 My name is Juna Duman. I'm a PhD student at Toru University-Bochum. And in this short video abstract, I'm going to talk about you on our work on group action-based key encapsulation and non-attractive key exchange in the quantum random rock model. And this is a joint work with Dominic Hartmann, Ike Kils, Sabrina Kunzweiler, Jonas Lehmann and Doreen Riepel. So what is a non-attractive key exchange? We have Alice and Bob, and they have a secret and public keys. And they exchange their public keys. And besides exchanging their public keys, there's no interaction and they can compute a shared key. And the Diffie-Helman key exchange is G to the A, B. And the Diffie-Helman key exchange is passively secure under the decisional Diffie-Helman assumption, which states that G to the A, given G to the A, G to the B and G to the A, B is a computationally indistinguishable from G to the A, G to the B, G to the U. For A, B and U, uniformly random from set P where P is the prime order of the group. Now, there's a slight variant of the Diffie-Helman key exchange called hash Diffie-Helman. And here the shared key G to the A, B is additionally hashed using hash function H. Also here we include the public keys. And interestingly, this is actually actively secure under the strong CDH assumption and the random model model. And what does a strong CDH assumption state? It states that it's difficult to compute G to the A, B, given G to the A and G to the B and additional access to an oracle. Decisional oracle, which decides whether G to the G1, exponentiated by A equals G2. So in a quantum world, we don't have the Diffie-Helman key exchange anymore, at least not the classical one, because discrete logarithms are efficiently computable by large quantum computers. And for lettuces and codes, it's an open research question to build efficient Nike. But from my Solgene-based cryptography, like C-Side, we have a candidate for quantum assistant Nike. And in our work, we take the more abstract view of group actions, or the group action framework. And what is a group action? It's a group G and set X together with a map. And the map maps from G and X to X. And we have some additional conditions, which I'm going to talk about more in the full version of the talk. So in our title, we say we studied in the quantum random oracle model. So what's a random quantum random oracle model? Well, if you want to study the quantum assistance of schemes and we are in the random oracle model, then we have to assume actually access to quantum access to the hash function, because a quantum computer can compute the hash function locally and then do superposition queries. So this is actually then the right model to study quantum assistance of schemes and the right extension of the random oracle model. So now let us talk what we do in our work. So we have the group action-based hash DVM and key exchange here. And what we do is we prove that the active security of the scheme and the Q-ROM using the group action quantum strong CDH assumption. And we show that such an assumption is necessary. And we show how to weaken the assumption by alternative constructions, for example, using training or key confirmation and we prove also the corresponding camp secure. So this is the last slide of this short video abstract. I look forward to see it the full version of the talk.