 So good morning to you all. So first of all, let me thank Peter for enabling every year this meeting of scholars in Jainism, which has become a real institution. So in my lecture today, I will address selected issues concerning the characterization of scientific knowledge and the position of Jain epistemologists on this issue as well as its consequences. So in order to do so, let us briefly introduce a selection of the main Jain epistemological concepts that are to be found in treatises on Pramana. Pramana as a type of knowledge and resulting knowledge. So first of all, I will present the definition put forward by Silasena in the eighth century because according to Balcerovic in Pramana language, a dispute between Dignaga, Dharmakirti and Akalanka, Silasena gives the first definition of Pramana properly speaking in Jainism. So let us depart from here in the Nyaya Vatara. It is written that Pramana is knowledge revealing itself and something else different from it and that is free from subversion. From our purpose, for our purpose, the three important characteristics to keep in mind from this definition are the following ones. First, there is a cognition, an indistinct object of knowledge. Jain epistemologists are realists. Second, self-knowledge is a core concept and will contribute to a systemic security. And third, the types of knowledge that will be studied in this framework are by essence, reliable ones. Now, the theory of Pramana was first incorporated into Jain epistemology in Umasvamin's Tadvarta Sutra for fifth century. So for this datting, too, I'm relying on Barserovic, Silasena, Mahathmati, and Akalanka Bata, a revolution in Jain epistemology. If we have a look on Umasvamin's classification, we see that the Jain specificity is the core criterion distinguishing between direct types of knowledge and indirect ones. So that is to say that they do distinguish between Pratyaksha, Pramana, direct or perception like Pramana, like... So the list is that of telepathy, Manahaparyaya Anyana, Kravrayana, Savadinyana, and Omniscience, Kivalanyana. And this is distinguished with Paroksha, Pramana. So indirect knowledge, that is to say, the census knowledge, Matinyana, which is further distinguished between sensory knowledge, the Indriya, the five senses, and quasi-sensory knowledge, so Anindriya, the mind. And testimonial knowledge, so Shrutanyana. So each Jain author offers a different classification. For a history of this classification, see one of the two mentioned papers. There is also a very clear overview by Shastri in his China epistemology. And recently, Klavel has developed a nice analysis of one tradition of evolution of this classification in her Sensuous Cognition, Pratyaksha or Paroksha, Gina Baratras' reading of the Nandi Sutra. So what we will keep in mind for the present purpose is that Jain philosophers performed a radical shift from the traditional conception, shared by scholars of over schools, more precisely, the division into direct and indirect. Pramana is already formed in Upanishad, for example, between direct and indirect, sorry. It's already formed in Upanishad, for example, in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, what is directly in front of our eyes is called Pratyaksha, and whereas the realm of the divine beyond our eyes is Paroksha. But in Jainism, Aksha, the preserving organ, is not taken as a referring to the eye, but to the soul. From this, and from the fact that there is a very dominant role of the soul in Jainism, Pratyaksha comes to denote direct knowledge of the soul and mediated by any physical organ, whereas Paroksha refers to cognitive acts by means of sense organs and all the mind, which serve as instruments of knowledge for the soul. Therefore, this is this type of Pratyaksha that is associated with the realm of the divine. So by the way, a lot of adjustments to this classification are due to this huge gap between the Jaina understanding of Pratyaksha and the one of over schools, in such a way that the two types of understanding of perception actually coexisted. A conventional sense dependent perception, when the perceiving organ Aksha is understood as referring to the eye, and an absolute sense independent perception, when the perceiving organ Aksha is understood as referring to the soul. So in order to draw conclusion from this selected aspect of the Jaina epistemological framework concerning scientific knowledge, let us now devote five minutes to the characterization of scientific knowledge. So scientific knowledge is a type of knowledge which we claim offers us explanation of the way the word is. It is a type of propositional knowledge. It takes the forms of statements. This type of knowledge is both a result of and a basis for our operation within the world. So to keep this essential feature in mind, let us call this knowledge operational knowledge. So in what sense and to what extent is science able to provide us with such operational knowledge? Statements on the world. First, science can be seen to provide us with universal laws, both explaining and predicting our individual observations of the world. For the epistemologists who take this stance, induction is the basis for scientific knowledge. More precisely, the operational knowledge gained from the scientific method is acquired by means of causal inferences which rely on induction because induction is ensuring necessity when drawing a universal law from knowledge of a particular case. So we are very well acquainted with a series of problems concerning the inductive process. Namely, are we justified in formulating these universal laws from knowledge of particular cases? And so I will be very brief on this discussion over the range of scientific knowledge. I will only mention Bertrand Russell's chickens because this example gives a vivid understanding of the problem and does leave a good memory of it. So I usually like to summarize the problems of induction by mentioning it. So in his Problems of Philosophy, Russell wrote, domestic animals expect food when they see the person who feeds them. We know that all these rather crude expectations of uniformity are liable to be misleading. The man who has fed the chicken every day through his life at least at last rings its neck instead, showing that more refined views as to the uniformity of nature would have been useful to the chicken. So concerning the causes of this problem of induction, let us take David Hume as a historical landmark. To have faith in the guarantee of a necessary causal link is to beg the question of the uniformity of nature and to think that what has always been will continue to be for apparently no good reason. So causal inferences are a habit of the mind to which we succumb. They are not determined by reason. This is, they are not determined by reason. So this is the one on critical parts. But you might know that there is also a constructive part. Causal inferences are determined by associative principles. And these associative principles have the same position for our knowledge acquisition process than Newton's gravity principle for laws of nature. So they do go beyond logic as gravity principle goes beyond mechanical laws. Therefore to go beyond what is strictly logical is to go from a mechanical paradigm to a Newtonian one. So finally, as a consequence of this problem of induction, Carol Popper redefines science. First is asks us to dissolve our dream of prophecy or dream of being able to make prediction. And to see science as a multi methodology whose aim is to solve problems and in which induction is not really used. From this science can be distinguished from non-science not from its ability to make predictions. So much for induction as providing a basis for scientific knowledge but from its falsifiability. Scientific claims are universal ones, hence no demonstration will be enough but at least they can be distinguished from metaphysical and religious claim in that they can be falsified or respectively escaped falsification. For example, I can prove that all crews are black is false by showing a white screw. But there is no way for me to prove that all souls are essentially omniscient is false. No, highlighting this discrepancy between scientific myth knowledge understood as a method to solve problems and whose corpus consists of falsifiable claims and metaphysical and religious claim make us realize that a generous part of China Paraman are not producing scientific claims in this paparrian sense. No, facing this line of analysis according to which actual scientific knowledge cannot be conceived as what provides us with certitude concerning universals is the line of analysis of those thinkers who consider that it can. The most salient thinker advocating this sense is Emmanuel Kant who considers that necessity based on subjective a priori conditions of experience is possible. So by the way, these a priori conditions not empirical are not falsifiable in paparal sense. So the aim of this lecture is to show that China philosophers consider that necessity based on metaphysical relations between universal is possible. So first of all, if science is understood as a method based on induction providing universal laws explaining and predicting our individual observations of the world, then the China theories of Pramana introduced in the first, in the beginning of this lecture are clearly intended to define scientific knowledge. What is more the angle by means of which the question of the feasibility of the scientific project is tackled in the classical Indian framework is the same that the one just presented with Hume. More precisely, the more logical sections of epistemological treatises in classical India pertain to take all the following question. How is it possible to know that two properties are unnecessarily and not only accidentally linked? This question is dealt with in sections concerned with the characterization of inference. So for example, let us take this example from the evidence that something is a product we can successfully infer that this thing is impermanent. Because by definition of a product it has been made which means that it has parts that have been arranged but every arrangement is within a decade process and has an end and by definition a permanent thing has no end. So therefore from the evidence that something is a product we can successfully infer that this thing is impermanent. But for this inference to be a properly working pramana we have to be certain that being a product ensures enduring changes in every possible situations and not only in the subset of them. But how to be certain of this? In other words, how is it possible to know that the two inferential properties are necessarily and not accidentally linked? This is phrased the following way in the Indian tradition. Is there a necessary concomitance, fiapty, between the evidence property being a product and the target property being impermanent? One famous Buddhist censor to this question is Dignagas theory of the triple characteristic of evidence as an attempt to discriminate between accidental and necessary relationships by stating that the evidence being a product is a good one if and only if it is present in the case and their consideration at least in one similar case and absent in similar cases. In reaction to this, the giants developed a new conception of what counts as good evidence that is of high interest for our discussion on scientific knowledge. For this dating, I'm still relying on Barcero Rich is inexplicability of a rise, a rise inexplicable, according to him, this new conception is to be tracked back to a lost treatise of the giant Patras Vamin, whose name is Trilaxana Cadartana, the torment of the triple characteristics in the eighth century. So for Jaina philosophers after Patras Vamin, verifying that the evidence property is well ascribed to the subject and their consideration to similar ones and not to the similar ones is not relevant in the evaluation process of the validity of inference. The only necessary and sufficient condition to be ensured of the presence of a necessary concomitance is to know that the evidence property has one unique characteristic and this one unique characteristic is the fact that it is impossible overrides than in the presence of the target property. This impossibility overrides is named Anyatan Upapati. In our example, the very concept of a product is such that it is not possible to conceive its presence without conceiving the presence of something impermanent. No, there is an important peculiar feature of the Jaina tradition, namely this impossibility for the evidence property to be present overrides than in the presence of the target property. This mark that is the basis of inference or in other words, the fact that the link between the two intended universal is a necessary one, even though the epistemic agent is inferring from the knowledge of a particular case or still in overrides, what does ensure the fact that the piece of knowledge resulting from the inferential process is scientific knowledge conceived as knowledge of universal laws which does explain our individual observations of the world and make it possible to predict from them. This is known by a separate type of knowledge called Tarka and with which I am properly speaking struggling. So this lecture is not that much a presentation of a research paper, but more a food for thoughts. So I will welcome every discussion on this. So the term Tarka has a long tradition. It is first a technical term of the Nyaya school. It refers to suppositional knowledge, presupposition. In Mimamsa, it refers to reasoning by opposition to exegesis. And in the giant tradition, a shift seems to be happening. In the following attempt to understand what is going on, I will not refer to the first mentions of the terms which are very elliptic ones, but I will rather focus on a detailed epistemological treatises which are commentaries of those. Prabha Chandra, since 11th century, is especially such a prolific author. When he is commenting on Manikannan's disverse in the Parikshamukam, 9th century. So I quote, the necessary concomitance is ascertained by a suppositional knowledge, Tarka. Prabha Chandra explains in his Prameya Kamara Martanda that it has been said that necessary concomitance, Vyapti, cannot be grasped by perception. Necessary concomitance is based on a type of knowledge called Uha or Tarka, that rests on the strengths of apprehension and non-apprehension. Neither the infinity of individuals, nor deviation in place and so on, suffice to obstruct the acceptance of that necessary concomitance. It is knowledge of the whole class that is labelled overrised as Tarka. So first, it is clear that necessary concomitance cannot be known by customary perception. Since perception deals only with, since customary perception deals only with particulars and that even the biggest list of repeated particular instances would not suffice to reach certainty. It cannot be known by inference either for obvious problems of infinite regress. But necessary concomitance can be known from the recognition of universal features in the two inferential properties. It functions as a conceptual discernment of universal and it is known through a process, through a reasoning. It is an indirect parochial parameter. Namely, we do not know every instance of the universal in question. So the universal's being a product and being impermanent, but we understand the relation between them. And this knowledge takes the form of a reasoning. More precisely, the unique characteristic of being impossible otherwise means that without the target property being impermanent, it is absolutely impossible for the evidence being a product to be present. Yet it is present. Therefore, the target property being impermanent is present as well. All this that we know concerning the relationship of the two universal's, we know only from their very concept. And this is enough for us to know every singular instance covered by this concept. Therefore, we will never have to face the situation that Russell's chickens have faced. No risk of the plus one case that will refute everything, not even the need to deal with perceptible entities. In this discussion, China epistemologists have a very strong attitude toward our ability to know universal's. They do not consider that perception and inference have two irreducible types of associated knowable, like in Buddhism. Namely, perception for particulars and inference for universal's. For the giants, there is one type of knowable, namely the non-one-sided knowable, in such a way that the possibility of this very special Tarka type of knowledge is linked to the possibility of knowing universal's in a particular situation. More precisely, the China epistemological theory of particular in universal facilitates the epistemic access to one from the other. Indeed, a complex object is conceived as having both an existent universal aspect and an existent particular aspect. So in the same situation in which it is possible to know properties of fire and of smoke, it is also possible from a different cognitive channel to know properties of fireness and smogness. Yet, although Tarka is presented as an empirical worldly type of knowledge, because it is not classified under the direct or perception-like types of knowledge, it seems, it does seem that the very possibility of this special type of knowledge is actually linked to the fact that China metaphysics allows for the soul to possess extraordinary faculties. Indeed, whereas we can agree on the possibility of necessarily knowing the relation between being a product and being impermanent by means of Tarka, it is far less easy to agree on the possibility to necessarily necessarily know the relation between the rise of the Pleiades, of the cluster start of the Pleiades, and the rise of Aldebaran, that China epistemologists grant. And even though etymologically speaking, it works in this sense that Aldebaran means in Arabic the follower. In this dynamic, actually, Nagin Shah, in his Akarenkas criticism of Darmakirti's philosophy, pointed the fact that the China of thoughts themselves were conscious of the difficulty to explain how discernment of universal can give us certitude. And he quotes here the Pramanamimamsa of Himachandra, 11th, 12th century, who writes that, at the time of knowing the necessary concomitance between two properties, a man attends the status of a mystic. In this example, probably in knowing that the nature of Aldebaran is such that at the next manifestation of the world, its rise will also follow the one of the Pleiades. So what we have to remind is that this observation links the China discernment of universal with the Nayaika extraordinary perception called Samanya Laksana Pratyaksana. That is the perception of a whole class of objects through the perception of its generic property. And this makes it hard to understand why Tarka is classified in the Paroksha knowledge here. So to come back to our concern of characterizing scientific knowledge in Jainism, the type of knowledge named Tarka that is traditionally rendered by suppositional knowledge is the basis of scientific knowledge, even though it is classified in the Paroksha Shem scheme. And even though it is defined as a reasoning, it seems that Jain epistemologists conceived it as being close to the Nayaika Samanya Laksana Pratyaksana. In this dynamic, it seems that Jaina epistemologists do not attempt to describe it as entirely falling under the range of rational process, which was what Popper criticized, but that they are classifying it as a metaphysical discernment of universals. What criterion of this being that it is a personal experience not subject to decision procedures in rational investigation and discussion. So in conclusion, whereas the Buddhist hold that inference is erroneous pranta in the sense that there is always the possibility of error because it is with universals as conceptual constructions embedded in a set of relations. And we could say that they share distance with Hume. Jaina epistemologists consider that necessity based on metaphysical relations between universals is possible. In this respect, they are closer from Kant's approach and move. They're namely, there are things that we cannot know directly, but we can secure our knowledge of them by means of an indirect method. The Anyatanupapati method of considering that the only way to give an account of the repeated occurrence of two related facts is to postulate a special relation between them, namely the invariable concomitance. And even though this only shifts the problems to a higher level of analysis, because is this postulation really the only possible one? So that would be this Jaina contribution to the question of the characterization of scientific knowledge in this respect. So thank you for your attention.