 I want to say thanks to all of you. Welcome, we're glad to have you here. My name is John Hamry. I'm the president at CSIS. This is when Dr. Lam proposed having this conference, I said absolutely. This was the first topic that I ever brought to CSIS when I came. I came back in 2000. I had been at the Defense Department. I was the Deputy Secretary of Defense and was, at the time, we had had long and rather difficult experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo. I can still remember going to Bosnia, and this was in 1997, and talking with the commanders. And the entire conversation was about the challenges of re-establishing civil society. We're pretty good about overthrown governments, but we don't know how in the world to create new civil society afterwards. And I can remember this, our commanding officer, three-star general, and this remarkable insight he had, which he said, I found out the most important thing that we should do to get things going here is we've got to get the schools opened. He said, the reason is, is because moms are the foundation of civil society, and they're not going to abandon their kids unless schools are operational. It was a remarkable insight. It's nothing that a DOD guy like me would have ever thought about. And it's one of those insights that you get that's a product of painful experience. We've had, what, 15 years of painful experiences. And we are right now going back into our normal pattern, which is government amnesia. We're going to forget all of this. This tends to be the norm, I'm afraid. I can remember so many times in 2000 when we were, or 2001 when we were getting ready for this invasion of Iraq, we were involved at the time because of work we had done and tried to put in front of a template. This is what you're going to experience. This is what we learned from this project. And we stumbled our way into it all, all over again. We've now had 10 years of this experience. We've been mapping it. The SIGAR, the Special Inspector General, has been documenting all of it. But what's the structure to remember it? And how do we make it part of us? This is what our fear is that we're going to, this amnesia is going to take over. And we ought to try to save ourselves making mistakes one more time. So, fortunately we found two really very important partners to help us with this. Arthur Keyes, I have to say, most remarkable meeting I ever had, first meeting I ever had with somebody with Art Keyes, we were going to have breakfast over at the Metropolitan Club and he shows up with a dozen eggs. I said, well, they have them here, you know. But he has, he's a micro, he's a micro farmer. He's got his own chickens and he showed up with, but it grows a bit out of his spirit. This is a remarkable man, he created IRD. And in the last 30 years it has distributed almost $2 billion of humanitarian assistance. I mean, talk about a remarkable organization and a remarkable set of accomplishments. And it's done by ingenious concepts of development. So, when we started talking about this, and he said yes, we would be willing to help with something like this, it really gave life to the idea. And David Wall is with us from ACOM. He's the International Development, Senior Vice President at ACOM. Deep and long experience in Iraq was it with USAID, I think for seven years. And was actually one of our experts on economic development and finance development. And so ACOM said, yes, we're interested in this too. We need to still harvest what we can learn from this experience. And these are two organizations and two gentlemen that are committed to doing that. And so that's what we're going to do today. And all of you are very important to have you here for this. So I want to say thank you to all of you for coming. And thank you to these gentlemen for coming. Arthur, let me just start with you. Let's open this up for real. And would you please welcome Arthur Keyes. Thank you. Thank you, John. My only correction to your comments is we're only 15 years old, not 30 years old. But I want to thank you for your remarks this morning and for helping IRD and ACOM to cosponsor this important conference. We began this idea of the conversation that John and I had some time ago. It's great being here today to see everything coming into fruition. John has a direct experience of these knowledge of the importance of stabilization from his years of service at the Defense Department as well as CSIS. So we thank you for hosting us today. Let me thank Robert Lamb and the very competent CSIS team focused on crisis conflict and cooperation for making this conference happen as well, including Joy Ohn and Catherine Mixon and many others that have been working on this. I'd also like to thank ACOM, our cosponsor today and our partner in several international programs in the developing world. David Wall has shown great leadership and foresight and we're privileged to work together with him. And ACOM. We undertake this conference at a key moment with so much happening in the developing world that challenges US foreign policy. From instability and transition problems in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran to Libya, Egypt, Syria and other Middle East issues to Mali, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso, West Africa from Sudan and South Sudan, Somalia and Yemen to political transitions in Burma and North Korea or to the presence of large numbers of internally displaced persons in Columbia. The international community is faced with a host of complicated and dangerous decisions to protect and facilitate stability and help advance strategic interests that will lead to peace, economic growth and reduction in world poverty. We're glad that CSIS entitled this conference, Rethinking Civil, Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction because that's exactly what we need to rethink. We now have a lot of experience in the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan and Africa for us to look objectively at what has worked and what has not worked as well as we would like to have had. Of course every political and social situation is different and we have different historical backgrounds but there are many common themes that we need to explore and see how we can do a better job in unstable situations that are bursting forth all around us. We need a rethink that is focused both inwardly, probing our civilian led stability, instrumentation and effectiveness as well as externally, focused on how host nations perceive and benefit from these activities. What lessons can we learn? From the breakup of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s to Yemen and Somalia today, fragile states pose security and financial threats to the entire international community. Yes, there is a strong track record of success by civil society groups in helping stabilize such societies by protecting vulnerable people, building resilience against renewed conflict and rebuilding economic and governance institutions. Recent civilian stabilization successes can be traced to efforts launched by IRD and other international and local NGOs in the Balkans in the 90s where civil society groups became critical partners in sustaining the peace and laying the groundwork for solid economic and social development. Since we're talking about the real world, it is fair to say that some civil societies, economies and sovereign governments have developed differently in the Balkans. All were at peace today. Most economies have grown and the civil society has continued to flourish. The stabilization programs, the community revitalization through democratic action program we did in Serbia started out with quick impact and then it moved to local government programs and then on as the government and the economy began to take off in the straight economic development programs. It was a continuum. And I think today we can look at the Balkans in Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro and see significant progress in all of those countries. Bosnia-Herzegovina, it's a mixed bag. Yes, there is peace. Yes, civil society does exist. But there is a weak functioning or non-functioning government and the economy is dormant. At the same time, two of the states of the former Yugoslavia have entered the European Union, Croatia and Slovenia. IRD and other NGOs are now applying similar community-based models of development in other conflict and post-conflict zones, including West Africa, Yemen and Afghanistan. Relatively new development is that NGOs and donors now cooperate and coordinate directly with US and international security forces. In places like Iraq and Afghanistan, the coordination has been so close that NGOs' work has been viewed as a key pillar of effective counter-insurgency. Particularly in the build phase of Coins Clear Hold Build Strategy. Both military and civilian leaders repeatedly point out that civilian agencies are often better equipped to understand and work directly with local communities. They are generally better received by local governments and populations. While some development organizations say such partnerships compromise their political neutrality, beneficiaries recognize the congruency with the NGO community's mission to assist vulnerable populations, especially those caught in armed conflict. IRD believes that the vulnerable populations cannot wait until all of the ideal conditions are present for development. In fact, our experience shows that social development and economic growth are key elements that speed the securing of stability peace and long-term development. We have learned that it is important to bring in civilians early. According to one of our US government civilian counterparts in Afghanistan, even before the initial clearing operations in Argonne Dopp had concluded, Uproad IRD in its lightly armored SUVs ready to join the military in engaging local leaders in dialogue. Stability requires the trust of the host community. Trust is about winning the hearts and minds of the local population. Distrust is endemic in unstable environments, so modeling accountability by your words and deeds is by far the most important aspect of trust building. Beginning from the first engagement, we must deliver on our promises and expect and help our host country residents and officials to do the same. Security is always a major concern in fragile areas, with open warfare always just around the corner. You can't develop your way to security, a PRT commander told me, describing the challenge of pushing a road into an insecure area of Afghanistan. One of our leaders was in a convoy that where an IED exploded and he got a call from Ambassador Eikenberry in Afghanistan and our leader, IRD leader appropriately responded, get the hell off the telephone. Why would Ambassador Eikenberry be telephoning me? So after three or four exchanges like this, the ambassador was able to convince him that he really was concerned about him and that he really was the ambassador. But it does give an example of how the fragile relationship is in terms of stability and how important it is to have open dialogue with all the leaders on the same page. Programs should plan for and attempt to reduce risk in communities, work areas, project sites and field visits and build the key relationships to the local power structure that are so vital to our personal safety and our development objectives. It is important to keep lines of communication open to the military and police leadership and outside security forces. The international NGO has an important role in being an honest broker, building lines of communication between community leaders, program leaders, local political leaders, the police, national government ministries and officials and military leaders. Civilian led stabilization programming is vulnerable to being sidelined or marginalized by several different actors. The military, foreign policy institutions, local communities, local governments, national governments and international donors. Too often these policy makers or military leaders are not familiar with the life cycle of stabilization and development programs and are often frustrated with the speed, pace or direction of programming on the ground. Policy changes can happen very quickly and interrupt programs that are underway. And there are many actors involved in this situation and it's very important that they keep working together in the same direction and problems come when different actors go in different directions. But it is important to recognize that stability programs are intended to provide stability from both the military and security standpoint and stability to vulnerable populations needing access to healthcare, sanitation services, water, food and an ability to learn a livelihood for your families. Stability and reconstruction initiatives need to be large, significant and strategic to show immediate results and improvement in living conditions. This might be in the form of electrical power restored to a community or the extension of electrical power to a village that has never had electricity before. Or it might be in the form of the distribution of seeds to farmers to cultivate or in the farm of agricultural implements or the rehabilitation of irrigation ditches that have been destroyed by conflict. Civil society is strengthened when underrepresented groups women, ethnic groups, minorities, geographically isolated villagers and others are invited to become partners in building a new society. And it may be in the form of giving legitimacy to local, regional and national government structures who are seeking effectiveness and recognition. Jobs and employment need to be generated quickly. Some of the most effective stabilization and reconstruction tools come in the form of training, upgrading the skills of a workforce that is desperately yearning to get back into economic activity. This can often be done under the auspices of a government agricultural ministry or decentralized outreach project. IRD has learned that the more we build our stability and reconstruction programs around the common long-term community, provincial and or national development plan, the more successful we will be as conflict areas move from instability to stability and on to successful development. In Serbia, the Djingic government, when it came into play, had a very clear policy of privatization. It had an EU focus. It strengthened local governments and it decentralized a lot of powers and it was committed to a market economy. So in that regard, the programs we did in Serbia sped up that process and major economic and social growth resulted. And as you know, in Afghanistan, a major challenge is for the US policy and the Karzai government to be working on the same page. Ministries have to be aligned together with stabilization programs for stable post-conflict stability. Stabilization programs must be flexible, nimble and adaptable. The ability to respond quickly with targeted programming is crucial but it is even more important to be ready to adapt rapidly to the host communities working in living environment. Program results must be prioritized, documented and communicated. High levels of funding injected into small areas naturally increase the visibility and expectations that come with stability operations and may be followed by high levels of mistrust, criticism and media scrutiny. We must insist that our programs model accountability, invest in strong documentation systems and build robust communications plans targeting beneficiaries, donors and stakeholders. Also from the NGO perspective and people involved in stability, we have to stay close to our donors because they drive the process and they also make changes. When we were working in Afghanistan, there was a lion of a man named Richard Holbrook who was very involved in major decisions. I can remember very clearly how he took an interest in our Avipa program which was agricultural program which was distributing seeds to farmers in the North and wanted to move it into the South to become part of the counterinsurgency. On the July 4th of 2007, I got a phone call from Kabul and said, we really appreciate this program. We want to move it in. The Marines are going into Hellman. We want you there quickly and we're adding $300 million to your agreement. Boom, get to work. We're watching. So the donor is very important and very much a key actor of this whole process. Monitoring and evaluation of course needs to be a priority from the start and throughout implementation. It is important to measure program achievements against plans and continuously monitor results and make changes as necessary. That is being flexible, nimble and adaptable. Detailed M&E plans before startup must prioritize hiring and training local qualified staff. Most successful programs welcome independent evaluation and measurement from and in collaboration with outside experts and as we all know, every large stabilization program in a conflict zone will be audited and usually by multiple agents. In closing, I would like to thank everyone for attending today's conference. I know I speak on behalf of IRD's 3000 plus employees around the developing world who look forward to hearing about this conference and our expert discussions. I hope we can work together collaboratively to take the lessons we discuss here today and try to help and make an impact in future programs for the benefit of those vulnerable populations who need and indeed depend on our effective support. I'd like to thank our participants from various sectors, from host country representatives, US government officials, for-profit development firms and international NGOs. This conference is really a testament to how important they feel this topic is. I think we all stand unified in our goal of developing peaceful, stable and effective transitions in conflict environments so that economic, social and political development can take root, helping vulnerable populations to succeed and flourish. In summary, General Petraeus recently noted that shedding our capacities and capabilities for stability operations will not make the need for those capabilities disappear. All future operations will continue to include some mix of offense, defense and stabilization and most will be comprehensive civil military endeavors requiring us to employ every tool in our diplomatic, economic and defense arsenals. Development has always been the weaker institution at the conflict table. Nevertheless, it must be elevated and supported or the other institutions risk diminishing their own effectiveness and success. Thank you. Thank you very much, Art, for your very kind words and to John and to Robert for inviting us to participate and inviting us to sponsor this event. On behalf of ACOM, I wanna welcome our distinguished guests as well as everyone who's participated. There was some discussion early on, I guess, about the topic of stabilization and whether it was still relevant and judging by the participation, I would say, it is indeed very relevant. On behalf of ACOM, we're very excited to be here and sponsoring this event but also very happy to participate with IRD. Some of you may or may not know we do have a fairly close collaboration across a number of programs in a number of different countries and we enjoy a very close collaboration in that regard. We view stabilization as really almost an emerging, if not kind of here to stay activity in the development framework. It's unfortunately becoming an increasingly more prominent activity in a lot of the programs that we see around the world and as a result, we've seen unfortunately a sort of trend whether it's through our OTI programs, Office of Transition Initiative with USAID or just straight up stabilization activities, whether it be in Afghanistan or elsewhere around the world and I think it's important to echo, I think John's earlier comments about old wine, new bottles, if you will, this is not a new thing for the United States government or the United States foreign security apparatus to contend with, but I think it certainly bears worth a careful analysis as we begin to embark on the next phase, if you will, because of the relevance of the lessons learned over the last 12, 13, 14, 15 years. It's not even that, quite frankly. I think if anybody who's a student of this particular arena or this particular paradigm, if you will, within the development context, whether it's Beirut in the early 90s, late 80s, whether it's Central America or even going back to the Vietnam Hamlet Evaluation System, I mean, there's a tremendous body of data that's out there for us to look at as development practitioners and as folks who participate in foreign security operations and I think it certainly is more relevant today than ever as we begin to see a pullback, if you will, of the military sort of hard power aspect of things and the resurgence of soft power. And I think we really do need to look at the tools and the lessons learned, if you will. So as far as we're concerned from ACOM's perspective, we think the relevance of this conference at this particular juncture is paramount, quite frankly, in the discussion. And I think, as we were just chatting earlier on this morning, as many folks are sort of running away, if you will, from this discussion, I think it's very important for us to remain engaged and remain committed to the debate and the discussion and finding out, again, lessons learned and what works and what doesn't work. So on behalf of ACOM, I wanna thank you and welcome everyone. And in the interest of time, I think we'll just hand things over to Robert and get things underway. So thank you very much.