 scheduler for the I have... ఉ య్ర్చ౎ల౎ంధుబోశ౪ివాసౌ.enga. ఎసియాసొయ్చరల్చ� Perpet trabaj Gesetzentwurf . వ్ళోశఁ.yddేరోక఺ ఍పిస్చిట్ . I have explained about the representation theory of Mind బఢపొడింి mão. and in this i have explained about the representation ఉ ðణిదికౌబ సంాస౒ని and then how this representation theory of mind is related to a hypothesis of language of thought and semantic engines. Then today I will be discussing about the computational theory of mind which is very important to know about the representational theory of mind because this computational theory of mind plays vital role in fodder yet concept of mind and fodder has explained mind not only in terms of mechanistic but also in the non mechanistic way as it shows because there is a delay in fodder and concept of mind and that will be very clear if we go through all these things. As we have seen in the last few lectures that computational theory of mind maintains that the mental processes are computational processes. The theory of computation has become more popular after the publications of Alan Turing's famous article on Computing and Intelligence and this thesis explains how the machine is functioning in a mechanistic way, the possibility of mechanistic mind. The Turing thesis maintains that machines have intelligence and this intelligence capacity can find from the mechanical devices and Turing thesis is said to be a program in abstract symbolism. In other words if you see a Turing machine can perform symbol manipulations, the symbols appearing of the machines are read by its scanner and are altered by its printer in accordance with a set of rule laid down in the program. The machine operates the program. The various formulas have their formal rules in virtue of their syntactic properties and not due to their semantic contents. That is to say that a Turing machine does not have semantic contents. As we said the reader must accept it as a fact that the digital computers can be constructed and indeed has been constructed according to the principles we have described and that they can in fact mimic the action of a human computer very closely. But if you see according to Jerry Fodor, machine operations are operations on symbols on semantically interpreted objects. Thus it is entirely possible that the machine could operate differently upon symbols according to the formal rules without bringing in the semantic content of the symbols. The computational theory of mind argues that mental states are identical with functional or computational states and that mental processes are those operates specified by the machine table that adequately describes mental functions. If you see this means that the mental states and processes are analogous to the states and operations of a Turing machine. And like a Turing machine that specifies all that formal specifiable symbol manipulations. The mind too is a symbol manipulating device according to computational thesis of mind the way Turing is explaining. And that is to say that the mind is a software for which the brain is a hardware and both the systems performs computations on the symbols in their uniquely specified ways. Both are the devoid of semantic properties. But moreover both sets of symbols should be semantically interpreted. And it is due to the semantic interpretations of the formula of the program that we can say that the machine operates are rule governed and meaning full. Similarly, because the symbols upon which computational operations are performed are semantically interpreted, the operations of a computer are described in intentional idioms. In short, the semantic interpretations help us to understand the computer as a semantic engines. As we have seen in the last sections, semantic engines are possible in effect given an interpretation of a formal systems with true axioms and truth preserving rules. The semantics of the formal systems will take care of itself. That is to say if you take care of syntax, the semantic will take care of itself. Right kind of formal systems, interpretations a machine can handle the meaning. If we are not interpreting in the right way, then machine cannot handle the meaning. This basic insight is the underlying theory of cognitive science and artificial intelligence. The argument that the computational theory of mind is posing that mental processes are computational in a Turing machine that establishes the legit machine of the program of artificial intelligence. Computational processes are both formal and symbolic. They are symbolic because they are performed on symbols. Similarly, the mental processes are operations on some kind of symbols like object in virtue of N form or roughly the syntax of these symbols. In this connection, it would be relevant to understand the structure of the propositional attitudes and how they can be computationally analyzed. The mental representations including the propositional attitudes constitutes the bedrock of the computational and the representational theory of mind. Let us see the propositional attitudes because it is very necessary to explain, to understand the computational theory of mind how this semantic is possible and if you take care of syntax, the semantic is possible. As we know generally propositional attitudes are the attitudes towards propositions. In our day to day life, we have been struggling with our mental processes, the conception of mentality bestowed with the notions like belief, desire, intentions, hope and etcetera. Many other things like intentional attitudes. These attitudes are identified by their propositional contents. For example, a belief that snow is white is identified by the proposition that snow is white. On the other hand, propositional attitudes are pervasive in our descriptive, explanatory and justificatory practices. But in these sections, we shall see that propositional attitudes are relations between organism and the external environment. Before analyzing the above point, now we have to clarify the relationship between intentionality and propositional attitudes. Intentionality we have to go back to Sarlian concept of intentionality. According to John Sol, intentionality is the property of many mental states and events by which they are directed at or about or of object and state of affairs in the world. This will be very clearly if we go through this example. If I have a belief, it must be a belief that such and such is the case. If I have a fear, it must be a fear of something or that something will occur. Similarly, if I have a desire, it must be a desire to do something. The ever grammar of intentionality shows that the propositional attitudes are intentional, might be called a grammatical form of intentionality. According to Fodor, propositional attitudes should be analyzed as relations. For example, the verb in a sentence like John believes it is raining expresses a relation, a relation between John and something else and a token of that sentence is true. If John stands in the belief relation to that thing, John believes it is raining is true in virtue of belief making relationship between John and John. John believes it is raining and a token of it is raining and it is the complement of a belief ascribable that determines which internal formula is involved in its truth conditions. That is, in effect, it is raining. John believes it is raining functions as an index which picks out of it is raining. Otherwise, it is not. For example, elephants have wings. That means, John's belief is only about it is raining, not it is about elephants have wings. Therefore, Fodor has been trying to say that, as we have seen, every kind of mental capacities are productive and systematic and here it is systematic and productive also. Fodor says that, this kind of systems is internal, representational, which can be used in any way. So, he says that, this kind of systems is internal, representational, which can be used in any way. That constitutes a language. That constitutes a language becomes a computational and that language according to Fodor is a kind of koala language. This koala language especially has a syntax and a semantic. That is specifying the language involved saying what the properties are in which formula are well formed and what relations obtain between the formula and the things in the world. This is kind of relationship there in the case of computational theory of mind. Even if we do not have the idea about the semantic, still the semantic is a taking care of itself. This is also specifying the semantic for the intentional realism systems by saying that some of its formula expresses in the propositions. Whenever we express the propositions, the semantic is there and if you do say this, then we can make sense of the notion that propositions are relations to propositions. Therefore, they are a form of a mediated relations to propositions with internal representations doing the mediating. But on the other hand, folk psychology shows that the propositions attitudes like belief, desire, etc. that are real and that are part of the mental world of the human beings. Fodor defends folk psychology against the anti-folk psychologists like Dennett's and Schostle and also Connexionist model of mind and all of them have maintained that the belief, desire, psychology is described as the human mind, describable as the human mind is nothing but the brain. One of the Connexionist model of mind, a Connexionist like P. M. Schostle and who states that mental states are identified with the brain state and so if our mental states are in some sense identical with those states, then we have no reason to refute materialism. But here Schostle and who states that folk psychology, which the displays propositional attitudes is similar with mathematical physics, which display numerical attitudes. For example, in folk psychology, if X fears that P, then X desires the mental state. And that not P. Dennett argues that we can attribute internal functional states to human, not on the basis of any new physiological knowledge, which ordinarily people do not have. But on the basis of observation of how that persons behave in the light of what she or he perceives as the mental state. In other words, Dennett says that this behavioral output we project upon the certain functional way, the way even if every day our psychological explanations operates. And therefore, from the Schostle and Dennett thesis, it can be said that attribute in the head functions neither as the result of certain referring to real internal or intervene in the processes. Rather, we make such a attributions as a result of guessing what part when speaking in a special intentional functions way the brain and the center nervous systems would have played in the complex production line of perceptual inputs, central processing and behavioral outputs if where an intentional engine. This intentional descriptions can be seen to be expression of a particular sort of attitudes or stance, which the humans have towards other humans and animals. Dennett's explanation is like this. He says that behavioral can be at least sometimes explained and predicate by relying on excretion of the systems of beliefs and desires, like intention, hopes and fear, etc. And he calls such systems and predications, intention, explanations and predications in virtue of the intention of the items of beliefs and desires. In general, one can take up the intentional stance in order to explain the and predict and so plan to take an actions. But we should be clear that Dennett's view differ from Fordor's. As Dennett's make it clear that definition of the intentional systems Dennett has given that this intentional systems really have belief, desire, what that one can explain and predicate their behavior by ascribing beliefs and desires to them. Here Dennett's points out that there are other stance besides the intentional stance of the designs, which we take up two things. For example, we might consider a machine from the point of view of its design and that is we might take up the design stance. Here there is a design is there, because of the particular design we can call it a design stance. In the like that there is a intentional stance also is there according to Dennett. If one knows exactly how a computer or a machine is designed, one can predict its designed response any more one makes by following the propositional instruction of the program. For example, if you see this example that will be very clear, the radio engineers are wearing the diagrams have symbols for each register and the register, capacitor, transistor and etcetera. Each with its task to perform and here see can give a design stance predication to switcher generated by assuming that each the elements performs its tasks. The essential feature of a design stance is that we make predications slowly from knowledge or assumptions about those symbols functional designs in functional designs irrespective of the physical constitution of the particular design. The essential feature of a design stance is that we make predications slowly from knowledge or assumptions about those symbols functional designs in functional designs irrespective of the physical constitution of the particular design. Therefore, here there is a physical objects are there. Therefore, Dennett's call it is a physical stance and design stance and then physical stance. This attitude or stance is to consider something only in so far as it is made of certain material or certain type of material which have certain properties. To take up the physical stance or to human is to investigate their psychology or at a more basic level. Their physical level is more than the physical level. So, it is a physical level. It is a physical level or chemistry and however, on the other hand the core of a drastic's account of intentional lies in his account of the human brain and its perceptual organs as an information processing systems which in terms is based on intentional theory depends developed by the cognitive theories. This information processing account of power mental life is purely physicalistic in nature because for the drastic's accounts of intentionality of mental function is mentalistic. The information processing input mechanism we call the sense senses and by treating the brain as an information processor. We can build up an account of the mental function of intentional states such as knowledge and belief. From here, the drastic's suggesting is that human perceptual and cognitive system is based on the transformation of information for analysis of the digital form. And it is the successful conversation of information into digital form that constitute the essence of cognitive activities. Now, we have to find a way to do this. We have to find out how physical structure which carry a information in analog form can be transferred into the physical structure that carry information into digital form. So, that this digitalized information becomes a true cementing content and so able to be the content of some mental act such as a belief. For example, humans occur the correct concept of a red by seeing to red objects. That is by having his or her visual perception assimilated by a red object. Internally, some social objects are not available in the digital form. So, we have to find a way to do this. So, we have to find a way to do this. So, we have to find a way to do this. So, we have to find a way of seeing to red objects. That is by having his or her visual perception assimilated by a red object. Internally, some structures will be selected on the analogous registering structure for red simulation of the visual systems. If the persons concerned is also exposed to a good number of things which are not red, such structures become one which has semantic content and so on which is representing a a utilizable concept of red to the person whose brain contains structures only in the digital form. So, we have to find a way to do this. So, we have to find a way to do this. Similarly, when this structure has been made precise and determined. In this way, it can be shown that semantic content has nothing to do with the behavioural output of the systems. Now, when this semantic content is utilized so as to guide behaviour, it is employed as a map by which the person whose head contains the behavioural output. This semantic structure finds its way about the world and here there is a semanticity relationship is there. This semantic contents becomes belief in so far as they are used as maps or represented to guide output of behaviour. Therefore, semantic content becomes a cognitive content when it gains a functional role and this propositional attitudes can be defined in this way. Therefore, there is a computational model of mind. Then, further is combining both this computational theory of mind and representational theory of mind in order to explain you know to build the gap between syntax and semantics. Let us see this computational representational theory of mind. Photo has adopted the computational representational theory of mind. This theory is unlike the non-computational versions of representational theory of mind. This CRTM computational representational theory of mind makes a strong assumptions about mental processes. Mental processes are computational processes. Therefore, the formal operations is defined over symbols according to CRTM. Consequently, the computational representational theory is based on two important assumptions. The first one is the language of thought and the second one is the psychological explanation, which is both intentional and nomological. That is to say that it involves laws like generalisation of the language of thought. The first one is the language of thought and the second one is the psychological explanation, which is both intentional and nomological. That is to say that it involves laws like generalisation, which refers to or quantify over the content of the propositional attitudes. Jacob calls as the nomic intentional character of mind. According to Dennett, mental representations are not only constructed realistically, but only as a sort of useful predictive psychological calculus. Possibly, execution of thoughts are simply attempts to explain behaviour in the face of massive ignorance of the internal dynamics. For example, a small child may speak grammatically correct English and we may say of her that she knows that corn is a noun. However, for this it would be inferred that the child actually deploys a mental representations and a representation that itself literally means that a corn is a noun. But it could be said that some specific cognitive architecture is installed in the child in the child. The child's brain because of which she implicitly knows corn within the coat to be a noun and not that she manipulates any representations explicitly representing corn is a noun. The child's knowledge is perhaps best viewed as simply a state supervenient to any cognitive architectures. And on the other hand, if you see like for a representationalist, not only thought descriptions do point to specific mental representations, but also to the mental representations, but also those that do not nevertheless depend upon this in that to do strictly speaking. The child does not think like the corn is a noun because she does not have any idea about the noun and also in the case of Bob also. Rather she literally thinks that it is permissible to utter please pass the corn, not please corn the plate. And here he is making this distinction in the literally way. A representationalist will hold that the child's way with corn is the result of her processing specific mental representations. So, the child's way with corn is the result of her processing specific mental representations. According to Fodor, the computational representational theory of mind or CRTM provides two-fold ways of type individual mental states. That is, the mental states can be individualized either on the basis of the kind of the computational relations they have or on the basis of content of the representations. Here, the belief that the snow is white is different from the belief that snow is black. On the basis of difference in the content of string of symbols and the express and that express the corresponding propositions. It has correspondence relationship with the fact whatever we say, because if it is not corresponding, that may not be the ideal way of explanations. Similarly, the belief that the snow is white differentiated from the doubt that the snow is black on the account of differences in syntactically or computational relations. But if you see according to this computational representational theory of mind or the theory of mind, we will throw light on the three questions which are interrelated with each other. The first question is, how can complex propositional attitudes have complex semantic properties on the basis of simple semantic properties of their concierge to ends? The second question is, how can propositional attitudes generate other propositional attitudes? Thirdly, how can propositional attitudes generate other propositional attitudes? How can propositional attitudes be involved in the production of intentional behavior? If we think from individual's language of thought on the model of digital computers machine language, then the computer model of mind promises to provide an answer to these questions. It can explains how the semantic properties are assigned to the propositional attitudes and also have a causal properties as assigned to them. In the language of thought, as we have seen, there are two ingredients namely a semantic ingredients and a syntactic ingredients. Thus, this language of thoughts provides with a reasonable explanation of the compositionality of semantic properties of an individual's propositional attitudes. The second question is, how can propositional attitudes consist with the assumptions of intentional realism? The propositional theory reduces the semantic properties of an individual's attitude to the semantic properties of mental representations. That is, the latter reduces in the semantic properties of symbols in the language of thought. This is a kind of machine language. As we have seen for the computational theory of mind, the mental state causally interacts among themselves and produces over behavior just by virtue of their internal representations. This means that for the type of individual's mental states, the form of the internal representations has to be taken into account. Fodor argument is that we do not have to bother about the content of the mental state as such because the formal aspect of the mental representation execute to them. Again, he says that if the mental processes are formal, then they have access only to the formal properties of such as representations of the environment as the senses provided to it. Hence, they have no access to the semantic properties of such as representation including properties of being true, having reverent or indeed the property of being representation of the environment. The idea that the content of a mental state can be reconstructed as an aspect of its forms. That is that mental states have different content only if they are relation to formally distinct mental representations and successfully explain the capacity of propositional attitudes. The difference in the content of mental states implies that the internal representations are formally distinct. This means that if the mental states differ in content, they are also functionally different because they have functional relation to formally different techos of the formula of the internal language. That internal language as you know is called mentalist which we have seen in this lectures. To be precise, according to further, the mental events differ in their computational structure as well also. By using the notion of computation content together, it is possible to explain how mental states are sensitive for their contents in the causal interaction of the various mental states and the productions over behavior. This is one within those syntactic framework of the computational representational theory of mind. The semantic notions such as truth and reference do not have any explanatory role in the syntactic theory because the semantic notions do not finger in the formal structure. Therefore, according to further, the ideal mental processes are basically formal in the sense that they can be explained computationally according to formal role. Now, we have to see the intentional realism because it is very important to explain about the forward and way of intentional realism because forward and this intentional realism is really explaining how forward is combining the syntax and semantic in both ways in the computational way. And now I will be explaining about the intentional realism which is one of the important thesis of forward concept of mind. How forward is building or establishing the relationship between mind and body? At the same time, he is trying to show how the syntax and semantics will go together in this intentional realism. A realistic theory of mind holds that intentional realism is a thesis that the mind is a primarily a representational system or individual's mind is just a system whose job is to deliver representation of the environment for the benefit of the individual whose mind it is. An important problem for intentional realism is to offer an account of how intentional states can be causally related to one another and to the world and to the behavior of the rational agents and it plays very vital role because it has some kind of relationship between the agent and the world and this intentionality is admitted by Jerry Ford as the real feature of the mental representations which can be computationally studied. But there is a distinction between the intentional realism and intentional realism. The weak sense of representation is intentional realism. According to intentional realism thesis which claims that the so called propositional attitudes can be thought of a mental representation of state of affairs. This is about the intentional realism and which we can say that weak sense of representationalism. In the case of strong sense of representationalism which is the claim that the representational properties of propositional attitudes can take us some way towards understanding aspect of conscious experience. According to intentional realism any utterance of sentences ascribing a semantic properties to an individual's propositional attitudes express false properties. Intentionality is also known as eliminative materialist according to whom no mental difference without some physical differences. Let us see what is eliminative materialism. According to eliminative materialism they are eliminating the existence of mind and there is nothing called mind at all. The thesis is that our common sense perception of psychological phenomena constitute a radically false theory. A theory so fundamentally defective that both the principles and the ontologies of that theory will eventually be displaced rather than smoothly reduced by complicated neuroscience. This theory says that our folk concept of propositional attitudes with their purported semantic properties are best compared to such concept as the physical and chemical concept of chirolic and or other chemical things which is happening in the brain that all those concepts divide of references. Therefore, there are no such state as propositional attitude with semantic properties according to eliminative materialism. And as you know PF Churchland is one of the famous eliminative one of the we can say that one of the founder of this thesis. The non factual version of intentional realism is the claim that predicates that are used to refer to semantic properties of an individual's propositional attitudes simply do not stand for any genuine properties at all. And this version of intentional realism has been advocated by Stitz and according to him such predicates typically do not express properties at all. What this suggest is that there is no such thing as the property of believing that P the predicate is a believe that P does not express or correspond to a property. If this is right then we have yet another reason for not thinking of folk psychological belief as state token since a state of token is the instantiation of a property by an individual during a time interval. And if there is no property then there can be no state token. It is important to realize that the non existence of believe properties and believe state tokens do not entail that predicates of the form is believe that P are meaningless or never apply to anything else. And if you see the above non factualist interpretation of intentional realism is the influential view of denit who has introduced the concept of intentional stance and which intentional stance. The intentional stance says that the attribute propositional attitudes to a physical system is not to attribute semantic properties to the system. Rather it consists in adopting a certain heuristic stance towards it which in turn serves pragmatic goals. According to denit the division to adopt the strategy is pragmatic and is not intrinsically right or wrong. Therefore, the intentional stance view says that semantic properties of an individual's properties attitudes arise from the stance taken towards by the individual by an observer or an interpreter. Then the intentional realism is different from both error theorism and non factualist realism. Because intentional realism is commuted to the view that the semantic properties of an individual's propositional attitudes are genuine properties of the individual's brain. Then they say that we can ascribe three thoses to intentional stance and then we can ascribe the three thoses to intentional stance. Realism and these three thoses actually advocated by Petr Jakov and firstly the semantic properties of an individual's propositional attitudes are genuine of the individual's. And secondly the semantic properties of an individual's utterance are derivative from the semantic properties of his or her propositional attitudes. Thirdly the semantic properties of an individual's propositional attitudes must contribute to the production of the individual's intentional behaviour. And if the semantic properties are genuine properties then having a mind must make a causal differences. And we have to say that minded systems must be able to do things which systems lacking a mind must be unable to do. And if having a mind did not make a causal differences. Now the question is what would it do to have a mind therefore state of mind must be causes. But the fact that minds can occupy states with semantic properties can explain why systems being a mind can do things which systems without a mind cannot do. And this is the problem of mental causation. The problem raised by Jerry Fodor shows that intentional realistic dilemma. On the other hand the intentional realistic is a physicality. The mind must be a complex physical system. On the other hand he is also realistic about the minds. It is the view of the anti reductionist that mind passes semantic properties which must make a causal differences. And this the issues is closely related to the issues of reducibility of a systems semantic properties to its non semantic properties. According to Jacob there are two ways one can think about reduction. For example water turned to be identical to H2O molecules and the genes turns out to be nothing but DNA molecules. Such identities are nomming in the sense that what is claimed is that nothing would be water unless it were composed of H2O molecules. On the other hand semantic properties are reduced to non semantic properties on the ground that the later provide necessary and sufficient non semantic condition for the position of semantic properties. Therefore the intentional realistic like Fodor tries to bridge the gap between semantic properties and non semantic properties. And this is the main dilemma of the intentional realistic. And you know to eradicate this dilemma we have to see some of the important aspects of especially non-reactionistic thesis of mind which will give the exact explanation of mind as well as the exact explanation of body. And exact explanation of syntax and exact explanation of semantics although they goes together bridge between semantic and non semantic is very difficult. But they goes together they have close relationship that does not mean that we can bridge the gap. But the gap is there that gap itself is making mind as different from the body. Now I will stop this here on representationalism and some of the things I will be discussing in next lectures and my colleagues professor Ponda will be explaining in his lectures on related to this topics. Thank you very much.