 Stoic Ethics here. According to the division of ethics that is spelled out by Diogenes Laertes on page 190 or so of the Inwood and Gerson textbook, and that divides into these eight topics. Impulse, the good and the bad. I feel like I'm on that game show where I'm giving you different topics. So this is how we should do it, to take the good and the bad for 100. Passions or emotions, virtue, the goal, primary value, actions, and encouragements and discouragements. And in theory, the entire philosophy can be summarized under those headings. Now, each of those headings, in fact, break down into further subdivisions. And of course, I'm not going to be able to go through all of those subdivisions, but for example, when discussing passions or emotions, there are four different kinds of those. Fear, distress, desire, and pleasure. Actually, those are the negative ones that you should get rid of. There are also some positive ones like joy, caution, wish, and so forth. But I'm going to be essentially setting that topic aside today because we are going to spend several days devoted to discussing Stoic theory of emotion in connection with reading Seneca's Consolations and his work on anger. Similarly, the topic of virtues breaks down into four topics, wisdom, justice, courage, and self-control. Each of those topics then has further subdivisions, further manifestations of those kinds of virtues, and then corresponding to each of those kinds of virtues is a kind of vice. And each of the kinds of vice breaks down into several different kinds and so forth. But today, we want to just get a general idea about the moral system. And as I said, with Epicureanism, Epicurean physics, and ethics, I think is harder to understand or is easier than Stoicism to understand, that's what Cicero says. This one philosophy is so easy, it's practically too obvious and doesn't even really count as a philosophy. This other one is so complicated and counter-intuitive that it barely counts as a philosophy because you can't figure out what it really amounts to. For us, it seems more bizarre, perhaps, because it's further from ethical ideas that are taught in contemporary ethics and contemporary politics. But whether it's really that much further or just differently presented, we'll have to discuss. OK, so the starting point is, what is the impulse? What do we naturally move toward? If you remember, there was an argument in the Epicureans that the starting point of their ethics should be an analysis of what we naturally tend towards or what we naturally move towards. And in the Epicurean view, that's pleasure, infants, animals, and so forth. We can describe all of their behavior and what they pursue according to pleasure. The Stoics say that's not actually correct. The primary impulse is actually for survival. Every animal aims at its own preservation and health and survival and so forth. All animals are congenial to themselves. They aren't alienated from themselves or their bodily parts. They want to preserve their bodily integrity. And this is obvious from the fact that they repel things that are interest to them and they avoid those things, whereas they pursue things that are congenial to them and they tend to go after such things. So this is sort of a stoical version of the cradle argument. Like the Epicureans, they too appeal to animal and infant psychology to support their view that all living things seek self-preservation. All living things love themselves, are aware of themselves initially and mostly of their bodies, but then in the case of humans also of their minds and of knowledge and so on. All animals, you may have noticed, can move their limbs in fitting ways and ways that are appropriate to them. You can notice this in your own pets and so forth. And this is so even if they're not conscious of those states, just as infants are not conscious of their states but naturally seem able to move their limbs and so forth in appropriate ways. So there's a natural way that we think that infants develop and so forth and if they do not develop according to that natural course then there may be something wrong in which case we need medical intervention and so forth. Well, all of that is premised on the idea that there's a natural way that they develop or that they should develop. And the stoics claim that nature would not create an animal that doesn't possess what it needs in order to survive and preserve itself. Now they contradict the Epicurean idea then that what animals and infants are pursuing is pleasure. Pleasure, they claim, is just a kind of byproduct that supervenes or accompanies a living being when it is joined with that which is congenial to it. And the stoics point out that children and animals will undergo pain in order to do things the right and proper way. So for example, it might be more pleasurable for the infant just to lay there and not ever attempt to walk but we notice that infants attempt to walk and even though they stumble and they're frustrated by it and they fall over and it might be painful or distressing and they might cry and so forth. Nevertheless, they keep getting up and trying to do it. They keep trying to walk in accordance with their nature as bipedal erect animals. They struggle to walk and remain upright. They struggle to begin to speak. They struggle to begin to reason and so forth and they're willing to take pains for all these things. All of this contradicts the view that they're just seeking pleasure. Now, certain beings, humans, acquire reason at a certain point and there is a dispute within the school as I mentioned before about when that is. Is it age seven or is it age 14? Maybe we should say it's much later like something like 21 instead. We can have a debate about that but there's some point at which the primary impulse that is what is natural for us becomes reason and seeking to live in accordance with the rational, reasonable way of being. Nature leads all humans to reason because it's the virtue of human nature and human animals thus begin with the primary impulse for survival and self-awareness but they acquire rationality as they age and then they try to live in accordance with that. Okay, so that's the idea behind the starting point of this ethical system, the impulse. Anybody comments or anything that seems straightforward? Yeah. So I guess is there a basis for ethics based around self-preservation and I guess self-interest? Well, it's based around the idea of living in accordance with nature and they say that our nature is, we're trying to preserve our nature but what our nature really is, our nature as human beings is rational and so it's really based around a rational cognitive account. It's not mere survival like any form of survival. Humans could survive, you could go on living in a way that wasn't rational but you can't live well unless you're living in accordance with reason and in accordance with nature. So it's not mere survival, it's just that the initial impulse that we have is for survival. The first thing that occurs to us is trying to preserve our life and preserve our limbs and things like that and then once we grow into a certain level of maturity we realize well what we really need to preserve is our mind, our reason and so what becomes more worrisome to us than even losing hands and feet and so forth is the idea that we would start to lose our memory, lose our minds, become insane or suffer dementia or extreme memory loss. We feel like that would, once we begin to identify with reason then we think that would be an even greater loss than losing the ability to control our bodies like our limbs and so forth. And that's a realization and an identification of what our nature is actually like. So that doesn't seem that controversial except that it directly contradicts the starting point of the Epicurean system but let's move on to get into the sort of proto-morality that's what motivates us but now what is morality really about? What is their account of good and bad? Well the first thing I wanna remind you of is the common sense, a resilient view according to which there's a whole range of goods that include goods of the soul, goods of the body, external goods and so forth. Now the Stoics restrict our use of the term good by distinguishing between things that are merely valuable and things that are actually good. So good things are things that always are beneficial and furthermore that are in accordance with the nature of a rational being. In fact those are practically definitions of the good, those two different well criteria that I give for them. The contrary of this is the bad. Bad is that from which something detrimental always comes and which is out of accordance with the nature of a rational being. So that'll give you a bare definition of good and bad but now consider the wider issue of what is valuable. What's valuable includes number one, what is good? That is what is in accordance with rational nature and which always produces beneficial things but also two, that which brings about that which is in accordance with nature or can help produce it. And we could distinguish these two kinds of value by talking about on the one hand intrinsic value, that's what the good had. Okay, any questions about that? Yeah. So would you say that we have that natural impulse to live in accordance with nature because it's worth seeking for its own sake? Do we do because it's worth, do we have that naturally because it's? Because it's. It's more that it has that value because it's natural. Living in accordance with nature is the governing concept here. Okay, and things are valuable which are in accordance with nature. That's why being in accordance with our rational nature is one of the definition of what's good. Yes, Luca. So it seems like we were using nature to maybe a little ambiguous cases. One, you can say nature with the rational being just with what humans are. And what is just in accordance with nature in the sense of just being in that order? Like, is it both? No, okay, that's a good point and it's a point that Cicero presses in book four so I can put off resolving it until then. But here's how the initial issue of that works. It is living in accordance with nature but each thing has a nature, okay? And so dogs live in accordance with dog nature and cats in accordance with cat nature and humans in accordance with human nature. So to live in accordance with the wider generic idea of nature is for a human being to live in accordance with human nature. So the Stoics wouldn't accept that there's a division here between general nature and specific nature that depends on what the being under consideration actually is. And there is no question as to who the humans are and who the non-humans are, who the dogs are and who the cats are. All of this can be scientifically figured out in accordance with their physics. Go ahead. So are humans the only creatures that live, that can live not in accordance with their human nature? Are there dogs that don't live in accordance with dog nature too? It seems that only humans can fail to live in accordance with nature. And it's because they have reason? Correct. And it's because they have reason and reason's a really complicated thing that can fail and not everybody follows the natural course of development with their reason for various reasons that gets interrupted. For example, if you live in a bad political situation that makes you have to pay exorbitant amounts for your education, you might not become well enough educated, in which case you don't develop your rationality fully, you don't become a virtuous person and so forth. And so conventional things, human things, intrude and interrupt the natural process of reason and that's why we need a philosophy that entrains us whatever those circumstances are that we can continue to develop in accordance with our rational nature. So I was gonna ask last time if there wasn't time, but I guess that might answer it. So I was gonna say, everyone's heard the stories of humans who grow up with wolves or whatever and so the reason why they're not living in accordance with nature is because they're not living in accordance with human nature, they would. Right, that's right, and so they can't be happy, they can't be successful on the stoic terms. Living like a wolf, living like a dog is not living in accordance with their own nature and neither could a wolf or a dog, even if you could put human clothes on and so forth, would it be happy and successful by living out of accordance with its own nature and trying to be like something else? Wouldn't it make more sense for the slogan then to be living in accordance with one's own nature or in with human nature instead? Well, it is, it's explained about it. And virtually that's what they say or if you ask them what is the slogan living in accordance with nature? I mean, in a way we can say, everybody talks about things being natural. The Epicureans say that they're living in accordance with nature, but what do you mean by nature? It's very similar to the platitude, we all wanna be happy. Well, that's true, but what does happiness mean? We all wanna live in accordance, we all wanna live naturally, right? That's why when you go into the grocery store there's little stickers and things that say, natural, 100% natural. Well, why would I care about that? Well, because I think nature is something good and non-natural things or something bad. By the way, I saw one the other day in the grocery store, a sticker that said, real. And I was like, this is even beyond this. Natural is like they're reassuring my ontological doubts. This really is cheese. You know? And so I suppose we want things that are real as well, but we definitely want things that are natural. Now, everything I've been saying so far is quite uncontroversial, I think. I mean, distinction between mere instrumental goods and intrinsic goods and so forth. I mean, perhaps I'll just give one more attempt to illustrate it because it's rather important. Virtues, these kind of things, wisdom, justice, courage, self-control are intrinsically valuable and should be chosen for their own sake because they always produce benefits and they are in accordance with our rational nature. But things like books and money might be valuable for the sake of getting wisdom or something, but they are only instrumentally valuable. Similarly, pleasure might be valuable in forming a friendship with someone, but it would be perverse to pursue justice or friendship or wisdom for the sake of owning more books or having more money or getting more pleasure. Rather, we should orient our lives so that the right things are put in the service so that all those kind of things are put in the service of the ends and not vice versa. This is one way we become confused. We pursue wisdom merely for the sake, which is an end for the sake of something that's merely instrumentally valuable. Now, here's one of the most controversial claims is that there's a class of things that they call actually indifference, okay? So what is moral, i.e. virtues, are the only things that are good, but as Cicero points out in section 25 of book three, all other things are indifferent and indistinguishable from one another, except virtue and vice. But there can be a ranking among all these other things, these things that they call indifference. Okay, so there's actually two classes of things that we're indifferent to. One of them are things that just make absolutely no difference to us. Like, there is a fact of the matter whether you have an even or odd number of hairs on your head right now, but it just doesn't make any difference. Or is, notice whether your smallest pinky finger is extended right now, or is slightly bent. Okay, so those things don't, we're totally indifferent to them and we don't act on them, they don't matter at all. There's another class of things that are sort of like that, but we actually do tend to prefer one over another. Things like life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, reputation, having a good family, living in a good country. These things don't totally fail to motivate us like whether we have an even or odd number of hairs on our head, but they aren't goods because they don't always produce good things and they aren't always used in accordance with our rational nature. And for example, if used by somebody acting out of accordance with nature, they can actually be destructive. So well, wealth might be valuable in helping me get an education and thus becoming wise if I'm using the money to buy something destructive like heroin or finance international terrorism or something like that, then wealth is a bad thing. And it would be better for that individual agent under consideration that would otherwise be able to buy those destructive things. It would be better for them not to have that wealth. And the same argument can be run for every other one of these things, health, pleasure, and so forth. When they are in the service of an instrumentally valuable for some virtue, then they are worthwhile. Otherwise not. And so our main position with respect to them is indifference. If I can use them, great. If not, then not. But what really matters, what's really good, is what's moral. And these things, like the amount of wealth or power or reputation that we have, do not directly benefit or directly harm us. And that's why we call them indifference. Benefiting is an intrinsic property of good things. So wisdom never harms us. Wisdom only benefits us and helps us, okay? Whereas, again, wealth and power sometimes help us. Beauty sometimes help us, sometimes harm us. It depends on how they're used. So for wisdom, it's like the more you know, the more you don't know. So it's like a... A paradox kind of idea. Well, what you just said is a paradox. And the Stoics use paradoxes, but they don't use that paradox. So I'm not sure what you're getting at. So it's like, wisdom, how do you define wisdom? If you know more things, then you will know that the more you don't know. Well, basically you define wisdom as the ability to select things in accordance with nature. So it's like, if you get more wise, you know there's more things to select and then you have to figure out... Well, what do you mean you know there's more things to select? No, it's not that you know there are more things to select. It's like, it's that you know what to select. Did you get more options when you get wiser? No, you have the exact same number of options. It's just you know the right ones as opposed to knowing the wrong ones. The difference between foolish people and wise people is not the number of things that they're presented with and the options that they're presented with. It's which options they take or don't take that distinguishes wisdom. And that's a good thing, right? Yeah. Okay, good. Yeah, because we don't want overly complicated things. We want things to be exactly as simple or as complicated as they need to be. And so that's our concept of wisdom. And we'll get into more detail about what each of these definitions is, the definitions of each of these virtues, but to make a long story short, they are all forms of knowledge. They are actually all forms of wisdom. And thus they have an intellectualist account of virtues and all of the vices, all of the opposites of these, ignorance, injustice, cowardice, being out of control and in temperate and so forth are forms of ignorance. So the people that have all of those vices do so because they're not thinking about things, right? And they're not rationally, they're not rational enough. And so they're not acting in accordance with nature. They're acting out of accordance with their own nature. And this is how they've developed these vicious character traits because of their ignorance. And there is a solution for their ignorance and their problems and that is more education, more learning, more pursuit of philosophy to get clearer on these things. Yes, Jamal. So last time about how the Stokes seem to believe that philosophers are superior to standard humans. And we're talking a moment ago about our natural inclination as to reason or be rational and then that can be taught to us through some sort of education or it can be not taught to us. So do they also believe that anyone can be a philosopher and any individual person can be wise? Yes. Yes. They have a completely universalist thing about this because that is everyone who's a human. Okay, you have to be a human but as long as you're a human person, then you can't. And so, and furthermore, you can even if you're in really bad circumstances that are outside of your control, so long as you can figure out so long as your reason can keep developing. Now, there's an issue there because you might think, well, what if I'm in a situation where I can never get exposed to stoicism and that's a problem and that's why we need to promote stoicism and we need to live like stoics and so forth and we all, and everybody needs to be taking Hellenistic philosophy, not just a mere 40 virtuous souls here but everyone in the entire world needs to be learning this stuff and that's why we're promoting it and why we have these exhortations to it. But so long as you can get exposed to those ideas and learn those things and learn logic and physics and so forth, then you can't. Did these things be devised without someone teaching you these stove principles or like reaching your goal? Yes, in theory these can be rediscovered. In fact, and so that's what happened with the initial founders of the school is they basically just followed out, reasoned out what nature's really like and figured it all and figured it all out. So in that way, and furthermore, it happens every time there's another cosmic cycle. It gets redone in cosmic history all the time. And so, yes, and it also gets translated into different cultures. So it's translated into the Roman culture and extremely influential among Romans. It wasn't just this crazy nerdy Greek thing, it turned out to be really influential on Romans. And then if you read Richard Syravji's book comparing it to comparing stoicism to the philosophy of Gandhi, Gandhi himself didn't study stoicism but he seems to have invented a lot of ideas and arrived at a lot of ideas on his own that seemed to be identical with doctrines of stoicism. And then of course, there are all the modern day stoics going around four people in this class. The most number who wrote on the reports in the same book wrote on the book called How to Be Astoic. And this is a modern, updated, how to live in our modern secular world and be a stoic. So it's a universal philosophy that can be translated, updated and adapted for anything. And it doesn't actually even need to diffuse from its Greek sources. It just takes discovering what our natures really like. Yeah. I just wanted to know that if someone were to pursue a specific sort of type of wisdom and were to suffer along that pursue, would it be considered a wrong sort of point of wisdom? Well, suffering in a way, taking pains and it's distrustful because getting up in the morning and coming to classes and so forth takes, no, no, that's just, you're actually pursuing, by doing that, you're pursuing your own, something in accordance with nature and your own nature. Because your nature is really not to stay in bed and just eat sugared cereal and not do anything. Your nature is really to learn about things and understand things and be constantly trying to improve yourself and so forth. And so struggling in order to do that, that's exactly what Stoics do. That even comes out in the modern notion of what a Stoic is, somebody so committed to what they're doing that they're willing to undergo great suffering and so forth in order to make it happen. So this is a point on which Epicureans are quite different. Because Epicureans say, hey, any philosophy that makes you suffer that much, as much as these Stoics make you do, that can't really be the right answer to the question of how to become happy. They're off on some trip doing something completely different. They have all these crazy notions about what virtue is and nothing's good or bad except virtue. That's all crazy, you know. So from an Epicurean standpoint, it would be criteria whether you suffer or not. And they would say, well, you can't even live virtuously if you're constantly suffering. And by the way, you can't suffer if you're constantly living virtuously. And so that's a criterion. And so that's one of their big arguments against Stoicism, where, as the Stoics say, suffering, pain and distress, these pain, of course, we should undergo. It's exactly like going to the dentist or undergoing surgery or learning how to walk, for that matter, learning how to walk upright. It's exactly the kind of thing we should be willing to undergo and we should be indifferent to it. Sometimes pain is good. The slogan, no pain, no gain exactly encapsulates this, that sometimes pain is a really good thing and you should choose pain in order to get something that's actually good, like some kind of virtuous state of your body. That's a kind of really simplistic model of it, but that's exactly how they reason about it. Furthermore, pain in the sense of distress is actually an irrational emotion that can be eliminated. And so you don't actually, you can learn to live with pain, like a pain in your foot or something like that, as long as you can get rid of irrational emotions like distress. And distress is really a cognitive thing. It's a belief that there is some bad thing that's present to you, but that's a confusion because it's not actually bad, okay? So for example, if you have an extreme pain in your foot and you think there's something really bad happening to me because I have this, that's false and that's wrong. Now, somebody explained to me why I say that's false and that's wrong for me to have the cognition, for me to have the judgment that because I have a pain in my foot, I have something bad. What are you experiencing? Well, I'm just saying that, I mean, first of all, you don't even know if there's anything wrong with your foot. It could just, I mean, if pain were to exist because it's like only our brain creating pain doesn't mean that there's actually something there. Well, actually with pleasure and pain, I think there really is one of those cases where sort of if you feel it's there, it's gonna actually be there. I mean, that's a really bad case to say, oh, I mean, I guess I might be dreaming that the whole external world exists or I might be under a delusion that something else happens. But if I, pain is pretty much something if you think it's happening, it's happening. So that's not actually right. But the question is, why would a stoic say that it is a false and irrational judgment to say that I have something bad because I have got this pain in my foot? Yeah, sound. Well, if the pain was actually somehow leading to something good or better, then that, it wouldn't be a bad thing that's happening, it would actually be a good thing. I mean, it's like the dentist's example, the foot's kind of harder because who knows what's happening in the foot. It could be bad, it could be that you have a wound in your foot that needs attention. But if you're the dentist and it hurts, you're gonna be distressed, you're gonna think this pain is a bad thing. But if the outcome is health, then it actually, the pain is a good thing because it's leading to that. Okay, let me take that apart and put it in a slightly more stoic way because you ended up conflating pain and distress. So the reason why it's irrational and wrong for me to say that I have pain in my foot and therefore I have something bad is that pain is not something bad. Something that's bad always produces bad outcomes. Now, as you pointed out, pain could produce a good outcome. For example, pain at the dentist, but also pain in my foot. So if it's painful for me, a little bit painful for me to walk, but walking enables me to get rescued, then pain in my foot is a very good thing to have or allows me to save my comrades on the battlefield even though it causes pain in my foot because I was injured there or something, right? Okay, so therefore pain is not bad. Pain is an indifferent that we would prefer not to have, but it's not itself good or bad. Distress is an emotion, an irrational emotion cause when I have the mistaken cognition that because I have got pain, I've got something bad. Instead I should think I've got pain and I'd rather not have that, but it's not bad. I'm not doing anything morally wrong, okay? If I think I just cheated my friend while playing out of a bet or I cheated on my girlfriend or something, now we're talking about something that could be actually unjust and so it's bad. Now, worrying that I'm doing something unjust does not cause irrational distress. It's actually something you should, that's the kind of thing you should be worried about, okay? Now, so each one, we give an analysis of each one of these along the same lines. So fear is an irrational belief that about something that isn't actually present. Like I'm worried that I'll be in pain. I'm worried that I won't become rich, something like that. Since being in pain and becoming rich are not good things, but merely indifferent things, my belief that I might not actually acquire them at some point gives rise to an irrational contraction of fear about them, okay? And desire is a belief that something that isn't present to me, that there's some good that isn't present to me, that isn't actually something good, okay? So sexual pleasure, for example, if I think, well, this is really lame, I'm not getting laid, so that's a really bad thing. And so I've got a desire about it and it's influencing the decisions I make. That's all an irrational thing that should be eliminated by me realizing that'd be nice if it happened, but it's not bad that it's not happening. Because again, it's not an immoral vice that is vice. And so then pleasure, they actually consider it to be an irrational thing. And that's when I've got some good present to me and I think it's good. I got something that I think is good, like pleasure. Like enjoyment and I think it's a good thing. So if I think that this drink that I'm having and my ability to have this really expensive whiskey and everything and that I'm enjoying this and I have a sort of elation about it, that's irrational. It's not actually a good thing. Not that whiskey's a bad thing, it might be good, it might be bad, right? And it might be good sometimes and bad at other times. Might be good to have a whiskey at the beginning of the night, but after you've already had seven or eight of them, it's probably a bad thing, for example, okay? So, but what we gotta do is not be confused about what things are good and bad. And when we are confused about them, then we give rise to these irrational emotions. When we're not confused about them, when we understand what's good, then we actually act in accordance with these virtues like wisdom, justice, courage, and self-control. Another way to think about passions or emotions is that there are things that happen to us. There are things that we suffer and that push us around. So fears make us do things. Being in distress makes us do something and affects us emotionally. And what we wanna do is eliminate as much as possible other things pushing us around and making us do things so that instead of passions and things being acted on us, we're actually able to act and our actions are effective and so we can act as just, wise, courageous, self-controlled people and not get pushed around by irrational contractions of our mind that come from a confusion about what our nature is and how we live in accordance with it. Now, let me put a shirt. Oh, what a good desire for virtues. Okay, there are opposite states of several of these. Okay, so there's joy, caution, and wish. So caution is actually a good feeling that corresponds to fear. And corresponding to pleasure is joy and corresponding to desire is wish. So when I have a true belief that something bad might happen, like I might do something unjust or I might lose my self-control and my temperance and actually indulge in that chocolate cake or something, then the appropriate feeling to have is caution about that so that I don't get pushed around by that and instead act out of my own volition in accordance with these virtues. And when I believe that something good is present to me and something actually good is present to me, then there's a sort of appropriate good feeling that comes with that, which we call joy. Now, just out of curiosity, what would be a good cognition along those lines? So what would be a case of somebody thinking that some good is present to them and it's actually is present to them? And anyone, just blurt it out. Give an example. So what you need to do is figure out what's good and I hope you can do that soon and then figure out what would be an example of a case of somebody actually having that and then so as a result having a reasonable feeling of joy, not an irrational elation or pleasure. You're making a new scientific discovery. Okay, that's a very specific example. And that would be a case of, for example, I've made a new discovery and I've realized and proved something to myself and so I realize that I've got wisdom. Wisdom actually is a good thing and so that explains why I feel joy in that case. Okay, but we could make up cases similar to all of these if I realize that I'm a courageous, that I've held my line in battle or whatever or I've not folded in reaction to these enemies that are attacking us and I think, okay, that was a really courageous thing that I managed to do and that's a good thing. Then I will have a kind of joy about that. I won't have an irrational pleasure or elation about it but I will have good, calm, rational, stoic joy about it. Well, pride is a more complicated issue. It's connected with, it's contrasted with shame and in their view, the only thing you could possibly be proud of is virtues and the only thing you could possibly be ashamed of are vices. Okay, but those are really about conventions about how we relate to other people and how we evaluate other people's character and so forth. They're not, but shame in a way is, having a sense of shame is in a way one of the positive emotions. So it's part of the caution I think. Somebody can correct me on that if I'm wrong but having a sense of shame is where you think I might do this really bad thing but I'll be cautious and won't do it because I have a sense of shame. So there's a way that a sense of shame is a good thing and if pride is connected with a consciousness of an actual presence of a good thing, i.e. a virtue that I really have, then pride will be a form of joy or something like that. Wasn't shame something you feel happy? You did something bad? Caught you something you feel before? You did something bad? What do you mean? Wasn't it like that? I mean, isn't that the case? Isn't the case that you feel shame? Yes, so that's why these categories get distinguished in terms of whether the thing is present yet or not on the one hand and then whether it is good or not. And that gives us a matrix of all of the all of the positive and negative emotions except there is no, there doesn't seem to be any good emotion or passion that corresponds to distress. Now in the minute we have left, let's just figure out why that is, why they do not recognize any emotion, positive emotion corresponding to that.