 On October 19, 1992, at its headquarters in McLean, Virginia, the United States Central Intelligence Agency held its first in a series of intelligence history symposiums, open to the public, historians, and the press. Inspired by the view that the study of intelligence is frequently overlooked in the analysis of history, the CIA brought together on this day the major participants in one of the defining events of the Cold War. The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. Thirty years earlier, on October 15, 1962, in an unmarked warehouse in Washington, a photo analyst for the CIA was examining aerial photographs of the rugged terrain of Cuba. To the untrained eye, these photographs seemed innocuous, but CIA photo interpreter Vincent di Renzo saw something very menacing in the oblong shapes hidden in the woods just northwest of the Cuban village San Diego de los Paños. By measuring the size and shape and comparing them to manuals of Soviet missiles, smuggled out of Russia by spy Colonel Oleg Pankovsky, he could confirm that what he saw was equipment associated with the SS-4 ballistic missiles. With a range of 1,100 nautical miles and a payload of nuclear warheads, they represented a major threat to the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. For these missiles could reach as far north as Washington DC and as far west as Dallas, Texas. At 11.45 the next morning, intelligence officers Arthur Lundahl and Ray Klein told President Kennedy that the Soviet Union was erecting offensive missiles on the island of Cuba. The President's manner was business-like as he turned to Lundahl and asked, Are you sure? Lundahl replied, Mr. President, I am sure of this as a photo interpreter can be sure of anything. In the next 13 days the President would be brief daily on the status of the missiles, with new surveillance of Cuba showing what progress the Russians had made overnight and how many hours before the missiles were operational. Armed with this information, Kennedy could buy valuable time to plan a strategy on how to confront the Soviets. Today historians continue to look at the Cuban Missile Crisis and its key players to discover the lessons of diplomacy in the modern era. But until the CIA's symposium, much of the first-hand experience surrounding the crisis was based on speculation. What follows are edited excerpts from this symposium. The panelists first discussed the intelligence activity which led to the discovery of the missiles. As Deputy Director of Plans at this period I was charged with espionage, counterespionage and covert action. That year, 1962, saw Cuba in the forefront of our activity. Having lived through the trauma of the Bay of Pigs, we recognized that its failure hung over the Kennedy Administration and dominated the work of all of us in the Plans directorate. Let me emphasize, President Kennedy wanted to get rid of Castro and his communist government, period. Operation Mungoos had been in effect for a year before the crisis. Secret agents were being recruited and trained for work in Cuba. The Opa Laca Interrogation Center was processing refugees from Cuba as rapidly as sound interrogation procedures permitted. Tales of Soviet weapons being seen on the island filled the press, the radio, intelligence channels. Senator Kenneth Keating of New York was making life miserable for the intelligence community by asserting repeatedly on the Senate floor that offensive missiles were arriving in Cuba at a time when every analyst was bursting his britches in an effort to verify the truth of these allegations. To say that the agency's operational arm was stretched taut and thin is to understate woefully. Given these circumstances, all of us were hard pressed to verify the multitude of reports we were getting about sightings of missiles and other types of Soviet offensive weapons and equipment. It was a mammoth undertaking. But where possible, we checked every weapon report against U-2 photography of Cuba and against other intelligence sources. Samuel Halperin, Task Force W official, and Warren Frank were involved in the gathering of intelligence in Cuba. We all felt we'd said so over and over again we have to get some intelligence first. We have to know what's going on in the island, who's doing what to whom, because after the Bay of Pigs we were left without any assets at all in the island. We then started to create an organization with a station down in Miami or south of Miami called JM Wave, which at one time was the largest station the CIA had in the world until the Vietnam activities in 65 and there on. The station in Miami was set up as originally I guess as sort of a cleanup to the Bay of Pigs activity. We had a lot of disadvantages for the one thing we had no agents in Cuba. There was no embassy there, which is usually the place you start to do some research or something. So it was kind of a tough assignment. We had some advantages though. There were a lot of Cubans in Miami and these were the first wave of emigres, as is common in most places where a communist system took over, were the professional managerial business class. These people got out early and had remained in contact with their families and friends and associates in Havana, so there were a lot of contacts existing. In September and October of 1962, field sources reported missile-like objects moving through Cuba. We had at least 75 to 100 reports of long missiles, not the sand but the palm tree sized missiles. These were observation reports and we had good observation reports from the unloadings at Mariela, which were not disseminated by Washington. And there's no photographic proof of this of course because it was done in the middle of the night and the U-2s didn't fly at night. So these things were ignored. We had many reports on these SS-4s which turned out to be being stuck on corners. They couldn't negotiate the corners because it was called traffic jams. They had to back up and everybody in Cuba is a little country. People find out about these things, so there wasn't that great a secret. The problem of noise or having too many reports of different quality kept the legitimate reports from reaching policymakers. Our view in Miami I think was consistently that Washington had locked itself into a position with the national intelligence estimates that the Soviets wouldn't do this, wouldn't put missiles in Cuba. And this we felt tended to prejudice them against our reports in which we had a great number, we can discuss this a little later, of missiles in Cuba. The first reports we got of large missiles in Cuba were of missiles the sizes of palm trees. Well we got a whipper snapper in from Washington one day saying a palm tree, this is meaningless, a palm tree can be a six inch seedling or a 120 foot royal palm. Therefore all these reports are rejected. When the Cuban talks about a palm tree the national tree in Cuba is a royal palm which is 60 to 80 feet. Ray Hofstetler then analyst at CIA headquarters spoke about the problem of verifying the many and often conflicting sources. Prior to January 1962 we had already received some 200 reports of missiles in Cuba. Of course this was before there were any missiles at all. The problem of separating the wheat from the chaff was a problem of trying to correlate events of cross-check checking the references and of trying to pull up out of an enormous amount of confusing misleading sometimes contradictory reporting what the patterns are upon which you might base a judgment as to the facts extend at the time. On the one hand you had refugee reporting coming in a lot of it helpful. Indeed a lot of it helped us to pin down areas which later were to be photographed and targeted for technical coverage. You had agent reports on the island coming in and you had technical collection both in aircraft flown imagery and in signals intelligence which we have not talked about this morning and actually which we're not going to talk much about at all. But nonetheless there are a variety of different sources coming in. All of these had to be cross-checked to try to determine pin down what the facts were. Another situation which I think you heard well depicted today both in Vince's discussion and in Warren's discussion is the problem of being able to determine what a single report means. In this case let me say that a picture is not worth a thousand words. A picture brings to anybody a new piece of information against a background of understanding. And I think the impression that I had that I would like to share with you is that trying to figure out what the facts are when you have reporting from so many sources is indeed a daunting task. It was popular opinion that the Soviets would not put offensive missiles in Cuba. John MacCone the new director of the CIA felt differently and demanded close U-2 surveillance of the island. Now MacCone had been sensitized to Cuba ever since he took office and he also ended up with a very firm personal conviction about the possibility of the introduction of Soviet missiles into Cuba. His reasoning I think is worth a brief review. He says Khrushchev knows the state of the strategic balance and he knows that we know. Now how can he possibly redress it? Well he has an absolute plethora of IRBMs and MRBMs he's got more missiles than he has targets. He has never deployed one outside the borders of the Soviet Union but in Cuba he has a piece of real estate where he can do that without fear that falling into unfriendly hands those missiles could be redirected toward Moscow. If he said I were Khrushchev I would put offensive missiles in Cuba. I would then bang my shoe on the table and I would say let's talk about your overseas bases. Let's talk about Berlin and let's talk about any other subject that I choose. Dr. Albert Whelan shared MacCone's suspicions. Because I was new to CI because I'd never read clandestine reports I used to stick around here every night until about 9 o'clock reading a big stack of them myself rather than asking the staff to read them for me. I recognized full well that the Cubans were trying to stimulate us to take action to liberate their country and that there was a great deal of falsification and fabrication going on. I was struck however by several reports several clandestine reports that are not unfortunately in your package. It described a convoy this was prior to this was in early September a convoy of very long devices moving through Cuban towns and having to turn corners on these small village roads which are characteristic of the Caribbean area that I knew something about and having in order to negotiate these turns to remove mailboxes and light poles and I said to myself a fabricator would not have thought of that and I was convinced at that moment that there really were very large objects probably missiles certainly not SAMs that were going into Cuba. It seemed to me that with this data unless one could refute it there was no reason not to jump to the conclusion that they had probably taken a very big gamble after all they put a big defensive ring in place. It did seem to me that it was a pretty sensible move if they could take the missiles that they had already built and had deployed in Eastern Europe transport them across the ocean, install them and then suddenly they would be added to the strategic balance. We were about even at that time about but by doing this they could effectively increase and would have had they continued their strategic inventory of nuclear tip rockets by about 50% virtually overnight and so it was a bold move but one with a big payoff it seemed to me. I knew that a special national estimate was being prepared and I went to Sherman Kent virtually on the eve of that estimate. I presented the best case I could to Sherman he was courteous to me I think Sherman liked me. He knew that I knew something about missiles but after listening courteously he said well the die is cast and we're going in a different direction and I felt at least that I had my moment. In the five weeks prior to the crisis reconnaissance flights over the most sensitive areas of Cuba were grounded due to the loss of a U-2 over China and a fear of State Department officials of an international incident. John McCone who was on his honeymoon in France at the time was unaware of this until he returned. He immediately convinced an interdepartmental group to allow one more U-2 flight and on October 14th at 731 a.m. Major Richard S. Hazer boarded a U-2 reconnaissance plane and flew Mission G3101. He returned with eight cans of film containing 464 frames of imagery. The film was processed and sent to the headquarters of the National Photographic Interpretation Center. Former Chief NPIC Information Branch Dino Brugioni and Analyst Vincent DiRenzo discussed the process of identifying the missiles. About 2 p.m. I received two cans of imagery with the target sheet titled Possible Missile Associated Installation. I looked at the target area on the imagery and noted groupings of equipment scattered along the tree lines. I had the team begin a systematic analysis of the imagery. We needed location, precise geographic coordinates, equipment ID and counts. The scattered collection of vehicles and tents was similar to and yet different than very early deployment of SAM sites and SAM support equipment. Size and shape of the long canvas cover trailer was very unusual. The shape was different and the length being 65 to 70 feet long and 9 feet wide. Especially the length was almost twice as long as any trailer associated with any Soviet defensive system. There were no breaks in the canvas support frames to indicate two or more vehicles parked together or that two or more trailers might be parked end to end. This was a single unit and it was designed to carry one long object. The pattern started to develop in my mind. The signatures didn't fit anything in any of the systems that we were expecting and what we saw being deployed in Cuba at the time. There were no parent ties to any normal military field units nor electronics and nothing fit dummy or decoy activity. There was just too much activity. Yet the equipment appeared to be missile related. With that I started to weigh the possibilities of an offensive system. We assembled all the information we had on the system and at that point being convinced that we had the SS-4 missile plus the associated equipment, I called Dino and asked for some additional support to make sure that we considered all possibilities. We looked at his specialized files of SS-3, SS-4, SS-5. We checked the various photos, prints, details that he had. After seeing again the parade photos together with the photogrammetric measurements Dino had, I was convinced without a doubt we had the SS-4 system. I turned to the team members and said this is an operational field deployed MRBM site. They checked the site, made measurements and fully agreed we had our first MRBM site. Richard Helms then described the details of briefing President Kennedy. On October 16, President Kennedy was informed that Soviet offensive missiles had been found in Cuba. It was a bombshell. He was shown photographs of SS-4 medium range missile launching installations under construction at San Cristobel in western Cuba. To the untrained naked eye the photographs looked like a football field being excavated. From the missile manual that Pankovsky had transmitted in 1961, the intelligence community knew all the operational details of the liquid-fueled SS-4 missiles. What the photo reconnaissance team saw in the U-2 aerial photographs was a characteristic deployment pattern or a footprint of the SS-4s that was shown in the missile manual supplied by Pankovsky. Pankovsky's manual assisted the intelligence community to estimate for President Kennedy how long it would take to complete the installation. We looked at power and fuel lines, launching moons and all the other details which were in the manual. The assessment gave President Kennedy several extra days. The big issue of the moment was whether to send in our air force to take out the missile bases and the army to invade the island. With the aid of the material Pankovsky delivered, we were able to tell the President, quote, this is what we've got here and it will take them X days to be ready to fire, unquote. It gave President Kennedy time to maneuver. I don't know of any single instance where intelligence was more immediately valuable than at this time. After what Ray asked Robert Kennedy and McGeorge Bundy how much they thought that single piece of evidence was worth. Both men agreed, quote, it had fully justified all that the CIA had cost the country in its preceding years, unquote. Missile expert Sidney Graybeal and Albert Whelan described the daily briefing of President Kennedy. And essentially what they were looking for was a question of are these missiles ready to be fired? The answer was no. The question was how long would it take? As was pointed out earlier, Pankovsky had provided us invaluable information on how these missiles operated in the Soviet Union. This is the first time they'd ever been shipped out of the Soviet Union. How were they packed? Cosmoline, what was the difficulties that unpack them? We knew they had to be erected. We knew that the war had to be mated. We knew they had to be fueled. We knew roughly the time factor it would take operating inside the Soviet Union. And we explained this to the President. There are many unknown factors in this. But when the question came up, how long would it take? It would take two hours roughly to make the warhead. But to make the warhead then you have to erect and do the fueling. So you were talking hours, even when the missile was in good condition and had been brought out. We were unable to confirm the nuclear warheads there. But it was our opinion, contrary to what McNamara wrote in the New York Times piece recently, that the CIA advised them that the nuclear warheads were not there. What we advised was we had no evidence that the nuclear warheads were there. But I think most of us felt that they wouldn't put these missiles there in the position they were in without the nuclear warheads. And as Dino pointed out, we could see all the necessary equipment, even though you didn't have the nuclear storage facilities and the security. The key thrust of all of these questions though, an important point here, the President really wanted to know how much time did he have to act? For me, the most challenging questions that Kennedy put to me were, and he pointed his finger right at me a number of times, he wanted to know how long he had to make his decision. And that really turned on how long it would take to bring the missiles to operational configuration. And in this, we were fortunate in having the Pankowski material. I'd known enough about this operation to know, to believe them. And the manuals were absolutely important, absolutely essential, because they really told a field commander how to set these things up and what the timelines were. And so with great confidence, I could answer the President's question and give him a hard answer, which I think he deserved. The panelists then discussed the process of estimations and why on September 19, 1962, roughly a month before the crisis, the CIA's Board of Estimates issued a statement concluding that the Soviets would not install offensive missiles in Cuba. I remember spending all of one Saturday morning with Sherman Kent after the estimate prepared going through every one of these reports and trying to figure out which ones were. And still we had these four or five reports that appeared legitimate, but in our view was not enough to change the basic thrust of the estimate. We had somewhere in the order of two to three thousand reports. And Sammy mentioned before some of these reports that were very accurate, that they collected in Cuba, but were never disseminated. You've got to remember that at that time the analyst looks for hard facts. Every one of these reports that reported missile activities, we would take to NPIC, and NPIC would look for the photographic information and all of them that they could confirm with photographs were negated. However, remember, and the material passed out to you shows that the U-2 was not permitted to fly in the entry of the Cuba during this extended period of roughly three weeks. At the time, I didn't know all of this as an analyst, I was told that weather was keeping the U-2 down and we weren't able to fly due to weather conditions when we were pressing for more of the Cuban flights. Roger Hillsman During the summer of 1961, when the satellites showed that the so-called missile gap was in our favor and proved it, we had a knock-down, drag-out discussion in this town, which Dick, you will remember well, trying to decide whether we're going to tell the Soviets that we knew the truth. Now, the intelligence community didn't want to tell me. You don't want to reveal any of your sources. But they were turning the screws on Berlin, and the decision finally was to tell them in as low-key a way as possible. I think we handled it well. Now, my point is this. Everybody in town and in the intelligence community knew that this would scare the Soviets very much. And that they would do something desperate. We knew they had plenty of MRVMs. We knew they were running out of their ears. We knew they had plenty of IRVMs. We thought there would be a crash ICBM program, but none of us, me included, thought that they might move those MRVMs. We didn't even raise the question and discuss it, or at least I never heard discussed at UCIP or elsewhere. Now, that, I think, was a real estimating failure. And the reason I say so is that by the time that the president and the White House and the policymakers were alerted to the possibility, the decision had been made. The ships were on their way. Kennedy began to talk to Gromyko. He made his speeches in September. I can't believe, I can't believe that Kushov or any major chief of state is going to reverse that major decision that's already been made and being implemented on the basis of a few talks with Gromyko or a couple of public speeches. But if Kennedy had made those speeches in January or March or February before the decision was made, the missiles may not have showed up in Cuba at all. Hillsman argued that estimators have a different role than policymakers. As an example, he used Winston Churchill in World War II, predicting that the Germans would attack Russia. Well, Churchill makes much that the British national intelligence estimate of the time did not predict, I mean, the German attack on the Soviet Union until just about two weeks before it occurred. But he says, I, Winston Churchill, immediately cabled, and this is in February, immediately cabled Stalin to expect the German attack. Well, now that's a policymaker's right to take one agent report and put a lot to it because he is making a policy act. He's saying something to another head of state. If he proves wrong, he pays the policy cost. But if an intelligence estimator says that one agent report indicates to me the Germans are going to attack the Soviet Union, he is preempting the head of state. And that's one of the reasons it doesn't happen. Now, what difference did it make? First of all, I once, I confronted Joe Newbert, who was one of our senior Sovietologists in the State Department, along with Hal Sollenfeld, about why were you wrong about the September 19th estimate? Why were we wrong? And he said, look, you can't ask a Soviet scholar or an estimator to estimate that the other fellow is going to make a stupid mistake. You can only estimate that he's going to behave sensibly and logically. He made a stupid mistake as history proves. He said, you can't ask an estimator to do that. So my point is, don't feel too bad about the September 19th estimate. It was a correct estimate. The Soviets made a mistake. You can't estimate that they're going to make mistakes. The floor was then open for discussion. Chester Cooper, I agree that the Soviets made a mistake in putting the missiles in Cuba. I would submit that we made a mistake in saying that they wouldn't put the missiles in Cuba. My sense is that we got paid, not for trying to predict what was logical, but rather to predict what was likely to happen. Anybody can predict what was logical. And the Office of National Estimates was supposed to obviously consider what was logical, but also consider what might happen in any case. Okay, but Chad, if the September 19th estimate had said, we think the Soviets will put missiles in Cuba. Now, I didn't assign that estimate, so I'm able to defend it a little bit better than some of the rest of you guys. But if we had had an estimate that said, the Soviets are going to put missiles in Cuba, what would the United States have done differently than what it did? Let me say something. Intelligence and policy are different fields. Intelligence in the Central Intelligence Agency has to make estimates. They have to make probabilities. They're very problematical. Now, policy is different. John MacCone talked about policy. He talked to the president. He sent messages to the president. And he understood that he didn't know exactly what would happen, that policy is a different relationship with the president than the CIA and the intelligence community. We have a question on the right here. Charles Davis, if we do not take the risk of being wrong or of saying the other person would make a mistake, that means that we'll never make a correct estimate. We wouldn't have made a correct estimate when the Germans invaded Poland. When this particular crisis occurred when the Arabs attacked Israel for 17 times. We will never make a correct estimate unless we take the risk. Charlie, I'm going to take that as a statement. Not a question. I'm going to recognize the person in the back on the right. Had the September estimate been different, do you think that Dean Ross's arguments that you two flights shouldn't have continued over Cuba would have held sway in the government? Seems to me that one of the great revelations today is that there was a whole month there when a number of people were making the right call but yet intelligence assets were not used to discover the information required to achieve closure. So maybe that estimate did have an effect on requirements. Maybe I will answer that one because I have read the summaries of the Executive Committee meetings that have been released by the Kennedy Library and Ross's point of departure was the loss of a U-2 over China which had occurred just in advance of the meeting where scheduling of the U-2s was to occur and that was primary in his mind. He was concerned about another international incident. Of course, he had no idea that there were missiles in Cuba and it seemed imprudent to simply delay for a while. The delay was put in place and was not broken until as Walt Elder tells us, McCone came back from his honeymoon, discovered it. I think you expressed it rather moderately. My understanding from eyewitnesses is that it was an explosion on the seventh floor of the CIA and he then persuaded the XCOM to re-institute the flight. So in a way it was an accident. Two historians were asked to give commentary. George Herring from the University of Kentucky. But I do see running through intelligence crises or intelligence failures, whatever you want to call them, problems of intelligence from Pearl Harbor through the missile crisis, through the Tet Offensive in 1968, through Kuwait even, one sort of thread that we have alluded to a couple of times and talked about and I think perhaps would do well to come back to over and over again and that is the inability to conceive of an adversary or a potential adversary to do something as apparently rash as a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor or placing missiles in Cuba or the like. Maybe as Roger Hillsman suggests, we can't estimate that the other person is going to make a mistake and one could argue that in each of these cases, ultimately it does turn out to be a mistake but still I think this is an issue that we need to raise and need to grapple with. I as historian don't. I can sit back as the Monday morning quarterback and simply say why and stop there but I think it is an issue. It comes up so often. It seems to be the fundamental flaw that it must be considered. Graham Allison, former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, an author of The Essence of Decision. I think while this is ancient history, it still remains the best window we have, cloudy as it is, into the real risks of nuclear war and the kind of calculations that leaders make in these circumstances. I think the missile crisis also serves in a nutshell as a good symbolic reminder of the major strengths and the major weaknesses of American intelligence, particularly in this domain of analysis and estimates. Let me begin with the bottom line so we're not confused. This was a success. Net a substantial success. Intelligence succeeded in identifying for the president and the policy-making community before weapons were operational that could threaten the U.S. the presence of these weapons. Indeed, looked at in historical terms an extraordinary success. That's the bottom line. But let me talk then first about strengths and then secondly about weaknesses. In strengths, this exhibits clearly the major strength of American intelligence if we try to put it in a big historical picture, which is technological magic. The capturing of pictures from overhead reconnaissance of activity on the ground in 1962 was an act of stunning technological virtuosity, not approached by any other country in the world, never achieved previously in history. Today it's almost impossible for us who become familiar with it to understand what it meant or the frontier that had been pressed by this. If you ask yourself, what if? This is a way to bring this home. What if this technological capability had not existed? If not, the judgment recorded in the September 19 estimate that the Soviet Union would not install offensive missiles in Cuba, would have stood, the missiles would have become operational, Kennedy would have faced a fait accompli, and the outcome would have been quite different. So that's the first strength. The second strength is what Dick Helms pointed to today, namely quality human intelligence. And I'll only say on that that I agree entirely with what he said. Let me turn quickly to the weaknesses. Weaknesses in analysis and estimate. And I'll underline three in the notorious September 19 special national intelligence estimate about which the other members of the panel have spoken. First, the point for us here is in the first failing that organizational indicators that provided indelible clues for intelligence, especially organizational SOPs, were difficult to interpret but weren't captured and interpreted in this instance. Second failure. The failure to acquire and interpret the significance of these indicators reflect a second weakness, which is a weakness of mirror imaging as against really getting within the skin or seeing the world through the eyes of the opponent. Third failing. Alternative futures. This notorious special national estimate of September 19, which is included in the materials, concludes that the Soviet Union will not make Cuba a strategic offensive base, will not put strategic offensive missiles in Cuba. Now, as we've heard in both panels this morning, John McCown, the director, had a different idea. Bud Whelan had a different idea. But the intelligence estimate is very categorical. If the intelligence estimate had been prepared to consider alternative futures or maybe even put in an addendum that said, let us discuss a possible alternative, asking what the consequences of such an alternative would be and trying to identify what the indicators that such an alternative might be emerging would be to which the intelligence collectors should have been especially alert, one might have gotten a different outcome. And there, I would like to applaud a new policy of the agency or at least one of its directors, I understand it, who recently in a speech said the following, when assessing events or developments where the outcome is truly unknown, we must do better in exposing the policymaker to uncertainty, to alternative possibilities, and to different points of view, even while providing our best estimate. David Grease then summarized the lessons of the symposium. I won't keep you long. There are just a few points I'd like to make at the beginning. I mentioned that we were here to learn. Let me just mention a few negative points I think we've heard in a few positive ones. First, the problem of noise in the world of intelligence. So many reports. Which are the true ones? That problem has not left us. Second, mindset, the analysts who worked on those estimates who used American style logic to estimate what the Cubans will do. That problem is still with us. Compartmentation, one part of the agency knowing something that the other part doesn't know. Always a danger. And finally, forgetting the impact of U.S. policy on the adversary, something that our policymakers and our intelligence people still do. On the positive side, teamwork. Once we got going, the teamwork was fantastic. Another point, self-examination. The very fact that we're willing to argue in front of you, in public, with the press here about our own shortcomings and mistakes and try to learn from them. And finally, the synergism, which I think is the hallmark of American intelligence between old methods of intelligence like espionage and new methods of intelligence like technical collection from U2s and satellites and so forth. This is what is different about American intelligence. The analysis that comes out at the end puts the two together and makes our product a little different than that of others.