 And I'm glad that you are here. We always begin, many of you have heard me say this before, but we begin our public events with a little safety announcement. I'm your responsible safety officer. I'm in charge of all of you to make sure that you're going to be well and safe today. If anything happens, please follow my directions. The exits are right here at that door, that door. The exit down to the ground level is in that corner. We'll go out through those doors. We're going to go across the street. We're going to meet under those great, big, beautiful trees, and we'll have a picnic, okay? But please, if anything happens, follow me, and we're all going to be safe. I'm very happy and very proud to be able to welcome the minister today. We don't often have a chance to have deputy prime ministers and defense ministers, but it's a real privilege. And I'm delighted to have minister Shimonyak with us. I'm a very sentimental person, and we Americans should be eternally grateful to Poland for having given us generals that got us in shape for the Revolutionary War. We would have lost the Revolutionary War had it not been for a couple of Polish generals who came over here and said, we can help train this ban. The first year was pretty ragged. We hardly survived the first year of the Revolutionary War, and it hadn't been for General Poloski. We wouldn't have survived. So we just have an eternal debt of gratitude to Poland and what Poland has done for us. I think it's an important setting to say we've relied on this very important ally for many things through the years, and I think more now than ever. I think that we're facing a challenge, a security challenge in Europe that's as large in my personal experience that we've had in the last 20 years. And we have a lot of questions. We have a lot of uncertainty. We have a NATO has not been the focus of attention for 20 years. One country has kept it at the top of its thinking. Poland has consistently held that its primary responsibility was to be at the heart of this alliance, and it has been a champion for it. And now we turn to Poland to be able to help us think through the challenges of the day that we're in. So I think it's unusually important for us and valuable for us to have the leader of the defense establishment and the vice prime minister here to talk with us this afternoon about the security challenges that we're facing in Europe and the leadership we're counting on from our best ally Poland that's going to help us think that through and work together with them. So could I ask all of you with your applause to please welcome the deputy prime minister and the minister of defense, his honorable excellency Tomasz Szymoniak. Thank you. Welcome. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I hope that within the next hour you will not have to follow the guidance of your boss where the exit is from this room because the subjects at hand are very important and serious. I really enjoy that you have come here in such a big crowd and I hope that the upcoming hour and a half will match the expectation that was presented in the introduction. And they will also be in line with the situation. People in Poland, in the United States and globally are interested in because people are interested in security. They ask security-related questions in Poland. They ask with concern whether Poland and Europe continue to be safe and secure and whether or not the demons of history have perhaps returned and those demons that made us start everything from scratch every two generations. So moving on to the subject of my address, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the questions of security in my country have become definitely our priority. They are in the very heart of the public debate. But before I move on to the security situation, I would like to thank very much for the invitation to come to the center, to John Hamm and Ms. Conley for their idea to have this meeting. I also would like to thank for a long-term cooperation with Poland. I also thank for being an American pillar of the Warsaw Defense Dialogue and that was one of the reasons for which we had a chance to meet and during this meeting you will get a first report from those meetings. I want to thank for that too because that was an initiative of my deputy who used to be our ambassador to Washington, Mr. Robert Kupiecki. I value that very much all these meetings that took place in the frameworks of the dialogue. Ladies and gentlemen, after Poland joined NATO, we focused on the development and modernization of our armed forces and we considered it to be our tangible contribution to the Alliance. For example, about 15 years ago by the means of the act of law we defined that the defense budget should be 1.95 percent of GDP. We also made efforts to keep a strong dimension of collective defense within NATO. We stressed the significance of the transatlantic bond building our partnership with the United States. It was about the acquisition of F-16, the military contribution in our combined operations in Iraq and then in Afghanistan. We supported the practical initiatives for the development of European defense capabilities. For example, We have been doing this and this continuous conviction that defense really and always matters. Today all those directions of Polish defense policy continue to be relevant and they do not have to be changed. The radical change of the security environment in Europe, however, indicated the necessity to strengthen the whole Euro-Atlantic political and military cooperation infrastructure. And I believe that this is the main Polish defense priority today. The point of departure must be an identification of the situation together. And coming to a conclusion that the worsening of the security situation in particular along the eastern front line of the Alliance is of a permanent nature. As Karl Bild recently said here, Europe is not surrounded today by the Ring of Friends, by the Ring of Fire. Poland has no doubt that the events of recent months indicate and prove without doubt that we are having to do with the change of the climate and not a summer storm only. We hope that it will be fully understood also by our allies. The solution of the problem takes us through politics and diplomacy that is free from illusions, which must not be naive or hypocritical. But against the background of it, there must be the military measures deterrence. The Russian aggression against Ukraine and the contempt for the rules of the international law demonstrate that Maithat has a permanent destabilizing influence on the entirety of the European security architecture because it is not about the kinetic measures that are taken by Russia. The essence of the problem is a combined and suppressive military doctrine that assumes the use of force, the growing combat capabilities and their practical manifestation in terms of regular offensive exercises as well as concentration of significant forces along the borders of NATO. It is accompanied by the whole range of aggressive instruments which are called compound warfare. Another more complicated are those challenges for European security. They come from the south, they are equally important and they also require our common response. However, we have the stress that outside of the military dimension, the challenges that we are having to do in the southern dimension, southern neighborhood of Europe are of an economic, cultural or even civilizational background. The response to threats coming out of that must cover a much broader span of actions and military instruments are only one of the measures and I believe not most important. It is important to understand this difference in order to avoid the false dilemma, east or south, which could very negatively influence the debate on the directions for the development of NATO. In Poland, we do not accept this division, however, we see the necessity of sound and strategic contact in both directions. Ladies and gentlemen, the current strategic situation is a test for transatlantic relations. For over 25 years that have passed since the end of the Cold War, the significance of the transatlantic bond and its military visibility have never been so important as they are today. The basis of this bond has been and will be the real engagement of the United States. The European security and the solidarity and determination of allies in order not to allow others to divide us in the name of the particular and our health benefits. In recent decades, American infrastructure and military presence in the Mediterranean, in the south and west of Europe have been an important factor that allows NATO to get involved in operations of crisis response in the Balkans, in Afghanistan and in Libya. The American presence there is still important, it's a very important component of our activities along the south border of the alliance where Poland is ready to participate actively. However, the shift in the security situation makes the permanent rotational presence of allied troops, in particular American troops along the eastern border of NATO, has become also very important and it requires the revision of many post Cold War dogmas that create the military policy of NATO and in the current situation they are not justified that is why it is important to know the European reassurance initiative that reinforces the reassurance measures along the eastern front line of the alliance. We believe that they will have a permanent and not only temporary nature because the stable and long-term prospect of military presence is very important for assurance but also deterrence. That is why what General Breedlove said prior to the Wales summit is that the strengthening of the eastern front line of NATO must be a new normal in the alliance activities. The challenge to this extent is the execution of the concept of the establishment of the storages and military equipment pre-positioned here, realizing this we will be trying to get as much synergy between the measures of NATO as the alliance and our strategic partnership with NATO. The result of this bilateral cooperation is very good now, but it is not exhausted for over a year American troops have been training in Polish and training ranges. Our air forces have been cooperating on the basis of the American aviation detachment in Poland. We are starting to develop the base of the missile defence system in Rajikowo in Poland so these forms of cooperation can be extended to cover also other allies of our region and it is better to bring into the system also the Vizagrad group and the Baltic states. New capabilities in this context will also be opened up by the acquisition of patriot systems by Poland and we have just started intergovernmental consultations about that. We are thinking in realistic terms about partnership with the United States. We do not expect the 6th fleet to be deployed to the Baltic Sea. We know that it has to be in the Mediterranean, however we believe that Poland can be a hub for American military activity in the region. The aviation detachment I mentioned can be a basis for the broader cooperation of Air Force in central Europe. The location of the military equipment, the prepositioning of that could serve the purpose of American military activity along the eastern front line of the alliance and the multinational corps in Szczecin is very important to the 6th and head quarters together with EUCOM can get more involved in the planning and coordination of combined exercises and trainings. The American presence is only one of the measures of the transatlantic equation. Another which is also important is Europe and European contribution to our defence effort. We have been debating this for years and December 2013 has of state and government of the European Union in the first statement of their declaration they wrote. Defence matters and I believe that it is the shortest sentence in European documents. After a year and a half since that meeting this statement is only a political slogan without any real activities. And is still one of quite a numerous group of European allies that fulfil the commitments of investment in defence according to defence investment pledge from Wales. Our defence budgets will go above the level of 2% GDP this year according to the legislation from next year on 2% defence budget as a measure of GDP will be guaranteed. We are investing in new helicopters, missile and air defence system, modern artillery, mobility of our army and modernisation of navy, the communication and command systems. Pretty soon in the planning perspective which is 2022 Poland will have spent over 40 billion dollars on modernisation. And that means that we are spending today to defence more than all other countries that joined NATO after 1999 together. We encourage our European partners to make similar effort. What concerns us in particular is preparing a number of European armies mainly to perform expeditionary operations of crisis response profile. What has been neglected is more requiring combat capabilities, high end combat capabilities. So cooperation within the European Union should focus on the seeking of practical measures that can reduce European deficit in defence capabilities. The pragmatic solutions cannot be replaced by ambitious but also abstract discussions about the European army. It is true in the early 50s Western Europe was only one step from the execution of this vision. However, only few people remember today that the then joined European army was prepared by shape officers and it was to be under full control and command of SACUR that was General Eisenhower and his successors. 60 years later NATO continues to be the key to the European security. However, NATO must adjust the change of the security situation that we are having to do with today. It does not need the revolution but what is necessary is the strategic adaptation. The readiness action plan that was adopted in Wales is the beginning of the process. The priority is the practical execution of key elements of wrap. It is mainly focused on three factors, full implementation of the reform of NATO response force, including the achievement of the operational readiness by the VJTF, the so-called spearhead. Poland has taken over the duty to become one of the framework nations for VJTF and we are ready to host them and exercise in Poland. The exercise will happen this June. The adjustments to the new requirements of command structure in Poland and other five countries of eastern front line, the command elements are being established, so-called nephews that are to facilitate the movement of VJTF and support of planning and exercises of Article V. But it is also important to note the role of the core in the stretching that was created by Poland, Germany and Denmark. We are increasing its readiness, preparing to take up new tasks and increasing internationalisation. The headquarters in the stretching is to take a command role for the NRAF force if they are going to be deployed in the eastern front line. Next thing is the strengthening of advanced planning of NATO in the frameworks of the collective defence. It is one of the key questions for the practical execution of Article V guarantees, including the threats of a compound or hybrid nature, the detailed planning solutions for the border countries of NATO is necessary to talk about the actual increasing of our crisis response capabilities. We are based on experience from the implementation of Redness Action Plan, so we want the next year's summit in Warsaw to initiate the next stage of strategic adaptation of NATO. It should strengthen the capabilities and measures and assets of the Alliance. Not only those units that are needed for the immediate reaction, it is necessary to change the profile of NATO first structure which will give the Alliance the possibility to respond not only with the brigade but also with the division and core. It is necessary to stress more heavy capabilities and that increase the credibility of conventional deterrents. This also seems that it is necessary to increase NATO common funding for the development of defence infrastructure that allows the reception of the reinforcement forces, especially in the east. We called these proposals the Warsaw Initiative of Strategic Adaptation and we are going to talk about it with our allies pretty soon and we are counting on the support rendered towards by the United States. I believe that an important contribution to the discussion can be made by the Warsaw Defence Dialogue. I talked about it a moment ago and I hope that you will continue to express interest in this project. To conclude, ladies and gentlemen, I also would like to tell you that this morning I had a possibility to meet Secretary of Defence Ashkelot to talk about all these subjects I am presenting to you in the frameworks of our broad agenda of Polish-American military cooperation. I thanked Secretary Kot on behalf of Polish authorities and Polish people for all their measures and activities the United States has taken over a year to demonstrate the strength of NATO and to demonstrate its engagement also in Poland, but not only in Poland, it concerns also other allies. We are convinced that this engagement is one of the fundamental guarantees of our security. When I talked to Secretary Kot today, I asked for increasing the intensity of this cooperation, more American presence in Poland and at the same time I declared increased continuous Polish effort including financial effort and strengthening of our alliance and I believe that our common thinking, our shared responsibility is the best response to all the crises whichever the direction. I am going to leave Washington reassured that we are thinking in very similar terms about the situation and there is a great possibility for us to work together within the upcoming months and years. Thank you very much. Mr. Minister, thank you so much for those wonderful comments. I'll let you get your device on. Welcome. My name is Heather Conley. I'm Senior Vice President here at CSIS for Europe and Eurasia and I have to say not only a warm thank you to the minister but to all of my colleagues from the Ministry of Defense. In December of last year CSIS and the Polish Defense Ministry embarked on a new transatlantic security initiative called the Warsaw Defense Dialogue. U.S. we're going to change your things. Perfect. We came together U.S. security experts, Polish experts to have a quiet conversation about the changed European security environment and what we needed to do. I have to tell you personally it was one of the most invigorating and intellectually rich discussions that I participated in. The minister took time out of his busy schedule to speak to us and it began a series of conversations out front. I please take a copy of some of the ideas and the conversations that took place in that dialogue. It's really a wealth of information so that's my little advertisement but we encourage you to do that. Mr. Minister, I have so many questions for you. I'm going to hold back and only ask you a few and then let our audience ask you some important questions but you've just made a little news. You've told us about the Warsaw Initiative for Strategic Adaptation. This would be a very bold new plan for NATO during next year's NATO summit in Warsaw. If I understood you correctly though this would probably require a change or perhaps the end to the NATO Russia Founding Act. Something that was created in 1997 for a very different purpose. Are you suggesting perhaps that NATO must put aside the NATO Russia Founding Act? You promised. Simple questions. And this question will be sufficient to publish a thicker book than the record of your work. But I will try to respond briefly. I remember perfectly well that moment two years ago when the British were preparing the NATO summit in Newport and they were thinking what the purpose of that summit was supposed to be. What kind of NATO are we going to have after Afghanistan? NATO post-Afghanistan. However, life brought answers to these questions. So the fact that we decided to become hosts of NATO summit in 2016 results from our very deep conviction that it is necessary to have a new alliance. It is necessary for the alliance to go through the process of strategic adaptation. Since Warsaw is a venue of NATO summit, it is really worthwhile naming this initiative, a Warsaw initiative. Perhaps you know it. Or perhaps you don't know it by the meeting of NATO's heads of state and government or at least their dinner as planned in exactly the same room where in 1955, 60 years ago, the Warsaw pact was signed and that is going to be of a great symbolic character. So I believe that both the name and this initiative can totally defend themselves. How can we connect it with NATO's Russia funding pact? We talked about it a lot before Newport and we decided to look at it pragmatically. Actually, that the alliance must not be limited in its measures that concern the security of its allies and that we assess that it was Russia that violated first the provisions of the founding act. I think that the caution expressed by some European allies is excessive. Because even if we take this act into account, then the measures, the activities taken up by NATO and the United States in crisis response do not go beyond that act. But definitely NATO-Russia relations will be in the focus of our attention within the upcoming months. Today there was a meeting of Secretary-General Stoltenberg with the Russian Foreign Minister after quite a long pause, I have to admit. And I'm sure that our, well, we will have to talk about that we will be discussing the subject in the coming weeks. I'm sure that it is also going to be an important part of the context of the next year's summit in Warsaw. Minister, have you been pleased with the exercising what you've been seeing as NATO's putting together the spearhead force, the multiple exercises that have taken place over the last several months? Is there anything that concerns you about how NATO is building forward its deployable forces and its exercises? What has anything surprised you as you've watched and been very engaged with these NATO exercises? Another difficult question, I guess, because my official response should be very optimistic. But I guess that this year has tested us very much in terms of our attitude to exercises. It's a NATO and other NATO states. It is difficult to resist an impression that before everything happened, very much attention was focused on VIP days for the visits of all those distinguished visitors. And that was the culmination of exercises. But today, we are fighting VIP days, actively fighting them in order to avoid an impression that the exercises serve the only purpose of satisfying officials or mass media, satisfied and fed with picture. When American Patriot batteries were exercising of war. So together with my friend, Ambassador of the United States, Stephen Mull, we went there to Sohachev and then we told them, don't put all those batteries behind us with the rows of troops there. We were in the field and the exercises were far, far in the field in order to demonstrate that we are not doing that for the picture, but that those exercises were for fact. And to tell you the truth, that really means a very brutal verification of what really works, what is really prepared. But this is the only way now. Russia, as I said, Russia has been exercising for years. Practically, they have also been testing whether the army is able to leave barracks within a couple of hours or whether all those indicators are fake. I guess what we started a year ago will give very good tangible outcomes. The noble job exercise in June, I mentioned that it's the first VJTF exercise. We plan that exercise to show really what works and what does not work. Oh, I'm afraid I may ask another difficult question. Sorry. Poland has been embarking on a very impressive military modernization program. In fact, you've just very recently announced some very, very significant weapons purchases from missile defense to attack helicopters and now embarking on more modernization of your maritime, the Navy, the submarine effort. Are you pleased with the pace of this progress? Would you, what would you do differently if you could do something differently right now as you looked at how you've approached military modernization and help us understand some of your thinking about what the future modernization picture looks like. You've been a model for other NATO members. We welcome your insights on your own program. The modernization of the Polish armed forces after the collapse of communism started 15 years ago in 2000, 2001. That was the decision concerning the acquisition of the multi-role fighter, F-16. At that time, we accepted that the priority for us was a significant transformation of our air force and what followed from that was the decision to buy F-16 and new transportation aircraft, the airlift aircraft. That priority was well done and it observed significant funds. You were asking about the Navy. That is one of the most neglected services in our conditions. There are different reasons for that. Some of those reasons are that for years, people believed that Poland did not need the more powerful Navy, that the Baltic Sea was a small sea and that we actually have to focus on NATO commitments like seconding one ship, perhaps, and we don't have a significant force in the Baltic Sea. But we changed that approach and we believe that Poland should have state-of-the-art Navy and there has been a plan adopted for the development of the Polish Navy up to 2030 that covers submarines, the coastal defense ships, patrol ships and mine destroyers. And with great satisfaction, I can tell you that after years, of course, in the upcoming months, we are going to present two new ships to our Navy. Have the recent events influenced the shift in our priorities? Yes, they have. We decided that we have to speed up our helicopter program and that is why there was a decision that we were going to buy the attack helicopters faster. We also have introduced some adjustments in our ideas that are connected with the cyber threats, communication systems, individual soldiers equipment and we decided that we could not postpone the execution of these programs. So as much as our budget allows us, we are trying not to waste more time. Mr. Minister, I ask you to look at the strengths and weaknesses of NATO's exercises. I'd like your reflections on and your observations of Russia's military exercises. We've seen a lot of activity in the maritime component and the Baltic Sea as well as in multiple exercises showing us complexity. What have been some of your observations of the Russian military exercise in the region? Russian exercises have been very intensive in recent months and they have been organized without any notice. There are some limitations imposed by the international law. However, good relations should also be connected with warning or notice to other nations about your plans. These exercises are organized quite often in such a way that is quite well widespread in the media. So it is no secret that it is of a provocative nature. For example, they use aircraft to test different systems, flying very close to the borders or flying in such a way that it can pose a threat to civilian aviation. So definitely the exercises of the Russian armed forces are on the one hand very practical. They test their systems, but on the other hand, we see an element of exerting political pressure in them and the Baltic Sea has become a place where the pressure is quite visible. For hundreds of years, Russia has believed a strategic space for Russia. If you look back in history, you can see that in terms of Western neighbors of Russia, Russia has wedged wars against Poland, Sweden. So those areas, this space, traditionally has been very much of Russia's interest. So we are watching the Baltic Sea very attentively and we do encourage the United States to see the Baltic Sea as a very important space. When you look at a big map of the world, when you look at it from Washington, you'll see that it's a small sea and it's surrounded by allies mainly, but from the geopolitical perspective, from the perspective of Europe, the Baltic Sea is of a great significance. A few months ago, Polish Prime Minister Eva Kopacz spoke with President of the United States Barack Obama on the phone. They talked about different things and President Obama congratulated her on taking over the position, but she noted one thing with President Obama, the Baltic Sea, that the United States looked at the Baltic Sea. So it's quite an important indication and it is important and it's very good that we are talking about it. It's good that the United States can see the Baltic States. Sweden and Finland are also in your American agenda. My last question, I'm just a warm-up because our audience is going to ask even more difficult questions. I have been reading some articles that there's been a volunteer movement to get some military training, members of the Polish parliament, other young people are being encouraged to join some exercises. Could you tell us a little bit more about that? True. Recently, we have observed the increased interest of training of reserve troops and the defense organizations a few days ago. There was a one-day-long training of members of parliament. It was actually to serve a purpose of a role model and not a practical exercise, I believe. And it is a demonstration of what I referred to at the beginning of my address, that people of Poland, our citizens, they feel that security is important, that security does matter, also individually, personally. For six years, we haven't had any conscript army anymore because our army is now professional and in practice for the last 20 years. Quite many young people haven't served in the armed forces because they went to university. So these people now, they want to have some skills. Sometimes when I talk with my vouchers and then I hear that, for example, a wife gave her husband a gift for his 40th birthday, a shooting course, for example. So it's not only about hobby. It's also about people being very serious about security and about their capabilities. I look at it positively. We are also only trying to make it in such a way so that it was beneficial both for these people but also for the security system because we have to see the difference between all those hobbyists, amateurs, who want to have a nice time in the firing range from those who want to do something for the country and for themselves. All right. Well, I hope I've given you some time to think of your questions. Thank you. We have microphones. If you could give us your name, your affiliation, particularly because we have translation. If you could keep the question very concise in the comments short, I know our translator would be grateful. So I think we're going to start down here in the middle, sir. In the back, there's a microphone coming your way. Okay, am I on here? Yeah. Mr. Minister, thank you for your appearance and for your comments. My name is Dan Abahazi, working at the Department of Defense on the Joint Staff and I'm in the training and exercise business. So you took a decision recently to move Anaconda from September to June, your national exercise next year, I believe to coincide with the Warsaw Summit. Can you tell us what your expectations are for Anaconda and what the potential is for it to send a clear message to the allies, to assure them and to our friends in the East? Thank you. This message is simple. And that is also connected with what I'm talking about here. Our will that key decisions from Newport will have been implemented by NATO Summit in Warsaw. Not having them on paper, not us announcing that they have been implemented, but we simply want to show in practice that they work and that all these structures and all these elements we talked about in Newport, that they are really implemented. And that is why we made that decision. Anaconda is a traditional name of our Polish exercises that take place every second year, quite often with the participation of our allies, including those from the United States. We are ready to do a lot. And this exercise is also going to be about our national effort. Using this opportunity of having you here, sir, I would like to ask you to act in your work for that cause that this exercise is really visible for those who are supposed to see them and not only our guests for the VIP day, then I will be very much committed to you for that, sir. Message received. Thank you. I think we'll stay in just in this section here. We have one and two questions. Microphone here, sir? Right here. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Minister. Arwan Nagadek from George Washington University. We've talked a lot about the NATO side, but you briefly mentioned the European Union side of defense in your comments. Couple of questions. The first one is in terms of European Union diplomacy, when we look back at how Radiev Sikorski used to be very visible and forceful in the early days of the Ukraine crisis, I just would like to have your comments on the Normandy format, which now only includes the French, the Germans, the Ukrainians and the Russians. Are you satisfied with that format or do you feel that it will be better off with more of an Eastern European voice? And second, we are headed to a rare European Union summit on defense in June, and you mentioned what got us there, which is the December 2013 summit. In a nutshell, what is a successful outcome from that summit in your mind? Thanks. So a question on the diplomacy of the Normandy format, your view on that and then any predictions for the June European Council meeting on European defense? Thank you for noticing the role of our former foreign minister, Radiev Sikorski. The activity of these three foreign ministers definitely influenced the situation in Kiev, February last year, as far as the Normandy format is concerned, in Poland we are quite distanced from that project because we believe that it's not just about Poland, but it is much better whenever the United States is involved and the European Union is such as involved. But we definitely support the Minsk process and the Minsk protocol and the personal courage, bravery of Chancellor Merkel, who put very much on the table and she deserves very much respect because we knew that it would be terribly difficult to go to Minsk, Alexander Lukashenko, and that situation meet Vladimir Putin. I guess that the recent activity of the United States, which is not involved in the Normandy format, but the engagement of Secretary Kerry and Mr. Lante in the Kiev, Solchiy, Moscow, they open up a new stage. We do not know about that stage, what it is going to be like, but let's hope that the engagement of the United States serves the purpose of pushing things forward because if you follow the evaluation of the Minsk agreement in Germany or the position on Russia in Germany, you can see how very much people are disappointed that Russia is not keeping its word to speak quite lightly. Talking about the European Council on Common European Security and Defense Policy. We are looking forward to having practical decisions. Our expectations are not really overinflated. Many good documents have been drafted in the past. So what we want is the opening of the development of the new European Security Strategy, the last, the current strategy was drafted in 2003 and it is from a different epoch. The epoch when we were not even a member of the European Union. Secondly, we want decisions to be made, that instruments that were created a long time when they even cost money like the European Battle Groups or the European Defense Agency so that they started to be operational, working, giving outcomes without any illusion that it is going to be an equal form of some institution to NATO. No, because this is not the point. But we believe that in different European measures, we can do a lot, but at the end of the day, it is about individual national capabilities. If we are engaged in some European projects, for example, to a tanker, they will serve NATO, not only us in the European Union. So our Polish Prime Minister is going to go to that council with a strong expectation to have tangible outcomes from that council. We have had a number of declarations up to date, but tangible things must be finally done. It's not going to be great. For example, the European Union is to have 1,000 troops that are able to deploy any place in the world any time. That would be sufficient. Can we avoid Steve Larby, a question right there? And then I promise I'll move over to the section. Mr. Minister, Steve Larby, re-incorporation, one second. There have been repeatedly reports over the years, and particularly in the last month, that Russia has moved its candor missiles, which have a range which could reach Moscow into the district by Kulungrad. Could you enlighten us about that? And secondly, whether they've also moved back fire, which are nuclear capable, back into Crimea. What's the reason for this or the official rationale, and what is Poland's position on this? Just to make sure everyone understood that the movement of a sconder missiles, potentially within range of Poland, whether that's Crimea, Kaliningrad. Thank you. A sconder. In Poland, it's like the Loch Ness Monster. It pops up from time to time. That Russia has deployed, is deploying or will deploy, a sconder is to Kaliningrad Oblast. So we are a little immune to the nervousness or anxiety about it. I don't think that it should be treated as something isolated from a broader context. You can deploy a sconder anytime, and you can redeploy them anytime, anyplace. I'm sure it is strong in propaganda, political thing, scunders. Let me note that this Loch Ness Monster popped up when the missile defense talks were pending as a reaction to the installation of missile defense in Poland. So surely it is not something against Poland, but against NATO, especially that the Rangers cover at least the territory of Germany. So this is the problem of the whole alliance. I and we in Poland see a lot of game playing about it because any Russian commentator, whenever they say anything about a scounders, then Polish mass media, will add as immediately the headlines. Your second question. It's also, you know, there's very much propaganda in it and demonstration how permanent this link is going to be between Russia and Crimea. It is about a number of different ideas undertakings Russia is involved in in Crimea. I just read that one in the hockey game where President Putin played the best player was Russian defense minister Shoigu. And as a reward, he was given the vacation in Crimea. So, you know, nuclear warrants or minister Shoigu, whatever, these are elements to show that Crimea is Russian. And it's about, you know, irritating public opinion, definitely in Ukraine, but also in other countries. I'm feeling a lot of tweets are going out that a scounders are like Loch Ness monsters. So, I can already feel the message going. We'll take a colleague right there, please, sir. Thank you. Thank you. Brad Harris with the Friends Committee on National Legislation. A few months ago, two senior members of the US Congress wrote a letter to the US administration saying that we should consider deploying US B61 nuclear bombs to the Baltic states and Poland. I wonder if you could comment on this and comment on how Poland views nuclear weapons in your defense posture. Thank you. For the nuclear weapons, it has always been part of NATO discussions. I remember a discussion a few years ago when ministers of defense from Eastern Europe convinced some of our Western colleagues that it was not worth while giving up that option. And that nuclear weapons will continue to be a key element for deterrence in years ahead, as it has been the case for dozens and dozens of years. In recent period, in connection with the activities taken by Russia with its nuclear potential, we also approach this differently in NATO. The discussion in NATO, the February ministerial, was a little bit different. It was not routine anymore, but it was political. I do not want to talk about details responding to the question of that letter of the representatives of the Congress, because it is not that we have the nuclear weapons. But I trust that the states, in particular, the United States, that in NATO have nuclear weapons, follow very attentively what the Russians are doing and whether or not it fits in the limitations of the treaty, or whether or not it shifts the situation strategically. Certainly, it is not the case that the nuclear weapon is something that can be put in the closet. No, it's just the other way around. Oh, turn it around. There you go. John Tropp. My name is John Tropp. The post-eagle weekly online newspaper reports news of special interest to Polish Americans. My question goes to civilian control over Polish defense spending. Recently, the Polish opposition press reported that the Parliamentary Committee that routinely reviews contracts and expenditures did not look at the contract to purchase helicopters from France that Poland bought that are twice as expensive as comparable helicopters produced by Boeing. The question is, is that true? Are those Polish opposition press reports true that the Polish Parliamentary Committee never looked at the contract to buy helicopters from France? I thought that my question was difficult. You're asking a politician from a ruling coalition says semi-junkingly, I will tell you, it is difficult for me to say that the opposition press is writing the truth. But in this case, it is not true, because the Parliamentary Committee on our initiative has dealt with all the questions and all the contracts. The Polish law does not give any competencies to the Parliamentary Committee on that. It's different to Germany, where in Germany the Parliamentary Committee has to express its consent or something, but it's just like that. We informed the Committee about the process. If you follow Polish efforts, you know that it is now the peak of the election campaign in our country, and all these questions are highly emotional. It's a very transparent, competitive process and three-builders decisions haven't been made yet. It's simply a decision for one of those proposals, one of the best to be moved on to the next stage. And I believe that when the emotions of the election campaign go down, it will be evaluated differently. As proof that what I'm saying is true, I can say that the Chairman of the Senate, Defense Committee in Poland, who was acquainted together with the members of the Committee with documents, facts, information, recognized our documents, and we found them convincing. And he's a representative of the opposition party. So if you wish, via the Embassy, I can give you more details about the process. The press is quite critical about the government in Poland, as it is the case in every democratic country, I believe, but we have the only opposition presentation. So the review of information, it's been very broad. We have a question over there, please. Justin, excuse me, Justin Doubley with Inside Defense. I just wanted to ask about the patriot purchase. Could you just... Zaku Patriotów. Military considerations went into that decision and how much do Poland's plans align with the United States' plans for its air and missile defense forces? Until the very end of the process, we talked with two governments and with two bidders, the government of the United States and the government of France. And we asked these governments to present as comprehensive proposals on missile defense system as possible, something that would not cover only the system, which is the military, technical and financial factors, but also industrial and political securities factors. And after comprehensive analysis of these two proposals on the 21st of April, the government made a decision that we moved on to the stage of negotiations with the government of the United States, which unequivocally pointed out at one system, what is the Patriot system, supported by the United States government. Today, we talked about it with Secretary Carter, initiating in practical terms political negotiations. And it's a very good basis because the American proposal was drafted earlier and it was submitted to us. A few days ago, I also met with President Kennedy of Raytheon. So in those double-track negotiations, within the upcoming months, we will be preparing the language of contracts. Together with Secretary Carter, we decided that these subjects are so serious that they will require a personal watch by him as Secretary of Defense and myself as defense minister. So I'm satisfied with the talks today. My objective was to show to Secretary Carter that for us, it is a strategic decision, a governmental decision. It is not just about the purchase of a system, just as element of equipment, but it is a decision for years, for decades to come. And I'm glad that Secretary Carter shared my thinking and that our two governments, our two states are aware of the strategic significance of these decisions. Thank you, Igor Dunaevsky, your reporter for Russian newspaper. President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, in the recent months called for creation of European armed forces. So my question is, do you support this idea and are there any practical consultations between European defense ministries and how would you brought that fit in the European security system where NATO till the moment was the main element? Thank you. European defense ministers naturally support all the ideas that support European defense capabilities. That idea of President Juncker, it's not new. I mentioned that in my address and we took it as a good incentive for our further discussion and making everyone aware that if we were to sum up the budgets and number of troops in individual nations, we would have the second largest army of the world in Europe after the United States. But since the effort is scattered, then when we sum up the defense capabilities of individual nations, we get a much lower figure. This is how I responded to the question what we expected from the June European Council on Defense. We believe that it is a far reaching plan and it is good to talk about specifics, about specific tangible things we can do, we can get and something that is already on the table. The European army is a very tough project for a variety of reasons. And I, to tell you the truth, do not know whether it would be simply a redundancy, the application of what NATO already has with its military structure, the preparation for taking up different operations that has already been tested in Kosovo, in Afghanistan, in many different operations and exercises. So I believe that what President Juncker is saying is a great intellectual provocation so that Europeans could talk more about defense with each other. However, I guess that very much time will have to pass before that plan has any tangible outcome. Mr. Minister, you have answered a lot of tough questions this afternoon. Thank you so much. I know you have some meetings with members of Congress that you are going to need to get to. So we're going to have to finish our conversation. But thank you audience. Those were really tough and good questions. Mr. Minister, thank you. Thank you for being such a stalwart of the U.S.-Polish relationship, but also of a very strong NATO and a very uncertain picture for Europe's security. We're delighted with our partnership. Look forward to more conversation about the U.S.