 Good afternoon everyone. Welcome to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. My name is Heather Conley. I'm Senior Fellow and Director of the Europe Program here at CSIS, and I have a confession to make. I have been looking forward to this conversation for a very long time. Not only do we get to do the public unveiling here in Washington of a new CSIS report, Russian Soft Power in the 21st Century, but we also, I think, sort of have a public unveiling of a brand new ambassador here in Washington, and we could not be more delighted to welcome Ambassador Marina Calderon here to Washington. Guys, I have to do this. First female Estonian ambassador to Washington. We like it. We like it. And Marina, if I may be so American and informal, has been so gracious in helping us unveil this report. She, and I told her, we had an opportunity to be at a dinner together last evening, and I told her she was heaven sent because if there was one person that could help us understand the complexities, it is you, Marina. So this was perfect, and we could not be more grateful for you. But I'm going to save Marina for a little later. What I'd like to do with the time we have this afternoon is give you an overview of our new report. We released this report last month in Tallinn, actually to a briefing in the Foreign Ministry, which I think provoked a very interesting discussion within Estonia about the report. We then went to Brussels to brief the report, but I guess we could argue we'll save Washington, save the best for last, and this is the final series in the public briefings for our report. So you're going to have to, I'm going to have to beg your indulgence. I'm not going to spend a very long time on the overview of the report. It's very hard to give an encapsulating review of a 52-page report with a lot of statistical analysis, but I wanted to give you some of our takeaways, and then as I said, let's immediately turn to Marina and a nice conversation. So I'm going to see how we do this here. Okay. So this project actually, I had the privilege of ending the project. I didn't have the privilege of beginning the project. Dr. Sarah Mendelson, who was the director here of our Wonderful Human Rights and Security Initiative, conceptualized this study. It was to look at, and using the Joe Nye definitional quantifying of what soft power is, we wanted to take a deep dive and look at, if there was Russian soft power in Estonia, and to determine its efficacy, if you will, was it having an impact specifically on the younger generation of both young Estonians in Estonia, young Russians in Estonia. And we really wanted to see that next generational element of that Russian soft power. And I raise, and look at this, because I think it's important for this definition, how we analyze the Russian soft power was to look at the Russian compatriot policy. That was what we, the instrument we took to develop that. And I'm going to talk a bit about the compatriot policy and specifically how it functions in Estonia. But I wanted to give you that definition. Some of the elements of the compatriot policy do not fall neatly into the Joe Nye definition. But again, that attraction of culture, the language, the ideas certainly does. And I'll highlight where we sort of deviate a bit from Joe Nye's definition. Again, our project goals were to examine Russian soft power using that compatriot policy. Again, the relationship between the Russian diaspora to its homeland. And again, we used a lot of survey work to determine and quantify that impact. We really initiated a very comprehensive survey in 2009 and 2010. Again, this was under Dr. Mendelssohn's leadership, as well as the co-author of the port, Dr. Ted Gerber. He's my wingman. He's not here with me today. He's a sociologist by training. And he did all the survey work and all the data. So I'm going to give you the snapshot of that data. Oh, but please don't ask me about methodology. I'm probably not the best place to speak to that. But what I want to focus on is the size. 3,000 individuals were interviewed between the ages of 16 and 29. And again, those approximately 1,000, 1,000, 1,000 young of young Estonians in Estonia, young Russians in Estonia, and then young Russians in Russia. So we've got a nice, nice bit of data. So let me begin a bit. For those of you who are quite familiar with Russian compatriot policy, please forgive me, but I want to do a brief overview. If you read the literature, there's an estimate of about 35 million compatriots, the Russian compatriot policy that live in 90 countries. Approximately half of that 35 million, however, reside in the Baltics and the other former Soviet states. So it's certainly a concentrated policy in the former Soviet space. It began in the early 1990s as a drive for citizenship and resettlement, the dual citizenship, not very successful to be honest. And then in 1999, the Russian Federation adopted its state policy towards compatriots living abroad. It's a quite broad definition. It encompasses Russian Federation citizens that are living abroad. It encompasses former citizens of the Soviet Union, Russian immigrants from either the Russian Federation or the USSR, descendants of compatriots, and then a very, very broad category, foreign citizens who admire Russian language and culture. Well, I think that encompasses, certainly I'll raise my hand, certainly I'm a great admirer of Russian culture and language. And then in 2010, the compatriot policy was updated once again to, I think, sort of solidifying it, institutionalizing it. To be a compatriot, it was important to be certified by a respected civil society organization, or you had to be engaged in activities that promote compatriot policy. So, you know, in a nutshell, the objective of the policy is clearly to promote Russian culture and language, the classic definition of soft power. But I think what stands unique to the Russian compatriot policy are its two other objectives, to fight the falsification of history and to protect the rights of compatriots. Now, how does that work in function? I think, and we will walk you through a bit of how we came to these conclusions, that really the goal of the compatriot policy is to keep the communities separate from society. We felt that was a very important tool. If you separate them, give them different media streams, do not allow that integration, that in fact empowers Russia's soft power or increases its power. It's also, I think, a benefit of legitimizing the historical, the great patriotic war. I think Russian soft power will confront, sometimes very dramatically, if it feels that that narrative is being questioned. And this, of course, is at the intersection of the Baltic states, whether you are a liberator or an occupier. And that tension plays out continually. I think another benefit of the compatriot policy is to counter Western criticism of Russia's own internal human rights democracy situation. Interestingly, it quite often uses Western techniques to criticize, in this instance, Estonia's treatment of minorities using a lot of international tools, OSCE, European Court of Justice, European Court of Human Rights, in a way to counterbalance criticisms that it receives from the West. So that's a very broad brush overview of the compatriot policy. So in our analytical work, we broke this down into five areas where we saw the greatest exertion of influence and Russian soft power, use of NGOs, media, political influence, legal action, and then the use of the Russian Orthodox Church. By far, the use of NGOs is the most potent element of Russian soft power, in my view. It's certainly their most extensive tool. Really through two vehicles, the Rusky Dome, Russia House, and the Rusky Mir Foundation. Again, a broad network, a growing network, 50 centers. In some of the literature, it's said by 2020, we may see 100 centers. The budget is growing. In fact, we may see centers certainly increasing in the Baltic area. So this is in becoming a larger effort. It is how culturally they reach out to one another through language classes. And the stated goal, again, is to popularize Russian language and culture. Again, the classic soft power tools. It is a very youth-focused agenda, looking at sporting camps, sporting events, summer camps, exchange programs. This is certainly a broad brush area. And I think it's quite interesting. In the recent Russian national security strategy, it noted that patriotic education is an element of Russian national security. So this is very, very important, patriotic education, this cultural and language experience. The media. In one interview, an Estonian official told us that, you know, it's very hard to reach an audience when they're getting their information from different sources in a different language from a very separate media channel. We found up to 30 periodicals, five television stations, certainly a use of radio. This is a very powerful tool. Again, supported by the NGO network, the Rusky Mirror Foundation. We're seeing an increase in funding, broadcast advertisements. And again, a very youth-focused message, mixing very popular music with some commentary on history. And I think, again, it's a very attractive tool for the next generation. It's certainly growing in popularity. So again, a very effective tool of Russian soft power in our view and its effectiveness in Estonia. This is where we begin to deviate from the classic Joe Nye definition. Because it's not using money overtly to influence. But here in the political party dimension, we certainly have seen some both overt, and I would say a bit more covert, financing of political parties in the Baltics, certainly in Estonia. And throughout, again, we can make some comparisons of Russian compatriot policy across the post-savvy space. I think these five categories that I've outlined, in some countries they are stronger tools and in others. But certainly you see a uniformity of Russian soft power and its use in politically influencing. And perhaps we can ask Marina a little bit. In fact, in March of this year, prior to Estonian national elections, there was a controversy about receipt of foreign funds prior to the campaign to the center party. And that caused quite a controversy. So again, we do see this as a tool. It's successful. It can be more successful in other countries. In this particular case, where a 1.5 million dollar euro contribution to Mr. Savisar was actually a political sort of caused quite a controversy. And perhaps, I think, certainly changed the dynamics before the Estonian national elections. This is what I was alluding to is this very interesting twist. The extensive use of legal action and through international organizations to file claims on behalf of the Russian diaspora. We've seen, and this is where I have to, truth and advertising, in the European Court of Human Rights, you don't know who the filing country is. You only know the country where, you know, to the complaint is being made. So we know that more than 800 claims were brought against Estonia. 98% of those were inadmissible. I can't tell you for sure that those 98%, sorry, those 828 came from Russia, but I have a fair certainty that a strong percentage of them did. But I want to be very truthful in saying we don't have that statistical data point. Clearly, this is from a foreign policy standpoint. Senior Russian officials have been very clear that they're going to use these entities to draw attention to the negative humanitarian situation in Latvia and Estonia. We certainly see at the OSCE in particular a lot of use of birussian diplomats to highlight Russian minorities in their treatment in Estonia. Finally, the Orthodox Church. I have to confess again to you this was an area that I wasn't quite familiar with. I mean, I certainly had been very recognizing of the growing elevation of the Orthodox Church, certainly within Russia. But I had not realized in Estonia that it does touch the daily life whether you get your new car blessed or your new apartment blessed. There is an element of the church in daily life and the use of the Orthodox Church again to reach out to the diaspora. Again, it is a different strength in a different country as it were, but we did find some mild, certainly some influence in Estonia. Now, here's the part where I, as I said, I need my statistical sociological wingman here. What I wanted to do is give you a couple of snapshots of the statistical data and do a very brief overview of really the assessment. And again, part of our work was to determine the efficacy of Russian soft power. Was it working? Did it have an effect, and particularly on the next generation? I think there was an assumption that some of these historical issues and tensions would dissipate with the passing of an older generation that would not have been so associated with that. I have to tell you, absolutely not. These have all passed to the next generation. So this is a problem that's not going to go away if anything. It has already been transferred to the next generation. So again, let's remember the objectives of the compatriot policy. It's certainly trying to fight the falsification of history. And again, that history is very much related to the Soviet liberation of Estonia. And again, I know these are very loaded historical terms. I just want to provide that in context. So one of the questions that the survey asked, did Stalin may have made some mistakes, but overall, he did more good than bad. And I hope you can see the color key. The green is the cohort that we asked of young Russians in the Russian Federation. The blue bar represents young Russians in Estonia. And then the red bar is young Estonians in Estonia. You can see again, the strongest, it's the most strongly agreed with that statement, 15% in the Russian Federation. You can see where strongly agree Estonians. That's a very different interpretation of their history. So you can see again, those dynamics. What's so interesting to me is that last category, hard to say. Look at that. It's sort of even percent of, not sure, hard for me. So there is again, some ambiguity there. But if you're trying to, part of your soft power is to ensure your history is glorified, that may have some nuances. But we're certainly seeing the polarization, if you will, of the next generation of those types of questions. Question two. And again, you have all of these in the report. And there are charts and charts and charts. It's so much interesting information. I'm just highlighting a couple of the few. Should the Russian government intervene to protect Russians living in Estonia, regardless of citizenship? So whether they are Estonians that hold the gray passport, the alien passport, or actually have a blue Estonian passport. Again, very interesting. And I'm going to caveat this. The young Russians and Russia said 48% of those, yes, the Russian government should intervene. Here was a funny thing that happened. When our survey worked, when we went to Russia to interview the approximately 1,000 young Russians living in Russia, only 25% really went through the whole course of questions. Why? Because the questioner was making them so mad. They're like, why are you asking me all these questions about Estonia? I don't care about Estonia. I don't know anything about Estonia. And so the folks that were taking the survey thought, okay, we're going to get really skewed results if we take this survey the whole way through. So really only 25% of those young Russians and Russians really had enough knowledge, quite frankly, patience to go through the whole survey. So that tells you, again, where the thinking is. So 48% of them said yes, but that was only a very small man that actually could go through the survey. Again, you're seeing the very broad dimension. Young Estonians said, you know, definitely no, the Russian government should not intervene. So again, you see that polarization. What influence, if any, does Russian government statements and actions have on the actual situations of Russians in Estonia? The reason this question was asked, we really wanted to get to tell you, this really impacted your daily life. Do you feel this? Do you see this? Again, let's check the Estonian data. What influence? Only 5% said very negative, 49% said somewhat negative. So young Estonians in Estonia feel this is a negative influence. However, and this is the big thing to be concerned about, the young Russians in Estonia, 54% said don't know. Don't feel it. They don't see where that Russian government potential intervention or influence is there. So is that soft power reaching them on a daily basis? Unclear. Which of the following places do you feel the strongest connection? This is about identity. Where do those young people in Estonia, where do they, where do they belong? This gets back to sort of the origins of the Russian compatriot policy resettlement coming back home. Again, very interesting. 52, 47% of young Russians in Estonia affiliated where their strongest connection are their town, their village, their city. As did, of course, the young Estonians in Estonia. This means that if there's not, I identify or want to be back in the Russian Federation, I identify with my home where I've grown up and that's Estonia. And we felt that was actually quite an encouraging sign of that, of that identity. What proportion of your friend's acquaintances are Estonian and what proportions are Russia? This is again the question of separation. And for us, we noted this, this was the concern we shared both with our Estonian government colleagues as well as the Estonian think tank community. We're not seeing much mixing of these young Russians and young Estonians, particularly not in the workplace. And again, if you're not seeing one another, if you're not dealing with friendship bonds and, you know, you're not on Facebook talking, you're friending everybody, you tend to separate yourselves and then that's where you don't have an appreciation for what the other one is feeling. We felt that was important. Although Estonian citizenship rates have been very encouraging, this separation, that's a long-term concern because if these communities remain separate, they will not be part of building Estonia's future together. And this again speaks to that, what proportion of your coworkers are Estonian and proportion are Russians, they're really very separate in the workplace, they're very separate in their friend and their friendship networks. Do you want to stay in Estonia permanently or would you prefer to leave the country? Again, we have this, and this is where we did divide the passport holders, both the ethnic Russians with great passports, the alien passports, and then those that have citizenship have the Estonian passports. You can see again, those with the blue passports, 47% want to stay in Estonia. Estonia, that means let's build our future together and we were heartened by some of those statistics. So the assessment of the efficacy of Russian soft power, it's a mixed picture. I think it's quite good in its dissemination, its NGO network is very powerful and strong and growing, its use of media, very powerful, very effective. We certainly had a sense through the whole survey work that the Russian-speaking population did have a better view of Russian policies. They actually had a better view of Russia economically than young Russians in Russia did. That was very interesting, so we think that media influence paid off. Again though, a very small proportion of young Russians in Russia really had a knowledge base about Estonia. But as we saw, there's still deep, deep divisions historically on issues of World War II that has now simply passed to the next generation. But on the other side, there's no strong identity to Russia. The location of their place of birth or their place of where they are living is much stronger and we just didn't see the residents that Russia's soft power had an effect on the daily lives of these young people. They didn't feel it or touch it. Any universal young person right now, what do they care about? Graduating, finding that job, that's what's important. It's the economy and we certainly did not see where Russian, either through the foundation network that was not having an impact on their lives economically. So we had, this was, I have to tell you, a fabulous project, fascinating for me. I learned a lot, but now we're going to turn to finding out more about Russian soft power in the 21st century. And with that, I'm going to scoot over here and we're going to sort of do CSIS the view. We're going to do the interview here. Time to switch you on. Now, let me introduce you before we, before we start here. Marina began, well, before the independence of Estonia, she taught law at the Tallinn Economic Technical School and then when her country gained independence, and even a little before that, she joined the Foreign Service. She raised her hand and said, I want to be part of this and joined the Estonian Foreign Service and the Press and Information Department. We have a Fulbrighter here on a Fulbright scholarship that earned her master's degree in international law and diplomacy from Tufts University and then continued her education and then returned to the foreign ministry in the Office of International Treaties. The lawyer returned and was instrumental in working on the legal documents to the withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia. After serving some brief stints in Helsinki and the Foreign Minister, she returned back to the legal department where she was the executive director and then ultimately became Under Secretary for Legal and Consular Affairs 2001 and 2005. She has served as Estonian ambassador to Russia as well as to Israel and Kazakhstan but did not reside in either of those last two countries and from 2008 to 2011 she was Under Secretary for Foreign and Economic Relations and Development and that's her official CV but may I tell them a little bit about your personal CV? Marina is not an ethnic Estonian. Her father is Latvian. Her mother was ethnic, is ethnic Russian, is, praise God, is ethnic Russian and you are a third generation though living in Estonia and you grew up speaking Russian in your home so you are the living embodiment of some of our report so I'd love to begin with just some getting your reflections on what our report said or didn't say or if there are elements of it that you disagreed with or were you surprised by anything and we welcome you. Thank you for being with us and we're going to jump right in. Heather, thank you so much. Thank you so much. I'm not part of the report. I'm not 29 anymore. You're 29 in your mind. We're all 29 in our minds. But thank you very much for having me here. It's an honor and privilege. It's my first meeting in the premises of CSIS. I've been in DC only for two months. I'm really new in the city but I hope that we'll continue our perfect cooperation. Heather, I would like to thank you personally and also your staff and your other co-authors, Theodore Gerber, Lucy Moore and Mikayla David. Mikayla is here for conducting the survey and for writing the report. As much as I know that's not the first time you're dealing with Russian soft power. You had a very good seminar a year ago which was chaired by Janusz Bukajski and which was dealing with Russian soft power in Baltics, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. But this one targeted specifically at Russian soft power in Estonia is extremely interesting. You did a great job. 3,000 persons were interviewed. Among them 16, those who are 16 today, they were born in independent Estonia. Those who are 29 were born in Soviet Estonia but it was part of the childhood. I don't know how much to remember about that. My daughter is 25, she doesn't remember anything. My son is 19. He's the child of independent Estonia. So it was very interesting to see the age group, not only those who were born after Estonia regained independence but also those who were born during the Soviet times. You see I did a very thorough work with the report. I think I can publish my own report now. The response will be forthcoming. But I will start with maybe some remarks and then we can continue. First of all the term soft power. As you explained and as it was defined by Professor Joseph Nye, for me it has a positive meaning. For me it's our ability to get what you want through attraction. When we talk about soft power in this context that's not exactly the same soft power that was meant by Professor Nye that was meant by American and to apply to the politics of America. For me, Russian soft power which is a mixture of promotion of cultural and linguistic ties but also a mixture of propaganda, mixture of disinformation and so on and so on has negative connotations. So maybe one of the things we should think about is to use or to think about another term, should it be strategic disinformation, should it be strategic misinformation, should it be strategic miscommunication or if we go back to the language of the Cold War, active measure. Because as you can see the aim of the soft power is not to promote Estonia as a nice country where all Russians or people belonging to Russian ethnicity want to live. On the contrary the aim is to depict Estonia as a poorest country in the EU, not a very successful country, a country that is not a good place to live with massive violation of human rights. As to the data 800 claims in the European Court of Human Rights I don't know exactly but I think that maybe two thirds could be from foreigners, one third from Estonians. What is Estonia's complaining usually about? They're complaining about the too long period of imprisonment before the court makes the ruling. But again I didn't look into that I can look into that later. So that concerns the term of soft power and maybe for beginning what else I would like to say I see lots of friends who know Estonia very well but for those who are maybe not too familiar with Estonian history I'd like to say just some facts. We regained our independence in 1991 which means that we reinforced the laws we had before the Second World War including citizenship law. Before the Second World War the population of Estonia nearly 90% were ethnic Estonians. What we saw in 1991 was that the percentage of ethnic Estonians had fall to 67 which means that during the 50 years of Soviet time whether I use the term of occupation or not it's not important here but during the Soviet years there was a very massive trend of bringing I'll use the term Soviets to Estonia using the pretext of turning Estonia into successful USSR republic the pretext of bringing that agrarian province into an industrial republic and so on and so on and I think that those people who came they believed it although today if we look just at the facts before the Second World War Finland and Estonia were like twins we had the same level of level of industrial development and level of development and now let's see where we were in 1991 where was Finland where was Estonia and I'm not going to comment more about that whether the 50 years of Soviet era were good or bad for Estonia definitely not good so 1991 the percentage of non ethnic Estonians in Estonia was 30 67 32 after that today we can say that 7% of our population are Russian citizens 7% of our population have not determined their citizenship yet is it better good of course we're not completely happy with that of course we would like to see each and every person living in our in our country being citizen of one or another country of course we're striving at that but you just can't take the citizenship and put it on somebody it's a two-way movement there there have to be options provided by the government and there has to be interest from the other side what we see today is the diminishing interest in some cases even lack of interest to acquire Estonian citizenship why if you look at the conditions or if you look at the rights in Estonia the only difference between Estonian citizens and non-citizens is in political rights and to be more precise only in the right to to participate in parliamentary elections in local elections everybody who resides legally in Estonia can participate which is not very typical in Europe so I think that we're doing very well in that sense social rights no difference whether you're a citizen or not social benefits no difference right to education no difference and I can continue so so we have to find something that makes Estonian citizenship still attractive for those who haven't determined yet does Russia help us not really not in the propaganda work and not in the concrete actions that Russia undertakes today living in Estonia as a permanent EU resident without Estonian citizenship is very convenient you can travel all over EU you can get established started businesses all over EU and you can travel without visas to Russia it's a clear benefit especially for those people who feel ties to their kin state yeah who feel ties to their to their country the recommendations were very good yes I agree my government has to keep integration still as a priority on the agenda have we been successful very difficult to say because there are there's no international there are no international standards there is no measurement we can't say yes we fulfilled one two three four five we're perfect we're not perfect but I think that taking into account all the facts we are doing pretty well do we have to teach Estonian language as was recommended yes we have yes we have do we have to do it to adults as well as the children yes but the programs are already going on there is Estonian language there are Estonian language courses not only to children but also to adults they are even free of charge if after the course you will do the language exam so they are they are ongoing Russians and Estonians working together very good point but that's something that I would like to ask from from from from Theodore how he was determining that because Marina Kalyurant whenever there is a survey I'm not counted as a Russian because usually when Estonian social sociologists approach me for them they look at my family name it's Kalyurant okay let's go further my children Kaisa Kalyurant Christian Kalyurant who would ever think that they might have Russian blood or they might determine themselves as Russians how do I determine myself yes I'm Russian Russian was my mother tongue my mother is still alive we still communicate with her in Russian although she's Estonian citizen she's perfect in Estonian but it was very clear for her that her daughter being Russian has to honor the culture the Russian culture as well as the culture and the language of the country where we live that's why I was brought up bilingual did I lose anything I don't think so did I win yes I love Russian culture I love Russian literature and I can read Pushkin in Russian and that's a huge advantage huge advantage and the final thing yeah I have so many things to say I'm sorry I'm not stopping no no but you're supposed to ask and I'm supposed to answer but there are some but there are some more things to say where I would like also you to understand the distinction it's Russians or Russian speakers in Estonia and Soviets it's a very big difference my mother Russian she had four classes of education she's not she she didn't go to the university I'm the first generation in my family going to the university I was born in 62 deep Soviet times nobody was talking about regaining independence as we started to talk in the 80s or as we were hoping in the 40s but for her it was very clear living in a country you have to honor language culture of that country clear no questions about that what about my other relatives there was a clear division there were so those who who acted like my mother and there were those who went only to Russian schools who didn't learn Estonian language and for whom I think what happened to to to Estonia in 91 was or geogeogeogeogeogeogeogeogeogeoge geopolitical catastrophe there were those who still thought that Estonia will return back being the Republic of the USSR and they didn't see any sense in learning the language of the country and that's the Soviet approach to Estonia. Can we change it? Among those who are of my age and older, let's say 50 plus, I don't think so. Among their children, yes. All my relatives who didn't speak Estonia 20 years ago are speaking now. All of the children are speaking Estonian. Their grandchildren are brought up bilingual. I don't want to say that they are turned into Estonians. I don't think I'm assimilated. I think I'm perfectly integrated because I know my roots. And that's the difference. So whenever you talk about Russians, I feel hurt because it's also me you're talking about. But I would like to just make the distinction between Russians, Russian speaking, and Soviets living in Estonia, if there are any left. Maybe a little. Okay, I'll stop here. No, we're not gonna stop yet. We've got some more things to talk about. I wanted to pull back for a moment. When we briefed the report in Tallinn and I was prepared for, whoa, we're gonna hear a lot. Because we did make some recommendations and to have the government rethink, what surprised me, quite frankly, is that the feedback we got was there was criticism of the citizenship policy simply because it was a lot of money but they didn't feel that those communities had truly integrated. Raising the concerns and obviously this is very sensitive about the the transition of Russian language, Russian language to Estonian in high schools and the teacher certification and things like that, that they felt that perhaps the government needs to take a fresh look at how to, as you said, sort of the re-motivate if there's interest in doing that. Was that a fair criticism? I was surprised because I thought I thought they would be more support for government policies but there was actually some concern and our report evidently sparked a debate because people, it's hard for people to look critically at their own citizenship policies. I think it proves we're a democratic country and people are not afraid of criticizing government but yes I agree that there is room for government to think but as I tried to explain how to make it attractive, it's very easy to say is only criticize bad bad bad bad but constructive criticism is much better and that's also something we're expecting from Russia like other international organizations and international states and other countries. Just say that we've done something well and help us. Talk to those people who are living in Estonia, talk to those people and say that if you have lived there for 20 years it seems that you want to live there. Why don't you integrate with that society? You will feel much more comfortable, you will be part of the society, you could apply for better positions at work, you could be full participants of the everyday life and of the society. Unfortunately we don't see that and there are two powers, our government working in one direction and another government working in the opposite direction and I have to admit that Russia's propaganda is just watch and learn case, they are doing it very well. They are doing it very well in some parts of Estonia especially in those parts Narva and around Narva which are populated by mainly Russian speakers who watch Russian TV. We have not five channels but I think we have some 35, 45 Russian channels. They are listening to Russian radio but here I can say that they are listening more and more to Russian radio programs produced in Estonia which is a clear shift. Radio 4 is becoming more and more popular among Russians. The government has done some things for example what is very nice in Narva it's the college of Tartu University, our oldest university in Tartu has established some colleges around the country and one of them is in Narva. It was supposed to teach Russian teachers, Russian speaking teachers about Estonian history, about Estonian culture and so on and so on because unfortunately even a couple of years ago majority of Russian speaking teachers working in Russian gymnasiums were educated not in Estonia but in Russia mainly in Pskov, in St. Petersburg, some in Moscow so they didn't get their higher education in Estonia. The Tartu University College saw it same to explain to Russian teachers the Estonian histories, the language Estonian culture and the colleges today it's much more than just an educational body. It's the place where people meet, it's a place where people have good discussions. I was invited there several times to discuss about Estonian Russian relations and to discuss Estonian foreign policy and there were different attitudes but the discussion was going on and that's extremely extremely important. Some other good projects Estonian army it's interesting to say but boys from Russian families are more eager to join army than boys from with a Estonian background and that's a perfect place for integration. Certainly in the American history it is. Sports, culture, there are ways and we're doing but I agree that everything is not perfect and so much could be much much more could be done but will be more effective if we do it together Estonia and Russia. Thank you. Okay I'm gonna let's let's go to 2007 to the bronze knight incident. You are the Estonian ambassador to Moscow. You have a pretty significant demonstration outside of your embassy. This is where Russian and Estonian tensions were at their greatest and we go into some detail in the report about the causes of that but in your words and your reflections help us understand the bronze knight and your own sense of the Russian in you and the Estonian. What was your personal reaction and obviously what the government was was doing during those very tense days in April of 2007. You put the picture on the cover of the report and that's the bronze knight? Yes although I think that yes it was an incident in our bilateral relations but maybe we're talking too much about that because our relations at 20 years old now with restored independent Estonia there are so many other things we should not maybe pay too much attention to that because look what's happening in Europe look what's happening with the Occupy, Occupy Wall Street movement or Multiculti in Germany France yes things like that occur but I think we shouldn't dramatize them. As to the events in Moscow of course those events were not nice to see just some thousands of youngsters ultra nationalist youngsters shouting slogans against Estonia that wasn't nice and what what we raised with our partners together with the United States and with EU wasn't the incident in Thailand because each and every person has the right to explain his or her political views not in the manner that was done there but okay they have the right but what happened in Moscow it was just the violation of international law Russia the country where our embassy was working is supposed to protect the embassy the diplomats and is supposed to create the conditions for normal working of an embassy and that wasn't done when we left the building then the Russian then militia now militia officers said sorry we can't do anything we have received instructions to stay aside. I had in my embassy some Russian parliamentarians even one was Mr. Slutsky who was then deputy chair of Foreign Affairs Commission he came to the embassy during the time when embassy was under siege and he said that he can stop it in three minutes but he's not going to do that because it's a nice place for Nazis for the young movement to to get more experienced to practice their work to practice their attitude towards Western countries and it was pleasure for him to look to see what was happening in the streets. With my knowledge today I can say that of course it was sanctioned by the Russian government. We don't have proof about that but as someone Estonian official said very nicely if somebody barks like a dog bites like a dog and looks like a dog then most probably it's a dog so so also in this case even if I can't say that there was any written decree saying go and do that to the Estonian Embassy I have all grounds to think that it was authorized and it was conducted from from from the highest echelons in Kremlin. So the bronze soldier that wasn't easy was was my government doing the was it the best solution to to to remove the bronze soldier like that I'm not in a position to comment I don't know but I can say that my government took the best decision it could under those circumstances. Before removal we were consulting with the Russian side why not to do it together the soldier wasn't in the right place it was in the center of Thailand who been there it's the it's a trolleybus station it's it's it's not a nice place. Dead people dead soldiers have to find their final resting place in cemeteries in the cemeteries. So the soldier was the the soldier and the remains of the Soviet soldiers were taken to a military cemetery a couple of kilometers from this place. Was it a bad place? No it wasn't. If you mentioned the Russian Orthodox Church I can say that parents or the then head of Russian Orthodox Church Alexios II, Patriarch of Moscow and Russia were buried on that cemetery. Whenever Patriarch visited Thailand he went to that cemetery. It was the same place to him. When I met him last before leaving before leaving Russia in the summer of 2008 he was saying that he would like to come to Estonia. He would like to go to the cemetery and he would like to to pay his respect to his parents and to the bronze soldier the statute and the remains that were removed there. He couldn't he died later that year unfortunately wouldn't come later to Estonia but it wasn't a bad place. When we discussed it with Russian officials at some point we were pretty close of doing it together with owners with banners with military all military owners with the participation of Estonian Church Russian Orthodox Church other churches if necessary because we didn't know who were the soldiers buried there. Russia State didn't want to do it with us. So that was the situation when the decision was made. And one more thing you mentioned Russian Orthodox Church. As I was saying some words about Alexios II who was the highest highest Russian Orthodox Church person in in Russia. He was born in Estonia. He was born in a as we call it Baltic German family. He is he was speaking at home Russian and German of course he was fluent in Estonia. When I as an Estonian ambassador at some point being ambassador of a fascist country met him at the official receptions either at his place or in other places in the city we always spoke in Estonian. The first sentences. Of course then we switched either to either to Russian or either to English because there were other people around us and it wasn't polite but he made it very clear that Estonian ambassador I'm talking to her in Estonia that's the language of the country where I was born. When we met in his private residences we were always speaking only Estonia although we were both laughing to Russians in Moscow speaking Estonia but that was true and he he's Estonia was it was it was good it was like Estonia that that was spoken by those people who returned back from Siberia. They kept the Estonia language of the time when they left the country. So for us Alexios II the patriarch I think he was he was a secret weapon. He was a real friend of Estonia. He was doing his best for Estonia even during the times when nobody came to Estonian Embassy and nobody wanted to greet me in the street. He was always talking to me he was always talking to me in Estonia. So you see even the Russian Orthodox Church might have might have different roles depending very much on the personality who's at the head of the church. Fascinating. Tell me what give me the state of Estonian relations official relations today. Certainly we sense that it took a while to officially come back after 2007. It was one official sort of said it was sort of like being in a deep freeze for a while but we started to see the culture minister coming some some of those official visits. Give us the state of play right now of where Estonian Russian relations are. I will just talk about different sectors because when I was well if I if I ask you the first word that comes to your mind Estonia Russian relations what would you say just the first word that comes to your mind. Say something. Not very good. Okay. That's it. And now I'll try to and now I'll try to try to to to say that they are good. Our political relations are not the best agree. During 20 years of regained independence we haven't had any official visits of either president prime minister or foreign minister from one country to another on the other we have standing invitation to all Russian high officials to visit Estonia at any appropriate time. We haven't had our VIPs have met at several multi forums in the United Nations at the meeting of the OEC at the meetings at other meetings. Yes they have but no official visits. That's not good. But politicians are doing it exofitio. So as soon as the political relations change and you tell politicians to become friends they will be friends immediately. It's more important what are people feeling. And when we come to the level of ordinary people then against statistics shows that more and more Russian tourists are coming to Estonia. More and more Russians are buying property in Estonia. More and more Russians are again rediscovering Estonia they knew before 20 years ago and are introducing Estonia to their children who don't know about Estonia anything. More and more we're happy with that. Russians are very good tourists. And I think each and every country is really happy to have them as tourists. When we come to the cooperation among administrative powers or ministries I think it's OK. Even during the years of the difficult months of 2007 our ministry of interior border guard authorities custom authorities social authorities MFA's were constantly working because we're professionals. We have to work if it's in your neighbors. We have to. And we did it. Cultural ties. Perfect. I think that even during the Soviet times there were never so many Russian artists Russian musicians Russian theaters visiting Estonia as there are now and vice versa. Estonians are very well received in Moscow St. Petersburg in other cities. And trust me Moscow is spoiled. Moscow has 263 theaters and to surprise them it's not easy. But our cultural people still can do that. They are very well received economic ties. Russia is our trade partner number four. If you look at Estonian trade then 80 percent is done with the EU. 10 percent is done with Russia. 10 percent with third countries always satisfied with the 10 percent. OK. Maybe it might be 11 12 13 but not much higher because not the country wants to have trade too much with one another specific country. You want to put the eggs into different baskets because it's risky. Even during 2007 when we had a significant drop in transit through Estonia and Russian officials were inviting Russian people not to buy Estonian candies and not to buy Estonian milk products. Russian people were still buying them because they know the quality and our trade was going up even in 2007. So our trade has been going up since 2004 constantly. Now if we put everything together then I would say that the political relations are important but not as important as all the other sectors because you can't tell people to be friends on Monday but you can tell politicians to be friends on Monday and they will be if it's the political will. Well now I'm going to let you in the conversation. I'm having too much fun up here. We have about 25 minutes or so of good conversation and you have a phenomenal interview here. So if you'd like to ask a question please raise your hand. You have mics and if you could identify yourself please in your affiliation and you can ask a question. You can also ask a question about our report. I'll do my best. But she's so much more interesting than I am. So and I'm going to tuck around here. Does anyone have any questions. You can let me have all this fun. Ambassador Smith. Thanks for the commentary. I think it keeps Smith with CSIS. I was CSIS sorry. I was in Estonia at the time the withdrawal took place of Russian troops Russian officers and helped negotiate in fact with the Russian Embassy and the Russian officer corps. One of the things that I discovered then was that the Russian government didn't really care what happened to the officers. Of course we had to help the officers more than the Russian Embassy would. I could never get the Russian ambassador to cooperate with us on meetings. But I'm going but I'm going back to some issues. One is the kind of the report. The the question of I remember in 1992 93 94 90 I'm sorry 94 95 in in Estonia the relationship between us the ethnic Russians and ethnic Estonians seemed to me to be quite good considering all that had happened in the past 50 years. Very good. I mean there was there wasn't any hostility. I didn't see anybody. There were no violent acts against Russian ethnic Russians. And I think that says something. And I even saw cases myself where if the same thing had happened in Moscow by Estonians there would have been somebody would have died. The things that happened in Tallinn by ethnic Russians were just dismissed by by Estonians and let it go. But the the question of is there more of a nationalistic feeling among this young generation of Russians than there are their parents. I have the kind of the impression from some earlier work that Sarah did that in fact there's more nationalism. There's more ethnic. Not pride but I would say almost chauvinism. Yeah. By by the new generation of Russians than there was by their parents and whether that's reflected in the figures. Another thing that might be reflected in the figures is that people who answer the questions might be people who feel more strongly and that those who really don't care or or don't want to be too accommodating don't answer the questions. Whereas those who feel very strongly against I see that we still see that when the on the list of Russian enemies and this is put out every year by one of the Russian think tanks that Estonia Latvia United States and Georgia are the four main enemies of people in Russia. I know that in fact in 1994 95 when I was in Estonia you were that you was number one you were number one and in Latvia was number two. Now we've joined the list. But I just wonder how much also in the last question is has to do with television and the influence of television. I noticed that Russia today RT is all is all over Europe and in the United States. But I see that it's become much more subtle. And I noticed that even in Poland I go to Poland a lot that in Poland RT has replaced CNN in many towns because it's it's free. They pay for CNN. So when we had some young Estonians Latvians Lithuanians here a couple years ago and they said their studies showed that ethnic Estonians Latvians and Lithuanians not Lithuanians Estonians and Latvians ethnic Estonians and Latvians were watching more Russian television than they were their own television. Is that's the case do you think or do you think that's exaggerated. And what influences that having on these numbers. Triple header Keith. So sort of comments lots of questions on the Soviet coup withdrawal that you were also in the ministry at that time and those negotiating agreement. Love that. And then nationalism and then maybe it's not from TV. The rule of TV during the Soviet time TV was playing. It was the most important media channel. Most important media channel. No question. Russia today I'm talking about the experience I had living there. Yes still meet the channel number one. It's a must to watch state sponsor channels. It's a must to watch nine o'clock. It's a must. That's the prime source of information. Radio not so much maybe in more distant parts. We might say that to some extent Russian media is free. Yes they have a homo square. It's maybe listened by three millions. Okay. Six seven millions not more. They have some newspapers. They have internet sites. Yes they have. But majority of population is used to watching TV. Now my own experience during 2007 and during my whole my whole time as an ambassador to Russia. I tried to go to TV stations on the air. Not prerecorded but on the air. I was allowed twice. Once to a TV show where I was promised that I will get two to three minutes without interruption to say what I want to say. It didn't work out. Second to the political debate by Vladimir Vladimir H. Pozner. Primina where Pozner again promised that I will have some time without interruptions to say what I wanted to say. I didn't get it. Okay. These were my two experiences. All the other times. I was several times prerecorded and when I saw the clips on Ramya. That wasn't me. It means that I was me. But it was twisted. I started speaking in this jacket and finished in another jacket. So these were all my words and all my sentences. But they were put together. And then I stopped doing that. Another channel where I was speaking. It was again near Moscow. As I said, they were open. They invited me and they asked for comments. But unfortunately, as I said, maybe less than 10 million listened to a home school. It's a niche. It's a niche for certain circles in Russia. So it's very Russians are very, very TV people. Russians in Estonia. I have the impression that Russian in Estonia also very TV people. But they are more used to internet searches. They are more used to listening radio. As I said, radio for is becoming more and more important. So they have also other channels. But the propaganda that is done by Russian media to ethnic Russians in Estonia, it's so strong. As you pointed out in the report, you have a nice Soviet movie, you have a nice concert, then you have news. If you look at the news, all the sentences are right. But they are given with a twist that the whole picture is not correct. I remember a clip in Vrema about one of the US shuttles coming down. The clip started. Another US shuttle will land tomorrow. It's going to be disaster. Because usually they have problems. They have problems with that was that was that everything was correct. So it went for about five minutes. And then there was the last sentence, the shuttle landed and the next was news music or sports or anything. Everything was correct. You can't say that the sentence was wrong. But the way it was it was conducted, it wasn't right. Chauvinism among young Russians. What happened on that night? It was a mixture of everything. Yes, those young Russians in the streets were shouting slogans against Estonian sovereignty. There were shouting slogans supporting Russia. Yes, they were doing it. But later when the later when our investigators looked at the picture of those who gathered, there were lots of criminals. There were lots of well, how to say, not too many young people with higher education. So I can't say that it was the full picture of Russians residing in Estonia. Definitely not. I think it was more coincident of different negative, negative, negative things or matters. What the Russians are doing, young Russians in Estonia today, they have discovered, like me, that knowing three languages, Estonia, Russian and English, you can bet the best job, you can get the best job. In Estonia, if you want. Young Estonians have discovered the same. Russian is today foreign language number two, studied by young Estonians. English first, Russian second. For long years, second and third were German and French. Now it's definitely Russian. So they are learning more. Are they learning because they want to stay in Estonia or they want to go to other EU countries? I think it's both ways. During my three years in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I visited approximately 40 secondary schools and all the Estonian universities and talked to students. I was invited to talk about development cooperation, but also about Russia. And when I asked the Russian people, what do you want? We want to go to study in America. We want to go to do, but come on, guys, not everybody can study in America. Somebody has to work and somebody has to live here. So think about your future from that point of view. Not all of you can go to study abroad. If you want to leave the country, you have to also find some place or some work to do in this country. Do you want to go to Russia? No. We want to stay here or better, go to study abroad. I think it's too early to say what has happened to that trend. Perhaps we have to come to it some years later, maybe some five, ten years to see what happened to that young Russian generation that was born after 91 and that wanted to go to Europe. Did they go or did they stay in Estonia? Definitely. Maybe a small number of them will go to Russia, if any at all. And if you look at the numbers that Heather was showing, there's no hatred among ethnic Estonians, ethnic Russians. There's no hatred. It's the propaganda. And if you see who's complaining the most about the massive violation of human rights in Estonia, it's official Russia. Then there's a gap. Then Russians living in Estonia and Russians living in Russia, they don't care about it. Russians living in Estonia, are they complaining really? Again, look at the data, not really. Their concerns are the same as for young Estonians. Education, employment, social guarantees, they have the same interests. During 20 years, we have had several ethnic Russian political parties. None of them has been popular, enough popular among the population to get a vote or a seat in parliament. None. Which means that the interests of population are not divided by their ethnicity. Yes, we can say that central party is more popular among Russians than among Estonians, but it's not a Russian party. It's still, it's multi, multi, multi ethnic party. So maybe that's the question that the division does not go so much by, by, by ethnic. My personal view is that they're getting better. My personal view is that they are getting better. Because if I look at my children, they're without complexes like we are. They're completely different. They travel to Russia. They travel to the United States when they travel to Russia. The first, when we were exchanging groups, when I was ambassador in Moscow, we were exchanging groups of students, group of children. We always ask the Russian kids who are going to Estonia to come to the embassy so that we can explain what is the country about. For them, it was difficult to understand that the whole Estonia was one tenth of Moscow. So that the whole population of the Baltics was smaller than Moscow. So we tried to explain. The question they often asked was, how can I recognize a fascist, a fascist, walking in the streets of Thailand so that I know I can run away? Okay. We also asked the kids to come to the embassy after they visited Thailand. There were no questions like that. From Estonian side, my son was going to, to, he was seventh grade at the time at his teacher called me, Madam Ambassador, what do you think about our grade going to Moscow? Is it too dangerous? If we speak Estonian language, are they going to beat us? Okay. If you can go with the children to the zoo in Riga, and if you can go with the children to a zoo in Helsinki, then you can come to zoo in Moscow. No difference. It depends so much on your children. How do they behave? If they are bad guys, they will get beaten everywhere, anywhere. And what was the result of that? After they went back, they were calling us and saying, but, but they are very much like we are. They wear the same jeans. They listen to the same music. They have the same shops in the street. So I think that they don't have the problems, but it's very much in our hands. What do we tell at home? If we continue saying that Estonians and nationalists and Russians are Soviets, then of course, it's more complicated. It very much depends on that what we tell them at home. My children are free of complexes, trust me. Hello, my name is Mikhail Kolugin and I'm from Russian Embassy. I wonder, Mark, actually, I find some some statistical data from this report very interesting, I think useful. And of course, some of the conclusions about how to integrate the Russians or Russian speaking people into Estonian society or how to teach Russian history or history in unbiased way. It's also, I think, very useful recommendations. I wanted to ask actually, and I want to thank Ambassador for very warm words about how better, former better his role in getting Estonia and Russia together. It was a very great job done by him. But I wanted to ask about the words, the comments made by Miss Conly at the beginning, that the official goal of Russian compatriot policy is to keep Russians in Estonia separated. Actually, I don't find, I can't support this. And I think if you study carefully, all all the comments by Russian officials from our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, you can say that we urge our partners in Estonia to solve the problem of citizenship. So it's not our goal to keep these people separated. Thanks. Thank you very much. Some of the recommendations and it absolutely pulls from your comments. You know, young people, regardless of where they are, have a lot in common. And where we found the deepest divisions was the historical understandings. And again, that has been passed. You do, you listen to your mom and dad and how they are interpretation. Their political views, their historical views that we found one way. And again, we were not really speaking of official policy. But how do you get to that where they're working together, they're at the coffee shops together, they're having a dialogue and understanding their similarities and talking through their differences. And we thought one idea would be on historical curriculum, having a discussion of the different points of view and how they understood their history. Some very interesting projects I know within the Russian human rights community, they do this memorial and things like that. You know, how the family, what has happened to them in the past? And to do a little family research and then to present that to each communities and just to have a discussion. It's just building awareness of the differences, but also of the similarities. And I think that's the type of innovation, in addition to official policy, that will be really important. Your comment on the separation of policy, it was, it came from our analysis again, through if you receive your information from a separate source and you're not getting different sources of information. If your communities, and let's take Narva for example, if you don't have any ethnic Estonians in your workplace, if you're getting news from a different place, if culturally you're going to go to the Rusky Dome Center, and that's where you're meeting your friends, you're in your own community, to your point of multicool to your things like that. That's an assimilation issue. We have it here in the United States and some it's when a community can be so separate, yet not be part of the larger effort. And in part, we felt that that was an outcome of the compatriot policy, whether implicitly or complicitly, that was how explicitly, that was what it was in part, what it was doing. And we felt an anecdote to that was to bring these young peoples together, not informal networks, but at the coffee shops, on the internet, in the Facebook chat rooms. Let's have them talk to one another and see themselves as together they're building Estonia's future, not having parallel communities where the other one doesn't have much influence or role on the other. That was how we came about it. And you're absolutely right. Your comments on the patriarch, you know, as I look at history as my own understanding, as a former government official, how often does it come down to the personal, the relationships, what that one person can do? And that's an amazing, unestoyed, but I didn't understand her now. That's a very powerful message, particularly from the the leader of the really amazing, really amazing. I don't have any comments on that. Were we right in assuming that there was a policy of separation or it's not we over dramatized that? We officials, we know how to write policies. We can write different policies. We can talk according to the talking points. Our ministers can say what needed. What your foreign minister said a couple of days ago was that yes, the Western democracies or the Western countries have their rights, have their right to be present in the former USSR region, including the Baltics, but they have to take into account our interests. That was Mr. Lavrov saying a couple of days ago. What is important is not only what's written in the policies, but what happens in practical life. If Mr. Lavrov would come to Thailand for official visit, have a meeting with Russians living in Estonia and talk to them and encourage them to apply for a stoning citizenship, encourage them, learn Estonian language, that's something that would make a difference. As long as the different policies and strategies are put on the websites, it doesn't change anything. And that's to the Estonian language. Having met the present ambassador of Moldova in DC, if you haven't, he's a young guy. I met him a couple of days ago. He was a journalist in Estonia at the beginning of 90s, end of 80s. He was in Estonia for six months and he learned the language. Journalist in six months. So there are no excuses that people can't learn it in 20 years. And we can write strategies, we can write policies, but we need human touch. And they talked about with your parliamentarians, why don't you come? Why don't you say Estonia is doing bad things one, two, three, but give us credit for the things that we're doing well. The only time when Putin gave credit to Estonia, it was I think 2009, during the gas dispute with Ukraine, when he said that, look at Estonia, they've been paying market price for 20 years and they're not complaining. That's the only thing I found. Because as I said, we're not perfect. There are things we can do much better, but a little encouragement from your side and we'll be doing much better. I don't know how to come after that. Are there any questions or other comments? Yes, sir, please hold on, we'll get a microphone to you. And we will make you our very last question. Just a comment, I'm Dick Murphy, I'm a senior associate at CSIS. I don't think this has anything to do with your government. But to me, a great example of Estonian soft power is the movie The Singing Revolution and how that has been marketed everywhere. I get constant emails from the producers of that film telling me when and where it's going to be performed and all of that. And the movie, of course, was dynamite. It was fantastic. And I think it was a lot of people learned about Estonia through that movie. Thank you. And it was on WHUT a couple of weeks ago, Sunday or Saturday, prime time. But if anybody hasn't seen, we have copies of them, but please send me an email. And they also want internet, which means that you can download it also from internet. Yes, I encourage everybody to see the movie. Maybe it's documentary, maybe it's too primitive, but it's very human. And it was done by Americans. Estonian Americans, it wasn't done by Estonians. And it makes it even more important. Well, thank you for ending on that note. Let me thank you, Marina. You are a five star. You're fantastic. Thank you so much for being with us and for sharing. We sometimes have the opportunity to interview ambassadors, and they stick to their talking points. You provided us with insights that So we feel like it's fired. Yeah, no, you won't get fired. We're not going to allow her to get fired. No, you won't get fired. But you have provided us with great insights. You've helped our research. You've helped us understand this complex but important relationship. I want to thank all of you for spending your valuable time with us today. This was a terrific, as I said, this was the grand finale. We saved the best for last in rolling out this report, and I could have asked for a better friend to help help us do that. I have some wonderful colleagues to thank as well. I'm Mihaela David, who was a contributing author to this report. Mihaela is an incredible intern in our program, and she's she's the future, and she's spectacular. Lucy Moore, who's now gone on to graduate school, is also helpful to this report. And my staff, Terry Tolan, who tried to potty, thank you all so very much for helping us. And I hope we do more of this. And I hope you'll come back to CSIS. And again, thank you all very much. There's copies of the report, and I think we all better watch the singing revolution. So thank you all very much. Thank you so much. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.