 I think we'll just go down the line from you to Fulker Pertes, who's the head of, I'm not sure how to translate it, but it's the SVP in Berlin, which is one of Germany's best think tanks. And Fulker has been particularly, has lots of expertise, but has been very involved with Syria questions too. So one of the things that you might want to talk about is a bit of European foreign policy and defence. So Fulker, over to you. Well, thank you, Steve. SVP, you better don't translate. It's Stiftung Wissenschaft and Politik, which is a hard test for everybody who doesn't speak German. So we call it the German Institute for International Security Affairs, which is easier, I think. Minister Vitrin has already sort of laid out the whole layer of uncertainties. And I think it would be fair to say, and you asked us what concerns us most, to say what probably of all these uncertainties concerns me not as much as other things. Ten years ago, we would have said the financial crisis and the economic situation of Europe. It's no longer our main concern. At some point in these last ten years, we would have said European institutions. We don't think it is our main concern. 2016, I thought that Brexit would become our major concern. It would occupy us for many, many years and sort of divide Europe. That hasn't happened. Even the migration crisis is, well, under control for the time being, and I guess we are a bit better braced today than we were in 2015-16. So there are a lot of things that don't concern me as much, even though they are part of these uncertainties. What concerns me much most, I think, is in an order of priority, I wanted just to mention, too, sort of the combination of developments in our strategic environment, our most important ally, no longer being our most reliable ally, unrest in our immediate neighborhood, which Europe has proven unable to deal with in a convincing manner. A big neighbor who has told us, again, that military power counts, even in Europe, which we thought it didn't so much, and a rising power in China, which is not a benign partner, but still has to be a partner because we don't want to decouple, as probably some Americans think they should do. And the combination of these changes in our strategic environment with a rise of illiberal movements in our own countries. The two things, of course, aren't separable. They hang together, not directly, but indirectly, and I think we already see in some countries that where more illiberal movements get to govern their countries, they are also much closer in their outlook to some of our adversaries outside Europe. So that is concerning for me. I think we can go deeper into what Europe should do in this field, but I'll leave it at that. That's also quite a good start, because sometimes I think at the base of all this is really a Europe that isn't growing fast enough to provide the money required to keep wonderful social programs going, which creates a whole class of people who feel that their lives have been worsened by modernity. And that goes to the heart, I think, of quite a lot of these issues.