 and we're back. We're live. It's a one o'clock clock. I'm Jay Feindell. This is ThinkTech and we're talking today about American foreign policy with Russia and China with Bob Gerrier and David Santora, both the Pacific Forum, which lives in, it lives around the world, but mostly it lives in Bishop Square. How do you like that? So welcome to the show, Bob. Welcome to the show, David. Thank you, Jay. You're here with you, Jay. Thanks. So let's first talk about the Pacific Forum. They're doing the Pacific Forum. Bob, can you talk about it? Sure. Well, first of all, we've been around for 45 years. I think of us as kind of Hawaii's own Think Tank, private Think Tank, nonpartisan. Again, 45 years in the business, so to speak. I'm actually passing the baton come this summer, late June, over to David Santora, who's currently our vice president and director for nuclear policy programs. So looking forward to this very seamless change and I'm heading back to the east coast to continue my third chapter now, post retirement from the Navy. But I love what we do and I had an opportunity to really grow the forum this last three years. And I was particularly pleased that we were ranked among the top Think Tanks globally in a recent University of Pennsylvania Lauder Institute Global Think Tank rankings. So very pleased with that. And again, a small staff and we weathered COVID okay, lots of virtual groups like this and looking forward to getting back on the road and meeting face to face. That's great. Thank you. It's been great having you here and been great talking to you when we have on a couple of occasions. And I really appreciate you coming on today and sharing. David, you have a rebuttal? No, I don't have a rebuttal. I'm in full agreement. It's a great organization. This is an organization I've been with since 2011. So it's been nearly 10 years, the end of 2011. So we're doing a lot of work with a very small staff and we're doing work that in many ways is a little different from most Think Tanks because a lot of what we do is convening dialogues and facilitating discussions on often very sensitive issues, security issues. That's one aspect. The other aspect is we do also a lot of research, which is really what Think Tank, think and do. But so we are, I want to say, do and a Think Tank, which makes us in many ways quite unique. And we also do work that focuses on the whole Indo-Pacific. So we are not specializing in one particular area. We look at the entire region, which again is very unique among Think Tanks. Good for you. It's important to have you here. It's important to have Pacific Forum among us. It sort of gives us a global consciousness that we might not otherwise have actually. And I want to congratulate you on your promotion, so to speak. I'm happy that you got the job and I look forward to having regular conversations with you. Thank you. I'm absolutely thrilled and honored to take over from Bob. Actually, let me thank him in public for all the work that he's done. And frankly, I mean, it's going to be difficult to follow his steps. But I think Pacific Forum is set for growth. We're doing a lot. We're doing a lot more than what we've been doing. And so I think the future is bright. Yes, I agree. And from my thoughts here on the opening of our discussion, you look at the news and you look at the local public conversation and you don't hear that much about America's position in the world, geopolitical position. And that's tragic in its own way because we don't have the same influence that we used to have. And as President Biden says, we've got to regain that somehow. And it's a long haul to do that. It's very important to the future of the country. And so I really appreciate people who enter that conversation, especially including Pacific Forum, and are welling able to discuss these issues so that people here in Hawaii know a little about it. And it's more than what they get on the 6 o'clock and 10 o'clock news. It really has to be much, much more. Anyway, our conversation today is about American foreign policy at this point in time with Russia and China. Let's start with Russia. I say to myself, we've been engaging with them, perhaps, in a more of an embrace, that's not necessarily a good term, for a long time. And we have engaged back in the day of the Tsar and certainly through the 20th century. And a lot of people in the US have come from Russia. They've immigrated from Russia in the satellite countries. And so perhaps we have a greater consciousness of Russia. Should we? What is going wrong with Vladimir Putin? Why have we such a contention with them? And what would you advise the United States to do at this difficult moment? Well, I mean, I think just to kind of chart us through where we've been and where we're going with Russia, you know, the successor of the Soviet Union, right? Obviously, kind of catch everyone up. Obviously, Cold War crested and did the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the emergence of Russia then as a successor state and by treaty law, by the way, really following all those responsibilities and major relationships. And then what we've seen really is the head of that state, you know, taking them into a very authoritarian direction. And in many ways, I think looking to confront the US wherever it can on areas of foreign policy, of outcomes of international events. We haven't seen too many situations where both Russia and the United States are on the same side. That's not to say that these don't exist. There are functional areas where we certainly have common ground. And hopefully we'll get to this, I think, a little bit later, because I think that is the way ahead. But you see in particular some of the events in the Black Sea and the Crimea, which crossed red lines. I mean, in terms of grabbing territory, forcibly, you know, occupying areas, the whole use of active measures and, I guess, again, another version of gray zone tactics, which I can talk about on the Chinese side. But there's this notion of a struggle, a continuous, contentious atmosphere, and this pressure that's kind of moving back and forth, if you will, in our relationship. So, I mean, that's writ large. But in particular, the use of force, the use of coercive means in Europe and in the continental area, this crosses a line. And the U.S. can't just stand by and watch that happen, because it's contrary to the norms that we've developed collectively, post-World War II norms, we always hear about 70-plus years of building on the ashes of a World War II and building a world order, a collective world order, by the way. No one dictated this unilaterally, that everyone stacked hands and agreed on basic principles. And this is what we talk about when people talk about rule of law, norms, respecting international law. Quite frankly, they're all enshrined in the UN Charter. But it's not insignificant. And this has been eroding. And Russia has been an active participant in eroding this. So I think that's the source of the friction, what to do about it and how to engage. I look forward to having that discussion here, because the answer is not always military. I think often people resort to that and say, well, gosh, what's our military response? You ask anyone in leadership positions in the Department of Defense today and past. Military choice is really your last resort. It's this diplomacy. It's about state leads and all of these relations and the logic and the strategy behind it. What the defense offers, of course, is deterrence. And it has this capability that you maintain. And that's what gives strength, if you will, to your policies that State Department leads. And looking forward to talking about all these aspects. But I want to pause just to see if you agree or not with that view. Sure. Let me go back to what Tony Blinken on Sunday night with 60 minutes. One thing he made clear is that we're not going to have a war with them. It's in nobody's interest to do that. And for that matter, we're not going to have a cold war with them. But they have been attacking us. They put bounties on the heads of our troops. They've been making strange moves, not strange, but aggressive moves all over their western and southern borders. And they have attempted to control our elections, which is perhaps the most obnoxious of all. And that's troublesome. So you have, on the one hand, you want to impose sanctions or otherwise get them to stop doing these negative adverse things to the United States. On the other hand, you don't want to take it so far that it gets to be a heightened sense of aggression. And that's a problem. And Tony Blinken was talking about how you, on the one hand, have a discussion about nonproliferation. And on the other hand, you show them that they can't get away with these things, including internal things like Navalny. So I'm thinking this is a more complex kind of diplomacy for that country that we have ever had. It's not black. It's not white. And we have to trade off on both of those considerations, both of those missions, if you will, in everything we do. But, query, how do you do that without showing too much weakness or too much strength? What do you think, David? Well, I mean, I think you're correct. I mean, it's not going to be black and white. It's going to have to be confrontational in some areas. In others, we're going to have to give cooperation a chance. I think the way forward is to try and compartmentalize the issues. And frankly, even at the heights of the Cold War, we've managed to do that. We managed to have a very adversarial relationship at all levels. And despite that, we managed to conclude arms control agreements. We managed to agree that preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and in particular, nuclear weapons, was in the interest of Washington and Moscow. And so how do we basically push back against what has been, especially since 2014, a new relationship with Russia? So how do we push back on the one hand? And on the other hand, manage to say, all right, well, those issues are issues that concerns both. And we need to actually work together. And it seems to me that what we have seen over the past few months is an effort on the part of Washington to do this. The renewal, the extension of the so-called New START Treaty, which is really an arms control treaty, is evidence that, yeah, okay, we can do arms control together. We're not going to agree on much. But let's at least make sure that we can isolate the nuclear dimension insofar as possible, because this is the most dangerous aspect. I happen to think that there are a lot of other things that we can do together. But it's going to be very difficult. And if we can at least, again, isolate the most dangerous components of the relationship, I'll be happy with it. I know a lot of people talk about the need to get some U.S., Russia, and for that matter, U.S., China stability. And to me, this is much, much too ambitious. I talk about stabilization. I say, let's try and move towards stability. Let's try and take care of the worst aspects of competition in both relationships with Russia and with China. And if we can do that, then I'll be happy. Of course, it would be even better to have stable relationship and, ideally, on terms favorable to the United States. But right now, let's take care of, again, the worst aspects. And if we do that, then I'll sleep better. Yes, we would all. So, Bob, one other thing comes to mind about Russia, and that is this. Putin is a very powerful man, despite the fact that he's a dictator. And he's ensured himself to be an absolutist until, what, 2036, I think. He's going to hang around, do his thing, and he's going to crush any opposition, crush any protest. And that's clear. He knows how to do that. At the same time, he knows how to do invasive things with American democracy. And he knows that American democracy is, as D. Tocqueville said, tumultuous. And because of that tumult, every four years, we have a turnover of power, sometimes more peaceful than other times. In this past November election, it was not peaceful. It still isn't peaceful. And other nations look at us as an example of disorganized, fragmented, divided, weak. And they take advantage. So, here's a guy who's, some people think he's quite pathological, but he's a dictator in charge. And he's going to be there longer than any president would be there. How can we deal with him when he does not have our interest in mind, and when he is going to be there longer than any president? Well, again, going back to your first point, what's different now than in the past? I think absolutely the degree of sophistication of how you think about security issues has grown. It's grown with technology, because you have means to do things that you couldn't do before. So the realms of the struggle, of the tension, of the friction that exists, it goes well beyond the conventional arms and things that we normally count. Let's call them the industrial age metrics of how we think about power. And so those are all still there. In fact, they're there for a long time to come. We built our defense establishment around them, but add to that these 21st century capabilities of cyber, what we're now increasingly doing in space, which is growing rapidly. And these are now added to the deck, if you will, of things that can be done. And in many ways, much more powerful. And so I think you see the adaptability of the field of competition as spreads beyond the mere physical and, again, traditional terms of the use of force to areas that are now virtual, the manipulation of elections, the loss of trust. Think about the fundamentally how you really get at an adversary or someone that you're really competing with. And if you really want to do damage to them, you try to break down the trust that these democratic systems are based on. And that's a very powerful thing to try to unwind. It's ethereal. It's hard to grasp, right? And then we're grappling with it. And I have confidence, actually, we're going to figure this out. We have to. But it's part of the 21st century and how the struggle, the friction is playing out. So what you're seeing now, you know, I had the privilege to attend the Indo-Hacom change of command just last Friday, and the Secretary of Defense, Austin was there speaking. And he talked about some, you know, he really did a wonderful job of recapping the world we live in. And his comment was, you know, I just finished the last two decades of my life, you know, working, fighting, you know, the last of the old style wars, referring to Afghanistan and so forth. And he says, you know, we're in a new age now, we really need to think, we need to adapt and not kid ourselves or even be surprised at the level of competition that we're seeing and the use of these new technologies, information, misinformation, disinformation, cyber and all these tools. So in the end, what you're hearing in policy statements, and I believe this is very correct and appropriate, you know, we need moving forward in a world characterized by friction that's not going to go away among great powers that are openly competing. But you look to cooperate wherever you can, right? I mean, you cooperate where you can. David just talked about some of those areas and they're there. There are absolute areas of mutual interest. But at the same time, you're cognizant that you've got to compete wherever required and then confront where you must. We're our own core values and red lines. And then in the end, the Defense Department's mission, of course, is to be ready when passed to fight and win. So that's the whole spectrum. It's a continuum of all the notes on the keyboard you have to be able to play, right? And to be compelling and to turn to the big part of that. And he mentioned the notion of integrated deterrence. That we need to move past this, you know, often many practitioners have thought about, well, they're strategic deterrents. This is only the clear things. Well, no, it's more Yes, it is. But what lessons can we learn to apply to China? Because China is not the same kind of situation. How would you differentiate our, you know, need to plan good foreign policy with Russia as with China? Is it different, right? Absolutely. I think, again, the Cold War is often brought up as a reference point. Big difference, of course, is there was not a degree of economic integration that we see, of course, now with the US and China and Russia, for that matter, but especially China. And you look at the capacity that China brings to the table in terms of population, some resources, but, you know, but it's mostly about this massive manpower and ability to build an economy rather quickly with help, by the way. And under a post World War II order that was conducive to their growth, which is an important point to remind others that criticize, you know, the narrative perhaps that they're somehow trodden upon and they've been taking advantage of. Well, it's hard to believe that these days. You know, we had a show, David, last week about one Belt One Road. And, you know, there are various cardists, quite a few various cardists by land and by sea and also by the Arctic. And the one in the Arctic, if not the one across Russia to Europe, they both assume and spring out of a kind of axis between Russia and China. How real is that? Is that a true long term alliance? Or are they just sort of fair weather friends? You know, about 15 years ago, a former US policy makers told me the Chinese and Russian economies are incompatible. We shouldn't worry about them forming certainly not an alliance, but even any form of cooperation that will, you know, basically create trouble for the United States and its allies. I think this is still true to in many ways. And we heard a few weeks ago the Russian Prime Minister very clearly say that he would not conclude an alliance with the Chinese. That said, since the early 1990s, the cooperation between the Russians and the Chinese has never stopped increasing. And over the past 10 years, in particular, what we're seeing or what we've seen is growing cooperation in the security area, more than in the diplomatic forums or in economic and so on and so forth. We see cooperation, for instance, the Russians are helping the Chinese develop early warning systems. And so I'm sure they don't like each other. And I've heard, particularly in Russia, you know, not nice words about the Chinese, but they agree when it comes to confronting the United States. And they both see the United States as, you know, a competitor, an adversary, whatever word you want to use, but they agree on this. And therefore, it might be an axis of convenience, but it's an axis nonetheless. And from Washington's perspective, I think, unfortunately, this is something that we need to worry about. So going to the question I was asking Bob, too, we have to deal differently with them. That's the better part of human relations. Everybody is different, and you have to deal differently. So to the extent we have one approach that Tony Blinken expressed to deal with Russia, what about dealing with China? That's another kettle of fish, isn't it? How do we deal with them? So, you know, many people who have been talking about basically allying with Russia to confront China, that's not going to work for the reasons I've talked about, and also because simply the Russians are not interested. How do we deal with China? Well, first of all, I think we need to understand China better. I think that the Secretary of Defense was right when he characterized China as the facing threat, quote unquote, of the United States. And we basically have to make better priorities. You know, from my perspective, getting out of Afghanistan is actually a good move. Now, that said, doing less somewhere doesn't mean that we will automatically do more elsewhere. But I think that basically prioritizing China is something that the US government as a whole needs to do. That doesn't mean necessarily launching a Cold War against China. But it means taking China seriously because it has more than just military, growing military power. It's got power across the board. And this is something that we frankly not used to. Even during the Cold War, the Soviet Union was much, much weaker economically. And so we need to take China seriously. And you know, former Ambassador to Russia talked about the fact that with Russia, it's no longer a Cold War, it's a hot piece. And I think frankly, it's the same thing with China. It's not going to be a Cold War. It's going to be we're heading for trouble. But it's big trouble because China is big. That said, again, there are areas where we can cooperate. I mean, I know right now it's not very popular to say that. But I actually think that we need to talk about crisis management. We should talk about climate change. We should talk about non-proliferation because basically these issues are not issues that the United States or any other country for that matter can address alone. And so we distrust the Chinese. They distrust us. But we have to find a way to work with them however frustrating it might be. One of the troublesome things about the challenge to Tony Blinken and Joe Biden is that when we tell them do something, and by the way, our tariffs are still in place, the tariffs that Donald Trump put in over a period of years during his administration is still in place. There's been no rolling back of those tariffs in the Biden administration. No plan to roll them back, I guess for reasons that are pretty sophisticated. In any event, what gets in the way is in the meeting that Tony Blinken had with the Chinese, his Chinese counterpart, he said, you know, you're doing some things over there that we really can't agree with. You know, Xinjiang, human rights, what you're doing in Hong Kong, you know, and your style about taking over the South China Sea, all that stuff. This is a problem for us. And, you know, you cut it out. And the response from his counterpart was, don't tell us what to do. You know, you got the last ones to talk about racial prejudice. You're the last ones to talk about fragmentation. You're the last ones to talk about our efforts to quote, retrain people who are not following the system. Because in fact, you know, you guys are in bad shape. And so we can't take advice from you. Now this undermines, you know, our negotiating position, doesn't it? Well, I mean, if I may, I'm most definitely, but I mean, I categorically, you know, deny that narrative, which is a typical Chinese narrative that takes its small issues and then takes plates number one, or then takes way out of context. In every single case of the things that we're having a problem with what China is doing, it's where there are gross violations of international norms. And so the normal quick response is, well, this is our personal business, we've claimed this area is now an internal matter because they've, you know, declared. However, it doesn't change the facts that it is contrary to international norms. And this goes also for, you know, how they're treating people in ethnic groups, the deprivation of liberty and incarceration and the whole gamut. And so going back to how you deal with China, this is a large country with significant capabilities that has to be taken extremely seriously, just as David mentioned. And so to do that, you have to be consistent, you have to be coherent in your approach. And it has to be fully integrated, meaning all in. So it's not just whole of government getting all the agencies and departments aligned. It's also whole of nation. And then go beyond that. Don't stop there. It's whole of allies, partners, and like-minded. Because in the end of what we're up against here, and part of this friction that's really enduring, is it's not just episodic small things about an island dispute or island building, or claiming territories, or other such conduct. It's about a rejection of an international order that was built collectively. And this makes it global business. So a typical Chinese response will be, well, no, this is my internal, because I've said so. And we say, well, no, that's not the case, because it affects all of us. And it goes beyond the region. And in fact, these are international norms. They're not even regional norms. They're bigger than that. So these are important. And in order to enforce that or to show, or give the weight of that argument, you need the power of allies, partners, like-minded. And so again, the rest of this narrative, and it's really pretty well articulated in the term free and open Indo-Pacific, and that's a really good narrative, by the way. There's nothing objectionable in that. There's no territory grabs in there for the US. These are shared values. It's eminently reasonable. And it's a very powerful thing. And I'd add, lastly, that it's, again, the counter narrative would be, oh, you're trying to contain us. And it's no. It's more about advocacy for those things that we all collectively the world hold dear and work together to build. Come join us. Come be a part of that. It can evolve, but it needs to be all of us and not done through coercion. That's the narrative. And the coherence of that message is a mission of the State Department. So to kind of cut to the chase, what do we need to do better? What do we need to improve upon? It's the coherence of that message coming through, loud and clear. And this is, democracies are messy. We're a carnival of sorts, but that's also a source of power because it makes us less brutal. We're messy from the get-go. And authoritarian organizations, certainly, they have coherence built in. So a very sharp message. It's very consistent, but it's not unbeatable because often it can be brittle and it's overreach. It can be proven wrong and then it collapses. But again, thoughts on the approach. I think your point about developing or redeveloping alliances is really important. David, isn't it so that the key to dealing with both Russia and China is to develop or redevelop alliances with multiple nations and create multilateral experiences for the world to bring the world together, but then to be the good guy for everybody. And if we can do that, we're way ahead. Now, the thing about it so far, China has ignored global norms. Look at the South China Sea and that lawsuit in the Hague, which it lost and then ignored. And Russia is ignoring all the norms in Ukraine and so forth. So it seems to me that the key here is to reestablish, and we lost some ground here during the last administration, to reestablish our relationships with the EU and everyone, to be more active in the United Nations, to be more active in United Nations affiliates. And be the guy who created the New World Order after World War II, who participated in developing this consensus that we have enjoyed for all these years. But how do you do that? Well, my reference point is Putin's speech in, I think, 2014 when he said, new rules or a world without rules. So it was very clear that either you change the system or it's going to be basically whatever we decided it's going to be. And so I think the way to do that is exactly what you said is that we need the coalition of allies, partners, and we need to invest a lot more in existing multilateral organizations and possibly also develop new ones to try and sort of defend the system that certainly has benefited us, but also many others. And so if we can do that, then we cannot think, establish some form of return to normalcy when it comes to international order. And then this is true for Russia, this is true for China, where I think it's going to be, it's going to be a little difficult is to do so with China, because again, China is a much bigger power and a number of countries are very dependent on the Chinese economy and therefore reluctant to engage or to take on China by being a little bit more, by doing more pushback. But I don't think it's impossible. I think that it's fairly reasonable to expect, again, as Bob mentioned, respect for a number of rules and norms because we can't really function in a system of 193 countries if we don't have common rules. Yeah. One last question, Bob, and it's a hard one. I'm warning you now. Okay. During the past four years, the government, such as it is, at least two out of, well, I'd say three out of the three branches, didn't fully recognize the importance of having good foreign policy and good international relations. And we lost ground. Okay. Now, Joe Biden is hopefully trying to mend that, but it seems to me that Congress has to go along, as it has to go along with other positive initiatives that he's trying to adopt for the country. And it would seem to me that although the President and the Secretary of State have a lot of authority here and a lot of opportunity here, you ultimately have to have the Congress and especially the Senate behind you. Because if you don't do that, if they just hunker down and say, we don't agree with the President on anything, that leaves us with a problem on foreign policy, on foreign relations. So how do we fix that? Well, I think, I mean, yeah, that's really a softball question, thanks, Joe. So in the end, it goes back to how I thought about my job here at Pacific Forum. I'm not being cute with that answer. What we're nonpartisan, that we declare ourselves as that, because I really believe deep down that this notion of international security, national security really transcends politics. Of course, I'm not naive that how you choose to pursue different paths takes on political implications, of course. But the larger consensus of a direction of strategy is a very, can be, if it's written properly, a unifying theme. Let me add that amongst all the tumult, if you will, the last several years, there's actually been a remarkable consensus among the parties in our external foreign policy, not everywhere, but a general sense of agreement on our situation with China and Russia in terms of this notion of great power competition, and the need to really lean into this as an entire country, as a whole of nation. And you're right, it's a whole of nation. It's beyond whole of government, all three branches, it's whole of nation allies and partners, as I mentioned, and the need for coherence. And I think that transcends politics. And so that's my fundamentally, it's in all of our interests, not every decision, not every comment, not every press conference need be a political event, or a zero sum exchange, where was someone scoring a point, absolutely. There are elements, you know, politics, you know, stops at the edge of the border. Now that's an ideal, hard to attain precisely, but it is an ideal that doesn't, that makes a lot of sense in the end, it's in our national interest. Absolutely, amen to that. Okay, well, why don't we give you the last word, David? You can add to what Bob was talking about, you can say anything you want in your moment of elevation here. You know, I, let me put it this way, I, okay, so here goes. I have a book out this month. And so I'm going to make a shameless plug for it, where I talk about the need to actually engage China on the nuclear aspect of things. And we need to actually think of China as a global power, and consider other nations and how we can shape the US-China nuclear relationship by taking into account other powers, be it North Korea, South Asia, India in particular, as well as US allies. And so I guess my final word is, this is a good book. Okay, I don't know if you have it with you, but if you do, maybe you can read us a few sentences from it so we can feel the strength of your prose. I, you know, unfortunately, haven't received it yet, but it's on its way, so it will be out very soon. Okay, where can we find it? You need to read up on this. It's published by Lynn Reiner, and I was told that the official publication date was May 3rd, but again, I haven't received it, but I'm told it's out since Monday. Okay, well, I hope you'll come back on our show and talk about that book, and we can drill down on the points you make there, and the steps to follow in this very difficult time of reasserting ourselves on the global stage. And Bob, all the best to you, but I know that they have internet on the East Coast. I know this for a moral certainty, and I know we can catch you on Zoom just exactly in the same way. So I hope you'll let us do that. I'd be delighted, I'd be delighted to, Jay, thanks for the opportunity to chat today and talk about some pretty important topics. Thank you very much. Thank you, Bob Jurier and David Santoro. Thanks for this specific forum. Thank you so much for joining us today. Aloha. Thank you, Jay.