succession of men's thoughts there is nothing to observe in the things they think on, but either in what they be like one another, or in what they be unlike, or what they serve for, or how they serve to such a purpose, those that observe their similitudes, in case they be such as are but rarely observed by others, are said to have a good wit, by which in this occasion is meant a good fancy. But they that observe their differences and dissimilitudes, which is called distinguishing, and discerning, and judging between thing and thing, in case such discerning be not easy, are said to have a good judgment, and particularly in matter of conversation and business, where in times, places, and persons are to be discerned, this virtue is called discretion. The former, that is fancy, without the help of judgment, is not committed as a virtue, but the latter which is judgment and discretion, is committed for itself, without the help of fancy. Besides the discretion of times, places, and persons necessary to a good fancy, there is required also an often application of his thoughts to their end, that is to say, to some use to be made of them. This done, he that hath this virtue will be easily fitted with similitudes that will please, not only by illustration of his discourse, and adorning it with new and apt metaphors, but also by the rarity of their invention. But without steadiness and direction to some end, great fancy is one kind of madness, such as they have that, and ring into any discourse, are snatched from their purpose by everything that comes in their thought, into so many and so long digressions and parentheses, that they utterly lose themselves. Which kind of folly I know no particular name for, but the cause of it is sometimes want of experience, whereby that seemeth to a man new and rare which doth not so to others, sometimes pusillanimity, by which that seems great to him, which other men think a trifle, and whatsoever is new or great, and therefore thought fit to be told, withdraws a man by degrees from the intended way of his discourse. In a good poem, whether it be epic or dramatic, has also in sonnets, epigrams, and other pieces, both judgment and fancy are required, but the fancy must be more eminent, because they please for the extravagancy, but ought not to displease by indiscretion. In a good history, the judgment must be eminent, because the goodness consistseth in the choice of the method, in the truth, and in the choice of the actions, that are most profitable to be known. Fancy has no place, but only in adorning the style. In orations of praise and in invectives, the fancy is predominant, because the design is not truth, but to honor or dishonor, which is done by noble or by vile comparisons. The judgment does but suggest what circumstances make an action laudable or culpable. In hortatives and pleadings, as truth or disguise serveth best to the design in hand, so is the judgment or the fancy most required. In demonstration, in counsel, and all rigorous search of truth, sometimes does all, except sometimes the understanding have need to be opened by some apt similitude, and then there is so much use of fancy. But for metaphors, they are in this case utterly excluded, for seeing they openly profess deceit to admit them into counsel or reasoning, or manifest folly. And in any discourse whatsoever, if the defective discretion be apparent, how extravagant so ever the fancy be, the whole discourse will be taken for a sign of want of wit, and so will it never when the discretion is manifest, though the fancy be never so ordinary. The secret thoughts of a man run over all things holy, profane, clean, obscene, grave, and light, without shame or blame, which verbal discourse cannot do, farther than the judgment shall approve of the time, place, and persons. An anatomist or physician may speak or write his judgment of unclean things, because it is not to please but profit. But for another man to write his extravagant and pleasant fancies of the same is as if a man, for being tumbled into the dirt, should come and present himself before a good company. And it is the want of discretion that makes the difference. Again, in profess grimissness of mind and familiar company, a man may play with the sounds and equivocal significations of words, and that many times with the encounters of extraordinary fancy. But in a sermon, or in public, or before persons unknown, or whom we ought to reverence, there is no jingling of words that will not be accounted folly, and the difference is only in the want of discretion. So that where wit is wanting, it is not fancy that is wanting, but discretion. The judgment, therefore, without fancy, is wit, but fancy without judgment, not. When the thoughts of a man that has a design in hand running over a multitude of things, observes how they conduce to that design, or what design they may conduce unto, if his observations be such as are not easy, or usual, this wit of his is called prudence, and depended on much experience and memory of the like things and their consequences here too fore. In which there is not so much difference of men, as there is in their fancies and judgments, because the experience of men equal in age is not much unequal as to the quantity, but lies in different occasions, everyone having his private designs. To govern well, a family and a kingdom are not different degrees of prudence, but different sorts of business. No more than to draw a picture in little, or as great, or greater than the life, are different degrees of art. A plain husbandman is more prudent in affairs of his own house than a privy counselor in the affairs of another man. To prudence, if you add the use of unjust or dishonest means, such as usually are prompted to men by fear or want, you have that crooked wisdom, which is called craft, which is a sign of pusillanimity. For magnanimity is contempt of unjust or dishonest helps. And that which the latins call versucia, translated into English, shifting, and is a putting off of a present danger or in commodity by engaging into a greater, as when a man robs one to pay another, is but a shorter-sighted craft, called versucia from versura, which signifies taking money at usury for the present payment of interest. As for acquired wit, I mean acquired by method and instruction, there is none but reason, which has grounded on the right use of speech, and produces the sciences. But of reason and science, I have already spoken in the fifth and sixth chapters. The causes of this difference of wits are in the passions, and the difference of passions precede us partly from the different constitution of the body, and partly from different education. For if the difference preceded from the temper of the brain, and the organs of sense, either exterior or interior, there would be no less difference of men in their sight, hearing or other senses than in their fancies and discretions. It precedes, therefore, from the passions, which are different not only from the difference of men's complexions, but also from their difference of customs and education. The passions that most of all cause the differences of wit are principally the more or less desire of power, of riches, of knowledge, and of honor. All which may be reduced to the first, that is, desire of power, for riches, knowledge and honor, are but several sorts of power. And, therefore, a man who has no great passion for any of these things, but is, as men term it, indifferent, though he may be so far a good man as to be free from giving a fence, yet he cannot possibly have either a great fancy or much judgment. For the thoughts are to the desires as scouts and spies to ranger broad and find the way to the things desired, all steadiness of the mind's motion, and all quickness of the same proceeding from thence. For us to have no desire is to be dead, so to have weak passions is dullness, and to have passions indifferently for everything, giddiness and distraction, and to have stronger and more vehement passions for anything that is ordinarily seen in others is that which men call madness. Whereof there be almost as many kinds as of the passions themselves? Sometimes the extraordinary and extravagant passion preceded from the evil constitution of the organs of the body or harmed on them, and sometimes the hurt and indisposition of the organs is caused by the vehemence or long continuance of the passion, but in both cases the madness is of one and the same nature. The passion whose violence or continuance maketh madness is either great vanglory which is commonly called pride and self-conceit or great dejection of mind. Pride subjecteth a man to anger the excess whereof is the madness called rage and fury, and thus it comes to pass that excessive desire of revenge when it becomes habitual, hurteth the organs, and becomes rage. That excessive love with jealousy becomes also rage. Excessive opinion of a man's own self, for divine inspiration, for wisdom, learning, form, and the like becomes distraction and giddiness. The same joined with envy, rage, vehement opinion of the truth of anything contradicted by others, rage. Dejection subjects a man to causeless fears, which is a madness commonly called melancholy apparent also in diverse manners, as in haunting of solitudes and graves in superstitious behavior and infirming someone, some another particular thing. In some, all passions that produce strange and unusual behavior are called by the general name of madness. But of the several kinds of madness, he that would take the pains might enroll a legion. And if the excesses be madness, there is no doubt that the passions themselves when they tend to evil are degrees of the same. For example, though the effect of folly in them that are possessed of an opinion of being inspired, be not visible always in one man by any very extravagant action that precedeth from such passion. Yet when many of them conspire together, the rage of the whole multitude is visible enough. For what argument of madness can there be greater than to clamor, strike, and throw stones than our best friends? Yet this is somewhat less than such a multitude will do, for they will clamor, fight against, and destroy those by whom all their lifetime before they have been protected and secured from injury. And if this be madness in the multitude, it is the same in every particular man. For, as in the midst of the sea, though a man perceive no sound of that part of the water next to him, yet he is well assured that part contributes as much to the roaring of the sea as any other part of the same quantity. So also, though we perceive no great unquietness in one or two men, yet we may be well assured that their singular passions are parts of the seditious roaring of a troubled nation. And if there were nothing else to berate their madness, yet that very irrigating such inspiration to themselves is argument enough. If some man in bedlam should entertain you with sober discourse and you desire in taking leave to know what he were that you might another time require his civility, and he should tell you he were God the Father, I think you need expect no extravagant action for argument of his madness. This opinion of inspiration, called commonly private spirit, begins very often from some lucky finding of an error generally held by others, and not knowing or not remembering by what conduct of reason they came to so sing it or a truth as they think it, though it be many times an untruth they light on, they presently admire themselves as being in the special grace of God Almighty who hath revealed the same to them supernaturally by his spirit. Again, that madness is nothing else, but too much appearing passion may be gathered out of the effects of wine, which are the same with those of the evil disposition of the organs. For the variety of behavior in men that have drunk too much is the same with that of madmen. Some of them raging, others loving, others laughing all extravagantly, but according to their several domineering passions. For the effect of the wine does but remove dissimulation, and take from them the sight of the deformity of their passions. For, I believe, the most sober men, when they walk alone without care and employment of the mind, would be unwilling the vanity and extravagance of their thoughts at that time should be publicly seen, which is a confession that passions unguided are for the most part mere madness. The opinions of the world, both in ancient and later ages concerning the cause of madness have been too, some deriving them from the passions, some from demons or spirits, either good or bad, which they thought might enter into a man, possess him, and move his organs in such strange and uncouth manner as madmen used to do. The former sort, therefore, called such men madmen, but the latter called them sometimes demoniacs, that is, possessed with spirits, sometimes in argumenti, that is, agitated or moved with spirits, and now in Italy they are called not only potzi, madmen, but also spiritati, men possessed. There was once a great conflux of people in Abdera, a city of the Greeks, at the acting of the tragedy of Andromata, upon an extreme a hot day, lure upon a great many of the spectators, falling into fevers, had this accident from the heat and from the tragedy together, that they did nothing but pronounce iambics with the names of Perseus and Andromata, which together with a fever was cured by the coming on of winter, and this madness was thought to proceed from the passion imprinted by the tragedy. Likewise, there reigned a fit of madness in another Grecian city, which seized only the young matins and caused many of them to hang themselves. This was by most then thought an act of the devil, but one that suspected that contemplative life in them might proceed from some passion of the mind, and supposing they did not contempt also their honor, gave counsel to the magistrates to strip such as so hang themselves and let them hang out naked. This, the story says, cured that madness. But on the other side, the same Grecians that often ascribe madness to the operation of the humanities, or furies, and sometimes of Ceres, Phoebus, and other gods, so much did men attribute to phantasms as to think them aerial living bodies and generally to call them spirits. And as the Romans in this held the same opinion with the Greeks, so also did the Jews, for they called madmen prophets, or according as they thought the spirits good or bad, demoniacs, and some of them called both prophets and demoniacs madmen, and some called the same man both demoniac and madmen. But for the Gentiles it is no wonder because diseases and health, vices and virtues, and many natural accidents were with them termed and worshipped as demons, so that a man was to understand by demons as well, sometimes an agu as a devil. But for the Jews to have such opinion is somewhat strange. For neither Moses nor Abraham pretended to prophesy by possession of a spirit, but from the voice of God or by a vision or dream. Nor is there anything in his law, moral or ceremonial, by which they were taught there was any such enthusiasm or any possession. When God is said to take from the spirit that was in Moses and give to the seventy elders, the spirit of God, taking it for the substance of God is not divided. The scriptures by the spirit of God in man mean a man's spirit inclined to godliness. And where it is said whom I have filled with the spirit of wisdom to make garments for Aaron is not meant a spirit put into them that can make garments but the wisdom of their own spirits in that kind of work. In the like-sense spirit of man when it produces unclean actions is ordinarily called an unclean spirit and so other spirits though not always yet as often as the virtue of vice so styled is extraordinary and eminent. Neither did the other prophets of the Old Testament pretend enthusiasm or that God spoke in them but to them by voice, vision or dream and the burden of the Lord was not possession but command. How then could the Jews fall into this opinion of possession? I can imagine no other reason but that which is common to all men. Namely the want of curiosity to search natural causes and they're placing felicity in the acquisition of the gross pleasures of the senses and the things that most immediately conduce there too. For they that see any strange and unusual ability or defect in a man's mind unless they see with all from what cause that may probably proceed can hardly think it natural and if not natural they must need to think it supernatural and then what can it be but that either God or the devil is in him. And hence it came to pass when our Savior was compassed about with a multitude those of the house doubted he was mad and went out to hold him but the scribe said he had Beelzebob and that was it by which he cast out devils as if the greater madman had awed the lesser. And that some said he hath the devil and is mad whereas others holding him for a profit said these are not the words of one that hath a devil. So in the Old Testament he that came to an aunt Jehu was a prophet but some of the company asked Jehu what came that madman for. So that in some it is manifest that whosoever behaved himself an extraordinary manner was thought by the Jews to be possessed either with a good or evil spirit except by the Sadducees who aired so far on the other hand is not to believe there were at all any spirits which is very near to direct atheism and thereby perhaps the more provoked others to term such men demoniacs rather than madmen. But why then does our Savior proceed in the curing of them as if they were possessed and not as if they were mad? To which I can give no other kind of answer but that which is given to those who urged the scripture in like manner against the opinion of the motion of the earth. The scripture was written to show unto men the kingdom of God and to prepare their minds to become his obedient subjects leaving the world and the philosophy thereof to the disputation of men for the exercising of their natural reason. What are the earths or sun's motion make the day and night or what are the exorbitant actions of men proceed from passion or from the devil? So we worship him not. It is all one as to our obedience and subjection to God Almighty which is the thing for which the scripture was written. As for that our Savior speaketh to the disease as to a person it is the usual phrase of all the cure by words only as Christ did and enchanters pretend to do whether they speak to a devil or not. For is not Christ also said to have rebuked the winds? Is not he said also to rebuk a fever? Yet this does not argue that a fever is a devil. And whereas many of those devils are said to confess Christ it is not necessary to interpret those places otherwise than that those madmen confess to him. And whereas our Savior speaketh of an unclean spirit that having gone out of a man wandereth through dry places seeking rest and finding none and returning into the same man with seven other spirits worse than himself it is manifestly a parable alluding to a man that after a little endeavor to quit his lusts is vanquished by the strength of them and becomes seven times worse than he was. So that I see nothing at all in the scripture that requires a belief that demoniacs were any other thing but madmen. There is yet another fault in the discourses of some men which may also be numbered amongst the sorts of madness. Namely that abuse of words were of I have spoken before in the fifth chapter by the name of absurdity. And that is when men speak such words as put together have in them no signification at all but are fallen upon by some through misunderstanding of the words they have received and repeat by rote by others from attention to deceive by obscurity. And this is incident to none but those that converse in questions of matters incomprehensible as the schoolmen or in questions of abstruse philosophy. The common sort of men seldom speak insignificantly and are therefore by those other egregious persons counted idiots. But to be assured their words are without anything correspondent to them in the mind there would need some examples which if any man require let him take a schoolman into his hands and see if he can translate any one chapter concerning any difficult point as the trinity the deity the nature of Christ transubstantiation free will etc. into any of the modern tongues so as to make the same intelligible or into any tolerable Latin such as they were acquainted with all that lived when the Latin tongue was vulgar. What is the meaning of these words? The first cause does not necessarily inflow anything into the second by force of the essential subordination of the second causes by which it may help it to work. They are the translation of the title of the sixth chapter of Suarez's first book of the concourse motion and help of God. When men write whole volumes of such stuff are they not mad or intend to make others so? And particularly in the question of transubstantiation where after certain words spoken they that say the whiteness roundness magnitude quality corruptibility all which are incorporeal etc. go out of the wafer into the body of our blessed savior do they not make those nesses toods and ties to be so many spirits possessing his body for by spirits they mean always things that being incorporeal are nevertheless movable from one place to another. So that this kind of absurdity may rightly be numbered amongst the many sorts of madness and all the time that guided by clear thoughts of their worldly lust they forbear disputing or writing thus but lucid intervals and thus much to the virtues and defects intellectual. End of Chapter 8 Recording by Darren L. Slider www.logoslibrary.org Chapter 9 of Leviathan This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer visit LibriVox.org Recording by Carl Manchester 2007 Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes Chapter 9 Of the Several Subjects of Knowledge There are of knowledge two kinds whereof one is knowledge of fact the other knowledge of the consequence of one affirmation to another. The former is nothing else but sense and memory and is absolute knowledge as when we see a fact doing or remember it done and this is the knowledge required in a witness. The latter is called science and is conditional as when we know that if the figure shown be a circle then any straight line through the centre shall divide it into equal parts and this is the knowledge required in a philosopher that is to say of him that pretends to reasoning. The register of knowledge of fact is called history whereof there be two sorts one called natural history which is the history of such facts or effects of nature as have no dependence on man's will such are the histories of metals plants animals regions and the like the other is civil history which is the history of the voluntary actions of men in commonwealths. The registers of science are such books as contain the demonstrations of consequences of one affirmation to another and a commonly called books of philosophy whereof the sorts are many according to the diversity of the matter and may be divided in such manner as I have divided them in the following table. One science that is knowledge of consequences which is called also philosophy. One consequences from accidents of bodies natural which is called natural philosophy. One consequences from accidents common to all bodies natural which are quantity and motion. One consequences from quantity and motion in determinant which being the principle or first foundation of philosophy is called philosophy a prima. Two consequences from motion and quantity determined. One consequences from quantity and motion determined by figure by number mathematics geometry arithmetic. Two consequences from motion and quantity of bodies in special. One consequences from motion and quantity of the great parts of the world as the earth and stars. Cosmography astronomy geography. Two consequences from motion of special kinds and figures of body. Mechanics doctrine of weight. Science of engineers architecture navigation. Two physics or consequences from qualities. One consequences from qualities of bodies transient such as sometimes appear sometimes vanish. Meteorology Two consequences from qualities of bodies permanent. One consequences from qualities of stars. One consequences from the light of the stars out of this and the motion of the sun is made the science of seeography. Two consequences from the influence of the stars. Astrology. Two consequences of qualities from liquid bodies that fill the space between the stars such as the air or substance ethereal. Three consequences from qualities of bodies terrestrial. One consequences from parts of the earth that are without sense. One consequences from qualities of minerals as stones metals etc. Two consequences from the qualities of vegetables. Two consequences from qualities of animals. One consequences from the qualities of animals in general. One consequences from vision optics. Two consequences from sounds music. Three consequences from the rest of the senses. Two consequences from qualities of men in special. One consequences from passions of men, ethics, two, consequences from speech, one, in magnifying, vilifying, etc., poetry, two, in persuading rhetoric, three, in reasoning, logic, four, in contracting, the science of just and unjust, two, consequences from accidents of politic bodies, which is called politics and civil philosophy, one, of consequences from the institution of commonwealths to the rights and duties of the body politic, or sovereign, two, of consequences from the same to the duty and rights of the subjects. End of Chapter 9. Chapter 10 of LibriVox Recording LibriVox Recording LibriVox by Thomas Hobbes Chapter 10 of Power, Worth, Dignity, Honor and Worthiness The power of a man, to take it universally, is his present means to obtain some future apparent good, and is either original or instrumental. Natural power is the eminence of the faculties of body or mind, as extraordinary strength, form, prudence, arts, eloquence, liberality, nobility. Natural are those powers which, acquired by these, or by fortune, are means and instruments to acquire more, as riches, reputation, friends, and the secret working of God, which men call good luck. For the nature of power is, in this point, like to fame, increasing as it proceeds, or like the motion of heavy bodies, which, the further they go, makes still the more haste. The greatest of human powers is that which is compounded of the powers of most men, united by consent in one person, natural or civil, that has the use of all their powers depending on his will, such as is the power of a commonwealth, or depending on the wills of each particular, such as is the power of a faction, or of diverse factions, leagued. Therefore to have servants is power, to have friends is power, for they are strength united. Also, riches joined with liberality is power, because it procures friends and servants, without liberality, not so, because in this case, they defend not, but expose men to envy, as a prey. Reputation of power is power, because it droid with it the adherence of those that need protection. So is reputation of love of a man's country, called popularity, for the same reason. Also, what quality, so ever, maketh a man beloved or feared of many, or the reputation of such quality, is power, because it is a means to have the assistance and service of many. And success is power, because it maketh reputation of wisdom or good fortune, which makes men either fear him, or rely on him. Affability of men already in power is increase of power, because it gaineth love. Reputation of prudence in the conduct of peace or war is power, because to prudent men we commit the government of ourselves more willingly than to others. Nobility is power, not in all places, but only in those commonwealths, where it has privileges, for in such privileges consisteth their power. Science is power, because it is seeming prudence. Form is power, because being a promise of good it recommendeth men to the favor of women and strangers. The sciences are small powers, because not eminent, and therefore not acknowledged in any man, nor are at all but in a few, and in them but of a few things. For sciences of that nature as none can understand it to be, but such as in a good measure have attained it. Arts of public use, as fortification, making of engines, and other instruments of war, because they confer to defense and victory are power, and though the true mother of them be science, namely the mathematics, yet because they are brought into the light by the hand of the artificer, they be esteemed, the midwife passing with the vulgar for the mother, as his issue. The value or worth of a man is, as of all other things, his price, that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his power, and therefore is not absolute, but a thing dependent on the need and judgment of another. An able conductor of soldiers is of great price in time of war present or imminent, but in peace not so. A learned and uncorrupt judge is much worth in time of peace, but not so much in war. And as in other things, so in men, not the seller, but the buyer determines the price. For let a man, as most men do, rate themselves at the highest value they can, yet their true value is no more than it is esteemed by others. The manifestation of the value we set on one another is that which is commonly called honouring and dishonouring. To value a man at a high rate is to honour him. At a low rate is to dishonour him. But high and low, in this case, is to be understood by comparison to the rate that each man seteth on himself. The public worth of a man, which is the value set on him by the Commonwealth, is that which men commonly call dignity. And this value of him by the Commonwealth is understood by offices of command, due licuture, public employment, or by names and titles introduced for distinction of such value. To pray to another for aid of any kind is to honour, because a sign we have an opinion he has power to help. And the more difficult the aid is, the more is the honour. To obey is to honour, because no man obeys them who they think have no power to help or hurt them. And consequently, to disobey is to dishonour. To give great gifts to a man is to honour him, because it is buying of protection and acknowledging of power. To give little gifts is to dishonour, because it is but arms and signifies an opinion of the need of small helps. To be sedulous in promoting another's good also to flatter is to honour, as a sign we seek his protection or aid. To neglect is to dishonour. To give way or place to another in any commodity is to honour, being a confession of greater power. To arrogate is to dishonour. To show any sign of love or fear of another is honour, for both to love and to fear is to value. To condemn or less to love or fear than he expects is to dishonour, for it is undervaluing. To praise, magnify or call happy is to honour, because nothing but goodness, power and felicity is valued. To revile, mock or pity is to dishonour. To speak to another with consideration, to appear before him with decency and humility is to honour him, as signs of fear to offend. To speak to him rashly, to do anything before him obscenely, slovenly, impudently is to dishonour. To believe, to trust, to rely on another is to honour him, sign of opinion of his virtue and power. To distrust or not believe is to dishonour. To harken to a man's counsel or discourse of what kind so ever is to honour, as a sign we think him wise or eloquent or witty. To sleep or go forth or talk the while is to dishonour. To do those things to another which he takes for signs of honour or which the law or custom makes so is to honour, because in approving the honour done by others, he acknowledges the power which others acknowledge. To refuse to do them is to dishonour. To agree in opinion is to honour, as being a sign of approving his judgement and wisdom. To dissent is dishonour and an upbraiding of error, and if the dissent be in many things, of folly. To imitate is to honour, for it is vehemently to approve. To imitate one's enemy is to dishonour. To honour those another honours is to honour him, as a sign of approbation of his judgement. To honour his enemies is to dishonour him. To employ in counsel or in actions of difficulty is to honour, as a sign of opinion of his wisdom or other power. To deny employment in the same cases to those that seek it is to dishonour. All these ways of honouring are natural, and as well within as without commonwealths. But in commonwealths where he or they that have the supreme authority can make whatsoever they please to stand for signs of honour, there be other honours. The sovereign doth honour a subject with whatsoever title or office or employment or action that he himself will have taken for a sign of his will to honour him. The king of Persia honoured Mordecai when he appointed he should be conducted through the streets in the king's garment upon one of the king's horses with a crown on his head and a prince before him proclaiming thus shall it be done to him that the king will honour. And yet another king of Persia or the same another time to one that demanded for some great service to wear one of the king's robes gave him leave so to do, but with this addition that he should wear it as the king's fool and then it was dishonour. So that of civil honour the fountain is in the person of the commonwealth and dependeth on the will of the sovereign and is therefore temporary and called civil honour such as our magistracy, offices, titles and in some places coats and scutians painted and men honour such as have them as having so many signs of favour in the commonwealth which favour is power. Honourable is whatsoever possession, action or quality is an argument and sign of power and therefore to be honoured, loved or feared of many is honourable as arguments of power to be honoured of few or none dishonourable. Dominion and victory is honourable because acquired by power and servitude for need or fear is dishonourable. Good fortune if lasting honourable as a sign of the favour of God, ill and lost is dishonourable. Riches are honourable for they are power. Poverty dishonourable, magnanimity, liberality, hope, courage, confidence are honourable for they proceed from the conscience of power. Pucillanimity, parsimony, fear, diffidence are dishonourable. Timely resolution or determination of what a man is to do is honourable as being the contempt of small difficulties and dangers and irresolution dishonourable as the sign of too much valuing of little impediments and little advantages. For when a man has weighed things as long as the time permits and resolves not, the difference of weight is but little and therefore if he resolves not, he overvalues little things which is pucillanimity. All actions and speeches that proceed or seem to proceed from much experience, science, discretion or wit are honourable for all these are powers. Actions or words that proceed from error, ignorance or folly, dishonourable. Gravity as far forth as it seems to proceed from a mind employed on something else is honourable because employment is a sign of power but if it seemed to proceed from a purpose to appear grave it is dishonourable. For the gravity of the former is like the steadiness of a ship laden with merchandise but of the latter like the steadiness of a ship ballasted with sand and other trash. To be conspicuous that is to say to be known for wealth, office, great actions or any eminent good is honourable as a sign of the power for which he is conspicuous. On the contrary obscurity is dishonourable. To be descended from conspicuous parents is honourable because they the more easily attain the aids and friends of their ancestors. On the contrary to be descended from obscure parentage is dishonourable. Actions proceeding from equity joined with loss are honourable as signs of magnanimity for magnanimity is a sign of power. On the contrary, craft, shifting, neglect of equity is dishonourable. Covetousness of great riches and ambition of great honours are honourable as signs of power to obtain them. Covetousness and ambition of little gains or preferments is dishonourable. Nor does it alter the case of honour whether an action, so it be great and difficult and consequently a sign of much power be just or unjust for honour consisteth only in the opinion of power. Therefore the ancient heathen did not think they dishonoured but greatly honoured the gods when they introduced them in their poems committing rapes, thefts and other great but unjust or unclean acts. In so much as nothing is so much celebrated in Jupiter as his adulteries nor in Mercury as his frauds and thefts of whose praises in a hymn of Homer the greatest is this that being born in the morning he had invented music at noon and before night stolen away the cattle of Apollo from his herdsmen. Also amongst men till they were constituted great commonwealths it was thought no dishonour to be a pirate or a highway thief but rather a lawful trade not only amongst the Greeks but also amongst all other nations as is manifest by the histories of ancient time. And at this day in this part of the world private duels are and always will be honourable though unlawful till such time as there shall be honour ordained for them that refuse and ignominy for them that make the challenge. For duels also are many times effects of courage and the ground of courage is always strength or skill which are power though for the most part they be effects of rash speaking and of the fear of dishonour in one or both combatants who engaged by rashness are driven into the lists to avoid disgrace. Scuttions and coats of arms hereditary where they have any eminent privileges are honourable otherwise not for their power consisteth either in such privileges or in riches or some such thing as is equally honoured in other men. This kind of honour commonly called gentry has been derived from the ancient Germans for there never was any such thing known where the German customs were unknown nor is it now anywhere in use where the Germans have not inhabited. The ancient Greek commanders when they went to war had their shields painted with such devices as they pleased in so much as an unpainted buckler was a sign of poverty and of a common soldier but they transmitted not the inheritance of them. The Romans transmitted the marks of their families but they were the images not the devices of their ancestors. Amongst the people of Asia, Africa and America there is not nor was ever any such thing. Germans only had that custom from whom it has been derived into England, France, Spain and Italy when in great numbers they either aided the Romans or made their own conquests in these western parts of the world. For Germany, being anciently as all other countries in their beginnings divided amongst an infinite number of little lords or masters of families that continually had wars one with another those masters or lords principally to the end they might when they were covered with arms be known by their followers and partly for ornament both painted their armour or this guccian or coat with a picture of some beast or other thing and also put some eminent and visible mark upon the crest of their helmets and this ornament both of the arms and crest descended by inheritance to their children to the eldest pure and to the rest with some note of diversity such as the old master that is to say in Dutch the heli out thought fit but when many such families joined together made a greater monarchy this duty of the herald to distinguish scutians was made a private office apart and the issue of these lords is the great and ancient gentry which for the most part bare living creatures noted for courage and rapine or castles, battlements, belts weapons, bars, palisades and other notes of war nothing being then in honour but virtue and military afterwards not only kings but popular commonwealths gave diverse manners of scutians to such as went forth to the war or returned from it for encouragement or recompense to their service all which by an observing reader may be found in such ancient histories Greek and Latin as make mention of the German nation and manners in their times Titles of honour such as our Duke Count, Marquis and Baron are honourable as signifying the value set upon them by the sovereign power of the commonwealth which titles were in old time titles of office and command derived some from the Romans some from the Germans and French Dukes in Latin duques being generals in war Counts, Comites such as bore the general company out of friendship and were left to govern and defend places conquered and pacified Marquises, Marchenès were counts that governed the marches or bounds of the empire which titles of Duke, Count and Marquis came into the empire about the time of Constantine the Great from the customs of the German militia but Baron seems to have been a title of the Gauls and signifies a great man such as were the kings or princes men whom they employed in war about their persons and seems to be derived from Via to bear and bar that signified the same in the language of the Gauls that Via in Latin and thence to Bero and Baro so that such men were called Barones and after Barones and in Spanish Barones but he that would know more particularly the original of titles of honour may find it as I have done this in Mr Seldon's most excellent treatise of that subject in process of time these offices of honour by occasion of trouble and for reasons of good and peaceable government were turned into mere titles serving for the most part to distinguish the precedents, place and order of subjects in the commonwealth and men were made dukes, counts, marquises and barons of places wherein they had neither possession nor command and other titles also were devised to the same end worthiness is a thing different from the worth or value of a man and also from his merit or dessert and consisteth in a particular power or ability for that whereof he is said to be worthy which particular ability is usually named fitness or aptitude for he is worthiest to be a commander, to be a judge or to have any other charge that is best fitted with the qualities required to the well discharging of it and worthiest of riches that has the qualities most requisite for the well-using of them any of which qualities being absent one may nevertheless be a worthy man and valuable for something else again a man may be worthy of riches, office and employment that nevertheless can plead no right to have it before another and therefore cannot be said to merit or deserve it for merit presupposeeth a right and that the thing deserved is due by promise of which I shall say more hereafter when I shall speak of contracts end of chapter 10 chapter 11 of Leviathan this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for further information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes chapter 11 of the difference of manners by manners I mean not here decency of behavior as how one man should salute another or how a man should wash his mouth or pick his teeth before company and such other points of the small morals but those qualities of mankind that concern their living together in peace and unity to which end we are to consider that the felicity of this life consists if not in the repose of a mind satisfied for there is no such finis ultimus utmost aim nor sumum bonum greatest good as is spoken of in the books of the old moral philosophers nor can a man any more live whose desires are at an end than he whose senses and imaginations are at a stand felicity is a continual progress of the desire from one object to another the attaining of the former being still but the way to the latter the cause were of is that the object of man's desire is not to enjoy once only and for one incident of time but to assure forever the way of his future desire and therefore the voluntary actions and inclinations of all men tend not only to the procuring but also to the assuring of a contented life and differ only in the way which arises partly from the diversity of passions in diverse men and partly from the difference of the knowledge or opinion each one has of the causes which produce the effect desired so that in the first place I put for a general inclination of all mankind a perpetual and restless desire of power after power that sees if only in death and the cause of this is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight than he has already attained to or that he cannot be content with a moderate power but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well which he hath present without the acquisition of more and from hence it is that kings whose power is greatest turn their endeavors to the assuring it at home by laws or abroad by wars and when that is done there succeeded the new desire in some of fame from new conquest in others of ease and sensual pleasure in others of admiration or being flattered for excellence in some art or other ability of the mind competition of riches, honor, command or other power inclineth to contention, enmity and war because the way of one competitor to the attaining of his desire is to kill, subdue, supplant or repel the other particularly competition of praise inclineth to a reverence of antiquity for men contend with the living not with the dead to these ascribing more than due that they may obscure the glory of the other desire of ease and sensual delight disposed if men to obey a common power because by such desires a man doth abandon the protection that might be hoped for from his own industry and labour fear of death and wounds disposed if for the same and for the same reason on the contrary needy men and hardy not contented with their present condition as also all men that are ambitious of military command are inclined to continue the causes of war and to stir up trouble and sedition for there is no honor military but by war nor any such hope to mend an ill game as by causing a new shuffle desire of knowledge and arts of peace inclineth men to obey a common power for such desire containeth a desire of leisure and consequently protection from some other power than their own desire of praise disposed if to laudable actions such as please them whose judgment they value for of those men whom we condemn we condemn also the praises desire of fame after death does the same and though after death there be no sense of the praise given us on earth as being joys that are either swallowed up in the unspeakable joys of heaven or extinguished in the extreme torments of hell yet is not such fame vain because men have a present delight therein from the foresight of it and of the benefit that may redound there by to their posterity which though they now see not yet they imagine and anything that is pleasure in the sense the same also is pleasure in the imagination to have received from one to whom we think ourselves equal greater benefits than there is hope to requite disposed to counterfeit love but really secret hatred and puts a man into the state of a desperate debtor that in declining the sight of his creditor tacitly wishes him there where he might never see him more for benefits oblige and obligation is thralldom and unrequitable obligation perpetual thralldom which is to one's equal hateful but to have received benefits from one whom we acknowledge for superior inclines to love because the obligation is no new depression and cheerful acceptation which men call gratitude is such an honor done to the oblige as he's taken generally for retribution also to receive benefits though from an equal or inferior as long as there is hope of requital disposed to love for in the intention of the receiver the obligation is of aid and service mutual from whence preceded an emulation of who shall exceed in benefiting the most noble and profitable contention possible wherein the victor is pleased with his victory and the other revenge by confessing it to have done more hurt to a man than he can or is willing to expiate inclineth the doer to hate the sufferer for he must expect revenge or forgiveness both which are hateful fear of oppression disposeth a man to anticipate or to seek aid by society for there is no other way by which a man can secure his life and liberty men that distrust their own subtlety are in tumult and sedition better disposed for victory than they that suppose themselves wise or crafty for these love to consult the other fearing to be circumvented to strike first and in sedition men being always in the precincts of battle to hold together and use all advantages of force is a better stratagem than any that can proceed from subtlety of wit feign glorious men such as without being conscious to themselves of great sufficiency delight in supposing themselves gallant men are inclined only to ostentation but not to attempt because when danger or difficulty appears they look for nothing but to have their insufficiency discovered feign glorious men such as estimate their sufficiency by the flattery of other men or the fortune of some precedent action without a short ground of hope from the true knowledge of themselves are inclined to rash engaging and in the approach of danger or difficulty to retire if they can because not seeing the way of safety they will rather hazard their honor which may be solved with an excuse than their lives for which no self is sufficient men that have a strong opinion of their own wisdom in matter of government are disposed to ambition because without public employment in council or majesty the honor of their wisdom is lost and therefore eloquent speakers are inclined to ambition for eloquence see myth wisdom both to themselves and others pusillanimity disposes if men to irresolution and consequently to lose the occasions and fittest opportunities of action for after men have been in deliberation till the time of action approach if it be not then manifest what is best to be done it is a sign the difference of motives the one way and the other are not great therefore not to resolve then is to lose the occasion by weighing of trifles which is pusillanimity frugality though in poor men of virtue make it a man unact to achieve such actions as require the strength of many men at once for it weaken if their endeavor which is to be nourished and kept in vigor by reward eloquence with flattery disposes if men to confide in them that have it because the former is seeming wisdom the latter seeming kindness add to them military reputation and it disposes if men to adhere and subject themselves to those men that have them the two former having given them caution against danger from him the latter gives them caution against danger from others want of science that is ignorance of causes disposes if or rather constrain it a man to rely on the advice and authority of others for all men whom the truth concerns if they rely not on their own must rely on the opinion of some other whom they think wiser than themselves and see not why he should deceive them ignorance of the signification of words is want of understanding disposes if men to take on trust not only the truth they know not but also the errors and which is more the nonsense of them they trust for neither error nor nonsense can without a perfect understanding of words be detected from the same it precedes that men give different names to one and the same thing from the difference of their own passions as they that approve a private opinion call it opinion but they that mislike it heresy and yet heresy signifies no more than private opinion but has only a greater tincture of color from the same also it preceded that men cannot distinguish without study and great understanding between one action of many men and many actions of one multitude as for example between the one action of all the senators of Rome in killing catiline and the many actions of a number of senators in killing Caesar and therefore are disposed to take for the action of the people that which is a multitude of actions done by a multitude of men led perhaps by the persuasion of one ignorance of the causes and original constitution of right equity law and justice disposes the man to make custom an example the rule of his actions in such manner as to think that unjust which it had been the custom to punish and that just of the impunity and approbation whereof they can produce an example or as the lawyers which only use this false measure of justice barbarously call it a precedent like little children that have no other rule of good and evil manners but the correction they received from their parents and masters say that children are constant to their rule whereas men are not so because grown strong and stubborn they appeal from custom to reason and from reason to custom as it serves their turn receding from custom when their interest requires it and setting themselves against reason as oft as reason is against them which is the cause that the doctrine of right and wrong is perpetually disputed both by the pen and the sword whereas the doctrine of lines and figures is not so because men care not in that subject what be truth as a thing that crosses no man's ambition profit or lust for I doubt not but if it had been a thing contrary to any man's right of dominion or to the interest of men that have dominion that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two angles of a square that doctrine should have been if not disputed yet by the burning of all books of geometry suppressed as far as he whom it concerned was able ignorance of remote causes disposes men to attribute all events to the causes immediate and instrumental for these are all the causes they perceive and hence it comes to pass that in all places men that are grieved with payments to the public discharge their anger upon the publicans that is to say farmers collectors and other officers of the public revenue and adhere to such as find fault with the public government and thereby when they have engaged themselves beyond hope of justification fall also upon the supreme authority for fear of punishment or shame of receiving pardon ignorance of natural causes disposes a man to credulity so as to believe many times impossibilities for such know nothing to the contrary but that they may be true being unable to detect the impossibility and credulity because men love to be harkened unto in company disposes them to lying so that ignorance itself without malice is able to make a man both to believe lies and tell them and sometimes also to invent them anxiety for the future time disposes men to inquire into the causes of things because the knowledge of them make if men the better able to order the present to their best advantage curiosity or love of the knowledge of causes draws a man from consideration of the effect to seek the cause and again the cause of that cause to the necessity he must come to this thought at last that there is some cause whereof there is no former cause but is eternal which is it men call God so that it is impossible to make any profound inquiry into natural causes without being inclined thereby to believe there is one God eternal though they cannot have any idea of him in their mind answerable to his nature for as a man that is born blind hearing men talk of warming themselves by the fire and being brought to warm himself by the same may easily conceive and assure himself there is somewhat there which men call fire and is the cause of the heat he feels but cannot imagine what it is like nor have an idea of it in his mind such as they have that see it so also by the visible things of this world and their admirable order a man may conceive there is a cause of them which men call God and yet not have an idea or image of him in his mind and they that make little or no inquiry into the natural causes of things yet from the fear that proceeds from the ignorance itself of what it is that hath the power to do them much good or harm are inclined to suppose and feign unto themselves several kinds of powers invisible to stand in awe of their own imaginations and in time of distress to invoke them as also in the time of an expected good success to give them thanks making the creatures of their own fancy their gods by which means it has come to pass that from the innumerable variety of fancy men have created in the world innumerable sorts of gods and this fear of things invisible is the natural seed of that which everyone in himself calleth religion and in them that worship or fear that power otherwise than they do superstition and this seed of religion having been observed by many some of those that have observed it have been inclined thereby to nourish dress and form it into laws and to add to it of their own invention any opinion of the causes of future events by which they thought they should best be able to govern others and make unto themselves the greatest use of their powers end of chapter 11 chapter 12 of Leviathan this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Leon Meyer Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes chapter 12 of religion seeing there are no signs nor fruit of religion but in man only there is no cause to doubt but that the seed of religion is also only in man and consisted in some peculiar quality or at least in some imminent degree thereof not to be found in other living creatures and first it is peculiar to the nature of man to be inquisitive into the causes of the events they see some more some less but all men so much as to be curious in the search of the causes of their own good and evil fortune secondly upon the sight of anything that hath a beginning to think also it had a cause which determined the same to begin then when it did rather than sooner or later thirdly whereas there is no other felicity of beasts but the enjoying of their quotidian food, ease, and lusts as having little or no foresight of the time to come for want of observation and memory of the order, consequence, and dependence of the things they see men observeth how one event hath been produced by another and remembereth in them antecedents and consequence and when he cannot assure himself of the true causes of things for the causes of good and evil fortune for the most part are invisible he supposes causes of them either such as his own fancy suggesteth or trusted to the authority of other men such as he thinks to be his friends and wiser than himself the two first make anxiety for being assured that there be causes of all things that have arrived hitherto or shall arrive hereafter it is impossible for a man who continually endeavoreth to secure himself against the evil he fears and procure the good he desireth not to be in a perpetual solicitude of the time to come so that every man, especially those that are over provident are in an estate like that to be of Prometheus for as Prometheus, which interpreted as the prudent man was bound to the Helococcuses, a place of large prospect where an eagle feeding on his liver devoured in the day as much as was repaired in the night so that man, which looks too far before him in the care of future time hath his heart all the day long gnawed on by fear of death, poverty, or other calamity and has no repose nor pause of his anxiety but in sleep this perpetual fear, always accompanying mankind in the ignorance of causes as it were in the dark, must needs have for object something and therefore when there is nothing to be seen there is nothing to accuse either of their good or evil fortune but some power or agent invisible in which sense perhaps it was that some of the old poets said that the gods were at first created by human fear which, spoken of the gods, that is to say the many gods of the Gentiles is very true but the acknowledging of one god, eternal, infinite and omnipotent may more easily be derived from the desire men have to know the causes of natural bodies and their several virtues and operations then from the fear of what was to befall them in time to come for he that, from any effect he seeth come to pass should reason to the next and immediate cause thereof and from thence to the cause of that cause and plunge himself profoundly in the pursuit of causes shall at last come to this that there must be, as even the heathen philosophers confessed one first mover that is a first and eternal cause of all things which is that which men mean by the name of God and all this without thought of their fortune the solicitude whereof both inclines to fear and hinders them from the search of their causes of other things and thereby gives occasion of feigning of as many gods as there be men to feign them and for the matter or substance of the invisible agents so fancied they could not by natural cogitation fall upon any other concept but that it was the same with that of the soul of man and that the soul of man was of the same substance with that which appeared in a dream to one that sleepeth or in a looking glass to one that is awake which men not knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but the creatures of the fancy think to be real and external substances and therefore call them ghosts as the latins called them imagines and umbri and thought them spirits that is thin aerial bodies and those invisible agents which they feared to be like them save that they appear and vanish when they please but the opinion that such spirits were incorporeal or immaterial could never enter into the mind of any man by nature because though men may put together words of contradictory signification as spirit and incorporeal yet they can never have the imagination of anything answering to them and therefore men that by their own meditation arrived to the acknowledgement of one infinite omnipotent and eternal God choose rather to confess he is incomprehensible and above their understanding than to define his nature by spirit and corporeal and then confess their definition to be unintelligible or if they give him such a title it is not dogmatically with intention to make the divine nature understood but piously to honor him with attributes of significations as remote as they can be from the grossness of bodies visible then for the way by which men think that these invisible agents wrought their effects that is to say what immediate causes they used in bringing things to pass men that know not what it is we call causing that is almost all men have no other rule to guess by but by observing and remembering what they have seen to proceed the like effect at some other time or times before without seeing between the antecedent and subsequent events any dependence or connection at all and therefore from the like things past they expect the like things to come and hope for good or evil luck superstitiously from things that have no part at all in the causing of it as the Athenians did for their war at Lepanto demand another formio the Pompeian faction for their war in Africa another Cypio and others have done in diverse other occasions since in like manner they attribute their fortune to a standard by to a lucky or unlucky place to word spoken especially if the name of God be amongst them as charming and conjuring the liturgy of witches in so much as to believe they have power to turn a stone into bread bread into a man or anything into anything thirdly for the worship which naturally men exhibit the powers invisible it can be no other but such expressions of their reverence as they would use towards men gifts petitions thanks submission of body considerate addresses sober behavior premeditated words swearing that is assuring one another other promises by invoking them beyond that reason suggested nothing but leaves them either to rest there or for further ceremonies to rely on those they believe to be wiser than themselves concerning how these invisible powers declare to men the things which I'll hear after come to pass especially concerning their good or evil fortune in general or good or ill-success in any particular undertaking men are naturally at a stand save that using the conjecture of the time to come by the time passed they're very apt not only to take casual things after one or two encounters for prognostics of the like encounter ever after but also to believe the like prognostics from other men of whom they have once conceived a good opinion and in these four things opinion of ghosts ignorance of second causes devotion towards what men fear and taking of things casual for prognostics consisted the natural seed of religion which by reason of the different fancies judgments and passions of several men have grown up into ceremonies so different that those which are used by one man are for the most part ridiculous to another for these seeds have received culture from two sorts of men one sort have been that they have nourished and ordered them according to their own invention the other have done it by God's commandment and direction but both sorts have done it with a purpose to make those men that relied on them the more apt to obedience laws peace charity and civil society so that the religion of the former sort is a part of human politics and teaches part of the duty which earthly kings require their subjects and the religion of the latter sort is divine politics and contain its precepts to those that have yielded themselves subjects in the kingdom of God of the former sort were all the founders of the commonwealths and the law givers of the Gentiles of the latter sort were Abraham, Moses and our blessed savior by whom have been derived unto us the laws of the kingdom of God and for that part of religion which consisted in opinions concerning the nature of powers invisible there was almost nothing that has a name that has not been esteemed among the Gentiles in one place or another a God or devil or by their poets feigned to be animated inhabited or possessed by some spirit or other the unformed matter of the world was a God by the name of chaos the heaven, the ocean, the planets, the fire, the earth, the winds were so many gods men, women, a bird, a crocodile, a calf, a dog, a snake an onion, a leak, were deified besides that they filled almost all places with spirits called demons the plains with pan and penises or satyrs the woods with fawns and nymphs the sea with tritons and other nymphs every river and fountain with a ghost of his name and with nymphs every house with its lairies or familiars every man with his genius hell with ghosts and spiritual officers as Charon, Cerberus and the Furies and in the nighttime all places with larvae, limerace, ghosts of men deceased and a whole kingdom of fairies and bugbears they have also ascribed divinity and built temples to mere accidents and qualities such as their time, night, day, peace, concord, love, contention, virtue, honor, health, rust, fever and the like which when they prayed for or against they prayed as if they were ghosts of those names hanging over their heads and letting fall or withholding that good or evil for or against which they prayed they invoked also their own wit by the name of muses their own ignorance by the name of fortune their own lust by the name of Cupid their own rage by the name Furies their own preppy members by the name of Priapus and attributed their pollutions to Incubi and Secubi in so much as there was nothing which a poet could introduce as a person in its poem which they did not make either a god or a devil the same authors of the religion of the Gentiles observing the second ground for religion which is men's ignorance of causes and thereby their aptness to attribute their fortune to causes on which there was no dependence at all apparent took occasion to obtrude on their ignorance instead of second causes a kind of second in ministerial gods ascribing the cause of acundity to Venus the cause of arts to Apollo of subtlety and craft to Mercury of tempests and storms to Eolus and of other effects to other gods in so much as there was among the heathen almost as great variety of gods as of business and to the worship which naturally men can see fit to be used to their gods namely oblations, prayers, thanks, and the rest formerly named the same legislators of the Gentiles have added their images both in picture and sculpture that the more ignorant sort that is to say the most part of the generality of the people thinking the gods for whose representation they were made were really included and as it were housed within them might so much the more stand and fear them and endowed them with lands and houses and officers and revenues set apart from all other human uses that is consecrated made holy to those their idols as caverns, groves, woods, mountains, and whole islands and have attributed to them not only the shape some of men, some of beasts, some of monsters but also the faculties and passions of men and beasts as sense, speech, sex, lust, generation and this not only by mixing one with another to propagate the kind of gods but also by mixing with men and women to beget mongrel gods and but inmates of heaven as Bacchus, Hercules, and others besides anger, revenge and other passions of living creatures and the actions proceeding from them as fraud, theft, adultery, sodomy, and any vice that may be taken for an effect of power or a cause of pleasure and all such vices as amongst men are taken to be against law rather than against honor lastly to the prognostics of time to come which are naturally but conjectures upon the experience of time past and supernaturally divine revelation the same authors of the religion of the Gentiles partly upon pretended experience partly upon pretended revelation have added innumerable other superstitious ways of divination and made men believe that they should find their fortunes sometimes in the ambiguous or senseless answers of the priests at Delphi, Delos, Ammon, and other famous oracles which answers were made ambiguous by design to own the event both ways or absurd by the intoxicating vapor of the place which is very frequent in Sulphur's caverns sometimes in the leaves of the Sibles of whose prophecies, like those perhaps of Nostradamus for the fragments now extant seem to be the invention of later times there were some books in reputation in the time of the Roman Republic sometimes in the insignificant speeches of madmen supposed to be possessed with the divine spirit which possession they called enthusiasm and these kinds of foretelling events were accounted theomancy or prophecy sometimes in the aspect of the stars of their nativity which was called horoscopy and esteemed a part of judiciary astrology sometimes in their own hopes and fears called thumomancy or presage sometimes in the prediction of witches that pretended conference with the dead which is called necromancy, conjuring and witchcraft and is but juggling in confederate navery sometimes in casual flight or feeding of birds called augury sometimes in the entrails of a sacrifice beast which was horospacy sometimes in dreams sometimes in croaking of ravens or chattering of birds sometimes in the lineaments of the face which was called metaposcopy or by palmistry in the lines of the hand in casual words called amana sometimes in monsters or unusual accidents as eclipses, comets, rare meteors, earthquakes inundations, uncouthpers and the like which they called portenta and ostenta because they thought them to portend or foreshow some great calamity to come sometimes in mere lottery as cross and pile counting holes in a sieve dipping of verses and Homer and Virgil and innumerable other such vain conceits so easier men to be drawn to believe anything from such men as have gotten credit with them and can with gentleness and dexterity take hold of their fear and ignorance and therefore the first founders and legislators of commonwealth amongst the Gentiles whose ends were only to keep the people in obedience and peace have in all places taken care first to imprint their minds a belief that those precepts which they gave concerning religion might not be thought to proceed from their own device but from the dictates of some God or other spirit or else that they themselves were of a higher nature than mere mortals that their laws might the more easily be received so Numa Pompilius pretended to receive the ceremony instituted amongst the Romans from the Nymph Egeria and the first king and founder of the kingdom of Peru pretended himself and his wife to be the children of the son and Muhammad to set up his new religion pretended to have conferences with the Holy Ghost in form of a dove secondly Naph had a care to make it believed that the same things were displeasing to the gods which were forbidden by the laws thirdly to prescribe ceremonies, supplications sacrifices and festivals by which they were to believe the anger of the gods might be appeased and that ill success and war great contagions of sickness earthquakes and each man's private misery came from the anger of the gods and their anger from the neglect to their worship or the forgetting or mistaking some point of the ceremonies required and though amongst the ancient Romans men were not forbidden to deny that which in the poets is written of the pains and pleasures after this life which divers of great authority and gravity in that state have in their harangues openly derided yet that belief was always more cherished than the contrary and by these and such other institutions they obtained in order to their end which was the piece of the commonwealth that the common people in their misfortunes letting the fault on neglect or error in their ceremonies or on their own disobedience to the laws were the less apt to mutiny against their governors and being entertained with the pomp and pastime of festivals and public games made in honor of the gods needed nothing else but bread to keep them from discontent, murmuring and commotion against the state and therefore the Romans that had conquered the greatest part of the then known world made no scruple of tolerating any religion whatsoever in the city of Rome itself unless it had something in it that could not consist of their civil government nor do we read that any religion was there forbidden but that of the Jews who, being the peculiar kingdom of God thought it unlawful to acknowledge subjection to any mortal king or state whatsoever and thus you see how the religion of the Gentiles was a part of their policy but where God himself by supernatural revelation planted religion there he also made to himself a peculiar kingdom and gave laws not only a behavior toward himself but also towards one another and thereby in the kingdom of God the policy and law civil are a part of religion and therefore the distinction of temporal and spiritual domination hath there no place it is true that God is king of all the earth yet he may be king of a peculiar and chosen nation for there is no more incongruity therein than that he that hath a general command of the whole army should have with all a peculiar regiment or company of his own God is king of all the earth by his power but of his chosen people he is king by covenant but to speak more largely of the kingdom of God both by nature and covenant I have in the following discourse assigned another place from the propagation of religion it is not hard to understand the causes of the resolution of the same and do its first seeds or principles which are only an opinion of a deity and powers invisible and supernatural that can never be so abolished out of human nature but that new religions may again be made to spring out of them by the culture of such men as for such purpose are in reputation for seeing all formed religion is founded at first upon the faith which a multitude hath in some one person whom they believe not only to be a wise man and to labor to procure their happiness but also to be a holy man to whom God himself vouchsafes to declare his will supernaturally it followeth necessarily when they that have the government or religion shall come to have either the wisdom of those men their sincerity or their love suspected or that they shall be unable to show any probable token of divine revelation that the religion which they desire to uphold must be suspected likewise and without the fear of the civil sword contradicted and rejected that which takeeth away the reputation of wisdom in him that formeth a religion or addeth to it when it is already formed is the enjoining of a belief of contradictories for both parts of a contradiction cannot possibly be true and therefore to enjoing a belief of them is an argument of ignorance which detects the author in that and discredits him in all things else he shall propound as from revelation supernatural which revelation a man may indeed have of many things above but of nothing against natural reason that which takeeth away the reputation of sincerity is the doing or saying of such things as appear to be signs that what they require other men to believe is not believed by themselves all which doings or sayings are therefore called scandalous because they be stumbling blocks that make men to fall in the way of religion as injustice cruelty profaneness avarice and luxury for who can believe that he that doth ordinarily such actions as proceed from any of these routes believe that there is any such invisible power to be feared as he a frighteth other men with all for lesser faults that which takeeth away the reputation of love is the being detected of private ends as when the belief they require others conduceth or seemeth to conduce to the requiring of dominion, riches, dignity or secure pleasure to themselves only or specially for that which men re-benefit by to themselves they are thought to do for their own sakes and not for the love of others lastly, the testimony that men can render of divine calling can be no other than the operation of miracles or true prophecy, which is also a miracle or extraordinary felicity and therefore to those points of religion which have been received from them that did such miracles those that are added by such as approved not their calling by some miracle obtain no greater belief than what the custom and laws of the places in which they be educated have wrought into them for as in natural things men of judgment require natural signs and arguments so in supernatural things they require signs supernatural, which are miracles before they consent inwardly and from their hearts all which causes of the weakening of men's faith do manifestly appear in the examples following first, we have the example of the children of Israel who, when Moses that had approved his calling to them by miracles and by the happy conduct of them out of Egypt was absent but 40 days revolted from the worship of the true God recommended to them by him and setting up Exodus 32 1-2 a golden calf for their God relapsed into the idolatry of the Egyptians from whom they'd been so lately delivered and again, after Moses, Aaron, Joshua and that generation which had seen the great works of God in Israel were dead another generation arose and served Baal judges 211 so that miracles failing, faith also failed again, when the sons of Samuel being constituted by their father judges in Beersheba received bribes and judged unjustly the people of Israel refused anymore to have God to be their king in other manner than he was king of other people and therefore cried out to Samuel to choose them a king after the manner of the nations for Samuel 8-3 so that justice failing, faith also failed in so much as they deposed their God from reigning over them and whereas in the planting of Christian religion the oracle ceased in all parts of the Roman empire and the number of Christians increased wonderfully every day and in every place by the preaching of the apostles and evangelists a great part of that success may reasonably be attributed to the contempt into which the priests of the Gentiles of that time had brought themselves by their uncleanness, avarice and juggling between princes also the religion of the Church of Rome was partly for the same cause abolished in England and many other parts of Christendom in so much as the failing of virtue in the pastors maketh faith fail in the people and partly from bringing the philosophy and doctrine of Aristotle into religion by the schoolmen from whence there arose so many contradictions and absurdities as brought the clergy into a reputation in both of ignorance and a fraudulent intention and inclined people to revolt from them either against the will of their own princes as in France and Holland or with their will as in England lastly, amongst the points by the Church of Rome declared necessary for salvation there be so many manifestly to the advantage of the Pope so many of the spiritual subjects residing in the territories of other Christian princes that were not for the mutual emulation of those princes they might without war or trouble exclude all foreign authority as easily as it has been excluded in England for who is there that does not say to whose benefit it conduceth to have it believed that a king hath not his authority from Christ unless a bishop crown him that a king if he be a priest cannot marry that whether a prince be born in lawful marriage or not must be judged by authority from Rome that subjects may be freed from their allegiance if by the court of Rome the king be judged a heretic that a king as children of France may be deposed by a pope as Pope Zachary for no cause and as kingdom given to one of the subjects that the clergy and regulars in what country so ever shall be exempt from the jurisdiction of their king in cases criminal or who does not see to whose profit redound the fees of private masses and the values of purgatory with other signs of private interest enough to modify the most lively faith if as I have said the civil magistrate in custom did not more sustain it than in the opinion they have the sanctity wisdom or property of their teachers so that I may attribute all the changes of religion in the world to one in the same cause and that is unpleasing priests and those not only amongst Catholics but even in that church that has presumed most of reformation end of chapter twelve chapter thirteen this is a liverbox recording all of the box recordings on the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit liverbox dot org leviathan by thomas hobs chapter thirteen of the natural condition of mankind as concerning their felicity and misery nature hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of quicker mind than another when all is reckoned together the difference between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he for as to the strength of body the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest either by secret machination or by confederacy with others that are in the same danger with himself as to the faculties of mind setting aside the arts granted upon words and especially that skill of proceeding upon general and infallible rules called science which very few have but in few things as being not a native faculty born with us nor tamed as prudence while we look after someone else i find yet a greater equality amongst men than that of strength for prudence is but experience which equal time equally bestows an all men in those things they equally apply themselves unto that which may perhaps make such equality incredible is but a vain conceit of one's own wisdom which almost all men think they have in a greater degree than the vulgar that is than all men but themselves and a few others whom by fame or for concurring with themselves they approve for such is the nature of men that have so ever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty or more eloquent or more learned yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves for they see their own wit at hand and other men's at a distance but this proveth rather that men are in that point equal than unequal for there is not ordinarily a greater sign of the equal distribution of anything than that every man is contented with his share from this equality of ability arises the equality of hope in the attaining of our ends and therefore if any two men desire the same thing which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy they become enemies and in the way to their end which is principally their own conservation and sometimes their delectation only endeavor to destroy or subdue one another and from hence it comes to pass that where an invader hath no more to fear than another man's single power if one plant so build or possess a convenient seat others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united to dispossess and deprive him not only of the fruit of his labor but also of his life or liberty and the invader again is in the like danger of another and from this diffidence of one another there is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation that is by force or wiles to master the persons of all men he can so long till he see no other power great enough to endanger him and this is no more than his own conservation requireth and is generally allowed also because there be some that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest which they pursue farther than their security requires if others that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds should not by invasion increase their power they would not be able long time by standing only on their defense to subsist and by consequence such augmentation of dominion over men being necessary to a man's conservation it ought to be allowed him men have no pleasure but on the contrary a great deal of grief in keeping company where there is no power able to over all them all for every man looketh that his companion should value him at the same rate he sets upon himself and upon all signs of contempt or undervaluing naturally endeavors as far as he dares which amongst them that have no common power to keep them in quiet is far enough to make them destroy each other to exhort a greater value from his conteminers by damage and from others by the example in the nature of man we find three principal causes of quarrel competition secondly diffidence thirdly glory the first make of men invade for gain the second for safety and the third for reputation the first use violence to make themselves masters of other men's persons wives children and cattle the second to defend them the third for trifles as a word a smile a different opinion and any other sign of undervalue either direct in their prisons or by reflection in that kindred their friends their nation their profession or their name hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe they are in that condition which is called war and such a war as is of every man against every man for war consists of not in battle only or in the act of fighting but in a tract of time or in the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known and therefore the notion of times to be considered in the nature of war as it is in the nature of weather for as the nature of foul weather left not in a shower or two of rain but in an inclination there too of many days together so the nature of war consists of not in actual fighting but in the known disposition there too during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary all other time is peace whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war where every man is enemy to every man the same consequent to the time wherein men live without other security than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them with all in such condition there is no place for industry because the fruit thereof is uncertain and consequently no culture of the earth no navigation nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea no commodious building no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force no knowledge of the face of the earth no account of time no arts no letters no society and which is worst of all continual fear and danger of violent death in the life of man solitary poor nasty brutish and short it may seem strange to some man that has not well weighed these things that nature should thus dissociate and render men apt to invade and destroy one another and he may therefore not trusting to this inference made from the passions desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by experience let him therefore consider with himself when taking a journey he arms himself and seeks to go well accompanied when going to sleep he locks his doors when even in his house he locks his chests and this when he knows there be laws and public officers armed to revenge all injuries shall be done him what opinion he has of his fellow subjects when he rides armed of his fellow citizens when he locks his doors and of his children and servants when he locks his chests does he not there as much accused mankind by his actions as I do by my words but neither of us accused man's nature in it the desires and other passions of man are in themselves no sin no more are the actions that proceed from those passions until they know a law that forbids them which till laws be made they cannot know nor can any law be made till they have agreed upon the person that shall make it it may per adventure be thought that there was never such a time nor condition of war as this and I believe it was never generally so over all the world but there are many places where they live so now for the savage people in many places of America except the government of small families the concord where I've depended on natural lust I have no government at all and live at this day in that British manner as I said before how so ever it may be perceived what manner of life there would be where there were no common power to fear by the manner of life which men that have formerly lived under a peaceful government to use to degenerate into a civil war but though there had never been any time where in particular men were in a condition of war one against another yet in all times kings and persons of sovereign authority because of their independency there are in continual jealousies and in the state and posture of gladiators having their weapons pointing and their eyes fixed on one another that is their forts, garrisons and guns upon the frontiers of the kingdoms and continual spies upon their neighbors which is a posture of war but because they uphold thereby the industry of their subjects there does not follow from it that misery which accompanies the liberty of particular men to this war of every man against every man this also is consequent that nothing can be unjust the notions of right and wrong justice and injustice there have no place where there is no common power there is no law where no law no injustice force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues justice and injustice on none of the faculties neither of the body nor mind if they were they might be in a man that were alone in the world as well as his senses and passions there are qualities that relate to men in society not in solitude it is consequent also to the same condition that there be no propriety no dominion no mine and thine distinct but only that to be every man's that he can get and for so long as he can keep it and thus much for the ill condition which man by mere nature is actually placed in though with a possibility to come out of it consisting partly in the passions partly in his reason the passions that incline men to peace are fear of death desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living and a hope by their industry to obtain them and reason suggests a convenient articles of peace upon which men may be drawn to agreement these articles are they which otherwise are called the laws of nature where I shall speak more particularly in the two following chapters and chapter thirteen this recording is in the public domain chapter fourteen of leviathan this is a liverbox recording all the products recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit liverbox dot org leviathan by thomas hobs chapter fourteen of the first and second natural laws and of contracts the right of nature which writers commonly call use natural a is the liberty each man have to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature that is to say of his own life and consequently of doing anything which in his own judgment and reason he shall conceive to be the aptest means there on to by liberty is understood according to the proper signification of the word the absence of external impediments which impediments may often take away part of a man's power to do what he would but cannot hinder him from using the power left him according as his judgment and reason shall dictate to him a law of nature lex naturalis is a precept or general rule found out by reason by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life or take it away the means of preserving the same and to omit that by which he think it may be best preserved for though they that speak of the subject used to confound use and lex right and law yet they ought to be distinguished because right consists of in liberty to do or to forbear whereas law determineth and bindeth to one of them so that law and right differ as much as obligation and liberty in one and the same matter are inconsistent and because the condition of man as have been declared in the precedent chapter is a condition of war of everyone against everyone in which case everyone is governed by his own reason there is nothing he can make use of that may not be a help unto him in preserving his life against his enemies it followeth that in such condition every man has a right to everything even to one another's body and therefore as long as this natural right of every man to everything endureth there can be no security to any man how strong or wise so ever he be of living out the time which nature ordinarily alloweth men to live and consequently it is a precept or general rule of reason that every man ought to endeavor peace as far as he has hope of obtaining it and when he cannot obtain it that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war the first branch of which rule containeth the first and fundamental law of nature which is to seek peace and follow it the sum of the right of nature which is by all means we can to defend ourselves from this fundamental law of nature by which men are commanded to endeavor peace is derived the second law that a man be willing when others are so too as far forth as for peace and defense of himself he shall think it necessary to lay down this right to all things and be contented with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself for as long as every man holdeth this right of doing anything he likeeth so long are all men in the condition of war but if other men will not lay down their right as well as he then there is no reason for anyone to divest himself of his for that were to expose himself to pray which no man is bound to rather than to dispose himself to peace this is that law of the gospel whatsoever you require that others should do to you that do ye to them and that law of all men quattibi fieri non wies alterine fercheris to lay down a man's right to anything is to divest himself of the liberty of hindering another of the benefit of his own right to the same for he that renounceeth or passeth away his right giveeth not to any other man a right which he had not before because there is nothing to which every man had not right by nature only standeth out of his way that he may enjoy his own original right without hindrance from him not without hindrance from another so that the effect which redoundeth to one man by another man's defect of right is but so much diminution of impediments to the use of his own right original right is laid aside either by simply renouncing it or by transferring it to another by simply renouncing when he cares not to whom the benefit thereof redoundeth by transferring when he intendeth the benefit thereof to some certain person or persons and when a man hath in either manner abandoned or granted away his right then is he said to be obliged or bound not to hinder those to whom such right is granted or abandoned from the benefit of it and that he ought and it is duty not to make void that voluntary act of his own and that such hindrance is injustice and injury as being seen a jury the right being before renounced or transferred so that injury or injustice in the controversies of the world is somewhat like to that which in the disputations of scholars is called absurdity for as it is there called an absurdity to contradict what one maintained in the beginning so in the world it is called injustice and injury voluntarily to undo that which from the beginning he had voluntarily done the way by which a man either simply renounceeth or transfereth his right is a declaration or signification by some voluntary and sufficient sign or signs that he doth so renounce or transfer or hath so renounced or transferred the same to him that accepteth it and these signs are either words only or actions only as it happeneth most often both words and actions and the same are the bonds by which men are bound and obliged bonds that have their strength not from their own nature for nothing is more easily broken than a man's word but from fear of some evil consequence upon the rupture when so ever a man transfereth his right or renounceeth it it is either in consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself or for some other good he hopeeth for thereby for it is a voluntary act and of the voluntary acts of every man the object is some good to himself and therefore there be some rights which no man can be understood by any words or other signs to have abandoned or transferred as first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them that assault him by force to take away his life because he cannot be understood to aim thereby at any good to himself the same may be set of wounds and chains and imprisonment both because there is no benefit consequent to such patience as there is to the patience of suffering another to be wounded or imprisoned as also because a man cannot tell when he seeeth men proceed against him by violence whether they intend his death or not and lastly the motive and end for which this renouncing and transferring of right is introduced is nothing else but the security of a man's person in his life and in the means of so preserving life as not to be weary of it and therefore if a man by words or other signs seem to spoil himself of the end for which those signs were intended he is not to be understood as if he meant it or that it was his will but that he was ignorant of how such words and actions were to be interpreted the mutual transferring of right is that which men call contract there is difference between transferring of right to the thing and transferring or tradition that is delivery of the thing itself for the thing may be delivered together with the translation of the right as in buying and selling with ready money or exchange of goods or lands and it may be delivered sometime after again one of the contractors may deliver the thing contracted for on his part and leave the other to perform his part at some determinate time after and in the meantime be trusted and then the contract on his part is called packed or covenant or both parts may contract now to perform here after in which cases he that is to perform in time to come being trusted his performance is called keeping of promise or faith and the failing of performance if it be voluntary violation of faith when the transferring of right is not mutual but one of the parties transfer it in hope to gain thereby friendship or service from another or from his friends or in hope to gain the reputation of charity or magnanimity or to deliver his mind from the pain of compassion or in hope of reward in heaven this is not contract but gift free gift grace which words signify one and the same thing signs of contract are either express or by inference express our words spoken with understanding of what they signify and such words are either of the time present or past as I give I grant I have given I have granted I will this be yours or of the future as I will give I will grant which words of the future are called promise signs by inference are sometimes the consequence of words sometimes the consequence of silence sometimes the consequence of actions sometimes the consequence of forbearing an action and generally assigned by inference of any contract is whatsoever sufficiently argues the will of the contractor words alone if they be of the time to come and contain a bear promise are an insufficient sign of a free gift and therefore not obligatory for if they be of the time to come as tomorrow I will give they are a sign I have not given yet and consequently that my right is not transferred but remaineth till I transfer it by some other act but if the words be of the time present or past as I have given or do give to be delivered tomorrow then is my tomorrow's right given away today and that by the virtue of the words though there were no other argument of my will and there is a great difference in the signification of these words wallo hock tuum esse cras and cras dabo that is between I will that this be thine tomorrow and I will give it the tomorrow for the word I will in the former manner of speech signifies an act of the will present but in the latter it signifies a promise of an act of the will to come and therefore the former words being of the present transfer a future right the latter that be of the future transfer nothing but if there be other signs of the will to transfer a right besides words though the gift be free yet may the right be understood to pass by words of the future as if a man propound a prize to him that comes first to the end of a race the gift is free and though the words be of the future the right passive for if he would not have his words so be understood he should not have let them run in contracts the right passive not only where the words are of the time present or past but also where they are of the future because all contract is mutual translation or change of right and therefore he that promise of only because he have already received the benefit for which he promise of is to be understood as if he intended the right should pass for unless he had been content to have his words so understood the other would not have performed his part first and for that cause in buying and selling and other acts of contract a promise is equivalent to a covenant and therefore obligatory he that performeth first in the case of a contract is said to merit that which he is to receive by the performance of the other and he hath it as do also when a prize is propounded to many which is to be given to him only that winneth or money is thrown amongst many to be enjoyed by them that catch it though this be a free gift yet so to win or so to catch is to merit and to have it as do for the right is transferred in the propounding of the prize and in throwing down the money though it be not determined to whom but by the event of the contention but there is between these two sorts of merit this difference that in contract i merit by virtue of my own power and the contractors need but in this case of free gift i am enabled to merit only by the benignity of the giver in contract i merit at the contractors hand that he should depart with his right in this case of gift i merit not that the giver should part with his right but that when he has parted with it it should be mine rather than another's and this i think to be the meaning of that distinction of the schools between merit whom congrui and merit whom condign for god almighty having promised paradise to those men hoodwinked with carnal desires that can walk through this world according to the precepts and limits prescribed by him they say he that shall so walk shall merit paradise ex congruo but because no man can demand a right to it by his own righteousness or any other power in himself by the free grace of god only they say no man can merit paradise ex condigno this i say i think is the meaning of that distinction but because disputers do not agree upon the signification of their own terms of art longer than it serves their turn i will not affirm anything of their meaning only this i say when a gift is given indefinitely as a prize to be contended for he that winneth meriteth and may claim the prize as do if a covenant be made wherein neither of the parties perform presently but trust one another in the condition of mere nature which is a condition of war of every man against every man upon any reasonable suspicion it is void but if there be a common power set over them both with right and force sufficient to compel performance it is not void for he that performeth first has no assurance the other will perform after because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men's ambition avarice anger and other passions without the fear of some coercive power which in the condition of mere nature where all men are equal and judges of the justness of their own fears cannot possibly be supposed and therefore he which performeth first does but betray himself to his enemy contrary to the right he can never abandon of defending his life and means of living but in a civil estate where there is a power set up to constrain those that would otherwise violate their faith that fear is no more reasonable and for that cause he which by the covenant is to perform first is obliged so to do the cause of fear which maketh such a covenant invalid must be always something arising after the covenant made as some new fact or other sign of the will not to perform else it cannot make the covenant void for that which could not hinder a man from promising ought not to be admitted as a hindrance of performing he that transfereth any right transfereth the means of enjoying it as far as lieth in his power as he that selleth land is understood to transfer the urbage and whatsoever grows upon it nor can he that sells a mill turn away the stream that drives it and they that give to a man the right of government in sovereignty are understood to give him the right of levying money to maintain soldiers and of appointing magistrates for the administration of justice to make covenants with brute beasts is impossible because not understanding our speech they understand not nor accept of any translation of right nor can translate any right to another and without mutual acceptation there is no covenant and to make covenants with God is impossible but by mediation of such as God speaketh to either by revelation supernatural or by his lieutenants that govern under him and in his name for otherwise we know not whether our covenants be accepted or not and therefore they that vow anything contrary to any law of nature vow in vain as being a thing unjust to pay such vow and if it be a thing commanded by the law of nature it's not the vow but the law that binds them the matter or subject of a covenant is always something that falleth under deliberation for to covenant is an act of the will that is to say an act and the last act of deliberation and is therefore always understood to be something to come and which judged possible for him that covenanteth to perform and therefore to promise that which is known to be impossible is no covenant but if that prove impossible afterwards which before was thought possible the covenant is valid and bindeth though not to the thing itself yet to the value or if that also be impossible to the unfeigned endeavor of performing as much as is possible for to more no man can be obliged men are freed of their covenants two ways by performing or by being forgiven for performance is the natural end of obligation and forgiveness the restitution of liberty as being a retransferring of that right in which the obligation consisted covenants entered into by fear in the condition of mere nature are obligatory for example if I covenant to pay a ransom or service for my life to an enemy I am bound to buy it for it is a contract wherein one receiveeth the benefit of life the other is to receive money or service for it and consequently where no other law as in the condition of mere nature forbideth the performance the covenants is valid therefore prisoners of war if trusted with the payment of the ransom are obliged to pay it and if a weaker prince make a disadvantageous piece with a stronger for fear he is bound to keep it unless as hath been said before there arises some new and just cause of fear to renew the war and even in commonwealths if I be forced to redeem myself from a thief by promising him money I am bound to pay it till the civil law discharge me for whatsoever I may lawfully do without obligation the same I may lawfully covenant to do through fear and what I lawfully covenant I cannot lawfully break a former covenant makes void a later for a man that hath passed away his right to one man today hath it not to pass tomorrow to another and therefore a later promise passeth no right but is null a covenant not to defend myself from force by force is always void for as I have shown before no man can transfer or lay down his right to save himself from death wounds and imprisonment the avoiding whereof is the only end of laying down any right and therefore the promise of not resisting force in no covenant transfereth any right nor is obliging for though a man may covenant thus unless I do so or so kill me he cannot covenant thus unless I do so or so I will not resist you when you come to kill me for man by nature chooseeth the lesser evil which is danger of death in resisting rather than the greater which is certain and present death in not resisting and this is granted to be true by all men in that they lead criminals to execution and prison with armed men notwithstanding that such criminals have consented to the law by which they are condemned a covenant to accuse oneself without assurance of pardon is likewise invalid for in the condition of nature where every man is judged there is no place for accusation and in the civil state the accusation is followed with punishment which being force a man is not obliged not to resist the same is also true of the accusation of those by whose condemnation a man falls into misery as of a father, wife, or benefactor for the testimony of such an accuser if it be not willingly given is presumed to be corrupted by nature and therefore not to be received and where a man's testimony is not to be credited he is not bound to give it also accusations upon torture are not to be reputed as testimonies for torture is to be used but as a means of conjecture and light in the further examination in search of truth and what is in that case confessed tendeth to the ease of him that is tortured not to the informing of the torturers and therefore ought not to have the credit of a sufficient testimony for whether he deliver himself by true or false accusation he does it by the right of preserving his own life the force of words being as I have formerly noted too weak to hold men to the performance of their covenants there are in man's nature but too imaginable helps to strengthen it and those are either a fear of the consequence of breaking their word or a glory or pride in appearing not to need to break it this latter is a generosity too rarely found to be presumed on especially in the pursuers of wealth, command, or sensual pleasure which are the greatest part of mankind the passion to be reckoned upon is fear whereof there be two very general objects one the power of spirits invisible the other the power of those men they shall there in offend of these two though the former be the greater power yet the fear of the latter is commonly the greater fear the fear of the former is in every man his own religion which hath place in the nature of man before civil society the latter hath not so at least not place enough to keep men to their promises because in the condition of mere nature the inequality of power is not discerned but by the event of battle so that before the time of civil society or in the interruption thereof by war there is nothing can strengthen a covenant of peace agreed on against the temptations of avarice, ambition, lust or other strong desire but the fear of that invisible power which they every one worship as God and fear as a revenger of their perfidy all therefore that can be done between two men not subject to civil power is to put one another to swear by the God he feareth which swearing or oath is a form of speech added to a promise by which he that promises signifyeth that unless he perform he renounceeth the mercy of his God or calleth to him for vengeance on himself such was the heathen form let Jupiter kill me else as I kill this beast so is our form I shall do thus and thus so help me God and this with the rites and ceremonies which every one useeth in his own religion that the fear of breaking faith might be the greater by this it appears that an oath taken according to any other form or rite than his that sweareth is in vain and no oath and that there is no swearing by anything which the swearer thinks not God for though men have sometimes used to swear by their kings for fear or flattery yet they would have it thereby understood they attributed to them divine honor and that swearing unnecessarily by God is but profaning of his name and swearing by other things as men do in common discourse is not swearing but an impious custom gotten by too much vehemence of talking it appears also that the oath adds nothing to the obligation for a covenant if lawful binds in the sight of God without the oath as much as with it if unlawful bindeth not at all though it be confirmed with an oath end of chapter fourteen this recording is in the public domain chapter fifteen of Leviathan this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes chapter fifteen of other laws of nature from that law of nature by which we are obliged to transfer to another such rights as being retained hinder the peace of mankind their followeth a third which is this that men perform their covenants made without which covenants are in vain and but empty words and the right of all men to all things remaining we are still in the condition of war and in this law of nature consists of the fountain and original of justice for where no covenant hath preceded there hath no right been transferred and every man has right to everything and consequently no action can be unjust but when a covenant is made then to break it is unjust and the definition of injustice is no other than the not performance of covenant and whatsoever is not unjust is just but because covenants of mutual trust where there is a fear of not performance on either part as have been said in the former chapter are invalid though the original justice be the making of covenants yet injustice actually there can be none till the cause of such fear be taken away while men are in the natural condition of war cannot be done therefore before the names of just and unjust can have place there must be some coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants by the terror of some punishment greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant and to make good that propriety which by mutual contract men acquire in recompense of the universal right they abandon and such power there is none before the erection of a commonwealth and this is also to be gathered out of the ordinary definition of justice in the schools for they say that justice is the constant will of giving to every man his own and therefore where there is no own that is no propriety there is no injustice and where there is no coercive power erected that is where there is no commonwealth there is no propriety all men having right to all things therefore where there is no commonwealth there nothing is unjust so that the nature of justice consists of in keeping a valid covenants but the validity of covenants begins not with the constitution of a civil power sufficient to compel men to keep them and then it is also that propriety begins the fool hath said in his heart there is no such thing as justice and sometimes also with his tongue seriously alleging that every man's conservation and contentment being committed to his own care there could be no reason why every man might not do what he thought conduced there unto and therefore also to make or not make keep or not keep covenants was not against reason when it conduced to one's benefit he does not therein deny that there be covenants and that they are sometimes broken sometimes kept and that such breach of them may be called injustice and the observation of them justice but he questioneth whether injustice taking away the fear of god for the same fool hath said in his heart there is no god not sometimes stand with that reason which dictated to every man his own good and particularly then when it conduced to such a benefit as shall put a man in a condition to neglect not only the dispraise and revilings but also the power of other men the kingdom of god is gotten by violence but what if it could be gotten by unjust violence were it against reason so to get it when it is impossible to receive hurt by it and if it be not against reason it is not against justice or else justice is not to be approved for good from such reasoning as this successful wickedness hath obtained the name of virtue and some that in all other things have disallowed the violation of faith yet have allowed it when it is for the getting of a kingdom and the heathen that believed that Saturn was deposed by his son Jupiter believed nevertheless the same Jupiter to be the avenger of injustice somewhat like to a piece of law in Koch's commentaries on Littleton where he says if the right air of the crown be attained of treason yet the crown shall descend to him and EO instante the attainer be void from which instances a man will be very prone to infer that when the heir apparent of a kingdom shall kill him that is in possession though his father you may call it injustice or by what other name you will yet it can never be against reason seeing all the voluntary actions of men tend to the benefit of themselves and those actions are most reasonable that conduce most to their ends specious reasoning is nevertheless false for the question is not of promises mutual where there is no security of performance on either side as when there is no civil power erected over the party's promising for such promises are no covenants but either where one of the parties has performed already or where there is a power to make him perform there is the question whether it be against reason that is against the benefit of the other to perform or not and i say it is not against reason for the manifestation whereof we are to consider that when a man doth a thing which not withstanding anything can be foreseen and reckoned on tend to his own destruction also ever some accident which he could not expect arriving may turn it to his benefit yet such events do not make it reasonably or wisely done secondly that in a condition of war wherein every man to every man for want of a common power to keep them all in awe is an enemy there is no man can hope by his own strength or wit to defend himself from destruction without the help of confederates where everyone expects the same defense by the confederation that anyone else does and therefore he which declares he thinks it reason to deceive those that help him can in reason expect no other means of safety than what can be had from his own single power he therefore that breaketh his covenant and consequently declare that he thinks he may with reason do so cannot be received into any society that unite themselves for peace and defense but by the error of them that receive him nor when he is received be retained in it without seeing the danger of their error which errors a man cannot reasonably reckon upon as the means of his security and therefore if he be left or cast out of society he perisheth and if he live in society it is by the errors of other men which he could not foresee nor reckon upon and consequently against the reason of his preservation and so as all men that contribute not to his destruction for bear him only out of ignorance of what is good for themselves as for the instance of gaining the secure and perpetual felicity of heaven by any way it is frivolous there being but one way imaginable and that is not breaking but keeping of covenant and for the other instance of attaining sovereignty by rebellion it is manifest that though the event follow yet because it cannot reasonably be expected but rather the contrary and because by gaining it so others are taught to gain the same in like manner the attempt thereof is against reason justice therefore that is to say keeping of covenant is a rule of reason by which we are forbidden to do anything destructive to our life and consequently a law of nature there be some that proceed further and will not have the law of nature to be those rules which can do to the preservation of man's life on earth to the attaining of an eternal felicity after death to which they think the breach of covenant make induce and consequently be just and reasonable such are they that think it a work of merit to kill or depose or rebel against the sovereign power constituted over them by their own consent but because there is no natural knowledge of man's estate after death much less of the reward that is then to be given to breach of faith only a belief grounded upon other men's saying that they know it supernaturally or that they know those that knew them that knew others that knew it supernaturally breach of faith cannot be called a preceptive reason or nature others that allow for a law of nature the keeping of faith do nevertheless make exception of certain persons as heretics and such as use not to perform their covenant to others and this also is against reason for if any fault of a man be sufficient to discharge our covenant made same-aughting reason to have been sufficient to have hindered the making of it the names adjusted and unjust when they are attributed to men signify one thing and when they are attributed to actions another when they are attributed to men they signify conformity or in conformity of manners to reason but when they are attributed to action they signify the conformity or in conformity to reason not have manners or manner of life of particular actions. A just man, therefore, is he that taketh all the care he can that his actions may be all just, and an unjust man is he that neglecteth it. And such men are more often in our language styled by the names of righteous and unrighteous than just and unjust, though the meaning be the same. Therefore, a righteous man does not lose that title by one or a few unjust actions that proceed from sudden passion or mistake of things or persons. Nor does an unrighteous man lose his character for such an action as he does, or for bears to do, for fear, because his will is not framed by the justice, but by the apparent benefit of what he is to do. That which gives to human actions the relish of justice is a certain nobleness or gallantness of courage, rarely found, by which a man scorns to be beholding for the contentment of his life to fraud or breach of promise. This justice of the manners is that which is meant where justice is called a virtue, and injustice a vice. But the justice of actions denominates men, not just, but guiltless, and the injustice of the same, which is also called injury, gives them but the name of guilty. Again, the injustice of manners is the disposition or aptitude to do injury, and is injustice before it proceed to act, and without supposing any individual person injured. But the injustice of an action, that is to say injury, supposes an individual person injured, namely him to whom the covenant was made, and therefore many times the injury is received by one man when the damage redoundeth to another. As when the master commandeth his servant to give money to a stranger, if it be not done, the injury is done to the master, whom he had before covenanted to obey, but the damage redoundeth to the stranger, to whom he had no obligation and therefore could not injure him. And so also in commonwealths, private men may remit to one another their debts, but not robberies or other violences, whereby they are endammaged, because the detaining of debt is an injury to themselves. But robbery and violence are injuries to the person of the commonwealth. Whatsoever is done to a man conformable to his own will signified to the doer, is not injury to him. For if he that doeth it hath not passed away his original right to do what he please by some antecedent covenant, there is no breach of covenant, and therefore no injury done him. And if he have, then his will to have a done being signified is a release of that covenant, and so again, there is no injury done him. Justice of actions is by writers divided into commutative and distributive. And the former they say consisteth in proportion arithmetical, the latter in proportion geometrical. Commutative therefore they place in the equality of value of the things contracted for and distributive in the distribution of equal benefit to men of equal merit. As if it were injustice to sell dearer than we buy, or to give more to a man than he merits. The value of all things contracted for is measured by the appetite of the contractors, and therefore the just value is that which they be contented to give. And merit, besides that which is by covenant, where the performance on one part meriteth the performance of the other part and falls under justice commutative, not distributive, is not due by justice, but is rewarded of grace only. And therefore this distinction, in the sense wherein it useth to be expounded, is not right. To speak properly, commutative justice is the justice of a contractor, that is, a performance of covenant in buying and selling, hiring and letting to hire, lending and borrowing, exchanging, bartering and other acts of contract. And distributive justice, the justice of an arbitrator, that is to say the act of defining what is just. Wherein, being trusted by them that make him arbitrator, if he perform his trust, he is said to distribute to every man his own. And this is indeed just distribution, and may be called though improperly distributive justice, but more properly equity, which also is a law of nature as shall be shown in due place. As justice dependeth on antecedent covenant, so does gratitude depend on antecedent grace, that is to say, antecedent free gift. And is the fourth law of nature, which may be conceived in this form. That a man which receiveth benefit from another of mere grace endeavor that he which giveth it have no reasonable cause to repent him of his good will. For no man giveth but with intention of good to himself, because gift is voluntary. And of all voluntary acts, the object is to every man his own good, of which, if men see they shall be frustrated, there will be no beginning of benevolence or trust, nor consequently of mutual help, nor of reconciliation of one man to another. And therefore, there are to remain still in the condition of war, which is contrary to the first and fundamental law of nature, which commandeth men to seek peace. The breach of this law is called ingratitude, and hath the same relation to grace that injustice hath to obligation by covenant. A fifth law of nature is complacence. That is to say, that every man strive to accommodate himself to the rest. For the understanding whereof, we may consider that there is in men's aptness to society, a diversity of nature, rising from their diversity of affections. Not unlike to that we see in stones brought together for building of an edifice. For as that stone which by the asperity and irregularity of figure takes more room from others than itself fills, and for hardness cannot be easily made plain, and thereby hindreth the building, is by the builders cast away as unprofitable and troublesome. So also, a man that by asperity of character will strive to retain those things which to himself are superfluous, and to others necessary, and for the stubbornness of his passions cannot be corrected, is to be left or cast out of society as cumbersome thereunto. For seeing every man, not only by right, but also by necessity of nature, is supposed to endeavor all he can to obtain that which is necessary for his conservation. He that shall oppose himself against it for things superfluous is guilty of the law that thereupon is to follow, and therefore doth that which is contrary to the fundamental law of nature which commandeth to seek peace. The observers of this law may be called sociable. The Latins call them commodi. The contrary, stubborn, insatiable, forward, intractable. A sixth law of nature is this, that upon caution of the future time, a man ought to pardon the offenses past of them that, repenting, desire it. For pardon is nothing but granting of peace, which though granted to them that preserve in their hostility, be not peace but fear, yet not granted to them that give caution of the future time is sign of an aversion to peace, and therefore contrary to the law of nature. A seventh is that in past revenges, that is, retribution of evil for evil, men look not at the greatness of the evil past but the greatness of the good to follow, whereby we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other design than for correction of the offender, or direction of others. For this law is consequent to the next before it, that commandeth pardon upon security of the future time. Besides, revenge without respect to the example and profit to come is a triumph or glorying in the hurt of another. Tending to no end, for the end is always somewhat to come, and glorying to no end is vain glory, and contrary to reason. And to hurt without reason tendeth to the introduction of war, which is against the law of nature, and is commonly styled by the name of cruelty. And because all signs of hatred or contempt provoke to fight, in so much as most men choose rather to hazard their life than not to be revenged, we may in the eighth place for a law of nature set down this precept, that no man by deed, word, countenance, or gesture declare hatred or contempt of another. The breach of which law is commonly called contumally. The question who is the better man has no place in the condition of mere nature, where, as has been shown before, all men are equal. The inequality that now is has been introduced by the law's civil. I know that Aristotle, in the first book of his politics, for a foundation of his doctrine, makeeth men by nature some more worthy to command, meaning the wiser sort, such as he thought himself to be for his philosophy, others to serve, meaning those that had strong bodies, but were not philosophers as he. As master and servant, we're not introduced by consent of men, but by difference of wit, which is not only against reason, but also against experience. For there are very few so foolish that had not rather grinned themselves than be governed by others. Nor, when the wise, in their own conceit, contend by force with them who distrust their own wisdom, do they always, or often, or almost at any time, get the victory. If nature therefore have made men equal, that equality is to be acknowledged, or if nature have made men unequal, yet, because men that think themselves equal will not enter into conditions of peace, but upon equal terms, such equality must be admitted. And therefore, for the ninth law of nature, I put this, that every man acknowledge another for his equal by nature. The breach of this precept is pride. On this law dependedeth another, that at the entrance into conditions of peace, no man required to reserve to himself any right which he is not content should be reserved to everyone of the rest. As it is necessary for all men that seek peace to lay down certain rights of nature, that is to say, not to have liberty to do all they list, so it is necessary for man's life to retain some, as right to govern their own bodies, enjoy air, water, motion, ways to go from place to place, and all things else without which a man cannot live or not live well. If, in this case, at the making of peace, men require for themselves that which they would not have to be granted to others, they do contrary to the precedent law that commandeth the acknowledgement of natural equality, and therefore also against the law of nature. The observers of this law are those we call modest, and the breakers arrogant men. The Greeks call the violation of this law pleonexia, that is a desire of more than their share. Also, if a man be trusted to judge between man and man, it is a precept of the law of nature that he deal equally between them, for without that the controversies of men cannot be determined but by war. He therefore that is partial in judgment doth what in him lies to determine from the use of judges and arbitrators, and consequently against the fundamental law of nature, is the cause of war. The observance of this law from the equal distribution to each man of that which in reason belonged to him is called equity, and as I have said before, distributive justice. The violation, exception of persons, prosopolepsia. And from this, follow with another law, that such things as cannot be divided be enjoyed in common, if it can be, and if the quantity of a thing permit, without stint. Otherwise, proportionably to the number of them that have right, for otherwise the distribution is unequal and contrary to equity. But some things there be that can neither be divided nor enjoyed in common. Then the law of nature which prescribes equity requires that the entire right, or else making the use alternate, the first possession, be determined by lot. For equal distribution is of the law of nature, and other means of equal distribution cannot be imagined. Of lots, there be two sorts, arbitrary and natural. Arbitrary is that which is agreed on by the competitors. Natural is either primogeniture, which the Greek calls clarinomia, which signifies given by lot, or first seizure. And therefore those things which cannot be enjoyed in common, nor divided, ought to be a judged to the first possessor, and in some cases to the first born as acquired by lot. It is also a law of nature that all men that mediate peace be allowed safe conduct. For the law that commandeth peace as the end, commandeth intercession as the means. And to intercession, the means is safe conduct. And because though men be never so willing to observe these laws, there may nevertheless arise questions concerning a man's action. First, whether it were done or not done. Secondly, if done, whether against the law or not against the law, the former whereof is called a question of fact, the latter a question of right. Therefore, unless the parties to the question covenant mutually to stand to the sentence of another, they are as far from peace as ever. This other to whose sentence they submit is called an arbitrator. And therefore it is of the law of nature that they that are at controversy submit their right to the judgment of an arbitrator. And seeing every man is presumed to do all things in order to his own benefit, no man is a fit arbitrator in his own cause. And if he were never so fit yet equity allowing to each party equal benefit, if one be admitted to be judge, the other is to be admitted also. And so the controversy that is the cause of war remains against the law of nature. For the same reason no man in any cause ought to be received for arbitrator to whom greater profit or honor or pleasure apparently arises out of the victory of one party than of the other. For he have taken though an unavoidable bribe yet a bribe and no man can be obliged to trust him. And thus also the controversy and the condition of war remaineth contrary to the law of nature. And in a controversy of fact the judge being to give no more credit to one than to the other, if there be no other arguments, must give credit to a third or to a third and fourth or more, for else the question is undecided and left to force, contrary to the law of nature. These are the laws of nature dictating peace for a means of the conservation of men in multitudes and which only concern the doctrine of civil society. There be other things tending to the destruction of particular men as drunkenness and all other parts of intemperance, which may therefore also be reckoned among those things which the law of nature hath forbidden, but are not necessary to be mentioned nor are pertinent enough to this place. And though this may seem to subtle a deduction of the laws of nature to be taken notice of by all men, whereof the most part are too busy in getting food and the rest too negligent to understand, yet to leave all men inexcusable, they have been contracted to one easy sum, intelligible even to the meanest capacity, and that is, do not that to another which thou wouldst not have done to thyself, which showeth him that he has no more to do in learning the laws of nature, but when weighing the actions of other men with his own they seem too heavy to put them into the other part of the balance, and his own into their place, that his own passions and self-love may add nothing to the weight, and then there is none of these laws of nature that will not appear unto him very reasonable. The laws of nature oblige in foro interno, that is to say they bind to a desire they should take place, but in foro externo, that is to the putting them in act, not always. For he that should be modest and tractable and perform all he promises in such time and place where no man else should do so, should but make himself a prey to others, and procure his own certain ruin, contrary to the ground of all laws of nature which tend to nature's preservation, and again, he that having sufficient security that others shall observe the same laws towards him observes them not himself, seeketh not peace, but war, and consequently the destruction of his nature by violence. And whatsoever laws bind in foro interno may be broken, not only by effect contrary to the law, but also by effect according to it, in case a man think at contrary. For though his action in this case be according to the law, yet his purpose was against the law, which where the obligation is in foro interno is a breach. The laws of nature are immutable and eternal, for injustice in gratitude, arrogance, pride, inequity, exception of persons, and the rest can never be made lawful, for it can never be that war shall preserve life and peace destroy it. The same laws, because they oblige only to a desire and endeavor, mean an unfaigned and constant endeavor, are easy to be observed. For in that they require nothing but endeavor, he that endeavoreth their performance fulfilleth them, and he that fulfilleth the law is just. And the science of them is the true and only moral philosophy, for moral philosophy is nothing else but the science of what is good and evil in the conversation and society of mankind. Good and evil are names that signify our appetites and aversions, which in different tempers, customs, and doctrines of men are different, and diverse men differ not only in their judgment on the senses of what is pleasant and unpleasant to the taste, smell, hearing, touch, and sight, but also of what is conformable or disagreeable to reason in the actions of common life. Nay, the same man in diverse times differs from himself, and one time praeseth, that is, calleth good, what another time he dispraeseth and calleth evil, from whence arise disputes, controversies, and at last war. And therefore, so long as a man is in the condition of mere nature, which is a condition of war, private appetite is the measure of good and evil, and consequently all men agree on this, that peace is good, and therefore also the way or means of peace, which, as I have shown before, are justice, gratitude, modesty, equity, mercy, and the rest of the laws of nature are good, that is to say, moral virtues, and their contrary vices, evil. Now, the science of virtue and vice is moral philosophy, and therefore the true doctrine of the laws of nature is the true moral philosophy, but the writers of moral philosophy, though they acknowledge the same virtues and vices, yet not seeing wherein consisted their goodness, nor that they come to be praised as the means of peaceable, sociable, and comfortable living, place them in a mediocrity of passions, as if not the cause, but the degree of daring made fortitude, or not the cause, but the quantity of a gift made liberality. These dictates of reason men used to call by the name of laws, but improperly, for they are but conclusions or theorems concerning what conducive to the conservation and defense of themselves, whereas law, properly, is the word of him that by right hath command over others, but yet if we consider the same theorems as delivered in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things, then are they properly called laws. End of chapter 15. This recording is in the public domain. Chapter 16 of Leviathan. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes. Chapter 16 of persons, authors, and things personated. A person is he whose words or actions are considered either as his own, or as representing the words or actions of another man, or of any other thing, to whom they are attributed, whether truly or by fiction. When they are considered as his own, then is he called a natural person, and when they are considered as representing the words and actions of another, then he is a feigned or artificial person. The word person is Latin, instead whereof the Greeks have prosopon, which signifies the face, as persona in Latin signifies the disguise or outward appearance of a man counterfeited on the stage, and sometimes more particularly that part of it which disguises the face as a mask or visard, and from the stage have been translated to any representative of speech and action, as well in tribunals as theaters, so that a person is the same that an actor is, both on the stage and in common conversation, and to personate is to act or represent himself or another, and he that acteth another is said to bear his person, or act in his name, in which sense Cicero uses it, where he says Uno Sustinio Tres Personas Me y Adversari y Ad Yutikis I bear three persons, my own, my adversaries, and the judges, and is called in diverse occasions, diversely, as a representer or representative, a lieutenant, a vicar, an attorney, a deputy, a procurator, an actor, and the like. Of persons artificial, some have their words and actions owned by those whom they represent, and then the person is the actor, and he that owneth his words and actions is the author, in which case the actor acteth by authority. For that which in speaking of goods and possessions is called an owner, and in Latin dominus, in Greek kurios, speaking of actions is called author, and as the right of possession is called dominion, so the right of doing any action is called authority, so that by authority is always understood a right of doing any act, and done by authority, done by commission or license, from him whose right it is. From hence it followeth that when the actor maketh a covenant by authority, he bindeth thereby the author no less than if he had made it himself, and no less subjecteth him to all the consequences of the same. And therefore, all that hath been said formerly, chapter 14, of the nature of covenants between man and man in their natural capacity, is true also when they are made by their actors, representers, or procurators, that have authority from them, so far forth as is in their commission, but no further. And therefore he that maketh a covenant with the actor or representer, not knowing the authority he hath, doth it at his own peril. For no man is obliged by a covenant whereof he is not author, nor consequently, by a covenant made against or beside the authority he gave. When the actor doth anything against the law of nature by command of the author, if he be obliged by former covenant to obey him, not he, but the author, breaketh the law of nature. For though the action be against the law of nature, yet it is not his, but, contrarily, to refuse to do it is against the law of nature that forbiddeth breach of covenant. And he that maketh a covenant with the author, by mediation of the actor, not knowing what authority he hath, but only takes his word, in case such authority be not made manifest unto him upon demand, is no longer obliged. For the covenant made with the author is not valid without his counter-assurance. But if he that so covenanteth knew beforehand he was to expect no other assurance than the actor's word, then is the covenant valid, because the actor in this case maketh himself the author. And therefore, as when the authority is evident, the covenant obligeth the author not the actor. So, when the authority is feigned, it obligeth the actor only, there being no author, but himself. There are few things that are incapable of being represented by fiction. Inanimate things as a church, a hospital, a bridge, may be personated by a rector, master, or overseer. But things inanimate cannot be authors, nor therefore give authority to their actors. Yet, the actors may have authority to procure their maintenance, given them by those that are owners or governors of those things. And therefore, such things cannot be personated before there be some state of civil government. Likewise, children, fools, and madmen that have no use of reason may be personated by guardians or curators, but can be no authors during that time of any action done by them longer than, when they shall recover the use of reason, they shall judge the same reasonable. Yet, during the folly, he that hath right of governing them may give authority to the guardian. But this again has no place but in a state civil, because before such a state there is no dominion of persons. An idol or mere figment of the brain may be personated, as were the gods of the heathen, which by such officers as the state appointed were personated and held possessions and other goods and rights, which men from time to time dedicated and consecrated unto them. But idols cannot be authors, for an idol is nothing. The authority proceeded from the state, and therefore, before introduction of civil government, the gods of the heathen could not be personated. The true god may be personated, as he was. First, Moses, who governed the Israelites, that were not his, but God's people, not in his own name with Hock di Kitt Moses, but in God's name with Hock di Kitt Dominus. Secondly, by the Son of Man, his own son, our blessed savior Jesus Christ, that came to reduce the Jews and induce all nations into the kingdom of his father, not as of himself, but as sent from his father. And thirdly, by the Holy Ghost, or Comforter, speaking and working in the apostles, which Holy Ghost was a Comforter that came not of himself, but was sent and proceeded from them both. A multitude of men are made one person when they are by one man, or one person, represented, so that it be done with the consent of everyone of that multitude in particular. For it is the unity of the representer, not the unity of the represented, that maketh the person one. And it is the representer that beareth the person, and but one person, and unity cannot otherwise be understood in multitude. And because the multitude naturally is not one, but many, that cannot be understood for one, but many others, of everything their representative sayeth or doeth in their name, every man giving their common representer authority from himself in particular, and owning all the actions the representer doth, in case they give him authority without stint. Otherwise, when they limit him in what and how far he shall represent them, none of them owneth more than they gave him commission to act. And if the representative consists of many men, the voice of the greater number must be considered as the voice of them all. For if the lesser number pronounced, for example, in the affirmative, and the greater in the negative, there will be negatives more than enough to destroy the affirmatives, and thereby the excess of negatives, standing uncontradicted, are the only voice the representative hath. And a representative of even numbers, especially when the number is not great, whereby the contradictory voices are oftentimes equal, is therefore oftentimes mute, and incapable of action. Yet in some cases, contradictory voices equal in number may determine a question, as in condemning or absolving, equality of votes even in that they condemn not, do absolve. But not on the contrary condemn in that they absolve not, for when a cause is heard, not to condemn is to absolve. But on the contrary, to say that not absolving is condemning is not true. The like it is in deliberation of executing presently, or deferring till another time, for when the voices are equal, the not-decreying execution is a decree of dilation. Or if the number be odd, as three or more men or assemblies, where everyone has by a negative voice authority to take away the effect of all the affirmative voices of the rest, this number is no representative. By the diversity of opinions and interests of men it becomes oftentimes, and in cases of the greatest consequence, a mute person and unappet, as for many things else, so for the government of a multitude, especially in time of war. Of authors there be two sorts. The first simply so-called, which I have before defined to be him that oneth the action of another simply. The second is he that oneth an action or covenant of another conditionally. That is to say, he undertaketh to do it if the other doth it not, at or before a certain time. And these authors conditional are generally called sureties. In Latin, fide yosores and sponsores, and particularly for debt, predes, and for appearance before a judge or magistrate, wathes, and chapter 16, and first part of man. This recording is in the public domain. Chapter 17 of Leviathan. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org, recording by Anna Simon. Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes. The second part of Commonwealth. Chapter 17 of the causes, generation, and definition of a Commonwealth. The final cause and or design of man who'd naturally love liberty and dominion over others, in the introduction of that restrained upon themselves in which we see them live in Commonwealth, is the foresight of their own preservation and of a more contented life thereby. That is to say of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of war, which is necessarily consequent, as has been shown, to the natural passions of man when there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants, and observation of those laws of nature set down in the 14th and 15th chapters. For the laws of nature, as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and in some doing to others as we would be done to, of themselves, without the terror of some power to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions that carries to partiality, pride, revenge, and alike, and covenants without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore, notwithstanding the laws of nature, which everyone had then kept when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely, if there be no power erected, or not great enough for our security, every man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art for caution against all other men. And in all places, where men have lived by small families, to rob and spoil one another has been a trade, and so far from being reputed against the law of nature, that the greater spoils they gained, the greater was their honor. And men observed no other laws therein, but the laws of honor. That is to abstain from cruelty, leaving to men their lives and instruments of husbandry. And as small families did then, so now do cities and kingdoms, which are but greater families, for their own security, enlarge their dominions upon all pretenses of danger and fear of invasion, or assistance that may be given to invaders, endeavor as much as they can to subdue or weaken their neighbors by open force and secret odds, for want of other caution justly, and are remembered for it in after ages with honor. Nor is it the joining together of a small number of men that gives them this security, because in small numbers, small additions on the one side or the other make the advantage of strength so great as it's sufficient to carry the victory, and therefore gives encouragement to an invasion. The multitude sufficient to confide in for our security is not determined by any certain number, but by comparison with the enemy we fear, and is then sufficient when the art of the enemy is not of so visible and conspicuous moment to determine the event of war as to move him to attempt. And be there never so great a multitude, yet if their actions be directed according to their particular judgments and particular appetites, they can expect thereby no defense, no protection, neither against a common enemy nor against the injuries of one another. For being distracted in opinions concerning the best use and application of their strength, they do not help but hinder one another, and reduce their strength by mutual opposition to nothing, whereby they are easily not only subdued by a very few that agree together, but also when there is no common enemy, they make war upon each other for their particular interests. For if we could suppose a great multitude of men to consent in the observation of justice and other laws of nature without a common power to keep them all in awe, we might as well suppose all mankind to do the same, and then there neither would be nor need to be any civil government or commonwealth at all, because there would be peace without subjection. Nor is it enough for the security which men desire should last all the time of their life, that they be governed and directed by one judgment for a limited time, as in one battle or one war. For though they obtain a victory by their unanimous endeavor against a foreign enemy, yet afterwards, when either they have no common enemy, or he that by one part is held for an enemy is by another part held for a friend, they must needs by the difference of their interests dissolve and fall again into a war amongst themselves. It is true that certain living creatures as bees and ants live socially one with another, which are therefore by Aristotle numbered amongst political creatures, and yet have no other direction than their particular judgments and appetites, nor speech whereby one of them can signify to another what he thinks expedient for the common benefit, and therefore some men may perhaps desire to know why mankind cannot do the same, to which I answer. First, that men are continually in competition for honor and dignity which these creatures are not, and consequently amongst men there arises on that ground envy and hatred and finally war, but amongst these not so. Secondly, that amongst these creatures the common good differ not from the private, and being by nature inclined to their private they procure thereby the common benefit, but men whose joy consisted in comparing himself with other men can relish nothing but what is eminent. Thirdly, that these creatures having not as men the use of reason do not see nor think they see any fault in the administration of their common business, whereas amongst men there are very many that think themselves wiser and able to govern the public better than the rest, and these strive to reform and innovate, one this way another that way, and thereby bring it into distraction and civil war. Fourthly, that these creatures, though they have some use of voice in making known to one another their desires and other affections, yet they want that art of words by which some men can represent to others that which is good in the likeness of evil, and evil in the likeness of good, and augment or diminish the apparent greatness of good and evil, discontenting men and troubling their peace and their pleasure. Fifthly, irrational creatures cannot distinguish between injury and damage, and therefore as long as they be at ease they are not offended with their fellows, whereas man is then most troublesome when he's most at ease, for then it is that he loves to show his wisdom and control the actions of them that govern the commonwealth. Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is natural, that of man is by covenant only, which is artificial, and therefore it is no wonder if there be somewhat else required besides covenant to make their agreement constant and lasting, which is a common power to keep them in awe and to direct their attention to the common benefit. The only way to erect such a common power is maybe able to defend them from the invasion of foreigners and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort as that by their own industry and by the fruits of the earth they may nourish themselves and live contentedly, is to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills by plurality of voices and to one will, which is as much as to say to appoint one man, or assembly of man, to bear their person, and everyone to own and acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person shall act or cause to be acted in those things which concern the common peace and safety, and therein to submit their wills everyone to his will, and their judgments to his judgment. This is more than consent or concord, it is a real unity of them all in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner as if every man should say to every man, I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of man, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner. This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a Commonwealth, in Latin, Civitas. This is a generation of that great Leviathan, or Rada, to speak more reverently of that mortal God to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and defense. For by this authority, given him by every particular man in the Commonwealth, he had to use of so much power and strength conferred on him that by terror thereof, he is enabled to form the wills of them all to peace at home, and mutual aid against their enemies abroad. And in him consisted the essence of the Commonwealth, which, to define it, is one person of whose acts a great multitude by mutual governance, one with another, have made themselves everyone the author. To the end, he may use the strength and means of them all as he shall think expedient for their peace and common defense. And he that carried this person is called sovereign, and set to have sovereign power, and everyone besides his subject. The attaining to this sovereign power is by two ways, one by natural force, as when a man maketh his children submit themselves and their children to his government as being able to destroy them if they refuse, or by war substitute his enemies to his will, giving them their lives on that condition. The other is when men agree amongst themselves to submit to some man or assembly of men voluntarily on confidence to be protected by him against all others. This letter may be called a political Commonwealth, or Commonwealth by institution, and the former a Commonwealth by acquisition. And first I shall speak of a Commonwealth by institution. End of chapter 17 Chapter 18 of Leviathan This is a LibriFox recording. All LibriFox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriFox.org recording by Anna Simon. Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes. Chapter 18 Of the Rights of Sovereign by Institution A Commonwealth is said to be instituted when the multitude of men do agree and covenant, everyone with everyone, that to whatsoever man or assembly of men shall be given by the major part the right to present the person of them all, that is to say, to be their representative. Everyone, as well he that voted for it, as he that voted against it, shall authorize all the actions and judgments of that man, or assembly of men, in the same manner as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men. From this institution of a Commonwealth are derived all the rights and faculties of him or them, on whom the sovereign power is conferred by the consent of the people assembled. First, because they covenant, it is to be understood, they are not obliged by former covenant to anything repugnant hereon too, and consequently, they that have already instituted a Commonwealth, being thereby bound by covenant to only actions and judgments of one, cannot lawfully make a new covenant amongst themselves to be obedient to any other, in anything whatsoever, without his permission. And therefore, they that are subject to a monarch, cannot, without his leave, cast off monarchy and return to the confusion of a dis-united multitude, nor transfer their person from him that beareth it to another man, other assembly of man, for they are bound, every man to every man, to own and be reputed author of all that already is their sovereign shall do, and judge fit to be done, so that any one man dissenting, all the rest should break their covenant made to that man, which is injustice, and they have also every man given the sovereignty to him that beareth their person, and therefore, if they depose him, they take from him that which is his own, and so again it is injustice. Besides, if he that attempted to depose his sovereign be killed or punished by him for such attempt, he is author of his own punishment, as being, by the institution, author of all his sovereign shall do. And because it is injustice for a man to do anything for which he may be punished by his own authority, he is also upon that title unjust. And whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their sovereign, a new covenant made, not with man, but with God, this also is unjust. For there is no covenant with God, but by mediation of somebody that represented God's person, which none doth but God's lieutenant who have the sovereignty under God. But this pretence of covenant with God is so evident a lie even in the pretender's own consciences, that it is not only an act of an unjust, but also of a vile and unmanly disposition. Secondly, because the right of bearing the person of them all is given to him they make sovereign, by covenant only of one to another, and not of him to any of them, there can happen no breach of covenant on the part of the sovereign, and consequently none of his subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his subjection. That he which is made sovereign make it no covenant with his subjects beforehand is manifest, because either he must make it with the whole multitude as one party to the covenant, or he must make a several covenant with every man. With the whole as one party it is impossible, because as they are not one person, and if he makes so many several covenants as there be men, those covenants, after he had sovereignty, are void. Because what act so ever can be pretended by any one of them, for breach thereof, is the act both of himself, and of all the rest, because done in the person, and by the right of every one of them, in particular. Besides, if any one or more of them pretend a breach of the covenant made by the sovereign at his institution, and others, or one other of his subjects, or himself alone, pretend there was no such breach, there is in this case no judge to decide the controversy. It returns therefore to the sword again, and every man recovered the right of protecting himself by his own strength, contrary to the design they had in the institution. It is therefore in vain to grant sovereignty by way of precedent covenant. The opinion that any monarch receiveeth his power by covenant, that is to say, on condition, proceedeth from want of understanding this easy truth, that covenants, being but words, and breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any man, but what it has from the public sword, that is, from the untied hands of that man, or assembly of men, that hath the sovereignty, and whose actions are avouched by them all, and performed by the strength of them all, in him united. But when an assembly of men is made sovereign, then no man imagine any such covenant to have passed in the institution. For no man is so dull as to say, for example, the people of Rome made a covenant with the Romans to hold the sovereignty on such or such conditions, which not performed, the Romans might lawfully depose the Roman people. That man see not the reason to be alike in a monarchy, and in a popular government, proceedeth from the ambition of some that are kinder to the government of an assembly, whereof they may hope to participate, than of monarchy which they despair to enjoy. Thirdly, because the major part hath by consenting voices declared a sovereign, he that dissented must now consent with the rest, that is, be contented to avow all the actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by the rest. For if he voluntarily entered into the congregation of them that were assembled, he sufficiently declared thereby his will, and therefore tacitly covenanted to stand to what the major part should ordain, and therefore, if he refused to stand there too, or make protestation against any of their decrees, he does contrary to his covenant, and therefore unjustly, and whether he be of the congregation or not, and whether his consent be asked or not, he must either submit to their decrees, or be left in the condition of war he was in before, wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever. Fourthly, because every subject is by this institution author of all the actions and judgments of the sovereign instituted, it follows that whatsoever he doth can be no injury to any of his subjects, nor ought he to be by any of them accused of injustice. For he that doth anything by authority from another doth dare in no injury to him by whose authority he acted, but by this institution of a commonwealth every particular man is author of all the sovereign doth, and consequently he that complaineth of injury from his sovereign, complaineth of that whereof he himself is author, and therefore ought not to accuse any man but himself, no, nor himself of injury, because to do injury to oneself is impossible. It is true that they that have sovereign power may commit iniquity, but not injustice or injury in the proper signification. Fifthly, and consequently to that which was said last, no man that hath sovereign power can justly be put to death, or otherwise in any manner by his subjects punished. For seeing every subject is author of the actions of his sovereign, he punisheth another for the actions committed by himself. And because the end of this institution is the peace and defence of them all, and whosoever has right to the end has right to the means, they belong of right to whatsoever man or assembly that hath the sovereignty to be judged both of the means of peace and defence, and also of the hindrances and disturbances of the same. And to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done both beforehand for the preserving of peace and security by prevention of discord at home, and hostility from abroad, and when peace and security are lost for the recovery of the same. And therefore, sixthly, it is annexed to the sovereignty to be judged of what opinions and doctrines are averse and what conducing to peace, and consequently on what occasions, how far and what man are to be trusted with all in speaking to multitudes of people, and who shall examine the doctrines of all books before they be published? For the actions of man proceed from their opinions, and in the well-governing of opinions consisted the well-governing of man's actions in order to their peace and concord. And though in matter of doctrine nothing ought to be regarded by the truth, yet this is not repugnant to regulating of the same by peace. For doctrine repugnant to peace can no more be true than peace and concord can be against the law of nature. It is true that in a commonwealth whereby the negligence or unskillfulness of governors and teachers false doctrines are by time generally received, the contrary truth may be generally offensive, yet the most sudden and rough bustling in of a new truth that can be does never break the peace, but only sometimes awake the wall. For those men that are so remissly governed that they dare take up arms to defend or introduce an opinion are still in war, and their condition not peace, but only a cessation of arms for fear of one another, and they live as it were in the proscenes of battle continually. It belonged therefore to him that had the sovereign power to be judged or constitute all judges of opinions and doctrines as a thing necessary to peace, thereby to prevent discord and civil war. Seventhly is annexed to the sovereignty the whole power of prescribing the rules whereby every man may know what goods he may enjoy and what actions he may do without being molested by any of his fellow subjects, and this is it men call propriety. For before constitution of sovereign power as had already been shown, all men had right to do all things, which necessarily caused war, and therefore this propriety being necessary to peace and depending on sovereign power is the act of that power in order to the public peace. These rules of propriety, or meum and tomb, and of good, evil, lawful and unlawful in the actions of subjects are the civil laws, that is to say the laws of each commonwealth in particular, though the name of civil law be now restrained to the ancient civil laws of the city of Rome, which being the head of a great part of the world her laws at that time were in these parts the civil law. Eightly is annexed to the sovereignty the right of jidicature, that is to say of hearing and deciding all controversies which may arise concerning law, either civil or natural, or concerning fact. For without the decision of controversies there is no protection of one subject against the injuries of another. The laws concerning meum and tomb are in vain and to every man remaineth from the natural and necessary appetite of his own conservation the right of protecting himself by his private strength, which is the condition of war and contrary to the end for which every commonwealth is instituted. Ninthly is annexed to the sovereignty the right of making war and peace with other nations and commonwealths. That is to say of judging when it is for the public good and how great forces are to be assembled armed and paid for that end and to levy money upon the subjects to defray the expenses thereof. For the power by which the people are to be defended consisted in their armies and the strength of an army in the union of their strength in the one command. Which command the sovereign instituted therefore hath because the command of the militia without other institution maketh him that hath it sovereign. And therefore whosoever is made general of an army he that hath the sovereign power is always generalissimo. Tenthly is annexed to the sovereignty the choosing of all councillors, ministers, magistrates and officers both in peace and war. For seeing the sovereign is charged with the end which is the common peace and defense he is understood to have power to use such means as he shall think most fit for his discharge. Elementally to the sovereign is committed the power of rewarding with riches or honor and of punishing with corporal or pecuniary punishment or with ignominy every subject according to the law he hath formally made or if there be no law made according as he shall judge most to conduce to the encouraging of men to serve the commonwealth or deterring of them from doing this service to the same. Lastly considering what values men are naturally apt to set upon themselves what respect they look for from others and how little they value other men from whence continually arise amongst them emulation, quarrels, factions and at last war to the destroying of one another and diminution of their strength against the common enemy. It is necessary that there be laws and a public rate of the worth of such men as hath deserved or are able to deserve well of the commonwealth and that there be force in the hands of some or other to put those laws in execution. But it hath already been shown that not only the whole militia or forces of the commonwealth but also the judicature of all controversies is annexed to the sovereignty. To the sovereign therefore it belonged also the gift titles of honor and to appoint what order of place and dignity each man shall hold and what signs of respect in public or private meetings they shall give to one another. These are the rights which make the essence of sovereignty and which are the marks whereby a man may discern in what man or assembly of man the sovereign power is placed and resided. For these are incommunicable and inseparable. The power to coin money, to dispose of the estate and persons of infant heirs, to have preemption in markets and all other statute prerogatives may be transferred by the sovereign and yet the power to protect his subjects be retained. But if he transferred the militia he retains the judicature in vain for want of execution of the laws or if he grant away the power of raising money the militia is in vain or if he give away the government of doctrines men will be frighted into rebellion with the fear of spirits and so if we consider any one of the said rights we shall presently see that the holding of all the rest will produce no effect in the conservation of peace and justice the end for which all commonwealths are instituted. And this division is it whereof it is said a kingdom divided in itself cannot stand for unless this division proceed division into opposite armies can never happen. If there had not first been an opinion received of the greatest part of England that these powers were divided between the king and the lords and the house of commons the people had never been divided and fallen into this civil war first between those that disagreed in politics and after between the dissenters about the liberty of religion which have so instructed men in this point of sovereign right that there be few now in England that do not see that these rights are inseparable and will be so generally acknowledged at the next return of peace. And so continue till their miseries are forgotten and no longer except the vulgar be better taught than they have hitherto been. And because they are essential and inseparable rights it follows necessarily that in whatsoever words any of them seem to be granted away yet if the sovereign power itself be not in direct terms renounced and the name of sovereign no more given by the grantees to him that grants them the grant is void. For when he is granted all he can if we grant back the sovereignty all is restored as inseparably annexed thereon too. This great authority being indivisible and inseparably annexed to the sovereignty there is little ground for the opinion of them that say of sovereign kings though they be single as Majora's of greater power than every one of their subjects yet they be Universus Minorus of less power than them altogether. For if by altogether they mean not the collective body as one person then altogether and every one signify the same and the speech is absurd. But if by altogether they understand them as one person which person the sovereign bears then the power of altogether is the same with the sovereign's power and so again the speech is absurd. Which absurdity they see well enough when the sovereignty is in an assembly of the people but in a monarch they see it not and yet the power of sovereignty is the same in whomsoever it be placed. And as the power so also the honor of the sovereign ought to be greater than that of any or all the subjects. For in the sovereignty is the fountain of honor the dignities of Lord Earl Duke and Prince are his creatures as in the presence of the master the servants are equal and without any honor at all so are the subjects in the presence of the sovereign and though they shine some more some less when they are out of his sight yet in his presence they shine no more than the stars in presence of the sun. But a man may here object that the condition of subjects is very miserable as being obnoxious to the lusts and other irregular passions of him or them that have so unlimited a power in their hands and commonly they that live under a monarch think it the fold of monarchy and they that live under the government of democracy or other sovereign assembly attribute all the inconvenience to that form of Commonwealth whereas the power in all forms if they be perfect enough to protect them is the same not considering that the state of men can never be without some incomodity or other and that the greatest that in any form of government can possibly happen to the people in general is scarce sensible in respect of the miseries and horrible calamities that accompany a civil war or that disillute condition of masterless men without subjection to laws and a coercive power to tie their hands from rapine and revenge nor considering that the greatest pressure of sovereign governance proceeded not from any delight or profit they can expect in the damage weakening of their subject in whose vigor consisted their own strength and glory but in the restiveness of themselves that unwillingly contributing to their own defense make it necessary for their governors to draw from them what they can in time of peace that they may have means on any emergent occasion or sudden need to resist or take advantage on their enemies for all men are by nature provided of notable multiplying glasses that is their passions and self-love through which every little payment appeared a great grievance but our destitute of those prospective glasses namely moral and civil science to see afar off the miseries that hang over them and cannot without such payments be avoided End of chapter 18 Chapter 19 of Leviathan this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Anna Simon Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes Chapter 19 of the several kinds of Commonwealth by institution and of succession to the sovereign power the difference of Commonwealth consisted in the difference of the sovereign or the person representative of all and every one of the multitude and because the sovereignty is either in one man or in an assembly of more than one and into that assembly either every man has right to enter or not everyone but certain men distinguished from the rest it is manifest there can be but three kinds of Commonwealth for the representative must need to be one man or more and if more then it is the assembly of all or but of a part when the representative is one man then is the Commonwealth a monarchy when an assembly of all that will come together then it is a democracy or popular Commonwealth when an assembly of a part only then it is called an aristocracy other kind of Commonwealth there can be none for either one or more or all must have the sovereign power which I have shown to be indivisible and tire there'll be other names of government in the histories and books of policy as tyranny and olacarchy but they are not the names of other forms of government but of the same forms misliked for they that are discontented and their monarchy call it tyranny and they that are displaced with aristocracy call it olacarchy so also they which find themselves grieved under a democracy call it anarchy which signifies want of government and yet I think no man believes that want of government is any new kind of government nor by the same reason ought they to believe that the government is of one kind when they like it and another when they mislike it or are oppressed by the governors it is manifest that men who are in absolute liberty may if they please give authority to one man to represent them every one as well as give such authority to any assembly of man whatsoever and consequently may subject themselves if they think good to a monarch as absolutely as to other representative therefore where there is already erected a sovereign power there can be no other representative of the same people but only to certain particular ends by the sovereign limited for that what's erect to sovereigns and every man to have his person represented by two actors that by opposing one another must need to divide that power which if man will live in peace is indivisible and thereby reduce the multitude into the condition of war contrary to the end for which all sovereignty is instituted and therefore as it is absurd to think that a sovereign assembly inviting the people of their dominion to send up their deputies with power to make known their advice or desires should therefore hold such deputies rather than themselves for the absolute representative of the people so it is absurd also to think the same in a monarchy and I know not how this so manifested truth should have laid be so little observed that in a monarchy he that had the sovereignty from a descent of 600 years was alone called sovereign had the title of majesty from every one of his subjects and was unquestionably taken by them for their king was notwithstanding never considered as their representative that name without contradiction passing for the title of those men which at his command were sent up by the people to carry their petitions and give him if he permitted it their advice which may serve as an ammunition for those that are the true and absolute representative of a people to instruct men in the nature of that office and to take heed how they admit of any other general representation upon any occasion whatsoever if they mean to discharge the trust committed to them the difference between these three kinds of commonwealth consisted not in the difference of power but in the difference of convenience or aptitude to produce the peace and security of the people for which end they were instituted and to compare monarchy with the other two we may observe first that whosoever beareth the person of the people or is one of that assembly that bears it beareth also his own natural person and though he be careful in his politic person to procure the common interest yet he is more or no less careful to procure the private good of himself his family, kindred and friends and for the most part if the public interest chance to cross the private he prefers the private for the passions of men are commonly more potent than their reason from whence it follows that where the public and private interest are most closely united there is the public most advanced now in monarchy the private interest is the same with the public the richest power and honor of a monarch arise only from the richest strength and reputation of a subject for no king can be rich nor glorious nor secure whose subjects are either poor or contemptible or too weak through want or dissension to maintain a war against their enemies whereas in a democracy or aristocracy the public prosperity confers not so much to the private fortune of one that is corrupt or ambitious as not many times a perfidious advice a treacherous action or a civil war secondly that a monarch receive a council of whom when and where he pleases and consequently may hear the opinion of men verse in a matter about which he deliberates of what rank or quality so ever and as long before the time of action and with as much secrecy as he will but when a sovereign assembly has need of council none are admitted but such as have I right there too from the beginning which for the most part are of those who have been versed more in the acquisition of wealth than of knowledge and are to give their advice in long discourses which may and do commonly excite men to action but not govern them in it for the understanding is by the flame of the passions never enlightened but dazzled nor is there any place or time wherein an assembly can receive council secretly because of their own multitude thirdly that the resolutions of a monarch are subject to no other inconstancy than that of human nature but in assemblies besides that of nature there arises an inconstancy from the number for the absence of a few that would have the resolution once taken continue firm which may happen by security negligence or private impediments or the diligence appearance of a few of the country opinion and does today all that was concluded yesterday fourthly that a monarch cannot disagree with himself out of envy or interest but an assembly may and that to such a height as may produce a civil war fifthly that in monarchy there is this inconvenience that any subject by the power of one man for the enriching of a favorite or flatterer may be deprived of all he possesseth which I confess is a great and inevitable inconvenience but the same may as well happen where the sovereign powers in an assembly for their powers the same and they are a subject to evil council and to be seduced by orators as a monarch by flatterers and becoming one another's flatterers serve one another's covetousness and ambition by turns and whereas the favorites of monarchs are few and they have none else to advance but their own kindred the favorites of an assembly are many and the kindred much more numerous than of any monarch besides there's no favorite of a monarch which cannot as well succor his friends as hurt his enemies but orators that is to say favorites of sovereign assemblies though they have great powers to hurt have little to save for to accuse requires less eloquence such as man's nature than to excuse and condemnation then absolution more resembles justice sixthly that it is an inconvenience in monarchy that the sovereignty may descend upon an infant or one that cannot discern between good and evil and consisted in this that the use of his power must be in the hand of another man or some assembly of men which are to govern by his right and in his name as curators and protectors of his person and authority but to say there is inconvenience in putting the use of the sovereign power into the hand of a man or an assembly of men is to say that all government is more inconvenient than confusion and civil war and therefore all the danger that can be pretended must arise from the contention of those that for an office of so great honor and profit may become competitors to make it appear that this inconvenience proceeded not from that form of government we call monarchy we are to consider that the president monarch had appointed who shall have the tuition of his infant successor either expressly by testament or tacitly by not controlling the custom in that case received and then such inconvenience if it happened is to be attributed not to the monarchy but to the ambition and injustice of the subjects which in all kinds of government whether people are not well instructed in their duty and the rights of sovereignty is the same or else the president monarch had not at all taken order for such tuition and then the law of nature had provided this sufficient rule that the tuition shall be in him that had by nature most interest in the preservation of the authority of the infant and to whom least benefit can accrue by his death or diminution foreseeing every man by nature seek of his own benefit and promotion to put an infant into the power of those that can promote themselves by his destruction or damage is not tuition but treachery so that sufficient provision being taken against all just quarrel by the government and their child if any contention arise to the disturbance of the public peace it is not to be attributed to the form of monarchy but to the ambition of subjects and ignorance of that duty on the other side there is no great commonwealth the sovereignty whereof is in a great assembly which is not as the consultations of peace and war and making of laws in the same condition as if the government were in a child for as a child wants the judgment to descend from council given him and is thereby necessitated to take the advice of them or him to whom he is committed so an assembly wanted the liberty to descend from the council of the major part be it good or bad and as a child has need of a tutor or protector to preserve his person and authority so also in great commonwealth the sovereign assembly in all great dangers and troubles have need of custodious libertantis that is of dictators or protectors of their authority which are as much as temporary monarchs to whom for a time they may commit the entire exercise of their power and have at the end of that time being often a deprived thereof than infant kings by their protectors regents or any other tutors though the kinds of sovereignty be as I have now shown but three that is to say monarchy where one man has it or democracy where the general assembly of subjects has it or aristocracy where it is in an assembly of certain persons nominated or otherwise distinguished from the rest yet he that shall consider the particular commonwealths that have been and are in the world will not perhaps easily reduce them to three and may thereby be inclined to think there be other forms arising from these mingled together as for example elective kingdoms where kings have the sovereign power put into their hands for a time or kingdoms where in the king had the power limited which governments are nevertheless by most writers called monarchy likewise if a popular or aristocratic commonwealth subdue an enemy's country and govern the same by president procurator or other magistrate this may seem perhaps at first sight to be a democratic or aristocratic government but it is not so for elective kings are not sovereigns but ministers of the sovereign nor limited kings sovereigns but ministers of them that have the sovereign power nor are those provinces which are in subjection to a democracy or aristocracy of another commonwealth democratically or aristocratically governed but monarchically and first concerning an elective king whose power is limited to his life as it is in many places of christendom at this day or to certain years or months as dictates his power amongst the romans if he have right to appoint his successor he is no more elective but hereditary but if he have no power to elect his successor then there is some other man or assembly known which after his disease may elect a new or else the commonwealth died or dissolved with him and returned it to the condition of war if it be known who have the power to give the sovereignty after his death it is known also that the sovereignty was in them before for none have right to give that which they have not right to possess and keep to themselves if they think good but if there be none that can give the sovereignty after the disease of him that was first elected then has he power he is obliged by the law of nature to provide by establishing a successor to keep to those that have trusted him with the government from elapsing into the miserable condition of civil war and consequently he was when elected a sovereign absolute secondly that king whose power is limited is not superior to him or them that have the power to limit it and he that is not superior is not supreme that is to say not sovereign the sovereignty therefore was always in that assembly which had the right to limit him and by consequence the government not monarchy but either democracy or aristocracy as of all times in sparta where the kings had a privilege to lead their armies but the sovereignty was in the aforeigh thirdly whereas here to fall the roman people governed the land of judia for example by a president yet was not judia therefore a democracy because they were not governed by any assembly into which any of them had right to enter nor by an aristocracy because they were not governed by any assembly into which any man could enter by their election but they were governed by one person which though as to the people of Rome was an assembly of the people or democracy yet as to the people of judia which had no right at all of participating in the government was a monarch for though where the people are governed by an assembly chosen by themselves out of their own number the government is called a democracy or aristocracy yet when they are governed by an assembly not of their own choosing it is a monarchy not of one man over another man but of one people over another people of all these forms of government the matter being mortal so that not only monarchs but also whole assemblies die it is necessary for the conservation of the peace of men that as there was order taken for an artificial man so there be order also taken for an artificial eternity of life without which men that are governed by an assembly should return into the condition of war at every age and they that are governed by one man as soon as their governor died this artificial eternity is that which men call the right of succession there is no perfect form of government where the disposing of the succession is not in the present sovereign for if it be in any other particular man or private assembly it is in a person's subject and may be assumed by the sovereign at his pleasure and consequently the right is in himself and if it be in no particular man but left to a new choice then is the commonwealth dissolved and the right is in him that can get it contrary to the attention of them that did institute the commonwealth for their perpetual and not temporary security in a democracy the whole assembly cannot fail unless the multitude that are to be governed fail and therefore questions of the right of succession have in that form of government no place at all in an aristocracy when any of the assembly died the election of another into his room belonged to the assembly as a sovereign to whom belonged the choosing of all councillors and officers for that which the representative doth as acting every one of the subjects doth as author and though the sovereign assembly may give power to others to elect new men for supply of their court yet it is still by their authority that the election is made and by the same it may when the public shall required be recalled the greatest difficulty about the right of succession is in monarchy and the difficulty arises from this that at first sight it is not manifest who is to appoint the successor nor many times who it is whom he had appointed for in both these cases there is required a more exact ratios the nation than every man is accustomed to use as to the question who shall appoint the successor of a monarch that had the sovereign authority that is to say who shall determine of the right of inheritance for elective kings and princes have not the sovereign power and propriety but in use only we are to consider that either he that is in possession has right to dispose of the succession or else that right is again in the dissolved multitude for the death of him that had the sovereign power and property leaves the multitude without any sovereign at all that is without any representative in whom they should be united and be capable of doing anyone action at all and therefore they are incapable of election of any new monarch every man having equal right to submit himself to such as he thinks best able to protect him or if he can protect himself by his own sword which is a return to confusion and to the condition of a war of every man against every man contrary to the end for which monarchy had its first institution therefore it is manifest that by the institution of monarchy the disposing of the successor is always left to the judgment and will of the present possessor and for the question which may arise sometimes who it is that the monarch in possession had designed to the succession and inheritance of his power it is determined by his express words in testament or by other tacit signs sufficient by express words or testament when it is declared by him in his lifetime five of voce or by writing as the first emperors of Rome declared who should be their heirs for the word heir does not of itself imply the children or nearest kindred of a man but whosoever a man shall anyway declare he would have to succeed him in his estate if therefore a monarch declare expressly that such a man shall be his heir either by word or writing then is that man immediately after the disease of his predecessor invested in the right of being monarch but where testament and express words are wanting other natural signs of the will are to be followed where of the one is custom and therefore where the custom is that the next of kindred absolutely succeeded there also the next of kindred had right to the succession for that if the will of him that was in possession had been otherwise he might easily have declared the same in his lifetime and likewise where the custom is that the next of the male kindred succeeded there also the right of succession is in the next of the kindred male for the same reason and so it is if the custom were to advance the female for whatsoever custom a man may by a word control and does not it is a natural sign he would have that custom stand but where neither custom nor testament have proceeded there it is to be understood first that a monarch's will is that the government remain monarchical because he had to prove that government in himself secondly that a child of his own male or female be preferred before any other because men are presumed to be more inclined by nature to advance their own children than the children of other men and of their own rather a male than a female because men are naturally fitter than women for actions of labour and danger thirdly where his own issue faileth rather a brother than a stranger and so still the nearer in blood rather than the more remote because it is always presumed that the nearer of kin is the nearer in affection and it is evident that a man receives always by reflection the most honour from the greatness of his nearest kindred but if it be lawful for a monarch to dispose with succession by words of contract or testament man may perhaps object a great inconvenience for he may sell or give his right of governing to a stranger which because strangers that is man not used to live under the same government nor speaking the same language do commonly undervalue one another may turn to the oppression of his subjects which is indeed a great inconvenience but it proceeded not necessarily from the subjection to a stranger's government but from the unskillfulness of the governors ignorant of the true rules of politics and therefore the Romans when they had subdued many nations to make their government digestible were want to take away that grievance as much as they thought necessary by giving sometimes to whole nations and sometimes to principal men of every nation they conquered not only the privileges but also the name of Romans and took many of them into the senate and officers of charge even in the Roman city and this was it our most wise king King James aimed at in endeavoring the union of his two realms of England and Scotland which if he could have obtained had in all likelihood prevented the civil wars which made both those kingdoms at this present miserable it is not therefore any injury to the people for a monarch to dispose with a succession by will though by the fold of many princes it has been sometimes found inconvenient of the lawfulness of it this also is an argument that whatsoever inconvenience can arrive by giving a kingdom to a stranger may arrive also by so marrying with strangers as the right of succession may descend upon them yet this by all men is accounted lawful End of chapter 19 Chapter 20 of Leviathan This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Nikki Sullivan Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes Chapter 20 of Dominion Paternal and Despotical A commonwealth by acquisition is that where the sovereign power is acquired by force and it is acquired by force when men singly or many together by plurality of voices for fear of death or bonds do authorize all actions of that man or assembly that have their lives in liberty in his power and this kind of dominion or sovereignty differeth from sovereignty by institution only in this that men who choose their sovereign do it for fear of one another and not of him whom they institute but in this case they subject themselves to him they are afraid of in both cases they do it for fear which is to be noted by them that hold all such covenants and proceed from fear of death or violence void which if it were true no man in any commonwealth could be obliged to obedience it is true that in a commonwealth once instituted or acquired promises proceeding from fear of death or violence are no covenants nor obliging when the thing promised is contrary to the laws but the reason is not because it was made upon fear but because he that promises had no right in the thing promised also when he may lawfully perform and doth not it is not in the inviolidity of the covenant that absolve with him but the sentence of the sovereign otherwise when so ever a man lawfully promises he unlawfully breaketh but when the sovereign who is the actor acquitted him then he is acquitted by him that extorted the promise as by the author of such absolution but the rights and consequences of sovereignty are the same in both his power cannot without his consent be transferred to another he cannot forfeit it he cannot be accused by any of his subjects of injury he cannot be punished by them he is judge of what is necessarily for peace and judge of doctrines he is sole legislator and supreme judge of controversies and of the times and occasions of war and peace to him it belongs to choose magistrates counselors commanders and all other officers and ministers and to determine of rewards and punishments honor and order the reasons whereof are the same which are alleged in the precedent chapter for the same rights and consequences of sovereignty by institution dominion is acquired in two ways by generation and by conquest the right of the dominion by generation is that which the parent hath over his children and is called paternal and is not so derived from the generation as if therefore the parent had dominion over his child because he begat him but from the child's consent either by express or by sufficient arguments declared for as to the generation God hath ordained to man a helper and there be always two that are equally parents the dominion therefore over the child should belong equally to both and he be equally subject to both which is impossible for no man can obey two masters and whereas some have attributed the dominion of man only as being of the more excellent sex they misreconnate for there is not always that difference of strength or prudence between the man and the woman as that right can be determined without war in commonwealths this controversy is decided by the civil law and for the most part but not always the sentence is in favor of the father because for the most part commonwealths have been erected by fathers not by the mothers of families but the question lies now in the state of mere nature where there are supposed no laws of metrimony no laws for the education of children but the law of nature and the natural inclination of the sexes one to another and to their children in this condition of mere nature either the parents between themselves dispose of the dominion over the child by contract or do not dispose thereof at all if they dispose thereof the right passes according to the contract we find in history that the amazons contracted with the men of neighboring countries to whom they had recourse for issue that the issue male should be sent back but the female remain with themselves so that the dominion of the females was in the mother if there be no contract the dominion is in the mother for in the condition of mere nature where there are no matrimonial laws it cannot be known who is the father unless it be declared by the mother and therefore the right of dominion over the child dependeth on her will and is consequently hers again seeing the infant is first in the power of the mother so as she may either nourish or expose it if she nourish it she owneth its life to the mother and is therefore obliged to obey her rather than any other and by consequence the dominion over it is hers but if she expose it and another find in nourish it dominion is in him that nourish it for it ought to obey him by whom it is preserved because preservation of life being the end for which one man becomes subject to another every man is supposed to promise obedience to him and whose power it is to save or destroy him if the mother be the father's subject the child is in the father's power and if the father be the mother's subject as when a sovereign queen married one of her subjects the child is subject to the mother because the father also is her subject if a man and woman monarchs of two several kingdoms have a child in contract concerning who shall have dominion of him the right of dominion passes by contract if they contract not the dominion followed with the dominion of the place of his residence for the sovereign of each country had dominion over all that reside therein he that had dominion over the child had dominion also over the children of the child and over their children's children for he that had dominion over the person of a man had dominion over all that is his without which dominion would bet a title without effect the right of succession to paternal dominion proceeded in the same manner as did the right of succession of monarchy of which I have already sufficiently spoken in the preceding chapter dominion acquired by conquest or in victory in war is that which some writers call despotical from despotese which signifyeth a lord or master and is dominion of the master over his servant and this dominion is then acquired to the victor when the vanquished to avoid the present stroke of death coventeth either in the express words or by the other sufficient signs of the will so long as his life in the liberty of his body allow with him the victor shall have the use thereof at his pleasure and after such covenant made the vanquished is a servant and not before for the word servant whether it be derived from serverae to serve or from serverae to save which I leave to grammarians to dispute is not meant a captive which is captain prison or bonds to the owner of him that took him or bought him if one that did shall consider what to do with him for such men commonly called slaves have no obligation at all but may break their bonds or the prison and kill or carry away captive their matter justly but one that being taken hath corporal liberty allowed him and upon promise not to run away nor to do violence to his master is trusted by him it is not therefore the victory that giveeth the dominion over the vanquished but his own covenant nor is he obliged because he is conquered that is to say beaten or taken or put to flight but because he cometh in and submitted to the victor nor is the victor obliged by an enemy's rendering himself without promise of life to spare him for this his yielding to discretion which obliges not the victor longer than in his own discretion he shall think of it and that which men do when they demand as is now called quarter which the Greeks called zagria taking life is to evade the present fury of the victor by submission and to compound for their life with ransom or service and therefore he that hath quarter hath not his life given but deferred till for the deliberation for it is not a yielding on condition of life but to discretion and then only is his life insecurity as his service do when the victor hath trusted him with his corporal liberty for slaves that work in prisons or fetters do it not of duty but to avoid the cruelty of their taskmasters the master of the servant is also master of all that he hath and may exact the use thereof that is to say of his goods of his labor of his servants and of his children as often as he shall think fit for he beholdeth his life of his master by the covenant of obedience that is of owning and authorizing whatsoever the master shall do and in the case of the master if he refuse kill him or cast him into bonds or otherwise punish him for his disobedience he is himself the author of the same and cannot accuse him of injury in some the rights and consequences of both paternal and despotical dominion are the very same with those of a sovereign by institution and for the same reasons which reasons are set down in the preceding chapter so that for a man that is monarch of diverse nations he hath in one the sovereignty by institution of the people assembled and in another by conquest that is by the submission of each particular to avoid death or bonds to demand of one nation more than of another from the title of conquest as being a concord nation is an act of ignorance of the rights of the sovereignty for the sovereign is absolute over both alike or else there is no sovereignty at all and so every man may lawfully protect himself if he can with his own sword which is the condition of war by this it appears that a great family if it be not part of some commonwealth is of itself as to the rights of sovereignty a little monarchy whether that family consists of a man and his children or of a man and his servants or of a man and his children and servants together we're in the father or master is the sovereign but yet a family is not properly a commonwealth unless it be of that power by its own number or by other opportunities as not to be subdued without hazard of war for where a number of men are manifestly too weak to defend themselves united everyone may use his own reason in time of danger to save his own life either by flight or by submission to the enemy as he shall think best and in the same manner as a very small company of soldiers surprised by an army may cast down their arms in demand quarter or run away then be put to the sword and thus much shall suffice concerning what I find by speculation and deduction of sovereign rights from their nature need and designs of men in erecting of commonwealths and putting themselves under monarchs or assemblies and trusted with power enough for their production let us now consider what the scripture teaches us in the same point to moses the children of israel say thus speak thou to us and we will hear thee but let not god speak to us lest we die exodus 2019 this is absolute obedience to moses concerning the right of kings god himself by the mouth of samuel sayeth this shall be the right of the king you will have to reign over you he shall take your sons and set them to drive his chariots and to be his horsemen and to run before his chariots and gather in his harvest and to make his engines of war and instruments of his chariots and shall take your daughters to make perfumes to be his cooks and bakers he shall take your fields your vineyards and your olive yards and give them to his servants he shall take the tithe of your corn and wine and give it to the men of his chamber and his other servants he shall take your manservants and your maidservants and the choice of your youth and employ them in his business he shall take the tithe of your flocks and you shall be his servants 1 samuel 8 11 through 17 this is absolute power and summed up in the last words you shall be his servants again when the people heard what power their king was to have yet they consented thereto and said us we will be as all other nations and our king shall judge our causes and go before us and conduct our wars the same 8 19 20 here is confirmed the right that sovereigns have both to the militia and to all judicature in which is contained in absolute power as one man can possibly transfer to another again the prayer of king Solomon to god was this give that servant understanding to judge like people and to discern between good and evil one kings three nine it belongs therefore to the sovereign to be judge and to prescribe the rules of discerning good and evil which rules are laws and therefore in him is legislative power Saul sought the life of david yet when it was in his power to slay Saul and his servants would have done it david forbade them Saul sought the life of david yet when it was in his power to slay Saul and his servants would have done it david forbade them saying god forbid i should do such an act against my lord the loonuitate of god 1 samuel 24 6 for obedience of servants st paul sayeth servants obey your masters in all things colossians 3 22 and children obey your parents in all things the same 320 there is simple obedience and those that are subject to paternal or despotical dominion again the scribes and Pharisees sit in moses's chair and therefore all that they shall bid you observe that observe and do matthew 23 2 3 there again is simple obedience in st paul warn them that they subject themselves to princes and to those that are in authority and obey them Titus 3 1 this obedience is also simple lastly our savior himself acknowledges that men ought to pay such taxes as are by kings imposed where he says give to Caesar what is Caesar's and paid such taxes himself and that the king's word is sufficient to take anything from any subject when there is need and that the king is judge of that need for he himself as the king of the jews commanded his disciples to take the ass and ass's colt to carry him into Jerusalem saying go into the village over against you and you shall find a she-ass tide and her colt with her untie them and bring them to me and if any man ask you what you mean by it say the lord has need of them and they will let them go matthew 21 2 3 they will not ask whether his necessity be a sufficient title nor whether he be judged with that necessity but acquiescence in the will of the lord to these places may be added also that of genesis you shall be as gods knowing good and evil genesis 3 5 and who told thee that thou was naked hast thou eaten of the tree of which i commanded thee thou shouldest not eat the same 3 11 for the cognizance or judicature of good and evil being forbidden by the name of the fruit of the tree of knowledge as a trial of Adam's obedience the devil to inflame the ambition of the woman to whom that fruit already seemed beautiful told her that by tasting it they should be as gods knowing good and evil whereupon having both eaten they did indeed take upon them gods office which is judicature of good and evil but acquired no new ability to distinguish between them alright and whereas it is said that having eaten they saw they were naked no man has so interpreted that place as if they had been formidably blind and saw not their own skins the meaning is plain that it was then they first judged their nakedness wherein it was gods will to create them to be uncommonly and by being ashamed to tacitly censure god himself and their upon god sayeth hast thou eaten etc as if he should say just thou that osmy obedience take upon thee to judge of my commandments whereby it is clearly though allegorically signified that the commands of them that have the right to command are not by their subjects to be censured or disputed so that it appears plainly to my understanding both from reason and scripture that sovereign power whether placed in one man as in monarchy or in one assemblyman as in popular and aristocratical commonwealth is as great a possibility men can be imagined to make it and though of so unlimited a power men may fancy many evil consequences yet the consequences of the want of it which is a perpetual war of every man against his neighbor are much worse the condition of man in this life shall never be without inconveniences but there happeneth in no commonwealth any great inconvenience but what proceeds from the subjects disobedience and breach of those covenants from which the commonwealth has its beginning and whosoever thinking sovereign power too great will seek to make it less must subject himself to the power that can limit it that is to say to a greater the greatest objection is that of the practice when men ask where and when such power has by subjects been acknowledged but one may ask them again when or where has there been a kingdom long free from suggestion in civil war in those nations whose commonwealths have been long lived and not been destroyed but by foreign war and subjects never did dispute of the sovereign power in those nations which commonwealths have been long lived and not been destroyed but by foreign war the subjects never did dispute of the sovereign power but how so ever an argument from the practice of men that have not sifted to the bottom and with exact reason weighted the causes in nature of commonwealths and suffer daily those miseries that proceeded from the ignorance thereof is invalid for though in all places of the world men should lay the foundation of their houses on the sand it could not that's being furred that so it ought to be the skill of making and maintaining commonwealths consisted in certain rules as depth arithmetic and geometry not as tennis play when practice only which rules neither poor men had the leisure nor men have had the leisure have hitherto had the curiosity or the method to find out end of chapter 20 recorded by nicky sullivan chicago chapter 21 of leviathan this is a libravox recording all libravox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer visit libravox.org recorded by kirsten ferrari leviathan by thomas hops chapter 21 of the liberty of subjects liberty what liberty or freedom signify as properly the absence of opposition by opposition i mean external impediments of motion and may be applied no less to irrational and inanimate creatures than irrational for whatsoever is so tied or environed as it cannot move but within a certain space which space is determined by the opposition of some external body we say it hath not liberty to go further and so with all living creatures whilst they are imprisoned or restrained with walls or chains and of the water whilst it is kept in by banks or vessels that otherwise would spread itself into a larger space we used to say they are not at liberty to move in such a manner as without those external impediments they would but when the impediment of motion is in the constitution of the thing itself we use not to say it wants the liberty but the power to move as when a stone lies still or a man is fastened to his bed by sickness what it is to be free and according to this proper and generally received meaning of the word a free man is he that in those things which by his strength and wit he is able to do is not hindered to do what he has will to but when the words free and liberty are applied to anything but bodies they are abused for that which is not subject to motion is not subject to impediment and therefore when tith said for example the way is free no liberty of the way is signified but of those that walk in it without stop and when we say a gift is free there is not meant any liberty of the gift but of the giver that was not bound by any law or covenant to give it so when we speak freely it is not the liberty of voice or pronunciation but of the man whom no law hath obliged to speak otherwise than he did lastly from the use of the word free will no liberty can be inferred to the will desire or inclination but the liberty of the man which consisted in this that he finds no stop in doing what he has the will desire or inclination to do fear and liberty consistent fear and liberty are consistent as when a man throweth his goods into the sea for fear the ship should sink he doth it nevertheless very willingly and may refuse to do it if you will it is therefore the action of one that was free so a man sometimes pays his debt only for fear of imprisonment which because nobody hindered him from detaining was the action of a man at liberty and generally all actions men do in commonwealths for fear of the law or actions which the doers had liberty to omit liberty and necessity consistent liberty and necessity are consistent as in the water that hath not only liberty but a necessity of descending by the channel so likewise in the actions which men voluntarily do which because they proceed from their will proceed from liberty and yet because every act of man's will and every desire and inclination proceeded from some cause which causes in a continual chain whose first link in the hand of the god the first of all causes proceed from necessity so that to him that could see the connection of those causes the necessity of all men's voluntary actions would appear manifest and therefore god that seeeth and disposes all things seeeth also that the liberty of man in doing what he will is accompanied with the necessity of doing that which god will and no more nor less for though men may do many things which god does not command nor is therefore author of them yet they can have no passion nor appetite to anything of which appetite god's will is not the cause and did not his will assure the necessity of man's will and consequently of all that on man's will dependeth the liberty of man would be a contradiction and impediment to the omnipotence and liberty of god and this justifies us to the matter in hand of that natural liberty which only properly is called liberty artificial bonds or covenants but as men for the attaining of peace and conservation of themselves thereby have made an artificial man which we call a common wealth so also have they made artificial chains called civil laws which they themselves by mutual covenants have fastened at one end to the lips of that man or assembly to whom they have given the sovereign power and at the other end to their own ears these bonds in their own nature but weak may nevertheless be made to hold by the danger though not by the difficulty of breaking them liberty of subjects consisteth of liberty from covenants in relation to these bonds only it is that I am to speak now of the liberty of subjects for seeing there is no common wealth in the world for the regulating of all the actions and words of men as being a thing impossible it followeth necessarily that in all kinds of actions by the laws pretermitted men have the liberty of doing what their own reason shall suggest for the most profitable to themselves for if we take liberty in the proper sense for corporal liberty that is to say freedom from chains and prison it were very absurd for men to clamor as they do for liberty they so manifestly enjoy again if we take liberty for an exemption from laws it is no less absurd for men to demand as they do that liberty by which all other men may be masters of their lives and yet as absurd as it is this is it they demand not knowing that the laws are of no power to protect them without a sword in the hands of a man or men to cause those laws to be put in execution the liberty of a subject life therefore only in those things which in regulating their actions the sovereign hath pretermitted such as as the liberty to buy and sell and otherwise contract with one another to choose their own abode their own diet their own trade of life and institute their children as they themselves think fit and the like liberty of the subject consistent with the unlimited power of the sovereign nevertheless we are not to understand that by such liberty the sovereign power of life and death is either abolished or limited for it has already been shown that nothing the sovereign representative can do to a subject on what pretends so ever can properly be called injustice or injury because every subject is author of every act the sovereign doth so that he never wanted to write to anything otherwise than as he himself is the subject of God and bound thereby to observe the laws of nature and therefore it may and doth often happen in common wells that a subject may be put to death by the command of the sovereign power and yet neither do the other wrong as when jeffa caused his daughter to be sacrificed in which in the light cases he that so dyeth hath liberty to do the action for which he is nevertheless without injury put to death and the same holdeth also in a sovereign prince that put it to death an innocent subject for though the action be against the law of nature as being contrary to equity as was the killing of uriah by david yet it was not an injury to uriah but to God not to uriah because the right to do what he pleased was given him by uriah himself and yet to God because david was God's subject and prohibited all iniquity by the law of nature which distinction david himself when he repented the fact evidently confirmed saying to the only have I sinned in the same manner the people of Athens when they banished the most potent of their commonwealth for ten years thought they had committed no injustice and yet they never questioned what crime he had done but what hurt he would do nay they commanded the banishment of they knew not whom and every citizen bringing his oyster shell into the marketplace written with the name of him he desired to be banished without actual accusing him sometime banished in Aristides for his reputation of justice and sometimes a scurrilous jester as hyperbolus to make a jest of it and yet a man cannot say the sovereign people of Athens wanted right to banish them or an Athenian the liberty to jest or to be just the liberty which writers praise is the liberty of sovereigns not of private men the liberty whereas there is so frequent and honorable mention in the histories and philosophy of the ancient Greeks and Romans and in the writings and discourse of those that from them have received all their learning in the politics is not the liberty of particular men but the liberty of the commonwealth which is the same with that which every man then should have if there were no civil laws nor commonwealth at all and the effects of it also be the same for as among masterless men there is perpetual war of every man against his neighbor no inheritance to transmit to the son nor to expect from the father no propriety of goods or lands no security but a full and absolute liberty in every man so in states and commonwealths not dependent on one another every commonwealth not every man has an absolute liberty to do what it shall judge that is to say what that man or assembly that represented it shall judge most conducing to their benefit but with all they live in the condition of a perpetual war and upon the confines of battle with their frontiers armed and cannons planted against their neighbors around about the Athenians and Romans were free that is free commonwealths not that any particular men had the liberty to resist their own representative but that their representative had the liberty to resist or invade other people there is written on the torrents of the city of luka and great characters at this day the word libertas yet no man can then infer that a particular man has more liberty or immunity from the service of the commonwealth there than in Constantinople whether a commonwealth be monarchical or popular the freedom is still the same but it is an easy thing for men to be deceived by the specious name of liberty and for wanted judgment to distinguish mistake that for their private inheritance and birthright which is the right of the public only and when the same error is conferred by the authority of men in reputation for their writings in the subject it is no wonder if it produced sedition and change of government in these western parts of the world we are made to receive our opinions concerning the institution and rights of commonwealths from Aristotle Cicero and other men Greeks and Romans that living under popular states derived those rights not from the principles of nature but transcribed them into their books out of the practice of their own common wealths which were popular as the grammarians describe the rules of language out of the practice of the time or the rules of poetry out of the poems of Homer and Virgil and because the Athenians were taught to keep them from desire of changing their government that they were freemen and all that lived under monarchy were slaves therefore Aristotle puts it down in his politics book six chapter two in democracy liberty is to be supposed for it is commonly held that no man is free in any other government end quote and as Aristotle so Cicero and other writers have grounded their civil doctrine on the opinions of the Romans who were taught to hate monarchy at first by them that having to pose their sovereign shared amongst them the sovereignty of Rome and afterwards by their successors and by reading of these greek and latin authors men from their childhood have gotten a habit under a false show of liberty of favoring tummels and of licentious controlling the actions of their sovereigns and again of controlling those controllers with the effusion of so much blood as i think i may truly say there was never anything so dearly bought as these western parts have bought the learning of the greek and latin tongues liberty of the subject how to be measured to come now to the particulars of the true liberty of a subject that is to say what are the things which though commanded by the sovereign he may never the less without injustice refused to do we are to consider what rights we pass away when we make a common wealth or which is all one what liberty we deny ourselves by owning all the actions without exception of the man or assembly we make our sovereign for in the act of our submission consist of both our obligation and our liberty which must therefore be inferred by arguments taken from thence there being no obligation on any man which arise if not from some act of his own for all men equally are by nature free and because such arguments must either be drawn from the express words i authorize all his actions or from the intention of him that submit of himself to his power which intention is to be understood by the end for which he so submitted the obligation and liberty of the subject is to be derived either from those words or others equivalent or else from the end of the institution of sovereignty namely the piece of the subjects within themselves and their defense against a common enemy subjects have liberty to defend their own bodies even against them that lawfully invade them first therefore seeing sovereignty by institution is by covenant of everyone to everyone and sovereignty by acquisition by covenants of the vanquish to the victor or child to the parent it is manifest that every subject has liberty in all those things the right were of cannot by covenant be transferred i have shown before in the fourteenth chapter that covenants not to defend a man's own body are void therefore if the sovereign command a man though justly condemned to kill wound or maim himself or not to resist those that assault him or to abstain from the use of food air medicine or any other thing without which he cannot live yet have that man the liberty to disobey again if a man be interrogated by the sovereign or his authority concerning a crime done by himself he is not bound without assurance of pardon to confess it because no man as i have shown in the same chapter can be obliged by covenant to accuse himself again the consent of a subject to sovereign power is contained in these words i authorize or take upon me all his actions in which there is no restriction at all of his former natural liberty for by allowing him to kill me i am not bound to kill myself when he commands me it is one thing to say kill me or my fellow if you please another thing to say i will kill myself or my fellow it followed therefore that no man is bound by the words themselves either to kill himself or any other man and consequently that the obligation a man may sometimes have upon the command of the sovereign to execute any dangerous or dishonorable office dependent not on the words of our submission but on the intention which is to be understood by the end thereof when therefore our refusal to obey frustrates the end for which the sovereignty was ordained then there is no liberty to refuse otherwise there is upon this ground a man that is commanded as a soldier to fight against the enemy though his sovereign have right enough to punish his refusal with death may nevertheless in many cases refuse without injustice as when he substituted the sufficient soldier in his place for in this case he deserted not the service of the commonwealth and there is allowance to be made for natural timorousness not only to women of whom no such dangerous duty is expected but also to men of feminine courage when armies fight there is on one side or both a running away yet when they do it not out of treachery but fear they are not assumed to do it unjustly but dishonorably for the same reason to avoid battle is not injustice but cowardice but he that enroleth himself a soldier or taketh impressed money taketh away the excuse of a timorous nature and is obliged not only to go to the battle but also not to run from it without his captain's leave and when the defense of the commonwealth required that once the help of all that are able to bear arms everyone is obliged because otherwise the institution of the commonwealth which they have not the purpose or courage to preserve was in vain to resist the sword of the commonwealth in defense of another man guilty or innocent no man hath liberty because such liberty takes away from the sovereign the means of protecting us and is therefore destructive of the very essence of government but in case a great many men together have already resisted the sovereign power unjustly or committed some capital crime for which every one of them expected death whether have they not the liberty then to join together and assist and defend one another certainly they have for they but defend their lives which the guilty man may as well do as the innocent there was indeed injustice in the first breach of their duty their bearing of arms subsequent to it though it be to maintain what they have done is no new unjust act and if it be only to defend their persons it is not unjust at all but the offer of pardon take it from them to whom it is offered the plea of self-defense and make it their persevering in assisting or defending the rest unlawful the greatest liberty of subjects dependeth on the silence of the law as for other liberties they depend on the silence of the law in cases where the sovereign has prescribed no rule there the subject hath the liberty to do or forbear according to his own discretion and therefore such liberty is in some places more and in some less and in some times more in other times less according as they that have the sovereignty shall think most convenient as for example there was a time when in England a man might enter into his own land and dispossess such as wrongfully possessed it by force but in after times that liberty of forcible entry was taken away by a statute made by the king in parliament and in some places of the world men have the liberty of many wives in other places such liberty is not allowed if a subject have a controversy with his sovereign of debt or of right of possession of lands or goods or concerning any service required at his hands or concerning any penalty corporal or pecuniary grounded on a precedent law he hath the same liberty to sue for his right as if it were against a subject and before such judges as are appointed by the sovereign foreseeing the sovereign demanded by force of a former law and not by virtue of his power he declareeth thereby that he requires no more than shall appear to be due by that law the suit therefore is not contrary to the will of the sovereign and consequently the subject hath the liberty to demand the hearing of his cause and sentence according to that law but if he demand or take anything by pretense of his power there lie of in that case no action of law for all that is done by him in virtue of his power is done by the authority of every subject and consequently he that brings an action against the sovereign brings it against himself if a monarch or sovereign assembly grant a liberty to all or any of his subjects which grants standing he is disabled to provide for their safety the grant is void unless he directly renounce or transfer the sovereignty to another for in that he might openly if it had been his will and in plain terms have renounced or transferred it and did not it is to be understood it was not his will but that the grant proceeded from ignorance of the repugnancy between such a liberty and the sovereign power and therefore the sovereignty is still retained and consequently all those powers which are necessary to the exercising thereof such as the power of war and peace of judicature of appointing officers and counselors of levying money and the rest named in the 18th chapter in what cases subjects are absolved of their obedience to their sovereign the obligation of subjects to the sovereign is understood to last as long and no longer than the power last it by which he is able to protect them for the right men have by nature to protect themselves when none else can protect them can by no covenant be relinquished the sovereignty is the soul of the common wealth which once departed from the body the members do no more receive their motion from it the end of obedience is protection which where so ever a man see of it either in his own or in another sword nature apply of his obedience to it and his endeavor to maintain it and those sovereignty in the intention of them that make it be immortal yet is it in its own nature not only subject to violent death by foreign war but also through the ignorance and passions of men it hath in it from the very institution many seeds of a natural mortality by intestine discord in case of captivity if a subject be taken prisoner in war or his person or his means of life be within the guards of the enemy and hath his life and corporal liberty given him on condition to be subject to the victor he hath liberty to accept the condition and having accepted it is the subject of him that took him because he had no other way to preserve himself the case is the same if he be detained in a foreign country on the same terms but if a man be held in prison or bonds or is not trusted with the liberty of his body he cannot be understood to be bound by covenant to subjection and therefore may if he can make his escape by any means whatsoever in case the sovereign cast off the government from himself in his heirs if a monarch shall relinquish the sovereignty both for himself and his heirs his subjects return to the absolute liberty of nature because though nature may declare who are his sons and who are his nearest of kin yet it dependeth on his own will as hath been said in the president chapter who shall be his heir if therefore he will have no heir there is no sovereignty nor subjection the case is the same if he die without known kindred and without declaration of his heir for then there can no heir be known and consequently no subjection be due in case of banishment if the sovereign banish his subject during the banishment he is not subject but he that is sent on a message or hath leave to travel is still subject but it is by contract between sovereigns not by virtue of the covenant of subjection for whosoever entereth into another's dominion is subject to all the laws thereof unless he have a privilege by the amity of the sovereigns or by special license in case the sovereign render himself subject to another if a monarch subdued by more render himself subject to the victor his subjects are delivered from their former obligation and become blige to the victor but if he beheld prisoner or hath not the liberty of his own body he is not understood to have given away the right of sovereignty and therefore his subjects are obliged to yield obedience to the magistrates formerly placed governing not in their name but in his for his right remaining the question is only of the administration that is to say of the magistrates and officers which if he hath not means to name he is supposed to approve those which he himself hath formerly appointed End of Chapter Twenty-One Chapter Twenty-Two of Leviathan This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Leon Meyer Leviathan by Thomas Hobbs Chapter Twenty-Two Of System Subject Political and Private Having spoken of the generation, form, and power of a commonwealth I am in order to speak next of the parts thereof and first of systems which resemble the similar parts or muscles of a body natural By systems I understand any numbers of men joined in one interest or one business of which some are regular and some irregular Regular are those where one man or assembly of men is constituted representative of the whole number all other are irregular Of regular some are absolute and independent subject to none but their own representative Such are only commonwealths of which I have spoken already in the five last precedent chapters Others are dependent that is to say subordinate to some sovereign power to which everyone as also their representative is subject Of system subordinate some are political and some private Political, otherwise called bodies politic and persons in law are those which are made by authority from the sovereign power of the commonwealth Private are those which are constituted by subjects among themselves or by authority from a stranger For no authority derived from foreign power within the dominion of another it's public there but private And of private systems some are lawful some unlawful Lawful are those which are allowed by the commonwealth all other are unlawful Irregular systems are those which having no representative consist only in concourse of people which if not forbidden by the commonwealth nor made on evil design such as our conflicts of people to markets or shows or any other harmless end are lawful but when the intention is evil or if the number be considerable unknown they are unlawful In bodies politic the power of the representative is always limited and that which prescribe it the limits thereof is the power sovereign for power unlimited is absolute sovereignty and the sovereign in every commonwealth is the absolute representative of all the subjects and therefore no other can be representative of any part of them but so far as he shall give leave and to give leave to a body politic of subjects to have an absolute representative to all intents and purposes were to abandon the government of so much of the commonwealth and to divide the dominion contrary to their peace and defense which the sovereign cannot be understood to do by any grant that does not plainly and directly discharge them of their subjection for consequences of words are not the signs of his will when other consequences are signs of the contrary but rather signs of error and misrecony to which all mankind is too prone the bounds of that power which is given to the representative of a body politic are to be taken notice of from two things one is their writ or letters from the sovereign the other is the law of the commonwealth for though in the institution or acquisition of a commonwealth which is independent there needs no writing because the power of the representative has there no other bounds but such as are set out by the unwritten law of nature yet in subordinate bodies there are such diversities of limitation necessary concerning their businesses times and places as can either be remembered without letters nor taken notice of unless such letters be patent that they may be read to them and with all sealed or testified with the seals or other permanent signs of the authority sovereign and because such limitation is not always easy or perhaps possible to be described in writing the ordinary laws common to all subjects must determine what the representative may lawfully do in all cases where the letters themselves are silent and therefore in a body politic if the representative be one man whatsoever he does in the person of the body which is not warranted in his letters nor by the laws is his own act and not the act of the body nor of any other member thereof besides himself because further than his letters or the law's limit he represents no man's person but his own but what he does according to these is the act of everyone for of the act of the sovereign everyone is author because he is the representative unlimited and the act of him that receives not from the letters of the sovereign is the act of the sovereign and therefore every member of the body is author of it but if the representative be an assembly whatsoever that assembly shall decree not warranted by their letters or the laws is the act of the assembly or body politic and the act of everyone by whose vote the decree was made but not the act of any man that being present voted to the contrary nor of any man absent unless he voted it by procreation it is the act of the assembly because voted by the major part and if it be a crime the assembly may be punished as far forth as it is capable as by dissolution or forfeiture of their letters which is to such artificial and fictitious bodies capital or if the assembly have a common stock wherein none of the innocent members have propriety by pecuniary mohked for from corporal penalties nature hath exempted all bodies politic but they that gave not their vote are therefore innocent because the assembly cannot represent any man in things unwarranted by their letters and consequently are not involved in their votes if the person of the body politic being in one man borrow money of a stranger that is of one that is not of the same body for no letters need limit borrowing seeing it is left to men's own inclinations to limit lending the debt is the representatives for if he should have authority from his letters to make the members pay what he borrow with he should have by consequence the sovereignty of them and therefore the grantor either avoid as proceeding from error commonly incident to human nature and as an insufficient sign of the will of the grantor or if it be avowed by him then it is the representor sovereign and falleth not under the present question which is only of body subordinate no member therefore is obliged to pay the debt so borrowed but the representative himself because he that lended it being a stranger to the letters and to the qualification of the body understandeth those only for his debtors that are engaged and seeing the representer can engage himself and none else as him only debtor who must therefore pay him out of the common stock if there be any or if there be none out of his own estate if he come into debt by contract or mohked the case is the same but when the representative is an assembly and the debt to a stranger all day and only they are responsible for the debt that gave their votes to the borrowing of it or to the contract that made it do or to the fact for which the mohked was imposed because every one of those in voting did engage himself for the payment for he that is author of the borrowing is obliged to the payment even of the whole debt though when paid by anyone he be discharged but if the debt be to one of the assembly the assembly only is obliged to the payment out of their common stock if they have any for having liberty of vote if he vote the money shall be borrowed he votes it shall be paid if he vote it shall not be borrowed or be absent yet because in lending he voted the borrowing he contradicted his former vote and is obliged by the latter and becomes both borrower and lender and consequently cannot demand payment from any particular man but from the common treasury only which failing he hath no remedy nor complaint but against himself that being privy to the acts of the assembly and to their means to pay and not being enforced did nevertheless through his own folly lend his money it is manifest by this that in body's politics subordinate and subject to a sovereign power it is sometimes not only lawful but expedient for a particular man to make open protestation against the decrees of the representative assembly and cause their dissent to be registered or to take witness of it because otherwise they may be obliged to pay debts contracted and be responsible for crimes committed by other men but in a sovereign assembly that liberty is taken away both because he that protestive there denies their sovereignty and also because whatsoever is commanded by the sovereign power is as to the subject though not always in the sight of God justified by the command for of such command every subject is the author the variety of body's politic is almost infinite for they are not only distinguished by the several affairs for which they are constituted wherein there is an unspeakable diversity but also by the times places and numbers subject to many limitations and as to their affairs some are ordained for government as first the government of a province may be committed to an assembly of men wherein all resolutions shall depend on the votes of the major part and then this assembly is a body politic and their power limited by commission this word province signifies a charge or care of business which he whose business it is committed to another man to be administered for and under him and therefore when in one commonwealth there be diverse countries that have their laws distinct from one another or are far distant in place the administration of the government being committed to diverse persons those countries where the sovereign is not resident but governs by commission are called provinces but of the government of a province by an assembly residing in the province itself there be few examples the romans who had the sovereignty of many provinces yet govern them always by presidents and preters and not by assemblies as they govern the city of Rome and territories adjacent in like manner when there were colonies sent from England to plant Virginia and summer islands though the government of them here were committed to assemblies in London yet did those assemblies never commit the government under them to any assembly there but did to each plantation send one governor for though every man where he can be present by nature desires to participate of government yet where they cannot be present they are by nature also inclined to commit the government of their common interest rather to a monarchical than a popular form of government which is also evident in those men that have a great private estates who when they are unwilling to take the pains of administering the business that belongs to them choose rather to trust one servant than an assembly either of their friends or servants but how so ever it be in fact yet we may suppose the government of a province or colony committed to an assembly and when it is that which in this place I have to say is this that whatsoever debt is by that assembly contracted or whatsoever unlawful act is decreed is the act only of those that us hinted and not of any that dissented or were absent for the reasons before alleged also that an assembly residing out of the bounds of that colony whereof they have the government cannot execute any power over the persons or goods of any of the colony to seize on them for debt or other duty in any place without the colony itself as having no jurisdiction or authority elsewhere but are left to the remedy which the law of the place allow with them and though the assembly have right to impose moat upon any of their members that shall break the laws they make yet out of the colony itself they have no right to execute the same and that which is said here of the rights of an assembly for the government of a province or a colony is applicable also to an assembly for the government of a town a university or a college or a church or for any government over the persons have been and generally in all bodies politic if any particular member can see himself injured by the body itself the cognizance of his cause belong to the sovereign and those the sovereign hath ordained for judges in such causes or shall ordain for that particular cause and not to the body itself for the whole body is in this case his fellow subject which in a sovereign assembly is otherwise for there if the sovereign be not judge though in his own cause there can be no judge at all in a body politic for the well ordering of foreign traffic the most commodious representative is an assembly of all the members that is to say such one as everyone that adventure at his money may be present at all the deliberations and resolutions of the body if they will themselves for proof whereof we're to consider the end for which men that are merchants and may buy and sell export and import their merchandise according to their own discretions do nevertheless to bind themselves up in one corporation it is true there be few merchants that with the merchandise they buy at home can free to ship to export it or with that they buy abroad to bring it home and have therefore need to join together in one society where every man may either participate at the gain according to the proportion of his adventure or take his own and sell what he transports or imports at such prices as he thinks fit but this is no body politic there being no common representative to oblige them to any other law than that which is common to all other subjects the end of their incorporating is to make their gain the greater which is done two ways by soul buying and soul selling both at home and abroad so that to grant to a company of merchants to be a corporation or body politic is to grant them a double monopoly whereof one is to be sole buyers another to be sole sellers for when there is a company incorporate for any particular foreign country they only export the commodities vindible in that country which is soul buying at home and soul selling abroad for at home there is but one buyer and abroad but one that selleth both which is gainful to the merchant because thereby they buy at home at lower and sell abroad at higher rates and abroad there is but one buyer of foreign merchandise and but one that sells them at home both which again are gainful to the adventurers of this double monopoly one part is disadvantageous to the people at home the other two foreigners for at home by their sole exportation they set what price they please on the husbandry and handiworks of the people and by the sole importation what price they please on all foreign commodities the people have need of both which are ill for the people on the contrary by the sole selling of the native commodities abroad and sole buying the foreign commodities upon the place they raise the price of those and abate the price of these to the disadvantage of the foreigner for where but one selleth the merchandise is the dearer and where but one buyeth the cheaper such corporations therefore are no other than monopolies though they would be very profitable for commonwealth if being bound up into one body and foreign markets they were at liberty at home every man to buy and sell at what price he could the end then of these bodies of merchants being not a common benefit to the whole body which have in this case no common stock but what is deducted out of the particular adventures for building buying viddling and manning of ships but the particular gain of every adventurer it is reason that everyone be acquainted with the employment of his own that is that everyone be at the assembly that shall have the power to order the same and be acquainted with their accounts and therefore the representative of such a body must be an assembly where every member of the body may be present at the consultations if you will if a body politic of merchants contracted debt to a stranger by the act of their representative assembly every member is liable by himself or the whole for a stranger can take no notice of their private laws but considerate them as so many particular men obliged everyone to the whole payment till payment made by one discharged with all the rest but if the debt beats on one of the company the creditor is debtor for the whole to himself and cannot therefore demand his debt but only from the common stock if there be any if the commonwealth impose attacks upon the body it is understood to be laid upon every member proportionally to his particular adventure in the company for there is in this case no other common stock but what is made of their particular adventures if a monk to be laid upon the body for some unlawful act they are only liable by whose votes the act was decreed or by whose assistance it was executed for in none of the rest is there any other crime but being of the body which if a crime because the body was ordained by the authority of the commonwealth is not his if one of the members be indebted to the body he may be sued by the body but his goods cannot be taken nor his person imprisoned by the authority of the body but only by authority of the commonwealth for they can do it by their own authority they can by their own authority give judgment that the debt is due which is as much as to be judged in their own cause these bodies made for the government of men or of traffic be either perpetual or for a time prescribed by writing but there be bodies also whose times are limited and that only by the nature of their business for example if a sovereign monarch or a sovereign assembly shall think fit to give command to the towns and other several parts of their territory to send to him their deputies to inform him of the condition and necessities of the subjects or to advise with him for the making of good laws or for any other cause as with one person representing the whole country such deputies having a place and time of meeting assigned them are there and at that time a body politic representing every subject of that dominion but it is only for such matters as shall be propounded unto them by that man or assembly that by the sovereign authorities sent for them and when it shall be declared that nothing more shall be propounded nor debated by them the body is dissolved for if they were the absolute representative of the people then were it the sovereign assembly and so there would be two sovereign assemblies or two sovereigns over the same people which cannot consist with their peace and therefore where there is once a sovereignty there can be no absolute representation of the people but by it and for the limits of how far such a body shall represent the whole people they are set forth in the writing by which they were sent for for the people cannot choose their deputies to other intent then is in the writing directed to them from their sovereign expressed private bodies regular and lawful are those that are constituted without letters or other written authority saving the laws common to all other subjects and because they be united in one person representative they are held for regular such as are all families in which the father or master order at the whole family for he obligeth his children and servants as far as the law permitted though not further because none of them are bound to obedience in those actions which the law hath forbidden to be done in all other actions during the time they are under domestic government they are subject to their fathers and masters as to their immediate sovereigns for the father and master being before the institution of commonwealth absolute sovereigns and their own families they lose afterward no more their authority than the law of the commonwealth takeeth from them private bodies regular but unlawful are those that unite themselves into one person representative without any public authority at all such as are the corporations of beggars thieves and gypsies the better to order their trade of begging and stealing and the corporations of men that by authority from any foreign person themselves and another's dominion for the easier propagation of doctrines and for making a party against the power of the commonwealth irregular systems in their nature but leagues or sometimes mere concourse of people without union to any particular design not by obligation of one to another but proceeding only from its multitude of wills and inclinations become lawful or unlawful according to the lawfulness or unlawfulness of every man's particular design therein and his design is to be understood by the occasion the leagues of subjects because leagues are commonly made for mutual defense are in a commonwealth which is no more than a league of all the subjects together for the most part unnecessary and savor of unlawful design and are for that cause unlawful and commonly go by the name of factions or conspiracies for a league being a connection of men by covenants if there be no power given to any one man or assembly as in the condition of mere nature to compel them to performance is so long only valid as there arises no just cause of distrust and therefore leagues between commonwealths over whom there is no human power established to keep them all in awe are not only lawful but also profitable for the time they last but leagues of the subjects of one in the same commonwealth where everyone may obtain his right by means of the sovereign power are unnecessary to the maintaining of peace and justice and in case the design of them be evil or unknown to the commonwealth unlawful for all uniting of strength by private men is if for evil intent unjust if for intent unknown dangerous to the public and unjustly concealed if the sovereign power be in a great assembly and a number of men part of the assembly without authority consult a part to contrive the guidance of the rest this is a faction or conspiracy unlawful as being a fraudulent seducing of the assembly for their particular interest but if he whose private interest is to be debated and judged in the assembly make as many friends as he can in him it is no injustice because in this case he is no part of the assembly and though he hire such friends of money unless there be an express law against it yet it is not injustice for sometimes as men's manners are justice cannot be had without money and every man may think his own cause just till it be heard and judged in all commonwealths if a private man entertain more servants than the government of his estate and lawful employment he has for them requires it is faction and unlawful for having the protection of the commonwealth he needed not the defense of private force and whereas in nations not thoroughly civilized several numerous families have lived in continual hostility and invaded one another with private force yet it is evident enough that they have done unjustly or else that they had no commonwealth and as factions for kindred so also factions for government of religion as of papis protestants etc or of state as patricians and plebeians of old time in rome and of aristocraticals and democraticals of old time in greece are unjust as being contrary to the peace and safety of the people and a taking of the sword out of the hand of the sovereign concourse of people is in a regular system the lawfulness or unlawfulness whereof dependent on the occasion and on the number of them that are assembled if the occasion be lawful and manifest the concourse is lawful as the usual meeting of men at church or the public show in usual numbers for if the numbers be extraordinarily great the occasion is not evident and consequently he that cannot render a particular and good account of his being amongst them is to be judged conscious of an unlawful and tumultuous design it may be lawful for a thousand men to join in a petition to be delivered to a judge or magistrate yet if a thousand men come to present it it is a tumultuous assembly because there needs but one or two for that purpose but in such cases as these it is not a set number that makes the assembly unlawful but such a number as the present officers are not able to suppress and bring to justice when an unusual number of men assembled against a man whom they accuse the assembly is an unlawful tumult because they may deliver their accusation to the magistrate by a few or by one man such was the case of st. Paul of Ephesus where Demetrius and a great number of other men brought two of Paul's companions before the magistrate saying with one voice quote great is Diana of the Ephesians unquote which was their way of demanding justice against them for teaching the people such doctrine as was against their religion and trade the occasion here considering the laws of that people was just yet was their assembly judged unlawful and the magistrate represented them for it in these words quote if Demetrius and the other workmen can accuse any man of anything there be pleas and deputies let them accuse one another and if you have any other thing to demand your case may be judged in an assembly lawfully called for we are in danger to be accused for this day's addition because there is no cause by which any man can render any reason of this concourse of people unquote acts 1940 where he called it an assembly where of men can give no just account a sedition and such as they could not answer for and this is all I shall say concerning systems and assemblies of people which may be compared as I said to the similar parts of man's body such as be lawful to the muscles such as are unlawful to wins bios and epistems engendered by the unnatural conflicts of evil humors end of chapter 22 chapter 23 of Leviathan this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Erewith Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes chapter 23 of the public ministers of sovereign power in the last chapter I have spoken of the similar parts of a commonwealth in this I shall speak of the parts organical which are public ministers a public minister is he that by the sovereign whether a monarch or an assembly is employed in any affairs with authority to represent in that employment the person of the commonwealth and whereas every man or assembly that has sovereignty represented two persons or as the more common phrase is has two capacities one natural and another politic as a monarch half the person not only of the commonwealth but also of a man and the sovereign assembly half the person not only of the commonwealth but also of the assembly that they be servants to them in their natural capacity are not public ministers but those only that serve them in the administration of the public business and therefore neither usherers nor sergeants nor other officers that wait on the assembly for no other purpose but for the commodity of the men assembled in an aristocracy or democracy nor stewards chamberlains coffers or any other officers of the household of a monarch are public ministers in a monarchy of public ministers some have charge committed to them of a general administration either of the whole dominion or of a part thereof of the whole as to a protector or regent may be committed by the predecessor of an infant king during his minority the whole administration of his kingdom in which case every subject is so far obliged to obedience at the ordinances he shall make and the commands he shall give be in the king's name and not inconsistent with his sovereign power of a part or province as when either a monarch or sovereign assembly shall give the general charge thereof to a governor lieutenant prefect or viceroy and in this case also every one of that province is obliged to all he shall do in the name of the sovereign and not incompatible with the sovereign's right for such protectors viceroy's and governors have no other right but what depends on the sovereign's will and no commission that can be given them can be interpreted for a declaration of the will to transfer the sovereignty without express in perspicuous words to that purpose and this kind of public ministers resemble if the nerves and tendons that move the several limbs of a body natural others have special administration that is to say charges of some special business either at home or abroad as at home first for the economy of a commonwealth that they have authority concerning the treasury as tributes imposition's rents fines or whatsoever public revenue to collect receive issue or take the accounts thereof our public ministers ministers because they serve the person representative and can do nothing against his command nor without his authority public because they serve him in its political capacity secondly they that have authority concerning the militia to have the custody of arms forts ports to levy pay or conduct soldiers or to provide for any necessary thing for the use of war either by land or sea our public ministers but a soldier without command though he fight for the commonwealth does not therefore represent the person of it because there is none to represent it to for everyone that half command represents it to them only whom he commanded they also that have the authority to teach or to enable others to teach the people their duty to the sovereign power and instruct them in the knowledge of what is just and unjust thereby to render them more apt to live in godliness and in peace amongst themselves and resist the public enemy or public ministers ministers and that they do it not by their own authority but by others and public because they do it or should do it by no authority but that is a sovereign the monarch of the sovereign assembly only half immediate authority from god to teach and instruct the people and no man but the sovereign received his power dea gratia simply that is to say from the favor of none but god all other received theirs from the favor and providence of god and their sovereigns as an a monarchy dea gratia at reaches or dea providentia at volentate reaches they also to whom jurisdiction is given or public ministers for in their seats of justice they represent the person of the sovereign and the sentence is his sentence for as half being before declared all judicature is essentially annexed to the sovereignty and therefore all other judges are but ministers of him or them that have the sovereign power and his controversies are of two sorts namely a fact and of law so are judgments some of fact some of law and consequently in the same controversy there may be two judges one a fact another of law and in both these controversies there may arise a controversy between the party judge and the judge which because they both be servants to the sovereign ought an equity to be judged by men agreed on by consent of both for no man can be judged in his own case but the sovereign is already agreed on for judged by them both and is therefore either to hear the cause and determine it himself or a point for judge such as they shall both agree on and this agreement is then understood to be made between them diverse ways as first if the defendant be allowed to accept against such of his judges whose interests make of him suspect them for as to the complainant he have already chosen his own judge those which he accept if not against are judges he himself agrees on secondly if he appeal to any other judge he can appeal no further for his appeal is his choice thirdly if he appealed to the sovereign himself and he by himself or by delicates which the party shall agree on give sentence that sentence is final for the defendant is judged by his own judges that is to say by himself these properties of just and rational judicature considered i cannot for bear to observe the excellent constitution of the courts of justice established both for common and also for public pleas in england by common pleas i mean those were both the complaintant and defendant are subjects and by public which are also called pleas of the crown those were the complaint into the sovereign for whereas there were two orders of men where one was lords the other commons the lords had this privilege to have for judges in all capital crimes none but lords as many as would be present which being ever acknowledged as a privilege of favor their judges were none but such as they had themselves desired and in all controversies every subject as also in civil controversy the lords had for judges men of the country with a matter in controversy lay against which he might make his exceptions till at last 12 men without exception being agreed on they were judged by those 12 so that having his own judges there could be nothing alleged by the party why the sentence should not be final these public persons with authority from the sovereign power either to instruct or judge the people as such members of the commonwealth as may fitly be compared to the organs of voice in a body natural public ministers are also those that have authority from the sovereign to procure the execution of judgments given to publish the sovereign's commands to suppress the mulps to apprehend and imprison malpractors and other acts tending to the conservation of the peace for every act they do by such authority is the act of the commonwealth and their service answerable to that at the hands in a body natural public ministers abroad are those that represent the person of their own sovereign to foreign states such are ambassadors messengers agents and heralds sent by public authority and on public business but such are sent by authority only of some private party of a troubled state though they be received are neither public nor private ministers of the commonwealth because none of their actions have the commonwealth for author likewise an ambassador sent from a prince to congratulate condole or to assist in the solemnity though the authority be public yet because the business is private and belonging to him in his natural capacity is a private person also if a man be sent into another country secretly to explore their councils and strength though both the authority and the business be public yet because there is none to take notice of any person in him but his own he is but a private minister but yet a minister of the commonwealth and maybe compared to an eye in the body natural and those that are appointed to receive the petitions or other information to the people and are as it were the public ear a public ministers and represent their sovereign in that office neither a counselor nor a council of state if we consider with no authority to jicature or command but only of giving advice to the sovereign when it is required or of offering it when it is not required is a public person for the advice is addressed to the sovereign only whose person cannot in his own presence be represented to him by another but a body of counselors are never without some other authority either of jicature or of immediate administration as in a monarchy they represent the monarch in delivering his commands to the public ministers in a democracy the council or senate propounds the result of their deliberations to the people as a council but when they appoint judges or hear causes or give audience to the ambassadors it is the quality of a minister of the people and in an aristocracy the council of state is a sovereign assembly itself and gives counsel to none but themselves end of chapter 23 chapter 24 of leviathan this is a lipovox recording all lipovox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit lipovox.org recording by anasimum leviathan by thomas hops chapter 24 of the nutrition and procreation of a commonwealth the nutrition of a commonwealth consisted in the plenty and distribution of materials conducing to life in concoction or preparation and when concocted in the conveyance of it by convenient conduits to the public use as for the plenty of metal it is a thing limited by nature to those commodities which from the two breasts of our common mother land and sea god usually either freely give it or for labor sell it to the mind kind for the matter of this nutriment consisting in animals vegetables and minerals god had freely laid them before us in or near to the face of the earth so as they're needed no more but the labor and industry of receiving them in so much as plenty depended next to god's favor merely on the labor and industry of man this matter commonly called commodities is partly native and partly foreign native that which is to be had within the territory of the commonwealth foreign that which is imported from without and because there is no territory under the dominion of one commonwealth except it be a very vast extent that produces all things needful for the maintenance and motion of the whole body and few that produce not something more than necessary the superfluous commodities to be had within become no more superfluous but supply these ones at home by importation of that which may be had abroad either by exchange or by just war or by labor for a man's labor also is a commodity exchangeable for benefit as well as any other thing and there have been commonwealths that having no more territory than had to serve them for habitation have nevertheless not only maintained but also increased their power partly by the labor of trading from one place to another and partly by selling the manufacturers where of the materials were brought in from other places the distribution of the materials of this nourishment is the constitution of mine and thine and his that is to say in one word propriety and belong in all kinds of commonwealth through sovereign power for where there is no commonwealth there is as have been already shown a perpetual war of every man against his neighbor and therefore everything is his that get at it and keep at it by force which is neither propriety nor community but uncertainty which is so evident that even Cicero a passionate defender of liberty in a public pleading attributed all propriety to the law civil let the civil law set he be once abandoned or but negligently guarded not to say oppressed and there is nothing that any man can be sure to receive from his ancestor or leave to his children and again take away the civil law and no man knows what is his own and what another man's seeing therefore the introduction of propriety is an effect of commonwealth which can do nothing but by the person that represents it it is the act only of the sovereign and consistent in the laws which none can make that have not the sovereign power and this they well knew of old who called that nomos that is to say distribution which we call law and defined justice by distributing to every man his own in this distribution the first law is for division of the land itself wherein the sovereign assigned it to every man a portion according as he and not according as any subject or any number of them shall judge agreeable to equity and the common good the children of israel were a commonwealth in the wilderness but wanted the commodities of the earth till they were masters of the land of promise which afterward was divided amongst them not by their own discretion but by the discretion of eliezer the priest and joshia their general who when there were 12 tribes making them 13 by subdivision of the tribe of joseph made nevertheless but 12 portions of the land and ordained for the tribe of levi no land but assigned them the 10th part of the whole fruits which division was therefore arbitrary and there were people coming into possession of a land by war to not always exterminate the ancient inhabitants as did the jews but leave too many or most or all of them their estates yet it is manifest they hold them afterwards as of the victor's distribution as the people of england held all theirs of william the conqueror from whence we may collect that the propriety which a subject had in his lands consisted in a right to exclude all other subjects from the use of them and not exclude their sovereign be it an assembly or a monarch for seeing the sovereign that is to say the commonwealth whose person he represented is understood to do nothing but in order to the common peace and security this distribution of lands is to be understood as done in order to the same and consequently whatsoever distribution he shall make and prejudice thereof is contrary to the will of every subject that committed his peace and safety to his discretion and conscience and therefore by the will of every one of them is to be reputed void it is true that a sovereign monarch or the greater part of a sovereign assembly may ordain the doing of many things in pursuit of their passions contrary to their own consciences which is a breach of trust and of the law of nature but this is not enough to authorize any subject either to make war upon or so much as to accuse of injustice or any way to speak evil of their sovereign because they have authorized all his actions and in bestowing the sovereign power made them their own but in what cases the commands of sovereigns are contrary to equity and the law of nature is to be considered hereafter in another place in the distribution of land the commonwealth itself may be conceived to have a portion and possess and improve the same by their representative and that such portion may be made sufficient to sustain the whole expense to the common peace and defense necessarily required which were very true if there could be any representative conceived free from human passions and infirmities but the nature of man being as it is the setting forth of public land or of any certain revenue for the commonwealth is in vain and tended to the dissolution of government to the condition of mere nature and war as soon as ever the sovereign power followed into the hands of a monarch or of an assembly that are either too negligent of money or too hazardous in engaging the public stock into long or costly war commonwealth can endure no diet for seeing their expense is not limited by their own appetite but by external accidents and the appetites of their neighbors the public riches cannot be limited by other limits than those which the emergent occasions shall require and whereas in england there were by the conqueror diverse lands reserved to his own use besides forests and chases either for his recreation or for preservation of woods and diverse services reserved on the land he gave his subjects yet it seems they were not reserved for his maintenance in his public but in his natural capacity for he and his successors did for all that lay arbitrary taxes on all subjects land when they judge it necessary or if those public lands and services were ordained as a sufficient maintenance of the commonwealth it was contrary to the scope of the institution being as it appeared by those in shewing taxes insufficient and as it appears by the late small revenue of the crown subject to alienation and diminution it is therefore in vain to assign a portion to the commonwealth which may sell or give it away and thus sell and give it away when it is done by their representative as a distribution of lands at home so also to assign in what places and for what commodities the subject shall traffic abroad belong to the sovereign for if it did belong to private persons to use their own discretion therein some of them would be drawn for gain both to furnish the enemy what means to hurt the commonwealth and hurt themselves by importing such things as pleasing men's appetites be nevertheless noxious or at least unprofitable to them and therefore it belonged to the commonwealth that is to the sovereign only to approve or disapprove both of the places and matter of foreign traffic further seeing it is not enough to the sustentation of a commonwealth that every man have a propriety in a portion of land or in some few commodities or a natural property in some useful art and there is no art in the world but it's necessary either for the being or well-being almost of every particular man it is necessary that man distribute that which they can spare and transfer their propriety therein mutually one to another by exchange and mutual contract and therefore it belonged to the commonwealth that is to say to the sovereign to appoint in what manner all kinds of contract between subjects as buying selling exchanging borrowing lending letting and taking to hire are to be made and by what words and words and sign they shall be understood for valid and for the matter and distribution of the nourishment to the several members of the commonwealth thus much considering the model of the whole world is sufficient by concoction i understand the reducing of all commodities which are not presently consumed but reserved from nourishment in time to come to something of equal value and with all so portable as not to hinder the motion of men from place to place to the end a man may have in what place so ever such nourishment as the place afforded and this is nothing else but gold and silver and money for gold and silver being as it happens almost in all countries of the world highly valued is a commodious measure of the value of all things else between nations and money of what matters so ever coined by the sovereign of a commonwealth is a sufficient measure of the value of all things else between the subject of that commonwealth by the means of which measures all commodities movable and in movable are made to accompany a man to all places of his resort within and without the place of his ordinary residence and the same passeth from man to man within the commonwealth and goes round about nourishing as it passes every partner of in so much as this concoction is as it were the sanctification of the commonwealth for natural blood is in like manner made of the fruits of the earth and circulating nourish it by the way every member of the body of man and because silver and gold have their value for the matter itself they have first this privilege that the value of them cannot be altered by the power of one nor of a few commonwealths as being a common measure of the commodities of all places but base money may easily be enhanced or based secondly they have the privilege to make commonwealths move and stretch out their arms when need is into foreign countries and supply not only private subjects that travel but also whole armies with provision but that coin which not considerable for the matter but for the stamp of the place being unable to endure a change of air has its effect at home only where also it is subject to the change of laws and thereby to have the value diminished to the prejudice many times of those that have it the conduits and ways by which it is conveyed to the public use are of two sorts one that conveyed it to the public coffers the other that issued the same out again for public payments of the first sort are collectors receivers and treasurers of the second are the treasurers again and the offices appointed for payment of several public or private ministers and in this also the artificial man maintains his resemblance with the natural whose veins receiving the blood from the several parts of the body carry it to the heart where being made vital the heart by the arteries sends it out again to enliven and enable promotion all the members of the same the procreation or children of a commonwealth are those we call plantations or colonies which are numbers of men sent out from the commonwealth under a conductor or governor to inhabit a foreign country either formally void of inhabitants or made void then by war and when a colony is settled they are either a commonwealth of themselves discharge of their subjection to their sovereign that sent them as had been done by many commonwealths of ancient time in which case the commonwealth from which they went was called their metropolis or mother and requires no more of them than fathers require of the children whom they emancipate and make free from the domestic government which is honor and friendship or else they remain united to their metropolis as where the colonies of the people of Rome and then there are no commonwealths themselves but provinces and parts of the commonwealth that send them so that the right of colonies saving honor and league with their metropolis depended wholly on their license or lettuce by which their sovereign authorized them to plant end of chapter 24 chapter 25 of Leviathan this is a liverfox recording all liverfox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit liverfox.org recording by Anno Simon Leviathan by Thomas Hobbs chapter 25 of council how fallacious it is to judge of the nature of things by the ordinary and inconstant use of words appeared in nothing more than in the confusion of councils and commands arising from the imperative manner of speaking in the both and in many other occasions besides for the words do this are the words not only of him that commanded but also of him that give it counsel and of him that exhorted and yet there are but few that see not that these are very different things or that cannot distinguish between them when they perceive who it is that speak it and to whom the speech is directed and upon what occasion but finding those phrases in men's writings and being not able or not willing to enter into consideration of the circumstances they mistake sometimes the precepts of counselors for the precepts of them that command and sometimes the contrary according as it best agree with the conclusions they would infer or the actions they approve to avoid which mistakes and rendered to those terms of commanding counseling and exhorting their proper and distinct significations i define them thus command is where a man said do this or do not this without expecting other reason than the will of him that says it from this it followed manifestly that he that commanded pretended thereby his own benefit for the reason of his command is his own will only and the proper object of every man's will is some good to himself counsel is where a man said do or do not this and deduce of his reasons from the benefit that arrived by it to him to whom he said it and from this it is evident that he that give it counsel pretend that only whatsoever he intended the good of him to whom he give it it therefore between counsel and command one great difference is that command is directed to a man's own benefit and counsel to the benefit of another man and from this arise it another difference that a man may be obliged to do what he's commanded as when he had covenant to obey but he cannot be obliged to do as he is counseled because the hurt of not following it is his own or if he should covenant to follow it then is the counsel turned into the nature of a command a third difference between them is that no man can pretend a right to be of another man's counsel because he is not pretend benefit by it to himself but to demand right to counsel another argues a will to know his designs or to gain some other good to himself which as I said before is of every man's will the proper object this also is incident to the nature of counsel that whatsoever it be he that asketh it cannot inequity accuse or punish it for to ask counsel of another is to permit him to give such counsel as he shall think best and consequently he that give it counsel to his sovereign whether a monarch or an assembly when he asketh it cannot inequity be punished for it whether the same be conformable to the opinion of the most or not so it be to the proposition in debate for if the sense of the assembly can be taken notice of before the debate be ended they should neither ask nor take any further counsel for sense of the assembly is a resolution of the debate and end of all deliberation and generally he that demandeth counsel is author of it and therefore cannot punish it and what the sovereign cannot no man else can but if one subject give it counsel to another to do anything contrary to the laws whether that counsel proceed from evil intention or from ignorance only it is punishable by the commonwealth because ignorance of the law is no good excuse where every man is bound to take notice of the laws to which he is subject exhortation and de-hortation is counsel accompanied with signs in him that give it of vehement desire to have it followed or to say it more briefly counsel vehemently pressed for he that exhorteth doth not deduce the consequences of what he advised it to be done and tie himself therein to the rigor of true reasoning but encourages him he counseleth to action as he that de-horteth deterreth him from it and therefore they have in their speeches a regard to the common passions and opinions of man in deducing their reasons and make use of similitudes metaphors examples and other tools of oratory to persuade their hearers of the utility honor or justice of following their advice from whence may be inferred first that exhortation and de-hortations is directed to the good of him that give it the counsel not of him that asketh it which is contrary to the duty of a counselor who by the definition of counsel ought to regard not as own benefit but his whom he advices and that he directed his counsel to his own benefit is manifest enough by the long environment urging or by the artificial giving thereof which being not required of him and consequently proceeding from his own occasions is directed principally to his own benefit and but accidentally to the good of him that is counseled or not at all secondly that the use of exhortation and de-hortation lieeth only where a man is to speak to a multitude because when the speech is addressed to one he may interrupt him and examine his reasons more rigorously than can be done in a multitude which are too many to enter into dispute and dialogue with him that speaketh indifferently to them all at once thirdly that they that exhort and de-hort where they are required to give counsel are corrupt counselors and as it were bribed by their own interest for though the counsel they give be never so good yet he that gives it is no more a good counselor than he that give it but just sentence for a reward is a just judge but where a man may lawfully command as a father in his family or a leader in an army his exhortations and de-hortations are not only lawful but also necessary and laudable but then they are no more counsels but commands which when they are for execution of sour labor sometimes necessity and always humanity required to be sweetened in the delivery by encouragement and in the tune and phrase of counsel rather than in harsher language of command examples of the difference between command and counsel we may take from the forms of speech that express them in holy scripture have no other gods but me make to thyself no grave an image take not god's name in vain sanctify the Sabbath honor thy parents kill not steal not etc our commands because the reason for which we are to obey them is drawn from the will of god our king whom we are obliged to obey but these words sell all our haste give it to the poor and follow me our counsel because the reason for which we are to do so is drawn from our own benefit which is this that we shall have treasure in heaven these words go into the village over against you and you shall find an ass tight and her cult lose her and bring her to me our command for the reason of their fact is drawn from the will of their master but these words repent and be baptized in the name of jesus our counsel because the reason why we should so do tended not to any benefit of god almighty who shall still be king in what manner so ever we rebel but of ourselves who have no other means of avoiding the punishment hanging over us for our sins as the difference of counsel from command has been now deduced from the nature of counsel consisting in a deducing of the benefit or hurt that may arise to him that is to be counseled by the necessary or probable consequences of the action he propounded so may also the differences between apt and inept counselors be derived from the same for experience being but memory of the consequences of like actions formally observed and counsel but the speech whereby that experience is made known to another the virtues and defects of counsel are the same with the virtues and defects intellectual and to the person of a commonwealth his counselors serve him in the place of memory and mental discourse but with this resemblance of the commonwealth to a natural man there is one disillimitued joint of great importance which is that a natural man received his experience from the natural objects of sense which work upon him without passion or interest of their own whereas they that give counsel to the representative person of a commonwealth may have and have often their particular ends and passions that render their councils always suspected and many times unfaithful and therefore we may set down for the first condition of a good counselor that his ends and interest be not inconsistent with the ends and interest of him he counseleth secondly because the office of a counselor when an action comes into deliberation is to make manifest the consequences of it in such manner as he that is counseled may be truly and evidently informed he ought to propound his advice in such form of speech as may make the truth most evidently appear that is to say with as firm ratiosination as significant and proper language and as briefly as the evidence will permit and therefore rash and unevident inferences such as are fetched only from examples or authority of books and are not arguments of what is good or evil but witnesses of fact or of opinion obscure confused and ambiguous expressions also all metaphorical speeches tending to the stirring up of passion because such reasoning and such expressions are useful only to receive or to lead him we counsel towards other ends than his own are repugnant to the office of a counselor thirdly because the ability of counseling proceeded from experience and long study and no man is presumed to have experience in all those things that to the administration of a great commonwealth are necessary to be known no man is presumed to be a good counselor but in such business as he had not only been much versed in but have also much meditated on and considered foreseeing the business of a commonwealth is this to preserve the people in peace at home and defend them against foreign invasion we shall find that requires great knowledge of the disposition of mankind of the rights of government and of the nature of equity law justice and honor not to be attained without study and of the strength commodities places both of their own country and their neighbors as also of the inclinations and designs of all nations that may anyway annoy them and this is not attained to without much experience of which things not only the whole sum but every one of the particulars requires the age and observation of a man in years and of more than ordinary study the width required for counsel as i've said before in chapter eight is judgment and the differences of man in that point come from different education of some to one kind of study or business and of others to another when for the doing of anything there be infallible rules as an engines and edifices the rules of geometry all the experience of the world cannot equal his counsel that has learned or found out the rule and when there is no such rule he that had most experience in that particular kind of business has therein the best judgment and is the best counselor fourthly to be able to give counsel to a commonwealth in a business that had reference to another commonwealth it is necessary to be acquainted with the intelligences and let us that come from thence and with all the records of treaties and other transactions of state between them which none can do but such as the representative shall think fit by which we may see that they who are not called to counsel can have no good counsel in such cases to obtrude fifthly supposing the number of counselors equal a man is better counseled by hearing them apart than in an assembly and that for many causes first in hearing them apart you have the advice of every man but in an assembly many of them deliver their advice with i or no or with their hands or feet not moved by their own sense but by the eloquence of another or for fear of displeasing some that have spoken or the whole by contradiction or for fear of appearing duller in apprehension than those that have applauded the country opinion secondly in an assembly of many that cannot choose but be some interests are contrary to that of the public and these their interests make passionate and passion eloquent and eloquence draws others into the same advice for the passions of man which asunder are moderate as the heat of one brand in assembly are like many brands that inflame one another especially when they blow one another with orations to the setting of the commonwealth on fire and they pretend of counseling it thirdly in hearing every man apart one may examine when there is need the truth or probability of his reasons and of the grounds of the advice he gives by frequent interruptions and objections which cannot be done in an assembly wherein every difficult question a man is rather astonished and dazzled with a variety of discourse upon it than informed of the course he ought to take besides there cannot be an assembly of many called together for advice wherein there be not some that have the ambition to be thought eloquent and also learned in the politics and give not their advice with care of the business propounded but of the applause of their motley orations made of the diverse colored threats or shreds of threat or shreds of others which is an impertinence at least that takes away the time of serious consultation and in the secret way of counseling apart is easily avoided fourthly in the liberations that ought to be kept secret where of there be many occasions in public business the councils of many and especially in assemblies are dangerous and therefore great assemblies are necessitated to commit such affairs to lesser numbers and of such persons as are most versed and in whose fidelity they have most confidence to conclude who is there that so far approves the taking of counsel from a great assembly of counselors that wish it fall or would accept of their paints when there is a question of marrying his children disposing of atlants governing his household or managing his private estate especially if there be amongst them such as wish not his prosperity a man that does his business by the help of many prudent counselors with everyone consulting a part in his proper element does it best as he that use it able seconds at tennis play plays in their proper stations he does next best that use it his own judgment only as he that has no second at all but he that is carried up and down to his business in a framed council which cannot move but by the plurality of consenting opinions the execution whereof is commonly out of envy or interest retarded by the part dissenting does it worst of all and like one that is carried to the ball though by good players yet in a wheelbarrow or other frame heavy of itself and retarded also by the incongruent judgments and endeavors of them that drive it and so much the more as they be more that set their hands to it and most of all when there's one or more amongst them that desire to have him lose and though it be true that many eyes see more than one yet it is not to be understood of many counselors but then only when the final resolution is in one man otherwise because many eyes see the same thing in diverse lines and are apt to look a squint towards their private benefit they that desire not to miss their mark though they look about with two eyes yet they never aim but with one and that therefore no great popular Commonwealth was ever kept up but either by a foreign enemy that united them or by the reputation of some one eminent man amongst them or by the secret council of a few or by the mutual fear of equal factions and not by the open consultations of the assembly and as for very little Commonwealth be they popular or monarchical there is no human wisdom can uphold them longer than the jealousy losses of their potent neighbors and of chapter 25 I understand the laws that men are therefore bound to observe because they are members not of this or that Commonwealth in particular but of a Commonwealth for the knowledge of particular laws belong to them that profess the study of the laws of their several countries but the knowledge of civil law in general to any man the ancient law of Rome was called their civil law from the word civitas which signifies a Commonwealth and those country switch having been under the Roman Empire and governed by that law retained still such part thereof as they think fit call that part the civil law to distinguish it from the rest of their own civil laws but that is not it I intend to speak of here my design being not to show what is law here and there but what is law as Plato Aristotle Cicero and diverse others have done without taking upon them the profession of the study of the law and first it is manifest that law in general is not counsel but command nor command of any man to any man but only of him whose command is addressed to one formerly obliged to obey him and as for civil law it added only the name of the person commanding which is persona civitatus the person of the Commonwealth which considered I define civil law in this manner civil law is to every subject those rules which the Commonwealth half commanded him by word writing or other significant sign of the will to make use of for the distinction of right and wrong that is to say of that is contrary and what is not contrary to the rule in which definition there is nothing that is not at first sight evident for every man see it that some laws are addressed to all subjects in general some to particular provinces some to particular vocations and some to particular men and are therefore laws to every of those whom the command is directed and to none else also that laws are the rules of just and unjust nothing being reputed unjust that is not contrary to some law likewise that none can make laws but the Commonwealth because our subjection is to the Commonwealth only and that commands are to be signified by sufficient signs because a man knows not otherwise how to obey them and therefore whatsoever can from this definition be necessary consequence be deducted ought to be acknowledged for truth now I deduce from it this that followeth one the legislature in all commonwealths is only the sovereign be he one man as in a monarchy or one assembly of men as in a democracy or aristocracy for the legislature is he that make it the law and the Commonwealth only prescribes and commanded the observation of those rules which we call law therefore the Commonwealth is a legislature but the Commonwealth is no person nor has capacity to do anything but by the representative that is the sovereign and therefore the sovereign is the sole legislature for the same reason none can abrogate a law made but the sovereign because a law is not abrogated but by another law that forbid it to be put in execution the sovereign of a Commonwealth be it an assembly or one man is not subject to the civil laws for having power to make and repeal laws he may when he pleaseth free himself from that subjection by repealing those laws that trouble him and making of new and consequently he was free before for he is free that can be free when he will nor is it possible for any person to be bound to himself because he that can bind can release and therefore he that is bound to himself only is not bound when long use obtained at the authority of a law it is not the length of time that make it the authority but the will of the sovereign signified by his silence for silence is sometimes an argument of consent and it is no longer law than the sovereign shall be silent therein and therefore if the sovereign shall have a question of right grounded not upon his present will but upon the laws formerly made the length of time shall bring no prejudice to his right but the question shall be judged by equity for many unjust actions and unjust sentences go uncontrolled a longer time than any man can remember and our lawyers account no customs law but such as reasonable and that evil customs are to be abolished but judgment of what is reasonable and if what is to be abolished belongeth to him that make it the law which is the sovereign assembly or monarch for the law of nature and the civil law contain each other and are of equal extent for the laws of nature which consist in equity justice gratitude and other moral virtues on these depending in the condition of mere nature as I have said before in the end of the fifteenth chapter are not proper laws but qualities that dispose men to peace and to obedience when a commonwealth is once settled then are they actually laws and not before as being then the commands of the commonwealth and therefore also civil laws for it is the sovereign power that obliges men to obey them for the differences of private men to declare what is equity what is justice and is moral virtue and to make them binding there is need of the ordinances of sovereign power and punishments to be ordained for such as shall break them which ordinances are therefore part of the civil law the law of nature therefore is a part of the civil law in all commonwealths of the world reciprocally also the civil law is a part of the dictates of nature for justice that is to say performance of covenant and giving to every man his own is a dictate of the law of nature but every subject in a commonwealth have covenanted to obey the civil law either one with another as when they assemble to make a common representative or with the representative itself one by one when subdued by the sword they promise obedience that they may receive life and therefore obedience to the civil law is also part of the law of nature civil and natural law are not different kinds but different parts of law where of one part being written is called civil the other unwritten natural but the right of nature that is the natural liberty of man may by the civil law be abridged and restrained may the end of making laws is no other but such restraint without which there cannot possibly be any peace and law was brought into the world for nothing else but to limit the natural liberty of particular men in such manner as they might not hurt but assist one another and join together against a common enemy five if the sovereign of one commonwealth subdu a people that have lived under other written laws and afterwards govern them by the same laws by which they were governed before yet those laws are the civil laws of the victor and not of the vanquished commonwealth for the legislator is he not by whose authority the laws were first made but by whose authority they now continue to be laws and therefore where there be diverse provinces within the dominion of a commonwealth and are in those provinces diversity of laws which commonly are called the customs of each several province we are not to understand that such customs have their force only from length of time but that they were anciently laws written or otherwise made known for the constitutions and statutes of their sovereigns and are now laws not by virtue of the prescription of time but by the constitutions of their present sovereigns but if an unwritten law in all the provinces of a dominion shall be generally observed and no iniquity appear in the use thereof that law can be no other law but a law of nature equally abiding all mankind six seeing then all laws written and unwritten have their authority enforced from the will of the commonwealth that is to say from the will of the representative which in a monarchy is the monarch and in other commonwealths the sovereign assembly a man may wonder from whence precede such opinions as are found in the books of lawyers of eminence in several commonwealths directly or by consequence making the legislative power depend on private men or subordinate judges as for example that the common law has no controller but the parliament which is true only where a parliament has the sovereign power and cannot be assembled nor dissolved but by their own discretion for if there be a right in any else to dissolve them there is a right also to control them and consequently to control their controlings and if there be no such right then the controller of the laws is not parliamentum but wrecks in parliamento and where a parliament is sovereign if it should assemble never so many or so wise men from the country subject to them for whatsoever cause yet there is no man will believe that such an assembly hath thereby acquired to themselves a legislative power item that the two arms of a commonwealth are force and justice the first whereof is in the king the other deposited in the hands of parliament as if a commonwealth could consist where the force were in any hand which justice had not the authority to command and govern seven that law can never be against reason our lawyers are agreed and that not the letter that is every construction of it but that which is according to the intention of the legislator is the law and it is true but the doubt is of whose reason it is that shall be received for law it is not meant of any private reason for then there would be as much contradiction in the laws as there is in the schools nor yet as Sir Edward Koch makes it an artificial perfection of reason gotten by long study observation and experience as his was for it is possible long study may increase and confirm erroneous sentences and where men build on false grounds the more they build the greater is the ruin and of those that study and observe with equal time and diligence the reasons and resolutions are and must remain discordant and therefore it is not that juris prudencia or wisdom of subordinate judges but the reason of this our artificial man the commonwealth and his command that make it law and the commonwealth being in their representative but one person there cannot easily arise any contradiction in the laws and when they're doth the same reason is able by interpretation or alteration to take it away in all courts of justice the sovereign which is the person of the commonwealth is he that judges the subordinate judge ought to have regard to the reason which moved his sovereign to make such law that his sentence may be according there unto which then is his sovereign sentence otherwise it is his own and an unjust one eight from this that the law is a command and a command consists of in declaration or manifestation of the will of him that commanded by voice writing or some other sufficient argument of the same we may understand that the command of the commonwealth is law only to those that have means to take notice of it over natural fools children or madmen there is no law no more than over brute beasts nor are they capable of the title of just or unjust because they had never power to make any covenant or to understand the consequences thereof and consequently never took upon them to authorize the actions of any sovereign as they must do that make themselves a commonwealth and as those from whom nature or accident hath taken away the notice of all laws in general so also every man from whom any accident not proceeding from his own default hath taken away the means to take notice of any particular law is excused if he observe it not and to speak properly that law is no law to him it is therefore necessary to consider in this place what arguments and signs be sufficient for the knowledge of what is the law that is to say what is the will of the sovereign as well in monarchies as in other forms of government and first if it be a law that obliges all the subjects without exception and is not written nor otherwise published in any such places as they may take notice thereof it is a law of nature for whatever men are to take knowledge of for law not upon other men's words but everyone from his own reason must be such as is agreeable to the reason of all men which no law can be but the law of nature the laws of nature therefore need not any publishing nor proclamation as being contained in this one sentence approved by all the world do not that to another which thou think is unreasonable to be done by another to thyself secondly if it be a law that obliges only some condition of men or one particular man and be not written nor published by word then also it is a law of nature and known by the same arguments and signs that distinguish those in a condition from other subjects for whatsoever law is not written or some way published by him that makes it law can be known no way but by the reason of him that is to obey it and is therefore also a law not only civil but natural for example if the sovereign employee a public minister without written instructions what to do he is obliged to take for instructions the dictates of reason as if he make a judge the judge is to take notice that his sentence ought to be according to the reason of a sovereign which being always understood to be equity he is bound to it by the law of nature or if an ambassador he is in all things not contained in his written instructions to take for instruction that which reason dictates to be most conducing to his sovereign's interest and so of all other ministers of the sovereignty public and private all which instructions of nature reason may be comprehended under one name of fidelity which is a branch of natural justice the law of nature accepted it belonged to the essence of all other laws to be made known to every man that shall be obliged to obey them either by word or writing or some other act known to proceed from the sovereign authority for the will of another cannot be understood by his own word or act or by conjecture taken from his scope and purpose which in the person of the commonwealth is to be supposed always consonant to equity and reason and in ancient times before letters were in common use the laws were many times put in diverse that the rude people taking pleasure in singing or reciting them might the more easily retain them in memory and for the same reason Solomon advised a man to bind the ten commandments upon his ten fingers proverbs seven three and for the law which moses gave to the people of israel at the renewing of the covenant he bid at them to teach it their children by discoursing of it both at home and upon the way at going to bed and at rising from bed and to write it upon the posts and doors of their houses Deuteronomy eleven nineteen and to assemble the people man woman and child to hear it read Deuteronomy thirty one twelve nor is it enough the lobby written and published but also that there be manifest signs that it proceeded from the will of the sovereign for private men when they have or think they have forced enough to secure their unjust designs and convoy them safely to their ambitious ends may publish for laws what they please without or against the legislative authority there is therefore requisite not only a declaration of the law but also sufficient signs of the author and authority the author or legislator is supposed in every commonwealth to be evident because he is the sovereign who having been constituted by the consent of everyone is supposed by everyone to be sufficiently known and though the ignorance and security of men be such for the most part as that when the memory of the first constitution of their commonwealth is worn out they do not consider by whose power they used to be defended against their enemies and to have their industry protected and to be righted when injury has done them yet because no man that considers can make question of it no excuse can be derived from the ignorance of where the sovereignty is placed and it is a dictate of natural reason and consequently an evident law of nature that no man ought to weaken that power the protection whereof he hath himself demanded or willingly received against others therefore of who is sovereign no man but by his own fault whatsoever evil men suggest can make any doubt the difficulty consists of in the evidence of the authority derived from him the removing whereof dependent on the knowledge of the public registers public councils public ministers and public seals by which all laws are sufficiently verified verified i say not authorized for the verification is but the testimony and record not the authority of the law which consists of in the command of the sovereign only if therefore a man have a question of injury depending on the law of nature that is to say on common equity the sentence of the judge that by commission hath authority to take cognizance of such causes is a sufficient verification of the law of nature in that individual case for though the advice of one that professeth the study of the law be useful for the avoiding of contention yet it is but advice it is the judge must tell men what is law upon the hearing of the controversy but when the question is of injury or crime upon a written law every man by recourse to the registers by himself or others may if he will be sufficiently informed before he do such injury or commit the crime whether it be an injury or not may he ought to do so for when a man doubts whether the act he goeth about be just or unjust and may inform himself if he will the doing is unlawful in like manner he that supposes himself injured in a case determined by the written law which he may by himself or others see and consider if he complained before he consults with the law he does unjustly and betrayeth the disposition rather to vex other men than to demand his own rights if the question be of obedience to a public officer to have seen his commission with the public seal and to heard it read or have had the means to be informed of it if a man would is a sufficient veracity of his authority for every man is obliged to do his best endeavor to inform himself of all written laws that may concern his own future actions the legislature known and the laws either by writing or by the light of nature sufficiently published there wanteth yet another very material circumstance to make them obligatory for it is not the letter but the intendment or meaning that is to say the authentic interpretation of the law which is the sense of the legislature in which the nature of the law consisteth and therefore the interpretation of all laws depended on the authority sovereign and the interpreters can be none but those which the sovereign to whom only the subject oath obedience shall appoint for else by the craft of an interpreter the law may be made to bear a sense contrary to that of the sovereign by which means the interpreter becomes the legislature all laws written and unwritten have need of interpretation the unwritten law of nature though it be easy to such without partiality and passion to make use of their natural reason and therefore leaves the violators thereof without excuse yet considering there be very few perhaps none that in some cases are not blinded by self love or some other passion it is now become of all laws the most obscure and has consequently the greatest need of able interpreters the written laws if laws they be short are easily misinterpreted for the diverse significations of a word or two if long they be more obscure by the diverse significations of many words in so much as no written law delivered in few or many words can be well understood without a perfect understanding of the final causes for which the law was made the knowledge of which final causes is in the legislature to him therefore there cannot be any not in the law insoluble either by finding out the ends to undo it or else by making what ends he will as alexander did with his sword in the gordeon not by the legislative power which no other interpreter can do the interpretation of the laws of nature in a commonwealth dependeth not on the books of moral philosophy the authority of writers without the authority of the commonwealth make it not their opinions law be they never so true that which i have written in this treatise concerning the moral virtues and of their necessity for the procuring and maintaining peace though it be evident truth is not therefore presently law but because in all commonwealths in the world it is a part of the civil law for though it be naturally reasonable yet it is by the sovereign power that it is law otherwise it were a great error to call the laws of nature unwritten law whereof we see so many volumes published and in them so many contradictions of one another and of themselves the interpretation of the law of nature is the sentence of the judge constituted by the sovereign authority to hear and determine such controversies as depend thereon and consisteth in the application of the law to the present case for in the act of judicature the judge doth know more but consider whether the demand of the party be consonant to nature reason and equity and the sentence he giveth is therefore the interpretation of the law of nature which interpretation is authentic not because it is his private sentence but because he giveth it by the authority of the sovereign whereby it becomes the sovereign sentence which is law for that time to the party's pleading but because there is no judge subordinate nor sovereign but may err in a judgment equity if afterward in another light case he find it more consonant equity to give a contrary sentence he is obliged to do it no man's error becomes his own law nor obliges him to persist in it neither for the same reason becomes it a law to other judges those sworn to follow it for though a wrong sentence be given by authority of the sovereign if he know and allow it in such laws as are mutable be a constitution of the new law in cases in which every little circumstance is the same such as are the laws of nature they are no laws to the same or other judges in the light cases for ever after princes succeed one another and one judge passeth another cometh nay heaven and earth shall pass but not one tittle of the law of nature shall pass for it is the eternal law of god therefore all the sentences of precedent judges that have ever been cannot all together make a law contrary to natural equity nor any examples of former judges can warrant an unreasonable sentence or discharge the present judge of the trouble of studying what is equity in the case he is to judge from the principles of his own natural design for example sake it is against the law of nature to punish the innocent and innocent is he that acquitted himself judicially and is acknowledged for innocent by the judge put the case now that a man is accused of a capital crime and seeing the power of malice of some enemy and the frequent corruption and partiality of judges run it away for fear of the event and afterwards is taken and brought to a legal trial and make it that sufficiently appear he was not guilty of the crime and being there of acquitted is nevertheless condemned to lose his goods this is a manifest condemnation of the innocent i say therefore that there is no place in the world where this can be an interpretation of a law of nature or be made a law by the sentence of precedent judges that had done the same for he that judged at first judged unjustly and no injustice can be a pattern of judgment to succeeding judges a written law may forbid innocent men to fly and they may be punished for flying but that flying for fear of injury should be taken for presumption of guilt and after man is already absolved of the crime judicially is contrary to the nature of a presumption which has no place after judgment given yet this is set down by a great lawyer for the common law of england if a man saith he that is innocent be accused of felony and for fear flyeth for the same albeit he judicially acquitted himself of the felony yet if it be found that he fled for the felony he shall notwithstanding his innocencey forfeit all his goods chattels debts and duties for as to the forfeiture of them the law will admit no proof against the presumption in law grounded upon his flight here you see an innocent man judicially acquitted notwithstanding his innocencey when no written law forbade him to fly after his acquittal upon a presumption in law condemned to lose all the goods he hath if the law ground upon his flight a presumption of the fact which was capital the sentence ought to have been capital the presumption were not of the fact for what then ought to you lose his goods this therefore is no law of england nor is the condemnation grounded upon a presumption of law but on the presumption of judges it is also against law to say that no proof shall be admitted against a presumption of law for all judges sovereign and subordinate if they refuse to hear proof refuse to do justice for though the sentence be just yet the judges that condemn without hearing the proofs offered are unjust judges and their presumption is but prejudice which no man ought to bring with him to the seat of justice whatsoever precedent judgments or examples he shall pretend to follow there be other things of this nature wherein men's judgments have been perverted by trusting to precedence but this is enough to show that though the sentence of the judge be a law to the party pleading yet it is no law any judge that shall succeed him in that office in like manner when question is of the meaning of written laws he is not the interpreter of them that write if a commentary upon them for commentaries are commonly more subject to scaval than the text and therefore need other commentaries and so there will be no end of interpretation and therefore unless there be an interpreter authorized by the sovereign from which the subordinate judges are not to recede the interpreter can be no other than the ordinary judges in the same manner as they are in cases of the unwritten law and their sentences are to be taken by them that plead for laws in that particular case but not bind other judges in like cases to give judgments for a judge may air in the interpretation even a written laws but no error of a subordinate judge can change the law which is the general sentence of the sovereign in written laws men used to make a difference between the letter and the sentence of the law and when by the letter is meant whatsoever can be gathered from the bare words it is well distinguished for the significations of almost all are either in themselves or in the metaphorical use of them ambiguous and may be drawn in argument to make many senses but there is only one sense of the law but if by the letter be meant the literal sense then the letter in the sentence or intention of the law is all one for the literal sense is that which the legislator intended should by the letter of the law be signified now the intention of the legislator is always supposed to be equity for if it were a great contumely for a judge to think otherwise of the sovereign he ought therefore if the word of the law do not fully authorize a reasonable sentence to supply it with the law of nature or if the case be difficult to respite judgment till he have received more ample authority for example a written law ordaineth that he which is thrust out of his house by force shall be restored by force it happens that a man by negligence leaves his house empty and returning is kept out by force in which case there is no special law ordain it is evident that this case is contained in the same law for else there is no remedy for him at all which is to be supposed against the intention of the legislator again the word of the law commandeth to judge according to the evidence a man is accused falsely of a fact which the judge himself saw done by another and not by him that is accused in this case neither shall the letter of the law be followed to the condemnation of the innocent nor shall the judge give sentence against the evidence of the witnesses because the letter of the law is to the contrary but procure of the sovereign that another be made judge and himself witness so that the in commodity that follows the bare words of a written law may lead him to the intention of the law whereby to interpret the same be better though no in commodity can warrant a sentence against the law for every judge of right and wrong is not a judge of what is commodious or incomodious to the commonwealth the abilities required in a good interpreter of the law that is to say in a good judge are not the same with those of an advocate namely the study of the laws for a judge as he ought to take notice of the fact from none but the witnesses so also he ought to take notice of the law from nothing but the statutes and constitutions of the sovereign alleged in the pleading or declared to him by some that have authority from the sovereign power to declare them and need not take care beforehand what he shall judge for it shall be given him what he shall say concerning the fact by witnesses and what he shall say in point of law from those that shall in their pleading show it and by authority interpret it upon the place the lords of parliament in england were judges and most difficult cases have been heard and determined by them yet few of them were much first in the study of the laws and fewer had made profession of them and though they consulted with lawyers that were appointed to be present there for that purpose yet they alone had the authority of giving sentence in like manner in the ordinary trials of right twelve men of the common people are judges and give sentence not only of the fact but of the right and pronounce simply for the complainant or for the defendant that is to say our judges not only of the fact but also of the right and in a question of crime not only determine whether done or not done but also whether it be murder homicide felony assault and the like which are determinations of law but because they are not supposed to know the law of themselves there is one that has authority to inform them of it in the particular case they are to judge of but yet if they judge not according to the he that tells them they are not subject there by to any penalty unless it be made appear that they did it against their consciences or had been corrupted by reward the things that make a good judge or good interpreter of the laws are first a right understanding of that principle law of nature called equity which depending not on the reading of other men's writings but on the goodness of a man's own natural reason and meditation is presumed to be in those most that had most leisure and had the most inclination to meditate there on secondly contempt of unnecessary riches and performance thirdly to be able in judgment to divest himself of all fear hatred anger love and compassion fourthly and lastly patients to hear diligent attention in hearing and memory to retain digest and apply what he had heard the difference in division of the laws has been made in diverse manners according to the different methods of those men that have written of them for it is a thing that dependent on nature but on the scope of the writer and is subservient to every man's proper method in the institutions of Justinian we find seven sorts of civil laws one the edict constitutions and epistles of prince that is of the emperor because the whole power of the people was in him like these are the proclamations of the kings of England two the decrees of the whole people of Rome comprehending the senate when they were put to the question by the senate these were laws at first by the virtue of the sovereign power residing in the people and such of them as by the emperors were not abrogated remained laws by the imperial authority for all laws that bind are understood to be laws by his authority that has power to repeal them somewhat like to these laws are the acts of parliament in England three the decrees of the common people excluding the senate when they were put to the question by the tribute of the people for such of them as were not abrogated by the emperors remained laws by the authority imperial like to these were the orders of the house of commons of England four senate us consulta the orders of the senate because when the people of Rome grew so numerous as it was inconvenient to assemble them it was thought fit by the emperor that men should consult the senate instead of the people and these have some resemblance with the acts of council five the edicts of praetors and in some cases of the adeles such as are the chief justices in the courts of England six response a prudentum which were the sentences and opinions of those lawyers to whom the emperor gave authority to interpret the law and to give answer to such as in matter of law demanded their advice which answers the judges in giving judgment were obliged by the constitutions of the emperor to observe and should be like the reports of cases judged if other judges be by the law of England bound to observe them for the judges of the common law of England are not properly judges but jurists consulta of whom the judges who are either the lords or twelve men of the country are in point of law to ask advice seven also unwritten customs which in their own nature are an imitation of law by the tacit consent of the emperor in case they be not contrary to the law of nature are very laws another division of laws is into natural and positive natural are those which have been laws from all eternity and are called not only natural but also moral laws consisting in the moral virtues as justice equity and all habits of the mind that conduced to peace and charity of which I've already spoken in the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters positive are those which have not been from eternity but have been made laws by the will of those that have had the sovereign power over others and are either written or made known to men by some other argument of the will of their legislator again of positive laws some are human some divine and of human positive laws some are distributive some penal distributive are those that determine the rights of the subjects declaring to every man what it is by which he acquireth and holdeth a propriety in lands or goods and a right or liberty of action and these speak to all the subjects penal are those which declare what penalty shall be inflicted on those that violate the law and speak to the ministers and officers ordained for execution for though everyone ought to be informed of the punishments ordained beforehand for their transgression nevertheless the command is not addressed to the delinquent who cannot be supposed will faithfully punish himself but the public ministers appointed to see the penalty executed and these penal laws are for the most part written together with the law's distributive and are sometimes called judgments for all laws are general judgments or sentences of the legislator as also every particular judgment is a law to him whose case is judged divine positive laws for natural laws being eternal and universal are all defined are those which being the commandments of God not from all eternity nor universally addressed to all men but only to a certain people or to certain persons are declared for such by those whom God hath authorized to declare them but this authority of man to declare what be these positive of God how can it be known God may command man by a supernatural way to deliver laws to other men but because it is of the essence of law that he who is to be obliged to be assured of the authority of him that declared that which we cannot naturally take notice to be from God how can a man without supernatural revelations be assured of the revelation received by the declare and how can he be bound to obey him for the first question how a man can be assured of the revelation of another without a revelation particularly to himself it is evidently impossible for though a man may be induced to believe such revelation from the miracles they see him do or from seeing the extraordinary sanctity of his life or from seeing the extraordinary wisdom or extraordinary felicity of his actions all which are marks of God's extraordinary favor yet they are not assured evidences of special revelation miracles are marvelous works but that which is marvelous to one may not be so to another sanctity may be feigned and the visible felicities of this world are most often the work of God by natural and ordinary causes and therefore no man can infallibly know by natural reason that another has had a supernatural revelation of God's will but only a belief everyone as the science thereof shall appear greater or lesser a firmer or weaker belief but for the second how he can be bound to obey him it is not so hard for if the law declared be not against the law of nature which is undoubtedly God's law and he undertake to obey it he is bound by his own act bound I say to obey it but not bound to believe it for men's belief and interior cojections are not subject to the commands but only to the operation of God ordinary or extraordinary faith of supernatural law is not a fulfilling but only an assenting to the same and not a duty that we exhibit to God but a gift which God freely give us to whom he pleaseth as also unbelief is not a breach of any of his laws but a rejection of them all except the laws natural but this that I say will be made yet clear by the examples and testimonies concerning this point in holy scripture the covenant God made with Abraham in a supernatural manner was thus this is the covenant which thou shalt observe between me and thee and thy seed after thee Genesis 1710 Abraham seed had not this revelation nor were yet in being yet they are a party to the covenant and bound to obey what Abraham should declare to them for God's law which they could not be but in virtue of the obedience which they owe their parents who if they be subject to no other earthly power as here in the case of Abraham have sovereign power over their children and servants again where God sayeth to Abraham in thee shall all nations of the earth be blessed for I know thou wilt command thy children and thy house after thee to keep the way of the Lord and to observe righteousness and judgment it is manifest the obedience of his family who had no revelation depended on their former obligation to obey their sovereign at Mount Sinai Moses only went up to God the people were forbidden to approach on pain of death yet were they bound to obey all that Moses declared to them for God's law upon what ground but on this submission of their own speak thou to us and we will hear thee but let not God speak to us lest we die by which two places it sufficiently appeareth that in a commonwealth a subject that has no certain and assured revelation particularly to himself concerning the will of God is to obey for such the command of the commonwealth for if men were at liberty to take for God's commandments their own dreams and fancies or the dreams and fancies of private men scarce two men would agree upon what is God's commandment and yet in respect of them every man would despise the commandments of the commonwealth I conclude therefore that in all things not contrary to the moral law that is to say to the law of nature all subjects are bound to obey that for divine law which is declared to be so by the laws of the commonwealth which also is evident to any man's reason for whatsoever is not against the law of nature may be made law in the name of them that have the sovereign power there is no reason men should be the less obliged by it when it is propounded the name of God besides there is no place in the world where men are permitted to pretend other commandments of God are declared for such by the commonwealth Christian states punish those that revolt from Christian religion and all other states those that set up any religion by them forbidden for in whatsoever is not regulated by the commonwealth it is equity which is the law of nature and therefore an eternal law of God that every man equally enjoy his liberty there is also another distinction of laws into fundamental and not fundamental but I could never see in any author what a fundamental law signify it nevertheless one may very reasonably distinguish laws in that matter for a fundamental law in every commonwealth is that which being taken away the commonwealth faileth and is utterly dissolved as a building whose foundation is destroyed and therefore a fundamental law is that by which subjects are bound to uphold whatsoever power is given to the sovereign whether a monarch or a sovereign assembly without which the commonwealth cannot stand such as the power of war and peace of judicature of election of officers and of doing whatsoever he shall think necessary for the public good not fundamental is that the abrogating whereof draweth not with it the dissolution of the commonwealth such as are the laws concerning controversies between subject and subject thus much of the division of laws I find the words lex civillus and just civil that is to say law and right civil promiscuously used for the same thing even in the most learned authors which nevertheless ought not to be so for right is liberty namely that liberty which the civil law leaves us but civil law is an obligation and takes from us the liberty which the law of nature gave us nature gave a right to every man to secure himself by his own strength and to invade a suspected neighbor by way of prevention but the civil law takes away that liberty in all cases where the protection of the law may be safely stayed for in so much as lex and juice are different as obligation and liberty likewise laws and charters are taken promiscuously for the same thing yet charters are donations of the sovereign and not laws but exemptions from law the phase of the law is jubio in jungle I command and enjoin the phrase of a charter is dead a concessy I have given I have granted but what is given or granted to a man is not forced upon him by a law a law may be made to bind all the subject of a commonwealth a liberty or charter is only to one man or some one part of the people for to say all the people of a commonwealth have liberty in any case whatsoever is to say that in such case there had been no law made or else having been made is now abrogated end of chapter twenty six read by cibela dentin chapter twenty seven of Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Smokey B Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes chapter twenty seven of crimes excuses and extenuations a sin is not only a transgression of law but also any contempt of the legislator for such contempt is a breach of all his laws at once and therefore may consist not only in the commission of a fact or in the speaking of words by the laws forbidden or in the omission of what the law commanded but also in the intention or purpose to transgress for the purpose to break the law is some degree of contempt of him to whom it belonged to see it executed to be delighted in the imagination only of being possessed of another man's goods servants or wife without any intention to take them from him by force or fraud is no breach of the law that sayeth thou shalt not covet nor is the pleasure a man may have in imagining or dreaming of the death of him from whose life he expected nothing but damage and displeasure a sin but the resolving to put some act in execution that tendeth there too for to be pleased in the fiction of that which would please a man if it were real is a passion so adherent to the nature both of man and every other living creature as to make it a sin or to make sin of being a man the consideration of this has made me think them too severe both to themselves and others that maintain that the first motions of the mind though checked with the fear of god be sins but I confess it is safer to err on that hand than on the other a crime is a sin consisting in the committing by deed or word of that which the law forbiddeth or the omission of what it hath commanded so that every crime is a sin but not every sin a crime to intend to steal or kill is a sin though it never appear in word or fact for god that seeeth the thought of man can lay it to his charge but till it appear by something done or said by which the intention may be argued by a human judge it hath not the name of crime which distinction the Greeks observed in the word amartima and eglikima or atii where of the former which is translated sin signifyeth any swerving from the law whatsoever but the two latter which are translated crime signify that sin only whereof one man may accuse another but of intentions which never appear by any outward act there is no place for human accusation in like manner the latins by peccatum which is sin signify all manner of deviation from the law but by crime in which word they derived from sereno which signifies to perceive they mean only such sins as may be made appear before a judge and therefore are not mere intentions from this relation of sin to the law and of crime to the civil law may be inferred first that where law seeeth sin seeeth but because the law of nature is eternal violation of covenants ingratitude arrogance and all facts contrary to any moral virtue can never cease to be a sin secondly that the civil law ceasing crimes cease for there being no other law remaining but that of nature there is no place for accusation every man being his own judge and accused only by his own conscience and cleared by the uprightness of his own intention when therefore his intention is right his fact is no sin if otherwise his fact is sin but not crime thirdly that when the sovereign power seeeth crime also seeeth for where there is no such power there is no protection to be had from the law and therefore everyone may protect himself by his own power for no man in the institution of sovereign power can be supposed to give away the right of preserving his own body for the safety whereof all sovereignty was ordained but this is to be understood only by those that have not themselves contributed to the taking away of the power that protected them for that was a crime from the beginning the source of every crime is some defect of the understanding or some error in reasoning or some sudden force of the passions defect in the understanding is ignorance in reasoning erroneous opinion again ignorance is of three sorts of the law and of the sovereign and of the penalty ignorance of the law of nature excuseth no man because every man that hath attained to the use of reason is supposed to know he ought not to do to another what he would not have done to himself therefore into what place so ever a man shall come if he do anything contrary to that law it is a crime if a man come from the indies hither and persuade men here to receive a new religion or teach them anything that tendeth to disobedience of the laws of this country though he be never so well persuaded of the truth of what he teaches he commits a crime and may be justly punished for the same not only because his doctrine is false but also because he does that which he would not approve in another namely that coming from hints he should endeavor to alter the religion there but ignorance of the civil law shall excuse a man in a strange country till it be declared to him because till then no civil law is binding in the like manner if the civil law of a man's own country be not so sufficiently declared as he may know it if he will nor the action against the law of nature the ignorance is a good excuse in other cases ignorance of the civil law excuseth not ignorance of the sovereign power of the place of a man's ordinary residence excuseth him not because he ought to take notice of the power by which he hath been protected there ignorance of the penalty where the law is declared excuseth no man for in breaking the law which without a fear of penalty to follow were not a law but vain words he undergoeth the penalty though he know not what it is because whosoever voluntarily doth an action accepteth all the known consequences of it but punishment is a known consequence of the violation of laws in every commonwealth which punishment if it be determined already by the law he is subject to that if not then is he subject to arbitrary punishment for it is reason that he which does injury without other limitation than that of his own will should suffer punishment without other limitation than that of his will whose law is thereby violated but when a penalty is either annexed to the crime in the law itself or hath been usually inflicted in the like cases there the delinquent is excused from a greater penalty for the punishment foreknown if not great enough to determine from the action is an invitement to it because when men compare the benefit of their own injustice with the harm of their punishment by necessity of nature they choose that which appeareth best for themselves and therefore when they are punished more than the law had formally determined or more than others were punished for the same crime it is the law that tempted and deceiveth them no law made after a fact done can make it a crime because if the fact be against the law of nature the law was before the fact and a positive law cannot be taken notice of before it be made and therefore cannot be obligatory but when the law that forbids a fact is made before the fact be done yet he that does the fact is liable to the penalty ordained after in case no lesser penalty were made known before neither by writing nor by example for the reason immediately before alleged from defect in reasoning that is to say from error men are prone to violate the laws in three ways first by presumption of false principles as when men from having observed how in all places and in all ages unjust actions have been authorized by the force and victories of those who have committed them and that potent men breaking through the cobweb laws of their country the weaker sort and those that have failed and their enterprises have been esteemed the only criminals have therefore taken for principles and grounds of their reasoning that justice is but a vain word that whatsoever a man can get by his own industry and hazard is his own that the practice of all nations cannot be unjust that examples of former times are good arguments of doing the like again and many more of that kind which being granted no act in itself can be a crime but must be made so not by the law but by the success of them that committed and the same fact be virtuous or vicious portion pleaseth so that what marias makes a crime so shall make meritorious and Caesar the same law standing turn again into a crime to the perpetual disturbance of the peace of the commonwealth secondly by false teachers that either misinterpret the law of nature making it thereby repugnant to the law civil or by teaching for laws such doctrines of their own or traditions of former times as are inconsistent with the duty of a subject thirdly by erroneous inferences from true principles which happens commonly to men that are hasty and precipitate in concluding and resolving what to do such as are they that have both a great opinion of their own understanding and believe that things of this nature require not time and study but only common experience and a good natural wit whereof no man thinks himself unprovided whereas the knowledge of right and wrong which is no less difficult there is no man will pretend to without great and long study and of those defects in reasoning there is none that can excuse though some of them may extenuate a crime in any man that pretendeth to the administration of his own private business much less in them that undertake a public charge because they pretend to the reason upon the want whereof they would ground their excuse of the passions that most frequently are the causes of crime one is vain glory or a foolish overrating of their own worth as if difference of worth were an effect of their wit or riches or blood or some other natural quality not depending on the will of those that have the sovereign authority from whence precedeth a presumption that the punishments ordained by the laws and extended generally to all subjects ought not to be inflicted on them with the same rigor they are inflicted on poor obscure and simple men comprehended under the name of the vulgar therefore it happeneth commonly that such as value themselves by the greatness of their wealth adventure on crimes upon hope of escaping punishment by corrupting public justice or obtaining pardon by money or other rewards and that such as have multitude of potent kindred and popular men that have gained reputation amongst the multitude take courage to violate the laws from a hope of oppressing the power to whom it belongs to put them in execution and that such as have a great and false opinion of their own wisdom take upon them to reprehend the actions and call in question the authority of them that govern and so to unsettle the laws with their public discourse as that nothing shall be a crime but what their own designs require should be so it happeneth also to the same men to be prone to all such crimes as consist in craft and in deceiving of their neighbors because they think their designs are too subtle to be perceived these i say are effects of a false presumption of their own wisdom for of them that are the first movers in the disturbance of commonwealth which can never happen without a civil war very few are left alive long enough to see their new designs established so that the benefit of their crimes redoundeth to posterity and such as would least have wished it which argues they were not so wise as they thought they were and those that deceive upon hope of not being observed do commonly deceive themselves the darkness in which they believe they lie hidden being nothing else but their own blindness and are no wiser than children that think all hid by hiding their own eyes and generally all vanglorious men unless they be with all timorous are subject to anger as being more prone than others to interpret for contempt the ordinary liberty of conversation and there are few crimes that may not be produced by anger as for the passions of hate lust ambition and covetousness what crimes they are apt to produce is so obvious to every man's experience and understanding as their needeth nothing to be said of them saving that they are infirmities so annexed to the nature both of man and all other living creatures as that their effects cannot be hindered but by extraordinary use of reason or a constant severity in punishing them for in those things men hate they find a continual and unavoidable molestation whereby either a man's patience must be everlasting or he must be eased by removing the power of that which molesteth him the former is difficult the latter is many times impossible without some violation of the law ambition and covetousness are passions also that are perpetually incumbent and pressing whereas reason is not perpetually present to resist them and therefore whensoever the hope of impunity appears their effects proceed and for lust what it wants in the lasting it hath in the vehemence which sufficeseth to weigh down the apprehension of all easy or uncertain punishments of all passions at which inclineth men least to break the laws is fear nay accepting some generous natures it is the only thing when there is appearance of profit or pleasure by breaking the laws that makes men keep them and yet in many cases a crime may be committed through fear for not every fear justifies the action it produces but the fear only of corporeal hurt which we call bodily fear and from which a man cannot see how to be delivered but by the action a man is assaulted fears present death from which he sees not how to escape but by wounding him that assault of him if he wound him to death this is no crime because no man is supposed at the making of a commonwealth to have abandoned the defense of his life or limbs where the law cannot arrive time enough to be his assistance but to kill a man because from his actions or his threatenings i may argue he will kill me when he can seeing i have time and means to demand protection from the sovereign power is a crime again a man receives words of disgrace or some little injuries for which they that made the laws had assigned no punishment nor thought it worthy of a man that has the use of reason to take notice of and is afraid unless he revenged he shall fall into contempt and consequently be obnoxious to the like injuries from others and to avoid this breaks the law and protects himself for the future by the terror of his private revenge this is a crime for the hurt is not corporeal but fantastical and though in this corner of the world made sensible by a custom not many years since begun amongst young and vain men so light as a gallant man and one that is assured of his own courage cannot take notice of also a man may stand in fear of spirits either through his own superstition or through too much credit given to other men that tell him of strange dreams and visions and thereby be made believe they will hurt him for doing or emitting diverse things which nevertheless to do or omit is contrary to the laws and that which is done so or omitted is not to be excused by this fear but is a crime for as i have shown before in the second chapter dreams be naturally but the fancies remaining in sleep after the impressions our senses had formally received waking and when men are by any accident unassured they have slept seem to be real visions and therefore he that presumes to break the law upon his own or another's dream or pretended vision or upon other fancy of the power of invisible spirits then is permitted by the commonwealth leave with the law of nature which is a certain offense and follow with the imagery of his own or another private man's brain which he can never know whether it signifies anything or nothing nor whether he that tells his dreams say true or lie which if every private man should have leave to do so as they must by the law of nature if anyone have it there could no law be made to hold and so all commonwealth would be dissolved from these different sources of crime it appears already that all crimes are not as the stoics of old-time maintained of the same alloy there is place not only for excuse by which that which seemed the crime is proved to be none at all but also for extenuation by which the crime that seemed great is made less for though all crimes do equally deserve the name of injustice as all deviation from a straight line is equally crookedness which the stoics rightly observed yet it does not follow that all crimes are equally unjust no more than that all crooked lines are equally crooked which the stoics not observing held it as great a crime to kill a hen against the law as to kill one's father that which totally excuseth a fact and takes away from it the nature of a crime can be none but that which at the same time take it away the obligation of the law for that fact committed once against the law if he that committed it be obliged to the law can be no other than a crime the want of means to know the law totally excuseth for the law where of a man has no means to inform himself is not obligatory but the want of diligence to inquire shall not be considered as a want of means nor shall any man that pretendeth to reason enough for the government of his own affairs be supposed to want means to know the laws of nature because they are known by the reason he pretends to only children and madmen are excused from offenses against the law natural where where a man is captive or in the power of the enemy and he is then in the power of the enemy when his person or his means of living is so if it be without his own fault the obligation of the law ceaseth because he must obey the enemy or die and consequently such obedience is no crime for no man is obliged when the protection of the law faileth not to protect himself by the best means he can if a man by the terror of present death be compelled to do a fact against the law he is totally excused because no law can oblige a man to abandon his own preservation and supposing such a law were obligatory yet a man would reason thus if i do it not i die presently if i do it i die afterwards therefore by doing it there is a time of life gained nature therefore compels him to the fact when a man is destitute of food or other thing necessary for his life and cannot preserve himself any other way but by some fact against the law as if in a great famine he takes the food by force or stealth which he cannot obtain for money nor charity or in the defense of his life snatch away another man's sword he is totally excused for the reason next before alleged again facts done against the law by the authority of another are by that authority excused against the author because no man ought to accuse his own fact in another that is but his instrument but it is not excused against a third person thereby injured because in the violation of the law both the author and actor are criminals from hence it follow with that when that man or assembly that has the sovereign power command if a man to do that which is contrary to a former law the doing of it is totally excused for he ought not to condemn it himself because he is the author and what cannot justly be condemned by the sovereign cannot justly be punished by any other besides when the sovereign command if anything to be done against his own former law the command as to that particular fact is an abrogation of the law if that man or assembly that has the sovereign power disclaim any right essential to the sovereignty whereby they're accrued to the subject any liberty inconsistent with the sovereign power that is to say with the very being of a commonwealth if the subject shall refuse to obey the command and anything contrary to the liberty granted this is nevertheless a sin and contrary to the duty of the subject for he to take notice of what is inconsistent with the sovereignty because it was erected by his own consent and for his own defense and that such a liberty as is inconsistent with it was granted through ignorance of the evil consequence thereof but if he not only disobey but also resists a public minister in the execution of it then it is a crime because he might have been righted without any breach of the peace upon complaint the degrees of crime are taken on diverse scales and measured first by the malignity of the source or cause secondly by the contagion of the example thirdly by the mischief of the effect and fourthly by the concurrence of times places and persons the same fact done against the law if it proceed from presumption of strength riches or friends to resist those that are to execute the law is a greater crime than if it proceed from hope of not being discovered or of escape by flight for presumption of impunity by force is a root from wint's springeth at all times and upon all temptations a contempt of all laws whereas in the latter case the apprehension of danger that makes a man fly renders him more obedient for the future a crime known to be so is greater than the same crime proceeding from a false persuasion that it is lawful for he that committed it against his own conscience presumeth on his force or other power which encourages him to commit the same again but he that duffet by error after the error shown him is conformable to the law he who's error proceeds from the authority of a teacher or an interpreter of the law publicly authorized is not so faulty as he whose error proceedeth from a peremptory pursuit of his own principles and reasoning for what is taught by one that teaches by public authority the commonwealth teaches and hath a resemblance of law till the same authority control of it and in all crimes that contain not in them a denial of the sovereign power nor are against an evident law excuseth totally whereas he that grounded his actions on his private judgment ought according to the rectitude or error thereof to stand or fall the same fact if it had been constantly punished in other men is a greater crime than if there have been many precedent examples of impunity where those examples are so many hopes of impunity given by the sovereign himself and because he which furnishes a man with such a hope and presumption of mercy as encourages him to offend hath his part in the offense he cannot reasonably charge the offender with the whole a crime arising from a sudden passion is not so great as when the same arises from a long meditation for in the former case there is a place for extenuation in the common infirmity of human nature but he that doth it with premeditation has used circumspection and cast his eye on the law on the punishment and on the consequence thereof to human society all which in committing the crime he hath condemned and postponed to his own appetite but there is no suddenness of passion sufficient for a total excuse for all the time between the first knowing of the law and the commission of the fact shall be taken for time of deliberation because he ought by meditation of the law to rectify the irregularity of his passions where the law is publicly and with assiduity before all the people read and interpreted a fact done against it is a greater crime than where men are left without such instruction to inquire of it with difficulty uncertainty and interruption of their callings and to be informed by private men for in this case part of the fault is just charged upon common infirmity but in the former there is apparent negligence which is not without some contempt of the sovereign power those facts which the law expressly condemneth but the lawmaker by other manifest signs of his will tacitly approveeth are less crimes than the same facts condemned both by the law and the lawmaker for seeing the will of the lawmaker is law there appear in this case two contradictory laws which would totally excuse if men were bound to take notice of the sovereign's approbation by other arguments than are expressed by his command but because there are punishments consequence not only to the transgression of his law but also to the observing of it he is in part a cause of the transgression and therefore cannot reasonably impute the whole crime to the delinquent for example the law condemneth duals the punishment is made capital on the contrary part he that refuses dual is subject to contempt and scorn without remedy and sometimes by the sovereign himself thought unworthy to have any charge or preferment in war if there upon he accept dual considering all men lawfully endeavor to obtain the good opinion of them that have the sovereign power he ought not in reason to be rigorously punished seeing part of the fault may be discharged on the punisher which i say not as wishing liberty of private revenges or any other kind of disobedience but a care in governors not to countenance anything obliquely which directly they forbid the examples of princes to those that see them are and ever have been more potent to govern their actions than the laws themselves and though it be our duty to do not what they do but what they say yet will that duty never be performed till it please god to give men an extraordinary and supernatural grace to follow that precept again if we compare crimes by the mischief of their effects first the same fact when it redounds to the damage of many is greater than when it redounds to the hurt of few and therefore when a fact hurteth not only in the present but also by example in the future it is a greater crime than if it hurts only in the present for the former is a fertile crime and multiplies to the hurts of many the latter is barren to maintain doctrines contrary to the religion established in the common wealth is a greater fault in an authorized preacher than in a private person so also is it to live profanely incontinently or do any irreligious act whatsoever likewise in a professor of the law to maintain any point or do any act that tendeth to the weakening of the sovereign power is a greater crime than in another man also in a man that hath such reputation for wisdom as that his councils are followed or his actions imitated by many his fact against the law is a greater crime than the same fact in another for such men not only commit crime but teach it for law to all other men and generally all crimes are the greater by the scandal they give that is to say by becoming stumbling blocks to the weak that look not so much upon the way they go in as upon the light that other men carry before them also facts of hostility against the present state of the commonwealth are greater crimes than the same acts done to private men for the damage extends itself to all such are the betraying of the strengths or revealing of the secrets of the commonwealth to an enemy also all attempts upon the representative of the commonwealth be it a monarch or an assembly and all endeavors by word or deed to diminish the authority of the same either in the present time or in succession which crimes the latins understand by criminal lacy majestitus and consist in design or act contrary to a fundamental law likewise those crimes which render judgments of no effect are greater crimes than injuries done to one or a few persons as to receive money to give false judgment or testimony is a greater crime than otherwise to deceive a man of the like or a greater sum because not only has wrong that falls by such judgments but all judgments are rendered useless an occasion minister to force and private revenges also robbery and depiculation of the public treasury or revenues is a greater crime than the robbing or defrauding of a private man because to rob the public is to rob many at once also the counterfeit usurpation of public ministry the counterfeiting of public seals or public coin then counterfeiting of a private man's person or his seal because the fraud thereof extended to the damage of many of facts against the law done to private men the greater crime is that where the damage in the common opinion of men is most sensible and therefore to kill against the law is a greater crime than any other injury life preserved and to kill with torment greater than simply to kill and mutilation of a limb greater than the spoiling a man of his goods and the spoiling a man of his goods by terror of death or wounds then by clandestine surruption and by clandestine surruption then by consent fraudulently obtained and the violation of chastity by force greater than by flattery and of a woman married then of a woman not married for all these things are commonly so valued though some men are more and some less sensible of the same offense but the law regardless not the particular but the general inclination of mankind and therefore the offense men take from contumely in words or gesture when they produce no other harm than the present grief of him that is reproached has been neglected in the laws of the Greeks romans and other both ancient and modern common wells supposing the true cause of such grief to consist not in the contumely which takes no hold upon men conscious of their own virtue but in the pusillanimity of him that is offended by it also a crime against the private man is much aggravated by the person time and place for to kill one's parent is a greater crime than to kill another for the parent ought to have the honor of a sovereign though he have surrendered his power to the civil law because he had it originally by nature and to rob a poor man is a greater crime than to rob a rich man because it is to the poor a more sensible damage and a crime committed in the time or place appointed for devotion is greater than if committed at another time or place for it proceeds from from a greater contempt of the law many other cases of aggravation and extinct and extinction might be added but by these i have set down it is obvious to every man to take the altitude of any other crime proposed lastly because in almost all crimes there is an injury done not only to some private men but also to the commonwealth the same crime when the accusation is in the name of the commonwealth is called public crime and when in the name of a private man a private crime and the pleas according there upon called public judicia publica pleas of the crown or private pleas and as in an accusation of murder if the accuser be a private man the plea is a private plea if the accuser be the sovereign the plea is a public plea end of chapter 27 recording by smoky b richmond virginia www.mindspace slash pan galactic love messiah or slash go with groove chapter 28 of leviathan this is a libra vox recording all libra vox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit libravox.org leviathan by thomas hobs chapter 28 of punishments and rewards a punishment is an evil inflicted by public authority on him that has done or omitted that which is judged by the same authority to be a transgression of the law to the end that the will of men may thereby the better be disposed to obedience before i infer anything from this definition there is a question to be answered of much importance which is by what door the right or authority of punishing in any case came in for by that which has been said before no man is supposed to bound by covenant not to resist violence and consequently it cannot be intended that he gave any right to another to lay violent hands upon his person in the making of a commonwealth every man give us away the right of defending another but not of defending himself also he obliged himself to assist him that hath the sovereignty in the punishing of another but of himself not but to covenant to assist the sovereign in doing hurt to another unless he that so covenanteth have a right to do it himself is not to give him a right to punish it is manifest therefore that the right which the commonwealth that is he or they that represented hath to punish is not grounded on any concession or gift of the subjects but i have also shown formerly that before the institution of commonwealth every man had a right to everything and to do whatsoever he thought necessary to his own preservation subduing hurting or killing any man in order therein too and this is the foundation of that right of punishing which is exercised in every commonwealth for the subjects did not give the sovereign that right but only in laying down theirs strengthened him to use his own as he should think fit for the preservation of them all so that it was not given but left to him and to him only and accepting the limits set him by natural law as entire as in the condition of mere nature and of war of everyone against his neighbor from the definition of punishment i infer first that neither private revenges nor injuries of private men can properly be styled punishment because they proceed not from public authority secondly that to be neglected and unpreferred by the public favor is not a punishment because no new evil is thereby on any man inflicted he is only left in the estate he was in before thirdly that the evil inflicted by public authority without precedent public condemnation is to be styled by the name of punishment but of a hostile act because the fact for which a man is punished ought first to be judged by public authority to be a transgression of the law fourthly that the evil inflicted by usurped power and judges without authority from the sovereign is not punishment but an act of hostility because the acts of power usurped have not for author the person condemned and therefore are not acts of public authority fifthly that all evil which is inflicted without intention or possibility of disposing the delinquent or by his example other men to obey the laws is not punishment but an act of hostility because without such an end no hurt done is contained under that name sixthly whereas to certain actions there may be a next by nature diverse hurtful consequences as when a man in assaulting another is himself slain or wounded or when he falls into sickness by the doing of some unlawful act such hurt though in respect of god who is the author of nature it may be said to be inflicted and therefore a punishment divine yet it is not contained in the name of punishment in respect to men because it is not inflicted by the authority of man seventhly if the harm inflicted be less than the benefit of contentment that naturally follow with the crime committed that harm is not within the definition and is rather the price or redemption than the punishment of a crime because it is of the nature of punishment to have for end the disposing of men to obey the law which end if it be less than the benefit of the transgression it attaineth not but work at the contrary effect eighthly if a punishment be determined and described in the law itself and after the crime committed there be a greater punishment inflicted the excess is not punishment but an act of hostility foreseeing the aim of punishment is not a revenge but terror and the terror of a great punishment unknown is taken away by the declaration of a less the unexpected addition is no part of the punishment but where there is no punishment at all determined by the law there whatsoever is inflicted half the nature of punishment for he that goes about the violation of a law wherein no penalty is determined expecteth an indeterminate that is to say an arbitrary punishment ninthly harm inflicted for a fact done before there was a law that forbade it is not punishment but an act of hostility for before the law there is no transgression of the law but punishment supposes a fact judged to have been a transgression of the law therefore harm inflicted before the law made is not punishment but an act of hostility tenthly hurt inflicted on the representative of the commonwealth is not punishment but an act of hostility because it is the nature of punishment to be inflicted by public authority which is the authority only of the representative itself lastly harm inflicted upon one that is a declared enemy falls not under the name of punishment because seeing that they were either never subject to the law and therefore cannot transgress it or having been subject to it and professing to be no longer so by consequence deny they can transgress it all the harms that can be done them must be taken as acts of hostility but in declared hostility all inflection of evil is lawful from whence it followed with that if a subject shall by fact or word wittingly and deliberately deny the authority of the representative of the commonwealth whatsoever penalty has been formerly ordained for treason he may lawfully be made to suffer whatsoever the representative will for in denying subjection he denies such punishment as by the law has been ordained and therefore suffers as an enemy of the commonwealth that is according to the will of the representative for the punishments set down in the law are to subjects not to enemies such as are they that having been by their own act subjects deliberately revolting deny the sovereign power the first and most general distribution of punishments is into divine and human of the former i shall have occasion to speak in a more convenient place hereafter human are those punishments that be inflicted by the commandment of man and are either corporal or pecuniary or ignominy or imprisonment or exile or mixed of these corporal punishment is that which is inflicted on the body directly and according to the intention of him that inflicted it such as our stripes or wounds or deprivation of such pleasures of the body as were before lawfully enjoyed and of these some be capital some less than capital capital is the inflection of death and that either simply or with torment less than capital are stripes wounds chains and any other corporal pain not in its own nature mortal for if upon the inflection of a punishment death follow not in the intention of the inflictor the punishment is not to be esteemed capital though the harm prove mortal by an accident not to be foreseen in which case death is not inflicted but hastened pecuniary punishment is that which consists of not only in the deprivation of a sum of money but also of lands or any other goods which are usually bought and sold for money and in the case the law that ordain a such a punishment be made with design to gather money from such as shall transgress the same it is not properly a punishment but the price of privilege and exemption from the law which does not absolutely forbid the fact but only to those who are not able to pay the money except where the law is natural or part of religion for in that case it is not an exemption from the law but a transgression as where the law exacteth a pecuniary mulked of them that take the name of God in vain the payment of the mulked is not the price of a dispensation to swear but the punishment of the transgression of a law indispensable in like manner if the law impose a sum of money to be paid to him that has been injured this is but a satisfaction for the hurt done him and extinguish at the accusation of the party injured but not the crime of the offender ignominy is the inflection of such evil as is made dishonorable or the deprivation of such good as is made honorable by the commonwealth for there be some things honorable by nature as the effects of courage magnanimity strength wisdom and other abilities of the body and mind others made honorable by the commonwealth as badges titles offices or any other singular mark of the sovereign's favor the former though they may fail by nature or accident cannot be taken away by law and therefore the loss of them is not punishment but the latter may be taken away by the public authority that made them honorable and are properly punishments such are degrading men condemned of their badges titles and offices or declaring them incapable of the like in time to come imprisonment is when a man is by public authority deprived of liberty and may happen from two diverse ends where of one is the safe custody of a man accused the other is the inflicting of pain on a man condemned the former is not a punishment because no man is supposed to be punished before he be judicially heard and declared guilty and therefore whatsoever hurt a man is made to suffer by bonds or restraint before his cause be heard over and above that which is necessary to assure his custody is against the law of nature but the latter is punishment because evil and inflicted by public authority for somewhat that has by the same authority been judged a transgression of the law under this word imprisonment I comprehend all restraint of motion caused by an external obstacle be it a house which is called by the general name of a prison or an island as when men are said to be confined to it or a place where men are set to work as an old-time men have been condemned to quarries and in these times to galleys or be it a chain or any other such impediment exile banishment is when a man is for a crime condemned to depart out of the dominion of the commonwealth or out of a certain part thereof and during a prefixed time or forever not return into it and seemeth not in its own nature without other circumstances to be a punishment but rather an escape or a public commandment to avoid punishment by flight and Cicero says there was never any such punishment ordained in the city of Rome but calls it a refuge of men in danger for if a man banished be nevertheless permitted to enjoy his goods and the revenue of his lands the mere change of air is no punishment nor does it tend to that benefit of the commonwealth for which all punishments are ordained that is to say to the forming of men's wills to the observation of the law but many times to the damage of the commonwealth for a banished man is a lawful enemy of the commonwealth that banished him as being no more a member of the same but if he be with all deprived of his lands or goods then the punishment lieth not in the exile but is to be reckoned amongst punishments pecuniary all punishments of innocent subjects be they great or little are against the law of nature for punishment is only for transgression of the law and therefore there can be no punishment of the innocent it is therefore a violation first of that law of nature which forbid us all men in their revenges to look at anything but some future good for there can arrive no good to the commonwealth by punishing the innocent secondly of that which forbid us in gratitude for seeing all sovereign power is originally given by the consent of every one of the subjects to the end they should as long as they are obedient to be protected thereby the punishment of the innocent is a rendering of evil for good and thirdly of the law that command equity that is to say an equal distribution of justice which in punishing the innocent is not observed but the infliction of what evil so ever on an innocent man that is not a subject if it be for the benefit of the commonwealth and without violation of any former covenant is no breach of the law of nature for all men that are not subjects are either enemies or else they have ceased from being so by some precedent covenants but against enemies whom the commonwealth judges capable to do them hurt it is lawful by the original right of nature to make war wherein the sword judges not nor does the victor make distinction of no saint and innocent as to the time past nor has other respect of mercy than as conducive to the good of his own people and upon this ground it is that also in subjects who deliberately deny the authority of the commonwealth established the vengeance is lawfully extended not only to the fathers but also to the third and fourth generation not yet in being and consequently innocent of the fact for which they are afflicted because the nature of this offense consists of in the renouncing of subjection which is a relapse into the condition of war commonly called rebellion and they that so offend suffer not as subjects but as enemies for rebellion is but war renewed reward is either by gift or by contract when by contract it is called salary and wages which has benefit due for service performed or promised when of gift it is benefit proceeding from the grace of them that bestow it to encourage or enable men to do them service and therefore when the sovereign of a commonwealth appoints a salary to any public office he that receiveth it is bound in justice to perform his office otherwise he is bound only in honor to acknowledgement and an endeavor of requital for though men have no lawful remedy when they be commanded to quit their private business to serve the public without reward or salary yet they are not bound there to by the law of nature nor by the institution of the commonwealth unless the service cannot otherwise be done because it is supposed the sovereign may make use of all their means and so much as the most common soldier may demand the wages of his warfare as a debt the benefits which a sovereign bestoweth on a subject for fear of some power and ability he have to do hurt to the commonwealth are not properly rewards for they are not salaries because there is in this case no contract supposed every man being obliged already not to do the commonwealth disservice nor are they graces because they be extorted by fear which ought not to be incident to the sovereign power but are rather sacrifices which the sovereign considered in his natural person and not in the person of the commonwealth makes for the appeasing of the discontent of him he thinks more potent than himself and encouraged not to obedience but on the contrary to the continuance and increasing of further extortion and whereas some salaries are certain and proceed from the public treasury and others uncertain and casual proceeding from the execution of the office for which the salary is ordained the latter is in some cases hurtful to the commonwealth as in the case of judicature for where the benefit of the judges and the ministers of a court of justice arises for the multitude of causes that are brought to their cognizance there must needs follow two inconveniences one is a nourishing of suits for the more suits the greater benefit and another that depends on that which is contention which is about jurisdiction each court drawing to itself as many causes as it can but in offices of execution there are not those inconveniences because their employment cannot be increased by any endeavor of their own and thus much shall suffice for the nature of punishment and reward which are as it were the nerves and tendons that move the limbs and joints of a commonwealth hitherto I have set forth the nature of man whose pride and other passions have compelled him to submit himself to government together with the great power of his governor whom I compared to Leviathan taking that comparison out of the two last verses of the one and fortieth of Job where God having set forth the great power of Leviathan calleth him king of the proud there is nothing sayeth he on earth to be compared with him he is made so as not to be afraid he seeeth every high thing below him and his king of all the children of pride but because he is mortal and subject to decay as all other earthly creatures are and because there is that in heaven though not on earth that he should stand in fear of and whose laws he ought to obey I shall in the next following chapters speak of his diseases and the causes of his mortality and of what laws of nature he is bound to obey end of chapter twenty eight chapter twenty nine of Leviathan this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes chapter twenty nine of those things that weaken or tend to the dissolution of a commonwealth though nothing can be immortal which mortals make yet if men had the use of reason they pretend to their commonwealths might be secured at least from perishing by internal diseases for by the nature of their institution they are designed to live as long as mankind or as the laws of nature or as justice itself which gives them life therefore when they come to be dissolved not by external violence but interest in disorder the fault is not in men as they are the matter but as they are the makers and orders of them for men as they become at least weary of irregular jostling and healing one another and desire with all their hearts to conform themselves into one firm and lasting edifice so for want both of the art of making fit laws to square their actions by and also of humility and patience to suffer the rude and cumbersome points of their present greatness to be taken off they cannot without the help of a very able architect be compiled into any other than a crazy building such as hardly lasting out their own time must assuredly fall upon the heads of their posterity amongst the infirmities therefore of a commonwealth i will reckon in the first place those that arise from an imperfect institution and resemble the diseases of a natural body which proceed from a defectuous procreation of which this is one that a man to obtain a kingdom is sometimes content with less power than to the peace and defense of the commonwealth is necessarily required from whence it come off to pass that when the exercise of the power laid by is for the public safety to be resumed it have the resemblance of an unjust act which dispose of great numbers of men when occasion is presented to rebel in the same manner as the bodies of children gotten by diseased parents are subject either to untimely death or to purge the ill quality derived from their vicious conception by breaking out into vials and scabs and when kings deny themselves some such necessary power it is not always though sometimes out of ignorance of what is necessary to the office they undertake but many times out of the hope to recover the same again at their pleasure wherein they reason not well because such as will hold them to their promises shall be maintained against them by foreign commonwealths who in order to the good of their own subjects let slip few occasions to weaken the state of their neighbors so was Thomas Beckett archbishop of Canterbury supported against Henry II by the pope the subjection of ecclesiastics to the commonwealth having been dispensed with by William the conqueror at his reception when he took an oath not to infringe the liberty of the church and so were the barons whose power was by William Rufus to have their help in transferring the succession from his elder brother to himself increased to a degree inconsistent with the sovereign power maintained in their rebellion against King John by the French nor does this happen in monarchy only for whereas the style of the ancient Roman Commonwealth was the senate and people of Rome neither senate nor people pretended to the whole power which first caused the seditions of Tiberius Cracus Caius Cracus Lutsus Saturnius and others and afterwards the wars between the senate and the people under Marius and Silla and again under Pompey and Cesar to the extinction of their democracy and the setting up of monarchy the people of Athens bound themselves but from one only action which was that no man on pain of death should propound the renewing of the war for the island of Salamis and yet thereby if Solon had not caused to be given out he was mad and afterwards in gesture and habit of a mad man and in verse propounded it to the people that flocked about him they had had an enemy perpetually in readiness even at the gates of their city such damage or shifts are all commonwealths forced to that have their power never so little limited in the second place I observe the diseases of the commonwealth that proceed from the poison of seditious doctrines where of one is that every private man is judge of good and evil actions this is true in the condition of mere nature where there are no civil laws and also under civil government in such cases as are not determined by the law but otherwise it is manifest that the measure of good and evil actions is the civil law and the judge the legislator who is always representative of the commonwealth from this false doctrine men are disposed to debate with themselves and dispute the commands of the commonwealth and afterwards to obey or disobey them as in their private judgments they shall think fit whereby the commonwealth is distracted and weakened another doctrine repugnant to civil society is that whatsoever a man does against his conscience is sin and it depends on the presumption of making himself judge of good and evil for a man's conscience and his judgment is the same thing and as the judgment so also the conscience may be erroneous therefore though he that is subject to no civil law sin if in all he does against his conscience because he has no other rule to follow but his own reason yet it is not so with him that lives in a commonwealth because the law is the public conscience by which he have already undertaken to be guided otherwise in such diversity as there is of private consciences which are but private opinions the commonwealth must needs be distracted and no man dare to obey the sovereign power farther than it shall seem good in his own eyes it have been also commonly taught that faith and sanctity are not to be attained by study and reason but by supernatural inspiration or infusion which granted i see not why any man should render a reason of his faith or why every christian should not be also a prophet or why any man should take the law of his country rather than his own inspiration for the rule of his action and thus we fall again into the fault of taking upon us to judge of good and evil or to make judges of it such private men as pretend to be supernaturally inspired to the dissolution of all civil government faith comes by hearing and hearing by those accidents which guide us into the presence of them that speak to us which accidents are all contrived by god almighty and yet are not supernatural but only for the great number of them that concur to every effect unobservable faith and sanctity are indeed not very frequent but yet they are not miracles but brought to pass by education discipline correction and other natural ways by which god work of them in his elect at such time as he think a fit and these three opinions pernicious to peace and government have in this part of the world proceeded chiefly from tongues and pens of unlearned divines who joining the words of holy scripture together otherwise is agreeable to reason do what they can to make men think that sanctity and natural reason cannot stand together a fourth opinion repugnant to the nature of the commonwealth is this that he that have the sovereign power is subject to the civil laws it is true that sovereigns are all subject to the laws of nature because such laws be divine and cannot by any man or commonwealth be abrogated but to those laws which the sovereign himself that is which the commonwealth make of he is not subject for to be subject to laws is to be subject to the commonwealth that is to the sovereign representative that is to himself which is not subjection but freedom from the laws which error because it set of the laws above the sovereign set of also a judge above him and a power to punish him which is to make a new sovereign and again for the same reason a third to punish the second and so continually without end to the confusion and dissolution of the commonwealth a fifth doctrine that tend to the dissolution of the commonwealth is that every private man has an absolute propriety in his goods such as excluded the right of the sovereign every man has indeed a propriety that excludes the right of every other subject and he has it only from the sovereign power without the protection whereof every other man should have right to the same but the right of the sovereign also be excluded he cannot perform the office they have put him into which is to defend them both from foreign enemies and from the injuries of one another and consequently there is no longer a commonwealth and if the propriety of subjects exclude not the right of the sovereign representative to their goods much less to their offices of judicature or execution in which they represent the sovereign himself there is a sixth doctrine plainly and directly against the essence of a commonwealth and it is this that the sovereign power may be divided for what is it to divide the power of a commonwealth but to dissolve it for powers divided mutually destroy each other and for these doctrines men are chiefly beholding to some of those that making profession of the laws endeavor to make them depend upon their own learning and not upon the legislative power and as false doctrine so also oftentimes the example of different government in a neighboring nation disposed of men to alteration of the form already settled so the people of the jews were stirred up to reject god and to call upon the prophet samuel for king after the manner of the nations so also the lesser cities of greece were continually disturbed with seditions of the aristocratical and democratical factions one part of almost every commonwealth desiring to imitate the lecidemonians the other the atanians and i doubt not but many men have been contented to see the late troubles in england out of an imitation of the low countries supposing they're needed no more to grow rich than to change as they had done the form of their government for the constitution of man's nature is of itself subject to desire novelty when therefore they are provoked to the same by the neighborhood also of those that have been enriched by it it is almost impossible to be content with those that solicit them to change and love the first beginnings though they be grieved with the continuance of disorder like hot bloods that having gotten the itch tear themselves with their own nails till they can endure the smart no longer and as to rebellion in particular against monarchy one of the most frequent causes of it is the reading of the books of policy and histories of the ancient greeks and romans from which young men and all others that are unprovided of the antidote of solid reason receiving a strong and delightful impression of the great exploits of war achieved by the conductors of their armies receive with all a pleasing idea of all they have done besides and imagine their great prosperity not to have proceeded from the emulation of particular men but from the virtue of their popular form of government not considering the frequent seditions and civil wars produced by the imperfection of their policy from the reading i say of such books men have undertaken to kill their kings because the greek and latin writers in their books and discourses of policy make it lawful and laudable for any man so to do provided before he do it he call him tyrant for they say not regicide that is killing of a king but tyrannicide that is killing of a tyrant is lawful from the same books they that live under a monarch conceive the opinion that the subjects in a popular commonwealth enjoy liberty but that in a monarchy they are all slaves i say they that live under a monarchy conceive such an opinion not that they live under a popular government for they find no such matter in some i cannot imagine how anything can be more prejudicial to a monarchy than the allowing of such books to be publicly read without present applying such correctives of discreet masters as are fit to take away their venom which venom i will not doubt to compare to the biting of the mad dog which is a disease that physicians call hydrophobia or fear of water for as he that is so bitten has a continual torment of thirst and yet a pour of water and is in such an estate as if the poison endeavored to convert him into a dog so when a monarchy is once bitten to the quick by those democratical writers that continually snarl at that estate it want if nothing more than a strong monarch which nevertheless out of a certain tyrannophobia or fear of being strongly governed when they have him they a poor as there have been doctors that hold there be three souls in a man so there be also that think there may be more souls that is more sovereigns than one in a commonwealth and set up a supremacy against the sovereignty cannons against laws and the ghostly authority against the civil working on men's minds with words and distinctions that of themselves signify nothing but berate by their obscurity that their walk of as something invisibly another kingdom as it were a kingdom of fairies in the dark now seeing it is manifest that the civil power and the power of the commonwealth is the same thing and that supremacy and the power of making cannons and granting faculties imply of a commonwealth it follow with that where one is sovereign another supreme where one can make laws and another make cannons there must need be two commonwealths of one and the same subjects which is a kingdom divided in itself and cannot stand for notwithstanding the insignificant distinction of temporal and ghostly they are still two kingdoms and every subject is subject to two masters for seeing the ghostly power challenge of the right to declare what is sin it challenges by consequence to declare what is law sin being nothing but the transgression of the law and again the civil power challenging to declare what is law every subject must obey two masters who both will have their commands be observed as law which is impossible or if it be but one kingdom either the civil which is the power of the commonwealth must be subordinate to the ghostly and then there is no sovereignty but the ghostly or the ghostly must be subordinate to the temporal and then there is no supremacy but the temporal when therefore these two powers oppose one another the commonwealth cannot but be in great danger of civil war and dissolution for the civil authority being more visible and standing in the clearer light of natural reason cannot choose but draw to it in all times a very considerable part of the people and the spiritual though it stand in the darkness of school distinctions and hard words yet because the fear of darkness and ghosts is greater than other fears cannot want a party sufficient to trouble and sometimes to destroy a commonwealth and this is a disease which not unfitly may be compared to the epilepsy or falling sickness which the jews talk to be one kind of possession by spirits in the body natural for as in this disease there is an unnatural spirit or wind in the head that obstructed the roots of the nerves and moving them violently take of the motion which naturally they should have from the power of the soul in the brain thereby cause of violent and irregular motions which men call convulsions in the parts in so much as he that is seized therewith fall of down sometimes into the water and sometimes into the fire as a man deprived of his senses so also in the body politic when the spiritual power move with the members of a commonwealth by the terror of punishments and hope of rewards which are the nerves of it otherwise and by the civil power which is the soul of the commonwealth they ought to be moved and by strange and hard words suffocates their understanding it must needs thereby distract the people and either overwhelm the commonwealth with oppression or cast it into the fire of a civil war sometimes also in the merely civil government there be more than one soul as when the power of levying money which is the nutritive faculty has depended on a general assembly the power of conduct and command which is the motive faculty on one man and the power of making laws which is the rational faculty on the accidental consent not only of those two but also of a third this and danger with the commonwealth sometimes for want of consent to good laws but most often for want of such nourishment as is necessary to life and motion for although few perceive that such government is not government but division of the commonwealth into three factions and call it mixed monarchy yet the truth is that it is not one independent commonwealth but three independent factions nor one representative person but three in the kingdom of god there may be three persons independent without breach of unity in god that reigneth but where men reign that be subject to diversity of opinions it cannot be so and therefore if the king bear the person of the people and the general assembly bear also the person of the people and another assembly bear the person of a part of the people they are not one person nor one sovereign but three persons and three sovereigns to what disease in the natural body of men i may exactly compare this irregularity of the commonwealth i know not but i have seen a man that had another man growing out of his side with a head arms breast and stomach of his own if he had had another man growing out of his other side the comparison might then have been exact hitherto i have named such diseases of the commonwealth as are of the greatest and most present danger there be other not so great which nevertheless are not unfit to be observed as first the difficulty of raising money for the necessary uses of the commonwealth especially in the approach of war this difficulty arises from the opinion that every subject half of a propriety in his lands and goods exclusive of the sovereign's right to the use of the same from whence it cometh to pass that the sovereign power which foreseeeth the necessities and dangers of the commonwealth finding the passage of money to the public treasury obstructed by the tenacity of the people whereas it ought to extend itself to encounter and prevent such dangers in their beginnings contractive itself as long as it can and when it cannot longer struggles with the people by stratagems of law to obtain little sums which not sufficing he is feign at least violently to open the way for present supply or perish and being put off into these extremities at last reduce if the people to their due temper or else the commonwealth must perish in so much as we may compare this distemper very aptly to an ague wherein the fleshy parts being congealed or by venomous matter obstructed the veins which by their natural course empty themselves into the heart are not as they ought to be supplied from the arteries whereby they're succeeded at first a cold contraction and trembling of the limbs and afterwards a hot and strong endeavor of the heart to force a passage for the blood and before it can do that content of itself with the small refreshments of such things as cool for a time till if nature be strong enough it break at last the contumacy of the parts obstructed and dissipate of the venom into sweat or if nature be too weak the patient die of again there is sometimes in a commonwealth a disease which resembles the pleurisy and that is when the treasury of the commonwealth flowing out of its due course is gathered together in too much abundance in one or a few private men by monopolies or by farms of the public revenues in the same manner as the blood in a pleurisy getting into the membrane of the breast breed of there and inflammation accompanied with a fever and painful stitches also the popularity of the potent subject unless the commonwealth have very good caution of his fidelity is a dangerous disease because the people which should receive their motion from the authority of the sovereign by the flattery and by the reputation of an ambitious man are drawn away from their obedience to the laws to follow a man of whose virtues and designs they have no knowledge and this is commonly of more danger in a popular government than in a monarchy because an army is of so great force and multitude as it may easily be made believe they are the people by this means it was that Julius Caesar who was set up by the people against the senate having one to himself the affections of his army made himself master both of senate and people and this proceeding of popular and ambitious men is plain rebellion and may be resembled to the effects of witchcraft another infirmity of the commonwealth is the immoderate greatness of the town when it is able to furnish out of its own circuit the number and expense of a great army as also the great number of corporations which are as it were many lesser commonwealths in the bowels of a greater like warrants in the entrails of a natural man to this may be added liberty of disputing against absolute power by pretenders to political prudence which though bred for the most part in the lease of the people yet animated by false doctrines are perpetually meddling with the fundamental laws to the molestation of the commonwealth like the little warrants which physicians call ascorides we may further add the insatiable appetite or bulimia of enlarging dominion with the incurable wounds thereby many times received from the enemy and the winds of ununited conquests which are many times a burden and with less danger lost than kept as also the lethargy of ease and consumption of riot and vain expense lastly when in a war foreign or intestine the enemies get a final victory so as the forces of the commonwealth keeping the field no longer there is no further protection of subjects in their loyalty then is the commonwealth dissolved and every man at liberty to protect himself by such courses as his own discretion shall suggest unto him for the sovereign is the public soul giving life and motion to the commonwealth which expiring the members are governed by it no more than the carcass of man by his departed though immortal soul for though the right of a sovereign monarch cannot be extinguished by the act of another yet the obligation of the members may for he that wants protection may seek it anywhere and when he hath it is obliged without fraudulent pretense of having submitted himself out of fear to protect his protection as long as he is able but when the power of an assembly is once suppressed the right of the same perish of utterly because the assembly itself is extinct and consequently there is no possibility for sovereignty to re-enter end of chapter 29 chapter 30 of Leviathan this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Nicholas James Bridgewater Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes chapter 30 of the office of the sovereign representative the office of the sovereign be it a monarch or an assembly consisteth in the end for which he was trusted with the sovereign power namely the procuration of the safety of the people to which he's obliged by the law of nature and to render an account thereof to God the author of that law and to none but him but by safety here is not meant to bear preservation but also all other contentments of life which every man by lawful industry without danger or hurt to the commonwealth shall acquire to himself and this is intended should be done not by care applied individuals further than their protection from injuries when they shall complain but by a general providence contained in public instruction both of doctrine and example and in the making and executing of good laws to which individual persons may apply their own cases and because if the essential rights of sovereignty specified before in the 18th chapter be taken away the commonwealth is thereby dissolved and every man returneth into the condition and calamity of a war with every other man which is the greatest evil that can happen in this life it is the office of the sovereign to maintain those rights entire and consequently against his duty first to transfer to another or to lay from himself any of them for he that deserteth the means deserteth the ends and he deserteth the means that being the sovereign acknowledges himself subject to the civil laws and renounces the power of supreme drudicature or of making war a peace by his own authority or of judging of the necessities of the commonwealth or of levying money and soldiers when and as much as in his own conscience he shall judge necessary or of making officers and ministers both of war and peace or of appointing teachers and examining what doctrines are conformable or contrary to the defense peace and good of the people secondly it is against his duty to let the people be ignorant or misinformed of the grounds and reasons of those his essential rights because thereby men are easy to be seduced and drawn to resist him when the commonwealth shall require their use and exercise and the grounds of these rights have the rather need to be diligently and truly taught because they cannot be maintained by any civil law or terror of legal punishment for a civil law that shall forbid rebellion and such is all resistance to the essential rights of sovereignty is not as a civil law any obligation but by virtue only of the law of nature that forbiddeth the violation of faith which natural obligation if men know not they cannot know the right of any law the sovereign maketh and for the punishment they take it but for an act of hostility which when they think they have strength enough they will endeavor by acts of hostility to avoid as i have heard some say that justice is but a word without substance and that whatsoever a man can by force or are to acquire to himself not only in the condition of war but also in a commonwealth is his own which i have already showed to be false so there be also that maintain that there are no grounds nor principles of reason to sustain those essential rights which makes sovereignty absolute for if there were they would have been found out in some place or other whereas we see there has not hitherto been any commonwealth where those rights have been acknowledged or challenged wherein they argue as ill as if the savage people of america should deny there were any grounds or principles of reason so to build a house as to last as long as the materials because they never yet saw any so well built time and industry produce every day new knowledge and as the art of well-building is derived from principles of reason observed by industrious men that had long studied the nature of materials and the diverse effects of figure and proportion long after mankind began though poorly to build so long time after men have begun to constitute commonwealths imperfect and apt to relapse into disorder there may principles of reason be found out by industrious meditation to make use of them or be neglected by them or not concern with my particular interest at this day very little but supposing that these of mine are not such principles of reason yet am i sure they are principles from authority of scripture as i shall make it appear when i shall come to speak of the kingdom of god administered by moses over the jews his peculiar people by covenant but they say again that though the principles be right yet common people are not of capacity enough to be made to understand them i should be glad that the rich and potent subjects of a kingdom or those that are counted the most learned were no less incapable than they but all men know that the obstructions to this kind of doctrine proceed not so much from the difficulty of the matter as from the interest of them that are to learn potent men digest hardly anything that set up a power to bridle their affections and learned men anything that discovered their errors and thereby lessen at their authority whereas the common people's minds unless they be tainted with dependents on the potent or scribbled over with the opinions of their doctors are like clean paper fit to receive whatsoever by public authority shall be imprinted in them shall whole nations be brought acquiesce in the great mysteries of christian religion which are above reason and millions of men be made believe that the same body may be in innumerable places at one and the same time which is against reason and shall not men be able by their teaching and preaching protected by the law to make that received which is so consonant to reason that any un predicated man needs no more to learn it than to hear it i conclude therefore that in the instruction of the people in the essential rights which are the natural and fundamental laws of sovereignty there is no difficulty whilst the sovereign has his power entire but what proceeds from his own fault or the fault of those who be trusted in the administration of the commonwealth and consequently it is his duty to cause them so to be instructed and not only his duty but his benefit also and security against the danger that may arrive to himself in his natural person from rebellion and to descend to particulars the people ought to be taught first that they ought not to be in love with any form of government they see in their neighbour nations more than with their own nor whatsoever present prosperity they behold in nations that otherwise govern than they to desire change for the prosperity of a people ruled by an aristocratical or democratical assembly cometh not from aristocracy nor from democracy but from the obedience and concord of the subjects nor do the people flourish in a monarchy because one man has the right to rule them but because they obey him take away in any kind of state the obedience and consequently the concord of the people and they shall not only not flourish but in short time be dissolved and they that go about by disobedience to do no more than reform the commonwealth shall find they do thereby destroy it like the foolish daughters of Pellius in the fable which desiring to renew the youth of their decrepit father did by the council of media cut him in pieces and boil him together with strange herbs but made not of him a new man this desire of change is like the breach of the first of god's commandments for there god says non habibis deos alienos thou shalt not have the gods of other nations and in another place concerning kings that they are gods secondly they are to be taught that they ought not to be led with admiration of the virtue of any of their fellow subjects how high soever he stand nor how conspicuously so ever he shine in the commonwealth nor of any assembly except the sovereign assembly so as to defer to them any obedience or honor appropriate to the sovereign only whom in their particular stations they represent nor to receive any influence from them but such as is conveyed by them from the sovereign authority for that sovereign cannot be imagined to love his people as he ought that is not jealous of them but suffers them by the flattery of popular men to be seduced from their loyalty as they have often been not only secretly but openly so as to proclaim marriage with them infakia ecclesiae by preachers and by publishing the same in the open streets which may fitly be compared to the violation of the second of the ten commandments thirdly in consequence to this they ought to be informed how great fault it is to speak evil of the sovereign representative whether one man or an assembly of men or to argue and dispute his power or any way to use his name irrevenently whereby he may be brought into contempt with his people and their obedience in which the safety of the commonwealth consists of slackened which doctrine the third commandment by resemblance pointeth to fourthly seeing people cannot be taught this nor when it is taught remember it nor after one generation passed so much as know in whom the sovereign power is placed without setting apart from their ordinary labor some certain times in which they may attend those that are appointed to instruct them it is necessary that some such times be determined wherein they may assemble together and after prayers and praises given to god the sovereign of sovereigns hear those their duties told them and the positive laws such as generally concern them all read and expounded and be put in mind of the authority that maketh them laws to this end had the jews every seventh day a Sabbath in which the law was read and expounded and in the solemnity whereof they were put in mind that their king was god that having created the world in six days he rested the seventh day and by their resting on it from their labor that that god was their king which redeemed them from their servile and painful labor in Egypt and gave them a time after they had rejoiced in god to take joy also in themselves by lawful recreation so that the first table of the commandments is spent all in setting down the sum of god's absolute power not only as god but as king by pact in peculiar of the jews and may therefore give light to those that have the sovereign power conferred on them by the consent of men to see what doctrine they ought to teach their subjects and because the first instruction of children depended on the care of their parents it is necessary that they should be obedient to them whilst they are under their tuition and not only so but that also afterwards as gratitude requires they acknowledge the benefit of their education by external signs of honor to which end they ought to be taught that originally the father of every man was also his sovereign lord with power over him of life and death and that the father of families when by instituting a commonwealth they resigned that absolute power yet it was never intended they should lose the honor due unto them for their education for to relinquish such right was not necessary to the institution of sovereign power nor would there be any reason why any man should desire to have children or take the care to nourish and instruct them if they are afterwards to have no other benefit from them than from other men and this accords with the fifth commandment again every sovereign ought to cause justice to be taught which consists of them taking from no man what is his is as much as to say to cause men to be taught not to deprive their neighbor by violence or fraud of anything which by the sovereign authority is theirs of things held in propriety those that are dearest to a man or his own life and limbs and in the next degree in most men those that concern conjugal affection and after them riches and means of living therefore the people are to be taught to abstain from violence to one another's person by private revenges from violation of conjugal honor and from forcibly rapine and fraudulent surreption of one another's goods for which purpose also it is necessary they be showed the evil consequences of false judgment by corruption either of judges or witnesses whereby the distinction of propriety is taken away and justice becomes of no effect all which things are intimated in the sixth seventh eighth and ninth commandments lastly they are to be taught that not only the unjust facts but the designs and intentions to do them though by accident hindered are injustice which consists of in the privacy of the will as well as in the irregularity of the act and this is the intention of the tenth commandment and the sum of the second table which is reduced all to this one commandment of mutual charity thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself as the sum of the first table is reduced to the love of god whom they had then newly received as their king as for the means and conduits by which the people may receive this instruction we are to search by what means so many opinions contrary to the peace of mankind upon weak and false principles have nevertheless been so deeply rooted in them i mean those which i have in the precedent chapter specified as that men shall judge of what is lawful and unlawful not by the law itself but by their own private judgments that subjects sinned in obeying the commands of the commonwealth unless they themselves have first judged them to be lawful that their propriety and their riches is such as to exclude the dominion which the commonwealth that they were the same that it is lawful for subjects to kill such as they call tyrants that the sovereign power may be divided and alike which come to be instilled into the people by this means they whom necessity or covetousness keep as a tent on their trades and labor and they on the other side whom superfluity and sloth carryeth after the essential pleasures which two sorts of men take up the greatest part of mankind being diverted from the deep meditation which the learning of truth not only in the matter of natural justice but also of all other sciences necessarily required receive the notions of their duty chiefly from divines in the pulpit and partly from such of their neighbors or familiar acquaintance as having the faculty of discoursing readily and plausibly seem wiser and better learned in cases of law and conscience than themselves and the divines and such others as make sure of learning derive their knowledge from the universities and from the schools of law or from the books which by men eminent in those schools and universities have been published it is therefore manifest that the instruction of the people dependeth wholly on the right teaching of youth in the universities but are not may some men say the universities of england learn it enough or ready to do that or is it you will undertake to teach the universities hard questions yet to the first i doubt not to answer that till towards the later end of henry the eighth the power of the pope was always upheld against the power of the commonwealth principally by the universities and that the doctrines maintained by so many preachers against the sovereign power of the king and by so many lawyers and others that had their education there is a sufficient argument that though the universities were not authors of those false doctrines yet they knew not how to plant the true for in such a contradiction of opinions it is most certain that they have not been sufficiently instructed and is no wonder if they yet retain a relish of that subtle liquor wherewith they were first seasoned against the civil authority but to the later question it is not fit nor needful for me to say either i or no for any man that sees what i am doing may easily perceive what i think the safety of the people require a further from him or them that have the sovereign power that justice be equally administered to all degrees of people that is that a well the rich and mighty as poor and obscure persons may be righted of the injuries done them so as the great may have no greater hope of impunity when they do violence dishonor any injury to the meaner sort than when one of these does the like to one of them for in this consist of equity to which as being a precept of the law of nature a sovereign is as much subject as any of the meanest of his people all breaches of the law are offenses against the commonwealth but there be some that are also against private persons those that concern the commonwealth only may without breach of equity be pardoned for every man may pardon what is done against himself according to his own discretion but an offense against the private man cannot in equity be pardoned without the consent of him that is injured or reasonable satisfaction the inequality of subjects proceeded from the acts of sovereign power and therefore has no more place in the presence of the sovereign that is to say in a court of justice than the inequality between kings and their subjects in the presence of the king of kings the honor of great persons is to be valued for their beneficence and the aids they give to men of inferior rank or not at all and the violences oppressions and injuries they do are not extenuated but aggravated by the greatness of their persons because they have least need to commit them the consequences of this partiality towards the great recede in this manner impunity maketh insolence insolence hatred and hatred an endeavour to pull down all oppressing and contumelious greatness though with the ruin of the commonwealth to equal justice appertaineth also the equal imposition of taxes the equality or of dependeth not on the equality of riches but on the equality of the debt that every man oweeth to the commonwealth for his defense it is not enough for a man to labor for the maintenance of his life but also to fight if need be for the securing of his labor they must either do as the jews did after their return from captivity and re-edifying the temple build with one hand and hold the sword in the other or else they must hire others to fight for them for the impositions that are laid on the people by the sovereign power are nothing else but the wages due to them that hold the public sword to defend private men in the exercise of several trades and callings seeing then the benefits that everyone receive with thereby is the enjoyment of life which is equally dear to poor and rich the debt which a poor man oweeth them that defend his life is the same which a rich man oweeth for the defense of his saving that the rich who have the service for the poor may be debtors not only for their own persons but for many more which considered the equality of imposition consists us rather in the equality of that which is consumed than of the riches of the persons that consume the same for what reason is there that he which laboreth much and sparing the fruits of his labor consumeeth little should be more charged than he that liveth idly getting little and spendeth all he gets seeing the one hath no more protection from the commonwealth than the other but when the impositions are laid upon those things which men consume every man payeth equally for what he useth nor is the commonwealth defrauded by the luxurious waste of private men and whereas many men by accident uninevitable become unable to maintain themselves by the labor they ought not to be left to the charity of private persons but to be provided for as far forth as the necessities of nature require by the laws of the commonwealth for as it is uncharitableness in any man to neglect the impotent so it is in the sovereign of the commonwealth to expose them to the hazard of such uncertain charity but for such as have strong bodies the cases otherwise they are to be forced to work and to avoid the excuse of not finding employment there ought to be such laws as may encourage all manner of arts as navigation agriculture fishing and all manner of manufacture that requires labor the multitude of poor and yet strong people still increasing they are to be transplanted into countries not sufficiently inhabited where nevertheless they are not to exterminate those they find there but constrain them to inhabit closer together and not range a great deal of ground to snatch what they find but to court each little plot with art and labor to give them their sustenance in due season and when all the world is overcharged with inhabitants then the last remedy of all is war which provideeth for every man by victory or death to the care of the sovereign belongeth the making of good laws but what is a good law by a good law i mean not a just law for no law can be unjust the law is made by the sovereign power and all that is done by such power is warranted and owned by every one of the people and that which every man will have so no man can say is unjust it is in the laws of a commonwealth as in the laws of gaming whatsoever the gamesters all agree on is injustice to none of them a good law is that which is needful for the good of the people and with all perspicuous for the use of laws which are but rules authorized is not to bind the people from all voluntary actions but to direct and keep them in such a motion as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires rashness or indiscretion as hedges are set not to stop travelers but to keep them in the way and therefore a law is not needful having not the true end of a law is not good a law may be conceived to be good when it is for the benefit of the sovereign though it be not necessary for the people but it is not so for the good of the sovereign and people cannot be separated it is a weak sovereign that has weak subjects and a weak people whose sovereign wanted power to rule them at his will unnecessary laws are not good laws but traps for money which where the right of sovereign powers acknowledged are superfluous and where it is not acknowledged insufficient to defend the people the perspicuity consists of not so much in the words of the law itself as in a declaration of the causes and motives for which it was made that is that shows us the meaning of the legislator and the meaning of the legislator known the law is more easily understood by few than many words for all words are subject to ambiguity and therefore multiplication of words in the body of the law is multiplication of ambiguity besides it seems to imply by too much diligence that whosoever can evade the words is without the compass of the law and this is a cause of many unnecessary processes for when i consider how short were the laws of ancient times and how they grew by degrees still longer me thinks i see a contention between the penners and pleaders of the law the former seeking to circumscribe the later and the later to evade their circumscriptions and the pleaders have got the victory it belongs therefore to the office of a legislator such as is in all common wealth the supreme representative be it one man or an assembly to make the reason perspicuous why the law was made and the body of the law itself as short but in as proper and significant terms as may be it belongeth also to the office of the sovereign to make a right application of punishments and rewards and seeing the end of punishing is not revenge and discharge of color but correction either of the offender of others by example the severest punishments are to be inflicted for those crimes that are of most danger to the public such as are those which proceed from malice to the government established those that spring from contempt of justice those that provoke indignation in the multitude and those which unpunish seem authorized as when they are committed by sons servants of favorites of men in authority for indignation carryeth men not only against the actors and authors of injustice but against all power that is likely to protect them as in the case of Tarquin when for the insolent act of one of his sons he was driven out of Rome and the monarchy itself dissolved but crimes of infirmity such as are those which proceed from great provocation from great fear great need or from ignorance whether the fact be a great crime or not there is a place many times for lenity without prejudice to the common wealth and lenity when there is such place for it is required by the law of nature the punishment of the leaders and teachers in a commotion not the poor seduced people when they are punished can profit the common wealth by their example to be severe to the people is to punish that ignorance which may in great part be imputed to the sovereign whose fault it was that they were no better instructed in like Manrit belongeth to the office and duty of the sovereign to apply his rewards always so as there may arise from them benefit of the common wealth wherein consists of their use and end and is then done when they that have well served the common wealth are with as little expense of the common treasure as is possible so well recompensed as others thereby may be encouraged both to serve the same as faithfully as they can and to study the arts by which they may be unable to do it better to buy with money or preferment from a popular ambitious subject to be quiet and assist from making ill impressions in the minds of the people has nothing of the nature of reward which is a day not for disservice but for service past nor a sign of gratitude but of fear nor does it tend to the benefit but to the damage of the public it is a contention with ambition like that of Hercules with the monster hydra which having many heads for every one that was vanquished there grew up three for in like manner when the stubbornness of one popular man is overcome with reward there rise many more by the example that do the same mischief in hope of like benefit and as all sorts of manufacture so also malice increases by being vendible and though sometimes the civil war may be differed by such ways as that yet the danger grows still the greater and the public ruin more assured it is therefore against the duty of the sovereign to whom the public safety is committed to reward those that aspire to greatness by disturbing the peace of their country and not rather to oppose the beginnings of such men with a little danger then after a longer time with greater another business of the sovereign is to choose good counselors i mean such whose advice he is to take in the government of the common wealth for this word council concilium corrupted from concidium is a large signification and comprehendeth all assemblies of men that sit together not only to deliberate what is to be done here after but also to judge of facts past and of law for the present i take it here in the first sense only and in this sense there is no choice of counsel neither in a democracy nor aristocracy because the person's counseling are members of the person counseled the choice of counselors therefore is to monarchy in which the sovereign that endeavor not to make choice of those that in every kind of the most able discharges not his office as he ought to the most able counselors are they that have least hope of benefit by giving evil counsel and most knowledge of those things that can juice to the peace and defense of the common wealth it is a hard matter to know who expected benefit from public troubles but the signs that guide to a just suspicion is the soothing of the people in their unreasonable or irremediable grievances by men whose estates are not sufficient to discharge their custom expenses and may easily be observed by anyone whom it concerns to know it but to know who has most knowledge of the public affairs is yet harder and they that know them need them a great deal the less for to know who knows the rules almost of any art is a great degree of the knowledge of the same art because no man can be assured of the truth of another's rules but he that is first taught to understand them but the best signs of knowledge of any art are much conversing in it and constant good effects of it good counsel comes not by lot nor by inheritance and therefore there is no more reason to expect good advice from the rich or noble in matter of state than in delineating the dimensions of a fortress unless we shall think there needs no method in the study of the politics as there does in the study of geometry but only to be look us on which is not so for the politics is the hardest study of the two whereas in these parts of Europe it has been taken for a right of certain persons to have place in the highest council of state by inheritance it is derived from the conquests of the ancient Germans or in many absolute lords joining together to conquer other nations would not enter into the confederacy without such privileges as might be marks of difference in time following between their posterity and the posterity of the subjects which privileges being inconsistent with the sovereign power by the favor of the sovereign they may seem to keep but contending for them as they're right they must needs by degrees let them go and have at last no further honor then adhere if naturally to their abilities and how able so ever be the counselors in any affair the benefit of their council is greater when they give everyone is advice and reasons of it apart then when they do it in an assembly by way of orations and when they have premeditated then when they speak on the sudden both because they have more time to survey the consequences of action and a less subject to be carried away to contradiction through envy emulation or other passions arising from the difference of opinion the best counsel in those things that concern not to the nations but only the ease and benefit the subjects may enjoy by laws that look only inward is to be taken from the general informations and complaints of the people of each province who are best acquainted with their own wants and ought therefore when they demand nothing in derogation of the essential rights of sovereignty to be diligently taken notice of for without those essential rights as I have often before said the commonwealth cannot at all subsist a commander of an army in chief if he be not popular shall not be beloved nor feared as he ought to be by his army and consequently cannot perform that office with good success he must therefore be industrious valiant affable liberal and fortunate that he may gain an opinion both of sufficiency and of loving his soldiers this is popularity and breeds in the soldiers both desire and courage to recommend themselves to his favor and protects the severity of the general in punishing when need is the mutinous or negligent soldiers but this love of soldiers if caution be not given of the commander's fidelity is a dangerous thing to sovereign power especially when it is in the hands of an assembly not popular it belongeth therefore to the safety of the people both that they be good conductors and faithful subjects to whom the sovereign commits his armies but when the sovereign himself is popular that is reverenced and beloved of his people there is no danger at all from the popularity of a subject for soldiers are never so generally unjust as to side with their captain though they love him against their sovereign when they love not only his person but also his cause and therefore those who by violence have at any time suppressed the power of their lawful sovereign before they could settle themselves in his place have been always put to the trouble of contriving their titles to save the people from the shame of receiving them to have a known right to sovereign power is so popular equality as he that has it needs no more for his own part to turn the hearts of his subjects to him but that they see him able absolutely to govern his own family nor on the part of his enemies but at a spanning of their armies for the greatest and most active part of mankind has never hitherto been well contented with the present concerning the offices of one sovereign to another which are comprehended in that law which is commonly called the law of nations I need not say anything in this place because the law of nations and the law of nature is the same thing and every sovereign have the same right in procuring the safety of his people that any particular man can have in procuring the safety of his own body and the same law that dictates to men that have no civil government what they ought to do and what to avoid in regard of one another dictates the same to common wealths that is to the consciences of sovereign princes and sovereign assemblies there being no court of natural justice but in the conscience only we're not man but god reyneath whose laws such of them as oblige all mankind in respect of god as he is the author of nature unnatural and in respect of the same god as he is king of kings are laws but of the kingdom of god as king of kings and as king also of peculiar people I shall speak in the rest of this discourse end of chapter 30 chapter 31 of leviathan this is a libravox recording all libravox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit libravox.org recording by leon mire leviathan by thomas hobs chapter 31 of the kingdom of god by nature that the condition of mere nature that is to say of absolute liberty such as is theirs that neither our sovereigns nor subjects is anarchy in the condition of war that the precepts by which men are guided to avoid that condition are the laws of nature that a common wealth without sovereign power is but a word without substance and cannot stand that subjects owe to sovereign simple obedience and all things wherein their obedience is not repugnant to the laws of god I have sufficiently proved in that which I have already written they're once only for the entire knowledge of civil duty to know what are those laws of god for without that a man knows not when he has commanded anything by the civil power whether it be contrary to the law of god or not and so either by too much solo obedience offends the divine majesty or through fear of offending god transgresses the commandments of the commonwealth to avoid both these rocks it is necessary to know what are the laws divine and seeing the knowledge of all law dependent on the knowledge of the sovereign power I shall say something in that which followeth of the kingdom of god god is king let the earth rejoice psalms 97 1 say it the psalmist and again god is king though the nations be angry and he that sit at the cherry of them though the earth be moved I bid 99 1 whether men will or not they must be subject always to the divine power by denying the existence or providence of god men may shake off their ease but not their yoke but to call this power of god which extended itself not only to man but also to beasts and plants and bodies inanimate by the name of kingdom is but a metaphorical use of the word for he only is properly said to reign that governs his subjects by his word and by promise of rewards to those that obey it by threatening them with punishment that obey it not subjects therefore in the kingdom of god are not bodies inanimate nor creatures irrational because they understand no precepts as his nor atheists nor they that believe not that god has any care of the actions of mankind because they acknowledge no word for his nor have hope of his rewards or fear of his threatenings they therefore that believe there is a god that governeth the world and have given precepts and propounded rewards and punishments to mankind are god subjects all the rest are to be understood as enemies to rule by words requires that such words be manifestly made known for else there are no laws for to the nature of laws belong at the sufficient and clear promulgation such as may take away the excuse of ignorance which in the laws of men is but of one only kind and that is proclamation or promulgation by the voice of man but god declared his laws three ways by the dictates of natural reason by revelation and by the voice of some man to whom by the operation of miracles he procured with credit with the rest from hence there arises a triple word of god rational sensible and prophetic to which corresponded the triple hearing right reason sense supernatural and faith as for sense supernatural which consisteth in revelation or inspiration there have not been any universal laws so given because god speaketh not in that manner but to particular persons and to diverse men diverse things from the difference between the other two kinds of god's word rational and prophetic there may be attributed to god a twofold kingdom natural wherein he governeth as many of mankind as acknowledge his providence by the natural dictates of right reason and prophetic wherein having chosen out one peculiar nation the jews for his subjects he govern them and none but them not only by natural reason but by positive laws which he gave them by the mouths of his holy prophets of the natural kingdom of god I intend to speak in this chapter the right of nature whereby god reigneth over men and punisheth those that break his laws is to be derived not from his creating them as if he required obedience as of gratitude for his benefits but from his irresistible power I have formally shown how the sovereign right arises from pact to show how the same right may arise from nature requires no more but to show in what case it is never taken away seeing all men by nature had right to all things they had right everyone to reign over all the rest but because this right could not be obtained by force it concerned the safety of everyone laying by that right to set up men with sovereign authority by common consent to rule and defend them whereas if there had been any man of power irresistible there had been no reason why he should not by that power have ruled and defended both himself and them according to his own discretion to those therefore whose power is irresistible the dominion of all men adhereth naturally by their excellence of power and consequently it is from that power that the kingdom over men in the right of afflicting men at his pleasure belongeth naturally to god almighty not as creator and gracious but as omnipotent and though punishment be due for sin only because by that word is understood affliction for sin yet the right of afflicting is not always to ride from men sin but from god's power this question why evil men often prosper and good men suffer adversity has been much disputed by the ancient and is the same with this of ours by what right god dispense at the prosperity and adversities of this life and is of that difficulty as it has shaken the faith not only of the bulgar but of philosophers and which is more of the saints concerning the divine providence how good says david is the god of israel to those who are upright and heart and yet my feet were almost gone my treading's had well nice slipped for i was grieved at the wicked when i saw the ungodly in such prosperity psalm seventy three one through three and job how earnestly does he expostulate with god for the many afflictions he suffered notwithstanding his righteousness this question in the case of job is decided by god himself not by arguments derived from god's sin but his own power for whereas the friends of job drew their arguments from his affliction to his sin and he defended himself by the conscience of his innocence god himself ticketed the matter and having justified the affliction by arguments drawn from his power such as this where was now when i laid the foundations of the earth job thirty eight four and the like both approved job's innocence and reprove the erroneous doctrine of his friends conformable to this doctrine is the sentence of our savior concerning the man that was born blind in these words neither have this men sinned nor his fathers but that the works of god might be made manifest in him and though it be said that debt entered into the world by sin by which is meant that if adam had never sinned he had never died that is never suffered any separation of his soul from his body it follows not thence that god could not justly have afflicted him though he had not sinned as well as afflicted other living creatures that cannot sin having spoken of the right of god's sovereignty as grounded only on nature we are to consider next what are the divine laws or dictates of natural reason which laws concern either the natural duties of one man to another or the honor naturally due to our divine sovereign the first are the same laws of nature of which i have spoken already in the 14th and 15th chapters of this treatise namely equity justice mercy humility and the rest of the moral virtues it remained it therefore that we consider what precepts are dictated to men by their natural reason only without other word of god touching the honor and worship of the divine majesty honor consisted in the inward thought and opinion of the power and goodness of another and therefore the honor god is to think as highly of his power and goodness as is possible and of that opinion the external signs appearing in the words and actions of men are called worship which is one part of that which the latins understand by the word cultists for cultists signify it properly and constantly that labor which a man bestows on anything with the purpose to make benefit by it now those things whereof we make benefit are either subject to us and the profit they yield follow with the labor we bestow upon them as a natural effect or they are not subject to us but answer our labor according to their own wills in the first sense the labor bestowed on the earth is called culture and the education of children a culture of their minds in the second sense where men's wills are to be right to our purpose not by force but by complacence it signified as much as courting that is winning a favor by good offices as by praises by acknowledging their power and by whatsoever is pleasing to them from whom we look for any benefit and this is properly worship in which sense publicala is understood for a worshipper of the people and cultist day for the worship of god from internal honor consisting in the opinion of power and goodness arise three passions love which hath reference to goodness and hope and fear that relate to power and three parts of external worship praise magnifying and blessing the subject of praise being goodness the subject of magnifying and blessing being power and the effect thereof felicity praise and magnifying are signified both by words and actions by words when we say a man is good or great by actions when we thank him for his bounty and obey his power the opinion of the happiness of another can only be expressed by words there be some signs of honor both in attributes and actions that be naturally so as amongst attributes good just liberal and the like and amongst actions prayers thanks and obedience others are so by institution or custom of men and in some times and places are honorable in others dishonorable in others indifferent such as other gestures and salutation prayer and thanksgiving in different times and places differently used the former is natural to latter arbitrary worship and of arbitrary worship there be two differences for sometimes it is commanded sometimes voluntary worship commanded when it is such as he required with who is worshipped free when it is such as the worshipper thinks fit when it is commanded not the words or gesture but the obedience is the worship but when free the worship consists in the opinion of the beholders for if to them the words or actions by which we intend honor seem ridiculous and tending to contumely they are no worship because no signs of honor and no signs of honor because a sign is not a sign to him that giveth it but to him to whom it is made that is to the spectator again there is a public and private worship public is the worship that a commonwealth performeth as one person private is that which a private person exhibiteth public in respect of the whole commonwealth is free but in respect of particular men it is not so private is in secret free but in the site of the multitude it is never without some restraint either from the laws or from the opinion of men which is contrary to the nature of liberty the end of worship amongst men is power for where a man seeeth another worshiped he supposes them powerful and is the readyer to obey him which makes his power greater but God has no ends the worship we do him proceeds from our duty and is directed according to our capacity by those rules of honor that reason dictated to be done by the weak to the more potent men in hope of benefit for fear of damage or in thankfulness for good already received from them that we may know what worship of God is taught us by the light of nature I will begin with his attributes where first it is manifest we ought to attribute to him existence for no man can have will to honor that which he thinks not to have any being secondly that those philosophers who said the world or the soul of the world was God spake unworthily of him and denied his existence for by God is understood the cause of the world and to say the world is God is to say there is no cause of it that is no God thirdly to say the world was not created by eternal seeing that which is eternal has no cause is to deny there is a God fourthly that they who attributing as they think ease to God take from him the care of mankind take from him his honor for it takes away men's love and fear of him which is the root of honor fitly and those things that signify greatness and power to say he is finite is not to honor him for it is not a sign of the will to honor God to attribute to him less than we can and finite is less than we can because the finite it is easy to add more therefore to attribute figure to him is not honor for all figure is finite nor to say we conceive and imagine or have an idea of him in our mind for whatsoever we conceive is finite nor to attribute to him parts or totality which are the attributes only of things finite nor to say he is in this or that place for whatsoever is in place is bounded in finite nor that he is moved or rested for both these attributes ascribed to him place nor that there be more gods than one because it implies them all finite for there cannot be more than one infinite nor to ascribe to him unless metaphorically meaning not the passion but the effect passions that partake of grief as repentance anger mercy or of want as appetite hope desire or of any passive faculty for passion is power limited by someone else and therefore when we ascribe to God a will it is not to be understood as that of man for a rational appetite but as the power by which he affected everything likewise when we attribute to him sight in other acts of sense as also knowledge and understanding which in us is nothing else but a tumult of the mind raised by external things that press the organical parts of man's body for there is no such thing in God and being things that depend on natural causes cannot be attributed to him he that will attribute to God nothing but what is warranted by natural reason must either use such negative attributes as infinite eternal incomprehensible or superlatives as most high most great and the like or indefinite as good just holy creator and in such sense as if he meant not to declare what he is for that were to circumscribe him within the limits of our fancy but how much we admire him and how ready we would be to obey him which is a sign of humility and of a will to honor him as much as we can for there is but one name to signify our conception of his nature and that is I am and but one name of his relation to us and that is God in which is contained father king and lord concerning the actions of divine worship it is a most general preceptive reason that they be signs of the intention to honor God such as our first prayers for not the carvers when they made images were thought to make them gods but the people that prayed to them secondly thanksgiving which differs from prayer and divine worship know otherwise than that prayers precede and thanks exceed the benefit the end both of the one and the other being to acknowledge God for author of all benefits as well past as future thirdly gifts that is to say sacrifices and oblations if they be of the best are signs of honor for they are thanksgivings fourthly not to swear by any but God is naturally a sign of honor for it is a confession that God only know at the heart and that no man's wit or strength can protect a man against God's vengeance on the perjured fifthly it is a part of rational worship to speak considerably of God for it argues a fear of him and fear is a confession of his power ends follow with that the name of God is not to be used rashly and to no purpose for that is as much as in vain and it is to no purpose unless it be by way of oath and by order of the commonwealth to make judgments certain or between commonwealths to avoid war and that disputing of God's nature is contrary to his honor for it is supposed that in this natural kingdom of God there is no other way to know anything but by natural reason that is from the principles of natural science which are so far from teaching us anything of God's nature as they cannot teach us our own nature nor the nature of the smallest creature living and therefore when men out of the principles of natural reason dispute of the attributes of God they but dishonor him for in the attributes which we give to God we are not to consider the signification of philosophical truth but the signification of pious intention to do him the greatest honor we are able from the one to which consideration have preceded the volumes of disputation about the nature of God that tend not to his honor but to the honor of our own wits and learning and are nothing else but inconsiderate in vain abuses of his sacred name. Sixthly in prayers, thanksgivings, offerings and sacrifices it is a dictate of natural reason that they be everyone in his kind the best and most significant of honor as for example that prayers and thanksgivings be made in words and phrases not sudden nor light nor plebeian but beautiful and well composed for else we do not God as much honor as we can and therefore the heathens did absurdly to worship images for gods but they're doing it in verse and with music both of voice and instruments was reasonable also that the beast they offered in sacrifice and the gifts they offered and their actions and worshiping were full of submission and commemorative of benefits received was according to reason as proceeding from an intention to honor him. Seventhly reason directed not only to worship God in secret but also and especially in public and in the sight of men for without that that which is honor is most acceptable that procuring others to honor him is lost. Lastly obedience to his laws that is in this case to the laws of nature is the greatest worship of all for as obedience is more acceptable to God than sacrifice so also to set light by his commandments is the greatest of all and these are the laws of that divine worship which natural reason dictated to private men but seeing a commonwealth is but one person it ought also to exhibit to God but one worship which then it doth when it commanded it to be exhibited by private men publicly and this is public worship the property whereof is to be uniform for those actions that are done differently by different men cannot be said to be a public worship and therefore where many sorts of worship be allowed proceeding from the different religions of private men it cannot be said there is any public worship nor that the commonwealth is of any religion at all and because words and consequently the attributes of God have their signification by agreement and constitution of men those attributes are to be held significative of honor that men intend shall so be and whatsoever may be done by the wills of particular men where there is no law but reason may be done by the will of the commonwealth by laws civil and because a commonwealth hath no will nor makes no laws but those that are made by the will of him or them that have the sovereign power it follow it that those attributes which the sovereign ordaineth in the worship of God for signs of honor ought to be taken and used for such by private men in their public worship but because not all actions are signs by constitution but some are naturally signs of honor others of contumely these latter which are those that men are ashamed to do in the sight of denly reverence cannot be made by human power a part of divine worship nor the former such as our decent modest humble behavior ever be separated from it but whereas there be an infinite number of actions and gestures of an indifferent nature such of them as the commonwealth shall ordain to be publicly and universally in use as signs of honor and part of God's worship are to be taken and used for such by the subjects and that which is said in the scripture it is better to obey God than man hath place in the kingdom of God by pact and not by nature having thus briefly spoken of the natural kingdom of God and his natural laws I will add only to this chapter a short declaration of his natural punishments there is no action of man in this life that is not the beginning of so long a chain of consequences as no human providence is high enough to give a man a prospect to the end and in this chain there are linked together both pleasing and unpleasing events in such manner as he that will do anything for his pleasure must engage himself to suffer all the pains and next to it and these pains are the natural punishments of those actions which are the beginning of more harm than good and hereby it comes to pass that intimperance is naturally punished with diseases rashness with mischances injustice with the violence of enemies pride with ruin cowardice with oppression negligent government of princes with rebellion and rebellion with slaughter for seeing punishments are consequent to the breach of laws natural punishments must be naturally consequent to the breach of the laws of nature and therefore follow them as their natural not arbitrary effects and thus far concerning the constitution nature and right of sovereigns and concerning the duty of subjects derived from the principles of natural reason and now considering how different this doctrine is from the practice of the greatest part of the world especially of these western parts that have received their moral learning from Rome and Athens and how much depth of moral philosophy is required in them that have the administration of the sovereign power I am at the point of believing this my labor as useless as the commonwealth of Plato for he also is of opinion that it is impossible for the disorders of stage and change of governments by civil war ever to be taken away till sovereigns be philosophers but when I consider again that the science of natural justice is the only science necessary for sovereigns and the principal ministers and that they need not be charged with the sciences mathematical as by Plato they are further than by good laws to encourage men to the study of them and that neither Plato nor any other philosopher hitherto hath put into order and sufficiently or probably proved all the theorems of moral doctrine that men may learn thereby both how to govern and how to obey I recover some hope that one time or other this writing of mine may fall into the hands of a sovereign who will consider it himself for it is short and I think clear without the help of any interested or envious interpreter and by the exercise of entire sovereignty in protecting the public teaching of it convert this truth of speculation into the utility of practice end of chapter 31 this concludes the reading of Leviathan or the matter form and power of a commonwealth ecclesiastical and civil parts one and two by Thomas Hobbes