 Thank you for coming. I apologize to people who have to stand that we don't have more seats but we very much appreciate your being here. I'm Michael Green, Senior Vice President for Asia at CSIS and Japan Chair and a Professor at Georgetown. And we're joined today by a distinguished group of members of the National Diet of Japan representing three of the major parties, the Liberal Democratic Party, the Democratic Party of Japan and New Comey. And we have an opportunity today to go into more detail about the defense guidelines, collective self-defense, and the issues that were highlighted earlier this week by the 2 plus 2 meeting between US and Japanese foreign and defense officials and by the summit meeting between Prime Minister Obama and President Prime Minister Abe and President Obama and then of course the congressional presentation. So we've divided into two panels and I will moderate this first panel and then my friend Sunohara-san from Nikkei will moderate the second panel. This panel will focus on the domestic politics and the homework Japan has now because many of the agreements that were discussed this week have to be put into law. And as I understand it, those laws will be submitted in about two weeks. So we're going to learn about what might happen when the rubber hits the road, when these US-Japan agreements and announcements are put to the vote in the diet. And I'm going to ask my colleagues about the domestic political context, how each of their parties views the new defense reforms and related legislation and also ask what it means for relations with other countries in Asia. Do those countries have adequate understanding of what this means? Are there opportunities for expanding cooperation with neighboring countries? So those are the themes we'll cover in this panel. And in the next panel, Sunohara-san would be joined by Professor Kitoka and Professor Morimoto to talk about the policy and strategy trajectory overall for the alliance going forward. So I'm joined by some of the most important members of the diet who will in fact be on point shepherding or attacking this legislation as it moves forward. All very strong supporters of the US-Japan alliance and the US-Japan relationship. Takashi Iwai to my right is a member of the House of Representatives from the LDP and a leading figure in the foreign affairs and defense committees of the party and the diet. Seiji Maihara, this is the list here. So Seiji Maihara, former foreign minister under the Democratic Party of Japan government, a member of the House of Representatives. And Onodera-san, Itsunori Onodera, former minister of defense under the Abe cabinet and a senior member of the LDP and the diet. And Akihi-san Nagashima, former national security advisor and vice defense minister under the Noda cabinet of the Democratic Party of Japan and prominent member and leader on those issues now on the diet. And Isamu Ueda, a veteran of the lower house of the diet, a member of New Komei and a key opinion leader on foreign affairs defense issues in particular. So we have really the best group we could assemble in Washington to begin to understand what will happen next or not, at least understand what the different views on for what should happen next. And I'd like to open up by asking first about the legislative process and the politics of collective self-defense of the new defense guidelines in Nagata-cho, in the diet and in Japan. And let me start first with Iwayasan, who will have a key role in shepherding some of this legislation through to tell us what the LDP's view is and what some of the political considerations are within Japan. I am Takeshi Iwaya from the LDP. Prime Minister Abe just made a address to the joint session of Congress. It's only been a couple of days at this moment to be able to come to CSIS and participate in a seminar such as this. In the afterglow of the Prime Minister's visit, it's something that I'm most pleased about. This opportunity was made possible by Mr. Sunohara of Nikkei and President Hamri of CSIS and others and donors. My gratitude to you all. Within the LDP, for a long time, I was the head of the study committee on security. At present, the security legislation to be delivered in the diet with the coalition partner, the Komeito, I have been in these coordinating talks. We're pretty much in agreement, but I have participated in those talks. There's not much time. Prime Minister Abe, what has he done in order to shore up our security structure? The guidelines, vision, security legislation, is this the very first thing that we'd know over two years? We have done various things, taken various measures in order to strengthen our security structure. First of all, we created a national security council for the first time in Japan, and we created a national security strategy. And the key word in it is proactive contributions to peace. Based on this strategy, the national defense program guidelines, which are created every 10 years, we revised them. And then the midterm defense program, which is created every five years, we also revised them. So it's not much, but we did increase our defense budget by 1.8 percent. And then the three principles on the export of arms. We created in their place three principles for the transfer of weapons. And this attempt had begun in the Democratic Party of Japan administration. But what we have done is to go about making the rules more clear. It was quite a domestic debate that surrounded this, but we also passed the law on the protection of special secrets. Based on all of this, finally, we will go about creating our security legislation, which will secure all of these things. Professor Kitawaka and others advise the government. And so based on that discussion on security legislation, we have been making preparations. And we want to make seamless legislation. When we talk about the U.S.-Japan guidelines, there's cooperation in peacetime. And then there are situations that could have a serious effect on Japan and then U.S.-Japan cooperation in that context. And then situations that threaten international peace. And U.S.-Japan cooperation happens then. And stepping it up further, there is U.S.-Japan cooperation in the face of an armed attack against Japan. Even if Japan is not directly attacked, if there's attack on the United States, a very serious effect could be exerted on Japan. And then we would have different cooperation for that and then cooperation in disasters. So we want to create legislation that can cover all of these situations seamlessly. And based on the draft that we have been coordinating with the Komeito, we'd like to submit legislation to the diet in mid-May. As the Prime Minister said in his speech, it's just a target. But we would really like to have the legislation passed by this summer. What is the purpose of all this? It's to strengthen deterrents. But people sometimes criticize Prime Minister Abe as moving too far to the right or being perhaps militaristic. I would say rather that he is being very realistic and balanced. The security environment surrounding Japan has shifted dramatically based on that strengthening and maintaining deterrents is extremely realistic, I think. I think that this is the sort of approach that any party taking power would likely take. I am concerned, though, that in the U.S. there might be maybe slightly too high expectations. And in neighboring countries, there might be too much concern. So I do worry about that. So we will have to explain carefully to get understanding from the international community. I'll leave it at that for now. Thank you very much. The last point is an interesting one because the temptation is to say this is a great historic change, but it's not really so great in historic. It is certainly historic in the context of U.S.-Japan relations. The proposal to review and revise the defense guidelines was made when DPJ was in power by Mr. Morimoto, who is Defense Minister. And the discussion on collective self-defense also began when you were in government. Is this legislation and this process, is this moving in the direction that you anticipated? What do you think the views will be in Japan when the Prime Minister comes home and has to convince people to support this in the diet? Good afternoon. Maihara from the DPJ. Next Foreign Minister Nagashima. I don't know if you'll actually be the next Foreign Minister, but next Foreign Minister is with me on the diet here. So I'll leave the expert-level discussion to him. We also have Koichiro Genba, former Foreign Minister, and Deputy CCS Fukuyama, and Kishimoto Shuhei, and Tamaki Yuichiro, who were in the Ministry of Finance. I'd just like to point them out. First of all, many thanks to Nikkei, CSIS, and the donors, my heartfelt gratitude. So Mr. Green has just said something, but let me give you some background on that. The guidelines were revised 18 years ago in 1997, but actually it was the Chizasa government the LDP, SDP, and Saki-gake coalition that had created the foundation for that, and I wasn't who we were involved in that. So what's slightly different this time? It's that we revised the guidelines in response to specific needs, mainly two. One, in 1994, North Korea was engaged in nuclear development, and there was an option of aerial bombardment. And how much could Japan cooperate with the United States? This was very behind the scenes, these consultations. So there were some specific requests that came to Japan very specifically since the end of the war. Our answer was that we could do nothing. So what North Korea could do might affect Japan in a life-or-death manner, and if our allies in the U.S. were to do something about it, Japan couldn't help at all. This became clear, and so that led to the law on situations in areas surrounding Japan, and cooperation in peacetime and in wartime, and situations in areas surrounding Japan. So we created those three pillars then. Another thing was that there was the Okinawa base issue. In 1995, there was a rape by a U.S. service member, and you know that the alliance is not symmetrical. Japan is not responsible for defending the United States when attacked, whereas the U.S. is responsible for defending Japan. Japan simply provides facilities in areas. So it's Article V and Article VI that are not symmetrical, but to reduce the burden of bases on Okinawa, the highest priority was returning Futema Air Station. In 1996, Ritaro Hashimoto, the Prime Minister of the time, in deciding the return of Futema Air Base, along with reducing the burden on Okinawa, he said that we should deepen U.S.-Japan cooperation in terms of action. It's been 18 years since then. The strategic environment has greatly changed. We have new guidelines and we're about to try to create new security legislation. I think it's important to do, but the present revision, was it really done in response to specific needs? I think that is very much open to question. So, Prime Minister Abe, I think, has told his staff, let's do everything that can be done. As Mr. Yuawa just said, we don't want the U.S. to have too high expectations. I am concerned about that as well. It's precisely because I think the U.S. Japan Alliance is important that I am concerned about that. I think there are three important things. One is needs. Is there really a need in the security legislation, collective self-defense, or protection of U.S. naval vessels in peacetime? Is there a need for that? Yes, I think so. But is everything that's being done right now in response to a specific need? I think that is open to question. Second, the capabilities and equipment and structure of the self-defense forces will, we actually be able to have them carry all of this out. I think that's very much open to question. The third point is the understanding of the public. I think that the term public diplomacy is very important, but diplomacy cannot be done without the understanding of the public. The law on situations in areas surrounding Japan is now being called the important effects law. It does away with the effect, with the regional element. But how do we define all these things? 18 years ago, we created the guidelines. What exact cooperation would we be able to do with the United States? There was an annex that showed this, but this hasn't been done this time either. And I think that that is creating a lot of anxiety among the public. I think that it's a big package that no one knows the details of what's in it, and it might raise expectations too much in the U.S., and it might actually hurt the U.S.-Japan alliance. And so I think that what needs to be done is to have a full debate in the diet about any possible issues. So we in our DPG government gave great importance to the U.S.-Japan alliance, that perspective had not changed at all. And it's because of our concerns about the sustainability of the alliance that we are mentioning these topics. Now, in the press, I saw that Prime Minister Abe said something like that the guidelines are directed at China and North Korea. If that's true, I think that's very much a problem. 18 years ago, let me add a bit. Actually, China and South Korea expressed concerns, so the United States had collapsed, the U.S.-Japan security alliance was no longer needed according to them. And even though that's the case, you're strengthening it. Are you going to direct this alliance at China or at South Korea? At the time, our government very carefully explained the purpose of our alliance. Now, if Prime Minister Abe said such a thing, I think that would be very much a diplomatic problem. Is that would not help the United States either, I don't think. I haven't checked this, but it's just what I saw in the press. We have to bear all this in mind, I think. The U.S.-Japan alliance is a vital relationship in order for our cooperation to progress. I think we have to carefully take the three steps that I mentioned earlier. And that's what I'd like to keep in mind as we discuss the guidelines and security legislations in the diet. Some people argue that these days the casting vote always comes to Kometo because of its position in the coalition. I won't ask you to make your casting vote, but wait a second. Can you tell us how these issues are viewed in your party and how you see them? You've worked on foreign policy and defense for at least 20 years by my count, so please. Thank you very much. First of all, I'm very honored to be able to give an opportunity to give my presentation at this distinguished guest. And I am the member of the House of Representatives belonging to Komete Party, as Mr. Green has mentioned. The Komete Party is in coalition with the Liberal Democratic Party and has been in coalition for 15 years now, except for the three years that we, both of us, were in the opposition. I have been a member of the discussion group of the coalition parties on reviewing and development of the security legislation mentioned by Mr. Iwaya. So I would like to comment on the outline of the security really, Bayles, that will be presented to the diet in the coming couple of weeks. The discussion group has met over 20 times since last April and has reached a basic consensus which was authorized as a cabinet decision in last July the 1st. The group has resumed the discussion this spring and has reached a de facto agreement on the contents of the necessary bills just this Monday. The basic principles that we share in the review of the security legislation is that, first, the pacifist policies under the constitution will be maintained and observed. That is, we strictly limit the use of military force to the defense of our country and will not exercise any form of force overseas, nor will dispatch the self-defense force for the purpose of exercising force. In order to ensure this principle or the use of weapons by the self-defense force will be strictly defined in control. Second, we will develop and maintain Japan's own defense capabilities based on its exclusively national defense-oriented policy, so what we call the Senshu Boe principle. And also, we will maintain and strengthen the deterrence provided by the alliance with the U.S. in the region. And finally, we will contribute proactively to peace and prosperity of the international community. Based on these principles, we have agreed on the revision of the related security legislation. Because of the limited time, we will not go into the details of each legislation. But I would like to make several comments, which I think is important for relations with the United States. First, we clarified the authority of the SDF to use weapons in order to protect U.S. forces and its assets for the purpose for protecting U.S. armed forces and their assets, which are engaged in activities contributing to the security of Japan. This measure by the SDF will be implemented under conditions which is not necessarily wartime. So this new clause that will be added to the SDF law is therefore not considered as an exercise of collective self-defense, but rather as a part of the SDF's police activities. And second, we would extend the logistic support and other non-combat activities in international cooperation by proposing a new bill so that the SDF could provide logistic support to U.S. and the multinational forces engaged in activities for ensuring peace and stability of the international community. And third, we would strengthen cooperation between SDF and U.S. forces in emergency situations. We would revise the current law of emergency situations in areas surrounding Japan, the so-called Shuhenji Daiko, to enable more effective support to U.S. forces engaged in activities contributing to peace and stability of Japan. And fourth is one of the controversial issues that is discussed in Japan, but we would allow a limited exercise of collective self-defense by altering the interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution which has been interpreted as prohibiting the exercise of collective self-defense force. The situation that we would allow exercise of collective self-defense will be limited to a situation, very strict limitation will be imposed. But as I've mentioned before, when the SDF force would be in protecting the U.S. forces which are in joint actions or when the SDF force is providing logistic support to the U.S. forces, there might be a situation that, of course, the situation that is being anticipated is non-combat, is a peacetime situation, but it could develop to a situation that could be an armament attack to one of the parties. In that case, in protecting, mutual protection might extend to be exercise of collective self-defense. Therefore, limited exercise of collective self-defense will be needed to fulfill our cooperation between the U.S. and Japan. These are the major points of this new legislation. Of course, there are more details that have to be covered, but they are the major points that I would like to make. Probably the bills will be presented in the coming couple of weeks and hope that we could be finalized by the end of this session. Thank you. Terrific. Thank you, Adelson. Let me turn to former Defense Minister Onodera. If you'd like to comment on what's been said so far, please do. But in particular, could you tell us about the regional dimension? You spent a lot of time as Defense Minister in defense diplomacy with your counterparts in Asia, and I think you'll have a real insight for us on how these changes are viewed in Asia and what Japan should do or can do going forward. Last summer, I gave a speech here at CSS as Defense Minister. Let me once again thank you for extending that opportunity to me. Looking at the audience, I think that there are a lot of DPJP, but also LDP. There's Mr. Nishimura, who is a future leader. Please keep your eyes on him. Up to now, listening to this discussion on security, I imagine that some of the audience might have difficulty following some of this argument. Even people in Japan have difficulty understanding it sometimes, and it's hard to explain it to people abroad. What I felt as Defense Minister was that Japan's security legislation is so complex. When we actually mobilize a unit, we always at every step of the way have to think about is this allowable, is it not allowable, and then it's really tough to actually command a unit. So many of the MOD employees are always thinking about legal issues, actually. But when you think about our duty to protect Japan, there are natural things that any country has to do. You have to protect your people, your territory, your seas. If you're attacked, you respond with the use of force to protect the country and the people. Also, the U.S. forces are cooperating in the defense of Japan. Because of that, together with the U.S. forces, we should protect various U.S. assets. This is nothing to be natural. Also, if the international community, if the U.N. makes a request, then various countries can come together. Then at the same level as other countries, or maybe at a slightly lower level, we should be able to make international contributions. It should be something that could we should do as a matter of course. But this was not the case, and that is the aim this time. As defense minister going to ASEAN countries, the ROK, China, meeting with defense officials myself, or my staff, or ministry of foreign affairs staff certainly explained all of these matters in a careful and thorough manner. And no problems were pointed out by the neighboring countries. It's basically Japan being responsible for Japanese policy. So that there's no misunderstanding, this legislation does not aim at a particular country or at a particular situation. In many situations, we have to be able to protect our country and our people. That's what this set of laws is supposed to do. When we make our defense equipment plans for the next 10 years, what kind of equipment will we procure? What kind of units will we create? We're always transparent about this. And before it's announced, we directly explain it to our neighbors, such as China and the ROK. Unfortunately, we can't do so to North Korea, but we're always open about this and give a careful, thorough explanation. What's the main reason? It's because this is a deterrence to protect our own country. Asia is now the center of global growth. And the U.S. economy and the European economy are also being helped by the economic growth in Asia. So it's very much in our interest to not see any incident in Asia, to see any conflict in Asia. For that purpose, to keep that from happening, we have to put in place necessary legislation and also put in place guidelines for cooperation between the U.S. and Japan, which we were able to do. It was my predecessor's defense minister, Mr. Morimoto, that proposed the upgrade of the guidelines. He was a DPJ minister, an LDP defense minister, but we have been consistent on defense policy. And the result of that was the just updated guidelines. This will strengthen the alliance, and the U.S. rebalance can only contribute to stability in Asia. And Asia's development can contribute to the U.S. economy. These are always our perspectives as defense officials. And as we go about explaining various issues to neighboring countries, we tell them that this is a domestic defense policy question in Japan. So I was never criticized by them for that. Thanks. Thank you. And last, let's turn to the next foreign minister. I'm not making an endorsement. That's his title. Thanks so much for this opportunity to speak. I'm the fifth panelist, so there are hardly any points to cover and hardly any time left. I came to Washington in July of last year. It's been about a year since I was here. And so we are still in the opposition, and that's kind of tough. But let me, in conclusion, say something that many of you may have heard very much. Mr. Marihara, I talked about the revision of the guidelines and that it was Minister Morimoto that proposed it in the first place. And as a vice minister, I came to Washington under his instructions and met with Ashton Carter, who was deputy secretary at the time and is now secretary of defense, and we reached agreement to move in that direction. So we do have quite a bit of responsibility for the current guidelines. What was our objective at the time? In the Asia Pacific region, peace, stability, and prosperity, we wanted to guarantee them over the long term, and we wanted to create a structure centered on the U.S. and Japan that would guarantee that. The U.S. rebalance policy and an increase in Japan's role were something that we wanted to pursue together. The rebalancing strategy of the U.S. is something that's often talked about. When it actually comes to implementation, it's a bit iffy. Is the emphasis shifting to Asia? Well, look at the chaos in the Middle East. There's trouble in the Ukraine. In Ukraine, there's a lot of focus on Iran. The U.S. forward press that's in Asia is something we have to take advantage of. It's good for the U.S. It's good for the countries of Asia. It is the most desirable outcome, as a matter of fact. The U.S. has had a hub and spoke approach centered on the U.S. So there was a U.S. Japan spoke, a U.S. ROK spoke, a U.S. Singapore, U.S. Australia, U.S. The Philippines spoke with the U.S. at the hub, like the wheel on a car. That's been the model. But the burden on the hub on the United States financially is great, and also in terms of operationally. So it keeps the U.S. at the hub, but the different spokes, such as the Philippines, the ROK, the Vietnam, Australia. So instead of having a bunch of lines, we would have a surface. I've called it host region support. So each country would have host nation support to support the U.S. forward presence. But I call it host region support for the region as a whole to work together. And I think that's the direction that the new guidelines are aimed at. And Japan wants to play a central role in that. In implementing it, what is the effort that lacks the most right now? It's how we manage Japan-ROK relations. Two days ago, Prime Minister Abe addressed Congress. And it's been very favorable received in Washington, the speech, I think. And I listened to it on the radio, and I also watched it later on YouTube. He was gesturing grandly and so forth. But I think that it sent out a pretty good message. But only the South Koreans were quite tough in their criticism. So how do we manage Japan-ROK relations? In mid-June, I believe that President Park is going to visit. And the U.S. has given a lot of advice. I think about improving relations. I hear Mike is on his way to Korea. The next month and a half for Japan and the ROK and the U.S. will be an important time for managing trilateral relations, I believe. Prime Minister Abe gave such a speech in the U.S. We're going to be debating security legislation in Japan. Within that context, we have to solidify relations between Japan and South Korea. And so move away from hub and spoke to a more of a plainer host region support. I'm in opposition now. And so I would really want to see a tough debate on this in the diet. But as to the overall direction, we are on the same page. Nagashima-san first wrote this proposal for host regional support when we were together at Council on Foreign Relations 17 years ago. And the rest of the world is starting to catch up, finally, to that idea. Sunohara-san has given me some extra time so we can take a few questions from the audience. And I believe we have microphones. So please raise your hand and if you have a question. And if not, I will. But we'd welcome questions from the floor. Let me ask you a question then. Maihara-san said, like Nagashima-san, that the opposition parties, at least the DPJ shares the direction and the goal of these new defense guidelines, but had three concerns, whether the mission really fit the needs, whether the self-defense forces really had the capabilities, and then, of course, winning support from the public. So I'd like to ask our LDP colleagues, beginning with Iwai-san, how do you think you can address these concerns in either the legislation or in implementation going forward? Before we talk about the guidelines, the purpose of the security legislation, how did we set this up? As I mentioned earlier, all conceivable situations we want to be able to deal with. And that's what's needed in creating legislation. You don't try to look at possibility and so forth. So even cases that probably never happen have to be included in what you contemplate in creating seamless legislation. It's important for Japan's crisis management. So based on that, for example, U.S.-Japan exercises, I think their content is going to change in the future. Through those sorts of things, the U.S.-Japan alliance will become stronger, I think, and we'll have to show that to the international community. The alliance's deterrence will be enhanced, and as Mr. Onder said, this will contribute to the peace and stability of Asia and of the world even more so than up to now. Both Japan and the U.S.-Japan alliance will do so. That's what we were thinking about in preparing this draft legislation. It's true that the self-defense forces might lack capabilities in certain areas right now. But we have to come to complete all possible scenarios, and I think that we can coordinate with the United States to bring up our capabilities at the current point. Does the self-defense forces have power projection? Capability? Well, there are a lot of things that we can't do right now. But within the capability that we do have, how do we contribute to the stability of the region and of the world? That's the perspective from which we approached preparing the draft. For Japan, exercise force would only be when our security was seriously affected or threatened. It's limited to that. This law, this legislation does not at all allow use of force in any other situations. So neighboring countries and the international community will receive thorough explanations of this from us. As to building up the self-defense forces capabilities, I think that it's at quite a good level. Now, we have various new piece of equipment, and they can, it's normal for them to be connected to the equipment of other countries. For example, Japanese radar can contribute to missile defense systems of other countries, and missile defense systems of Aegis ships are connected across different national forces. It's not just one country or one ship that is protecting us. The basic way of doing it is that always this is being done as a team. That's also part of our legislation. So the US ships that are protecting Japan, for example, under certain conditions, the self-defense forces will be able to protect them. And of course, that is something that directly affects Japan's security. So we have contemplated all those cases in creating the draft legislation, and it's also closely linked to the new US-Japan guidelines. So the new guidelines have a lot more connectivity contemplated. I see these new guidelines in that light. We've taken enough time from the next panel. So let me conclude by just saying that in 2000, Rich Armitage, Jonai, and a number of us issued a report. And one of the things we said is the era of gaiatsu, of external pressure, is over. And if you look at the decision on collective self-defense, the defense guidelines, these are issues the US has a strong national interest in and has been discussing for many, many decades. But this most recent iteration was generated in Japan by the Democratic Party of Japan and then by the Abe government. And one thing we should never forget is that the strength of our alliance is our common democratic value system. And the people support is necessary, is indispensable for our alliance. And everybody at this table is working hard and will be working hard to get that support and to explain and adjust so that the Japanese people are confident in this decision. And in the US, we have to respect that. And we also have to really appreciate that you explained to us some of the issues that will come up. So please join me in thanking our panel and then we'll invite the next panel up. Just one more point on the understanding of the public. The security debates in the past differ from the recent debate and that we have more and more of the Japanese public that are forward-looking on defense issues. It just shows how much the Japanese public has a deep interest in security matters. And through the deliberations in the diet between the parties in power and the opposition, I think that this public understanding will be deepened. I'm just running out and let me start quickly. My name is Tsuyoshi Tsunohara. I'm sitting down here not as a Nikkei Washington correspondent, something like that, working for Nikkei newspaper, but as a secretary general for the US-Japan project at JSA, Japan Center for Economic Research. So I'd like to make a correction. Nikkei is not associated with this kind of initiative. Nikkei is just one of the sponsors for this new initiative, which we call Mount Fuji Dialogue, which was launched last year to enhance intellectual exchange and dialogues between American experts, Japanese friends. And this delegation from Japan very much distinguished people from LDP and Komei Party as well as DPJ are formed as a team under the name of this Mount Fuji Dialogue. So now having said that, I'd like to introduce my Japanese mentor, Dr. Kitaoka and Dr. Morimoto. And there are unspoken consensus between me and Dr. Kitaoka when you are in Rome, do as Romans do, which means this is Washington DC and we are supposed to speak in English. But I see many familiar faces and friends from Japan and Japanese faces. So let me speak from this point in Japanese and to American friends, would you please listen to our very capable interpreters that are back there. So we've had some politicians and friends discussing various issues, but I'd like to talk about if you see the, in soccer terms, the two top oisemen, shall we say, are professors Kiroga and Morimoto. And so I would like to have these oisemen talk about the recent security environment and the guidelines and the upcoming security legislation. So Professor Kiroga, please. It's really tough that I'm not allowed to speak in English. The MoFuji Dialogue, I think, has a great significance in that academics, politicians, and businessmen come together in Japan and not just politicians from one party. That would have been impossible 20 years ago, even 10 years ago. We didn't yet have a DPJ. So Maraha Nagashiva-san had not yet had the experience of government. So I think that was great to be able to have such a bipartisan participation. If people from the U.S. came, we used to have bipartisan breakfast and so forth, but I was really glad about this MoFuji Dialogue. Now a lot has already been covered. Let me take a different perspective. And it comes up in the press once in a while, constitutional revision. People are concerned about possible revision. Why is that? I think that revising the Constitution is actually a... It's the first right of a democratic people. So people that are against any revision, I think are totalitarians. They're not democratic. Second, concerns are being expressed even in the U.S. and I'm not happy about that either. Why? This constitution was designed to punish Japan six months after the end of the world, so that Japan would never again become a dangerous country. It's against international law and it's against the Potsdam Declaration for an occupying power to create a constitution, but there were several issues and let me deal with them. In spite of that, I think that our current constitution is much better than the imperial constitution. The symbolic imperial household and so forth and the parliamentary system and so forth, but there are problems such as Article 9. Many Japanese have misunderstanding too, but Article 9 has two sections. One mustn't resolve international conflicts with force peacefully. Some politicians are kind of odd and oppose that, but most people think it's just normal. If you oppose that, then you would have to renounce membership in the UN. So Article 9 paragraph 1 is not challenged by anyone. It's important. The problem is the second part of Article 9 is to not have armed forces, but Japan actually started with its police reserve and in 1954 we reached the interpretation that it is possible to have a minimal amount of armed forces prepared. But when we talk about revising the constitution, I'm rather moderate, but they talk about them as people that are trying to change Article 9 which is designed to keep the peace or something like that, the pacifistic article. And I think that to describe people's position that way cannot be forgiven as an academic. So it's Article 9 paragraph 2 that needs to be changed. It's not hardly anyone that would talk about Article 9 paragraph 1. It's important for even the Japanese people to understand this point. Looking at the Japanese media, it's not just they are not very clear about international relations. This also goes for history. I'm working on looking back at the 20th and 21st century in order to create the 21st century. I am the acting chair for this. I can't remember the full name of this group. One of the things I'm working on, but in the pre-war era, Japan challenged the international order with force. It was a huge error and it didn't work. We tried to increase our territory by force. And since we went in the wrong direction, there were others that opposed that and wanted to keep the international order. But post-war, Japan has benefited from free trade and open economies. So we can trade truly. Force cannot be used to solve disputes. I think that's a really important system. And I think that's the most important thing about Japan is that you don't solve disputes by force. And we'll keep a free, open economic system. That's allowed Japan to develop. But if we develop this much, then we have to start upholding the order. We used to be a challenger to the order and we have to reflect on that and rather move to make efforts to support the order. I think that is the biggest point in this current legislation is about how much time I have. We don't have much time, so I'll stop there. Right now in the beginning, I mentioned that I am a public social foundation. So that was good. So please, Mr. Morimoto. Now at 18, he went to the defense university and was responsible for defense matters, not just as an academic. And Article 5 talks of our treaty, talks about areas under the administration of Japan being an attack to our threat to peace and security. And the meaning, significance of the U.S.-Japan alliance is that Japan is responsible for Japan's defense, but Japan is not responsible for the defense of the U.S. It's lopsided. It's amazing that such a treaty was concluded, I always thought. But then I entered the security division of MOFA and learned about how weighty Article 6 was. So Article 5 is the U.S. protecting Japan, but Article 6 is Japan providing facilities in areas. It's in return for that. So it's sharing the pain, shall we say. One makes up for the other. And I thought to myself, aha, so that's how the treaty was set up, and I really felt that strongly. And it was my life's work ever since then to deal with these matters. We're not close to an equal partnership, but, and why is that? Under international law, the exercise of collective self-defense, the UN Charter of Article 51 outlines the right to collective self-defense. We can't exercise that right in the same conditions as other countries. So when you think about those two things, we're pretty close to an equal partnership, but from the U.S. perspective, the U.K. and NATO allies are at a different level than Japan is, for example, as Mr. Iwaya said earlier. You know, the right of collective self-defense committee exercise only for the defense of Japan. If we wanted to do full-scale collective self-defense, we would have to revise the Constitution. That is what the Legal Affairs Bureau person is saying. I'm thinking that we're maybe about halfway there. It's been pretty much improved, and the U.S.-Japan alliance is in a new stage. We have turned a page. I don't know how much life there is yet to live, but I'd like to keep making efforts to do the other half. And I think that's how I see this set of new guidelines. For Japan to voluntarily revise its Constitution and truly become a nation that can exercise the right to collective self-defense, I've never felt that the U.S. should try to force this. It's rather that the U.S. wanted a lot of logistical support, such as refueling, transport. Those are the sorts of things that the U.S. expressed interest in. And so domestically, we had a debate on CSD and have always answered no to U.S. requests. In the previous panel, it was talked about that we hope that the U.S. doesn't think that Japan is now able to fully exercise the right to CSD. I am slightly concerned about that, too, because it's not the case. It's under limited conditions. Under those limited conditions, we can provide rather broad support, but it's not the same sort of CSD as is widely practiced by other countries under international law. We're not yet there. So we very much hope that this will be correctly understood abroad. We hope that excessive expectations based on our wrong interpretation will not result in disappointment by the U.S. We're glad that Japan has finally made it this far, and we hope that that feeling will be shared. And so my immediate goal is to see cooperation done along those lines under the new guidelines. How do we strengthen lines? How do we increase our defensive capability? That's not all there is to talk about. When you think about the U.S. rebalance, it's not just the U.S. Japan. It's the U.S.-Japan Australia, U.S.-Japan India, U.S.-Japan ROK. Trilateral or multilateral cooperation can be harnessed with the U.S., Japan, and Japan at the core taking leadership to contribute to the security of the region. The U.S. and Japan will not do everything alone. We would like to have as many partners as possible with countries that share our values, getting them closer to our shores with the U.S. and Japan as at the center. With, first of all, trilateral with countries such as the ROK, Australia, and India. And then the ASEAN countries and other countries are countries we would like to try to make efforts to bring them as close as possible to our shores. These guidelines do represent a new stage that allows greater than ever before cooperation by Japan. And I think it's an epoch-making step that we haven't seen for 50 years. Thank you very much. In the beginning I mentioned, but this time we have initiated Mount Fuji Dialogue. As Dr. Kataoka said, not only academics, but also bureaucracies and some other political circles, we want you to convey the Japanese voice to the United States and allies. The message is we are committed to the promotion of alliance, and that is not only for Japan, but for the region and the world, and promote safe and stability. So that is why we have secured the collaboration from the economic business circles. So Mr. Mayhara, Mr. Genba, Mr. Onodera, and other people, Mr. Nagashima, all joined in the same team. And there are American participants and Japanese participants, also some other represented from other countries. But especially, I'd like to emphasize to the Japanese audience that some of you may feel kind of awkward because Japan is now being built as a kind of shifting towards the left, right. But however, that is not the reality. And Mr. Kataoka and Mr. Morimoto, both respectively giving very important advisors for the Democratic Party and also LDP. Starting at this point, I'd like to hear your questions from the audience. As many questions as possible we'd like to receive. So those who would like to ask a question, please raise your hand and wait for the mic and also mention your affiliation and then give a question, please. Thank you. I'm Li Boliu, the voice of America. Americans have fought two major wars recently. Have the American Japanese thought about the, perhaps the possibility that Americans may not come to Japan's aid if Senkaku is under attack? If the Japanese lawmakers do not move aggressively to pass the necessary legislation by the summer. Thank you. I'm Yamakoshi, sorry to be from Kei Danren. I'm not a security aspect, so it's rather basic my question. But you were criticizing the press coverage, but I think that the press were probably thinking about what the public consciousness was. So I think the problem is the understanding of the public in the first place, which the press is catering to. So your leadership, how do we carry that down to the people so that the tone of the press will be changed? What do you think about that? I'm Stanley Kober. Yesterday the Chinese Defense Ministry announced that it would be sending three warships to the Mediterranean to hold exercises with the Russian Navy. Are we now seeing the emergence of two global alliances? Thank you. Let me start with the Senkakus. They are Japan's inherent territory, historically, legally, no room for doubt. In 1971, China claimed the Senkaku, and they've always started ships of approach. Especially in 2010, I was the Defense Minister, but now it's because the Coast Guard was nationalized. But it's not really it was starting September 14th, two and a half years ago. Ever since then, three or four government ships come once a week near the line and once a month into our territorial waters. In November of 2013, they created the ADIZ. Airplanes have started to come in recent, and we have responded with scrambles last fiscal year, starting April 1st, last year to March 31st of this year. It was more than 460 times. So China is trying to take the similar sequence that they took in the South China in the Senkakus. Starting with fishermen and armed fishermen, and they'll be backed up with government ships and naval ships supporting them, giving them food, medicine, and to try to create a de facto occupation. If that were happened, our Coast Guard and police are patrolling our territory. But even if they were to come, it would not be considered as the use of force. So would we respond with police forces? There would be cases where the self-defense forces would go, but not by using force. We would use the self-defense forces for policing activities. In this case, they would not be doing activities for the defense of Japan. If they were actually attacked with force, then Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan alliance would be activated. It's very encouraging that the U.S. has said that this applies, but the process that goes up to there, primarily, it is Japan's unique responsibility to protect our own territory. Will the U.S. help us or not help us? Before we even think about that, first, Japan itself has a strong responsibility, a sense of that, to protect its territory, and is increasing its capability for that, and first needs to be able to have the will to do so. What's necessary for that is that we shouldn't unnecessarily provoke China. We can't unleash the SDF just because one ship came in. That's what China wants. So even if there's a mistake, then we can't have an excessive reaction. We cannot be seen as provocative. Whatever action we're faced with, we have to apply the law and be cautious. In spite of that, the U.S. public opinion, Japanese public opinion, the U.S. Congress, if everyone thought that we had to help Japan, then the president might send U.S. troops. But until then, Japan has to protect our territory with our own capability and our own responsibility. I think that's all there is to be said about that. Thanks very much, Mr. Kitoka. The second question is terribly tough. You have to think about it on various fronts. First of all, politicians, it's often said, oh, we'd like to do this, but we can't because of a lack of public and support. I wish you'd stop saying that. If you did just what the people want, then you wouldn't need politics. So I'd like for you to be courageous in making policy, even if there's a risk of losing your seat. No, at the McGraw-Hill textbook issue, it's not as if we will intervene with force, but the content of this textbook is just crazy. I think some LDP people said do something and Mofa did something, and it could be counterproductive. So we should avoid this and be patient and have academics taken care of by academics. The Nikkei is great, of course, but there are some media outlets in Japan that are not so great. I don't think that we're worse than other countries, though. I won't name countries, but even the US media is pretty bad. Same thing in the UK. I mean, that's the way things are. So if there is a mistake, then we'll just have to point it out. So to say people trying to change article nine, I think that's odd. It shouldn't be, you should label people that way. So there are people that quote me as saying Japan should apologize for wars of aggression. I've never said that, and when they say that, I just have them correct it. So I'm not excessive in my reaction, but TV is harder. If you look at television commentators. So it looks like really some of it is before Perry came with his black ships. Some of the commentary, but there can be scandals and are silly reporting if that's done by newspapers that they don't sell as much, really. Looking at the internet, I think it's an open place for discussion. I think that we should make it obligatory to use a real name when you comment on the internet, because otherwise people are careless in their remarks, they're vulgar in their remarks, they're not responsible. I think that you have to be responsible for speech. And so the internet, how much has it worsened the relations between Japan and South Korea and Japan and China a lot? I think that that should be taken up as an international issue. Earlier, there was a question that I failed to answer. China and Russia, in many places, especially in the Far East, are doing various joint exercises. It's not limited to today. They've done so ever since the end of the Cold War. What are they after? I think they have two goals. Looking at the U.S. rebalance, they want to respond, show a military response to that. They want to show the various countries of Asia that China and Russia are militarily close. This might be in the mutual interest of China and Russia. If you look at the content of these joint exercises, they increase the skills of their troops. They also have cooperation in terms of equipment, and they can invite third countries to join. So diplomatically, both countries can play a card against the United States as well. I think they have diplomatic aims as well. The U.S. and Japan don't need to be worried about every single exercise and have a specific response to every single one. I think that's very clear. Thanks very much. I'd like to have another round. Please raise your hand if you have a question. Hello. Justin Donocliff, United States Department of Defense. I would like to know how public opinion will play a role in shaping changes for national security policy for Japan if it will be influential or if political change can come without it. My name is Waguri. I'm a researcher at CSIS. But here, actually, there are, you know, my kind of senior boss, former senior boss. But I'd like to ask about the review of the national security regulations. If you have any opinion regarding, you know, as a next step in which direction the change should be guided. For example, there have been a collective defense being a keyword. But my personal opinion is most of the activities can be conducted without framework of collective self-defense. Right. So Dr. Kitaoka has been advocated that establishment of the legal framework that can be compatible and responsible for the international security system. So if you have any comments, please give me any other questions. I am in Azawa with Ritsumekan University. I have a question to Dr. Kitaoka. Dr. Kitaoka has been always, you know, studying about the military relationship. So how the national diet is going to make a commitment to the reorganization of the self-defense force and things. So I'd like to know how this is going to be played out. On public opinion and policymaking, we have the Nikkei CSS virtual think tank that Nikkei does cooperative with Mike Green. So for example, we did a poll on 3,000 Japanese businessmen on Japan-China relations. And so Mr. Morimoto said don't use the word nationalization, but 56% supported it of the Senkaku Islands. And about 70% oppose the Prime Minister visiting Yasukuni. So I think that Japanese public, their sense of balance is really on target. It's something of a silent majority. And I think that we do respond sensitive to that. So I don't think there will be any extreme shifts. So will Japan expand dramatically because of the new legislation? No, I don't think that's possible. It's because the public doesn't support it. There's also something like a generational change. I'll be 54 this year as a child. Every day there were right-wingers that came to our elementary school saying, give us back to the Northern Territories, don't forgive Russia. But no, Jiang Zemin from China and the ROK has anti-Japanese education, but we had anti-Russia education. But at a KODI university poll, 90% of the students said we might as well improve Russia relations, don't worry about getting all the territory. But China's, but looking at those 70 above, they were saying that couldn't trust Russia at all. So I think this generational change might affect policymaking as well. Second question, maybe you could address. Last May I made a proposal, not just me, my study group. The government didn't incorporate it. I think that was too bad because in article 9 paragraph 1 it says that international conflicts mustn't be solved with the use of force. It's not just international conflicts in general, it's ones that affect Japan. There's no other way to interpret but the cabinet legal affairs officer saying, no, this applies to just the international conflicts generally. So I was most dissatisfied with that. What role should you play? And then we have to protect Japan. And the center of all this is the U.S. Japan security tree. But it's not so much legislation as it is policy. So I earlier said that Japan has to be more supportive of the international order. We're doing a lot of things for human security, for example, around the world. At the Mount Fuji Dialogue last year, I took a surprising amount of the debate. I mean, people got really excited about what Japan could do for that. I wondered, Japan is not doing as much as it could. Japan has to be aware that it is a global player and to pursue policies along that line. This also ties in with public opinion. Mr. Waguri in 95 did work on UN Security Council reform, but the Security Council actually worsened because of that. But I think that we have to fundamentally revise the way we look at these issues. At third point, I think that Mr. Morimoto really wants to answer that. It's not so much that. I really don't want to answer, but I suppose it's my job too. Security legislation will be worked on by the politicians here in the room with us. And I very much hope that, thanks to their efforts, it will be passed. And I think that majority of the public in Japan shares my view. On the one hand, for the self-defense forces, they are the implementers. Once the law is passed, the next day they'll be given the duty. Can you do it? I was the minister. And for a long period, I was a member of the self-defense forces. The answer would be no. No, they cannot. But what's the most important thing while there are two? The self-defense forces and the MOD look at the law. They will have to create a system that will be able to create the implementation of the law. They also don't have the posture necessary. Logistics includes transport, supply, facilities, equipment. We don't, we've never had this sort of budget to do all of that. Now, for example, search and rescue, if the SDF were asked to do that, they would be able to do that the next day. But providing the facilities would be private sector facilities, hospitals, ports, airports. And when it comes to supply, we will be supplying it. It's different than transport. Transport and supply are fundamentally different because it depends who is responsible for the goods is different. Bringing something from A to B is transport. But let's say we don't have something, give it to me, then you have to have access to it or to give it. We don't have anything that's excess. Our budget only allows for the bare minimum. So it's actually not having a surplus. It's having an adequate structure in place. So we need a system. We need a posture. In cases, we need ROE, rules of engagement. All of these would have to be changed. Training manuals would have to be changed. And then the actual training would have to be done. In certain cases, we would have to have joint training with U.S. troops returning from Afghanistan so that people could really be able to carry out high-risk missions. We need time and experience to improve the level of our SDF members. It's not just their skills. It's also their mindset. It's also the mindset of the public. If the risks are higher, then the Japan to make necessary contributions with the U.S. to the international computer will have to do such things, will have to expose itself to risks. We'll have to think of that as being part of what we have to do. Will we be able to do it? It's not just one session of the diet that will accomplish it. That's what's most important in my mind. On equipment, the current diet would like to revise the law and create a law that might be called something like the law to create the acquisitions and technology development agencies. Something like DARPA. I don't know what it will be called exactly for the transfer of technology. We are making progress on that, but we're not there yet. Let's say a private company. There's a lot of reports in the press about India wanting U.S. too. They'd like to have license production. So, they'd like for all of the small parts manufacturers in Japan to come to India. It's not going to be feasible. They'll just make two of them and say, well, it'll be Indian and then sell it to third countries. That sort of cooperation is something we're negotiating on, but it's just not feasible. And they're saying, give us self-defense force people for years for training. There's no law that would allow that. We have nothing such as the foreign military sales legislation in the U.S. So even if we try to create contracts, will we be able to transfer Japanese technology? No. The law alone will not be enough. This is a field where we have done nothing for 50 years after the war and we're trying to enter it for the first time. There was a question for me too, so let me touch on that. It has on the research that I've conducted on relations between the government and the military. It's not like the opposition asking the government. I wouldn't say that it's taboo, but they try to avoid it. All of you politicians here have been both in power and in opposition, but listening to that, I wonder what would you do? Now politics in the first place is a choice between which is better. So is it 100% perfect? It's not. So we've done that for 55, since the 55 years. We have to have a debate that gives more than one option. It's not good for public debate either. As Mr. Moriwata says, even though we pass various laws, we're revising them because we've said that there are problems with interpretation up to now. But once you do that, then you get a budget, you buy equipment, and you train them. Now I think that among the main countries of the world, our military is the most difficult to operate. The essence of military affairs is its unpredictability and technological advancement. In 1905, we won the war with Russia and then Manchuria Incident was 1931, and Pearl Harbor was 1941. So in 36 years, so there were oil, submarines, airplanes that played a big role there, but all of this has changed a lot in that period. And so I think there's no time to waste, and the public needs to be aware of that. Thanks very much. We're over time. That concludes our second panel. Give everyone a round of applause. Thank you for bearing with us. We went over a little bit. It's going to be an interesting couple of months. On the one hand, the understanding of the Japanese people is important. On the other hand, we need to create a system, as Moriwata Sensei said, that is effective and credible and operationally useful. And these guys will have to find a way to bridge that, those two islands. And we wish them the best of luck. So thank you very much.