 The obligations of cessation and reparation are not differently owed by the responsible state when the internationally wrongful act is a serious breach of an obligation under peremptory norms of general international law. And this may sound strange, but there is actually no reason to require more in terms of cessation or reparation when the illegality is egregious. Reparation requires that the ongoing wrongful act be terminated and the reparation requires full reparation, nothing less, but nothing more. However, would it not make sense that some specific additional obligations arise as a result of serious violations of international law, in particular serious beaches of obligations that are owed under Yuskogen's norms? In 1979, at the suggestion of Roberto Agu, the International Law Commission made the distinction between crimes of international law and delicts. The distinction was set to reflect the normative hierarchy between Yuskogen's norms and the rest of international law. The word crime was not much appreciated by states and was replaced in the final draft of the ILC by the concept of, I quote, serious breaches of obligations under peremptory norms of general international law, end of quote. And according to article 40, paragraph 2 of Arsiewa, the breach of obligations under Yuskogen's norms is said to be serious if, I quote, if it involves a gross or systematic failure by the responsible state to fulfill the obligation, end of quote. Article 41 of Arsiewa identifies certain, I quote, particular consequences of such serious breaches. However, those consequences do not constitute any new secondary obligations owed by the responsible state. Rather, those consequences are primary obligations owed by all the other states when such serious breach occurs. Under article 41, paragraph 1, I quote, states shall cooperate to bring to a man through lawful means any serious breach, end of quote, of a Yuskogen's obligation. And this is clearly an obligation of conduct, a best effort, obligation, not an obligation of result. While under article 41, paragraph 2, I quote, no state shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation, end of quote. And you are already familiar with those obligations not to recognize and not to render aid or assistance, and we've already come across those obligations. Those are prohibitions that are best understood as obligations of result. It is not surprising that serious breaches of the most fundamental norms of international law that reflect common core values of the international community of states require certain reactions from all the other states. It is through those reactions that the obligations under Yuskogen's norms survive despite being breached.