 I give the floor now to Matashige Ito. You have the floor, and I hope that you will tell us that the lessons we can draw from the Japanese crisis are such that we will get out of the mess, please. Thank you. Because I have only eight minutes, I try to be very brief. I just speak chronological order. So 1997, we had a very serious financial crisis. And the lesson we learned is just too small and too late. And political factor was most important. At that time, it was almost impossible to just persuade the politicians to just have a very big capital injection or bailout process. I hope our failure of this time may give some kind of a good advice to other countries after 2008 crisis. Now, second is around 2000, in the period of the IT bubble crash. And Japan was just in the edge of entering into the deflation. And for some reason, Bank of Japan introduced very problematic or controversial race of the political aid. Maybe Bank of Japan was very unlucky because we had an IT bubble crash in 2011, next year. But anyway, what happened is it took almost 12 or 30 years for us to get out of the deflation trap. So once we are getting into the deflation trap, it's very difficult to get out of the trap with traditional policy. Just to remember, Bank of Japan was already zero interest rate policy for this period. So, multi-policy is very important when we are in a critical position of the deflation. Now, number three is Abenomics, especially Mr. Kroeder came. And as you know, the so-called unorthodox multi-policy, maybe a combination of two, one is very dramatic expansion of the base money. And the other is very explicit inflation targeting. And that was very successful to change the mindset of the people just overnight. You can just confirm how market changes by looking at GDP or employment numbers or corporate productivity on exchange rate and so on and so forth. So that kind of unorthodox or non-traditional multi-policy sometimes may be difficult when necessary, when the economy is in serious deflation trap. Now, number four, however, also we can, that kind of policy can be very effective to get out of the deflation trap, but we cannot achieve the target inflation level. So the original targeting level is 2%, but we are still alone or below 1%. So something is missing here. I don't, there are many discussion here, but one of the most important thing is we have to think both supply side and demand side. The monetary expansion is a very typical demand side policy. And if we have a very good expanding demand, we hope supply side is just touching up, but that didn't happen. For many reasons you probably know very well. And one of the reasons why this is very important is wage is not increasing in Japan. And without increasing wage, you can't expect just inflation rate just getting higher. And you can find many so-called the unfunctioning labor market in the case of Japan, which is reflected in the wage. And this is also very important for us to think about the future of the international economy. I mentioned yesterday that unfortunately the potential growth rate of major country including the United States is not very high. Robert Gordon just mentioned just total factor productivity have been very low. But at the same time, many countries increase Japan, United States, Europe is just doing very, very stimulating demand. So as long as demand is just spring up, the economy is good, but once that demand is just losing, then there's very big size of the backlash because we depend so much on demand. And so when demand is going down, maybe because of the US, China, maybe because of the crash of the financial market, whatever. So we have to be very careful of the very big magnitude of possible change because of the difficult demand. Now, lesson five is what is most important now in Japan. That is the unfortunately, quantitative theory of money is not working in short period. It may be true that if we just expand money supply, prices eventually going up, but it's never run according to Keynes. So we have already passed six years, and it's not going on. Then as time go on and go, then the cost from untraditional monetary policy become bigger and bigger and we are now that kind of discussion. Well, you can think of many distortion. One is just market for government, bond and stock market. Then Bank of Japan just buys so much of this asset and you can just identify many difficult problems coming from and possibly also the big possible but deficit of Bank of Japan may cause some problem. And second distortion of the very long, the monetary expansion is long-term interest rate. For some reason, Bank of Japan introduced what we call yield curve control by which they mean the 10-year government bond that should be around 0%. It may be good for the stimulating purpose. However, you can easily imagine that is very big hurt hurting to the banking sector. It's not only the profitability of the banking sector. The banking sector is a problem of the channel for the credit. And also it also has very important communication for fiscal consolidation. You know our debt GDP ratio is about 200% in some category. However, if you look at just the debt service of the Japanese government, it's surprisingly low because interest rate on the marginal issue of the government bond is zero so they can borrow money for nothing. And that is a very good story in the short period but that has provided less and less incentive for politicians to think seriously about the fiscal consolidation. So, Portugal's effect is very important. So this is a lesson we learned from our experience. Thank you. Thank you very, very much indeed. When you were speaking of the difficulty to get increases in wages and salaries so that you will have the supply element for inflation at the target, I cannot help reflecting on the case of Europe which is very, very similar not because the whole Europe is in that situation but because Germany in particular which is necessarily the seeding for the augmentation of the wages and salaries is very, very low obviously. So the ECB has the same problem and the same difficulty and we must understand much better why exactly it is so difficult in your country and others to have what we would expect in such a situation with full employment and so forth. So thank you very, very much.