 All right. Hello. This is Stefan Kinsella. It's August 18th, 2023. And my friend Jeff Barr is here who's a lawyer in Las Vegas. We did an episode about a few weeks ago. This is going to be Kinsella on Liberty 418. I think we did 415 or 414. In the meantime, I did three other episodes on Larkin Rose as a new movie. I don't know if you heard about this or saw it, Jeff. But anyway, his movie, Jones Plantation. So you and I left off. We kind of meandered through what we agreed on. You conceded a few points, which was a intellectually honest of you. Well, I think you conceded a couple of points too, but which is awesome. I never conceded anything. Well, if you don't mind, I don't want to bury the lead. And so I'd like to just kind of summarize my position. That's all right. Yeah, but let me set the stage. So what we're going to talk about is we're going to we're going to we're going to finish up on where we left off, which was we left off at this point about agreements or title transfers related to future things. I think that's the crux of our sort of disagreement because it plays into loan contracts and debtors prison and theft and implicit theft and breach of contract and all these kinds of issues. So, all right, go ahead, Jeff. All right. So as you mentioned, we did have this long previous discussion on title transfer theory and the importance of legal title and possession and I do think that it was important to discuss that to get some foundation. My position is that a contract, of course, in the libertarian legal system is always a simultaneous exchange of title, exchange of legal title. An example that we have to hold up does it have to be an exchange or could be one way like gratuitous or don't talk about gratuitous and gifts in a minute but in order for a contract for lack of a better word. Because I don't know. And you'll see where I'm going with this we'll talk about gifts I think in a minute but at least I want to get the concept of contract and exchange that I know that you have some thoughts on, you know, exchanges and economic term not a legal term. Yep, yep, yep, yep. Well, I think that you have some, I think that you have some predilections against the common law here and consideration and that kind of thing but we'll we'll get there but. My position really is that a contract at least in a libertarian sense is always a simultaneous exchange of legal title and the example we've talked about is I give you I give three bucks for a cup of coffee. I give legal title to my three bucks to the barista and she gives me legal title to the coffee. But in that exchange or in that transaction. There's also a near simultaneous exchange of possession. And I say near simultaneous because no, it's really rare that you have an actual you know, I slide you my three bucks you slide me the cup of coffee right there's always some time element in the middle of this. So I take possession of the coffee and the barista takes possession of my $3. So there's both and there's an exchange of legal title and an exchange of possession. Now, if I take the cup of coffee without transferring title or possession to my $3 I've committed a crime. I've taken. Say that again. Yeah, if I take the cup of coffee without transferring legal title or possession to the $3. But they're different, which which which one, which one is the which one results in the failure or the or the implicit theft or whatever. No, I think I think they're not different. I think that I think that I think that it's the failure. If I if I if I fail to get legal title or if I fail to get possession. Okay, but how do you give legal title. Yeah, there's an implicit there's an implicit exchange there right but but what I mean is what I mean is you give legal title by a communication of your consent, correct. Yes, certainly. So you've already communicated that before you receive the. No doubt. I'm trying to show is that there's a little bit of a time element but there's a almost near simultaneous exchange. There could be in a simultaneous exchange that's just one type of contract. No doubt, but you would agree with me that this that there's this near simultaneous exchange of legal. Of course, of course, but by the way, but that that's that that mismatch between the timing between the transfer of title and the transfer of possession is understood by both parties. Yes, which which means that for example, you hand me the candy bar. And I hand you a $10 bill. And you've got to go back and make change there's a little time delay between when you give me back the money that now you owe me as part of this complicated arrangement. And, but we understand that so we would say that for like a couple of minutes, the owner of the store is in possession of my $7 and change. Right. But he, but I own it already because you haven't given up legal title to. Well, besides, well, the owner, I gave up legal title to $3 of my $7 and change you've never done so. So now he owes me $7, which means that he's got $7 in his register and I own that already but he's possessing it, but the fact that he's possessing it for 10 minutes or five minutes before he's able to make change is not trespass because that's understood by both parties so it's consented to. Correct. Correct. I think we agree on that point. All right, let's take the case of alone. This is a little more sticky but there's still the time element right in the case of alone Murray gives Hans title to $1,000 today and of course I'm using dollars just in a generic sense here. And in exchange, Hans gives Murray legal title to $1,100 with the condition that Hans delivered possession of the $1,100 one year from now and title. Well, no title exchanges right then and there. The legal exchange of title is simultaneous. It has to be exchange of possession wait, wait, wait, wait, wait. It has to be for it has to be for it for for a simultaneous exchange contract. Hold on. The change the exchange of title is simultaneous. It could be. Now it always is. You'll see in a minute, you'll see in a minute. What I want my point is is that the exchange of possession, however, is asynchronous, meaning it's different timing. Of course, it has to be for a future for a future for a future performance or a future title transferred or for a future possession transfers you might call it, it has to be asynchronous, but the title has to be today. The title exchange has to be today. It's near simultaneous. Why, why does it have to be because because how do you how do you decide what Hans, what Murray owns a year from now in other words, who's there could be multiple claimants on that $1,100. Who has the better claim on that $1,100 a year from the owner. Who's the owner. The person with a better claim. That's a very lovely circle you just circle I mean so the better claim is the person. Yeah, we just go back to the first principles like so we go to the Lockheed homesteading principle right and contract principle and so. And so, if you look at the rest of the world. Who are we using Hans and Murray in this example, Hans and Murray yeah. So, Hans is the debtor Murray's the one in the world except for Hans and Murray they all have an inferior claim to this to this reason to this 1100. So, wait, who do they have an inferior claim. Because they have no claim to it. Why, what if Hans, what if Hans turns around after the day after he makes the loan to Murray he makes the loan to Gito. I mean, you're, I think we need to establish the fundamentals first before we talk about this illustrates the fundamental just priority. Of course, the law week. People listening might not realize this and as you and I both know the law has a has a detailed series of rules that that determine priority in cases of a of a dispute between. Two or more other claimants right so so let's give a simple example just to set the stage didn't go to law school. I own a farm. Yep. Let's make it Hans and Hans owns a farm. He, he sells a, he sells the naked ownership what's the word in the common law he sells the, he sells it to Murray but retains a life estate. Okay, so he gives Murray title to it but but Hans retains the right to use it until he dies. Okay, which means that we've divided the title of this real estate up so that the, what in the civil law we call naked ownership I forgot what they call it in the common law, but ownership and fee, the absolute. No, but it's divided so it's not it's like the reversionary. Murray owns the fee. Yeah, Murray owns. So Murray owns the fee, but Hans has life estate correct, which is a real or property interest, which he that means he has the right to use it until he got the right to possession. Yes. He can't sell it because he doesn't own the fee but he can sell his life estate. But he can't sell the. The point is when he dies that burden on the fee simple or fee absolute whatever you call it, the total, a low deal ownership of the land that disappears and now Robert, who previously owned the fee ownership in the land, but he didn't have the right to use it during Hans his life. Right. We should have switched his example because Hans is old Hans is younger but whatever. So when Hans dies that his life estate evaporates and now the ownership interest of Rothbard is 100%. So he's the full owner of it, correct something like the owner and fee simple absolute yes as the common. So the question is, so let's say a year after Hans gave sold Murray the fee, the fee ownership. Yeah. He sells it to someone else too. Right. So that's what I like saying I give you this land. Right. So now when Hans dies Murray steps on to the land but then number two says no no no, I paid, I paid Hans a million dollars for this land. A year after he did it with you. So I'm the owner. So now we have a dispute over the land. So then the question is who owns it and so in a court we would say in a property right in a court applying property law, the court would say, um, well, we have to go back in time the owner the original owner was Hans. On day one, he gave part of his rights to Murray by contract so now Murray has a better claim against Hans because of track right and against the rest of the world because from the point of view of the rest of the world. That is not including Hans and Murray, right. They were not homesteaders of the land and they didn't get by contract. But then the second guy says well I have a contractual claim it's like yeah but you got a contractual claim from someone who didn't own what he purported to give you because he had already given it away. Right. I think you would agree with me on that. That's why number two would lose to Murray in a future dispute. So the law rules about priorities like this. Let's be very clear about this why because really what you're articulating you're making my point for me. But I'm not just reading with that part of your point. I think the prior owner has the better claim. How do you establish that he's the prior owner. He's got to have legal title. Yeah, you trace it back to where it came from. Right. And therefore if the title is not today, if the title transfer is not today, the near synchronous exchange of titles, then you can't establish priority. That's fine. I think that you keep mixing this together with this exchange idea which I think confuses the issue especially if we do it alone where it's $1100 and $1100 and like it looks like the same thing. It's better to do either isolated one way transfers to analyze it or to have different things transferred like I'm going to loan you five cows and then you owe me $1100 in a year. Like it's better to separate it so we don't conflate these things. But the point is I don't think I would necessarily disagree with you that the way we characterize the effectiveness of a current transfer of a title to a future thing is that we characterize it as being effective now. Yes. That's correct. I think that your current statement of intent and consent now, but it's about a future thing that you might own is effective now, but it's only about a future uncertain thing. That's the difference between us. Yes. And my point is that you would agree with me that at time zero when whatever economics are involved in the transfer. If you don't like the word exchange, whatever economics are involved. I don't like the word exchange is that I don't think that it's essential like this would apply. It should apply to a one way transfer to like. We'll get there. I'm not sure that that's the case but just so that we understand. No, to think about this, an exchange of a payment for a service, because there's only one title exchange, but that's an economic exchange. I'm not sure that that's the case, but I'm not sure that that's the case. But the simplest is five cows for $1,100 in the future, right? You're transferring title to the $1,100 today and possession in the future. Well, it depends on the terms of the contract. I mean, maybe the creditor doesn't want possession. Whatever. But the point is that somebody's got the right to exclude. It's not necessarily possession. It's just title. Oh, that's fine. That's fine. It doesn't have to be possession, but somebody's got the legal right today to exclude the rest of the world from that $1,100. They will have the right to exclude. No, they have it today. No, they don't. Yeah, they have to. Otherwise, how can you establish priority if they don't have the right to exclude today? How do you say that they have a better claim to the rest of the world? Because all action is in the present. You cannot act to exclude someone from something in the future. It makes no sense. No, no, no. Your position makes no sense. How do you establish priority then? I agree with you that we've already, the way I look at it is when I make this communication, it's in a sense irrevocable. It's irrevocable because property is alienable. Okay. Our bodies are different. So we can, I don't think we want to talk about voluntary slavery and all that kind of stuff. That's a whole different issue. If we talk about owned objects that come into our possession and ownership by an active homesteading or an active contractual exchange or contractual donation or gift, then the will of the owner makes sense. And so the fundamental dilemma or paradox or question for us is, it's not too hard to explain why the contemporary, sorry, contemporaneous present owner of a physical good is entitled to express his consent and get rid of it and sell it to someone else, right? Yes. I think you can understand that. The question is, does that owner have the ability to sell his future things by making a statement now? No, I think you do because, as you mentioned earlier, most contracts necessarily have a future element, if only because there's no such thing as simultaneity, really. Yeah, that's right. There's almost no near simultaneous, I slide to three bucks. I would say there really is no such thing as simultaneity. Just like in Austrian theory, we talk about money prices and we talk about future prices, which are just predicted and forecast by entrepreneurs, and we use present prices as an accessory of appraisement to forecast them. But if you want to be technical, there are no present prices. There are only future prices and past prices, which are historical. That's right. There are only immediate past prices, but there's no such thing as a present price. A present price is just the price on a being offered by a merchant, which is like a bargaining point. But it's not a price until someone pays it. And once they pay it, it's a past price. I mean, I'm not saying there's no such thing as a present because we act in the present, but there is no such thing as a past price. It's a present price. So I guess I would say that by the same token, there's no such thing if you're going to do a contract that is an exchange. And like I said, not every contract has to be an exchange. That's why I think that's important to make that point. But if sometimes people do exchange things, and that's an economic phenomenon, and sometimes they want to use the law to have a legal framework to back that up, right? So they want the legal side to match the economic side. Well, the legal side always has to match the economic side. Correct. Otherwise you've got to cry, right? But it depends upon the nature of the economic exchange. No doubt. If the economic exchange is one owned item, one currently owned item for another currently owned item, then it's a more or less simultaneous, excuse me, economic exchange, not completely, but more or less. And the law recognizes that and deals with it by separating possession from ownership and saying, okay, well, if you need a few minutes to transfer, then it's not trespass when you're holding, it's not conversion or trespass when you're holding on to it. Because that's contemplated by the nature of this arrangement, right? I think we agree on all this, right? Yeah, well, I would say that what you're identifying this time function is just a matter of degree and not a matter of quality. In other words, that the length of time is 10 seconds or 10 years doesn't change the legal nature of the transaction. Well, no, it changes it in one sense is that when we make this agreement, if it takes 10 minutes, at the moment we make the agreement, the things both exist and title already transfers. No, but the change doesn't exist. You presume that the change is going to exist, but the change doesn't exist. That's $7. No, no, no, no, it does exist. What if the store burns down in that 10 seconds? What if a thief comes in and steals that? No, no, no, let's be let's be precise then. At the moment of the exchange, let's assume that the owner has plenty of cash. He owns the sufficient amount of money to make change. Okay, so at the moment of the exchange, the buyer is now an owner of $7. Let's assume there's $7 and change that he's owed, right? He's the owner of $7 in the till that's sitting behind this cashier, correct? Right. So he's the owner. He's not the possessor yet because the guy hasn't had time to turn around and hand it to him, correct? So he's the owner of $7. Now if the store burns down, then the owner of the store loses a lot of stuff and I've also lost $7 because my $7 was unfortunately burned down and this store is a fire, correct? Sure. There's no dilemma here. Well, well, I'm going to suggest there is a dilemma. There's no theft. I'm going to disagree with that. There was an exchange. That $7 was always mine. Correct. And you didn't give me that $7. Who's risk is that? Well, that's a different issue. Now if we have an insurance contract and we have a whole different other contract. Let me do it this way because you're suggesting that intent matters and I'm going to suggest that intent doesn't matter. Not intent. It's consent. It's communication. It's what the contract is and what the terms are. Let's say I have $7 and I just hand it to you, Jeff, and you're holding it and I decide not to make the purchase and so you have to give it back to me. Right. But someone walks in and they shoot you with a flamethrower and they burn you and the $7 up. Uh-huh. And you stole the $7 from me. From the point of view of the victim, I don't think it matters. Well, the victim is the burned up cashier. Yeah. In other words, no, the cashier didn't steal the money from me, the flamethrower person. Of course. And if the store burns down, then. It's a negligent. It's a freak accident that harmed the property of the store owner and also me because I foolishly entrusted them to be a caretaker of my property for three minutes. And in that minute, in that three minutes, then my money got destroyed. Now, if I had a side contract saying, Hey, you have a navigation to repay me, whatever I lose, if you're not, if you're negligent in the storage facilities. Okay. But that's just a second contract. But again, you're, you're, you're, you're from the point of view of the victim. It doesn't matter whether you intended to defraud me of the $7 or whether it was an accident that you thought it's deceit. Where's the deceit? Okay. It's not it. Okay. From the point of view of the victim, it doesn't matter that you denied me possession of the $7 accidentally, or that you denied me possession of the of the $7 intentional. Either way, I am out the $7. Well, but if the store burns down, that is not, that's not being caused by the person who is safekeeping your money temporarily. So what, what does causation left. So you're saying that there's an intent element in the libertarian concept. Well, it's got it's more about cause than intent. It's like, I mean, let's assume you have your grandfather's watch in a safety deposit box in the bank down the street. Now you own that watch, but you don't have possession of it. Correct. It's called a bailment contract for those of us. Right. Or in the Roman laws called a regular deposit. Right. Irregular is fungible stuff that could be commingled irregular is like you own that particular thing and they're more expensive because you have to have your own box and all that. That's why for money for gold coins, we just let them mix it together. You haven't a pro rata claim. Anyway, but for yeah, so I own this watch in the bank down the street. Now the bank burns down and my watch store or the let's say the bank is robbed. I mean, whatever. Well, now there's a difference. Right. There's a difference there because the actor. The actor is the robber. Right. Now maybe the bank is on the hook. I don't know. Maybe depends on the contract. That's right. Depends on if we have an insurance contract effectively. But a typical bailment contract includes I'm giving this to you for safekeeping. I presume you are going to keep it safe if a robber comes in and robs me. Yeah, but that's a negligence. I mean, but the point is what's what is. Yeah. Yeah. So basically there are subsidiary or ancillary conditions to all to all contracts either explicit or implicit. And so one would be that yeah, I'm giving you for safekeeping. I'm paying you a fee. So that means you're supposed to do something else. And if you don't, and my watch gets stolen, then you owe me some money. So that that would just be another title transfer saying, okay, we were transferring to you future money that compensate you for the watch if we were negligent. But if, if you know if 20, 20, you know, 20, Saudi Arabian, 19 Saudi raking Saudi Arabian hijackers come into the bank with Uzis. And they just steal that one watch because they know the owner is, there's a libertarian who hates whatever. Then, I mean, is the bank negligent for being robbed. Again, you're mixing concepts here from the point of view of the victim. It doesn't matter. The bank who was entrusted with the safe deposit box item, the watch has now lost stolen, whatever is now deprived me of my property. No, I just agree with you the way you're characterized you're saying that you're calling me a victim. But that implies that there's someone who victimized me. What you're saying is the banks, it's, you're assuming that the contract is this absolute liability thing, which is, it's, it's, it's not necessarily the case I mean the contracts can be all over the map. Lots of contracts have, look, we're not liable for this. I mean, you go to a supermarket, you park and there's a sign saying we're not liable if someone bangs the shop in your car. The point is in all of this is just to get back to sort of first principles here and again my position, which is, if you deny some of going back to Hans and Murray for just a second. If Hans fails to pay Murray the $1,100 years, regardless of why, from the perspective of Murray, Hans is the primary of the possession of Murray's property. That is a crime or a tort or a delay. Yeah, that's my position. Now, why is it because you said the word Oh, which means you're still stuck in the in the conventional concept. I'm not. Hans transfer title on the conditionally transfer possession 11 year from now, Hans fails to deliver the possession. It's got nothing to do the condition so let's just focus on the one title transfer that you that you so what you're saying is. Wait, Hans borrowed the money. I'm far the money. So, Hans on day one transfers to Murray $1,100 in the future to Murray correct. Hans transfers $1,100 today transfers legal title today. Well, a future one to a future $1,100. He still he he he transfers possession. No, he doesn't. I already we already in the future. He transfers possession in the future. He doesn't necessarily transfer possession. He's agreed to transfer possession in the future. Sure he does. No, he hasn't. He hasn't necessarily. If Hans is a bank Rothbard might be perfectly happy with Hans holding on to the money for him. That's a little different contract. That's not a loan contract. That's a bailment contract. Yeah, but I never surrender title or possession of my walk. I agree that the typical loan contract would say that would say that I'm transferring $1,100. $1,100 future dollars to you now, which means that in one year when this this future $1,100 comes into existence. If it does, then Rothbard is the owner and now he can demand that Hans, if he's in possession of it, that he turn it over. Yeah, and this is where we just disagree. What do you disagree with what I just said there? I disagree that I disagree that there's these implicit condition that the document exists in the future. Or that I'm sorry that the Jeff, the future is all inherently the future doesn't exist yet. I don't know anything in the future doesn't exist yet. That's right, but I don't think that there's a implicit condition in every contract. Otherwise there would never be any tort or crime. Why? Because I just say it doesn't exist anymore. I don't have that $1,100. Well, I think you cannot steal something that doesn't exist. Right. So there is no such thing as crime or tort, which can't be right now a crime just a crime means that I violated your rights, which gives you the right to use force against me. There's no example of that. I misspoke. There's no, there's no theft that can occur. No. If someone commits theft that means they use your property without your consent and that that that's an act of trespass or aggression. Right. And that gives the victim of this act of theft some right to retaliate or get resolution from the from the aggressor. And how do I establish that there's been some interference, derogation. Because you we can establish by property principles that you own something and someone used it without your permission. That's right that I have legal title, which gives me the right to do something back to him. That's right. It might give me it might give me a right to a claim on some of his currently owned resources. But if you have any resources, I can't get those from him and his inability to repay me is not theft. Okay. The theft already happened. You're double counting. Okay, so so let's let's go with that for just a second. You would agree with me that because there was a chance chance transfer of legal title. I have some claim on the assets of the in the in the loan. Yeah, in the loan. I think that that's a subsidiary condition of most contracts either either implied or explicit but sure. So if, so if I loan you a thousand, if Murray loans Hans $1,000, then what he's getting in exchange is number one, a current, as you would say a current transfer of title to a future $1,100 and subsidiary transfers in case the $1,100 doesn't exist. So for example, it would say something like, so if you have liquid cash in a year. You have more than $1,100 and liquid cash $1,100 of that money becomes mine and now you have to turn it over when I demand it. And if you don't know you're guilty of trespass or conversion. If you have $1,100 and liquid money, then, then if you own a home, I can, I can claim that home, or other, or maybe some of your stocks or whatever. And if you if you're totally penniless, then in the future whenever you come into money then you owe me the $1,100 with interest, either either out of money or out of your current property. This, this, this, this, this web of conditional title transfers. But the lender has to realize that there, this is always a risk because the future is uncertain. And so there's a chance that he will never get his money back, which is why he has to be paid interest to lonely left the $1,000. He's taking a risk that will number one the future is less valuable than the present because of time preference. So, so the, the debtor may never be able to repay him, even with this network of conditional transfers. That's true. And if he's unable to pay it's not necessarily theft. It's just, I took a risk, I took a gamble and he didn't pay a game. The reason I brought up the civil idea and I'm sure there must be a common law analog of sale of a hope. Like, I need to, I need to plant my wheat field this year. And so I say, well, Jeff, I need some money to go buy seeds and to hire some workers. So why don't you give me 5000 bucks. And I will give you one third of whatever the crop yields in a year. Yeah, but that's not the same. That's not the same thing here. Well, but the thing is, I'm transferring to you now ownership to one third of my future crop. It's the exact same thing. And but that's a that's called a sale of a hope because it's a certain it's an uncertain thing. And the law to its credit recognizes that as an uncertain thing because they call it a hope. But my point is, if you think about it, all future title transfers are sales of a hope. So, let me let me get it this way, from the point of view of Murray, the guy who's been who's out $1,100. Does he care why he's out the $1,100. Does it matter. I don't know I think I think if you trip over a dog on accident or if you kick it on purpose the dog might know the difference. The dog is still kicked, regardless. Yeah, would you and so if someone accidentally bumps into you on the street or if they bump into your purpose because they're being a dick. Does it matter. Yeah, no, it doesn't matter from the point of view of the matter. Of course. Okay, wait, wait, wait, wait, from the point of view of the victim, it doesn't matter the victim suffers the same damages like the kick dog or the accidentally stumbled dog has the same broken ribs. Right. I have a seizure and my arm swings out and hits you in the face. It's the same amount but I'm not even, I'm not liable at all because it wasn't intentional. Why? You are sneaking in an element of intent here. No, you are saying it's not about intent it's about cause. It's like the question is, when you're damaged. What is the cause of that damage. If it's just a universe then okay it's not it's not fortunate for you but you can't blame me. I'm only blamable if I caused it. And yes intent plays has a role in that because cause is something that you, it's one of your actions and actions are always intentional. That's right. So you're sneaking in an intent element. This is, this is sober, this is sober Rothbardian analysis. I'm not being, I'm being above board about I'm not sneaking at it. There's nothing wrong with blaming me. What you're saying, what I'm asking you is you are saying that there must be an element of intent. Well, and that and that that I'm saying people are responsible for their actions. Okay. If I don't pay you regardless of the reason why I have not I've intentionally not turned over the possession of the 1100. No, I think it so this is so this is the thing. intentionally not turning over could could be for different reasons that I think the reason does matter so for example, if I if I'm in possession of the $1,100 like let's say I'm a millionaire and say you need to pay me. My $1,100 back. Yeah. It's actually not back because it's new. It's not the original 1000. So you need to pay me the $1,100 that you owe me or one precise way is you're in possession of $1,100 of my money. That's right. I have a title to that I have legal title to and now I own possession and you should turn it over. If you don't now you're stealing my stuff. Right. So if Hans refuses to turn it over. That is an act of theft. Right. That's an intentional that's there's some intention there right. It's not about intentional. Well, sure it's it's it's it's it's intentionally refusing to respect someone's property rights. Sure. That's right. That's right. But if Hans is bankrupt and penniless and Rothbard says, give me the $1,100 and Hans says I would love to but I don't have any. He's not refusing to turn it over he just can't. He can't turn it over currently, but that doesn't mean that Murray doesn't have a claim on that $1,100 in perpetuity. Right. I agree. I never disagree. I never deny. Does it matter why Hans is bankrupt. It depends upon the terms of the contract. So if Hans is bankrupt because his snowball stand his snow. I keep saying snowball I should say snow cone right. Yeah, if Hans is snow cone stand just doesn't work. Well, then that that was just a business risk that both Rothbard and Hans took. Like Rothbard knew that I mean all entrepreneurial investments are uncertain, just like the future is uncertain. So that was a risk within the scope of the original ambit of the loan agreement. So Rothbard is taking the risk that Hans won't Hans is venture won't succeed. And he won't have enough profits to repay Rothbard he's taking that risk. Now he has some recourse. The recourse is. He has a claim on future property Hans comes into with and with an interest or crewing. He might also have recourse if he does a security device like he says. I mean, but the simple contract is you're taking a risk that the future, the future amount owed will not be there. But no matter why that future amount is not there. However, I would think that most loan contracts would have implied or express conditions on the conduct of the debtor. But it depends on how much overhead draft for that. I will tell you now draft. You can do some like a thousands of contracts you cannot draft for every contingency. You can't draft for every contingency so that's why we put things in there like good faith and arbitration clauses and no doubt. But you could have something saying like, listen, I'm giving this money for the purpose of starting a snow cone stand. Sure. And every month you owe me a report. And if at any given month, certain thresholds are exceeded, then that gives me the right to demand that you pay me now. Whatever you have remaining of the principal that I loaned you and stop this endeavor. That's right. So, so, so let's say we have a contract like that so ha Murray own low loans Hans 1000 bucks. And in months in month six. Hans sends Murray the report, and it shows that the snow cone stand is losing money. And Hans has 500 bucks left. And Murray says, Okay, I'm going to exercise that clause of the contract and say, Okay, I'm stopping I'm halting the loan. I'm freezing in place the principal that I loaned you and now that 500 bucks is now mine again. That's right. I'm accelerating. And then upon spends that money, then now he's stealing, of course. Okay. But let's just money. You can craft all kinds of conditions. Yes, what happens when the loan documents are silent. Then you have to, then you have to, then you have to use supplement of provisions or, or, or custom customs, or, or gap billers, right default rules, or you have to go to a judge who tries to guess what their intent would have been. All kinds of ways the legal system has to figure it out, but the ultimate goal of this process is to supply and answer that these two parties failed to negotiate in explicit terms. So in a way that's their fault, because it was too expensive for them to do that. And they both. It is too expensive to account for every contingency and they went ahead with the transaction anyway. Then what they're saying is they're willing to take the risk that they have to resolve this uncertain area somehow, and they might lose because they didn't take the time to express it. If you do an arbitrator and the arbitrator awards Rothbard or Murray or Hans the money, or the win in this, in this, in this contest. No one can really complain. But of course what would happen is people would learn from that. And if this became a big problem then people would start adjusting and they would start adding a boilerplate thing in their contracts to that problem. That's right. But my point is that from the, from the victims perspective from the, from the creditors perspective. I don't think it's fair to call him a victim. Okay, from the creditors perspective. I think it's fair to call him a victim, but, but, but, but okay. By the way, to not to be not to be petty fogging, I wouldn't call them debtor and creditor because those are that that assumes there's obligations. That's the old theory of contract but we can, we can call them from the property holders perspective. The property holder is still out possession of $1,100. It doesn't exist. Okay, regardless of the reason why it doesn't exist. Now what you're saying is, there may be some mitigating factors. Right. No, it's not mitigating it's why it doesn't sure it is. Hans didn't do anything. See, I think what you're assuming so the reason I think you went with this, does it matter why, because yeah, there are cases where if Hans basically spent the money on something other than what he was right I guess and put it all on red. Yeah, that's something that's something wrong or blame worthy. Okay, so okay. Okay, but what you're assuming is that if if Hans is unable to pay that in itself is blame worthy. Yes, I think that should be the default rule. The reason is because the simple nature of such a loan is basically Rothbard is financing someone else's entrepreneurial venture. Now, in economic terms what that means is that Hans and Rothbard are both staking some of their property in an uncertain entrepreneurial venture. That's right. Economically. So that's everybody. Which is risky. But that's everybody. There's no, there's no everybody faces the future and everybody's an entrepreneur in that. Exactly. Exactly. So every time we do something where we take a risk based upon a future event, both sides that are co-op and both both hope to gain from it if it works out. And both are taking the risk that they will be out something if it doesn't work like the property hoped Rothbard might might now might not be able to be repaid. And that risk and if the if the entrepreneurial venture doesn't work out. It's not like if someone fails in a business that is not morally blame worthy. Could be. It could be. It's not necessarily could be. Well, only if they violated the terms of the contract. And again, you can't draft for that kind of all those content. You can't say oh Hans was lazier than I wanted him to be sure you could. It's too much. It's too hard to it's too hard to supervise that into their partnership disputes all the time that where they say one partner didn't pull his way. I just literally had one yesterday. No, I agree. You could do that but but it becomes more and more subjective and it becomes expensive to supervise and to define to enforce. And like you said, you can't put every contingency in a contract. Which is why the default rule should be that if you fail to pay, you have committed a crime or a tort. Okay, well, I think you can't put that in a contract because because body rights are an alien you can't. You can't make a false thing true by default condition and a contract or even by an explicit condition like you couldn't put in a contract. Like, let's make it all explicit. On day one, they do this, they do this loan agreement. They put in their clause 17 which says, if Hans is unable to pay $1,100 to Murray in one year, we hereby both agree that that will be theft. That that is just that's like saying we hereby agree that that the moon is made of gold. They can say that but it's not true. No, no, no, no, no, no, from a libertarian perspective it is always it is always a tort. Again, it's not a tort if you're not stealing anything you there has to be something existing to steal. Well, ultimately I think your problem is you think that you can steal something that doesn't exist. I say your problem my problem with what your argument is is you you seem to assume that it's possible to have a tort, which is basically theft of someone's property, even though the property doesn't exist. The position that position that you've taken assumes some sort of intent, and I don't think you can assume some sort of intent. Why, why it doesn't exist is important function in your determination. So I think that's why that's why you're sort of implicitly determined to find to basically attribute attribute fault to the to the pillar. And because you are your position, your position, inherently requires that determination. Well, I gain. Let's go just for a second let's try one more time I think I think I think we just don't agree on this. Go back to the do you agree that it's possible to have a sale of a hope. Yeah, I think that's possible. So I can sell what you're calling a hope yes. What it means is, I'm transferring title to you now to one third interest in whatever crops my wheat field produces. Now I might be doing that as a donation to you I might be doing it as a gift. I might be doing it out of gratitude I might be doing it because you gave me some funds to hire the to buy the seeds, whatever. But for whatever reason I'm transferring to you now. One thing, you know, a simple example is, you know, fund my boat I'm going to go out into the ocean today in the Gulf of Mexico and try to catch a bunch of fish. And in return I'm going to give you half of my haul. This is common this happens all the time. Sure, no doubt. Now, come back empty. Then you get half of zero. That's fine. That's just what you get. That's what you agree to. There's no victim here. Now, now if I actually caught some fish and then I hid them, and I'm lying to you, then that's a different issue. Well, I assume that, or if I went out on the ocean and I just smoked a joint all day and I didn't even try to catch fish. Right. Why is that different from the perspective of the guy that the victim or the property owner. Because because you could imagine that if they had negotiated that clause in the contract, they would say I'm giving you $1,000 now to fund your fishing expedition. But if you go out there and you don't actually make a make a legitimate effort to fish at the moment you start doing that, then at that moment in time, my $1,000 transfers back to me. You keep adding conditions right. Well, I'm conditions. Contracts. As you said, you can't account for every, every contingency. But what that means is that languages is always imperfect and incomplete and contracts. Every contract is ever existed, except maybe for the simplest most bear contemporaries like you know candy bar for an apple something like that. Except for those they always have maybe a near infinite number of conditions, which could never be specified in language. There has to be always be a dispute resolution mechanism, which fills in the gaps. No doubt. No doubt. And my I'm not adding conditions realities adding conditions because there's always conditions and it is my position that you start with the idea that if the property owner is out his property. That is a crime or a tort. Now there may be some mitigating circumstances. No property. He's not out his property because there is no property. So I have to go, but I want to finish this. This will clearly lead into a part three because you always, you always scurry and run with this. I've got to work. Excuse me. Yeah, I've got to, I've got to be a lawyer. But you know, I'm just doing this law thing till the band gets back together. So, Well, I'm sure that I'm sure that these discussions will help you in your law practice. So, so let me let me let me tie this and we can probably pick this up in a week or two. Why is my position important to my criticism of the limited liability of the corporation. Let me end there that way we can pick this up. Yeah, I'm curious. I was wondering where you're going with this. Yeah, so, so let's be clear what a corporation is right. It's an association of individuals to whom the law provides a privilege of limited liability. Okay. Thus, when as a general proposition and just as a general proposition when the person representing the entity the business entity commits a tort. The modern law limits the liability of the managers and owners of that entity. Thus, if the tort damages exceed the assets of the entity, the victim of that tort, there's the cost of that tort. Certainly, the law socializes the cost of the tort onto the victim of the tort. This is one of my criticisms of the corporate form, where there is a default rule of limited liability. This rule socializes the cost of the corporations torts onto the corporations victims. Again, this is the whole loan kind of concept right that it doesn't matter what. The reason why the tort victim is a victim, whether that's an active, you know, whether that was an active negligence or an intentional tort, the tort victim is still out. And when there's limited live is still out is still victimized when there's limited liability, that when there's government imposed limited liability, the tort victim can't go and recover from those who created the tort in the first place. What I think is this gets back to our previous disagreement on corporations. I don't agree with your definition of corporations from a libertarian perspective, even from a legal perspective, they're not an association of individuals in the law there. They have a corporate personality which is that they are an association of individuals that the law recognizes them as a person doesn't doesn't alter the reality that they are an association of still individuals. Right corporations are collected is a convenient collective now. It's like saying France invaded or invaded Germany. Well, corporation doesn't know it means no means the corporation has legal personality I would disagree with like I think and libertarian law there would not be a corporation as defined by the current law. There would not be a legal there's only individuals in libertarian law. So yes, in libertarian law there would only be associated individuals that have a contract among each other to own property and to arrange their affairs a certain kind of way. And I don't care about the contract between the owners and manage what I care about as the torts committed and furtherance of the entity. Well I think we need to have another talk. I think what we need to do is have a talk about corporation limited liability, because I think what you're doing is you sense that there are some. I will say you sense there's some problems with the argument but you sense that part of our disagreement could be resolved if you can, if you can make this point about future title transfers. That's right. That's exactly. And so you want to tie them together but I think if we're going to go there we need to talk first about corporates corporations limited liability, because that is an interesting topic. I don't think limited liability is a privilege granted by the government because I don't think owners would be liable for the torts of employees anyway. Yeah, and we can discuss this in more detail later but I am running out of time. Okay, well go back to your real job make some money so you can afford to take an hour off every now and then and to add to the corpus of liberal libertarian legal understanding in the world. All right well until part three right. Part three. Until I get back from Iceland. Please travel.