 We are moving more on to the micro-level differences and the various aspects and perspectives of corporate governance. Now, we were first talking about internal audit and we were talking about audits, then we moved out about the origins of development and also laws and today we are going to talk about something which is a very interesting topic and that is alternate corporate governance controls. Now, when we are talking about this, we have looked in the past many sessions about the different models, the different frameworks, the different mechanisms, the different dimensions of corporate governance, but now we are going to move forward and look at alternate corporate governance controls which are less classical and more innovative in its context and approach. Now, when we are looking at these, then there is a market-based outsider system which basically is typified to a dispersed ownership, a clear separation of ownership and control, lower debt equity ratios and sophisticated financial markets. Now, in the more advanced countries, we see that this market-based outsider system basically tends to exist. So, we see it in America, we see it in Europe, we see it in Japan, we see it in Australia and again, they have their own texture and also contextualization, but broadly speaking it is market-based, definitely it is external to dispersed ownership and that basically means that there could be sometimes hundreds and thousands of shareholders, a clear separation of ownership and control. So, whoever the owners are, they have nothing to do with the control of the organization. They are not even part of the board of directors and the top management is independent in totality. So, we see a lower debt equity ratio which tends to exist and we see sophisticated market mechanisms basically in control of that. Now, when we are talking about a market-based outsider system, in this system there is less incentive for outsiders to participate in the control of the corporation except through equity markets. The interest of outsider stakeholders are not formally represented. So, again, we see there is a lot of independence in the organization. Usually large corporations have this type of market or it is being done in the advanced country. So, this is characteristic of that. Investors themselves often have less interest in the strategic goals of the enterprise. Investors show interest in the short-term returns that are available in the market-based system. So, again, the investors are not for the long-term, yes some they are, but many are there just for the short-term, they are playing the stock market and based upon that they are grappling in their profits and then going into different organizations and therefore we see that there is a lot of fluidity and there is a lot of deviation, there are a lot of undulations in this market-based outsider system. Now, when we are talking about the market-based insider system, then that is typified by highly concentrated ownership, high debt equity ratios, higher rate of bank credits and representation of banks on the board of corporations. So, what we see is that this is a more limited model in its context and that's why it's the insider system. We see that the bank corporations who are lending huge amounts of money to the corporation, they are a part of the board, high debt equity ratios tend to exist and the ownership is limited in the hands of a few and there can be minority shareholders but the majority shareholders have a very, very strong equity base and thereby have this control. Highly concentrated ownership is closely connected with the managerial control of the enterprise. High rate of bank credits is due to the closer relationship with banks that are often represented on the board and what we see is that most of the members of the board are actually shareholders, the large shareholders. So, not only the banks but also the large shareholders are over there and therefore they have this direct and indirect control of the whole organization and at least giving it a strategic direction. Now, in the insider system, hostile takeovers are rare because there is such a high concentration of shares existing in a few hands that it's difficult to take over while in the outside one, hostile takeovers are possible when different organization or investors tend to vulturize upon the different shares and accumulate them and then show their majority and take control of the particular organization but not in the insider systems and there's often a dense network of supportive relationships with the related businesses. So, again what we see is that there is more connectivity, there is more individualization and we see that even the different contextualization of relationships is based upon how the network tends to exist. So, what we see is that fundamentally the insider and the outsider systems are different in texture, complexity, in their frameworks, in their outlook, in their in-look and again what happens is that in one there is a lot of control and the other one is dispersed control or there's external control and then we see that the shares are in one particular hand and the other one we see that the shares are more dispersed with lesser chances of getting that control but in that one then what we see is that there can be hostile takeovers while in this one we usually see that it is usually family-driven or bank or financial institutions driven. So, this is the difference between both of these systems and it depends upon where the organization is and the characterization and textualization depends upon which type of models are being applied but these are the broad parameters and spheres of these two systems. Thank you so much.