 Greetings, everyone, I'm Steve Clements. I'm editor at Large of the Hill. I consider myself part of the INET family. It's always an honor to engage in consequential conversations that deal with the crossover of economics and society, what we're getting, what we deserve, all of these issues. And we have a US-China and kind of a China in the world aperture to look at today. We've had two really great panels so far. And this is the final one of this program called Towards a Constructive Path Forward. I really want to thank the last panel for helping to lay out so much of this and the first panel that we had that laid out a lot of what's wrong. Now let's see what we can do with it today. And today we have a really fascinating line of people. We have Justin Yefu leading, Lynn Dean of the Dean, Professor and Honorary Dean in the National School of Development at Peking University. I also want to say that he's also Dean of the Institute of New Structural Economies and the Institute of the South at Peking University. We were just discussing this before in our green room and really look forward to what the building blocks of development and opportunity are out there. We also have Danny Roderick, President of the International Economic Association and of course the Ford Foundation Professor of International Political Economy at the JFK School of Government at Harvard University. We have Michael Spence who is great friend. He was Vice, he was Chairman of the Independent Committee on Growth and Development Committee and he was also worked with Vaccinating the World. He is Nobel Laureate of course and a great friend of INET. And finally we have Adair Turner who is Chair of the Energy Transitions Committee, former Chair of the UK Financial Services Authority. Adair has written so compellingly about debt out there but he was more importantly also the former Chairman of INET and he's a great friend and it's great to be with you all. I'm gonna ask each of our people to speak for a few minutes to offer their portal into this question of globalization and US China issues and what we do, where we go from here. And just give each a few minutes and then we're gonna engage in conversation. I want to tell our audience that you can post your questions as you have in your other panel in our chat area and you can begin doing that now and we'll try not to just leave it to the end. We'll try and weave these questions in as part of our conversation and the round table that we have. So let me ask Michael Spence to go first and help lay the stage for what our challenge is. Michael, Michael you're muted, my friend. Need to unmute. Hopefully after several thousand years, we don't, or I don't. It's nice to be with you and no one for years and we're miss sleep. The previous two. So Michael, we have a sound problem with you that I'm gonna ask our team to help work out with you to come back because it's not coming through correctly. So let's, we'll come back to Michael and we're gonna come back. So if I'll ask Claire Novak to help it. Let me go to a dare Turner and a dare ask you to help set the stage for what we need to do as we're trying to get Michael there and I would ask our other participants on this panel for the time being to mute your mics while we're talking because we're getting the feedback and that may be what's causing the problem but a dare the floor is yours. Steve, can you hear me? And you can hear me correctly. Okay, good. Well, look, Rob Johnson asked me to join this session. I was on a meeting earlier and I couldn't come right at the beginning though I have been listening for the last hour to that very good discussion. And I'm gonna make comments which really are about climate change and what we can do to carve out climate change or can we carve out climate change from the tensions of the rest of the relationship between the US and China in particular. And I talk as the chair of something called the energy transition commission which is a global coalition which is very active in China as well as across the world. And I also, I feel I want to declare an interest. I have a commercial relationship with one of China's biggest wind turbine manufacturers which is also the owner of a Japanese battery company which also has battery factories in the UK and France and the US. So we are quite at the center of some of these issues about supply chains and technological competition, et cetera. Clearly over the last year between China and the US there have been major steps forward in commitments on climate change. Xi Jinping's commitment last September at the UN to get to net zero by 2060, Biden's commitment and the Chinese will remind you that it came later that the Chinese commitment was at a time when America was still as its president a climate change denier but Biden's commitment to net zero by 2050 as well. Those are good steps forward but we have to have concerns that they will not be enough. In China's case, I very strongly believe that they should make a commitment to be at zero by 2050, not 60 and should peak emissions earlier. And that is the big debate. Frankly, in the US, the big debate is will this commitment last or would it disappear with a Republican administration if one was elected in four years time? So we have made step forwards on climate change but in both China and the US there are concerns. So it would be great if these two major powers could agree to make more progress on climate change even if they do not agree on many other issues. And in personal terms, you would have thought we have a better opportunity to do that than you could hope for, which is that John Kerry, Biden's chief international climate envoy and Zhiyun Shenhua, the chief climate negotiator of China are good old colleagues who know each other well who get on personally who have a relation going back to Copenhagen. So you might hope that this is an environment where you could make a progress which carves it out from the wider attentions. But I have to say, I think that is unlikely to occur. I mean, John Kerry has recently been urging the Chinese to up their commitment before COP26 in Glasgow but has not been met with any favorable response. And I think there is an unwillingness to carve it out. I think there is a price in which they would carve it out and a, but that would be a price America will not do. I think if America shut up out about Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Taiwan, you might have a different environment but America is not gonna do that. So I think frankly, we are in a very difficult position on the carve out philosophy. And that is problematic because one of the ways that we make progress in the world is step by step reciprocity. I will do something if you do something and then we both do more than we originally intended. So this is a very difficult environment. The good news is that I think it is almost certainly the case that China is gonna do lots more than it has already committed to on a unilateral basis. And almost deliberately not allowing that to be seen as part of international diplomacy. I don't think there'll be any tightening of their position at COP26, there may be and that would be very welcome. But I suspect that we are going to see China progressing faster on emissions reductions than they have committed to because it makes sense for them domestically because they are a leader in all of the technologies whether it's batteries, hydrogen, electrolysis because they have individual companies who are now committed to going much faster. Only a month after Xi Jinping said China would be 2060 by, it would be net zero by 2060, Baowu Steel, which is the biggest steel company in the world said, we will be net zero by 2050 and they are technological drivers on how to get there. It is also the case that one of the biggest things China can do to drive down its emissions is to achieve the rebalance of its economy which it needs to achieve in any case away from a construction focused economy with excessive use of steel and cement. So I suspect we will see unilateral Chinese action rather than reciprocal. But to end with what could we do which would help here? I think one thing that we can do is to end up and this somewhat relates to what Martin Wilson did earlier with not overstating the challenges, not seeing problems where they don't exist. China is a leader in solar PV, it is a leader in batteries, it is now a leader in electrolysis. But the fact that China is a leader of those is not a national security threat to America because you don't fight wars with solar PV or with hydrogen electrolyzers. Yes, other countries should seek to develop those technologies as well. But I think it is quite possible to have a favorable competition, a competition of trying each to go as fast as possible on these technologies without ending up with a paranoic belief that somehow China's current leadership in these technologies is a threat to the West. That is my one idea of something which would help us go beyond a unilateral set of commitments in an environment where I think for now the process of reciprocal commitments through diplomacy is gonna continue to be quite difficult to achieve. I mean, well, Tara, thank you so much for those great framing comments and setting a platform for us to go further. Let me try to come back to Michael Spence and let me ask everyone to mute their line here so that we can hopefully hear Michael. So if you can mute, hopefully this will work. Michael, of course, you're here. Thank you, assistant, can you hear me? So Michael, I'm gonna ask the team to take you off and bring you back in so if you can leave the room and come back in, I think that may help solve the problem. Thank you so much. Danny, Roderick, if you would unmute and join us and share your thoughts and then we'll go to Justin. Yes, I hope you can hear me fine. The tough thing that I think we need to figure out conceptually is how we design a regime that is going to be cognizant of the fact that there are lots of areas where there's not going to be an agreement, whereas there are lots of areas that where there are some mutually beneficial bargains that can be struck. And I think it's in principle, it's quite possible to envisage a world which remains definitely bipolar, but it's bipolar in a very benign kind of a way. I have a very high speed internet connection. We need to take Michael off of the platform folks because we're getting feedback. So please take Michael off the platform and bring him in muted. Thank you very much. Go ahead, Danny. So in this benign bipolar world, the United States and China would understand that they will continue to compete on a number of fronts. They will continue to trade and invest in each other's economies. Very important, they will not challenge the legitimacy of each other's domestic systems, cooperate where interests are aligned, but also observe certain kinds of rules of the roads where there are inevitable clash of interests. Recently, Steve Walt, my international relations colleague at the Kennedy School and I wrote a paper where we tried to sketch out a kind of a vision which we call a kind of a meta regime that might achieve something along these lines where we simultaneously try to avoid the adverse consequences of a security dilemma that could devolve into hot conflict. As well as in the economics front, avoid problems of global public goods not being paid for and beggar-dye neighbor policies becoming the norm. We argue in this paper that it is possible to establish and visit such a world or such a meta regime. And the way that we think of this meta regime is essentially as a device for structuring the conversation around the relevant issues and facilitating either agreement or accommodation as the case might be. And such a regime would be actually very agnostic or open-ended about what the specific rules that would be pursued or applied in particular areas. So there's a, the way we describe it is there's a kind of a threshold condition that US and China would have to agree that they would need to agree that it's desirable to classify different issues into let's say three different domains without having to agree in advance on which actions or which issue belongs to each category. So what are these three domains? These domains would be let's say bucket one or category one would be actions that would be simply prohibited because both parties agree these are actions that are illegitimate or wrong and that contravene principles that both are willing to accept. These would be essentially harms that would be imposed on one party on the other that cannot plausibly be justified by either economic or national security considerations. So this would be the prohibited category. There would be a second category where essentially there would be significant difference of whether a particular action is legitimate or not. So it would not enter into the prohibited category but for which there might still be positive some positions positive some solutions could still be possible. For example, if state A adopts a policy that is harmful to state B the two parties may still be able to negotiate a mutually beneficial bargain that leaves both better off. Such a bargain might involve, for example, state B offering a concession in another domain in return for state A revoking the harmful policy. So this would be a category. This second category is where there is room for mutual adjustment and mutual bargaining. Then this third category would be a category of autonomous action or independent action where such mutual adjustment as in category two proves impossible and each state does resort to its own independent policy actions. The key requirement here, and this is the key point really is that even when there is a disagreement there is agreement on how that disagreement then plays out. So in this category essentially even though each state goes its own way they are free to adopt national actions. However, that have to be well calibrated. So the key idea here is that a well calibrated and what that means is that this individual autonomous actions have to be clearly linked to the damage being done by the other side's policies and intended solely to mitigate its negative effect. In particular, such counter whittling policy responses should not be undertaken for the express purpose of punishing the other side or weakening it in the long run nor should the failure to reach an acceptable compromise in one area be used as a pretext to retaliate in a different and unrelated domain. So this idea that many people have mentioned which is to ensure that disagreements in one domain don't contaminate and spill over into becoming problems in other domains as well. So of course we do not expect that US and China will start out with an acceptance as to where each policy issue belongs. But I think the process of getting into a conversation where you're trying to determine where each issue belongs can serve a useful function in so far as it encourages each party to explain their actions to clarify their motives and to justify their decisions. And I think this kind of a mutual explanation clarification in terms of trying to classify actions according to one of these categories is a fundamental building block for building trust that might accumulate over the time. And this Mitter regime can essentially over time can help boost right a level of cooperation that might not have occurred otherwise. So we try to apply this way of thinking in specific policy domains, whether it is high tech economic policy, whether it is conflicts or regional conflicts. And there are sort of more discussion about that in the paper that's on my website with Steve Walt as I mentioned. So, but I think it is possible to visit a Mitter regime a kind of a structured conversation that has the capacity to clarify areas where there's agreement, where there's disagreement and where there's disagreement to enable a kind of well calibrated set of responses that don't result in conflict escalating. So thank you, we're gonna have to leave it there because we've got very little time for this session. We've got to bring in Justin and Michael, but I'll just say in responses very quickly listening both to Adair and to you, Danny. You know, the thing in the back of my mind is the Cold War. When we had the fear and possibility of a thermonuclear exchange, it created pathways for partnership or possibly together. So I wanna come back to that when we get to discussion. Again, tell our audience that you can post your questions in the chat function to the right of your screen. We'd love to have them. And I'm now gonna come to Justin and then we'll go to Michael Spence who I know is back with us. So Justin, Yi Fu Lin, Justin. Well, thank you very much. Can you hear me well? Yes. Okay, very good. So let me offer some Chinese perspective because I'm the only Chinese in the session. And the first one I'd like to make is that I'd like to use this occasion to explain China's aspiration. And China's aspiration has been laid out in the 19th Party Congress in 2017. The aspiration, the first one is for China to become a modern country by the time of 2035. And for China to become an advanced country by the time of 2049 at the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic. And this year, when China adopts the 14th five-year plans and 2035 long-term regions, China further clarified what do we mean by a modern country by 2035. That is to double the GDP on the basis of 2035. And that means China hope to reach the GDP of around $22,000 to $23,000 by the time of 2035. And for that, China need to maintain 4.7% growth in Nepal. Right. And also China hope to become an advanced country by the time of 2049. That means China would actually have a particular GDP of half of the US by the time, just like Korea now has a particular GDP of the US and China like to reach that status by the time of 2045. And that means China would have to maintain about 4% growth from 2036 to 2049. And I think that most likely China will be able to achieve those kinds of aspirations because if China want to raise income, that means China need to maintain growth. And for growth, China need to have a continuous technological innovation in that aggrazie. And China has two advantages of that. The first one certainly is the late commercial advantages. China is still only catching up process in many sectors. And the second one in the fourth industrialization like the digital, big data, artificial intelligence. For those kind of new industries, it has a nature of short cycle innovation and heavily rely on human capital. China is a large country with a lot of talent. So China can compete in that kind of new industrial revolutions. And with these two advantages, I think unless we have a new queer conference between US and China, otherwise the growth in China is unstoppable. That's my first point. And the second point- So Justin, if that's your first point, I'm just gonna tell you, we're already at six 30, or we're already in my time, six 30. So we're halfway through and we need to bring in questions. So I'm just gonna ask people to give a digested version of their thoughts or we're not gonna get to our audience. So just need to be upfront about that. Thank you. So go ahead. Okay. The second one, China has no territory ambition. China's ambition, China's aspiration is mainly economically. Because if you look historically, China was the major power in East Asia for a thousand years, but China did not take any colonies. And in modern times, after the founding of people of republics, China engaged in three world. One is Korean War in 1950-53. The second one, the China-India War in 1962. The third one, China-Vietnam War in 1979. But every time when the world went over, China withdrew all the troops back to the Chinese border. China did not take any territory. And I think that will be still true. And just like Mahathir was warned about the rising power of China, may threaten Mahathir, Mahathir of Malaysia, this prime. China has been our neighbors for more than 2,000 years. And his China still are friendly neighbors. But when the West visited us in two years, we were colonized. So what's the second point I'd like to mention? The West should not use, its own historical pattern, to predict what China is going to do. China is China. China is not the West. And China has no territory and vision. The third one, that means China will continue to rise in its income. Certainly, that means China's industrial will continue to upgrade. So China will have more and more industry to compete with the industry in the advanced country. Just like when the US was catching up with the Britain in the late 19th century and early 20th century, it happened between the US and the UK. And in the post-World War II, when Japan and Germany caught up with the US, certainly there was some energy going to compete. Those kind of things are going to happen. But at the same time, China not only exporting goods to compete, China also input a lot of goods. For example, last year, China export 2.6 trillion US dollars, but China also input 2.5 billion billion US dollars. So trade is basically a balance. So we not only to look into the competition that the US or other advanced country faced from China, we also need to see the growth in China is an opportunity for everyone. And when China reached the same advancement stage as the advanced country, we know that trade basically based on the principle of specialization as Paul Krugman's theory tell us. So I would say overall when China grow, it's mainly an opportunity instead of a threat to the other country. And so let me conclude. When I studied in Chicago, I was taught development is a human right. And I hope this principle still been taught in the US. Development is a human right. And China certainly has a human right. And secondly, since I was a primary school students, I was taught about the spirit of the US constitution. Men are born equal. And I hope the principle is still being upheld in the US. Men are born equal. And China, Chinese men is also men. And so Chinese men should be treated as equal as men from any other country. And I saw the one that come to the details in a talk about the climate changes. We are facing so many challenges in the whole world and we need to have corporations. And I think to have a corporation between US and China would be very important for us to cope with the challenging of the humanity. And if we can work together, we can have a better futures. If we cannot work together, unless we have nuclear war, China will continue to grow. So let me stop here. Well, thank you, Justin. I really appreciate you giving a really a very different view than where we started with Adair Turner, who saw some of these dynamics in a very different dimension. We're going to get between them in between them. Danny Roderick really provided a very elegant and interesting game theoretic set of options that could look at in terms of how you build out of this. So we've got both views, frankly, of a contending issue in our part job today is to find our way out of this and to build forward. Where can we go to take the realities that we're at and kind of build it? So I'm going to give all of that responsibility to Michael Spence. So Michael, can you sew all this up? All right, let me try again. Can you hear me now? Perfectly, thank you. Very good, perfect. All right, okay. Well, those are a lot of very interesting comments. So let me make a couple of observations and try not to use up too much time. I think Danny's right, the mechanisms really matter. And attention to building mechanisms that can be used. These are institutions for solving problems is really quite important and probably under-emphasized. I know from the late Tom Schelling was my thesis advisor and a very important person in the sort of establishing the sort of incentive structures in the Cold War. And one of the things I learned from him is there was a rather relatively unknown entity in Vienna, Austria, which was the location where the major nuclear powers met and negotiated, talked and learned essentially how to manage nuclear weapons. And when a new nuclear power arrived, they were invited essentially to join this discussion. It was completely below the radar. You didn't have journalists cycling around talking about it. I don't know if that's a great example, but I do know that danger starts to arise if you don't have practical mechanisms, even if they're rather quiet for getting on with it. Steve, let me just say my perspective. I think that the reason we're in this situation is partly a bunch of mistakes have been made, but mainly because China is now a very powerful country. I agree with everything Justin just said. It's going to be, its growth is not gonna be disrupted with any high likelihood. It will be economically and in other ways, very powerful. I think in that context, having emerged from a world in which we had A, a Cold War and B, a kind of dominant United States, we're kind of on a learning curve, learning to live in a world where power is distributed much more widely. And I don't think we've kind of figured that out, but what I'm quite sure of, so I'll just say it, maybe somebody will wanna talk about it, is I think the only stable configuration is some kind of balance of power. You can't just rely on trust. Both countries are gonna have to have enough oomph in order to defend their interests if it becomes necessary. And that plus building trust over time, I think can lead to a pretty stable situation. Anything else I think is, has high degrees of instability kind of built into it. Having said that, I wanna end on an optimistic note. There is no evidence that I've seen that China is externally aggressive, as Justin said. Nor is there any evidence thus far that China is interested in exporting their governance model. They're quite attached to it themselves, but I don't see any. So this is quite unlike the former Soviet Union, at least the ideology of that. On the American side, we could probably be accused of wanting to export our governance model, at least to some extent. And maybe we should just back off from that, because it's not gonna work, at least in some parts of the world. And I won't get into kind of trends and what not's going on in the world. And then I think, if you, and balance of power, it has another dimension, Steve, I'll mention it quickly. And that is, if you have reasonably sane adults, men and women running the show, the consequences of either mistakes or accidents or letting things get out of hand are really quite dramatically bad. This is what balance of power really means, right? We didn't use nuclear weapons, but we didn't get into fights terribly often either. I mean, I think it's really, that's the world we're gonna live in. We just need adults, making rational choices with safety mechanisms built in. And then if we get, if we've managed to get there, then I'll just say it. Then I think the thing that Der talked about, which is this one of a long list of things where cooperation is probably not only useful, but crucial, can come over time to dominate the agenda. Go stop there. Well, thank you very much, Michael, and thank you to all of you. And I'd like to just get a little conversation going. And again, I remind people that the message counter is open, so share your thoughts with us and be happy to post them to our panel. But Adair and Danny, let me come back to you with the challenge here. I think part of the challenge is, and I guess the question to Adair, who defined this in terms of the challenges of climate at this moment, of whether or not it was sort of going back to, well, maybe it's not a G zero world like Ian Bremmer said, but we have a G two world. If we have the G two world kind of follow along the lines that both Justin and Michael Spence talked about, two big powers, each have their systems and they sort of stalemate. That doesn't solve the problem to climate, right? That actually assures we have a disaster. And I'm just, again, coming back to listening to Danny, thermonuclear war and the possibility of it were in my head, is the problem that a lot of people aren't scared enough about the climate realities we're in, Adair? Is that maybe part of it? But I also think that we allow myths about competition to get in the way. So I absolutely completely agree with Justin Lin that the growth of China to be by 2049, a fully developed rich economy, is pretty much unstoppable unless there is a catastrophic nuclear war. And I don't think that growth in prosperity of China is any threat to the rest of the world because I don't think the economy is a zero sum game. And I do think part of the problem here is that there is within America a rhetoric which just sort of can't sort of psychologically accept that by 2050 or 2049, China will be, and as Justin said, half the GDP per capita of America, but if it's half the GDP per capita of America, it will be twice the GDP. And there is part of the problem here is an American problem of just getting used to the idea that there can be another economy, which because of its numbers is gonna be much bigger. My belief is that if China is going to be a fully developed rich economy by 2050, it should be a fully developed rich zero carbon economy that we need all successful advanced economies to get to zero carbon by 2050 with poorer, less successful economies beyond that. But I think we could carve out and we should try to carve out everything to do with trade and flows of investment in all the technologies which are required to drive us towards a zero carbon economy from other forms of competition. That can still leave it appropriate for India to say, I want to take conscious steps to develop a value chain in solar PV and electrolyzers rather than being totally reliant on China. It can still mean that the US should say, yes, I want to make sure that there are some batteries built in the US as well as in China, as there indeed they're already are. But it should be relaxed about them being built by Chinese companies or they're being trade flows between the two because what one does in this trade area is that there is a paranoia. There is national security arguments deployed in areas of the economy where they are irrelevant. So I would like to try and sort of carve this out. And part of it, as you say, Steve is, we do have to convince people, those who are not yet convinced that this is so important that it's worth doing that carve out. Well, thank you. And Danny, I'd like to get your thoughts on this, but in addition to telling me where I'm wrong on the metaphor of war, which Tom Schelling and others used to think about, I'm interested when you talk of the autonomous actor option, what the limits of that? So I've been studying the European proposals, for instance, on border adjustability taxes and how important that is. And the outlier in that may very well be the United States. Could be China, but I mean, at some point you have to figure out how to do that or you're going to have places that high levels of fossil fuel embedded widgets are gonna all end up somewhere trying to escape that border, that those border costs and the production of them. So I'm interested in both your thoughts on what are the big scary things out there that drive positive some solutions and going to your comments on autonomous choices and autonomous actors, if that doesn't work, what are some of those well-calibrated dimensions that might apply in the climate case? Yes, I mean, I agree with the previous speakers. And I mean, I think the first thing to understand is that you cannot go back to the pre-pandemic or if you will pre-Trump understanding of the kind of world economy we're trying to build, which was essentially embedded in the WTO and sort of a network of bilateral and regional trade agreements, which presumed that countries like China would eventually converge to some U.S. or Western understanding of what a market economy is adds filters through the eyes of sort of commercial and investor sentiment. So I think there is, I agreed in particular that China's economy and China's economic development and China's economic strategies do not pose fundamental challenges to the economic interests of the West or the United States in particular. And I think that's, it's very important to start by framing what U.S. economic interests, for example, are. You're going to get a very different picture depending on whether your understanding of U.S. economic interests is shaped by the so-called foreign policy blob in Washington or whether it's the military industrial complex or whether it is the trade and investment and business community in the United States or it is workers in the Rust Belt or in areas of the United States that have been left behind by economic gains. These are sort of very different groups. I think the problem is for too long, the U.S. approach to China has been driven by a set of narrow trade and business interests that viewed essentially China opening up to U.S. businesses and U.S. investment as essentially the key driver in this at least the economic part of the relationship. And we've broadened the U.S. conception of what U.S. national economic interests is. There's absolutely nothing wrong with letting China pursue its own industrial policies. And let's not forget that it was China's industrial policies that brought us to the price of solar energy where it is today. And that is a policy of subsidization and industrial policy, which had China been forced to play by the rules of the WTO, by the rules that the United States wanted them to play with. It's a point that we would not have reached today. Now, that's actually a great example of how autonomous action on the part of China for their own perceived interest has actually sort of had huge positive benefits for the world as a whole. And yet, I think the West would have sort of had its way, would have sort of managed to prevent. So I think let's focus on those areas where the problems are real severe and do threaten real national economic interests. For example, if there is something wrong with Huawei and its investments in the West, that significantly threatens to undermine the integrity of communication systems and national security. Let's Western countries and the US keep Huawei out because it's a fundamental national economic interest. But that should not allow the US, for example, to try to keep Huawei out of all third markets from Africa or from the markets of Europe where other nations don't have similar concerns. So I think the kind of framework I was laying out before is one which would allow countries to explain what they're doing for fundamental national security and economic interests but would not allow them to basically internationalize their policies to apply their reasoning or their values or their preferences necessarily to other countries as well. I think the United States will have to learn how to act like that. But also by the same token, I would say that China will have to learn that it's going to face countries that are trying to maintain their labor markets. They're trying to maintain the integrity of their communication systems and national security that often fundamentally and really believe in human rights and therefore are concerned about certain things that are happening in Xinjiang and other parts. And so there's, I think that accommodation is needed on both sides. Well, thank you for that. And Justin, as you respond, because we're just, we're running out of time and so we've got to figure out how to weave in our audience. I'm gonna weave in our audience and ask you to comment but we've just got about 10 minutes. Do you think competition for resources like rare earth minerals needed to green the economy could heighten global tensions between the US and China? And this is really the zero sum question. And I think that Danny was getting into that sum as well. If we have battles over communications, how are we gonna manage it? I'm just be interested in to what, and if you listen to me just say Catherine Tai, the US trade representative, if you heard her last week, she's nowhere near close to your view or most of the views in the discussion here. There's a fairly pretty strident worry as expressed by the Biden administration about Chinese predatory economic behavior. Now, Dean Baker earlier today said that that's because of intellectual property and because those monopolies that want to protect themselves are worried about them. This is not about workers or the economy, but we'll just leave that there. I just love to see what you see as the potential bridges that might neutralize some of this obvious hostility. Justin? I think that competition should be good. I have been taught the principle in Chicago throughout my whole years. And secondly, if there's some disagreement, the better way is to go through multilateral institutional tribute. And certainly, if you have some doubt about the policy in China, it's not to put on sanction on China, but go to the international tribunal, but then to judge whether the policy in China is appropriate, child policy in China is consistent with the policy in other country. And I think that will be the better way. And so overall, I signed a statement by Danny about the mechanism that he just discussed and I fully endorse that. And it's a much better way to deal with this kind of disagreement through dialogue, through the rule-based multilateral institutional tribunal system. Thank you. Michael, I'm gonna jump to you and again, bring another question from our audience into whatever you'd like to say as we're looking forward. And the question is connecting back to the first session of today, which we did. Could the panelists, can you reflect on the extent to which bilateral competition is driven by a winner takes all game of monopoly capitalism to which both countries seem to be committed? Michael, you're muted, Michael. It's not my best day. There's probably people that see the world that way, but that wouldn't include any of us, I don't think. I mean, I think Adair said it clearly. I mean, economics is not a zero-sum game, flat out, right? And so framing it in that form is I think a huge mistake you asked earlier in addressing Justin, what would happen to sort of highly concentrated, very critical things like rare earths? And my answer to that is if we go down the road of deploying that as a kind of strategy to contain the other party, A, it will fail and B, it will take us in exactly the wrong direction. I mean, so item three, when the two presidents get together would be to sort of figure out the things they're not, have a sort of negative to-do list that just starts to cause an escalation and take you down. And we've all said it in one way or another. Any strategy that's designed to hold China down, it will fail. I mean, it's just gonna fail. So if we can sort of get rid of that idea and then move on to the settler stuff that Danny is talking about. Well, how do we manage tensions and through what mechanisms? Well, everybody's talked about it. I think that's the way to go. Well, thank you. Well, I dare, and I'm gonna, this may be, we're getting near the end of the session here, but coming back to some of the existential questions you put on the table at the very beginning on how we look at it. I would tell you from a U.S. perspective that we are on the edge, I think, of some nasty, racist, jingoistic nationalism. As you said, as has been said earlier, there's bipartisanship wrapped up in posturing in a very anti-China way. And I've been waiting for a smart strategy that America might do. A lot has come up about Huawei, but we're not doing much on the Huawei front. Nokia and Ericsson and Samsung don't have big economic arms behind them to present them as alternatives. The U.S. does not have a champion. It's just posturing and bluster, and that can sometimes have very racist impacts. And particularly, and I'll just put my perspective on, I sometimes worry about the demonization of any company or any player beyond this. And I just wonder if it's become a placeholder, whereas we should be debating, in my view, China's national intelligence law. It's national security law and what it subjects companies in China to do, just like we should be looking at those laws as they apply to U.S. technology companies in Silicon Valley with regard to the CIA and the FBI, which is missing in this discussion. But I just wanna kinda ask you in this, last opportunity in framing this, again, looking at all the things we've heard about pathways forward that are constructive and productive, but not naive and wonder where your thoughts are. There is a session here, and I don't think it was meant facetiously, a question that says in the last session, there was that discussion of sending the brightest minds from China to the U.S. on a spa retreat to come up with anything. It sounds like Bretton Woods. Would a Bretton Woods in the U.S.-China G2 game have any value from your perspective? Are you muted, Adair? That's a very wide set of questions, Steve. Yeah. Look, clearly it is the responsibility of politicians, but some politicians are irresponsible, to stop legitimate, perhaps concerns about particular national security issues or disagreements about different internal policies to spill over into the demonization of the other as being an inherent threat or as being just fundamentally different and therefore unable to get on with. And I mean, that is sometimes racist. Though there's a complication here that sometimes I don't think these statements are racist in the sense of attaching to people of Chinese ethnicity because the statements often clearly exclude from them people of Chinese ethnicity in America who happen to agree with you. I think there is, however, something which is not quite racism but it's a demonization of a culture or a civilization. And I think there is in the West a dismissiveness of China which fades over from legitimate areas of disagreement and criticism and concern into this wider attack on China and a failure to respect China. And I guess one of the things I would plead for is good history on both sides. I think reading each other's history in a really good and open fashion is one of the best things that we should try and do and that might create a more subtle discourse. Well, that's a terrific way to end this session. And I'll say I'll go back to Rob Johnson's first insightful comment on the woundedness on both sides in this relationship, how to heal and address that woundedness and those histories people left behind China feeling with a world of humiliation in its own sense of history and identity. But I think that's happened to a lot of Americans as well. So I don't think we've solved the problem yet but I do think we've had a very rich discussion laying out a lot of the foundation of what needs to be achieved. So I wanna thank our panel, very excellent panel. We have Justin Yifu Lin, Dean at Peking University, Danny Roderick from Harvard and the President of the International Economic Association Michael Spence, Nobel Laureate, SMART and so many things and a Dair Turner chair of the Energy Transitions Committee, former chairman as well of INET. Thank you all so much. And now I'm going to, this ends our summit on US-China relations and climate and now I'd like to bring to the stage our very own Rob Johnson, INET president Andrew Shang whom we heard from before, distinguished fellow at the Asia Global Institute for some final thoughts on this overall summit. Rob, over to you. Hopefully Rob is there to be. Can you hear me? A little bit of a delay. Well, first of all, I wanna thank all of our panelists and Jillian and Steve Clements for the vitality and the curiosity and the imagination that you've all brought to bear today. I guess as a doctor's son, my propensity is to create a narrative that starts with diagnosis but ends with prescribed remedies. And I thought this last panel would have made my father smile. There are lots of things that are difficult. I thought it was very valuable today to have Justin's perspective on who China wants to be. As always, Danny and Mike, you are leaders just like you are in our global commission on economic transformation. And I believe this US-China interface is a very, very important next dimension. Is Andrew on, Andrew Shang, is he? Does not seem to be here. So it's all you, Rob. Oh, okay. Well, I wanted, because Andrew all the way back to the beginning of INET has been a very, very formidable contributor. I wanted to ask him to make the final remarks as he lives and wrestles with these challenges every day. So I guess we can finish by, I'll say thank you to Andrew and thank you to all of you on all three panels. I believe this is the beginning of an exploration. I don't believe this is the end of it, but the quality of minds that came to this table is in itself quite encouraging. And I'm very, very grateful for the way in which you've all supported this enormous challenge and supported INET on this day. Thank you, Rob. And I'm just gonna share with our audience too as well that if you're interested in seeing past INET events or going back and sharing these discussions, and I have to say each panel was very different. I had the privilege of doing the first one. Jillian Tett of the Financial Times moderated the second with an extraordinary discussion and our third very rich discussion as well. These will all be available this time of the day on the INET events website. And to hear about new webinars and upcoming events, follow INET live at INET Economics on social media. See you next time. Thank you all very much and goodbye.