 Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome to this IIEA webinar on dynamics in the Indo-Pacific looking at EU and national perspectives. We're delighted to be joined today by George Cunningham, former strategic advisor on Asia Pacific Affairs in the European External Action Service, by Dr. Frederic Grar, senior policy fellow with the Asia Programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations, and by Shadda Islam, advisor and analyst on Europe's relations with Asia and Africa. We're very grateful to our speakers for being so generous with their time and taking time out of their busy schedules to join us today. Our panelists will speak for about 30 minutes or so, and then we will go to a Q&A with the audience. You will be able to join the Q&A. The discussions are using the Q&A function on Zoom, which you should see on your screen. Please feel free to send in your questions throughout the session as they occur to you, and we will come to them once our speakers have finished their presentations. And please feel free also to join the discussion on Twitter using the handle at IIEA. A reminder that today's presentation and the Q&A are both on record. I now formally introduce our speakers before handing over to them. George Cunningham was, until his recent retirement, a strategic advisor on Asia Pacific Affairs in the European External Action Service. He was previously Deputy EU Ambassador to Afghanistan. And before this, he served as EEAS Deputy Head of Division for China, Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and Mongolia. Dr. Frederic Grar is a senior policy fellow with the Asia Programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations. He previously worked at the French Ministry for Europe and External Affairs, where he focused on the Indo-Pacific region. Shadda Islam is an advisor and analyst on Europe's relations with Asia and Africa. She is a member of the European Policy Centre's Strategic Council, and she is a non-resident fellow at the Centre for Global Development. To further ado, let me hand over to our first speaker, George Cunningham. George, you have the floor. Thank you very much, John, and it's really a delight to be with you today, particularly as the IIEA is growing stronger and stronger. And I'm going to be giving a presentation concerning the European Union's recent strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. So this was a strategy which was adopted this year. In fact, I was the penholder for the strategy just before retirement, and it was done in a two-stage process. For those of you who follow the EU, first the Council conclusions which were adopted by the 27 foreign ministers in April 2021. And then there was a joint communication between the European Commission and the High Representative in September this year, so very, very, very fresh. And the issue is sufficiently important for the European Union that it was highlighted by the Commission President, Rousseau van der Leyen, at the state of the Union address in mid-September. So how has this come about and what can be learned from the EU's intentions in the region? But of course, as you well know, the Indo-Pacific is the fashionable place to be in terms of international affairs, but also there are very concrete reasons why people are talking about it. The first, of course, in terms of the EU's perspective is that the EU is the number one investor. It's the top development assistance provider and amongst the biggest traders in the Indo-Pacific region. We define this as stretching from the east coast of Africa to the Pacific un-states, that is our definition or the EU's definition. I've just stopped saying how because I've left the years, but nonetheless it's I'm still there with that terminology or that reference. So, in terms of, for instance, investments. There's about 11 trillion, I think, euros worth of investments and this compares to six or four of the United States. Is it billions of trillions? I don't quite remember. But anyway, it's 11 times the amount of investment that China has so far put into the region and just under half, so just double the what the US has done in the region as well. So it's really a major focus for the European Union. And the region, of course, is responsible for two thirds of economic growth. It's the manufacturing hub, central to supply global value chains, central in terms of the digital economy, and in terms of, of course, CO2 emissions and the whole issue of climate change. There's a lot going for that region, and it's really expanding. And if you want the prosperity, talk about prosperity, gender of the European Union, where that's the focus point in terms of the fact that if we can invest and if we can do well in trade with the region, our own citizens very much benefit from it. However, there's a lot of geopolitical competition, significant strains on trade and supply chains, of course COVID-19 had its impact. Vulnerabilities choke points in terms of global trade 40% of global trade passing through a straight some like a 30% of global trade passings to the South China Sea. There's no overarching regional security or order military expending is rocketing in the region. The issue of nuclear and non-perforation and malicious cyber attacks, the universality of human rights is being challenged. And all this is developing increasingly, all these developments are increasingly threatening the stability and security of the region, and therefore directly impacting upon the EU's own security and especially economic interests. So countries have been rolling out what they call Indo-Pacific strategies. Japan did it sometime ago back in 2007 then Australia 2013 and slowly slowly India United States under Trump. So Japan came out with its Outlook in 2019 New Zealand, UK in 2021, just before the EU strategy came out, and Canada is expecting to have a strategy in the Pacific strategy. Also amongst the member states of the European Union, France in 2018 Germany 2020 Netherlands 2020 have Indo-Pacific strategies. And that's the case that when the elections occurred, and Joe Biden, it was clear that Joe Biden had one or be it of course there was a great controversy within the United States. The EU produced a new EU US agenda for global change in December, which said increased EU focus should take place on the challenges and opportunities in the Pacific region. It also helped deepen cooperation with like-minded partners. And so it came about that the EU produced its strategy. Now you may say it's sort of given that this is an important part of the world, but if you look at the trade policy produced document produced just before the Indo-Pacific strategy work was done. The focus was very much to the neighborhood it was very much to Africa in terms of trade policy at least. And then you had this sort of afterthought, yes by the way you have this Asia Pacific, it was called at the time, and by the way it's sort of more or less as important to South America. So this was over a period of a few months there was a kind of revolution in terms of thinking and the Indo-Pacific strategy came about and it became important. The important thing to note here is that it's a strategy for cooperation. The terminology Indo-Pacific is normally a shorthand for anti-China, but it is actually inclusive of China is consistent with the EU's strategic outlook. But also the EU strategy on the Indo-Pacific highlights the importance of working with like-minded partners. And what we say there as well is in particular partners that have already announced Indo-Pacific approaches of their own. Because there is this pragmatic approach, principle pragmatism approach, which means also that of course in ASEAN we have a number of countries which aren't entirely democratic or have problems with human rights, some of which we of course we stay away from, but others of course we feel we can cooperate with nonetheless. And in that the strategy shows the importance of the centrality of ASEAN highlights that. Now the way that it's organized is that it's when you talk about Indo-Pacific people think immediate of security, but the EU strategy is all inclusive in all the areas we draw upon the palette of all the areas of the European Commission's competences. And so we have different chapters on sustainability and inclusive prosperity, because prosperity is the key thing we have to deliver to our citizens as well. The green transition is there of course, ocean governance, digital governance, connectivity, security and defense does have a place. And then we talk about human security, which is the health systems because of COVID-19. The importance of human rights and disaster risk reduction. And all this is underpinned by the usual analogy of partnerships and dialogues. There is an important aspect as well in the strategy about strengthening work with regional organizations and also strengthening them because of course the EU loves regional organizations and they want to do as much as possible, especially of course in intensified cooperation in multinational fora. So, the mutual economic well-being is the center stage of the strategy. And I think the whole, if you read the strategy, especially joint communication, you see that there is very little mention of China, China does not dominate. What really is all about this joint communications all about is diversifications to say, look at this region, there's so many countries, they're all growing, they all have potential. Let's diversify, let's work with all these countries, don't just put all your eggs in one basket and deal with China alone. And also because it has this white palette, partners can identify areas that want to cooperate with the EU. So we don't say we're throwing all this stuff down your throat and you have to do all these things to work with us. We simply saying, here it is, here are those areas of cooperation you choose, which ones you like to work with. And I remember that of course even at the time before we had the joint communication when I left in the summer. We already had India and Japan coming forward with specific suggestions. Okay, we likely when India was to do with ocean governments. Yes, we like this idea of cooperating on ocean governments. This is our suggestions and already this, this was very important not only that we've got that support from the region but we also have the areas in which people might work and I presume that since my departure and I'll find out more later about this and there have been some more approaches. So the economic well-being also talks about the sustainable global value chains. It talks about completing trade negotiations. Of course, Australia there is now slowed down because of the unfortunate situation concerning the nuclear submarines of course it's linked to that. Of course, but he talks about unlike the trade policy document you compare it with the trade policy document that was produced in January here by September we were talking about, you know, reminding people about Australia and New Zealand, not just in the trade document but also India, Indonesia and Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and even eventually an ASEAN region to region trade agreement. So, much, much wider. Economic partnership agreement specific and also the East Africa community because of course we're dealing with that part of the world as well in terms of strategy. The importance of green alliances in partnerships there was this green alliance which has been announced now with Japan. That is continuing digital connectivity and horizon European corporation research development with like minded partners underlined. So this is this is what's contained and in the as I said in joint communication. Specifically mentioned, we want to do digital partnerships with X, Y and Z and see that in there. Very much listed. Now on the security side of course we don't he doesn't have an aviates only relies on the member states, but work had been done to push forward the agenda there. And the first thing is that we were talking in terms of for the first time, enhancing the naval deployments by the EU member states to help protect sea lines of communication and freedom and navigation of course uncrossed mentioned several times particularly in the joint communication. And, and, and also we're into boosting in the Pacific partners capacity to ensure maritime security. So they're going to be more joint exercises and port calls between in the Pacific naval units, as well as you member states, and linked to the you counter piracy naval operation at Atlanta, and increased participation we hope in the use military and civilian common security defense policy missions, strengthen corporations one counter terrorism cybersecurity maritime security and crisis management. And we expect that the EU will declare its first maritime area of interest in terms of activity in the Indo Pacific under the French presidency in early 2022. So, the messages out now, and the EU the 27 member states and the European Parliament are getting the message out to the region. The strategy lays out many options for cooperation. It's been warmly greeted and some have already officially suggested there is to work together. And that we are continuing to work in terms of EU summits with India, Japan, US and Canada, bringing the agenda forward concerning the Indo Pacific. And as I mentioned before the next stage, the critical next stage is the French EU presidency in the first half of 2022, where they expect to hold a major meeting, which hopefully will be physical depending on covered 19 of the key partners, as well as themselves and the rest of the European Union, bearing in mind in particular that France of course is an Indo Pacific power so, and it has 1.5 million citizens in the region. So I think. So to conclude then the US conducting it's not a third way doctrine, I think is with a way to put it the third way between the EU, so between the US and China. But of course if there is a problem that will develop in the region. One can expect of course that the EU will lean towards the United States rather than China. Clearly there is an issue concerning the problem concerning Brexit as there is with everything. There is a problem concerning Brexit. The departure of the United Kingdom has significantly reduced the number of EU member state naval assets. I would guess something like the Royal Navy had something between a third and 40% of the EU's member combined member state naval strength. So the UK has a go to their own policy in the region, despite the desire for close cooperation and one can envisage that and see that in terms of the aircraft carrier strike force that is operating in that region at the moment. Of course, August has further rocks the boat unnecessarily and causes an issue just before France takes up the EU presidency. There is a sort of indication of a slowdown in the EU Australia free trade negotiations. And we'll see how that that works. It is a very unfortunate that's happened. It could have been avoided. And it's a really ham-fisted approach that was taken, I think. There's also the issue in terms of hard security that some member states are worried about precious naval resources because of the fact that of course the naval strength of the combined force of the EU has has reduced. They're worried about precious naval resources being away from potential flashpoints closer to home Baltic Sea, Black Sea, and so on. They're worried about the fact that this may draw resources away into distant lands and seas far away from those flashpoints. So there is this kind of restraint that's going on, but nonetheless, the whole idea of the EU's strategy and also the security aspect has been welcomed. And I think there's even, I think, this weekend that Prime Minister Kishida of Japan reiterated that, quote, considering the stability of the region is extremely important for European and US countries to be interested and involved in Asia's security environment. So I hope that's been helpful to everybody giving a background what's going on. And look forward to hearing the other speakers have to say thank you very much. Thank you very much, George, for what has been a very interesting and helpful presentation on the new EU strategy. And I'd now like to give the floor to our second speaker, Dr. Frederick grow. Frederick, you have the floor. Thank you very much, Ambassador. I will try to be brief and I will actually be brief. When we speak of the French strategy in the Indo-Pacific we're talking of two different things. We're talking of a doctrine and we're talking of a process. The doctrine is definitely an evolving one, based on three documents for those of you who are interested in reading them. There is of course a document produced by the French Ministry of Defense, which has sometimes given the impression that the French military, the French Indo-Pacific doctrine was all about military. There is a document, or at least there have been at least two documents written by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which take a larger perspective and so on. But the key document to read because every single orientation, it's part of that, is the speech of President Emmanuel Macron at government on May 2, 2018. I'll come back to that. Basically the doctrine is based like every doctrine should be on two different set of consideration. The first set is French national interest. And they reflect the fact that France is a resident power of the Indo-Pacific. That's a reality that France cannot escape. In other words, for France, the Indo-Pacific is not just a nice diplomatic thing to do. It's not the right thing to say. It's a duty because with population and territories as well as interest in the region, it has to take that into account. The second aspect of it is the evolving international situation. And clearly there we move to the content side of the doctrine. Basically, the doctrine says three things which are all contained again in Macron's speech of 2018. The first is manage, if possible, collectively, and certainly collectively, China's rights. And this is all contained in that first speech. We should prevent the, we should warm against the temptation of any hegemonic way. The circles have always been a two-way road and so on and so forth. So the tone was said there. The idea was not to oppose China. The idea was to make sure that China understood its responsibility as a major stakeholder and to the extent possible, rebalance peacefully the relationship with Beijing, which has been the objective all along. And within that objective there was a second one, which is common to most Indo-Pacific strategy all over the world, which is to manage the alliance with the U.S. And there are two dimensions there. There is the concern about the U.S. that will since Barack Obama and not Donald Trump disengaging what is raising questions as to the reliability of its commitment to the security of the Indo-Pacific, which is why the French had a very direct impact on their position there. And there was, of course, the concern about making sure on the other side that the U.S. would remain committed, of course, to the security of Europe. And those went any way. This is all to say that the French strategy most plays from the very beginning in the ambit of the transatlantic alliance and in connection with the U.S., no matter what has been said about tragic autonomy and so on and so forth, which basically meant one thing, we want Europe to increase its leverage to have a say in the decision, which is slightly different as autonomy. Third, try to avoid being caught in the U.S.-China rivalry. I mean, clearly, there is still a zero-sum game and perhaps more than ever a zero-sum game which is emerging. And we thought there was neither the interests of France, neither for that matter the interests of Europe to be caught in that game. And I know that it has been mocked, I mean, again, not created a third way, but at least try to do something, really find a reason in our own terms in order to do something that makes any sense. This is a Dimash that has been the Dimash of every single country which has adopted an Indo-Pacific strategy, take India, take Indonesia and later on, take Australia and so on. This is the very same thing in every way, right? How did it work? The team around which it was all articulated were what? Multilateralism. I mean, and multilateralism not as a sort of incantation and a reaction against what Trump was doing. Multilateralism had a force multiplier everywhere. And the goal there was not to gain the U.S. administration. The goal was the sort of China multilateralism that we saw all the time in which superpower is in a position to impose its own balance of power, its own strengths over the weaker of the multilateralism was definitely an element of that. But also things such as climate change, biodiversity, and they were all understood as strategic issues. Take biodiversity for example. Into one very single issue with fish fisheries. Fisheries have become in many places the mean by which China has the ability to impose its own balance of power, its own strengths over the weaker of the multilateralism was definitely an element of that. But also things such as climate change, biodiversity, and they were all understood as strategic issues. Take biodiversity for example, into one very single issue with fish fisheries. Fisheries has become in many places the mean by which China has advanced its own geopolitical interest in the East China Sea, in the South China Sea, and is now pushing in the Indian Ocean, for example. So, here are the kind of issue that seems inoculate because they deal basically with environmental protection and so on. And this is very much dimension of it, but we go further than that. They are definitely multidimensional issues, which are a strategic impact. Now, what about the process itself. I mean the doctrine of the process developed separately and we say in parallel because if you look at the technology clearly found sorry, let's study developing its own set of partnership before it did develop its strategy. We did develop a partnership with India a long time ago, we did develop a strategy where partnerships are in Australia, I'll come back to that with others. And of course with Japan, and there are also other partnerships in the making, although at the later stage of advancement. Now, of course, Europe was very much part of France started pushing for European strategy in 2018, even if it's only in 2020, and thanks to the fact that Germany and the Netherlands elaborating then their own strategy and the three countries decided to work together, that things were made possible, and that the EU strategy evolved. But that was the goal. And in the process the intention was to pull also Europe, a little more in the way that Europe had to think itself. So the process was a very pragmatic one, recognizing France on interest as well as on limitation, and trying to place the whole thing into the ambit of the transatlantic alliance, which in the fresh perspective made a lot of sense. And then came August, and then August changed all the equation. It changed the question not because there was a contract loss. But the few billion which definitely would have upset it many people, no matter what you said, that what it did in reality to the sort of partnership networks that first was evolving, because it clearly did weaken all the sudden relationship with Australia, the betrayal once sitting in the breach of trust has been underlying many times, but it did quickly finish the kind of organic cooperation that existed because of the technology transfer and the building up of an autonomous industry in Australia. That meant what? That because France was probably the most engaged European country in their region, the strategy claimed between Europe and the Indo-Pacific was weakened as well. The interesting process, and we at ECFR have done a study on the motivation of all European perception of the Indo-Pacific concept. If you speak to many European countries, especially in Central Europe, the Baltic states and so on, they all vote in favor of the concept simply because they see it as a way to buy American commitment to European security. Well, this may evolve now, this may be changing, but so if you break that strategy claim in a context where the connection with the US is the most important aspect, one of the most important aspects of your relationship with the US sending the message that no matter how much you cooperate with it, you don't matter anyway, then you create a serious problem for the cooperation between the EU and the Indo-Pacific. In that sense, that was clearly creating a very different situation. And for France now, part of the issue, as a national entity, it will continue building up on its national strategy, reinforced partnerships, develop new one and so on and so forth, as a European member, it will be also to make sure that this is not the process of debilitating impact on the EU strategy as such, because if you take out the strategic motivation, the strategic raison d'etre, which in fact is the only one of the EU strategy of any strategy, then you have a set of separate policy, and the worst connection with one another is quite weak, and certainly not enough to motivate and turn the EU into a natural. So that's where the problem is, let's hope that it doesn't go that far, but that's what the problem is now, and that's where the way it's being perceived from Paris and also there. Thank you very much, Frederick. It's very helpful to get a perspective from Paris, given the very strong French interests and presence indeed in the Indo-Pacific region. So I'll turn now to Shadda Islam, a third speaker, and invite you to take the floor, please. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, John. Thank you very much for inviting me to this webinar. It's great to be with George and Frederick on the same panel as well. Let's just get the orcas out of the way and focus a little bit on the EU to get orcas out of the way. Let me just say 35 years of watching Europe's relations with the Asia Pacific, now the Indo-Pacific. I'm not really surprised that there's so much attention being given to this military alliance because whenever we talk about the Indo-Pacific, the focus is always on military initiatives, hard security, naval exercises, deployment of ships and all the rest of us, whereas the real requirements and all of my Asian colleagues and friends tell me are really economic technology investments. So I'm not surprised that the focus is on orcas, but I'm also sure and convinced that that's not, and it should not deter the European Union and France, if I may say so, Frederick, from pursuing a very sophisticated and strategic strategy, which actually responds to what many countries, I would say most countries in the region really want. The European Union playing a hard security role has always been through member states. And though we have these ambitions now, our strengths really are regulatory market oriented. So I just want to get that out of the way. I don't think this is going to be a long term problem. Now everything is clear now. All the lines are clear. We can see the light of the day. We know where the competition is coming from. And I have to say, whereas the EU and Ursula von der Leyen, the commission president is always talking about competition and rivalry with China. But we now see very clearly, we're also competing with global Britain, if I may say so, very strongly with global Britain, I've always said so, global Britain has fantastic diplomats, and is going to make an impact in Africa, and in Asia and the Middle East, let's not be complacent about that. And we also see, as Orcas has shown but also as Afghanistan has shown let's not forget that Orcas came right on the heels of the rather, I would say, careless. And chaotic and confusing American withdrawal and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan. So there are scars that have been left in this transatlantic relationship. And, you know, John, I've been watching this relationship like Frederick and George for 35 to 40 years and they've always been competition with the United States in the Indo-Pacific, not just with China, though of course we now focus on that. So this third way approach that the EU is taken is very much inspired by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, also a multilateral organization. And I think the fact that we're saying no binary choice, we will work and cooperate when we have to with China and we will push back and compete when we have to, but that I think also now applies very clearly to global Britain and the United States. So, I think the key challenge as we go ahead is going to be to find a balance and this is an ongoing struggle that we've had as Europeans, between the EU's interest in expanding its economic presence, trade investments, key to our jobs and growth agenda, now obviously also talking about climate change, biodiversity, fisheries, etc. But we have to keep that discussion open, that conversation open while at the same time and the strategy says so. We go on and we talk about human rights and you know the rule of law and democracy in a very fragile region, and I'm not just talking about Myanmar at the moment I mean we see populism, like in Europe expanding in many parts of, in many parts of the Indo-Pacific as well we have to be very conscious of that and not too complacent about certain countries in the region which we see as like-minded partners, but which are really on the verge of, I would say, populism and all that goes with it. Also, how do we then balance this, interest and values, I mean that's an ongoing challenge as I said. But there's one new element that very few people connect to geopolitics but I do and that's the Black Lives Matter movement, not just an American phenomenon, excuse me Frederick for saying so because as France insists it's just part of a woke culture coming in from the US, it is not. But it is waking up the world to the intersection between geopolitics and race and colonialism and countries which were once let's say quite quiet, and not very vocal about double standards are going to be very vocal now but EU double standards are not just talking about China so China will of course take the lead and insist that you know when we criticize China for human rights breaches, we look inside our own home as well so that's a new element that the Indo-Pacific strategy, or those who will be implementing it will have to take into account more inconvenient and uncomfortable conversations on this with many in the Indo-Pacific. I think it's very important that we sharpen up profile, it's not a new thing we've been in the Pacific partners for 3540 years we've had partnerships trade agreements, security conversations with Asia for a very long time, but it was time to freshen up this, I think the Indo-Pacific strategy does that it's modern it's updated. I think the EU toolbox is very interesting, also very 21st century, if I may say so, it allows Indo-Pacific countries as George has said to pick and choose mix and match. It's a toolbox that responds to the 21st century challenges. I especially and I've been a great fan of the connectivity strategy of the EU for many years now not just not just always as a response to the Belt and Road Initiative. I think the norms, the standards, the accountability, the transparency that we bring to this conversation on connectivity, but actually be expanded and made more into a multilateral forum. I'm hoping that the Indo-Pacific countries and the EU working together, including China, Japan, and India can work out some kind of a multi multilateral or plurilateral arrangement where they have certain norms and standards for these connectivity projects and the gateway that the EU is coming out with I think is going to be a good segue into this conversation. I think we are bringing in a nuanced conversation, as I said, and I hope and I pray that despite caucus, we do not add to the tensions between the US and China, those are heated enough without us Europeans pouring more oil onto this fire. And because of that, I think it's very, very good, very important that the court, per se, the court, you know, the Australian, Japanese, India, EU, sorry, US format has is not mentioned, and I do not think the Europeans should be working with the court. It is very openly anti-China, though they may say it isn't. And I think it's important that we keep our autonomous independence identity in the Indo-Pacific as Europeans, very important. I do think we should be joining the CP TPP. I think that's very important. It's where the trade standards and norms are set. That's where if China is allowed in, if it does become a member, the new era of liberalisation that I hope will come in China will be determined. So I think it's important that we do that. I think it's important that we try and see how the RCEP, this regional comprehensive economic partnership deal can work out with us. And EU, ASEAN, FTA, very, very important. I think we should get over the hurdles and get that done. And then we haven't mentioned ASEM, the Asia-Europe meetings. There's going to be an ASEM summit in Cambodia online presided by Cambodia. And I think the Indo-Pacific strategy should be discussed there as well, because that is a very important format that we tend to sometimes underplay it. And I think what I do worry about is that we focus on the Indo-Pacific, but we have forgotten the other South Asian countries. George, you've heard me say this before. And I am very, very, I think saddened in the sense that we're putting all our eggs into the New Delhi basket, whereas the region per se, even though, you know, inter-regional cooperation is quite, it doesn't really take place if you like. It's trampled, but still it is about more than a billion. I think it would be two billion people in South Asia, a growing middle class, very active civil society, great technological leaps, great climate change and biodiverse diversity challenges. I think it's a big mistake in the Indo-Pacific strategy not to be more welcoming and more expansive, especially now that we have this Afghanistan issue as well. And finally, the great problem is going to be coordination and consultation on this. We have these national strategies within the EU. We also have different departments in the European Commission and, you know, the external action service may have the lead on some diplomatic issues. George, but the other DGs, especially DG trade, DG move on the connectivity will be very important. So trying to sort of juggle all that. Not to mention talking to the Indo-Pacific countries themselves. And I insist on this, I think it's very important that all of this going forward is based on consultation and dialogue with the countries themselves. The days where we could go in and dictate and set out our rules and our agendas is far gone. And that means talking to business leaders in the region, means talking to academic civil society. Very important that these discussions take place. So I'm all for it. And I hope that we do see a stronger European Union presence, economic definitely and why not also security cooperation, but within the limits without really intensifying this very heated rivalry and competition between the US and China, because I can tell you one thing, at one point US and China will get along and the group of two will get along, they'll talk to each other, they'll work out a kind of coexistence, a co accommodation, if you like. And that's where we have to be careful not to be excluded from that as well. Thank you very much.