 I think that in spite of the efforts to maintain what we call the liberal order, international order, I think that the deep currents are going against it. And I could provide a rationale why this is going to happen. And it's inescapable. And I think what we should try to do is to undertake damage control. I think what is happening in Europe, but it's happening also in other parts of the global economy is that increasing worries are linked with job losses. And people are saying it's because of technology. It's not because of a global competition. But this is still questionable. The second, and I think it's the bigger worry, it's secured in many respects, including physical. I mean, the fear of people of what can happen tomorrow. And take the case of Europe. Not EU institutions are asked by citizens to come to the rescue. The pressure is on governments. And this is going to continue in years to come. And this is the case. And I even imagine a price slide with a trade-off between safety and openness. Both are public goods. During hard times, the people value more safety. And here, I think, lies the origin of the inward-looking syndrome, which we see in Europe, but also in other parts of the world. Closing borders. Governments being more intrusive in people's lives. So I can provide it. But I don't want to continue on this slide now. But let me react to some of the comments I heard here. I think that liquidity is never enough. When something hits the global system, then it fades away like water in the sand. It's the liquidity trap, which can operate very, very intensely. Let's not delude ourselves. Second, I'm asking myself, because Monsieur Le Dillon, he has talked about the ETFs. And I would extrapolate, and I would talk about capital markets. And I'm asking myself, when it came to banks, the land of last resort function was performed by central banks. Who's going to perform it? In capital markets, we do have a precedent with the long-term capital management. It was the Fed, which brought together the big guys on Wall Street and said, look, we have to do something. Because if nothing is done, the system might collapse. And in my view, this is going to happen again. Non-bank actors, which provide increasingly banking services, are also pretty dangerous. Now, and I would raise the big question, big questions, because I think one should put on the plate issues like, is the system more simple than it used to be? Because if it's too complex, hard to manage, this is more than a pain in the ass. This is a route to disaster. It's not more simple. We have financial innovation, which is continuing. Toxic products are put on the market, are used in theory, in spite of what it believes to be a more effective regulation and supervision system. And the irony is that there is pressure to deregulate. I find it ridiculous. It's happening not only in the United States. And I hope very much that Jamie Dimon and the other people, I mean, it's resisted. But it's happening in Europe. To allow banks to, I don't understand why the Vickers reform in the UK is not replicated in Europe. I don't understand why. So another big question is, how much right is in the balance sheets of banks? We don't know. Why in Europe governments and central banks are reluctant to undertake the bailing in procedure to apply? That's very dangerous. So it's like we have an ongoing crisis management. We're not coming to grips with overwhelming reality. And then there is another big, and a very big question. For whom does the system work? Because you could say, look, we reform the system, we'll make it to function better for the benefit of the entire society. If it doesn't work OK for the benefit of the entire society but in an even way, even that's acceptable. If we do not face another crisis not looming at the horizon, even that is acceptable. We should not hope for perfect evens. But if we're going to go from one episode to another episode of crisis, although you could argue, this is the way capitalism works. We have to accept it, too. But it depends on how the crisis hits and how many people are impacted, and so on. But if the system is perceived by people that it doesn't function for the benefit of most of the citizens and we see that it's not functioning for the benefit of most of the citizens then, what do we get? Enormous social strain in society. Income inequality but also the number of losers and pressure put on the political system. Extremist parties coming to power. I mean, this is the crux of the matter. It's not about the ETFs and the non-banking actors which provide banking services. The questions, I believe, should go much more profoundly down. And in my view, we don't have adequate answers. Some of the people who used to be at the very top like Mervyn King but there are other people, too. They even raise fundamental questions about not only the architecture, but the logic of banking, fractional reserves, and so on and so on. I mean, we don't want to address these issues. We are afraid of addressing these issues. And if we are afraid of addressing such issues, we'll continue along the same lines. And God forbid a new episode of crisis hitting us. What's going to happen? Nationalize the whole banking sector? It might happen. This might happen with a new episode of big crisis. So with all due respect, it's not only about the ETFs or where the crisis will come from. It's about what next? Can we intervene? What are the tools? And the anger and the fury of people? I think these are the questions which we do not address. I mean, it's properly currently. Now, in operational terms, does this mean that the die is cast and we're just along for the ride? Does it mean that central banks should be quickly withdrawing their current support for financial markets? I believe that the BIS underestimates the power and the effectiveness of macro potential tools. We did have capital controls years ago, decades ago. I believe that they were effective. I think we succumbed to an ideology that we should have completely free financial markets because that's the way to make the system function. Extraordinary, well, that was bullshit, bullshit. Because those who were pragmatic, that philosophy was espoused by the IMF. That was imposed on Asia. I mean, the Asian economists were collapsing. And Mr. Kamdesu was suggesting to people in 1997, 1998 to continue with opening the financial markets. This is what we should not be blindfolded. We should ask the right questions because otherwise, we're going to be overwhelmed by events. And I think the BIS, I think, is right that we should not continue to pour money into the system of liquidity. But I think the BIS underestimates the power of capital controls. I think we should re-think. I think we should re-energize the Bratton Woods arrangements logic. We need, because you mentioned, Mr. Buddha, you mentioned the need for the EU to work together with Americans, the Japanese, and the Chinese. The Bratton Woods arrangements were policy coordination in action, clearly, with a clear logic. But we don't want. You know what's the mantra? And I heard it the other day. There is no way to have policy coordination. There is no way. If you start with a working assumption that there is no way to have policy coordination, you're not going to get it. What shall we wait for? For asteroids to hit planet Earth or aliens to come and to force us to work together? I mean, this is the sheer.