 Section 10 of Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 presidential election. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Angelique G. Campbell, April 2019. Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 presidential election by Robert Mueller. Section 10. Section 5 of the Report. Prosecution and Declination Decisions. The appointment order authorized the special counsel's office, quote, to prosecute federal crimes arising from its investigation, end quote, of the matters assigned to it. In deciding whether to exercise this prosecutorial authority, the office has been guided by the principles of federal prosecution, set forth in the justice, formally U.S. Attorney's Manual. In particular, the office has evaluated whether the conduct of the individuals considered for prosecution constituted a federal offense and whether admissible evidence would probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction for such an offense. See Justice Manual, Section 9-27.220. Where the answer to those questions was yes, the office further considered whether the prosecution would serve a substantial federal interest, the individuals were subject to effective prosecution and another jurisdiction, and there existed an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution. As explained below, those considerations led the office to seek charges against two sets of Russian nationals for their roles in perpetrating the active measures of social media campaign and computer intrusion operations, redacted, armed to ongoing matter. The office similarly determined that the contacts between campaign officials and Russian-linked individuals either did not involve the commission of a federal crime or, in the case of campaign finance offenses, that our evidence was not sufficient to obtain and sustain a criminal conviction. At the same time, the office concluded that the principles of federal prosecution supported charging certain individuals connected to the campaign with making false statements or otherwise obstructing this investigation or parallel congressional investigations. Subsection A, Russian Active Measures Social Media Campaign. On February 16, 2018, a federal grand jury in the District of Columbia returned an indictment charging 13 Russian nationals and three Russian entities, including the Internet Research Agency, IRA, and Concord Management and Consulting, LLC, with violating U.S. criminal laws in order to interfere with U.S. elections and political processes. The indictment charges all of the defendants with conspiracy to defraud the United States, count one, three defendants with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud, count two, and five defendants with aggravated identity theft, counts three through eight, as found in Internet Research Agency indictment. Concord, which is one of the entities charged in the count one conspiracy, entered an appearance through U.S. council and moved to dismiss the charge on multiple grounds. In orders and memorandum opinions issued on August 13 and November 15, 2018, the District Court denied Concord's motions to dismiss, see United States v. Concord Management and Consulting, LLC, 2018. As of this writing, the prosecution of Concord remains ongoing before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The other defendants remain at large. Although members of the Internet Research Agency, her afternoon as IRA, had contact with individuals affiliated with the Trump campaign, the indictment does not charge any Trump campaign official or any other U.S. person with participating in the conspiracy. That is because the investigation did not identify evidence that any U.S. person who coordinated or communicated with the IRA knew that he or she was speaking with Russian nationals engaged in the criminal conspiracy. The office therefore determined that such persons did not have the knowledge or criminal purpose required to charge them in the conspiracy to defraud the United States count one or in the separate count alleging a wire and bank fraud conspiracy involving the IRA and two individual Russian nationals count two. The office did, however, charge one U.S. national for his role in supplying false or stolen bank account numbers that allowed the IRA conspirators to access U.S. online payment systems by circumventing those systems' security features. On February 12, 2018, Richard Pinedo pleaded guilty. On February 12, 2018, Richard Pinedo pleaded guilty, pursuant to a single count information to identity fraud in violation of United States Code, Title 18, Section 1028. Plea Agreement, United States v. Richard Pinedo, 2018. The investigation did not establish that Pinedo was aware of the identity of the IRA members who purchased bank account numbers from him. Pinedo's sales of account numbers enabled the IRA members to anonymously access a financial network through which they transacted with U.S. persons and companies. On October 10, 2018, Pinedo was sentenced to six months of imprisonment to be followed by six months of home confinement and was ordered to complete 100 hours of community service. Subsection B, Russian Hacking and Dumping Operations, Subsection 1, Section 1030, Computer Intrusion Conspiracy, Subsection A, Background. On July 13, 2018, a federal grand jury in the District of Columbia returned an indictment charging Russian military intelligence officers from the GRU with conspiring to hack into various U.S. computers used by the Clinton campaign, DNC, DCC, and other U.S. persons in violation of U.S. Code Title 18, sections 1030 and 371, count one, committing identity theft and conspiring to commit money laundering in furtherance of that hacking conspiracy, in violation of U.S. Code Title 18, sections 1028 and 1956, resulting in counts two through ten, and a separate conspiracy to hack into the computers of U.S. persons and entities responsible for the administration of the 2016 U.S. election, in violation of U.S. Code 18, sections 1030 and 371, leading to count eleven. As of this writing, all twelve defendants remain at large. The NEDACO show indictment alleges that the defendants conspired with one another and with others to hack into the computers of U.S. persons and entities involved in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, still documents from these computers, and staged releases of the stolen documents to interfere in the election. The indictment also describes how, in staging the releases, the defendant used the GUCCI for 2.0 persona to disseminate documents through WikiLeaks. On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks released over 20,000 emails and other documents that the hacking conspirators had stolen from the DNC. In addition, on October 7, 2016, WikiLeaks began releasing emails that some conspirators had stolen from Clinton campaign chairman John Podesta after a successful spearfishing operation. Two instances of redaction for harm to ongoing matter. Subsection B, charging decision S2. There are now three instances of harm to ongoing matter redaction with footnote 1278 as follows embedded with an instance 3. The office also considered, but rolled out, charges on the theory that the post-hacking sharing and dissemination of emails could constitute trafficking in a receipt of stolen property under the National Stolen Property Act, NSPA. The statutes comprising the NSPA cover quote, goods, wares, or merchandise, end quote. And lower courts have largely understood that phrase to be limited to tangible items since the Supreme Court's decision in Dowling v. United States, 1985, see also United States v. Yixia Zhang. One of those post-Dowling decisions, United States v. Brown specifically held that the NSPA does not reach quote, a computer program in source code form, end quote, even though that code was stored in tangible items. In other words, a hard disk and in a three ring notebook. Congress, in turn, cited the Brown opinion in explaining the need for amendments to U.S. Code Title 18, Section 1030, that would, quote, ensure that the theft of intangible information by the unauthorized use of a computer is prohibited in the same way theft of a physical item is protected, end quote. The sequence of events would make it difficult to argue that hacked emails in electronic form, which are the relevant stolen items here, constitute, quote, goods, wares, or merchandise, end quote, within the meaning of the NSPA. Pages 177 and 178 are redacted for harm to ongoing matter. Page 179 begins with redaction, a harm to ongoing matter. Subsection 2. Potential section 1030, violation by. Herein are three blocks of redaction for personal privacy. See United States v. Willis, 2007, explaining that the 1986 amendments to section 1030 reflect Congress's desire to reach, quote, intentional acts of unauthorized access rather than mistaken, inadvertent, or careless ones, end quote. In addition, the computer, redaction for personal privacy, likely qualifies as a protected one under the statute, which reaches, quote, effectively all computers with Internet access, end quote. See United States v. Nosl, 2012, redaction for personal privacy. Applying the principles of federal prosecution, however, the office determined that prosecution of this potential violation was not warranted. Those principles instruct prosecutors to consider, among other things, the nature and seriousness of the offense, the person's culpability and connection with the offense, and the probable sentence to be imposed if the prosecution is successful. See Justice Manual 9-27.230, redaction for personal privacy. Page 180 begins with redaction for personal privacy. Subsection C. Russian government outreach and contacts. As explained in section four above, the office's investigation uncovered evidence of numerous links, in other words, contacts, between Trump campaign officials and individuals having or claiming to have ties to the Russian government. The office evaluated the contacts under several sets of federal laws, including conspiracy laws and statutes governing foreign agents who operate in the United States. After considering the available evidence, the office did not pursue charges under these statutes against any of the individuals discussed in section four above, with the exception of Foreign Agency Registration Act FARA charges against Paul Manafort and Richard Gates based on their activities on behalf of Ukraine. One of the interactions between the Trump campaign and Russian-affiliated individuals, the June 9, 2016 meeting between high-ranking campaign officials and Russians promising derogatory information on Hillary Clinton, implicates an additional body of law, campaign finance statutes. Schemes involving the solicitation or receipt of assistance from foreign sources raised difficult statutory and constitutional questions. As explained below, the office evaluated those questions in connection with the June 9 meeting. Redaction harmed to ongoing matter. The office ultimately concluded that, even if the principal legal questions were resolved favorably to the government, a prosecution would encounter difficulties proving that campaign officials or individuals connected to the campaign willfully violated the law. Finally, although the evidence of contacts between campaign officials and Russia-affiliated individuals may not have been sufficient to establish or sustain criminal charges, several U.S. persons connected to the campaign made false statements about those contacts and took other steps to obstruct the office's investigation and those of Congress. This office has therefore charged some of those individuals with making false statements and obstructing justice. Subsection 1. Potential Coordination, Conspiracy, and Collusion As an initial matter, this office evaluated potentially criminal conduct that involved the collective action of multiple individuals not under the rubric of collusion with the lens of conspiracy law. In so doing, the office recognized that the word collude appears in the Acting Attorney General's August 2, 2017 memorandum. It has frequently been invoked in public reporting, and it is sometimes referenced in antitrust law. See, for example, workgroup versus Brown and Williamson Tobacco Company of 1993. But collusion is not a specific offense or theory of liability found in the U.S. Code, nor is it a term of art in federal criminal law. To the contrary, even as defined in legal dictionaries, collusion is largely synonymous with conspiracy as that crime is set forth in the General Federal Conspiracy Statute, U.S. Code Title 18, Section 371. See, Black's Law Dictionary, Page 321, 10th Edition, 2014. Collusion is, quote, an agreement to defraud another or to do or obtain something forbidden by law, end quote. And, as cited in the 1871 edition of Alexander Burrill, a law dictionary in glossary, Page 311, quote, an agreement between two or more persons to defraud another by the forms of law or to employ such forms as means of accomplishing some unlawful object, end quote. Bovier's Law Dictionary of the year 1897 provides on Page 352 the definition of collusion as, quote, an agreement between two or more persons to defraud a person of his rights by the forms of law or to obtain an object forbidden by law, end quote. For that reason, this office's focus in resolving the question of joint criminal liability was on conspiracy as defined in federal law, not the commonly discussed term collusion. The office, considered in particular whether contacts between Trump campaign officials and Russia linked individuals could trigger liability for the crime of conspiracy, either under statutes that have their own conspiracy language. For example, U.S. Code Title 18, Sections 1349 and 1951, or under the General Conspiracy Statute, U.S. Code Title 18, Section 371. The investigation did not establish that the contacts described in Volume 1, Section 4 above, amounted to an agreement to commit any substantive violation of federal criminal law, including foreign influence and campaign finance laws, both of which are discussed further below. The office, therefore, did not charge any individual associated with the Trump campaign with conspiracy to commit a federal offense arising from Russia contacts, either under a specific statute or under Section 371's offenses clause. The office also did not charge any campaign official or associate with the conspiracy under Section 371's defraud clause. That clause criminalizes participating in an agreement to obstruct a lawful function of the U.S. government or its agencies through deceitful or dishonest means. The investigation did not establish any agreement among campaign officials or between such officials and Russia linked individuals to interfere with or obstruct a lawful function of a government agency during the campaign or transition period. It was discussed in Volume 1, Section 5, above. The investigation did not identify evidence that any campaign official or associate knowingly and intentionally participated in the conspiracy to defraud that the office charged, namely, the active measures conspiracy described in Volume 1, Section 2, above. Accordingly, the office did not charge any campaign associate or other U.S. person with conspiracy to defraud the United States based on the Russia-related contacts described in Section 4, above. Subsection 2, potential coordination, foreign agent statutes, FERA and U.S. Title 18, Section 951. The office next assessed the potential liability of campaign-affiliated individuals under federal statutes regulating actions on behalf of or work done for a foreign government. Subsection A, governing law. Under U.S. Code Title 18, Section 951, it is generally illegal to act in the United States as an agent of a foreign government without providing notice to the Attorney General. Although the defendant must act on behalf of a foreign government as opposed to other kinds of foreign entities, the acts need not involve espionage. Rather, acts of any type suffice for liability. See United States v. Durand in 2010, United States v. Lachlan in 2009, United States v. Dumessie in 2005. A quote, agent of a foreign government, is an individual who agrees to operate in the United States subject to the direction or control of a foreign government or official. End quote. See United States Code Title 18, Section 951. The crime defined by Section 951 is complete upon knowingly acting in the United States as an unregistered foreign government agent. The United States does not require willfulness and knowledge of the notification requirement is not an element of the offense. See United States v. Camper of 2008. The Foreign Agents Registration Act, or FERA, generally makes it illegal to act as an agent of a foreign principal by engaging in certain, large-life political, activities in the United States without registering with the Attorney General. United States Code Title 22, Section 611-621. The triggering agency relationship must be with a foreign principal or a, quote, a person, any of whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a foreign principal. End quote. That includes a foreign government or political party and various foreign individuals and entities. A covered relationship exists if a person, quote, acts as an agent, representative, employee, or servant, end quote, or quote, in any other capacity at the order, request, or under the foreign principal's direction or control, end quote. It is efficient if the person, quote, agrees, consents, assumes, or purports to act as, or who is or holds himself out to be, whether or not pursuant to contractual relationship, an agent of a foreign principal, end quote. The triggering activity is that the agent, quote, directly or through any other person, end quote, in the United States, one, engages in, quote, political activities for or in the interest of the foreign principal, end quote, which includes attempts to influence federal officials of the public. Two, acts as, quote, public relations council, publicity agent, information service employee, or political consultant. Four, are in the interest of such foreign principal, end quote. Three, quote, solicits, collects, distributes, or dispenses contributions, loans, money, or other things of value, or in the interest of such foreign principal, end quote. Or, four, quote, represents the interest of such foreign principal, end quote, before any federal agency or official. C.U.S. Code, Title 22, Section 611. It is a crime to engage in a, quote, willful violation of any provision of the act or any regulation there under, end quote. It is also a crime willfully to make false statements or a mission of material facts and vera registration statements or supplements. Most violations have a maximum penalty of five years of imprisonment at a $10,000 fine. C.U.S. Code, Title 22, Section 618. Subsection B, Application. The investigation uncovered extensive evidence that Paul Manafort and Richard Gates pre-campaign work for the government of Ukraine violated vera. Manafort and Gates were charged for that conduct and admitted to it when they pleaded guilty to superseding criminal information in the District of Columbia prosecution. The evidence underlying those charges is not addressed in this report because it was discussed in public court documents and in a separate prosecution memorandum submitted to the acting attorney general before the original indictment in that case. In addition, the investigation produced evidence of foreign agents registration act violations involving Michael Flynn. Those potential violations, however, concerned a country other than Russia, in other words, Turkey, and were resolved when Flynn admitted to the underlying facts in the Statement of Offense that accompanied his guilty plea to a false statements charge. C.U.S. vs. Michael T. Flynn, December 1, 2017, known as Flynn Statement of Offense. The investigation did not, however, yield evidence sufficient to sustain any charge that any individual affiliated with the Trump campaign acted as an agent of a foreign principle within the meaning of vera or in terms of Section 951 subject to the direction or control of the government of Russia or any official thereof. In particular, the office did not find evidence likely to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that campaign officials such as Paul Manafort, George Papadopoulos, and Carter Page acted as agents of the Russian government or at his direction control a request during the relevant time period. In 1282 states, on four occasions, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, FISC, issued warrants based on a finding of probable cause to believe that Page was an agent of a foreign power. The FISC's probable cause finding was based on a different and lower standard than the one governing the office's decision whether to bring charges against Page, which is whether admissible evidence would likely be sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Page acted as an agent of the Russian Federation during the period at issue, say, United States versus Cordoza of 2013, explaining that probable cause requires only a, quote, a fair probability, unquote, and not, quote, certainty or proof beyond a reasonable doubt or proof by preponderance of the evidence, unquote. End of footnote. Begin redaction. Personal privacy. As a result, the office did not charge redaction personal privacy or any other Trump campaign official with violating Farah or Section 951 or attempting or conspiring to do so based on contacts with the Russian government or a Russian principle. Finally, the office investigated whether one of the above campaign advisors, George Papadopoulos, acted as an agent of or at the direction and control of the government of Israel. While the investigation revealed significant ties between Papadopoulos and Israel and such warrants were obtained in part on that basis, the office ultimately determined that the evidence was not sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction under Farah or Section 951. Section 3. Campaign Finance. Several areas of the office's investigation involved efforts or offers by foreign nationals to provide negative information about candidate Clinton to the Trump campaign or to distribute that information to the public to the anticipated benefit of the campaign. As explained below, the office considered whether two of those efforts in particular, a June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower, redaction, harm to ongoing matter, constituted prosecutable violations of the campaign finance laws. The office determined that the evidence was not sufficient to charge either incident as a criminal violation. Section A. Overview of Governing Law. As relevant here, foreign nationals may not make and no one may, quote, solicit, accept a receive from them, a contribution or donation of money or other thing of value, or an express or implied promise to make a contribution or donation in connection with a federal, state, or local election. End quote of source, U.S. Code, Title 52, Section 30121. The term contribution, which is used throughout the campaign finance law, includes, quote, any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money, or anything of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for federal office. It excludes, among other things, quote, the value of volunteer services. End quote of U.S. Code, Title 52, Section 30101. Foreign nationals are also barred from making, quote, an expenditure, independent expenditure, or disbursement for an electioneering communication. The term expenditure includes any purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for federal office. End quote of U.S. Code, Title 52, Section 30101. It excludes, among other things, news, stories, and nonpartisan get-out-the-vote activities. A, quote, independent expenditure is an expenditure expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate and made independently of the campaign. An electioneering communication is a broadcast communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for federal office. End quote and is made within specified time periods and targeted at the relevant electorate. According to United States Code, Title 52, Section 30104. The statute defines foreign national by reference to FERA and the Immigration and Nationality Act with minor modification according to U.S. Code, Title 52, Section 30121. Cross-referencing United States Code, Titles 22 and 8. That definition yields five, sometimes overlapping categories of foreign nationals, which include all of the individuals and entities relevant for present purposes, namely, foreign governments and political parties, individuals outside of the U.S. who are not legal permanent residents and certain non-U.S. entities located outside of the U.S. A, quote, knowing and willful, end quote, violation involving an aggregate of $25,000 or more in a calendar year is a felony. See United States Code, Title 52, Section 30109. See also Blumen, Federal Supplement 800, noting that a willful violation will require some, quote, proof of the defendant's knowledge of the law, end quote. See United States v. Danilski of 2013, applying willfulness standard drawn from Brian v. United States of 1998. See also Wagner v. FEC of 2015, a knowing and willful violation involving an aggregate of $2,000 or more in a calendar year, but less than $25,000 is a misdemeanor. See United States Code, Title 52, Section 30109, Subsection B, Application to June 9, Trump Tower Meeting. The office considered whether to charge Trump campaign officials with crimes in connection with the June 9 meeting described above. The office concluded that, in light of the government's substantial burden of proof on issues of intent, quote, knowing and willful, end quote, and the difficulty of establishing the value of the offered information, criminal charges would not meet the Justice Manual standard that, quote, the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction, end quote of Justice Manual, Section 9-27.220. In brief, the key facts are that, on June 3, 2016, Robert Goldstone emailed Donald Trump Jr. to pass along from Amin and Aras Alagarov an offer from Russia's Crown Prosecutor to the Trump campaign of, quote, official documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia and would be very useful to Trump Jr.'s father, end quote. The email described this as, quote, very high level and sensitive information that is part of Russia and its government support of Mr. Trump, helped along by Aras and Amin, end quote. Trump Jr. responded, quote, if it's what you say, I love it, especially later in the summer, end quote. Amin and Aras Alagarov had follow-up conversations and, within days, scheduled a meeting with the Russia representatives that was attended by Trump Jr., Manafort, and Kushner. The communications setting up the meeting and their attendance by high-level campaign representatives support an inference that the campaign anticipated receiving derogatory documents and information from official Russian sources that could assist candidate Trump's electoral prospects. This series of events could implicate the federal election law ban on contributions and donations by foreign nationals, according to U.S. Code, Title 52, Section 312. Specifically, Goldstone passed along an offer purportedly from a Russian government official to provide, quote, official documents and information, end quote, to the Trump campaign for the purposes of influencing the presidential election. And Jr. appears to have accepted that offer and to have arranged a meeting to receive those materials. Documentary evidence in the form of email chain supports the inference that Kushner and Manafort were aware of that purpose and attended the June 9 meeting anticipating the receipt of helpful information to the campaign from Russian sources. The office considered whether this evidence could establish a conspiracy to violate the foreign contribution span in violation of U.S. Code, Title 18, Section 371, the solicitation of an illegal foreign source contribution or the acceptance or receipt of, quote, an express or implied promise to make a foreign source contribution, end quote, both in violation of U.S. Code, Title 52, Section 30121. There are reasonable arguments that the offered information would constitute a, quote, thing of value, end quote, within the meaning of these provisions, but the office determined that the government would not be likely to obtain and sustain a conviction for two other reasons. First, the office did not obtain admissible evidence likely to meet the government's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that these individuals acted, quote, willfully, unquote. In other words, with general knowledge of the illegality of their conduct, and second, the government would likely encounter difficulty improving beyond a reasonable doubt that the value of the promised information exceeded the threshold for criminal violation, see U.S. Code, Title 52, Section 30109. Subsection 1, Thing of Value Element. A threshold legal question is whether providing to a campaign, quote, documents and information, unquote, the type involved here would constitute a prohibited campaign contribution. The foreign contribution ban is not limited to contributions of money. It expressly prohibits, quote, a contribution or donation of money or other thing of value, end quote, see U.S. Code, Title 52, Section 30121. And the term contribution is defined throughout the campaign finance laws to, quote, include any gift, subscription, loan, advance or deposit of money or anything of value, end quote, see U.S. Code, Title 52, Section 30101. The phrases, thing of value and anything of value are broad and inclusive enough to encompass at least some forms of valuable information. Throughout the United States Code, these phrases serve as, quote, terms of art that are construed broadly, end quote, see U.S. States versus Nielsen of 1992, quote, thing of value includes both tangibles and intangibles, end quote. See also, for example, U.S. Code, Title 18, Sections 201 and 666 bribery statutes. Atom, Section 641, theft of government property. For example, the term thing of value encompasses law enforcement reports that would reveal the identity of informants, such as in United States versus Gerard of 1979, classified materials such as found in United States versus Fowler of 1991, confidential information about a competitive bid, referenced in United States versus Matskin of 1994, secret grand jury information, United States versus Jeter 1985, and information about a witness's whereabouts, United States versus Shecker of 1980, and in the public corruption context, thing of value is defined broadly to include the value which the defendant subjectively attaches to the items received, United States versus Renzi of 2014. Federal Election Commission regulations recognize the value to a campaign of at least some forms of information stating that the term anything of value includes, quote, the provision of any goods or services without charge, such as membership lists and mailing lists, end quote. Code of Federal Regulations, Section 152, the FEC has concluded that the phrase includes a state-by-state list of activists, see citizens for responsibility in ethics in Washington versus FEC. Likewise, polling data provided to a campaign constitutes a contribution, FEC advisory opinion, 1990-12, and in the specific context of the foreign contributions ban, the FEC has concluded that, quote, election materials used in previous Canadian campaigns, including fliers, advertisements, door hangers, trifolds, signs, and other printed material constitutes anything of value. Even though the value of these materials may be nominal or difficult to ascertain, end quote, FEC advisory opinion, 2007-22. These authorities would support the view that candidate-related opposition research given to a campaign for the purpose of influencing an election could constitute a contribution to which the foreign source ban could apply. A campaign can be assisted not only by the provision of funds, but also by the provision of derogatory information about an opponent. Political campaigns frequently conduct and pay for opposition research. A foreign entity that engaged in such research and provided resulting information to a campaign could exert a greater effect on an election and a greater tendency to ingratiate the donor to the candidate than a gift of money or tangible things of value. At the same time, no judicial decision has treated the voluntary provision of uncompensated opposition research or similar information as a thing of value that could amount to a contribution under campaign finance law. Such an interpretation could have implications beyond the foreign source ban. See U.S. Code, Title 52, Section 30116, imposing monetary limits on campaign contributions, and raised sparse amendment questions. Those questions could be especially difficult where the information consisted simply of the recounting of historically accurate facts. It is uncertain how courts would resolve those issues. Even assuming that the promised, quote, documents and information that would incriminate Hillary, end quote, constituted a thing of value under campaign finance law, the government would encounter other challenges in seeking to obtain and sustain a conviction. Most significantly, the government has not obtained admissible evidence that is likely to establish the Sianta requirement beyond a reasonable doubt. To prove that a defendant acted knowingly and willfully, the government would have to show that the defendant had general knowledge that his conduct was unlawful. See U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Prosecution of Election Offences, 123, 8th edition, December 2017, Election Offences. See Blumen, Federal Supplement, 800, noting that a willful violation requires, quote, proof of the defendant's knowledge of the law, end quote, Daniel Sick, Federal Supplement, 917, quote, knowledge of general unlawfulness, end quote, quoting Election Offences, 123, quote, This standard creates an elevated Sianta element requiring, at the very least, the application of the law to the facts in question be fairly clear. When there is substantial doubt concerning whether the law applies to the facts of a particular matter, the offender is more likely to have an intent defense, end quote. On the facts here, the government would unlikely be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the June 9 meeting participants had general knowledge that their conduct was unlawful. The investigation has not developed evidence that the participants in the meeting were familiar with the foreign contribution ban or the application of federal law to the relevant factual context. The government does not have strong evidence of surreptitious behavior or efforts at concealment at the time of the June 9 meeting. While the government has evidence of later efforts to prevent disclosure of the nature of the June 9 meeting that could circumstantially provide support for a showing of Sianta, that concealment occurred more than a year later, involved individuals who did not attend the June 9 meeting and may reflect an intention to avoid political consequences rather than any prior knowledgeable legality. Additionally, in light of the unresolved legal questions about whether giving documents and information of the sword offered here constitutes a campaign contribution, Trump Jr. could mount a factual defense that he did not believe his response to the offer in the June 9 meeting itself violated the law. Given his less direct involvement in arranging the June 9 meeting, Kushner could likely mount a similar defense. And while Manafort is experienced with political campaigns, the office has not developed evidence showing that he had relevant knowledge of these legal issues. Subsection 3, difficulties in valuing promised information. The office would also encounter difficulty proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the value of the promised documents and information exceeds the $2,000 threshold for criminal violation as well as the $25,000 threshold for felony punishment. The type of evidence commonly used to establish the value of non-monetary contributions, such as pricing the contribution on a commercial market or determining the upstream acquisition cost or the cost of distribution, would likely be unavailable or ineffective in this factual setting. Although damaging opposition research is surely valuable to a campaign, it appears that the information ultimately delivered in the meeting was not valuable. And while value in a conspiracy may well be measured by what the participants expected to receive at the time of the agreement. See, for example, United States v. Trumbello of 1982, Goldstone's description of the offered material here was quite general. His suggestion of the information's value that it would, quote, incriminate Hillary and would be very useful to Trump Jr.'s father, unquote, was not specific and may have been understood as being of uncertain worth or reliability, given Goldstone's lack of direct access to the original source. The uncertainty over what would be delivered could be reflected in Trump Jr.'s response, quote, if it's what you say, I love it. End quote. Accordingly, taking into account the high burden to establish a culpable mental state and a campaign finance prosecution and the difficulty in establishing the required valuation, the office decided not to pursue criminal campaign finance charges against Trump Jr. or other campaign officials for the events culminating in the June 9 meeting. Subsection C, application to redacted, harm to ongoing matter, with a second redaction for harm to ongoing matter ends page 188. The entirety of page 189 is redacted for harm to ongoing matter. Subsection 2, willfulness. As discussed, to establish a criminal campaign finance violation, the government must prove that the defendant acted knowingly and willfully. U.S. Code, Title 52, Section 30109. That standard requires proof that the defendant knew generally that his conduct was unlawful. See election offenses 123. Given the uncertainties noted above, the willfulness requirement would pose a substantial barrier to prosecution. Subsection 3, constitutional considerations. Finally, the First Amendment could pose constraints on a prosecution. The rest of the text is redacted for harm to ongoing matter. Section 4, analysis as to redaction, harm to ongoing matter. Page 91 begins with redaction for harm to ongoing matter. Subsection 4, false statements and obstruction of the investigation. The office determined that certain individuals associated with the campaign lied to investigators about campaign contacts with Russia and have taken other actions to interfere with the investigation. As explained below, the office therefore charged some U.S. persons connected to the campaign with false statements and obstruction offenses. Subsection A, overview of governing law, false statements. The principal federal statute criminalizing false statements to government investigators is U.S. Code, Title 18, Section 1001. As relevant here, under Section 1001, it is a crime to knowingly and willfully, quote, make any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive branch of the government, end quote. The FBI investigation is a matter within the executive branch's jurisdiction. See United States v. Rogers of the year 1984. The statute also applies to a subset of legislative branch actions, namely administrative matters and quote, investigations or reviews, end quote, conducted by a congressional committee or subcommittee. U.S. Code, Title 18, Section 1001, see also United States v. Pickett of 2004. Whether this statement was made to law enforcement or congressional investigators, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the same basic non-jurisdictional elements. The statements were false, fictitious, or fraudulent. The defendants knew both that it was false and that it was unlawful to make a false statement. Then the false statement was material. See United States v. Smith of 2017, listing elements. See also 9th Circuit pattern instruction 8.73 and comment, explaining that the Section 1001 jury instruction was modified in light of the Department of Justice's position, that the phrase knowingly and willfully in the statute requires the defendants' knowledge that his or her conduct was unlawful. In the D.C. Circuit, the government must prove that the statement was actually false. A statement that is misleading but literally true does not satisfy Section 1001. See United States v. Milton, D.C. Circuit 1993, United States v. Dale, D.C. Circuit 1993. For that false statement to qualify as material, it must have a natural tendency to influence or be capable of influencing a discrete decision or any other function of the agency to which it is addressed. See United States v. Godin in year 1995. United States v. Moore, D.C. Circuit 2010. Perjury. Under the federal perjury statutes, it is a crime for a witness testifying under oath before grand jury to knowingly make any false material declaration. See US Code, Title 18, Section 1623. The government must prove or elements beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a conviction under Section 1623. The defendant testified under oath before federal grand jury. The defendant's testimony was false in one or more respects. The false testimony concerned matters that were material to the grand jury investigation and the false testimony was knowingly given. See United States v. Bridges, D.C. Circuit 1983. The general perjury statute, US Code, Title 18, Section 1621, also applies to grand jury testimony and has similar elements, except that it requires that the witnesses have acted willfully and that the government satisfy, quote, strict common law requirements for establishing falsity, end quote. See Dunn v. United States, 1979, explaining, quote, a two-witness rule, end quote, and the corroboration that it demands. Abstruction of justice. Three basic elements are common to the obstruction statutes pertinent to this office's charging decisions. An obstructive act, some form of nexus between the obstructive act and an official proceeding, and criminal, meaning corrupt, intent. A detailed discussion of those elements and the law governing obstruction of justice most generally is included in Volume 2 of the report. Subsection B, application to certain individuals. Subsection 1, George Papadopoulos. Investigators approached Papadopoulos for an interview based on his role as a foreign policy advisor to the Trump campaign and his suggestion to a foreign government representative that Russia had indicated that it could assist the campaign through the anonymous release of information damaging to candidate Clinton. On January 27th, 2017, Papadopoulos agreed to be interviewed by FBI agents who informed him that the interview was part of the investigation into potential Russian government interference in the 2016 presidential election. During the interview, Papadopoulos lied about the timing, extent, and nature of his communications with Joseph Mifsud, Olga Polanskaya, and Ivan Timoviev. With respect to timing, Papadopoulos acknowledged that he had met Mifsud and that Mifsud had told him that the Russians had dirt on Clinton in the form of thousands of emails. But Papadopoulos stated multiple times that those communications occurred before he joined the Trump campaign and that it was a, quote, very strange coincidence, unquote, to be told of the dirt before he started working for the campaign. This account was false. Papadopoulos met Mifsud for the first time on approximately March 14th, 2016, after Papadopoulos had already learned he would be a foreign policy advisor for the campaign. Mifsud showed interest in Papadopoulos only after learning of his role on the campaign, and Mifsud told Papadopoulos about the Russians possessing dirt on candidate Clinton. In late April, 2016, more than a month after Papadopoulos had joined the campaign and been publicly announced by candidate Trump, Statement of Offense, the United States versus George Papadopoulos, Document 19, known as Papadopoulos Statement of Offense. Papadopoulos also made false statements in an effort to minimize the extent and importance of his communications with Mifsud. For example, Papadopoulos stated that, quote, Mifsud's a nothing, unquote, that he thought Mifsud was, quote, just a guy talking up connections or something, end quote, and that he believed Mifsud was, quote, bs-ing to be completely honest with you, end quote. In fact, however, Papadopoulos understood Mifsud to have substantial connections to high-level Russian government officials, and that Mifsud spoke with some of those officials in Moscow before telling Papadopoulos about the dirt. Papadopoulos also engaged in extensive communications over a period of months with Mifsud about foreign policy issues for the campaign, including efforts to arrange a, quote, history-making, end quote, meeting between the campaign and Russian government nationals. In addition, Papadopoulos failed to inform the investigators that Mifsud had introduced him to Timaviv, the Russian national who Papadopoulos understood to be connected to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, despite being asked if he had met with Russian officials, or, quote, anyone with a Russian accent, end quote, during the campaign. See Papadopoulos Statement of Offense. Papadopoulos also falsely claimed that he met Polonskaya before he joined the campaign, and falsely told the FBI that he had no relationship at all with her. He stated that the extent of their communications was her sending emails, quote, just hi, how are you, that's it, end quote. In truth, however, Papadopoulos met Polonskaya on March 24, 2016, after he had joined the campaign. He believed that she had connections to high-level Russian government officials and could help him arrange a potential foreign policy trip to Russia. During the campaign, he emailed and spoke with her over Skype on numerous occasions about the potential foreign policy trip to Russia. Papadopoulos's false statements in January 2017 impeded the FBI's investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. Most immediately, those statements hindered investigators' ability to effectively question Mifsud when he was interviewed in the lobby of a Washington, D.C. hotel on February 10, 2017. See United States v. George Papadopoulos. During that interview, Mifsud admitted to knowing Papadopoulos and to having introduced him to Polonskaya and Tim Aviv, but Mifsud denied that he had advanced knowledge that Russia was in possession of emails damaging to Kennedy Clinton, stating that he and Papadopoulos had discussed cybersecurity and hacking as a larger issue and that Papadopoulos must have misunderstood their conversation. Mifsud also falsely stated that he had not seen Papadopoulos since the meeting at which Mifsud introduced him to Polonskaya, even though emails, text messages, and other information show that Mifsud met with Papadopoulos on at least two other occasions, April 12 and April 26, 2016. In addition, Mifsud admitted that he had drafted or edited the follow-up message that Polonskaya sent to Papadopoulos following the initial meeting and that, as reflected in the language of that email chain, which was, quote, baby, thank you, end quote, Mifsud may have been involved in a personal relationship with Polonskaya at the time. The false information and admissions in Papadopoulos's January 2017 interview undermined investigators' ability to challenge Mifsud when he made these inaccurate statements. Given the seriousness of the lies and omissions and their effect on the FBI's investigation, the office charged Papadopoulos with making false statements to the FBI in violation of U.S. Code Title 18, Section 1001, Information, United States vs. George Papadopoulos. On October 7, 2017, Papadopoulos pleaded guilty to that charge pursuant to a plea agreement. On September 7, 2018, he was sentenced to 14 days of imprisonment, a $9,500 fine, and 200 hours of community service. Subsection 2, redacted for personal privacy. Here are two blocks of grand jury redacted text. Subsection 3, Michael Flynn. Michael Flynn agreed to be interviewed by the FBI on January 24, 2017, four days after he had officially assumed his duties as National Security Advisor to the President. During the interview, Flynn made several false statements pertaining to his communications with the Russian ambassador. First, Flynn made two false statements about his conversations with Russian ambassador Kislyak in late December 2016, at a time when the United States had imposed sanctions on Russia for interfering with the 2016 presidential election, and Russia was considering its response. See Flynn's statement of offense. Flynn told the agents that he did not ask Kislyak to refrain from escalating the situation in response to the United States' imposition of sanctions. That statement was false. On December 29, 2016, Flynn called Kislyak to request Russian restraint. Flynn made the call immediately after speaking to a senior transition team official, KT McFarland, about what to communicate to Kislyak. Flynn then spoke with McFarland again after the Kislyak call to report on the substance of that conversation. Flynn also falsely told the FBI that he did not remember a follow-up conversation in which Kislyak stated that Russia had chosen to moderate its response to the U.S. sanctions as a result of Flynn's request. On December 31, 2016, Flynn in fact had such a conversation with Kislyak and he again spoke with McFarland within hours of the call to relay the substance of his conversation with Kislyak. See Flynn's statement of offense. Second, Flynn made false statements about calls he had previously made to representatives of Russia and other countries regarding a resolution submitted by Egypt to the United Nations Security Council on December 21, 2016. Specifically, Flynn stated that he only asked the country's positions on how they would vote on the resolution and that he did not request that any of the countries take any particular action on the resolution. That statement was false. On December 22, 2016, Flynn called Kislyak and formed him of the incoming Trump administration's opposition to the resolution and requested that Russia vote against or delay the resolution. Flynn also falsely stated that Kislyak had never described Russia's response to his December 22 request regarding the resolution. Kislyak, in fact, told Flynn in a conversation on December 23, 2016 that Russia would not vote against the resolution if it came to a vote. Flynn made these false statements to the FBI at a time when he was serving as national security adviser and when the FBI had an open investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election, including the nature of any links between the Trump campaign and Russia. Flynn's false statements and omissions impeded and otherwise had a material impact on that ongoing investigation. Flynn's statement of offense. They also came shortly before Flynn made separate submissions to the Department of Justice pursuant to Foreign Agents Registration Act or PERA that also contained materially false statements and omissions. Based on the totality of that conduct, the office decided to charge Flynn with making false statements to the FBI in violation of U.S. Code Title 18, Section 101. On December 1, 2017, and pursuant to a plea agreement, Flynn pleaded guilty to that charge and also admitted his false statements to the Department in his PERA filing. See, plea agreement. United States v. Michael T. Flynn, December 1, 2017. As of this report date, April 2019, Flynn is awaiting sentencing. Subsection 4, Michael Cohen. Michael Cohen was the executive vice president and special counsel to the Trump Organization when Trump was president of the Trump Organization. See, United States v. Cohen, 2018. Known as Cohen Information. From the fall of 2015 through approximately June 2016, Cohen was involved in a project to build a Trump-branded tower and adjoining development in Moscow. The project was known as Trump Tower Moscow. In 2017, Cohen was called to testify before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, or HPSCI, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, SSCI, both of which were investigating Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election and possible links between Russia and the presidential campaigns. In late August 2017, in advance of his testimony, Cohen caused a two-page statement to be sent to SSCI and HPSCI addressing Trump Tower Moscow. The letter contained three representations relevant here. First, Cohen stated that the Trump Moscow project had ended in January 2016 and that he had briefed candidate Trump on the project only three times before making the unilateral decision to terminate it. Second, Cohen represented that he had never agreed to travel to Russia in connection with the project and never considered asking Trump to travel for the project. Third, Cohen stated that he did not recall any Russian government contact about the project, including any response to an email he had sent to a Russian government email account. Cohen later asked that his two-page statement be incorporated into his testimony's transcript before SSCI, and he ultimately gave testimony to SSCI that was consistent with that statement. Each of the four going representations in Cohen's two-page statements was false and misleading. Consideration of the project had extended through approximately June 2016 and included more than three progress reports from Cohen to Trump. Cohen had discussed with Felix Seder his own travel to Russia as part of the project, and he had inquired about the possibility of Trump traveling there, both with the candidate himself and with senior campaign official Corey Lewandowski. Cohen did recall that he had received a response to the email that he sent to Russian government spokesman Dmitry Peskov, in particular that he had received an email reply and had a follow-up phone conversation with an English-speaking assistant to Peskov in mid-January 2016. Cohen knew the statements in the letter to be false at the time and admitted that he had made them in an effort, one, to minimize the link between the project and Trump, who was by this time president, and two, to give the false impression that the project had ended before the first vote in the Republican Party primary process in the hopes of limiting the ongoing Russia investigations. Given the nature of the false statements and the fact that he repeated them during his initial interview with the office, we charged Cohen with violating Section 1001. On November 29, 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to a single-count information, charging him with making false statements and a matter within the jurisdiction of the legislative branch in violation of U.S. Code Title 18, Section 101. The case was transferred to the district judge presiding over the separate prosecution of Cohen pursued by the Southern District of New York after a referral from our office. On December 7, 2018, this office admitted a letter to that judge recommending that Cohen's cooperation with our investigation be taken into account in sentencing Cohen on both the false statements charge and the offenses in the Southern District prosecution. On December 12, 2018, the judge sentenced Cohen to two months of imprisonment on the false statements count to run concurrently with the 36-month sentence imposed on the other counts. Subsection 5, redacted for harm to ongoing matter. Page 197 has three blocks of redacted material until approximately the last one-eighth of page where we pick up. Subsection 6, Jeff Sessions. As set forth in Volume 1, Section 4, above, the investigation established that, while a U.S. senator and a Trump campaign advisor, former Attorney General Jeff Sessions interacted with Russian Ambassador Kizlyak during the week of the Republican National Convention in July 2016 and again at a meeting in Sessions' Senate office in September 2016. The investigation also established that Sessions and Kizlyak both attended a reception held before candidate Trump's foreign policy speech at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C. in April 2016 and that it is possible that they met briefly at that reception. The office considered whether, in light of these interactions, Sessions committed pottery before or made false statements to Congress in connection with his confirmation as Attorney General. In January 2017, testimony during his confirmation hearing, Sessions stated in response to a question about Trump's campaign communications with the Russian government that he had, quote, been called a surrogate a time or two in that campaign and I didn't have, did not have communications with the Russians, end quote. In written responses submitted on January 17, 2017, Sessions answered, quote, no, end quote, to a question asking whether he had, quote, been in contact with anyone connected to any part of the Russian government about the 2016 election, either before or after Election Day, end quote. And in a March 2017 supplement to his testimony, Sessions identified two of the campaign period contacts with Ambassador Kizlyak noted above, which had been reported in the media following the January 2017 confirmation hearing. Sessions stated in the supplemental response that he did, quote, not recall any discussions with the Russian ambassador or any other representatives of the Russian government regarding the political campaign on these occasions or any other occasion, end quote. Although the investigation established that Sessions interacted with Kizlyak on the occasions described above, and that Kizlyak mentioned the presidential campaign on at least one occasion, the evidence is not sufficient to prove that Sessions gave knowingly false answers to Russian related questions in light of the wording and context of those questions. With respect to Sessions' statements that he did, quote, not recall any discussions with the Russian ambassador regarding the political campaign, end quote, and he had not been in contact with any Russian official, quote, about the 2016 election, end quote. The evidence concerning the nature of Sessions' interactions with Kizlyak makes it plausible that Sessions did not recall discussing the campaign with Kizlyak at the time of his statements. Similarly, while Sessions stated in his January 2017 orbital testimony that he, quote, did not have communications with Russians, end quote, he did so in response to a question that had linked such communications to an alleged, quote, continuing exchange of information, end quote. Between the Trump campaign and Russian government intermediaries, Sessions later explained to the Senate and to the office that he understood the question as narrowly calling for disclosure of interactions with Russians that involve the exchange of campaign information, as distinguished from more routine contacts with Russian nationals, given the context in which the question was asked that understanding is plausible. Accordingly, the office concluded that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Sessions was willfully untruthful in his answers, and thus insufficient to obtain or sustain a conviction, preparatory, or false statements. Consistent with the principles of federal prosecution, the office therefore determined not to pursue charges against Sessions and informed his counsel of that decision in March 2018. Subsection 7. Others interviewed during the investigation. The office considered whether, during the course of the investigation, other individuals interviewed either omitted material information or provided information determined to be false. Applying the principles of federal prosecution, the office did not seek criminal charges against any individuals other than those listed above. In some instances, that decision was due to evidentiary hurdles to proving falsity. In others, the office determined that the witness ultimately provided truthful information and that consideration of culpability, deterrence, and resource preservation weighed against prosecution. The remainder of page 199 is redacted for matters related to personal privacy and grand jury. End of section 10. Recording by Angelika G. Campbell, April 2019. Section 11 of Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election. This is the LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election by Robert Mueller. Section 11. Introduction to Volume 2. Introduction to Volume 2. This report is submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to 28 CFR, Section 600.8C, which states that, quote, at the conclusion of the Special Counsel's work, he shall provide the Attorney General a confidential report explaining the prosecution or declination decisions the Special Counsel reached, unquote. Beginning in 2017, the President of the United States took a variety of actions toward the ongoing FBI investigation into Russia's interference in the 2016 Presidential Election and related matters that raised questions about whether he had obstructed justice. The order appointing the Special Counsel gave this office jurisdiction to investigate matters that arose directly from the FBI's Russia investigation, including whether the President had obstructed justice in connection with Russia-related investigations. The Special Counsel's jurisdiction also covered potentially obstructive acts related to the Special Counsel's investigation itself. This volume of our report summarizes our obstruction of justice investigation of the President. We first described the considerations that guided our obstruction of justice investigation and then provide an overview of this volume. First, a traditional prosecution or declination decision entails a binary determination to initiate or decline a prosecution, but we determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial judgment. The Office of Legal Counsel, OLC, has issued an opinion finding that, quote, the indictment or criminal prosecution of a sitting president would impermissibly undermine the capacity of the executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned functions, unquote, in violation of, quote, the constitutional separation of powers, unquote. Given the role of the Special Counsel as an attorney in the Department of Justice and the framework of the Special Counsel regulations, C-28 USC, Section 515, 28 CFR, Section 600.7A, this office accepted OLC's legal conclusion for the purpose of exercising prosecutorial jurisdiction. And apart from OLC's constitutional view, we recognized that a federal criminal accusation against a sitting president would place burdens on the president's capacity to govern and potentially preempt constitutional processes for addressing presidential misconduct. Second, while the OLC opinion concludes that a sitting president may not be prosecuted, it recognizes that a criminal investigation during the president's term is permissible. The OLC opinion also recognizes that a president does not have immunity after he leaves office. And if individuals other than the president committed an obstruction offense, they may be prosecuted at this time. Given those considerations, the facts known to us, and the strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of the criminal justice system, we conducted a thorough factual investigation in order to preserve the evidence when memories were fresh and documentary materials were available. Third, we considered whether to evaluate the conduct we investigated under the Justice Manual standards governing prosecution and declination decisions, but we determined not to apply an approach that could potentially result in a judgment that the president committed crimes. The threshold step under the Justice Manual standards is to assess whether a person's conduct, quote, constitutes a federal offense, unquote. U.S. Department of Justice Justice Manual, Section 9-27.220, 2018, Justice Manual. Fairness concerns counseled against potentially reaching that judgment when no charges can be brought. The ordinary means for an individual to respond to an accusation is through a speedy and public trial with all the procedural protections that surround a criminal case. An individual who believes he was wrongly accused can use that process to seek to clear his name. In contrast, a prosecutor's judgment that crimes were committed but that no charges will be brought affords no such adversarial opportunity for public name clearing before an impartial adjudicator. Concerns about the fairness of such a determination would be heightened in the case of a sitting president where a federal prosecutor's accusation of a crime, even in an internal report, could carry consequences that extend beyond the realm of criminal justice. OLC noted similar concerns about sealed indictments. Even if an indictment were sealed during the president's term, OLC reasoned, quote, it would be very difficult to preserve an indictment's secrecy, unquote. And if an indictment became public, quote, the stigma and approbrium could imperil the president's ability to govern, unquote. Although a prosecutor's internal report would not represent a formal public accusation akin to an indictment, the possibility of the report's public disclosure and the absence of a neutral adjudicatory forum to review its findings counseled against potentially determining, quote, that the person's conduct constitutes a federal offence, unquote. Justice manual, section 9-27.220. Fourth, if we had confidence after a thorough investigation of the facts that the president clearly did not commit obstruction of justice, we would so state. Based on the facts and the applicable legal standards, however, we are unable to reach that judgment. The evidence we obtained about the president's actions and intent presents difficult issues that prevent us from conclusively determining that no criminal conduct occurred. Accordingly, while this report does not conclude that the president committed a crime, it also does not exonerate him. This report on our investigation consists of four parts. Section 1 provides an overview of obstruction of justice principles and summarizes certain investigatory and evidentiary considerations. Section 2 sets forth the factual results of our obstruction investigation and analyzes the evidence. Section 3 addresses statutory and constitutional defenses. Section 4 states our conclusion. End of section 11, recording by Amy Conger, San Francisco, California. Section 12 of report on the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Report on the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election by Robert Mueller. Section 12. Executive Summary to Volume 2. Our obstruction of justice inquiry focused on a series of actions by the president that related to the Russian interference investigations, including the president's conduct towards the law enforcement officials overseeing the investigations and the witnesses to relevant events. Factual results of the obstruction investigation. The key issues and events we examined include the following. The campaign's response to reports about Russian support for Trump. During the 2016 presidential campaign, questions arose about the Russian government's apparent support for candidate Trump. After WikiLeaks released politically damaging Democratic Party emails that were reported to have been hacked by Russia, Trump publicly expressed skepticism that Russia was responsible for the hacks, at the same time that he and other campaign officials privately sought information redacted, harm to ongoing matter, about any further planned WikiLeaks releases. Trump also denied having any business in or connections to Russia, even though, as late as June 2016, the Trump Organization had been pursuing a licensing deal for a skyscraper to be built in Russia called Trump Tower Moscow. After the election, the president expressed concerns to advisors that reports of Russia's election interference might lead the public to question the legitimacy of his election. Conduct involving FBI Director Comey and Michael Flynn. In mid-January 2017, incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn falsely denied to the vice president, other administration officials, and FBI agents that he had talked to Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak about Russia's response to U.S. sanctions on Russia for its election interference. On January 27, the day after the president was told that Flynn had lied to the vice president and had made similar statements to the FBI, the president invited FBI Director Comey to a private dinner at the White House and told Comey that he needed loyalty. On February 14, the day after the president requested Flynn's resignation, the president told an outside advisor, now that we fired Flynn the Russia thing is over. The advisor disagreed and said the investigations would continue. Later that afternoon, the president cleared the Oval Office to have a one-on-one meeting with Comey. Referring to the FBI's investigation of Flynn, the president said, I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go. He's a good guy. I hope you can let this go. Shortly after requesting Flynn's resignation and speaking privately to Comey, the president sought to have Deputy National Security Advisor Katie McFarland draft an internal letter stating that the president had not directed Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak. McFarland declined because she did not know whether that was true, and a White House counsel's office attorney thought that the request would look like a quid pro quo for an ambassadorship she had been offered. The president's reaction to the continuing Russia investigation. In February 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions began to assess whether he had to recuse himself from campaign-related investigations because of his role in the Trump campaign. In early March, the president told the White House counsel, Donald McGahn, to stop Sessions from recusing. And after Sessions announced his recusal on March 2, the president expressed anger at the decision and told advisors that he should have an attorney general who would protect him. That weekend, the president took Sessions aside at an event and urged him to unrequise. Later in March, Comey publicly disclosed at a congressional hearing that the FBI was investigating the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election, including any links or coordination between the Russian government and the Trump campaign. In the following days, the president reached out to the Director of National Intelligence and the leaders of the Central Intelligence Agency, CIA, and the National Security Agency, NSA, to ask them what they could do to publicly dispel the suggestion that the president had any connection to the Russian election interference effort. The president also twice called Comey directly, notwithstanding guidance from McGahn to avoid direct contacts with the Department of Justice. Comey had previously assured the president that the FBI was not investigating him personally, and the president asked Comey to lift the cloud of the Russia investigation by saying that publicly. The President's Termination of Comey On May 3, 2017, Comey testified in a congressional hearing but declined to answer questions about whether the president was personally under investigation. Within days, the president decided to terminate Comey. The president insisted that the termination letter, which was written for public release, state that Comey had informed the president that he was not under investigation. The day of the firing, the White House maintained that Comey's termination resulted from independent recommendations from the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General that Comey should be discharged from his handling the Hillary Clinton email investigation. But the president had decided to fire Comey before hearing from the Department of Justice. The day after firing Comey, the president told Russian officials that he had faced great pressure because of Russia, which had been taken off by Comey's firing. The next day, the president acknowledged in a television interview that he was going to fire Comey regardless of the Department of Justice's recommendation, and that when he decided to just do it, he was thinking that this thing with Trump and Russia is a made-up story. In a response to a question about whether he was angry with Comey about the Russia investigation, the president said, As far as I'm concerned, I want that thing to be absolutely done properly, adding that firing Comey might even lengthen out the investigation. The appointment of a special counsel and efforts to remove him. On May 17, 2017, the acting Attorney General for the Russia investigation appointed a special counsel to conduct the investigation and related matters. The president reacted to the news that a special counsel had been appointed by telling advisors that it was the end of his presidency and demanding that Sessions resign. Sessions submitted his resignation, but the president ultimately did not accept it. The president told aides that the special counsel had conflicts of interest and suggested that the special counsel therefore could not serve. The president's advisors told him the asserted conflicts were meritless and had already been considered by the Department of Justice. On June 14, 2017, the media reported that the special counsel's office was investigating whether the president had obstructed justice. Press reports called this a major turning point in the investigation. While Comey had told the president he was not under investigation, following Comey's firing, the president now was under investigation. The president reacted to this news with a series of tweets criticizing the Department of Justice and the special counsel's investigation. On June 17, 2017, the president called McGahn at home and directed him to call the acting Attorney General and say that the special counsel had conflicts of interest and must be removed. McGahn did not carry out the direction, however, deciding that he would resign rather than trigger what he regarded as a potential Saturday Night Massacre. Efforts to curtail the special counsel's investigation. Two days after directing McGahn to have the special counsel removed, the president made another attempt to affect the course of the Russia investigation. On June 19, 2017, the president met one-on-one in the Oval Office with his former campaign manager, Corey Lewandowski, a trusted adviser outside the government, and directed a message for Lewandowski to deliver to Sessions. The message said that Sessions should publicly announce that, notwithstanding his recusal from the Russia investigation, the investigation was very unfair to the president. The president had done nothing wrong and Sessions planned to meet with the special counsel and let him move forward with investigating election meddling for future elections. Lewandowski said he understood what the president wanted Sessions to do. One month later, in another private meeting with Lewandowski on July 19, 2017, the president asked about the status of his message for Sessions to limit the special counsel investigation to future election interference. Lewandowski told the president that the message would be delivered soon. Hours after that meeting, the president publicly criticized Sessions in an interview with the New York Times, and then issued a series of tweets, making it clear that Sessions' job was in jeopardy. Lewandowski did not want to deliver the president's message personally, so he asked senior White House official Rick Dearborn to deliver it to Sessions. Dearborn was uncomfortable with the task and did not follow through. Efforts to Prevent Public Disclosure of Evidence In the summer of 2017, the president learned that media outlets were asking questions about the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between senior campaign officials, including Donald Trump Jr., and a Russian lawyer who was said to be offering damaging information about Hillary Clinton as part of Russia and its government support for Mr. Trump. On several occasions, the president's directed aides not to publicly disclose the emails setting up the June 9 meeting, suggesting that the emails would not leak and that the number of lawyers with access to them should be limited. Before the emails became public, the president edited a press statement for Trump Jr. by deleting a line that acknowledged that the meeting was with an individual who Trump Jr. was told might have information helpful to the campaign. And instead said only that the meeting was about adoptions of Russian children. When the press asked questions about the president's involvement in Trump Jr.'s statement, the president's personal lawyer repeatedly denied the president had played any role. Further efforts to have the Attorney General take control of the investigation. In early summer 2017, the president called sessions at home and again asked him to reverse his recusal from the Russia investigation. Sessions did not reverse his recusal. In October 2017, the president met privately with sessions in the Oval Office and asked him to take a look at investigating Clinton. In December 2017, shortly after Flynn pleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation agreement, the president met with Sessions in the Oval Office and suggested, according to notes taken by a senior advisor, that if Sessions unrecused and took back supervision of the Russia investigation, he would be a hero. The president told Sessions, I'm not going to do anything or direct you to do anything. I just want to be treated fairly. In response, Sessions volunteered that he had never seen anything improper on the campaign and told the president there was a whole new leadership team in place. He did not unrequise. Efforts to have McGahn deny that the president had ordered him to have the special counsel removed. In early 2018, the press reported that the president had directed McGahn to have the special counsel removed in June 2017 and that McGahn had threatened to resign rather than carry out the order. The president reacted to the news stories by directing White House officials to tell McGahn to dispute the story and create a record stating that he had not been ordered to have the special counsel removed. McGahn told those officials that the media reports were accurate in stating that the president had directed McGahn to have the special counsel removed. The president then met with McGahn in the Oval Office and again pressured him to deny the reports. In the same meeting, the president also asked McGahn why he had told the special counsel about the president's effort to remove the special counsel and why McGahn took notes of his conversations with the president. McGahn refused to back away from what he remembered happening and perceived the president to be testing his mettle. Conduct towards Flynn, Manafort. Redacted. Harm to ongoing matter. After Flynn withdrew from a joint defense agreement with the president and began cooperating with the government, the president's personal counsel left a message for Flynn's attorneys reminding them of the president's warm feelings towards Flynn, which he said still remains, and asking for a heads up if Flynn knew information that implicates the president. When Flynn's counsel reiterated that Flynn could no longer share information pursuant to a joint defense agreement, the president's personal counsel said he would make sure that the president knew that Flynn's actions reflected hostility toward the president. During Manafort's prosecution and when the jury in his criminal trial was deliberating, the president praised Manafort in public, said that Manafort was being treated unfairly and declined to rule out a pardon. After Manafort was convicted, the president called Manafort a brave man for refusing to break and said that flipping almost ought to be outlawed. Redacted. Harm to ongoing matter. Conduct involving Michael Cohen. The president's conduct toward Michael Cohen, a former Trump Organization executive, changed from praise to Cohen when he falsely minimized the president's involvement in the Trump Tower Moscow Project to castigation of Cohen when he became a cooperating witness. From September 2015 to June 2016, Cohen had pursued the Trump Tower Moscow Project on behalf of the Trump Organization and had briefed candidate Trump on the project numerous times, including discussing whether Trump should travel to Russia to advance the deal. In 2017 Cohen provided false testimony to Congress about the project, including stating that he had only briefed Trump on the project three times and never discussed travel to Russia with him in an effort to adhere to a party line that Cohen said was developed to minimize the president's connection to Russia. While preparing for his congressional testimony, Cohen had extensive discussions with the president's personal counsel, who, according to Cohen, said that Cohen should stay on message and not contradict the president. After the FBI searched Cohen's home and office in April 2018, the president publicly asserted that Cohen would not flip, contacted him directly to tell him to stay strong, and privately passed messages of support to him. Cohen also discussed pardons with the president's personal counsel and believed that if he stayed on message he would be taken care of. But after Cohen began cooperating with the government in the summer of 2018, the president publicly criticized him, called him a rat, and suggested that his family members had committed crimes. Overarching Factual Issues We did not make a traditional prosecution decision about these facts, but the evidence we obtained supports several general statements about the president's conduct. Several features of the conduct we investigated distinguish it from typical obstruction of justice cases. First, the investigation concerned the president, and some of his actions, such as firing the FBI director, involved facially lawful acts within his Article II authority, which raises constitutional issues discussed below. At the same time, the president's position as the head of the executive branch provided him with unique and powerful means of influencing official proceedings, subordinate officers, and potential witnesses. Which is relevant to a potential obstruction of justice analysis. Second, unlike cases in which a subject engages in obstruction of justice to cover up a crime, the evidence we obtained did not establish that the president was involved in an underlying crime related to Russian election interference. Although the obstruction statutes do not require proof of such a crime, the absence of that evidence affects the analysis of the president's intent, and requires consideration of other possible motives for his conduct. Third, many of the president's acts directed at witnesses, including discouragement of cooperation with the government and suggestions of possible future pardons, took place in public view. That circumstance is unusual, but no principle of law excludes public acts from the reach of the obstruction laws. If the likely effect of public acts is to influence witnesses, or alter their testimony, the harm to the justice system's integrity is the same. Although the series of events we investigated involved discrete acts, the overall pattern of the president's conduct towards the investigations can shed light on the nature of the president's acts and the inferences that can be drawn about his intent. In particular, the actions we investigated can be divided into two phases, reflecting a possible shift in the president's motives. The first phase covered the period from the president's first interactions with Comey through the president's firing of Comey. During that time, the president had been repeatedly told he was not personally under investigation. Soon after the firing of Comey and the appointment of the special counsel, however, the president became aware that his own conduct was being investigated in an obstruction of justice inquiry. At that point, the president engaged in a second phase of conduct, involving public attacks on the investigation, non-public efforts to control it, and efforts in both public and private to encourage witnesses not to cooperate with the investigation. Judgments about the nature of the president's motive during each phase would be informed by the totality of the evidence. Statutory and constitutional defenses The president's counsel raised statutory and constitutional defenses to a possible obstruction of justice analysis of the conduct we investigated. We concluded that none of those legal defenses provided a basis for declining to investigate the facts. Statutory defenses Consistent with precedent in the Department of Justice's general approach to interpreting obstruction statutes, we concluded that several statutes could apply here. C. Section 1512, subsection C2, is an omnibus obstruction of justice provision that covers a range of obstructive acts directed at pending or contemplated official proceedings. No principle of statutory construction justifies narrowing the provision to cover only conduct that impairs the integrity or availability of evidence. Sections 1503 and 1505 also offer broad protection against obstructive acts directed at pending grand jury, judicial, administrative, and congressional proceedings. And they are supplemented by a provision in section 1512, subsection B, aimed specifically at conduct intended to prevent or hinder the communication to law enforcement of information related to a federal crime. Constitutional defenses As for constitutional defenses arising from the President's status as the head of the Executive Branch, we recognized that the Department of Justice and the courts have not definitively resolved these issues. We therefore examined those issues through the framework established by Supreme Court precedent governing separation of powers issues. The Department of Justice and the President's personal counsel have recognized that the President is subject to statutes that prohibit obstruction of justice by bribing a witness or subordinating perjury because that conduct does not implicate his constitutional authority. With respect to whether the President can be found to have obstructed justice by exercising his powers under Article II of the Constitution, we concluded that Congress has the authority to prohibit a President's corrupt use of his authority in order to protect the integrity of the Administration of Justice. Under applicable Supreme Court precedent, the Constitution does not categorically and permanently immunize a President for obstructing justice through the use of his Article II powers. The separation of powers doctrine authorizes Congress to protect official proceedings, including those of courts and grand juries from corrupt obstructive acts regardless of their source. We also concluded that any inroad on Presidential authority that would occur from prohibiting corrupt acts does not undermine the President's ability to fulfill his constitutional mission. The term corruptly sets a demanding standard. It requires a concrete showing that a person acted with an intent to obtain an improper advantage for himself or someone else inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others. A preclusion of corrupt official action does not diminish the President's ability to exercise Article II powers. For example, the proper supervision of criminal law does not demand freedom for the President to act with a corrupt intention of shielding himself from criminal punishment, avoiding financial liability, or preventing personal embarrassment. To the contrary, a statute that prohibits official action undertaken for such corrupt purposes furthers, rather than hinders, the impartial and even-handed Administration of the Law. It also aligns with the President's constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws. Finally, we concluded that in the rare case in which a criminal investigation of the President's conduct is justified, inquiries to determine whether the President acted for a corrupt motive should not impermissibly chill his performance of his constitutionally assigned duties. The conclusion that Congress may apply the obstruction laws to the President's corrupt exercise of the powers of office, accords with our constitutional systems of checks and balances, and the principle that no person is above the law. Conclusion Because we determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial judgment, we did not draw ultimate conclusions about the President's conduct. The evidence we obtained about the President's actions and intent presents difficult issues that would need to be resolved if we were making a traditional prosecutorial judgment. At the same time, if we had confidence, after a thorough investigation of the facts, that the President clearly did not commit obstruction of justice, we would so state, Based on the facts and the applicable legal standards, we are unable to reach that judgment. Accordingly, while this report does not conclude that the President committed a crime, it also does not exonerate him. End of Section 12