 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the areas that I've had some concerns about is Iran's both direct and through proxies influence in Syria and Lebanon. And in fact, I was able to secure provision in the fiscal year 2020 Intelligence Authorization Act to ask the DNI to report to us a bit about those efforts by Iran and how those efforts might impact U.S. interests and our allies, including Israel. I was wondering if you all could provide me with a bit of an update on Iran's efforts to expand its influence in Syria and Lebanon? Yes, ma'am. I'll begin with Lebanon. As I spoke a little bit earlier, Iran sees Lebanon as the terminus of a land bridge to the Mediterranean that gives them a perch from which they can launch attacks on Israel. So their interest in Lebanon is wholly transactional and is limited to that. Now they exercise influence in Lebanon through Lebanese Hizballah LH, a shadow organization that we recognize has penetrated many aspects of Lebanese society, but then again doesn't actually do much for the Lebanese. Our response to that is, at my level, at the mill to mill level, despite many other things we're doing for the government of Lebanon writ large, is we work very hard to sustain the Lebanese armed forces as the single military representative of the properly constituted government of Lebanon. It is not a perfect relationship, but I believe in the long term our best solution and the strategy that we follow is to assist that armed force. I speak to the Chief of Defense of Lebanon frequently and I believe that they remain our best opportunity to balance the other nefarious actors that are in Lebanon. If we turn to Syria, again, Iran's interest in Syria, wholly transactional, wholly negative, it is the sort of middle part of a land bridge that allows them to get into Israel. It also serves as a staging place for potential attacks against Israel and it allows them also to stage for operations inside Iraq, which is a long term focus of Syrian foreign policy and military strategy. Great, thank you. And then just shifting a little bit. You know, the Wall Street Journal reported yesterday that Saudi Arabia is considering accepting the Chinese Yuan as payment for oil exports, which currently only accepts US dollars. And this is following up on news that Saudi Arabia had invited the Chinese president to visit the kingdom on an official trip. You know, I think when I think about the prospect of a growing Saudi Chinese relationship. It's a little concerning, especially given the historical partnership between the United States and the kingdom. What's your assessment of current Saudi Chinese relations and the impact that it could have on the United States relationship as well as our influence in the region? Ma'am, I can only talk really in my lane at the mill to mill level, but I will note that I have a good relationship with the Saudi chief of defense. We talk frequently. It is my belief that we remain the preferred partner of choice for the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. They want our equipment and they want more than our equipment, which is demonstrably the best available. They want the training, the education and all the things that come with a partnership with America. As for outreach to the Chinese and what they might do with oil sales there, probably not my lane to answer. I'll defer to Ms. Baker on that. Yeah, I mean, I agree completely with everything that General McKenzie has said. The only thing I would add, perhaps by way of context, it's clear to us I think that strategic competition has come to the Middle East and perhaps has been there for quite some time. And so we do see China and Russia, but particularly China looking for economic and other inroads with some of our partners and allies. As General McKenzie said from a defense perspective, we believe that those relationships are strong, that we remain the partner of choice and that there are things that we bring to the table and that we're offering to partners and allies in the region that frankly China and others can't match. Thank you and I yield back. Mr. Waltz has recognized for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General McKenzie, thank you again for your services, Great Nation and Semper Fi. I just have a pretty straightforward question for you on Afghanistan. Just given how the withdrawal, not the 20 years, not the mistakes that we've made, but given how this withdrawal was conducted, which I think most would say was a bit of a debacle. Any regrets? I think the end game for Afghanistan that played out in the summer of 2021, those events didn't begin in the spring of 2021 or the summer of 2021, you've got to look all the way back for that. Certainly I regret that we no longer have the ability to be as effective as we would like to be on the ground in Afghanistan and the CT mission. We're doing that over the horizon. As I've said, it's much harder to do that over the horizon and I'll talk in great detail about that in the closed session. So I certainly regret that we no longer have that opportunity. I've spoken with a number of the 13 Gold Star families who are now without their loved ones because of an ISIS fighter suicide bomber that was released from Bagram prison just weeks before. I just received notes from Afghan women who served in the military alongside us that are being hunted down right now with the database that we left behind with the payroll database. No regrets there? Nothing we could have done differently in terms of how we exited? I think you go back to the basic strategic decision that we were leaving and everything else flows from that basic strategic decision that we're going to leave and we're going to leave completely and everything flows from that. And was that the right decision in your view? I have my opinion has been and I've stated it publicly that we should have retained a small presence in Afghanistan. I argued for 4,500 in the fall of 2020 and as we went into the spring of 2021 it was my opinion and remains my opinion today that about 2,500 would have given us adequate forces on the ground to retain an advising capability. I appreciate that and I appreciate you reminding this committee of that because I think we are going to come to regret this decision and I think it's going to be felt on the home land and it's going to be felt by future American soldiers that have to go fight their way back in to deal with it. Miss Baker along those lines the FY22 NDAA required an over the horizon strategy within 60 days of passage. That was about a month ago. You're a month late. Where's that strategy? Congressman, I don't know the exact progress of that strategy. I'd be happy to look into it and get you an answer. You don't know the progress of an over the horizon strategy required by law. The President of the United States has cited over the horizon strategy. Secretary Austin, your boss here, the last time he was here said we can do over the horizon. We can keep America safe. I'm in my district saying the administration says we can do this even though it was a special operator, I know better. What's the status? General McKenzie, have you chopped on it and send it up to OSD? That strategy is working right now. We have had the opportunity to work on that strategy and we actually have a practical strategy that's in effect right now. Again, something I'd be happy to talk about in the closed session. Congressman, if I could just clarify, we do have a strategy for over the horizon. What I was referring to is the specific report. I don't know what the status of that report is, but I will get you an answer. Okay. Let's take a step back. We just had a successful strike against the leader of ISIS, the successor in Syria. As I've stated in this committee before, but I think it's worth repeating, we had local allies that helped with that. Correct? The Kurds. We have bases in the region and Jordan, Turkey, Israel, Northern Iraq. Right? Sir, I would still characterize that strike. As you know, I'm the officer who did it. Would you characterize that as over the horizon? That is over the horizon. Okay. I would characterize that as over the horizon. Let's look at the map again. Do we have any bases in any neighboring country in Afghanistan? No, the difference is, as you note, the distances are far greater going into Afghanistan. Conceptually, it's the same thing. The distances are greater. The risk will be higher, and you're well aware of that, sir. Right. Are we still reliant on Pakistan for overflight of our ISR assets? There's no other way to get into Afghanistan for me right now. Pakistan has historically supported the Taliban, correct? They have also supported us. The airline of communication is a direct reflect of Pakistan support of us. But it's a bit like asking the arsonist for access for the fire department to put out the fire should the homeland be threatened again. We are reliant, just to be clear, we are reliant on Pakistan for that overflight. Otherwise, we've got to fight our way in. We are reliant on Pakistan, but as you know, we always reserve the right to defend ourselves anywhere in the world. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield. Thank you. Mr. Crowe was recognized for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all of you for your service to the country and for coming in, and particularly General Townsend and General McKenzie in your last appearance here before the committee. I applaud you for your long and honorable service to the country. General McKenzie, I understand very deeply that decisions are made here in Washington, and strategic decisions are made, and the military has to carry it out. And I'm going to thank you for your service and candor before this committee and the American people on Afghanistan and related issues in General Townsend. As much as I want to start with you as a fellow Ranger, I'm actually going to start and direct my comments to Ms. Baker. Ms. Baker, what is the timeline for the national defense strategy? When can we expect to have that released by the administration? Congressman, I can't provide you with the specific data. I can tell you that it is in final coordination, and we are hopeful to get it over to you all and out to the public very soon. Okay. And has that been held up because of the recent events in Ukraine? Congressman, I think it's only appropriate for us to take a look at what's happened in Ukraine and make sure that we're reflecting that in the strategy. I will say that the NDS, as it's been developed over the course of the last year, we believe is very resilient to current events and, in fact, continues to sort of, the bones of it are going to remain unchanged. I can certainly appreciate that and appreciate that you are taking into account some of the current events as well that have changed the landscape a bit. Focusing in on Africa, you know, we have this notion, this proclivity to kind of look at China as 10 feet tall sometimes, and certainly they're making big investments, and it would be a mistake for us to underestimate them, but they're also making a lot of mistakes, right? And the use of Chinese labor, predatory economics, there's a lot of disenchantment that's growing within Africa in some places, so they certainly have their weak points. And we have our strengths. One of our strengths is the fact that we have a larger value proposition we can bring to the table, economic, humanitarian, you know, our moral authority, a lot of things. How would you classify, very briefly, what is the elevator pitch for what is U.S.'s strategy in Africa? How would you explain our strategic posture in Africa and our goals? Congressman, I'd invite General Townsend to add to this. I think we have three goals in Africa right now. One is counter-VEO, and we do that by, within, through our partners. The second is, to that same point, we are working to strengthen those partnerships and strengthen them. I don't mean to interrupt. Those are things to do, those are tasks, enablers. What is our overarching goal? How do we want to be known in Africa, and how would you classify our engagement? Congressman, I mean, I certainly think that our goal in Africa is to be the continent's strategic partner of choice. So with that in mind, from your purchase of DOD, and U.S. government often has silos, right? State Department has their silo in their lane, DOD, USAID. If our value proposition is to coordinate all of that and bring that all to bear in a way that our force multiplies each of those elements, how can we better do that, and what are the impediments to achieving that right now? Congressman, I think we're always working to break down those silos, as you well know from your time in Uniform. I will say, I think in General Townsend, again, can jump in here, but it works better in the AFRICOM AOR, the integration of our defense diplomacy and development efforts, the fact that General Townsend has folks from USAID and states sitting right beside him at his headquarters. So I think we've made a lot of progress in AFRICOM, and frankly, they're things we can learn from AFRICOM and apply to other co-coms. So I think she's got our strategic goal exactly right. We want to be the strategic partner of choice. That translates into U.S., sustained U.S. access and influence on the continent, and that will come in handy in a million ways that we can't even foresee today. Regarding the integration of, you know, the breaking down of the silos, we try really hard to do that every day in AFRICOM. Dr. Baker has mentioned the fact that we have a 3D command built that way, purpose built that way from the start. One of my most senior leaders is a senior State Department ambassador. I've got a senior development advisor from USAID. We look at everything through that 3D lens every day to be the strategic partner of choice and maintain U.S. access and influence. Thank you. I appreciate everyone's hard work. I yield back. Thank you. Just programming note, as I mentioned at one o'clock, we will have a classified brief upstairs on Ukraine. So we'll be closing, we'll be concluding this at 12.45 to give the committee any more time to sort of move up and get settled. We'll wrap this open hearing up at 12.45, and of course we'll be seeing all of these folks again at 2.30 for the classified portion of it. Mr. Bergman is recognized for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General McKenzie, General Townsend, thank you for your decades of leadership. It takes leadership to do what we need to do. Ms. Baker, General McKenzie, let me lay out a scenario for you. Under the 2015 JCPOA, Russia removed all excess low-enriched uranium and nuclear materials from Iran. If a similar requirement exists in a new deal, and if Iran subsequently believes the agreement has been violated, or that it has not received the promised sanctions relief, could Russia be in a position to return enriched uranium to Iran? In essence, would that potentially put Vladimir Putin in the position of being the de facto judge of compliance with a new agreement? Congressman, as you know, there is no agreement yet. Again, it was a scenario. Understood. We don't know whether Russia will play that role in a future agreement. Certainly, in whatever agreement is reached, if an agreement is reached, we would seek to pressure test it against any kind of interference of that kind from the Russians. To this point, we have not seen any indication, though, that they intend to act in that way. Okay. General McKenzie, in an unclassway, given the ongoing need to deploy U.S. air defenses to Europe, how do you assess our, the United States' ability to deploy and or sustain similar systems in the Middle East as a stopgap to help defend our Gulf allies, or at least until they are much better able to defend themselves? So over the last few years, we have worked closely with our Gulf allies to expand their ability to defend themselves. And in fact, some of those countries have very, very significant air defense inventories. Saudi Arabia has over 20 patriot batteries. UAE has a number of patriot batteries as well. And as you know, UAE actually possesses THAAD, the high-altitude system, which was tested successfully just last month. So we work, the way that we actually accommodate the basic fact of life that we don't have enough U.S. patriots to service all of our needs globally is through enhanced cooperation with our allies. We're still there. We still have patriots in the theater. We still work with them. But what you do is you try to think about the way nations can cooperate with each other. And I'll talk a little bit more about that in the closed session. But there is a path forward. And really, you know, the countries in the region are the ones that are directly threatened by the Iranian threat. They are focused, I believe, in a way they have never been focused before by the eminence of that threat. The fact that the quality and number of the Iranian missiles and LACMs and land-attack cruise missiles and UAVs is very concerning to them. So there's a real convergence of interest on the part of our partners now. Okay. And basically, I think my next question is going to be best answered in the closed, classified session about the engagement with our partners. You kind of alluded to that in the preparation and the training and the cooperation to confront and deter a nuclear Iran should that possibility become a potential reality. So with that, Mr. Chairman, I'll yield back and save my questions for the classified session. Thank you. Mr. Carpahall is recognized for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And General Townsend and General McKinsey, thank you for your many years of service to our country. I say that with great gratitude for the American people. We're lucky to have had you in your posts. And thank you, Secretary Baker, for your service now. General McKinsey, I applaud the department's commitment to improve its policy in order to better protect civilians, especially with Secretary Austin's new memorandum entitled Improving Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response. As we have seen several times just in this year alone, the U.S. tragically can get it wrong sometimes. With this new memorandum from the Secretary, including standing up a civilian protection center for excellence and issuing a forthcoming civilian harm mitigation response action plan, how do you believe this directive will impact the AOR's operations going forward? Sir, thank you for the question. I'd like to begin by saying nobody wearing this uniform ever wants to kill an innocent civilian. Nobody ever wants to do that. There's nothing that is more completely antithetical from the way we operate. We have made mistakes and we have killed innocent civilians and we acknowledge that and we're going to do everything we can to get better and narrow that gap between our ideals and our actions. I would tell you, with Secretary Austin, it is much more than a memorandum. It is the energy he has brought to the problem. I have several officers that are full-time committed to a study that's going on right now that will form the basis for future actions. But in the meantime, we're not waiting on that study as a result of the RAND study and other studies that have come out. We have undertaken a set of things in the short term to improve our own processes within Central Command as General Townsend has within Africa Command. So we don't want to minimize this problem. We recognize that it is in fact a significant and a critical problem that cuts right to the very heart of what we want to do as representatives of the United States. Thank you. General Townsend, African nations are increasingly influential in the United Nations and other international forums. Currently three of 15 United Nations Security Council seats are held by African nations with the K&U ambassador giving an extremely powerful speech at the UNSC meeting regarding Ukraine. Unfortunately, there is a lot of public misunderstanding about the AOR. You have been commander of AFRICOM for over two and a half years now. What are some of the misconceptions you hear from both American officials and the American public about the AOR? And how can we approach the AOR in a more productive and effective manner? Thanks, Congressman. I think some of the main misconceptions are probably that, first of all, Africa doesn't really matter to us, that we don't have to worry about Africa. And maybe America has been able to largely ignore Africa in the past, but that's not the future. That's why I said in my opening statement, America cannot ignore Africa. So that's probably the number one misconception. Then I think they don't understand that we have a lot of interest and a lot of partners there every day. We have a great relationship with much of Africa. We are the partner of choice for much of Africa and just educating the American public on that. You mentioned the vote in Ukraine and you're right. The Kenyan ambassador did give a powerful speech and he voted to condemn what the Russians were doing there. But I'm a little dismayed about much of the rest of the continent. About half of the continent voted to condemn Russia. The other half either abstained or did not vote. And that concerns me a bit. Only one country, though, did vote in support of Russia, Eritrea. But the other one half of the continent didn't really cast a vote and that concerns me a bit. But many of the countries that we are the strongest partners with did join us in the world in condemning Russia. So I think the future for this country's security is in Africa and we have to lean into it. Thank you. General Townsend and Secretary Baker. Around the world, violent extremism has been a very difficult problem to address. In particular, in the AFRICOM AOR. From a report on recent trends in militant Islamic group activity in Africa, the past few years it appears there has been an alarming increase in violent events by these groups, including al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda in the Islamic McRib area. What is the biggest impediment to being able to better address these threats? Do you think the U.S. needs to amend our strategy in the AOR? Congressman, I'll start and then of course turn to General Townsend. You know, I think the challenge that we face in the AFRICOM AOR and part of what's driving the growth in BEOs is challenges of underlying governance and underlying security. And so a lot of our effort in the AOR is dedicated towards institutional capacity building, building that security. I think General Townsend's time has expired. I should point to that even if you're answering the question. We try to wrap up as close as possible to respect other members' time. Mr. Banks is recognized for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General McKenzie, the original JCPOA was finalized in July of 2015. Iran tested missiles in October 2015 before the deal was even implemented in January of 2016. All of this directly contradicted the Obama Administration's objective to change Iran's behavior for better through the deal. Then after the implementation of the JCPOA in January 2016, Iran tested missiles again in March of 2016. General Lloyd Austin, the then Commander of CENTCOM, said in a Senate hearing at the time that despite the JCPOA quote, there are a number of things that lead me to personally believe that, you know, their behavior is not, they haven't changed any course yet, end quote. General McKenzie, six years later, do you agree with then General Austin's assessment of Iran's behavior following the implementation of the JCPOA? With regard to ballistic missiles, Korea's missiles lack them. It didn't change their behavior. It is not, their behavior has not changed. Do you think that the Islamic Republic of Iran will ever give up its revisionist intentions in the region? And if not, what does a successful counter Iran policy look like? Well, I think you begin by Iran not possessing nuclear weapons, and that needs to be an overarching, that's our overarching goal. I think it's better for everyone if Iran doesn't have a nuclear weapon. You should then try to find ways to bring their ballistic missiles, the other elements of their national power that they value very highly under some form of control. And you're right, they have proven extremely resistant to that up until this time. I appreciate that candidness. The Center for Strategic and International Studies reported on August 10, 2021, that Iran possesses the largest and most diverse missile arsenal in the Middle East, and is a major hub for weapons proliferation. If some form of the JCPOA is restored, how do you expect Iran to behave regarding missile proliferation amongst partner and proxy groups? Based on past behavior, I would expect not much modification in that behavior. And can you tell us specifically how St. Com is prepared to deal with that? So we work to prevent their successful attacks by working with our partners for integrated air and missile defense across the theater by enhancing the capabilities of all our partners air defense, air defenses in effect. And that's the best way to do it. I would also argue that Iran knows that if they strike us, we're prepared to respond very powerfully if need be. So we attempt to achieve deterrence. And that has largely worked over the past couple of years. You know, I note the attack last weekend, but let me emphasize again that attack was actually not directed at us. Understood. General, as one of his first foreign policy initiatives, President Biden delisted the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen as a foreign terrorist organization. But instead of de-escalating tension, the Houthis doubled their attacks on Saudi Arabia in 2021 and occupied the U.S. Embassy compound in Sana'a and took the local staff hostage. In late 2021 and early 2022, the Houthis also attacked UAE three times, killing three people. In the way the Houthis have conducted themselves, General, do you think that the Houthis are terrorists? I would defer to policy, Ms. Baker, for a discussion about the delisting decision. But I can tell you from an operational military perspective, they continue to wage war on their neighbors, both Saudi Arabia and UAE, and they wage irresponsible, reckless war without regard for casualties. I understand as well that you would probably defer, as I ask, why do you think the Iran-backed Houthis increase hostility since the Biden administration delisted them as a foreign terrorist organization? I'm sorry, could you say that again, please? Well, why do you think that the Iran-backed Houthis increase their hostility after the Biden administration delisted them as a foreign terrorist organization? I think the Houthis still believe there's a military means to achieve their end. I don't believe they're right in that, but it doesn't matter what I think, it's what they think. How does CENTCOM plan to address the Houthis' behavior moving forward? So we have worked closely with both our UAE partners in the wake of this most recent attack. We sent fifth generation fighters to UAE. We've moved a ballistic missile defense capable destroyer to the vicinity of UAE. We've conducted refueling of UAE fighters that are flying combat air patrol, and we've shared intelligence with UAE on this. So we've done some very discreet, measurable things to help our partners in UAE. I got 30 seconds left. Ms. Baker, why did the Biden administration delist the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization? Congressman, you know, I think no one in the administration, certainly no one in the department, takes lightly the threat that the Houthis pose in the region. And as General McKenzie said, we are attempting to get after that problem, and we are providing any number of avenues of support both to the UAE and to the Saudis. This is outrageous. With that, I yield back. Thank you. Ms. Spear has recognized for five minutes. Mr. Chairman, General McKenzie and Townsend, we can't begin to thank you enough for your extraordinary service, but know that we are very grateful. Let me start with the report that was just released a few days ago detailing the significant failures in training and physical security at the U.S. cooperative security location in Kenya where we lost a service member and two DOD contractors. It was alarming to read that there was inadequate focus on force protection, inadequate understanding of the threat, inadequate security force preparation, and problems with mission command. What has that taught us in terms of looking at other cooperative facilities in Africa as to our responsibility to harden them in terms of security? Thanks, ma'am. Well, first let me say we certainly regret the loss of the lives of our three Americans there at Manda Bay. We've studied this situation in great detail over the last two years and have applied the lessons learned across the African continent. All the things you mentioned that are in that report were all true, regretfully so. I think they go back, they stem back to incorrect threat assessments. So when commanders and leaders look at threat assessments, that's their first understanding, and that can lead them down the wrong path. So are you saying now that all of our facilities in Africa have been hardened and have greater protection, or do we have some areas where we need to do more, and should you alert us to those? All of our facilities have been improved since the attack at Manda Bay. We applied those lessons across all of them. However, we do have to continue that work. We've got to improve our foxhole every day. That work continues, and we do have requirements in that area. All right, thank you. Ms. Baker, in the NDA last year, an amendment that I authored to request the status of African women, excuse me, Afghan women and girls since the Taliban takeover was due March 1st. We haven't received it. When will we receive that? Congressman, I don't know the status of that specific report, but I would be glad to look into it and make sure we get it to you. All right, would you report back to the committee then as to when we can expect that report? Yes, absolutely. All right. Ms. Baker and General McKenzie, as far back as October, DOD said it would be making payments to the families of those who were killed on the August 29th drone attack. Can you tell us the status of those payments? Ma'am, we're moving forward with those payments in the interagency. I can talk a little bit more about it in the closed session. CENTCOM stands ready to carry out instructions on how to execute those payments once a decision is made. Well, I thought we already made a decision to make payments to those families. The modality of the payment and how it's actually going to be executed. So are you saying that there hasn't been any payments made to these families yet? Congressman, I just want to be a little careful about what we discuss in the public session because we don't want to put these families at further risk. But we'd be happy to get you that information and talk about it in the closed session this afternoon. I just want to make sure that when we make a commitment, we deliver on it. We have a history of not doing that, so I have your word that we are going to deliver to those families. This has the attention of the highest of our leadership, yes. Can any of you tell us the extent of RT in Africa? The extent of what, ma'am? I didn't catch it. Russia today? Right. So I can't specifically talk about that particular media outlet. I can say this. Russia has extensive media engagement on the continent. And that is greatly facilitated by Yevgeny Progosian, the oligarch, and his media arm in addition to, you know, he has the Wagner mercenaries, but he's got a media arm that does that. You know, I do think our committee has to take very seriously the impact of RT around the world. I just came back from Latin America where not only is it pervasive and ubiquitous, it is perceived to be objective. It is perceived to be just a legitimate TV network. And General Lady's time has expired. She makes an outstanding point, however, on the need to engage in the information warfare. Mr. Gates has recognized for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I completely concur with my colleague regarding the risk that RT poses. And it seems to appear more legitimate and objective when members of Congress go on RT. And so I associate myself with the General Lady's comments, and perhaps she could share them with the gentleman from California who chairs the Intelligence Committee who I've seen on RT talking about legislation, giving them credibility. Ms. Baker. Will the gentleman yield? I don't have a few moments, but I'd love to chat with you about it further. Ms. Baker, you said in response to Congresswoman Beis's questions, we've heard Israel's concerns about the JCPOA. What are they? Congressman, I think Israel remains concerned as do we all about Iran's malign activity in the region beyond its nuclear program, and that's something that we discuss with them regularly. So their concern is a better resourced Iran, whether through sanctions relief or cash payments, would be more capable in taking action against Israel? Does that surmise there? Congressman, that is my understanding, yes. And can we learn anything about whether or not cash payments are on the table as part of a renewed JCPOA? Congressman, I'm not able to discuss the details of the agreement only because there is no agreement that has been reached at this point. I think there has been progress made toward an agreement, but of course the issues that are remaining are some of the most complex. I understand that in a negotiation, nothing is settled until everything is settled, but there are contours of an agreement as we get closer to it. And since the administration has been working on an Iran deal, I was wondering whether or not we could take off the table infusions of cash. Because when I asked General McKenzie some years ago whether or not the cash payments that the Obama administration permitted to Iran increased that very malign activity that Israel is concerned about, that we're concerned about, his answer was that there was more malign activity following the last JCPOA. Again, Congressman, I understand the concern. I'm just not able to discuss specifics of the agreement that's being negotiated by the State Department. So you're not in position to be able to say the cash payments are off the table? I'm not in a position to be able to discuss the specifics of the agreement in any form. General Townsend, is Vladimir Putin bringing African mercenaries to the fight in Ukraine? I've heard those reports. We haven't seen that yet. We're watching for that very closely. However, I do believe they are bringing Wagner fighters from Africa to Ukraine. And General McKenzie, have you seen Vladimir Putin successfully bring Syrian mercenaries to the fight in Ukraine? Not yet. We watched that closely. I can't say one or two people haven't gone, but we haven't seen any systemic movement. Great. I'll yield the remainder of my time to my Florida colleague, Mr. Franklin. Thank you, Mr. Walts. General, in your testimony and throughout your statement – sorry, General McKenzie – in your written testimony here today and throughout the questioning, you've made it clear that you consider Iran to be the biggest threat to stability in the SENTCOM AOR. During my travels throughout the region and most recently in Israel two weeks ago, the recurring theme is the malign influence of Iran's proxies. You also spoke of those in your testimony. Do you consider the IRGC to be one of the drivers and facilitators of these proxies? The IRGC and its elite element that could force absolutely at the very heart of these activities. Okay, sir. It's been reported and as recently as yesterday in the press that the Biden Administration is considering delisting. The IRGC is a terror organization. I know that decision involves a lot of factors that are beyond your lane, but strictly on your military advice, do you think that would be a good idea? I'll defer on that one. I would not – I think they certainly are very disruptive and dangerous in the region. That remains my best military advice and we should treat them like that. And if they are emboldened or strengthened, do you think that would make them more formidable? I think anything you do to embolden or strengthen them would have a negative effect across the region. Sir, okay. Echoing some of my other colleagues here with respect to Israel, people we met with there were crystal clear that historically, whether it's been cash payments from the Obama Administration or any activities that lead to putting money in the coffers of Iran, there's a direct correlation to the pace of intensity of attacks when that money flows in there. Is it your opinion that buying Iranian oil and lessening sanction on Iran would lead to an increase in IRGC activity? I think any – I think the Iranian economy as a whole is penetrated thoroughly by the IRGC. So it's hard to – it's hard to see where money flows inside the Iranian economy and how much of it is used for legitimate reasons and how much of it is used for illegitimate reasons. Roger that. Thank you, General. I appreciate my colleague yielding this time. I could just follow up on that point. So we – I forget exactly when, but we left the JCPOA in 2017, 2018, something like that. So we went right back in maximum sanctions. Would you say that Iranian malign activity since we left the JCPOA has increased? I would, General. And that's the point. As you've said, the point of the JCPOA is to stop them from getting a nuclear weapon. It would appear that Iran's ability to do malign things in the region doesn't seem to be tied to the JCPOA because they are still incredibly active even though we've been out of it for three years, four years now. So just want to let members chew on that one. Ms. Escobar is recognized for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I just want to piggyback a little bit on your – the comment that you just made about the JCPOA. When you look at the evolution of Iran's malign activity, as you mentioned, we really do have to look at the withdrawal from the JCPOA instead of looking at just a narrow window. It's just like with our conversations on Afghanistan. We need to take a step back and look at the broader historical movement, but anyhow. So thank you for making that point. And I just wanted to put an exclamation point on it. Thank you so much, Chairman, for this hearing and for making sure that we have the opportunity to speak to our panelists. And to our panelists, just want to express my gratitude to all of you for your service to our nation and for being here today to share your wisdom. And I look forward to the conversations in closed session as well. I have the honor and privilege of representing El Paso, Texas, which is home to Fort Bliss, America's second largest military installation and largest joint mobilization force generation installation in the Army. Obviously, the regions of the world that you all are postured in have long been plagued by violence and stability and war in some cases that has been furthered by us. But as we look to the future and be especially beyond our withdrawal from Afghanistan, ahead of the challenges that we need to confront not just today, but going forward, challenges posed by Iran, China, Russia, and the terrorist groups that they empower in the CENTCOM and AFRICOM areas of operation. We've got to be strategic with our engagement and our posture in this ongoing battle, especially that battle between democracy and authoritarianism. General McKenzie, I was just in Israel and I had the opportunity to see for myself the warmer relations that exist between Israel and Arab states. It really is a source of great hope. And it's clear that the relationship has created some stability in the region. And I'm pleased that that CENTCOM under your leadership has embraced this new reality. But we know that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a source of tremendous friction. And it's that that threat is always just over the horizon. The fighting last May is a prime example of how the conflict in that region can very quickly escalate and become violence. Everyone there and here we are all concerned that the cycles of violence will only continue. But from an American national security perspective, do you believe that such rounds of violence have adversely impacted America's defense posture? And if so, is there a national security impetus for the United States to take an active role in improving the reality on the ground in order to help create the conditions needed to achieve a two-state solution? And if so, how? Ma'am, the entry of Israel into the AOR was a significant historical event. And so what it's done is it is sort of the operational expression of what began with the Abraham Accords and other normalization activities that go forward. And so the relationship that Israel is developing with its Arab neighbors is going to be profoundly significant in the years ahead. Something that is an irritant to those good relationships is, of course, the struggle with the Palestinians. And that's an irritant to the Arabs and to many of them. And I think it's a significant factor. Anything we could do to reduce that as an irritant to those relationships would contribute to not only Israeli security, not only security across the region, but ultimately our own security. Thank you so much. And I have less than a minute left. But generally speaking, to what extent does U.S. security assistance and coordination allow our regional partners to better coordinate with each other and remove some of the regional security burdens that would otherwise fall more directly on American shoulders? So we have seen over the past year, year and a half the opportunity for nations to share U.S. resources that one nation purchased, another nation had need of. There are processes that we go through to allow that third, what we call a third party transfer. And we have seen that work successfully. The specifics I'd rather put into the closed session, but I'm prepared to talk about that. But yes, it is something we have found valuable. I would simply tell you we also struggle sometimes with the United States bureaucracy when we attempt to do these moves. Sometimes we're our own most significant source of friction when nations want to share things like that. Thank you so much, General McKenzie. I'm out of time. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you. The chair recognizes Mr. Carl from Alabama. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I appreciate it. I apologize for popping in and out. But as you will know, it's one of those days. Thank you to all of our speakers. I know it's time consuming for you to come here and take time away. But I appreciate you coming here and, ooh-rah, General. I raised a marine myself, so I'm very proud of that. General Townsend, you mentioned your statement. The growing Chinese influence in AFCAN and their possible plans to establish a naval base on the western side of the continent, allowing the Chinese to do this project. How can we expand our naval capabilities to ensure that the Chinese do not have a dominant posture in this area? Congressman, I would defer to the Department and the Navy on how we might expand our naval capabilities there. The naval capabilities that I have today are sufficient to do what AFRICOM must do. They are not essential to precluding what China does on the Atlantic coast of Africa. They will be essential if China is successful in gaining a base there. In my view, we would have to invest more naval presence there and activity to further protect America from a Chinese naval base on the Atlantic coast. Thank you, sir. And that's what I was after. I appreciate that. And I give my time back. The only question I have, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Carl. The Chair recognizes Mr. Scott from Georgia for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ma'am, gentlemen, I appreciate your service. I slipped out for a few minutes to meet with a man named David Beasley, who is the head of the World Food Program. And I want to read to you one of his statements. We get 50 percent of our grains out of the Ukraine-Russia area. It's going to have a dramatic impact on food cost, shipping cost, oil and fuel. This is a catastrophe on top of a catastrophe. He pointed out that Sri Lanka right now, and I'll just read the headline from Bloomberg, shockwaves from war in Ukraine threaten to swamp Sri Lanka. In 2021, more than half of the grain for the UN World Food Program came from Ukraine. It's a tremendous exporter of wheat, corn, sunflower oil. Russia and Ukraine combined account for 30 percent of the global wheat exports. As this invasion continues, it's more and more unlikely that the Ukrainian farmers will be able to plant their crops, or fertilize their crops, or harvest their crops, or export any of this food supply into the world. Developing countries in the Middle East and North Africa will feel the impact of this. And my question is, have you considered the instability and unrest that will soon be taking place around the world in your respective AORs? How can we help alleviate the suffering and the instability that we believe will come from this, and what funding resources do you need to take on this challenge? Thanks, Congressman. So your point is exactly right about food instability, especially impacting Africa. In fact, just in the last day or so, the World Health Organization has declared a humanitarian disaster in Ethiopia as being the greatest one on the planet. So food security or insecurity is a critical part of that on the African continent. I would say, as I said in my opening remarks, I think, and in my written statement, I think it's imperative that we continue to fund USAID because they invest in a robust way in the African continent. It's probably one of the best investments America makes there, and I think there's going to be, because of the point you just made, there's going to be more of that required. Sir, I would note two countries in particular in my AOR will be threatened. One is Egypt, the other is Jordan. Both depend significantly on imports from Ukraine, and they will face a growing food insufficiency as we go forward. I think the long-term solution is you'd like to find a regional way to actually supplant exporting food into the region, but that's a long-term solution. We are looking aggressively now for short-term solutions that will bring wheat and other food stuffs in for the short term. And obviously, you're going to have to find other sources, other global sources rather than Ukraine and Russia, and that's going to be hard to do with a third of the market coming from those two areas. This is a very pressing concern, and I appreciate you calling it out. Ms. Baker. Congressman, I couldn't agree more with what General McKenzie and Townsend have said. I would add to General McKenzie's list, perhaps Yemen as being a country that will face an impact here. What we're seeing now are the second and third order consequences of Russia's unprovoked and illegal invasion of Ukraine. As General Townsend said, USAID has the lead on this issue. We are strongly in support of USAID's efforts and will continue to work with them in an interagency fashion. I think what's happening around the world right now is because of the shortages and the anticipated shortages is that people who were receiving some are now receiving none. And a lot of people have had the assistance they were getting through the World Food Program cut in half. I think as many as 13 million people in Yemen actually receive some type of assistance through the World Food Program. I can't emphasize to this committee and to the world enough the devastation of what Vladimir Putin has done in the disruption around the world. And I think that the pain and the suffering that that individual has caused is only now beginning to be felt. And I think the world is going to be hurting for several years because of what he's done. And I just hope that we're paying attention to the potential civil unrest and instability that comes from the lack of global food supply because of what Vladimir Putin's done. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield. Thank you. Ms. Jacobs has recognized for five minutes. Well, thank you so much and thank you to our witnesses. It's great to see you all again. I first wanted to ask you, General Townsend, a recent reporting brought to light U.S. support to the Rapid Intervention Battalion in Cameroon under the 127 ECHO program. The Rapid Intervention Battalion has been repeatedly implicated in human rights abuses. So why was U.S. support to the Rapid Intervention Battalion not blocked on human rights grounds? What steps is AFRICOM taking to ensure that any partner forces supported under Section 127 ECHO have not committed gross violations of human rights? And wouldn't one way to prevent this in the future be to subject 127 ECHO to the same kinds of Leahy vetting standards we use for nearly every other security assistance program? So there was a Amnesty International, I think, report in 2017 that brought this to light. That caused the Department of AFRICOM to look closely at our support, our engagement with the Rapid Intervention Battalion in Cameroon. In 2019, our relationship was ended with that element. In fact, we've drawn down pretty much in 2019 and by early 2020 we ended all of our engagement with Cameroon. We are starting to re-engage there on a very selected basis with a few programs, but not with the Rapid Intervention Battalion. And we do go through extensive vetting with all of our programs, training programs on the continent to include the 127 ECHO program. Okay, thank you. Ms. Baker, nice to see you. Recent years have seen U.S. trained officers in Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea, Mauritania, and the Gambia overthrow national governments and military coups. Many of these countries had issues with gross human rights violations in the past, particularly Burkina Faso and Mali, and lacked robust security sector governance and democratic progress that made this kind of challenge frankly predictable. On February 4th, I along with Chairman Meeks and a letter to President Biden, Blinken, and Secretary Austin on our strategy in the Sahel and requested that the administration evaluate its security sector assistance and other efforts over the last 15 years to assess their efficacy and areas for improvement. And I look forward to this briefing and hope we can work together on this going forward. But how have these developments impacted DoD's thinking on which Sahelian and West African militaries we provide security assistance to? Thank you, Congressman, and thank you for the question. I should note just up front that we do have security assistance restrictions as a result, as you said, of the recent coups in both Burkina Faso, Mali, and also Guinea. So for starters, that is in place. As you know, we work closely with the State Department to ensure that we are vetting all security assistance partners in compliance with U.S. law, with local screening, biometrics as it's required. There's always more that we can do in this space. And so we'll look forward to getting you a briefing on what we're working on. Okay, thank you. Frankly, I think some of these challenges with the folks we trained was a bit predictable. So I want to make sure we're going beyond just the immediate vetting to make sure we're contributing to the broader democratic governance of our partner countries. Absolutely. Absolutely. And I just say, as General Tencent said, one of our focuses in the Africa may or in particular is that institutional capacity building that will help us. We hope to move beyond these kinds of incidents. Great. And General McKenzie, the DOD has significantly undercounted civilian casualties compared to numbers provided by credible independent organizations, despite the fact that these organizations undertake interviews, site visits, and other measures that DOD does not generally have. Recently, New York Times reporting found that DOD prematurely dismissed many civilian casualty reports at the assessment phase without doing basic due diligence, like basic internet searches or searching in Arabic instead of only in English. And earlier this week, I along with my colleagues sent a letter to DOD urging it to take steps on preventing and mitigating civilian casualties moving forward. As CENTCOM implements changes in procedures for tracking, assessing, and investigating civilian harm, will CENTCOM revisit the many past cases that appear to have been prematurely dismissed? And going forward, what changes do you believe need to be made? So, again, by saying nobody wearing the uniform of the United States is interested in killing an innocent person. We work very hard to minimize that. But the battlefield is a deadly and dangerous place and we have made mistakes. And yes, we have killed innocent people. And we have tried very hard to mitigate that. As you know, the Secretary has undertaken a large, comprehensive, exhaustive, and high-energy project to further shape the efforts of the department. And we are full participants in that going forward. I would tell you, in the interim, based on various reports that have been issued, we have undertaken 10 discrete actions within U.S. Central Command that will support the larger effort, but we're not waiting on that to actually happen. And I will be happy to send those 10 things over so that you can examine them. But the Secretary has seized with us his energy is palpable, visible, and we're moving forward on it. Thank you. We appreciate the Secretary's efforts and we'll look forward to that briefing. Mr. Chairman, you'll be back. As time has expired, Mr. Franklin is recognized for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I had a couple more questions that I didn't quite get to before. And again, back to General McKenzie. As Chairman Smith had noted, Iranian terror activity has been significant whether there's a JCPOA in place or not. I understand that whether it's Hezbollah and Lebanon, Hamas and Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, the Codes Forces in Iraq. The common denominator is the neighborhood bully. And I hate to use that expression because it's obviously a lot more significant than that. But they're the bad guys. They're the bad actor in the neighborhood. They're the ones that want to destabilize everything. I hate to ask this question. I wouldn't normally ask this question because I understand your place to provide advice and counsel to the administration. But based on the way things unfold in Afghanistan and knowing now the questions we were asking and we're getting answers to before things are coming out, that there was a lot of advice provided by the Pentagon that was not heated by the administration. So before we get this treaty that the administration seems really been on getting back into into place, I think it's really essential that the details are discussed. Has the White House engaged you for your regional security expertise and the negotiation process of the Surandil? So Mike, the person I engage with is the Secretary of Defense and Policy. And we have a constant dialogue with the Secretary on all issues within the CENTCOM AOR. And I understand the Secretary's got a lot on his plate. But where he's getting his primary source of the boots on the ground feedback is going to be from you. I think he gets it from me. I think he gets it from policy. You know, a variety of sources. Okay. So my concern is what we're seeing on the press out there in the press of what may be coming out delisting IRGC, buying Iranian oil. Those from what you've told us here would not be in alignment with your advice on what's best from a military perspective. And I don't expect you to comment on that. But it's either that or they're not asking for your advice at all. And I find either of those to be very concerning. And we're going to watch very closely on how this treaty develops. But I thank you all. And I'm assuming that this will be the last time the two of you testify before us. But I want to thank you as a former military member for your decades of service. It's a lot of hard work and not very gratifying a lot of times, but your nation appreciates your work. And I yield back. Thank you very much. I just want to clarify in the last answer. John McKenzie said he is speaking to Secretary Austin, and that that's the chain of command here. The White House is not ignoring the Department of Defense's opinion on this. They are speaking with Secretary Austin, who is speaking to his people. And that's where the information goes back. And I will, the larger point is it's, you know, we have civilian control of the military for a reason. You know, the president is ultimately the one who has to make decisions. If we want to just do whatever the military told us, we wouldn't have civilian control of the military. You take the advice, you process it, and you make the best decision you can. And that's what they're trying to do. And Mr. Chairman, if I could, I do just want to clarify that both the chairman and the secretary have had opportunities to provide that advice to the president and to offer their recommendations. Okay. Thank you. I appreciate that clarification. Mr. Gallagher is recognized for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Baker, your testimony references the emerging concept of integrated deterrence multiple times. You say the department will continue to lean forward in strengthening multilateral security cooperation in order to strengthen integrated deterrence and to address threats, particularly those emanating from Iran. Later on you say the integrated deterrence means creating advantages for ourselves, our partners and our allies while creating dilemmas for our competitors. I'd like to talk a little bit about the dilemmas you envision under integrated deterrence. I know this is a Sencom hearing, but I wanted to ask quickly about Russia, your portfolio is obviously very vast. Would it be a fair characterization of the administration's policy that sanctions are designed to deny the Russian government resources they would otherwise have available in order to punish their behavior? Congressman, I would say that the sanctions that the U.S. led and that are not only U.S. owned but multinational at this point are designed to impose consequences on Russia for its illegal invasion of Ukraine. So that's a yes to punish their behavior. And by punishing Russian behavior, we are creating dilemmas, as you put it, or at least costs for the Russians, right, costs in position. Yes, Congressman. So under the same logic, if another actor, say China, provided the Russian government with funding to help them evade sanctions, that would in a sense create an advantage for Russia. In the sense that it would mitigate some of the costs we impose via sanctions, right? Congressman, yes, and we are having a conversation with China about our concerns in that regard. I think this is a very important point, not only because as we evaluate whether China increases its support to Russia, but to be clear, if our adversaries have access to more resources, that creates an advantage for them. And if our adversaries have more resources and are more capable, that creates dilemmas for ourselves and for our allies. Yes, and I bring this all up because I think it's a self-evident point that's getting lost in the shuffle that policies that give our enemies more resources give them an advantage and by the administration's own admission undermine its vision such as it exists of integrated deterrence. And I bring this up because as my colleague Ms. Lauria brought up before, we may be days away, according to some reports, from signing a deal with Iran, which will in any scenario provide a massive windfall to the tune of billions of dollars to the world's primary state sponsor of terrorism. And everything else aside, indications are that this deal will provide unprecedented sanctions relief well outside the scope of its nuclear program to the Iranian government, including from terrorism-related sanctions. And I don't think you have to be an opponent of the original JCPOA to understand that this makes no sense. Let's just take the administration's own words at face value. Their strategy calls for creating advantages for our allies and dilemmas for our adversaries. But this deal, by providing massive resources to our primary adversary in the Middle East, will create dilemmas for us and provide advantages to our foremost enemy. And just a quick question on that point to your knowledge, is the central bank of Iran still financing terrorism? Congressman, that's a question I'd have to defer to Treasury and others. Okay. I've asked this question in other committees. I've asked it to the CIA director. It's a matter of public record. The Treasury Department doesn't take arcane or exquisite intelligence to know the answer, but we'll take it back. I guess, since you responded to an earlier question from my colleague, Mr. Kuro, I believe, that the NDS is now being delayed because of the crisis in Ukraine. Is that correct? Congressman, I wouldn't say it's being delayed because of the crisis in Ukraine. It is in final coordination, and we hope to have it to you soon. Okay. Are you rethinking any of the assumptions underlying the NDS as a result of Ukraine, or do you see it as a validation of integrated deterrence? Congressman, we believe that the strategy, in fact, took into consideration some of the behavior that we've now seen Russia exhibit and that it's resilient to what we're seeing from the Russians at this time. So do you believe integrated deterrence succeeded in the case of Russia-Ukraine? I think what you're seeing right now is integrated deterrence in action, bringing together the sanctions, the allies and the partners. I have seven seconds, but what you're effectively saying is your entire theory of deterrence requires on a country getting invaded and pillaged in order to galvanize the West into action. And I just don't want to put our eggs in that basket. I'm out of time. Thank you. I appreciate it. I will point out we have sanctioned many nations long before they invaded another country. Certainly, we had sanctions against Russia. We have sanctions against Iran now, and I think the central dilemma that this administration is trying to wrestle with is we also don't want Iran to get a nuclear weapon. And that's kind of the tradeoff on that that we're trying to go through. And I have not seen any other reasonable plan other than negotiating with Iran for how we stop them from getting a nuclear weapon. Now, the details that negotiation obviously matter. What are we giving up? What are we getting? But we can't act like for no apparent reason whatsoever. We're just giving Iran sanctions relief so they can engage in more mischief. No, there's a very, very, very big reason why we're engaged in these negotiations, and as we don't want them to have a nuclear weapon. Now, you debate whether or not we're going to get there on that, but I think that's worth at least throwing into that conversation and discussion. We have no further requests for time. I want to thank you all for your testimony. We'll see you in a couple hours on the classified side. And with that, we are adjourned.